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**VENEZUELAN MIGRATION AND PERCEPTION OF CITIZENS  
SECURITY IN BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA: ACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR  
INSECURITY OR VICTIMS OF STIGMATIZATION AND XENOPHOBIA?**

Westerveld, Reinder Jan Douwe

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VENEZUELAN MIGRATION AND PERCEPTION OF CITIZENS SECURITY IN  
BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA

ACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR INSECURITY OR VICTIMS OF STIGMATIZATION  
AND XENOPHOBIA?

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AUTHOR: R.J.D. WESTERVELD

STUDENT NUMBER: 1931261

SUPERVISOR: DR. H.A.S. SOLHEIM

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## **ABSTRACT**

This paper examines the effect of the arrival of Venezuelan migrants in Bogotá from 2017 onwards in relation to the perception of security of the city's inhabitants. This study has been performed succeeding extensive reporting of Colombian media in which Venezuelan migrants were held responsible for what had been named 'a security crisis'. The results of this study show that the arrival of Venezuelan migrants has had a highly negative impact on the perception of security of Bogotá residents. Nevertheless, this study found that it is very unlikely, based upon official statistics, that the Venezuelan migrant population is to be held accountable for the 'security crisis'. This study found that the security crisis, which is in essence a management crisis, is being used as an instrument by the highest political powers in order to attain personal success and slander political opponents. Venezuelan migrants are the victim of this internal power battle, exemplified by the presence of xenophobic and stigmatizing acts and tendencies present in both the political and public domain.

**Key words:** perception of security, citizens security, Venezuelan migration, Bogotá, xenophobia, stigmatization.

## **RESUMEN**

Este trabajo examina el efecto de la llegada de migrantes venezolanos a Bogotá a partir de 2017 en relación con la percepción de seguridad de los habitantes de la ciudad. Este estudio se ha realizado tras una amplia información de los medios de comunicación colombianos en la que se responsabiliza a los migrantes venezolanos de lo que se ha denominado "crisis de seguridad". Los resultados de este estudio muestran que la llegada de los migrantes venezolanos ha tenido un impacto muy negativo en la percepción de seguridad de los habitantes de Bogotá. Sin embargo, este estudio encontró que es muy poco probable, con base en las estadísticas oficiales, que la población migrante venezolana sea responsable de la 'crisis de seguridad'. Este estudio encontró que la crisis de seguridad, que es en esencia una crisis de gestión, está siendo utilizada como un instrumento por los más altos poderes políticos con el fin de alcanzar el éxito personal y calumniar a los opositores políticos. Los migrantes venezolanos son víctimas de esta batalla interna de poder, ejemplificada por la presencia de actos y tendencias xenófobas y estigmatizantes presentes tanto en el ámbito político como en el público.

**Palabras clave:** percepción de seguridad, seguridad ciudadana, migración venezolana, Bogotá, xenofobia, estigmatización.

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## INTRODUCTION

In the context of our contemporary world, security and the perception thereof have evolved into fundamental pillars that are necessary in order to achieve greater levels of development. In many parts of the (Western) world security has become a given, implying that citizenry expects that security is being dealt with and provided by the responsible actors. However, in the region of Latin America this is not the case. For many years, the region has received the infamous title of being the most violent region worldwide. The painful accuracy of this title was reaffirmed following the publication of a report by the Brazilian think tank Igarapé Institute in 2018. The report highlighted that, despite Latin America only hosting 8 percent of the world population, 33 percent of the murders worldwide occur in the region. Consequently, this has caused that over 2,5 million people have died from violence since the beginning of the century. This development intertwined the notion of violence with the Latin American region and contributed to the establishment of demeaning nicknames such as the ‘triangle of violence’ for Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. While academics agree that the factors causing violence are abundant, the most dominant origin of the widespread violence in Latin America is often found in the extensive inequality present in every country of the region.

Colombia, the country standing central in this investigation, is no exception to this trend. For many decades, the country and its citizens found themselves in the middle of continuous bloodshed. This started during the colonization of the country by the Spanish crown in 1499 and lasted until 1810. After independence was gained, internal political power battles continued for many years, resulting in many collisions between ideological opponents which affected large segments of society. To these collisions also belong the country’s civil war involving the paramilitary groupings FARC-EP and the ELN, as well as the war on drugs fought against the Medellín and Cali cartels. These extensive conflicts, which have costed the lives of over 300,000 people, were the reason for Colombia having a leading role in Latin America being actively associated with violence. Whereas this violence disrupted the functioning of the Colombian state and society, it also placed a stain on the country’s reputation in the international domain.

