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## **Regional Security Governance in Action: Governing Non-Traditional Security Issues in the Pacific**

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Regional Security Governance in Action: Governing Non-Traditional Security Issues in the  
Pacific

*'In What Ways Does the Pacific Region Govern Non-Traditional Security Threats?'*

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## **Regional Security Governance in Action: Governing Non-Traditional Security Issues in the Pacific**

### *Abstract*

The study of regional security governance has gained much attention in the past years, particularly in regions such as Europe, Africa, and Asia. While the existing literature is focused upon those regions, this thesis will focus upon the Pacific region. The Pacific is vulnerable to a variety of non-traditional security issues (e.g. non-military), ranging from Environmental Security to Cybersecurity. These transborder threats ask for a regional response. Through an exploratory analysis of the security governance systems governing Environmental Security and Cybersecurity, this thesis gives a comprehensive understanding of the governance of non-traditional security issues in the Pacific region. Findings indicate that Climate Security is governed by a clear security governance system, while Cybersecurity is governed by a hybrid system that contains characteristics of two systems.

### *Introduction*

After the Cold War, the predominantly military and state-centric view on security began to change within the field of international security studies. Debates within the field opened it up to a deeper understanding of the referent object of security, one that goes beyond the state, and to a widening of the concept of security, one that goes beyond military threats (Buzan & Hansen, 2012, pp. 187-188). This led to an extensive body of research focused upon the governance of these non-traditional security threats. Non-traditional security threats encompass for example cybersecurity, health, food and water, the environment, energy, natural disasters, migration, and transnational crime (Caballero-Anthony & Cook, 2015, p. 3). The concept of security governance was coined to explain the transboundary structures and processes that emerged to deal with these threats (Krahmann, 2003, p. 11). Nevertheless, literature on security governance has only recently started to pay attention to regional security, by comparing security dynamics in different regions or by comparing different regional security organisations (Ceccorulli et al., 2017, p. 62). Scholars acknowledge the importance of regional analysis within the globalised world, it provides a proper middle-level between the state and the international system (Kelly, 2007, p. 201).

However, an extensive part of the (regional) security governance literature is characterised by a predominantly European focus (Ceccorulli et al., 2017, p. 61). This focus on European dynamics has biased the security governance theorisation, it overlooks how

different systems of security governance are established and realised in other regional contexts (Ceccorulli et al., 2017, p. 61). Several scholars have tried to de-Europeanise the literature by looking at Asia, the Persian Gulf, South America, and Africa (Ceccorulli et al., 2017, p. 64; Walsh, 2020). Consequently, empirical research on regional security dynamics is widening. However, it still overlooks how security dynamics rise in other regions, for example, the Pacific region. The Pacific is vulnerable to several non-traditional security threats, ranging from climate change, food security, and health security to transnational crime, cybersecurity, terrorism, and migration (PIF, n.d.(a)). Leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) have long recognised that regional cooperation is needed to deal with these non-traditional security threats (PIF Secretariat, 2018). With the Boe Declaration, the PIF decided to deepen the security cooperation within the region (PIF Secretariat, 2018). Consequently, one would expect intensified cooperation among the Pacific states. This thesis aims to fill the gap within the regional security literature, which has not addressed this region in relation to the governance of non-traditional threats compared to other regions. Moreover, with a better understanding of the governance processes and structures of the pressing non-traditional security threats in the Pacific, improvements can be directed more efficiently towards specific parts of the regional security framework. This might lead to an improvement of the overall security of the Pacific region. Hence, the central research question of this thesis is:

*'In what ways does the Pacific region govern non-traditional security threats?'*

To answer this question, an exploratory approach will be used, combining different types of data collection methods. Data will be collected from the year 2000 up till now, since the year 2000 can be seen as the beginning of security cooperation in the PIF, which is seen as the leading political and economic policy organisation (PIF, 2000; PIF, n.d.(b)). First, this thesis will provide a disquisition of the relevant literature on regional security governance.

Secondly, the theoretical framework will present theories of regionalism, regional security governance, and the framework on which the analysis will build. Thirdly, this thesis will present the research methodology and the data collection methods. This will be followed by the analysis, which is divided into two sections, Environmental Security and Cybersecurity. Finally, the conclusion will answer the central research question based upon the findings, and address some issues and implications of this research.

### *Literature Review*

Contemporary security issues are characterised by their transboundary nature, focus beyond military threats, and a wide understanding of the referent object, ranging from the state to the individual (Buzan & Hansen, 2012, pp. 187-188). The transboundary nature of non-traditional security issues causes problems for territorial, state-based responses, and generates demands for a new scale of governance (Jones & Hameiri, 2015, p. 15). This is in line with the argument on how security governance arose, looking at global interdependencies and the expanding security agenda (Ehrhart et al. 2014a, p. 121; Krahmman, 2003, pp. 11-12). In addition, Bevir & Hall (2013) describe how the rise of non-traditional security threats and a crisis in the bureaucratic state led to the emergence of security governance as a tool to overcome the problems with state-based responses (pp. 22-23). Security governance is defined as the structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to create and implement binding decisions, in the absence of a central political authority to coordinate their interdependent interests (Krahmann, 2003, p. 11). Nevertheless, this broad definition of security governance does not tell how the patterns of interaction are shaped, or what types of cooperation are included (Sperling, 2014b, p. 106).

