Does intra-party democracy affect the geographic representativeness of political parties? A look at candidate selection methods in the Netherlands between 2002-2021

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Abstract

In this thesis we test the claim that intra-party democracy, measured as the inclusiveness of candidate selection, leads to less diverse candidate lists. Previously, this area of research has often conceptualised diversity in the form of women's representation. To test whether previous findings also apply to other forms of descriptive representation, this thesis considers the geographic representativeness of parties. To do this, the Netherlands has been chosen as an ideal case due to its electoral system, which works as a single nationwide district. Twelve parties and seven elections between 2002 and 2021 were analysed with a multilevel linear regression model. The results suggest that inclusive candidate selection methods do not have a relevant effect on the geographic representativeness of parties. One finding is that rural parties are generally more geographically representative than urban parties. However, it remains unclear whether differences between urban or rural parties can be explained by levels of intra-party democracy. For further research, it is suggested to include more data on rural parties.

Introduction

Should political parties be internally democratic to improve the quality of democracy and political representation? This question proves to be a contentious issue. Political parties largely act as gatekeepers for those who seek to stand for election. The candidates that appear on the ballot usually end up there without necessarily any prior involvement or consent from voters. In this respect, parties effectively control a key feature of the democratic process and, therefore, are largely responsible for how political representation is fulfilled. For this reason, it is important to study the nature of the process that is responsible for how parties select their candidates.

One of the key interests of research on intra-party democracy is to what extent more democratic candidate selection processes affect the types of candidates selected by parties (Poguntke & Scarrow, 2020). An intriguing dilemma has emerged from this research: more democracy within parties may have a negative impact on the representativeness or diversity of candidates (Rahat et al., 2008). Although results from empirical research are not universal or without qualification, they do provide some support for this theory (Gauja & Cross, 2015; Pruysers et al., 2017). A key feature of this research, however, is that diversity is conceptualised in terms of women's representation. Nonetheless, the researchers argue that their findings should apply to other forms of descriptive representation such as "minorities, young people, immigrants and residents of the geographical periphery" (Rahat & Shapira, 2017, p. 91).

This thesis will study descriptive representation in terms of the geographical representativeness of parties. In this light, the research question can be phrased as: how do more democratic candidate selection methods affect the geographic characteristics of party candidates? Geographic representation is perhaps not the most salient topic within the broader topic of descriptive representation, but that does not mean it is not relevant or salient to voters or parties. As Pedersen et al. (2007, p. 160) argue, "geography is… the primeval dimension of political representation." One of the key motivations for previous research to focus on women's

representation was not only related to its political salience: gender or sex is relatively straightforward to measure (Pruysers et al., 2017; Rahat et al., 2008). In that respect, geography is a particularly more complicated and multidimensional concept to measure (e.g., Wong, 2004). However, as is the case for gender, geographic background is often information that identifies candidates on voting ballots (i.e., place of residence) or is available in public records. As a result, there is reliable and accessible data which can be used to study the geographic representativeness of candidates selected by political parties.

There has been comparatively little research published on the relationship between intra-party democracy and geographic representation. There is a small collection of recent articles that look at the specific case of Belgium (Put, 2016, 2021; Put et al., 2017; Vandeleene, 2017) and which find some support for the claim that there is an inverse relationship between intra-party democracy and the quality of geographic representation. However, the Belgian political system is quite unique and complex. In addition, the Belgian electoral system incorporates some form of geographic representation. Hence, it remains important to study other cases. Hence, this thesis will use The Netherlands as its main case. The entire country works as a single district which makes it an ideal case (Andeweg, 2005). This means that there is no element of geographic representation enforced by the system: it is entirely up to political parties to what extent, if at all, they offer geographic representation to voters (Latner & McGann, 2005). Even so, we do observe geographic dynamics in voting patterns and parliamentary behaviour in the Netherlands (Nagtzaam, 2019; Nagtzaam & Louwerse, 2021). In addition, the geographic distribution of parliamentarians is fairly proportional, even if the central metropolitan areas are overrepresented (Latner & McGann, 2005). Therefore, parties should experience some incentives to take into consideration the geographic characteristics of their potential candidates.

In short, this thesis will test the claim that more democratic parties are less likely to have geographically representative candidates. To do this, the geographic representativeness of twelve Dutch parties will be studied over seven elections between 2002 and 2021.

Theory

In response to declining party membership and increasing electoral volatility over the past decades (Biezen et al., 2012; Mair & van Biezen, 2001), many political parties have taken the opportunity to experiment with intra-party democracy (LeDuc, 2001; Scarrow et al., 2002). Bille (2001) finds that, on average, the organisational structure of parties has become more democratic over time. The following section will discuss the possible consequences of party democratisation on candidate selection. In addition, the challenges of conceptualizing geographic representation will be considered.

Intra-party democracy and diversity of candidates

In *Democracy within Parties*, Hazan & Rahat (2010) theorize that there may exist a trade-off between the level of democracy in parties and their ability to select a balanced slate of candidates for elections. They identify four democratic values impacted by intra-party democracy: *participation*, *representation*, *competition*, and *responsiveness*. The central claim is that all four values cannot be maximized simultaneously because they are interconnected and, in certain configurations, inversely related (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 114). This thesis will focus on the proposed inverse relationship between two of these values, *participation* and *representation*. *Participation* is an inherent aspect of candidate selection: who is allowed to take part in the process? Is it just the party leadership or is candidate selection open to participation of all party members? The outcome invariably affects *representation*: what are the characteristics of the candidates who have been selected? Do the candidates reflect and represent the values of the party elite, the party members or, more broadly, that of the party

electorate? The theory that will be tested in this study claims that higher levels of *participation* can reduce the *representativeness* of candidates.

Before describing the underlying mechanisms, we should first discuss the key concept that helps us understand and systematically characterize the candidate selection methods of parties. This happens primarily by characterising candidate selection methods as an *inclusive* or *exclusive* process. We determine this by identifying and classifying the *selectorate(s)* of a party. A selectorate is the individual or group tasked with the selection and nomination of candidates. Hazan & Rahat (2010, p. 35) place selectorates along an inclusive-exclusive continuum as illustrated in **Figure 1**. A selectorate is exclusive when a single leader or small committee controls the process of candidate selection, whereas an inclusive selectorate will involve all members or even non-members in the process via internal referenda or party primaries (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 35). It is possible for parties to have a more complex candidate selection process that involves multiple selectorates (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 37). Amongst 184 parties in 35 democracies, Tuttnauer & Rahat (2022) found that 85% of the parties had at least two selectorates – and three on average – involved in candidate selection. Selectorates might be involved in various or all stages of the process, such as: recruiting and proposing candidates, screening and filtering applicants, and confirming or vetoing a shortlist of candidates.