Consequently, for a long time, the number one priority of Colombia’s presidents has been to improve the country’s security situation and to buy leeway in the international domain by restoring the country’s reputation. Although this process has not been easy and continues to this very day, Colombia is no longer in the dark past where it once was. In itself, this has been a major achievement for Colombia and its people. However, based upon the complexity, multitude of actors involved, and the many years it took to enhance security in Colombia, it became evident that the maintaining of security will always remain a work in progress. Hence, this entails that there is no room to lean back or lessen devotion from the topic of security, as (suspected) change can occur suddenly.

That a security status can change unexpectedly, became apparent in Bogotá during the beginning of 2021. During this period, Colombian media outlets extensively covered what they had named ‘a security crisis’. This reportage followed after the publishing of various reports which revealed that the levels of criminality in the city were experiencing unprecedented increases. Continuously brought into connection with these increases was the Venezuelan migrant population residing in the capital city. This population, consisting out of roughly 350.000 people, started to come to Bogotá en masse from 2017-onwards as a result of the humanitarian crisis that is taking place in their home country. Due to the Venezuelan migrant population being brought into connection with the decline in the security status of Bogotá by the media, it is expected that the presence of this group has also had an effect on the perception of security of the city’s residents.

The aim of this paper is to attempt to reveal the effect of Venezuelan migration on the perception of security of Bogotá residents. This will be done by the following research question which will direct the investigation: what effect has Venezuelan migration (2017-onwards) had on citizens perception of security of Bogotá residents? Data collected from literary research, interviews, and a survey which has been distributed among Bogotá residents, will help with trying to answer this research question.

Chapter 1 is committed to presenting the theoretical framework in which this research is embedded. This is done through providing a thorough explanation of the concept of migration in the first section. This section is followed by one in which the concept of perception of insecurity is explained. This section is linked to one in which the role of the government in the provision of citizen security is explained. These two notions have been paired due their interrelatedness. The last section of the first chapter is dedicated to explaining the perception of insecurity in relation to migration and explains how this can lead to xenophobia and stigmatization.

Chapter 2 reveals the historical context of the investigation. This context is presented in three different sections, in which primary focus is placed on the bilateral relations between Colombia and Venezuela during the period 1948-2021. The different sections highlight the most important events which led to considerable changes in security status and/or brought forth extensive migrant streams in either country.

Chapter 3 presents the empirical analysis of the investigation. Subject to analysis is the data derived from fifteen semi-structured interviews, literary research, and a survey answered by 47 Bogotá residents. Whereas the primary focus of the chapter is to find out the effect of Venezuelan migration on the perception of citizen security of Bogotá residents, it also tasked with highlighting various factors which are ought to have contributed greatly to the creation of the current ‘security crisis’.

## CHAPTER 1: MIGRATION AND SECURITY – A THEORETICAL APPROACH

This first chapter provides an insight into the current academic debate and theoretical background relevant to this study. In the first section of this chapter, an explanation on the concept of ‘migration’ is given. This section is followed by a part that elaborates on the concept of ‘perception of insecurity’ and the role of the government in the provision of security and the maintaining thereof. Following this explanation, the last section provides an insight in how migration is being brought into connection with insecurity in our contemporary world.

### 1.1 MIGRATION

The leading understanding of the concept of migration is that it entails a change in residence, either temporary or permanent, depending upon the type of movement to which is being referred (Pardo Montano, 2015). Other scholars, such as Vivas (2007) Campbell and Crawford (2012) and Guerra Palmero (2017), have taken on a much broader definition of the concept and argue that it encompasses every form of displacement of a given population from the place of origin to another destination, entailing the passing of any given border be it political, administrative, or ecological. Although the understandings of the concept of migration show differences, research has proven that for millions of years, migration is one of the fundamental means of human adaptation used to avoid risks and to access opportunities, causing humans to be considered a true migratory species (Donato et al., 2016; Rodríguez, 2007).