Moreover, much of the literature on how to deal with these non-traditional security issues and regional security governance is based upon the European Union (EU) (Jones & Hameiri, 2015, p. 15; Ehrhart et al., 2014a, p. 121). The European bias is not surprising given Europe's institutional model, the EU is seen as the ideal case for security governance by many scholars (Ceccorulli et al., 2017, p. 61). This bias has led to the development of many proponents within security governance based upon the European context (Ehrhart et al., 2014b, p. 146). However, regional security regimes differ in their design and level of cooperation. As stated before, many scholars tried to de-Europeanise the literature on security governance, especially using the cases of Asia, Africa, and South America (see Walsh, 2020; Caballero-Anthony, 2018a; Ceccorulli et al., 2017).

Global non-traditional security threats have different regional impacts and thus lead to differences in regional responses. Thus, scholars have generally agreed that the regional level constitutes a plausible level of analysis to research the dynamics of both international and domestic pressures (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Acharya, 2004). In this respect, Buzan and Wæver (2003) developed the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), which went beyond the traditional state-centric and militarised concept of security and highlighted the importance of regional contexts (Walsh, 2020, pp. 302-303). This approach incorporated

social constructions, meaning that next to anarchy several additional variables, such as power distribution and the level of amity and enmity, define the structure of the RSC. This gives the potential for a change in the study of security structures and dynamics (Kahrs, 2004, p. 65). RSCT is widely used by scholars to look at how regions govern their security issues. It is predominantly utilised to explain regional security governance in Europe, Africa, (East)-Asia, and the Middle Eastern and Northern African (MENA) region (see Walsh, 2020; Santini, 2017; Kahrs, 2004; Buzan, 2003; Buzan & Wæver, 2003). However, RSCT is criticised because it relies heavily on regions that are close in geography and history, and thus on a narrow conceptualisation of a region (Kelly, 2007, pp. 208-209). Moreover, scholars argue that the RSCT remains too state-centric and fails to incorporate the impact of non-state actors (Walsh, 2020, p. 302). In line with the broader security governance literature, scholars argue that regional security governance also exists of collaboration between state and non-state actors (see Caballero-Anthony, 2018a; Sperling, 2014a; Breslin & Croft, 2012; Krahnemann, 2005). Literature thus provides two analytical frameworks to look at regional security. A more realist and power-oriented framework and a more critical and inclusive framework that incorporates non-state actors into the governance process.

Furthermore, literature on regional security governance directed its attention to several non-traditional security issues. Highly researched fields are health security, environmental security, migration, cybersecurity, energy security, and food security. Health has become a concern for regional cooperation due to diseases that can transcend borders. This paved the way for health to become part of many regional security studies (see Caballero-Anthony, 2018a; Caballero-Anthony, 2018b; Lamy & Phua, 2012). Secondly, research on regional environmental governance indicates that there is a multiplicity of regional environmental efforts (Elliott & Breslin, 2011, p. 4). Accordingly, many scholars diverted their attention to regional environmental governance systems (see Caballero-Anthony, 2018a; Elliott & Breslin, 2011). Moreover, migration has become associated with security in wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the European migration crisis, paving the way for research into regional border and migration security governance (Taylor, 2007, p. 171; see McMahon & Sigona, 2021). Fourth, scholars of non-traditional security issues look at regional solutions to mitigate cybersecurity threats. These threats arise due to increased interdependencies and technological improvements (see Ruohonen et al., 2016; Orji, 2018). The fifth issue is (nuclear) energy security, various stakeholders work together trying to guarantee protected, affordable, and clean energy within a region (see Zhang et al., 2021; Hermanson, 2018). Finally, after the

world food price crises of 2007-2008 and 2010, both academics and non-academics have focused their attention on food security (Candel, 2014, p. 585; see Montesclaros, 2020).

Given the existing gap in the literature, in light of the regions that are researched, this thesis will focus on the governance of non-traditional security threats within the Pacific region. The states in the Pacific region are increasingly concerned with common security issues. However, it remains unclear how the Pacific governs the non-traditional security issues. Consequently, the central question of this thesis will be:

*'In what ways does the Pacific region govern non-traditional security threats?'*

### *Theoretical Framework*

Regionalism is a contested concept, there is little agreement about what we study when we look at regionalism and there is no agreement on how to study it (Hettne, 2005, p. 543). It all starts with the definition of a region, to look at regionalism one first needs to be clear on what constitutes a region. Nye (1968) provides one of the most traditional definitions of a region “a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence” (Nye, 1968, p. vii). More comprehensive views on regions take social, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and historical ties into account (Hettne, 2005, p. 544). This thesis will build upon the traditional conceptualisation of a region as defined by Nye (1968). In addition, following Fawcett (2004), it will also include sub-state, supra-state, and trans-state units (p. 432). This definition provides an inclusive typology encompassing both state-based as well as non-state-based actors that constitute a region (Fawcett, 2004, p. 432). A region thus constitutes a specific geographical area in which interdependencies exist between states and non-state actors.

It is important to make a clear distinction between regionalism and regionalisation.

Regionalism can be seen as a project or policy, whereas regionalisation can be seen as both a process and a project, preceding and following regionalism (Mansfield & Solingen, 2010, p. 147). Regionalisation is considered to be a process that is driven by economic or social forces and regionalism is considered to be a political process (Mansfield & Solingen, 2010, p. 147). Hettne (2005) defines regionalism as “a tendency and a political commitment to organise the world in terms of regions” (p. 545), it thus refers to projects designed to govern a particular regional space. Regionalisation, on the other hand, is defined as the process of establishing regions (Hettne, 2005, p. 545). Regionalism and regionalisation are thus different conceptualisations. However, it is important to note that the processes are intertwined and have an impact on each other. In this thesis, regionalism is defined as a policy project in which states and non-state actors cooperate and develop a strategy within a region (Fawcett, 2005, p. 24).