Figure 1: Party Selectorates

Source: Hazan & Rahat (2010)

When speaking of the democratisation of candidate selection, we are describing a movement towards a more inclusive selectorate or, in other words, the widening of participation in the process (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 54). It is important to note here that

democratisation is often described alongside greater *decentralisation* of parties, not just the widening of participation. However, this concept will not be discussed in-depth in this thesis. The reason is that the cases in this study – political parties from the Netherlands between 2002 and 2021 – have a generally centralised process of candidate selection[3]. Therefore, we should not expect to observe much variation across this dimension and, as such, there is little utility in testing theories involving the decentralisation of candidate selection.

Why would an inclusive selectorate lead to a less balanced4 slate of candidates than in the case of an exclusive selectorate? In short, the argument is that inclusive selectorates are atomised and disorganised, whereas exclusive selectorates are more considerate of competing interests and the importance of having a balanced group of candidates (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, pp. 89, 101). When compiling a potential list of candidates, the exclusive selectorate tasked with this responsibility is more likely to consider the various characteristics of the candidates and whether they represent the norms and values the party wishes to convey to voters (Spies & Kaiser, 2014). These considerations might focus on substantive qualities of candidates, such as their expertise and experience, but exclusive selectorates may also take into consideration the descriptive characteristics of potential candidates, such as gender or geographic origin. A more inclusive selectorate, on the other hand, suffers from greater coordination and communication costs. In other words, an inclusive selectorate is more fragmented and inefficiently organised. As a result, the lack of effective deliberation and interaction amongst inclusive selectorates makes it more unlikely a balanced slate of candidates is selected.

Empirical research that has sought to test this theory has found some evidence to support Hazan & Rahat's claims but not without qualification (Rahat et al., 2008; Gauja &

[3] Many Dutch parties do have local and regional branches, but these do not appear to be delegated the responsibility of selecting candidates for general elections (although they may be tasked with finding candidates for municipal elections, for example).
[4] By 'less balanced' I mean a bias towards particular characteristics, such as: gender, income, education level, professional occupation, geographic origin, etc.

Cross, 2015; Pruysers et al., 2017). Key research on this topic has generally conceptualised descriptive representation in terms of women's representation. The finding is that, in general, the number of women, as well as the ranking or position of women on party lists, is negatively impacted by a more inclusive selectorate. However, Gauja & Cross (2015) find that this does not apply to all parties. In their case study of Australian parties, they show that a more exclusive selectorate was beneficial for women's representation in the Australian Labour Party but that this effect was not observed in the Liberal party. They theorized that this is due to the "will" of a party, or lack thereof, to improve women's representation (Gauja & Cross, 2015, p. 294). The other study by Pruysers et al. (2017, pp. 223–225), a cross-national inter-party analysis of women's descriptive representation, found that exclusive selectorates were a strong predictor of improved women's representation. However, once state legislation regarding gender quotas and party regulation were included, the effects of intra-party democracy on candidate selection were no longer of significance.

How can we translate these findings to theorize about the impact on geographic representation? For one, there is much less known about forms of descriptive representation other than that of women in the context of candidate selection. The attention women's representation has received, and the state regulation of parties and the introduction of quota's that have followed, appear to have reduced the relative impact of intra-party democracy (Pruysers et al., 2017, p. 225). These kinds of regulatory features and the political activism women's representation receives, are less common for other forms of descriptive representation. For this reason, it continues to be relevant to test the original hypothesis as formulated by Rahat and Hazan. Therefore, our *party democracy* hypothesis is formulated as follows:

> ***H1 (party democracy hypothesis):*** *a more inclusive candidate selection method will lead to a more unequal geographic distribution of candidates.*

Nonetheless, it would be unwise to ignore the insights gained from research on women's representation. In particular, the research by Gauja & Cross (2015) suggest we should account for the effects of what might invariably be described in terms of the 'will', 'culture', 'attitude', 'ideology', or 'orientation' of a party. They appear to argue for an interactive effect: "…where a party's leadership has a desire to increase female representation in its candidate pool, a more exclusive selection method offers a greater opportunity to do so" (Gauja & Cross, 2015, p. 295). They make their claim based on the observation that the Australian Liberal party was not able to improve women's representation despite a relatively exclusive selectorate, presumably because the party ideology emphasises individual merit, equal opportunity, and rejects institutional arrangements (such as quotas) to positively discriminate amongst potential candidates. Hence, a similar principle might be argued to apply to other forms of representation: as in, there needs to be a conviction within the party to be geographically representative. Therefore, we could formulate the *party attitude* hypothesis as follows:

> ***H2 (party attitude hypothesis)****:* a more exclusive candidate selection method in a party that values geographic representation, will lead to a more equal geographic distribution of candidates than a more inclusive candidate selection method in a party that does not value geographic representation.

Geographic representation

In the process of articulating our hypotheses, the concepts of party democratization and party attitudes have been discussed. However, crucially, geographic representation has not yet been conceptualised. This thesis assumes the principle that in a functioning and legitimate democracy, members of parliament and by extension political parties and their candidates, are expected to be a microcosm of society (Pitkin, 1967, p. 61). One way to conceptualise representation, is to think of it in terms of representing "ideas" or "presence" (Hazan & Rahat,

2010, p. 108). Representation of ideas is when representatives support the policies and preferences of their constituents. Representation of presence is when representatives reflect the descriptive characteristics of their constituents, such as religious adherence, ethnicity, or gender. The latter conceptualisation is what this thesis will seek to study: geographic representation in terms of the geographical identity of party candidates – where they were born, where they are from, or where they live.

The ideal of geographic representation historically motivates the structure of many majoritarian systems and early democracies, by dividing the country into numerous single- or multi-member districts (Pedersen et al., 2007). In practice, the goal is to have a parliament that reflects the geographic distribution of a country's citizens. However, party voters can often be geographically defined[5]. For example, a religious party might receive its support from religious voters concentrated in a particular region of a state. Similarly, working class voters might be concentrated in urban rather than rural areas. Another example could be cultural or ethnic groups in the geographic periphery of a state that vote for parties representing their particularistic, often nationalist, identities. This thesis suggests that, rather than responding to the geographic distribution of the general population (as is expected of parliament), the expectation is that parties respond to the geographic distribution of their voters. This treats parties equally and recognises that there is inter-party variation regarding the geography of party voters.