Although the human species has an extensive history as migratory subject, it were the processes of early capitalism and globalization, stemming from a period of consolidation after the Second World War, that have caused for an unprecedented acceleration and intensification of migratory processes. With the term globalization is meant the speedup and increase of both movements and exchanges of capital, services, cultural practices, and technologies all over the world (Beck, 2018). It are these changes that have constructed and maintain the high levels of worldwide interconnectedness as experienced in our contemporary world (Ibid.). This process, in combination with improved transportation, global communication, and political change on multiple continents, have caused that there is virtually no country in the world that is unaffected by a migratory movement, either internal or international, or as a sending or recipient country (Brettell, 2007; Uhsan Ullah, 2010).

Though the process of globalization and its subsequent interconnectedness have caused improvements in the (economic) well-being of many, it is also observed as a factor that is inherently connected to inequality. In order to be able to participate and also gain from the process of globalization, many (developing) countries introduced neoliberal economic policies that are regarded as the driving force behind inequality (ACNUR, 2016; Castles, 2003). Consequently, increasing amounts of people have been pushed to leave their places of origin in order to search for better opportunities. Currently, it is estimated that the total number of migrants worldwide exceeds 270 million, which would make it the

world's 6<sup>th</sup> most populous nation (Dao et al., 2021). It is expected that this number will continue to grow by over 4 percent each year in the near future, primarily caused by violence and conflict, persistent violation of human rights, and climate change (Anda et al., 2021; Suarez-Orozco, 2019).

Erdal and Oeppen (2018) explain that the magnitude of migratory groups and their predicted growth for the upcoming years, has established a particular trend in the field of migration that is related to naming. This trend encompasses the tendency to either name migration forced or voluntary. Here, voluntary is understood as acted out of choice and no compulsion (Zaloznaya et al., 2012). It is underlined that many governments regularly refer to most migration types as being 'voluntary', as it allows for an easier bureaucratic classification. However, while making the forced-voluntary distinction might be easy in the most extreme cases, research has proven that the vast majority of migrants falls somewhere in the blurry middle of this dichotomy (Salomon et al., 2017). As a result, this distinction which presents the reasons behind migration as a zero-sum game, has been named highly problematic (Charron, 2020).

This does not rhyme with the contemporary migratory processes, as they are characterized by their high levels of complexity (Pellegrino et al., 2001). This is in contrast to the past when fixed borders, passports and visas did not exist, allowing individuals to cross freely. Nowadays, countries are often presented with large diverse groups of migrants who often enter undocumented, unauthorized, or illegally in the search for better opportunities (Money et al., 2021). These flows prove that the current system of passports and visas and the closing of national borders is not sufficient to regulate these groups of people (Ibid.). In an attempt to regulate migrants, they are often classified as either labour migrant, refugee, or permanent resident by the national governments of the receiving countries (Massey, 1999). This is done with the aim to be able to subject these individuals to a certain immigration policy, which is the outcome of a political process and bargaining game in which is determined whether to encourage, discourse, or to coordinate flows of incoming migrant groups (Ibid). Currently, in the globalized world, most countries and societies prefer labour migrants over refugees and permanent residents. This preference is caused by the fact that labour migrants, in contrast to refugees and permanent residents, require less work in the administrative domain as often papers do not have to be handed out (Martínez, 2010). In addition, in many (Western) societies, the vision exists that labour migrants contribute something to society in which they are entering, as they often work full-time for a low wage in less desired sectors of the respective labour market (Buckley et al., 2017).

The usage of labels is something that is inherently connected to the discourse present within the field of migration (Cole, 2020). Discourse represents a certain way of thinking, which facilitates and supports the social construction of 'reality' (Foucault, 1972). This is often done through language, which has the capacity to research the domains of possibility, meaning establishing what should be seen as acceptable and what not (Capstick, 2021). Zetter (1991, 2007) showed that the usage of labels to describe migrants also majorly influences the selection of responses, as what is seen as 'acceptable' and which are seen



as 'possible'. Consequently, the label given to a certain migrant, for example refugee or economic migrant, has a significant influence on their treatment by immigration authorities, humanitarian actors and even international organizations (Feller, 2005; Ottonelli and Torresi, 2013).