Regionalism can roughly be divided into ‘old regionalism’ and ‘new regionalism’. ‘Old regionalism’ is associated with the pre–Cold War period and is related to selective but cumulative regional projects and growth (Fawcett, 2005, p. 29). ‘Old regionalism’ is generally understood as an endogenous process. Interdependencies require collective action in order to solve collective problems (Börzel & Risse, 2019, p. 1233). However, ‘old regionalism’ is often criticised for being narrow and Eurocentric (Söderbaum, 2003, p. 4). This criticism

paved the way for a 'new regionalism' that is considered to be pluralistic and global (Söderbaum, 2003, p. 4). 'New regionalism' is associated with the decentralisation of the international system and paved a way for new institutional forms and practices with expanding capacities, membership, and tasks (Fawcett, 2005, pp. 30-31). It looks at regionalism as a process that can emerge from below and within a region, and as a process with communities responding to a variety of push and pull factors that dictate the degree of cooperation (Farrell, 2005, p. 8). 'New regionalism' thus provides a more comprehensive understanding of regional cooperation. One of the issue areas which is increasingly associated with regionalism is non-traditional security. Complementary to the rise of 'new regionalism', the end of the Cold War also opened up the field of international security to incorporate a deeper understanding of the concept of security (Buzan & Hansen, 2012, pp. 187-188). However, to be seen as a security threat, the issue needs to pose an existential threat to a referent object (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21).

Sperling (2014b) developed a framework that provides a continuum along which systems of regional security governance can differ (p. 109). He acknowledges that due to the expanded number of threats (state, society, and milieu) and agents (state and non-state), the responses cannot be reduced to a state-centric calculation (Sperling, 2014a, p. 7). This acknowledgement is fundamental for the usefulness of this framework to assess the security governance system focused upon non-traditional security threats within the Pacific region. Sperling (2014b) emphasises four essential elements of security governance systems; the combination and content of these elements will lead to a specific system of security governance (pp. 107-108), see table 1. The four elements as emphasised by Sperling (2014b) are the security referent (source of the security concern), the system regulator (mechanism for conflict resolution), the normative framework (role of norms in defining interests), and the interaction context (level of enmity and amity in the system) (p. 108). Different values of these elements lead to different security governance systems, ranging from a Primitive State of Nature to a Civil International System (Sperling 2014b, p 110) (see table 1). Both these extremes are non-existent and highly unlikely to emerge (Sperling, 2014b, p. 109).

However, the seven systems that fall between the extremes are all plausible systems that could exist. The first is Impermanent Alliances, in which states have permanent interests, not permanent allies (Sperling, 2014b, p. 109). States enter into Impermanent Alliances to balance or bandwagon, in order to mitigate threats that arise from outside the system (Sperling 2014b, p. 109). Secondly, a Cooperative Security system lacks obligations to deliver aid in

times of military aggression, but it does promote consultation over threats arising due to interdependencies (Sperling, 2014b, p. 111). Threats arise from within the system, but there is no institutional basis for action (Sperling, 2014b, p. 111). Concerts are created to uphold the status quo and the norm of sovereignty, values are compatible, dispute resolution is informal and multilateral consultation on issues of mutual interests are fostered (Sperling, 2014b, p. 111). Fourth, a Collective Defence system is created among states with a similar threat to national security originating from the same adversary, it aggregates military and economic capabilities to deter attacks, they are decentralised, and members of the system are not obligated to provide aid to allies (Sperling, 2014b, p. 112). A Collective Security system obligates members to provide aid to allies, it provides rules for compulsory adjudication of disputes, and the sovereign decision to go to war is abnegated (Sperling, 2014b, p. 112). Within a Contractual Security Community, military enforcement of rules is replaced by internalisation of norms (Sperling, 2014b, pp. 112-113). This system relies on international law to mitigate conflicts, peaceful means to resolve disputes, and the willingness to give in on sovereignty to enhance collective security (Sperling, 2014b, p. 113). Finally, a Fused Security Community is a Contractual Security Community in which the members have a single set of security interests rather than collective or common ones (Sperling, 2014b, p. 113). This thesis will build upon Sperling's (2014b) comprehensive framework to analyse how the Pacific as a region governs non-traditional security issues.

However, before looking into the Pacific region, it is important to be clear on what constitutes the Pacific region. The Pacific region consists of three sub-regions, Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia. Nevertheless, within this research, Australia and New Zealand will also be seen as part of the wider Pacific. This is because they are highly involved in many regional organisations in the Pacific, making them a part of the regional security governance system. Annex A provides a map of the Pacific region.

Table 1: Security Governance Systems and their Characteristics

	SECURITY REFERENT	SYSTEM REGULATOR	NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK	INTERACTION CONTEXT
<i>STATE OF NATURE</i>	Other states in system	War	None, except self-preservation	Unrelenting enmity, intense security dilemma
<i>IMPERMANENT ALLIANCES</i>	Great Powers	War and balancing of power	Limited to rules of war	Neither a permanent state of enmity nor amity, classic security dilemma
<i>COOPERATIVE SECURITY</i>	Generally Within-group	Negotiation with rudimentary institutional framework; War remains an option	Narrow and broad, but neither deep nor binding	Security dilemma abated, distrust persist, enmity suppressed
<i>CONCERTS</i>	Great powers	Multilateral consultation, managed balance of power	Limited to supporting existing regimes, qualified renunciation of war	Conditional amity, mitigated security dilemma
<i>COLLECTIVE DEFENCE</i>	Identifiable enemy outside group	Balancing, deterrence, or war	Non-binding commitment to aid ally	Amity within group, enmity outside, security dilemma intact