The Netherlands as a Case Study

We know that geographic representation is affected by the electoral system (Pedersen et al., 2007). Most democracies have multiple constituencies or electoral districts, sometimes even obligating aspiring candidates to reside in the constituency or district in which they are standing for election. This means that some form of geographic representation is enforced by electoral

[5] For examples in the Netherlands, see report by Josse de Voogd (2017)

systems and its institutions. The well-known examples are the single-member districts in the first-past-the-post systems of the United Kingdom and United States. However, more proportional systems of representation can also incorporate a geographic element: Denmark, for example, has a proportional representation (PR) system, yet is divided into ten electoral districts with candidates only able to stand for election in the districts in which they reside (Pedersen et al., 2007). These kinds of arrangements are common, even in most PR systems. Therefore, democracies should be considered with electoral systems that do not incorporate a geographic element. In this context, countries that have a single national constituency are ideal cases. There are four democracies in the world that have such an electoral system: The Netherlands, Israel, Slovakia, and Namibia. The Netherlands will form the central case of this thesis, primarily because it is the only one of the four countries that consistently scores as a full democracy across various reputable democracy indices[6,7].

The evolution of political parties in The Netherlands has been documented over many decades (Koole & Leijenaar, 1988; Koole, 1992; Voerman, 2014). Much of the literature focuses on developments since the 1960s, with many parties changing their candidate selection methods at various points in time. The time-periods that are of particular interest are the movements towards centralisation from the late 80s onwards, and the wave of democratisation after the 2002 general elections. Gerrit Voerman (2014, p. 49) provides a snapshot of the large variation in the inclusiveness of candidate selection methods amongst contemporary parties. He shows that after 2002 parties have made significant changes in their candidate selection methods. For this reason, this thesis will use 2002 as a starting point as it provides temporal variation and inter-party variation in candidate selection methods. An additional consideration

[6] The indices checked were V-Dem, Democracy Matrix, and the EIU. Slovakia, Israel and Namibia did not qualify as 'full democracies' on at least two of the indices.

[7] An additional reason for omitting Slovakia, Israel and Namibia is that various data is much harder to acquire (or not available in English). This relates to election data, candidate data (i.e., their place of residence), and party statutes or expert surveys on party organisation. Of the three kinds of data, each country falls short at least in one aspect.

is that data from prior to 2002 becomes increasingly difficult to access, likely due to a lack of digitization and computerization of election and candidate data. Therefore, this thesis will be studying the seven elections for the Dutch lower house of parliament between 2002 and 2021.

An interesting, possibly unique, feature of The Netherlands is the use of administrative electoral districts. The country is divided into 19 electoral districts[8] but, perhaps confusingly, these play no role regarding the allocation of seats in parliament. However, parties can submit a list with different candidates per district. This feature is a remnant of the electoral system in The Netherlands prior to the electoral reforms of 1918, when the Netherlands had a first-past-the-post single-member district system. The electoral districts allow parties to still have local candidates (Koole, 1992, p. 280). This is, in fact, what parties sometimes do: they submit lists with different candidates or change the order of candidates on the list. Although this may be done with the intention to appeal to local and regional voters, it is not always the case that these candidates have local ties or appeal to local sentiments (ibid.). In either case, these candidates will be referred to as 'local candidates' in this thesis, regardless of whether they actually are residents of the district(s) where they are on the ballot.

Methods and Data

This thesis will use multilevel linear regression models[9] with random intercepts for parties and elections to test the main hypotheses. The data includes measurements for 12 parties and 7 elections between 2002 and 2021. Therefore, each party has up to 7 entries, one for each election. Because not all parties took part in each election, we have a total of 65 observations (rather than 84). Measurements and calculations were derived from approximately 4484

[8] The 20th district is the island of Bonaire but is excluded from this study.
[9] Multilevel models are not required knowledge for 1-year MSc Political Science students at Leiden University. However, multilevel models are the recommended to deal with panel and non-independent data. An OLS regression model with fixed effects for parties and elections was initially used in the 1st version of this thesis.

candidates[10] standing for election. All political parties were included for which the necessary data was available. Election data and candidate lists were sourced from public information available on the Web from the *Kiesraad*[11] and the Dutch government[12].

Separate models will be used to examine the geographic representativeness of three subsets of party candidates, that is: all candidates standing for election; all candidates except local candidates; and only candidates in electable position on the candidate list. The second model will account for the fact that parties sometimes use regional candidate lists with local candidates instead of a single national list. The third model is motivated on the basis that parties have far more candidates on the list than the seats they can expect to win during an election, particularly small parties. Therefore, this model will consider the geographic representativeness of parties based on the candidates that have a realistic chance of becoming members of parliament.

It is important to note that the number of observations in the data is relatively small for multilevel modelling. Such few observations per group may be problematic. For standard linear regression models, Greene (1991) recommends at least 50 observations or more depending on the number of independent variables and the effect size. In an article by Maas & Hox (2005), a multilevel structure appears to follow the same rule-of-thumb, except now there should be at least 50 observations per group. The multilevel model is still feasible, but the models are unlikely to detect smaller effect sizes. Hence, we should be vigilant for Type II errors.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is the overall geographic representativeness of a party's list of candidates in an election. A custom measure was developed to express this in a single value,

[10] The figure of 4484 candidates is not a count of unique individuals but number of candidates on the list per election (which includes incumbents). There are likely between 3500 and 4000 unique individuals. Without social security numbers or another unique identifier, it is difficult to establish this with certainty. Some people might share the same name (e.g. P. van Dijk) and be counted once, whereas others might be counted twice because they changed party or their place of residence (e.g. T. Kuzu or G. Wilders).
[11] https://www.kiesraad.nl (Dutch Electoral Council)
[12] https://www.overheid.nl

which indicates how much the geographic distribution of a party's candidates deviates from its voters. The larger the difference in geographic distribution between candidates and voters, the more unequal the distribution and the less geographically representative (and vice-versa). This measure will be referred to as the *Van Doeselaar Index (VDI)* and measured according to the following formula:

$$VDI = \sum_{a=1}^{19} \left| P_{a,t} - V_{a,t-1} \right|$$

The index is a summation of the absolute differences between the share of party candidates (P) from electoral district α minus the share of the national vote (V) the party received in that electoral district in the previous election ($t-1$). The minimum value of the measure is 0, which would indicate that candidates and supporters are equally distributed. The maximum value is between 2 and 19, depending on whether parties use multiple regional candidate lists or a single national list. This might be problematic if there is a large deviation in scores between parties using regional candidate lists or a national list. This is one of the key reasons why a separate model will be run without local candidates, which ensures that candidate lists are compared equally. By removing local candidates from calculations, the VDI scores for all parties will range between 0 and 2.