The usage of labels and the discourse present in the contemporary world have also caused a relatively new tendency, namely, wanting to restrict migration. Often as part of the discourse used both in the public and political domain, the word 'crisis' is being connected directly with the influx of migrants. Here, the word crisis is not solely a heading of a series of events, but rather a symbolic frame of thinking about our contemporary world (Dines et al., 2018). It is placed as an epistemological deadlock that will serve as the basis upon which alternative futures are found (Daly, 2020). The word has evolved in more than a word that describes a series of events, as it has become a narrative device that generates an array of meanings that carry the ability to structure our knowledge of social phenomena. Consequently, this has an important effect on the structures of governance and its subsequent decisions made within the policy domain (Strasser et al., 2021). Furthermore, the crisis narrative and the widespread acceptance thereof have enabled the managing of migration as a binary issue. This is particularly demonstrated by debates involving these divisions such as the integration versus segregation, modernity versus cultured backwardness, and the worthy versus the unworthy debates (Crawly and Skleparis, 2018).

However, most notably, the use of the crisis discourse provides the space necessary for one of the most contested debates within the migration realm, namely the temporality versus permanence debate (Martínez, 2010). In many countries, the use of this discourse has led to high levels of preoccupation among virtually all levels of society. The most prominent argument that is being used is the supposed danger posed by migrant groups with respect to social security protection and the labour market. Due to the process of globalization, we have the idea that we are part of a collective, which has made it harder psychologically to accept people perceived to be part of a so called 'outside group' (Kinnvall et al. 2010). The arrival of these groups generates a feeling of certain ambivalence as it is often perceived that the status-quo to which many have adjusted themselves, is no longer a given. As a result of this, many countries have imposed stricter entry requirements for migrants as this is ought to permit the enhancement of the management of migrant streams (Mahuteau et al., 2014). Additionally, the controlling of migratory streams is also increasingly brought into connection with the controlling of the perception of insecurity or the enhancing thereof.

## 1.2 PERCEPTION OF INSECURITY

It is important to note that the perception of insecurity is something radically different than insecurity. Insecurity is a true objective situation involving a risk of victimization, when in fact the perception of insecurity is a subjective perception formed around this risk (Mincke, 2010). Despite insecurity and the perception of insecurity being two separate notions, it does not exclude the latter from being a social reality (Ambrey et al., 2014). Often, this perception is felt by a larger segment of a given society and therefore also influences behaviour and the quality of life that is experienced. Hence, it is being taken very seriously by governments worldwide.

Although it might seem apparent to assume that the perception stems from an objective situation involving an actual risk, this is not automatically the case, meaning that the perception of insecurity can be radically different when being compared to, for example, official crime statistics (Indermaur and Roberts, 2005). Research has proven that the origins of the perception of insecurity are abundant and diverse (Shon, 2012). Robert and Pottier (1997) performed research at the institutional level and concluded that factors such as the efficiency and capacity of the government and the presence of its actors (i.e. police) have a major influence on the perception that citizens have. Furthermore, Lagrange (1984), Pearson et al. (2013), and van der Put et al. (2010) demonstrated that the sex and psychic state of an individual are also determinants that should be taken into account, as they can influence the level of anxiety and perceived level of exposure. Nevertheless, social factors seem to be of the most decisive influence on the perception that an individual or collective has. These factors include household income, level of education, and the environment in which people live (Hernandez, 2019). Due to these factors being of such importance, generally, the perception of insecurity of people living in neighbourhoods classified as 'low-income' or 'poor' is worse than the perception of those living in more upscale ones. Research performed by Roche (1998) in Grenoble, and Mincke (2010) in Brussels, and Valera and Guàrdia Olmos (2019) in Barcelona highlighted this.