<i>COLLECTIVE SECURITY</i>	Within-group	Compulsory adjudication of conflicts, collective enforcement of violations of group norms	Sovereignty norm compromised, but right to self-defence remains	Amity, security dilemma resolved
<i>CONTRACTUAL SECURITY COMMUNITY</i>	Within-group	International law, institutional conflict resolution mechanisms	Deep, broad, and binding rules, voluntary compliance, eroded judicial sovereignty	Deep amity derived from a positive or collective identity, common set of norms have been internalised
<i>FUSED SECURITY COMMUNITY</i>	Within-group	International law, institutional conflict resolution mechanisms	Deep, broad, and binding rules, compliance voluntary, formal rather than operational sovereignty	Deep amity derived from a single identity and total absence of differentiation between within-group members
<i>CIVIL INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM</i>	Within-group	Civil contract law in effect, compulsory adjudication, voluntary compliance	Sovereignty is no longer a principle defining within group interactions, substantive normative framework	Amity derived from an inviolable social contract among the group members

*Source: (Sperling, 2014b, p. 110).*

### *Research Methodology*

This exploratory case study focuses on the characteristics of the Pacific security governance system. As with many case studies, this case study is situated in a wider comparative context (Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 214). By examining the security governance system within the Pacific, we can compare it with other regional security governance systems. Moreover, it will deepen our understanding of regional security cooperation. The successes and pitfalls might be of importance for other regions in developing a regional security system. It might also shed some light on improvements that can be made in order to enhance the security of the Pacific region. The research will use agreements, declarations, and formal cooperation strategies, created after the Biketawa Declaration, as primary data sources. This declaration was issued by the PIF in 2000 and includes security cooperation as a guiding principle (PIF, 2000). Furthermore, this research will look into the governance of Environmental Security and Cybersecurity. These are two non-traditional security issues that are seen as the most pressing within the Pacific region (PIF Secretariat, 2018). Attention will be directed to Environmental Security because it is a longstanding issue within the Pacific, whereas Cybersecurity is a relatively new issue. Looking at both issues will provide a comprehensive understanding of how the Pacific deals with both old and new non-traditional security issues and thus with non-traditional security issues in general.

Since this research will look into four different variables as indicators for the regional security governance system in place, the data-gathering method will differ accordingly to the variable of concern. In the following section, a short disquisition will follow on how the four variables are operationalised.

### The Security Referent

The security referent, as stated before, is the source of the security concern (Sperling, 2014b, p. 108)<sup>1</sup>. A security referent may be within the system, as in a collective security system or it may be directed outwardly towards a hostile other, as in an impermanent alliance or collective defence arrangement (Sperling, 2009, p. 9). Where a security referent is directed outwardly the states within the system see another state or group of states as a common threat (Sperling, 2009, p. 10). As for non-traditional security threats, threats arising from outside the system

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<sup>1</sup> Note: The definition of a security referent as presented by Sperling (2014b) differs from the general understanding of a referent object, which is broadly defined as the actor that is threatened (see Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21-23).

will be regarded as outwardly directed security referents, for example, global transnational crime networks. Non-traditional security threats that may arise within the system are regional migration, natural disasters, or regional transnational crime networks. Sperling (2014b) argues that when the region is more interconnected and the security governance system is more formalised the security referent will be directed inwardly (p. 108). To pinpoint the security referent within the agreements in place, this thesis will take an exploratory approach. Within the different agreements, different security referents might arise. These differences lead to different security governance systems. Consequently, this research will utilise the security agreements, declarations and arrangements and look at how the agreements describe the threat, where it originates from.

### The System Regulator

The system regulator is the mechanism for conflict resolution, this regulator can range from the rule of war to the rule of law (Sperling, 2014b, p. 108). This variable thus looks at how institutionalised the system's rules are and what mechanisms are in place to resolve conflicts or meet security challenges (Sperling, 2009, p. 9). To measure the degree of institutionalisation a content analysis of the agreements in place and their enforcement mechanisms will be performed. These can range from war or the use of force to resolve conflict, to highly institutionalised mechanisms to resolve conflicts (Sperling, 2009, p. 9). Again, variation in these regulating mechanisms leads to different security governance systems. Where the use of force is the conflict resolution mechanism and/or the influence of the rule of law is weak, the security governance system is more likely to be a concert or a collective security system. While fused security communities and contractual security communities rely on the rule of law to mitigate conflict and compliance is often voluntary (Sperling, 2014b, p. 110).

### The Normative Framework

Norms must be taken into account to explain a state's security policy (Finamore, 2017, p. 163). Norms play an important role in the creation of state interests and the formulation of preferences accordingly (Finamore, 2017, p. 162). Norms shape interaction patterns between states; the deeper the norm is embedded in the regional level, the more it shapes state preferences and state behaviour (Sperling, 2014b, p. 108). Norms that are important in

shaping intrastate relations and cooperation are norms that value cooperation over sovereignty (Sperling, 2014b, p. 110). If norms related to self-preservation prevail, cooperation will be limited; if on the other hand norms of sovereignty are submissive to norms of cooperation and integration, cooperation will flourish (Sperling, 2014b, pp. 108-110). To look at the normative framework inherent in the Pacific security governance system, a discourse analysis will be performed, analysing shared values and norms that are highlighted within treaties and agreements. The normative framework can differ from non-existent except self-preservation, to deep, broad, and binding norms that regulate behaviour (Sperling, 2014b, p. 110).