Note that various choices have been made regarding the components of the VDI formula. These include the kind of variation measured (absolute), the geographic subunit (electoral districts), the geographic characteristics of the candidates (residence), and the addition of a time-lag. Firstly, the VDI is an aggregate measure that measures the absolute deviation from proportionality. It expresses an absolute value and does not measure over- or underrepresentation. This is motivated by the formulation of the hypotheses: the test concerns whether democratization of candidate selection in parties leads to a more unequal geographic

distribution of candidates, not whether democratization results in over- or underrepresentation of specific areas.

Secondly, the VDI aggregates measurements made at the level of electoral districts rather than provinces or municipalities. Because parties can submit separate candidate lists for each electoral district, this seems the most appropriate geographic unit to measure the dynamics of geographic representation in The Netherlands. In addition, the three largest Dutch cities – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague – are each their own district. Amsterdam is the capital while The Hague is the seat of government, hence it is useful that these cities are included as separate geographic units. In other country-cases, it will be preferable to use the first administrative subdivision of states, such as provinces.

Thirdly, the VDI measure uses the place of residence of candidates as the main indicator for evaluating representativeness. Place of birth could be an alternative indicator, but this data is more difficult to acquire. In addition, place of residence has been found to be a stronger predictor of parliamentary behaviour than place of birth (Nagtzaam & Louwerse, 2021).

Fourth, a has been time-lag included. This is based on the assumption that parties are responsive to the location of their voters and that their candidates likely reside in regions where there are also party voters. The most precise indication for the location of parties' voters are the results of the previous election. For now, the time-lag of one election is probably an adequate but not perfect solution. One possible issue is that, in response to regional electoral setbacks, parties may overcompensate with an increase in local candidate shares in the next election (Put et al., 2017).

Independent variables

Inclusiveness

The main independent variable, *Inclusiveness*, is a measure representing intra-party democracy. It will be measured using a method recently proposed by Tuttnauer & Rahat (2022). The index quantifies the specific component of intra-party democracy specifically of

interest for this thesis: the inclusiveness of candidate selection. The index is expressed as a continuous value between 0 and 1, with 0 being the maximum value for 'exclusive' and 1 the maximum value for 'inclusive'. Tuttnauer & Rahat's (2022) method has three key advantages: it specifically measures inclusiveness, it takes into account that more than one selectorate may be involved in candidate selection, and the method of calculation is explained in detail. Attempts to measure inclusivness in previous research failed to meet at least one of these conditions (Bille, 2001; Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 49; Lundell, 2004; Rahat & Shapira, 2017; Shomer, 2009, 2014; von dem Berge et al., 2013).

The data used for the calculations was gathered and coded by the author and based on information found in official party documents such as statutes and by-laws. These documents were either found on the official party websites or the digital archive of the DNPP[13]. Because the data was coded by one individual, there's no Krippendorf's alpha to be reported. The party ratings may vary slightly within a larger group of coders, as identifying selectorates and counting their roles can involve a degree of subjective interpretation.

Finally, no documents could be found detailing candidate selection in the PVV, one of the larger parties in parliament. The party was given the lowest score of 0 based on the assumption that the party leader, Geert Wilders, has complete control over candidate selection. However, this cannot be substantiated in the same way as has been done for the other parties. For that reason, the party is not included in the main analysis.

Urban-Rural Interests

Party attitudes will be measured using the urban-rural scale found in the Chapel Hill Expert surveys (CHES). Whereas with women's representation a general left-right scale or GAL/TAN scale might differentiate between conservative and progressive views on improving the position of socially disadvantaged groups (Pruysers et al., 2017, p. 218), it is less clear how

[13] *Documentatiecentrum nederlandse politieke partijen* (Translation: Document centre Dutch political parties). Website: https://www.dnpp.nl.

this would correlate to geographic representation. The urban-rural scale provided by CHES explicitly incorporates a geographic dimension and is therefore likely to be the most suitable measure. According to their coding book, the scale measures the position of parties on urban and rural interests. The urban-rural scale runs from 0 to 10, with a score of 0 for strongly supporting urban interests and a score of 10 for strongly supporting rural interests. The urban rural score used for each party will be based on the CHES publication closest to the relevant election year.

Candidates

The main control variable accounts for the size of a party's candidate list. Parties submit lists of varying size for elections and a longer list is more likely to have a more equal distribution of candidates than a smaller list. Therefore, this variable will control for the size of the lists that parties submit for elections. When it comes to determining how many candidates are in electable positions, polling data from six months before each election will be used. Polling data was sourced from the *Alle Peilingen*[14] website.

Results

Do more inclusive candidate selection methods, and the possible interplay with party attitudes, have an effect on the geographic representativeness of parties' candidate lists? The results presented in this section provide insufficient evidence that this is the case. This section will begin with an examination of the characteristics of the main independent and dependent variables. Following on from that, the results of the multilevel models will be discussed. Finally, to contextualise some of the results from the multilevel models, this section will conclude with a more descriptive analysis of the raw data.

[14] https://www.allepeilingen.com

Figure 2. Distribution of VDI measure



Descriptives

The distribution of the dependent variable, VDI, changes depending on which candidates are included in the calculation. In Figure 2a, after calculating the VDI based on all the candidates standing for election, we end up with a right-skewed distribution of scores. If local candidates are excluded or only candidates in electable positions are considered, a more normal distribution is observed, as can be seen in Figure 2b and 2c. The higher VDI scores in Figure 2a correlate strongly with the number of candidates standing for election (r = 0.73, p<0.001). With the highest score of 4.1, the CDA in 2021 represents an extreme outlier; at the same time, the party also had 367 candidates standing for election, which is more than twice the number of candidates than the second highest observation (170) and nearly six times the average ($\bar{x}$ = 66). The highest VDI scores in Figure 2a appear to be almost exclusively associated with disproportional number of local candidates on regional candidates lists, leading to overrepresentation rather than underrepresentation. Returning to the example of the CDA in 2021, if local candidates are excluded, the party now scores a 0.49 which is less than the mean in Figure 2b ($\bar{x}$ = 0.61). For the candidates in electable positions, the party scores a similar 0.53, which is also less than the mean ($\bar{x}$ = 1.02). Hence, the scores of individual parties may change significantly depending on the subset of candidates used to calculate the VDI measure. These changes will be larger for parties that use regional candidate lists.

Figure 3. Distribution of Inclusiveness scores



Figure 4. Changes over time in Inclusiveness, per party



Regarding the measure for inclusiveness, a sizeable number of parties have been given a score 0.5, as can be seen in **Figure 3**. Roughly an equal number of parties score more than 0.5, which indicates that there is some form of member participation in the parties regarding candidate selection. In this case, all the parties that score a 0.5 do not allow members to participate in candidate selection unless they are a member of the party executive, a relevant

selection committee, or acting as a party delegate. As a reference, the PVV is included in the histogram even though they do not feature in the main models.

What the histogram in Figure 3 does not show are changes over time in candidate selection per party. This can be observed in **Figure 4**. Some parties have left their candidate selection process unchanged between 2002 and 2021, such as the SGP or the PvdA, whereas other parties, such as D66 and GroenLinks (GL), can be observed to have implemented changes multiple times. In the case of D66, candidate selection has become less inclusive with the party executive gaining more influence, whereas GroenLinks has become more inclusive, with members given more power.

Given that the *party attitude* hypothesis depends on the interaction between intra-party democracy and party attitudes, it is useful to see how these two variables intersect. In **Figure 5**, a political compass shows the average position of political parties between 2002 and 2021 along the two dimensions of *Inclusiveness* and *Urban-Rural Attitudes*. Most parties sit in the upper-left quadrant, meaning that they are urban and inclusive. Most of the rural parties, on the other hand, are situated in the right quadrant, sitting on the horizontal line that separates predominantly exclusive and inclusive parties. There appears to be a dichotomy between predominantly inclusive and urban parties on the one hand, and less inclusive rural parties on the other. Between the urban parties there is some variation in inclusiveness. However, the rural parties are located quite closely to each other. It is important to add that the position of the parties is not stable over time and does change over time (although not very much along the urban-rural dimension). None of the parties are found in the lower half of the four quadrants for a simple reason: none of the parties have party leaders acting as a selectorate.

Figure 5. Plot of Urban-Rural Attitudes vs. Inclusiveness



Table 1. Intra-party democracy hypothesis

	All candidates	No local candidates	Electable candidates
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
(Constant)	-0.26 (0.39)	0.68 (0.15)***	1.34 (0.25)***
Inclusiveness	0.65 (0.62)	0.30 (0.23)	-0.05 (0.39)
Candidates	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.01 (0.00)***	-0.02 (0.00)***
AIC	*73.41*	*-50.51*	*1.85*
BIC	*86.45*	*-37.46*	*14.71*
Log Likelihood	*-30.7*	*31.25*	*5.08*
Num. obs.	*65*	*65*	*63*
Num. groups: Party	*12*	*12*	*12*
Num. groups: Election	*7*	*7*	*7*
Var: Party (Intercept)	*0.07*	*0.01*	*0.03*
Var: Election (Intercept)	*0.05*	*0*	*0*
Var: Residual	*0.08*	*0.01*	*0.03*

Note: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2. Party attitude hypothesis

	All candidates	No local candidates	Electable candidates
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
(Constant)	3.54 (1.05)***	1.55 (0.30)***	2.17 (0.64)***
Inclusiveness	-5.72 (1.67)***	-0.94 (0.51)	-1.10 (1.05)
Urban-Rural Attitudes	-0.96 (0.24)***	-0.19 (0.07)**	-0.17 (0.14)
Inclusiveness * Urban-Rural Attitudes	1.69 (0.41)***	0.28 (0.13)*	0.23 (0.25)
Candidates	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)***	-0.02 (0.00)***
AIC	*67.86*	*-49.73*	*9.45*
BIC	*85.26*	*-32.34*	*26.59*
Log Likelihood	*-25.93*	*32.87*	*3.28*
Num. obs.	*65*	*65*	*63*
Num. groups: Party	*12*	*12*	*12*
Num. groups: Election	*7*	*7*	*7*
Var: Party (Intercept)	*0.12*	*0*	*0.01*
Var: Election (Intercept)	*0.04*	*0*	*0*
Var: Residual	*0.06*	*0.01*	*0.03*

Note: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Interaction terms not centred.

Regression Models

The results of the multilevel linear regression models are presented in **Table 1** (intra-party democracy hypothesis) and **Table 2** (party attitude hypothesis). The first version of this thesis used an OLS linear regression model with fixed effects instead of a multilevel model[15]. However, using ANOVA tests, the multilevel models were generally found to be a better fit than the single level models. Lastly, the multilevel models were generally found to meet the assumptions for multilevel linear regression, the diagnostics can be found in Appendix D.

There is insufficient evidence to support the *intra-party democracy* hypothesis in any of the three models in Table 1. Although the effect of more inclusive candidate selection is in line with the predictions, the coefficients of *Inclusiveness* are not statistically significant. Between the models, there are substantial changes as the number of candidates included in the dependent variable is reduced. In **Model 1** (*all candidates*), the most exclusive candidate selection method (*Inclusiveness* = 0) is predicted to have a VDI score that is 0.65 lower than the most inclusive method (*Inclusiveness* = 1). That difference decreases to 0.3 in **Model 2** (*no local candidates*) and in **Model 3** (*electable candidates*), it is close to zero. In addition, looking at the intercept values, the mean VDI scores increase moving from Model 1 to Model 3. These large changes could indicate that the model results are not particularly robust, but they are not incongruent with the expectations either: a smaller subset of the candidate list is more likely to be less representative than the complete list of candidates. At the same time, an additional explanation may be that geographic representativeness is less of a concern for parties when they consider the most important positions on the candidate list.

[15] The results of the OLS model can be found in Appendix C.