### The Interaction Context

The interaction context looks at the level of amity and enmity between the countries, and the intensity of the security dilemma. The level of amity is expected to be higher as the level of cooperation increases, consequently, the intensity of the security dilemma diminishes (Sperling, 2014b, p. 108). Enmity leads to security cooperation based upon fear and mutual distrust (Kirchner & Berk, 2010, p. 866). Whereas amity leads to security cooperation based upon a collective identity (Kirchner & Berk, 2010, p. 866; Sperling, 2014b, p. 108). To look at the level of amity or enmity a discourse analysis will be performed. This thesis will look at the way state leaders describe the other states within the region, whether these states are seen as friends, more neutral, or as enemies. Moreover, it will look at statements that indicate a shared or common identity. Since this research is looking into cooperation one can expect that pure enmity is highly unlikely, differences in amity on the other hand, are likely to arise and these differences then lead to a different security governance system.

Together the characteristics of the security referent, system regulator, normative framework, and the interaction context define the security governance system. Table 1 will be used to relate the characteristics to the security governance system.

## *Analysis*

Before turning to the governance of the two non-traditional security issues, it is important to map out the regional organisations through which the Pacific countries reach their agreements<sup>2</sup>. The following organisations govern various issues, in the sections that look at specific non-traditional security issues, specialised organisations will be included. The first regional organisation governing security worth mentioning is the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). The PIF envisions a region of peace, security, harmony, prosperity, and social inclusion, fostering cooperation between governments, collaboration with international agencies, and representing the interests of its members (PIF, n.d.(b)). The second regional organisation is the Pacific Community (SPC). The SPC provides scientific and technical expertise in more than twenty thematic sectors, in order to address some of the most pressing challenges facing the region (Pacific Community, n.d.(a)); Pacific Community, 2021). Another important organisation is the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), this organisation focuses on the sustainable and inclusive development of Pacific Islands, with an emphasis on climate change and poverty eradication (PIDF, n.d.(a)). Moreover, within the Pacific region, two sub-regional organisations are established to enhance cooperation between countries in these sub-regions. The first sub-regional organisation is the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), it aims to develop a stronger political, economic, cultural, and social identity between the people of Melanesia (MSG, n.d.). The other sub-regional organisation is the Polynesian Leaders Group, this organisation wants to enhance cooperation to develop, protect, and promote common objectives and interests of Polynesian countries (Iati, 2017, p. 177). Another important body is the Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP). The CROP was founded to improve cooperation, coordination, and collaboration between inter-governmental organisations in the Pacific (PIF Secretariat, 2019a, p. 2). CROP provides policy advice and support to Pacific countries in the formulation of policy at the international, regional, and national levels (PIF Secretariat, 2019a, p. 2).

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<sup>2</sup> See Annex B for an overview of country membership of the organisations.

### *Environmental Security*

The founding treaty governing the protection of natural resources and the environment is the Noumea Convention of 1986. Moreover, the PIF has published several declarations that directly address climate change and environmental security. The PIF adopted the Biketawa Declaration, Niue Declaration on Climate Change, Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Declaration on Climate Change Action, Boe Declaration, Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Action Now, and the Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change-related Sea-Level Rise (PIF, n.d.(c)). Furthermore, in light of climate change, the SPC has set up several projects to deal with the regional impacts of climate change. Additionally, one of the CROP organisations governing environmental security is the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). The SPREP has set up the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change, embodying the visions of members for the long-term management of the environment, indicating broad priorities and focus points for the regional agenda (SPREP, 2005a, p. 6). Moreover, the SPC together with the SPREP supports the Regional Pacific NDC HUB, which aims to help member states implement their climate targets (Regional Pacific NDC HUB, n.d.).

### Security Referent

With the Niue Declaration, the leaders of the PIF recall that “[...] the Pacific Islands region is one of the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change including its exacerbation of climate variability, sea level rise and extreme weather events” (PIF, 2008). The Kainaki II Declaration touches upon the same security referents as mentioned above (PIF Secretariat, 2019b, p. 12). Moreover, the SPC published a strategic plan for 2016-2020, the security referents within this strategic plan are environmental degradation, climate change, and disasters (Pacific Community, 2015, p. 3). Also, the SPREP created the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change, this framework emphasises the threats arising from extreme weather events and climate variability (SPREP, 2005b, p. 19). While climate change as a phenomenon can be seen as a threat originating from outside the region, the direct threats that impact the Pacific originate from within. Environmental degradation, sea-level rise, and increased frequency of natural disasters are threats that originate from within the region. Furthermore, the MSG in its framework for action describes “[...] higher temperatures, increased storm activity, more frequent flooding or droughts, along with changing fire regimes and threats to food security from the impacts on coral reef ecosystems

and agricultural practices and crop yields” (MSG, 2016, p. 2) as serious threats affecting the security of the region. Furthermore, within the Taputapuātea Declaration, issued by the Polynesian Leaders Group, extreme weather events, rising sea levels, erosion of shorelines, displacements of populations, and loss of territorial integrity are described as the security referent (Polynesian Leaders Group, 2015, p. 1). Overall, the security referents are arising from within the region, while the overall phenomenon of climate change originates from outside the region. Looking at the framework presented earlier, a security referent that arises within the system indicates a Collective Security system, a Contractual Security Community, or a Fused Security Community.