Figure 6. Plot of interaction effects of Table 2



The regression results in Table 2 prove to be more interesting, suggesting that geographic representation is affected by the interplay between intra-party democracy and urban-rural attitudes. Although this would be a confirmation of the *party attitude* hypothesis, such a conclusion proves premature after taking a closer look. In **Figure 6**, the interactions in Models 1 to 3 of Table 2 have been plotted side-by-side. When considering all the candidates standing for election in Figure 6a, exclusive rural parties are found to have more geographically representative candidates than the most inclusive rural parties. A similar effect cannot be observed within urban parties: the uncertainty of the slope suggests there is no significant difference between inclusive and exclusive urban parties. In terms of the differences between urban and rural parties: there is no significant difference between exclusive parties in general, regardless of their urban or rural orientation. However, inclusive rural parties appear to perform worse than inclusive urban parties if the parties have a rating of 0.65 or more on the *Inclusiveness* index.

The caveat here is that the interaction patterns in Figure 6a change or become uncertain once we look at Figure 6b, which represents the model without local candidates. In this case,

the level of inclusiveness within rural parties does not have a significant effect: the widening confidence interval of the slope indicates the difference between the geographic representativeness of inclusive and exclusive rural parties is highly uncertain. The fact that the *Inclusiveness* coefficient in Model 2 in Table 2 is no longer statistically significant, confirms that this is the case. The contrast between inclusive and exclusive urban parties remains relatively unchanged compared to Figure 6a. One key difference with the model including all the candidates, is that exclusive rural parties are now found to be more geographically representative than exclusive urban parties (for parties with an *Inclusiveness* rating between approximately 0.5 and 0.75).

Finally, when it comes to the candidates in electable positions as shown in Figure 6c, there is no significant difference amongst parties regardless of their urban-rural orientation or their level of inclusiveness. That there is no difference between parties regarding candidates in electable positions, suggests that parties are prioritizing qualities unrelated to the geographic characteristics of candidates.

The difference between rural parties in Model 1 and 2 in Table 2 is almost certainly caused by the presence of regional candidate lists, as that is the only change between the two models. With local candidates included in the analysis, there is a significant difference between exclusive and inclusive rural parties. After excluding local candidates, that is no longer the case. This is probably explained by the rural parties CU and CDA, who sometimes use regional candidate lists. The additional local candidates drive up the VDI score. That effect can be observed in Model 1, wherein more candidates decrease the geographic representativeness of candidates (each extra candidate increases the VDI score by 0.01). The expectation was, as is the case in Models 2 and 3, that larger candidate lists would improve the geographic representativeness in parties. The opposite effect of *Candidates* in Model 1 shows how overrepresentation of local candidates in regional candidate lists gives the impression that more

inclusive rural parties are less geographically representative, when in fact they are pursuing geographic representation. An immediate question that follows from this is whether inclusive (rural) parties will have more local candidates on regional candidate lists than other parties if they use regional candidate lists. That is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Given the issues with the model including all candidates, the results of the models without local candidates appear to provide the best basis for making inferences. However, multilevel models do not provide an R^2 value. Instead, the explanatory power of Model 2 in Table 2 can be deduced by comparing it to a baseline model without the fixed effects. Of the total variance in the baseline model, 42% is attributable at the party level and 17% at the election level. After adding the fixed effects to Model 2, the regression model was able to explain 1.6% of the variation at the party level, 1.5% at the election level, and 1.1% of the remaining variance not attributed to the party or election level. Hence, the fixed effects in the model appear to explain only a tiny fraction of the variance in the data. An additional issue is the robustness of the results from Model 2 in Table 2. The results change quite substantially if the PVV is included in the model analysis (see Appendix B). In this scenario, the interaction effect loses statistical significance. The result is that there are no differences in geographic representation found between urban or rural and inclusive or exclusive parties.

Table 3. The highest and lowest scoring parties - VDI

Position	Party	VDI	Inclusiveness	Election
1	SGP	0.23	0.5	2021
2	CDA	0.28	0.5	2003
3	CDA	0.33	0.5	2010
4	CDA	0.35	0.6	2017
5	CDA	0.35	0.5	2002
6	D66	0.37	0.75	2012
7	VVD	0.42	0.67	2012
8	CDA	0.42	0.5	2006
9	VVD	0.43	0.57	2021
10	CU	0.43	0.5	2021
11	VVD	0.44	0.57	2017
12	CU	0.44	0.5	2017
13	D66	0.45	0.7	2017
14	CDA	0.46	0.5	2012
15	PvdD	0.48	0.75	2021
Mean (sd)		*0.39*	*0.57 (0.1)*	
Median			*0.5*	*2017*
Mode	*CDA*			*2021*
51	PvdD	0.75	0.5	2010
52	PvdA	0.76	0.6	2003
53	GL	0.77	0.75	2012
54	GL	0.78	0.75	2010
55	GL	0.78	0.64	2003
56	DENK	0.78	0.67	2021
57	PvdD	0.79	0.5	2006
58	SP	0.8	0.5	2012
59	50PLUS	0.81	0.63	2017
60	PvdA	0.83	0.6	2002
61	D66	0.89	0.75	2002
62	SP	0.93	0.5	2002
63	D66	0.97	0.75	2006
64	GL	1.01	0.57	2002
65	D66	1.11	0.75	2003
Mean (sd)		*0.85*	*0.63 (0.1)*	
Median			*0.63*	*2006*
Mode	*GL*			*2002*

Legend
Rural
Urban

Figure 7. Pairwise comparison of party means.



Further contextualisation of the data

Given that the multilevel models have relatively few observations, and small changes to the data affect the size of the estimates substantially, it is insightful to look at the raw data to provide additional context. In **Table 3**, fifteen parties have been listed with the most and least geographically representative candidate lists based on the VDI scores without local candidates. This roughly equates to the top and bottom quartile of the dataset (N=65). Generally, there are some interesting characteristics to highlight. Firstly, most parties in the top 15 are rural while the bottom 15 are exclusively urban parties. This is partially confirmed by the multilevel models: rural parties are often more geographically representative. It is notable that the *Inclusiveness* rating of the bottom 15 parties is higher than the rating of the top 15 parties. However, the multilevel models did not find this difference significant enough to support the *intra-party democracy* hypothesis. Another notable feature of Table 3 is that the lowest VDI scores are observed in more recent elections than the highest VDI scores. In general, the table corresponds with the findings of the multilevel models. The contexts of individual parties, election years, and the influence of urban-rurality in parties, makes it difficult to isolate the fixed effects intra-party democracy.