### System Regulator

Article 26 of the Noumea Convention outlines the dispute settlement mechanism. First, a dispute between parties needs to be resolved through negotiation or other peaceful means, if the parties cannot solve the dispute, a third party should be asked to mediate (PIF, 1986, p. 26). If both these processes prove to be inefficient, the dispute shall be submitted to arbitration (PIF, 1986, p. 26), the conditions of the arbitration are specified in an annex of the convention (pp. 37-42). The arbitration conditions are specified and outline procedures for different circumstances, it specifies how the tribunal is formed, how the arbitration is financed, and it specifies the binding nature of the tribunals’ decision (PIF, 1986, pp. 37-42). Moreover, within the charter establishing the PIDF the emphasis is on an amicable resolution of conflicts (PIDF, 2015a, p. 18). However, if this proves to be impossible, the dispute shall be referred to the Council and if the council cannot settle the dispute, it shall be referred to the summit (PIDF, 2015a, p. 18). Furthermore, within the Agreement establishing the MSG, dialogue is agreed upon as the conflict resolution mechanism (UN, 2010, p. 7). The Chair of the Leaders’ Summit may appoint a Special Mission to a person or group of persons to mediate and promote reconciliation during disputes, this Special Mission may be guided by the Biketawa Declaration (UN, 2010, p. 15). The conflict resolution mechanism is based upon dialogue and regional law. Overall, the conflict resolution mechanism can be seen as institutionalised and based upon the rule of law rather than the rule of war. Looking at the framework presented earlier, the system regulator that is present falls somewhere between a Contractual Security Community and a Fused Security Community.

### Normative Framework

In many of the organisations, declarations, and initiatives governing environmental security, cooperation and collaboration play a central role. The Noumea Convention sets the stage for regional cooperation in light of environmental protection, the Convention emphasises the need for cooperation to deal with environmental issues (PIF, 1986, pp. 16-18). In all the PIF Declarations mentioned above, the normative framework can be defined as cooperative, while still noting the importance of the principle of non-interference and sovereignty (PIF, 2000, p.1; PIF Secretariat, 2018, p. 6). In line with the declarations created by the PIF, the SPREP touches upon the sovereignty of the member states in light of their territory, internal or archipelagic waters, and territorial sea (SPREP, 1993, p. 11). However, the underlying foundation of the SPREP is based upon cooperation, the organisation is created to foster cooperation in the South Pacific region (SPREP, 1993, p. 4). Moreover, the Regional Pacific NDC HUB emphasises the need for enhanced collaboration to deal with climate change (Regional Pacific NDC HUB, 2021, p. 21). The PIDF also touches upon the need for cooperation in order to mitigate the consequences of climate change (PIDF, 2015b, p. 6; PIDF, 2019, p. 7). Furthermore, the sub-regional organisations also emphasise the need for cooperation while respecting the “national independence, and the sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and the right to non-interference in internal affairs of independent states” (MSG, 1988). Overall, the normative framework underpinning the governance of environmental security in the Pacific region can be seen as highly cooperative. Nonetheless, sovereignty and territorial integrity maintain important norms. Consequently, in light of the security governance system framework, the normative framework points towards a Contractual Security Community. There are deep, broad, and binding rules and compliance is often voluntary. However, sovereignty stays an important norm, consequently, a Contractual Security Community fits best with the presented findings.

### Interaction Context

Pacific Islands see each other as friendly, the Biketawa Declaration even states “[...] all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family” (PIF, 2000, p. 1). By describing the members of the PIF as an extended family, a positive or collective identity is implied. Moreover, within the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, forum leaders describe Pacific regionalism as: “The expression of a common sense of identity and purpose, leading progressively to the sharing of institutions, resources, and markets [...]” (PIF, 2014, p. 1).

Here, a common sense of identity and purpose is not implied but explicitly stated. Furthermore, in multiple declarations, the ‘Blue Pacific’ identity is indicated as driver of collective action (PIF Secretariat, 2018, p. 6; PIF Secretariat, 2019b, pp. 7-8). Moreover, within the sub-regional organisations, the level of amity is high as well. The MSG emphasises the traditional values of respect, equity, the promotion of relations, and an uplifting community-based system (MSG, 2016, p. 4). These traditional values indicate a high level of amity since they are based upon respect and equity. Besides, the agreement establishing the MSG touches upon the respect and promotion of Melanesian cultures, traditions, and values (MSG, 1988). This indicates that the Melanesian region has some kind of a common identity. Also, the Polynesian Leaders Group within the P.A.C.T. emphasises that the impacts of climate change are “[...] threatening the foundation of our identity as Polynesian peoples” (Polynesian Leaders Group, 2015, p. 1). Overall, the interaction context between the countries in the Pacific region can be seen as amicable. In light of the framework indicating the security governance system, the findings indicate a Contractual Security Community. It is a Contractual rather than a Fused Security Community because the countries still have their own cultures, norms, and values next to a sense of collective identity.

Taking into account the presented evidence, the security governance system dealing with environmental security can be seen as a Contractual Security Community. The security referent originates from within the system, the system regulator is based upon international law and includes institutionalised conflict resolution mechanisms. The normative framework provides deep, broad, and binding rules with often voluntary compliance while maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity. Finally, the interaction context can be seen as highly amicable, this is derived from a sense of collective identity.

## *Cybersecurity*

Cybersecurity is a relatively new issue for the Pacific, this explains why only some Pacific countries have enacted cybercrime legislation or are actively developing legislation modelled after the Budapest Convention (PRIF, 2019, p. 22; UNCTAD, 2020). However, several regional initiatives and organisations are created to enhance cooperation and create awareness in light of cybersecurity. In 2017 the Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network (PaCSON) was created to enhance regional cooperation and collaboration, information sharing, and develop incident response capabilities (PaCSON, n.d.). Moreover, the Pacific Islands Law Officers' Network (PILON) has set up a Cyber Crime Working Group. The Working Group promotes the accession of PILON members to the Council of Europe's Budapest Convention (PILON, n.d.). In addition, the Doe Declaration Action Plan emphasises the need for promotion and support for member state accession to the Budapest Convention (PIF Secretariat, 2018, p. 19), highlighting the importance of the Convention as a framework for regional cooperation. However, only two Pacific countries, Australia and Tonga, are currently parties to the Budapest Convention, and New Zealand is an observer country (Council of Europe, n.d.).

Another regional initiative is created by the Australian Police together with the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) and is called the Cyber Safety Pasifika (CSP) programme. It is created to enhance awareness and provide baseline training for the SPC, in how to stay safe online (PRIF, 2019, p. 9; Cyber Safety Pasifika, 2018, p. 1). Moreover, the CROP has set up an ICT Working Group which created the Pacific Regional ICT Strategic Action Plan (CROP ICT Working Group, 2015). In addition, the sub-regional organisations acknowledge the importance of cybersecurity but have not yet developed a binding legalised framework. In their Regional Security Strategy, the second strategic priority of the MSG is "to strengthen governance over cyberspace in the MSG region" (MSG Secretariat, 2019, p. 24). The Polynesian Leaders Group expressed their growing concerns on cybercrime and threats and emphasise the need for cooperation to enhance cybersecurity (Polynesian Leaders Group, 2018).

Despite this comprehensive framework of regional initiatives and organisations constructed to ensure cyber safety, no (sub-)regional binding legislative framework is created to govern cybersecurity. However, since these initiatives and organisations do govern cybersecurity in the Pacific nowadays, the analysis will look into them despite their non-binding nature. Since there is no binding regional framework governing cybercrime, countries

rely on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Acts that are present within national legislation to deal with the transboundary nature of cybercrime (PILON, 2020, pp. 41-62).

### Security Referent

The PaCSON does not provide a clear security referent. They touch upon the threat coming from cybercriminals (PaCSON, n.d.), but it remains unclear if these threats originate from within or outside the region. The Cybercrime Working Group of PILON on the other hand acknowledges the borderless nature of cybercrimes and the possibility to commit cybercrimes from anywhere across the globe (PILON, n.d.). In the Strategic Plan of 2016-2018, PILON states: “The borderless nature of cybercrime means it can occur anywhere there is access to the internet” (PILON, 2015, p. 7). The security referent thus might arise from within the region and from outside the region. Within the Boe Declaration Action Plan, cybercrimes are specified as “[...] illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system interference, misuse of devices, computer related forgery, computer related fraud, child pornography, and copyright breaches” (PIF Secretariat, 2018, p. 19). There is no mentioning of where these threats might originate from. However, it is acknowledged that accession to the global networked economy provides substantial benefits and significant risks (PIF Secretariat, 2018, p. 19). Consequently, the threat may arise from the global networked economy and thus the security referent can originate from within and outside the region. Both sub-regional organisations emphasise the increasing threats posed by cyber-attacks and call for a collaborative response. However, they do not specify where the threat originates from (MSG Secretariat, 2019, p. 24; Polynesian Leaders Group, 2018). Overall, the security referent within the regional framework governing cybersecurity is hard to pinpoint. Cyber threats may originate from both within and outside the region. Linking these findings to the different security governance systems as presented earlier proves to be difficult. Since the findings do not provide a clear answer, it is impossible to attribute a specific system to the findings.

### System Regulator

Since there is no legally binding framework in place yet to govern cybersecurity, a system regulator needs to be found within the regional initiatives and organisations as presented above and the agreements establishing the organisations. Nevertheless, the PIF does have several declarations that aim to strengthen regionalism and security cooperation. These

declarations are part of the security systems governing all non-traditional security threats. These declarations thus can provide a proper basis for dispute resolution within the PIF. Within the Biketawa Declaration resolution of conflicts and crises follow a specific institutionalised path in which conflict resolution by peaceful means and the use of customary practices are central (PIF, 2000, pp. 1-2). Moreover, within the Boe Declaration, the PIF leaders reaffirm “the importance of the rules-based international order founded on the UN Charter, adherence to relevant international law and resolution of international disputes by peaceful means” (PIF Secretariat, 2018, p. 7). This statement clearly indicates that the system regulator within the PIF is based upon the rule of law to mitigate conflict. As stated before, the MSG uses dialogue as a dispute settlement mechanism and falls back on the Chair of the Leaders’ Summit if dialogue proves to be ineffective (UN, 2010, pp. 7-15). There is no specific mechanism governing disputes within the cybersecurity governance system. However, since the Pacific consists of multiple organisations that govern bilateral and multilateral relations, the system regulator can be found within these organisations and their charters. The findings as presented above, lead to a Contractual or Fused Security Community, because conflict resolution is based upon international or regional law, and the mechanisms are institutionalised.

### Normative Framework

The CROP ICT Working Group Regional ICT Strategic Action Plan acknowledges the sovereignty of countries and territories to adopt and implement national policies and legislation plans (CROP ICT Working Group, 2015, p. 1). However, one of the key priorities of the Action Plan is to implement a regional strategy to increase effectiveness and coordination (CROP ICT Working Group, 2015, p. 6). Moreover, the Action plan aims to revive the Pacific Emergency Response Team (PacCERT) (CROP ICT Working Group, 2015, p. 15). PacCERT was established to regionally “[...] facilitate, coordinate and monitor activities related to cybersecurity to secure fast and effective response to cybersecurity and threats” (ITU, 2015, p. 6). Nonetheless, PacCERT ceased to exist due to a lack of fundings (ITU, 2015, p. 12). This indicates that the norms for cooperation are present, however, they are not yet fully institutionalised within this field. Furthermore, PaCSON was established to foster regional cooperation and collaboration and PILON emphasises the importance of cooperation to deal with criminal cyber offences due to the transboundary nature of cybercrime (PILON, 2020, p. II; PaCSON, n.d.). Moreover, the overall guiding principles of

the CROP, as specified in the charter, highlight the need for cooperation and coordination between Pacific states (CROP, 2019, p. 3). Again, the importance of cooperation and collaboration is acknowledged. Though, the current framework governing cooperation in criminal matters is based upon national Acts of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, no binding rules are created to ensure this cooperation. Overall, the norm of sovereignty is not submissive to norms of cooperation and collaboration. The norms of cooperation and collaboration are underscored as highly important in almost every organisation and initiative governing cybersecurity. However, the legal framework that is present within the Pacific is based upon national legislation. Because the norms of cooperation and collaboration are not yet creating binding rules, the findings point to a Collective Security governance system.