One aspect that is particularly interesting to see are some of the inter-party differences. The CDA appears to consistently have low VDI scores. Out of the seven elections in our dataset, the CDA appears in the top 15 six times (of which four times in the top 5). Amongst the worst scoring parties, GroenLinks has the most appearances (4). It is interesting to note that GroenLinks has made multiple changes to their candidate selection since 2002, and has amongst the highest *Inclusiveness* ratings in 2021, but is also amongst the worst performing parties. However, in a pairwise analysis of the means, based on a rudimentary one-way ANOVA test, only the CDA is ever found to be significantly different to other parties, as can be seen in **Figure 7**. The significant differences are mainly between the CDA and urban parties, and less so compared to the other rural parties. Nonetheless, it seems like the CDA is a special

case amongst Dutch parties with regards to geographic representation. What is unclear, however, is to what extent this relates to levels of inclusiveness in candidate selection.

The differences between Models 1 and 2, and the effect of regional candidate lists, suggest that it is worth looking at patterns of over- and underrepresentation. In **Figure 9**, eight maps are displayed for each party[16] and in **Figure 8** a separate map displays the combined average of all parties. The maps give an indication as to where party candidates are based in relation to the share of voters. The categories of over and underrepresentation correspond to the interquartile distribution of the data. The map showing the national average closely reflects the patterns found by Latner & McGann (Latner & McGann, 2005) for the members of parliament in the Netherlands after the 2003 elections: the central metropolitan areas are overrepresented, but so are the peripheral regions; it is the in-between areas that are underrepresented. However, looking at representation at the electoral district level rather than provincial level reveals an extra detail: the provincial areas of northern North-Holland (Den Helder) and southern South-Holland (Dordrecht) are consistently underrepresented. A possible explanation could be that parties consider geographic representation fulfilled when there are candidates on the list from elsewhere in the province.

The patterns of geographic representation are markedly different when looking at the individual parties. In the first place, it is visible why the CDA has low VDI scores: it is the only party that does not have strong over- or underrepresentation of candidates in any of the districts. Candidates of urban parties such as D66, GL, PvdA, SP, and VVD are heavily concentrated in Amsterdam or The Hague, or both. Of the non-urban parties, the SGP is the only party that has heavy overrepresentation of candidates beyond Amsterdam and the Hague, perhaps a reflection of the fact that it is rated, on average, as the most rural party in the data. It seems that where there is a large concentration of voters for parties, we can expect a disproportional number of

[16] Only parties have been included that have taken part in all seven elections in the data.

candidates. On the other hand, some of the more proportionally represented districts appear to be characterised by having few candidates and few voters. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to quantify and prove these observations. What is clear is that there is quite some inter-party variation in patterns of over- and underrepresentation. It would be interesting to investigate if part of this variation is related to levels of intra-party democracy.

Figure 8. Average over- and underrepresentation between 2002-2021. All parties.



Figure 9. Average over- and underrepresentation between 2002-2021 per individual party



Discussion & Conclusion

This thesis intended to explore how intra-party democracy could affect the geographic characteristics of parties' candidates. This was done by looking at the case of the Netherlands, a country with a single nationwide constituency that does not obligate parties to pursue geographical representation. We looked at how different levels of participation in candidate selection had an influence on the geographic representativeness of a party's candidate list. In addition, we looked at the interplay between intra-party democracy and party attitudes and how this impacted geographic representation.

Ultimately, the results provide insufficient evidence that intra-party democracy influences geographic representation. There was some indication that party attitudes can affect a party's geographic representativeness, but there is insufficient evidence that this happens in concert with the level of democracy inside the party. Beyond the central focus of our thesis, one finding was that regional candidate lists and lower placed candidates are used to pursue geographical representation in the Netherlands. The geographic characteristics of candidates do not appear to be a consideration for parties when it comes to placing candidates in electable positions. Lastly, geographic over- and underrepresentation appears to be a relevant dynamic, something which the models did not account for. As a result, we suggest further research to look at the link between intra-party democracy and patterns of geographic over- and underrepresentation.

Do the findings disprove the theory that greater participation of party members in candidate selection may come at the cost of descriptive representation? The results do not appear robust enough to make such a strong statement and, moreover, this study is limited to geographic representation. As was emphasised earlier, the multilevel models were based on a relatively small dataset. This feature involves the risk that the models were unlikely to uncover small effect sizes (and thus, report a type II error). In theory, a larger dataset might provide more precise, and possibly significant, results. However, there are only a limited number of

countries and political parties, so larger studies will remain a challenge. Assuming better data would provide an alternative conclusion, it still begs the question: how strong an effect should we consider relevant? Based on the results in this thesis, a possible conclusion is that intra-party democracy is not a major influence on the ability of parties to be geographically representative. Certainly, in the case of the Netherlands, the data shows no evidence that the inclusivity of candidate selection was a convincing explanation for the differences between the parties over seven elections.

It is likely that there is more traction to be gained in the theory that the effect of intra-party democracy is observable when it interacts with party attitudes. Again, the results were not able to support this claim, but this was also partially due to the quality of the data. As it stands, the feeling is that there was too little variation within and between the rural parties in the data to rule out an interactive effect. The data is particularly lacking rural parties with more (or less) inclusive candidate selection methods. In the models, rural parties were generally found to be more geographically representative than urban parties. While there was quite some variation in the level of intra-party democracy between urban parties, this was not the case for rural parties: the three rural parties in the dataset – CDA, ChristenUnie (CU), and SGP – were generally given the similar ratings regarding their level of intra-party democracy. Although there is a stronger indication that there are no differences between inclusive and exclusive urban parties, that contrast (or lack thereof) is less certain between inclusive and exclusive rural parties. Therefore, future research should include more rural parties by including more elections in the data or by conducting a cross-national study to increase the number of parties (or both). The key purpose should be to have data that has a greater contrast in the level of intra-party democracy between rural parties.

The indicators used to measure inclusiveness and geographic representativeness showed promise, although not with some shortcomings. The inclusiveness measure developed

by Tuttnauer & Rahat (2022) currently lacks the nuance to differentiate between selectorates that are not the party leader or the party members. It was notable that most parties scored at the mid-point of the index; this characteristic could also be observed in the summary statistics of the Tuttnauer & Rahat paper[17]. Moving forward, it would be beneficial if the measure can be modified to, for example, better differentiate between parties that have strong executives versus a system of party delegates. Regarding the VDI measure, a key shortcoming was that it did not detect over- and underrepresentation. In future, it may be productive to have a parallel measure that can do this.