### Interaction Context

As stated before, Pacific countries see each other as friendly. Both the Biketawa Declaration and the Framework for Pacific Regionalism touch directly or indirectly upon the common identity of Pacific countries (PIF, 2000, p. 1; PIF, 2014, p. 1; See interaction context in Environmental Security section). Besides, within the MSG, emphasis is upon the promotion and respect for Melanesian traditions, cultures, and values (MSG, 1988). Moreover, within the Strategic Plan of 2019-2021, PILON emphasises the importance of Pacific regionalism because it enhances a common identity and purpose (PILON, 2018, p. 4). Pacific values, such as “[...] good governance, rule of law, the promotion of human rights and gender equality, justice, and peaceful, safe, and secure communities” (PILON, 2018, p. 4), are seen as highly important for the work of PILON. PILON aims to contribute to these values by ensuring coordination, harmonisation, collaboration, and cooperation (PILON, 2018, p. 4). Overall, the interaction context can be seen as amicable, this amity is derived from a collective identity. Nevertheless, in light of cybersecurity, a common set of norms has not yet been internalised. This means that the findings point towards a Collective Security System.

Within the Pacific, cybersecurity is predominantly governed by national legislation. However, not all Pacific countries have cybersecurity laws in place yet. On a regional level, the Pacific has set up different organisations and initiatives to raise awareness and help with drafting legislation. Nonetheless, there is no regional framework governing cybersecurity, making it hard to pinpoint a security governance system. The four indicators that indicate how cybersecurity is governed, point to different systems, leading to tensions between the variables. Although the variables point to different security systems, it is possible to ascribe

one system to the overall findings. However, the tensions indicate the possibility of a specific security governance system with some aspects of another system. The lines between the systems are not as clear cut as the framework indicates. Combining all the findings, the security system governing cybersecurity can be said to be a Collective Security system, with some features of a Contractual Security Community.

### *Conclusion*

Overall, Pacific countries aim to increase their security by enhancing cooperation. This becomes clear in the several declarations on regional security cooperation and the several regional organisations that are created. Next to these broader organisations and declarations, the Pacific has created organisations and initiatives to deal with specific non-traditional security issues. Pacific countries have developed a comprehensive framework to deal with Environmental Security. Findings show that the system referent and the system regulator in the framework governing Environmental security point towards both a Contractual and a Fused Security Community. The normative framework and the interaction context point towards a Contractual Security Community. Consequently, the system governing Environmental security can be defined as a Contractual Security Community, with some aspects of a Fused Security Community.

Within the Cybersecurity governance system, the security referent does not point to a specific system because the threats may arise from within and outside the region. The system regulator points towards a Contractual or Fused Security Community, while the normative framework and the interaction context appear as a Collective Security system. These tensions between the variables indicate that the security governance systems can overlap; an issue can be governed by a specific system with features of another system, creating a more hybrid system. For the Cybersecurity governance system, this means that it can be seen as a Collective Security system with some features of a Contractual Security Community.

Consequently, the answer to the central research question, '*In what ways does the Pacific region govern non-traditional security threats?*', is as follows. The Pacific has created two different security governance systems to deal with respectively Environmental Security and Cybersecurity. The Pacific region governs Environmental Security through a Contractual Security Community, this means that norms are internalised and sovereignty is partly given in to enhance a cooperative approach. Moreover, the Pacific region governs Cybersecurity through a Collective Security system, in which countries provide aid in times of crisis but sovereignty remains intact. The level of governance in the Pacific differs in the context of different non-traditional security issues.

However, it is important to note that the declarations present within both security governance systems are soft law, they are not legally binding. Despite this non-binding nature of the declarations, they are still important within the security governance system, as they indicate the commitment of the Pacific states to move towards a certain direction and the acceptance

of certain principles. Moreover, efforts need to be directed to enhance the acceptance of common norms dealing with Cybersecurity. In addition, Pacific countries need to develop a proper regional framework to deal with Cybersecurity, the same as they have done to deal with Environmental Security. This needs to be done to adequately deal with the threats arising from cyber-crimes. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the findings of this exploratory research do not tell us anything about the security governance systems in other regions, it is not generalisable. The findings are time and context-specific but they nonetheless tell us something about security governance systems in general, as noted above.

Moreover, future research might look into other non-traditional security threats, such as Transnational Crime or Human Security, to indicate the security governance system present within these areas. Future research might also consider the influence of the tensions between the four indicators of the security governance systems, and how they affect the effectiveness of the systems.

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
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# Annex A


Figure 1: Map of the Pacific Region



Source: (Pacific Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development, 2015).

## Annex B

Figure 2: Overview of Country Membership of the different Regional Organisations in the Pacific Region



<sup>3</sup> (PIF, n.d.(a)).

<sup>4</sup> (Pacific Community, n.d.(b)).

<sup>5</sup> (PIDF, n.d.(b)).

<sup>6</sup> (MSGSEC, n.d.).

<sup>7</sup> (Wyeth, 2018).

<sup>8</sup> Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) of New Caledonia.