The purpose of this thesis was to contribute to the wider literature on how descriptive representation by parties can be affected by different levels of intra-party democracy in candidate selection. As was pointed out at the beginning of the thesis, previous research often studied this topic in relation to women's representation. As expected, geographic representation is a more complex concept to measure and analyse. In general, the data suggests geographic representation is relatively unaffected by the inclusiveness of candidate selection, perhaps more so than women's representation. Nonetheless, the overall feeling is that this thesis provided a fresh perspective by looking at another type of descriptive representation.

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Appendix A – Descriptive Statistics

A 1. Distribution of Urban-Rural Attitudes



Appendix B – Multilevel Model including the PVV

B 1. Multilevel Model including the PVV

	All candidates		No local candidates		Electable candidates	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
(Constant)	0.09 (0.25)	2.19 (0.96)*	0.91 (0.11)***	1.41 (0.30)***	1.27 (0.17)***	1.94 (0.62)**
Inclusiveness	0.09 (0.41)	-3.34 (1.51)*	-0.06 (0.16)	-0.53 (0.49)	-0.01 (0.26)	-0.98 (0.99)
Urban-Rural Attitudes		-0.45 (0.19)*		-0.08 (0.06)		-0.13 (0.12)
IPD*UR		0.79 (0.32)*		0.06 (0.10)		0.19 (0.20)
Candidates	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.01 (0.00)***	-0.01 (0.00)***	-0.01 (0.00)***	-0.01 (0.00)***
AIC	74.85	78.73	-53.48	-48.30	3.08	12.34
BIC	88.26	96.60	-40.08	-30.43	16.31	29.97
Log Likelihood	-31.43	-31.37	32.74	32.15	4.46	1.83
Num. obs.	69	69	69	69	67	67
Num. groups: Party	13	13	13	13	13	13
Num. groups: Election	7	7	7	7	7	7
Var: Party (Intercept)	0.08	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03
Var: Election (Intercept)	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	0.07	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

B 2. Plot of interaction effects in Table B1



Appendix C – OLS Model with Fixed Effects

C 1. OLS Model with Fixed Effects for Parties and Elections

Dependent variable: Geographic Representation (VDI)

	All candidates		No local candidates		Electable candidates	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
Main variables						
(Intercept)	0.35 (0.49)	**0.53** (0.23)*	**1.06** (0.20)***	**1.08** (0.12)***	**0.99** (0.48)*	**1.48** (0.22)***
Inclusiveness (I)	0.77 (0.75)	**3.34** (0.92)***	0.09 (0.30)	0.46 (0.40)	1.00 (0.73)	-0.64 (0.71)
Urban-Rural Ideology (UR)		-0.13 (0.09)		0.05 (0.04)		0.10 (0.07)
I*UR		**1.93** (0.49)***		0.29 (0.21)		0.22 (0.40)
Candidates	**0.01** (0.00)***	**0.01** (0.00)***	**-0.00** (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	**-0.01** (0.00)*
Fixed-Effects Parties (ref. 50PLUS)						
CDA	**-0.77** (0.26)**	-0.21 (0.37)	**-0.39** (0.10)***	**-0.60** (0.15)***	**-0.75** (0.26)**	**-0.99** (0.29)**
CU	-0.22 (0.24)	0.31 (0.33)	**-0.33** (0.10)**	**-0.43** (0.14)**	-0.10 (0.24)	-0.29 (0.26)
D66	**-0.51** (0.25)*	-0.12 (0.24)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.10)	**-0.59** (0.25)*	0.09 (0.23)
DENK	0.36 (0.35)	0.54 (0.32)	-0.07 (0.14)	0.14 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.34)	0.43 (0.28)
FvD	-0.26 (0.34)	-0.57 (0.31)	-0.21 (0.14)	**-0.34** (0.14)*	-0.27 (0.34)	-0.05 (0.27)
GL	-0.15 (0.24)	0.17 (0.23)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.36 (0.24)	0.23 (0.21)
PvdA	**-0.83** (0.24)**	**-0.55** (0.22)*	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.49 (0.26)	-0.17 (0.21)
PvdD	-0.08 (0.24)	0.09 (0.23)	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.45 (0.23)	0.39 (0.25)
SGP	-0.17 (0.24)	0.49 (0.42)	**-0.35** (0.10)***	**-0.50** (0.18)**	-0.45 (0.24)	**-0.77** (0.33)*
SP	-0.15 (0.25)	0.06 (0.22)	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.30 (0.24)	-0.21 (0.21)
VVD	**-0.81** (0.23)**	**-0.61** (0.21)**	**-0.24** (0.10)*	**-0.30** (0.10)**	**-0.59** (0.27)*	-0.39 (0.22)
Fixed-Effects Elections (ref. 2002)						
2003	-0.23 (0.14)	**-0.30** (0.12)*	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.14)	0.06 (0.09)
2006	-0.25 (0.14)	**-0.35** (0.12)**	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.13)	0.17 (0.09)
2010	**-0.40** (0.14)**	**-0.40** (0.12)**	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	0.07 (0.13)	0.09 (0.10)
2012	**-0.56** (0.14)***	**-0.54** (0.12)***	-0.12 (0.06)	**-0.15** (0.06)*	0.05 (0.14)	0.08 (0.10)
2017	**-0.66** (0.14)***	**-0.63** (0.12)***	**-0.16** (0.06)*	**-0.21** (0.06)**	-0.03 (0.13)	0.00 (0.09)
2021	**-0.70** (0.14)***	**-0.60** (0.13)***	**-0.19** (0.06)**	**-0.24** (0.06)***	0.02 (0.14)	0.01 (0.10)
R^2	0.84	0.88	0.72	0.76	0.61	0.81
Adj. R^2	0.77	0.83	0.60	0.64	0.45	0.71
Num. obs.	65	65	65	65	65	61

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Interaction variables in Model 2, 4, and 6 have been centered to account for multicollinearity.

C 2. Plot of interaction effects in Table C1



Appendix D – Diagnostics Multilevel Models

D 1.Diagnostics Table 1 Model 1



D 2. Diagnostics Table 1 Model 2



D 3. Diagnostics Table 2 Model 1



D 4. Diagnostics Table 2 Model 2