The connection made between living in a 'low-income' household and having a worse perception of insecurity also raised a lot of questions. The broken window theory, proposed by Wilson and Kelling in 1982, was formed as an attempt at explaining this possible correlation. The theory is formed upon the premises that crime is fundamentally spatial in nature due to the fact that it takes place in a particular space such as a neighbourhood. However, the theory suggests that crime might coincide to environmental characteristics of a particular neighbourhood if criminal activity is founded upon indicators that transmit a sentiment of crime tolerance within a given surrounding (Price, 2016; Ortiguiera-Sánchez, 2016). Within the broken window theory, housing characteristics are the indicators used to argue that there might be a sentiment of crime tolerance present. This is demonstrated by arguing that broken glass on the ground and broken windows on houses can be a sign of crime toleration present within a neighbourhood, as they are likely to be caused by illegal behaviour such as vandalism and violence (Sousa and Kelling, 2006). Likewise, it is argued that the presence of these two indicators also

represents the fact that citizens of these neighbourhoods are less likely to react unfavourably to further deprivation due to being accustomed to it (Skogan, 1990). Due to these aspects being more present in the 'low-income' households, this theory has been particularly influential in trying to explain the occurrence of crime in certain areas. Nevertheless, it is important to remain aware of the fact that this theory does not serve as an explanation for all situations (Alves Diniz et al., 2021). Inherently connected to the broken-window-theory is the government, due to being the most decisive factor in the security realm.

### 1.2.1. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PROVISION OF CITIZEN SECURITY

In the world as we know it today, the provision of citizen security is seen as a task of the government, for which it has become the most essential, as well as a normalized task (Hammerstad et al., 2015). People trust the government and perceive that their security is a given. The idea of citizen security and its subsequent discourse started to evolve in the 1990s post-Cold-War era, which demonstrated the need for context-specific analysis (Gasper et al., 2015). As a result of this, the United Nations introduced the seven dimensions of citizen security which involved the economic, nutritional, health, environmental, personal, community, and political realms (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2016). Despite the widening of the security scope, it is often argued that the realm of personal security is by far the most important. This is also found in the early works of thinker Thomas Hobbes, who incorporated citizen security in his so-called social-contract theory, which was published in his most famous work *Leviathan*. Here, Hobbes described how a central authority would be able to maintain collective peace and order (Turner, 2020). For him, the sovereign, which would be the state as we know it today, was the most powerful body present and the only body capable to defend the people successfully. Hobbes believed that security threats were imminent due to his belief in human beings possessing the natural right to self-preservation. According to him, human beings would do everything in order for their survival, allowing for an existence in which the desire and attitude to kill are part of the human being's state of nature. In response to this acute security threat, Hobbes designed the social-contract theory. Here, people unite into a collective under the sovereign and give up a degree of their own sovereignty to the sovereign, in exchange for their security. The sacrifice of individual liberty was understood as one of the key elements in Hobbes' theory, in order for people to be able to enjoy the advantages of being part of civil society (Crawford, 2020). The theory explains that even though individuals are being deprived from their sheer liberty, they will still comply due to it simply being safer. In addition, as Hobbes highlights, the forming of the collective could also bring forth other possible advantages, which are based upon a common economic, social, and political purpose (Ibid). Although Hobbes expressed his exceptional respect for the sovereign, he recognized that the task of governing could not be undertaken by a single person. Therefore, he underlined the necessity to appoint ministers and civil officers that would assist in this task, arguing that their appointment was intrinsically part of the same sovereignty (Turner, 2020).

The social contract theory is still of significant importance in today's world. This is exemplified by the fact that the performance of a certain state in the security realm is used as a frame of reference upon which the whole functioning of the state is being judged by both in- and outsiders. This is made more complex due to the fact that the security realm is one of the few realms that is able to affect the individual and the communal levels (Lonsdale, 2020). This is to say that problems in the security realm often spill over into other ones with the threat of creating much larger, often intersectional, problems that affect much larger amounts of people. Thus, it is viewed as the number one priority by governments worldwide.

The fact that governments are so cautious about security is aggravated further by the fact that their performance in the security realm is used to determine the level of legitimacy. Here, the term legitimacy refers to the extent that an institution is needed to be obeyed and therefore exists (Cottrell, 2016). This term is inherently political and is contingent in nature, exemplified by its rooting in the consent and justification of the community in question, which is ruled by the institution (Ibid). It is often argued that legitimacy serves as the tool that turns power into authority. In addition, the performance in the security realm is also being used to measure the capacities of individual states. Although state capacity is a complex concept, here it should be understood as the extent to which states and its apparatuses are capable and willing to protect its citizens and execute policy (Englehart, 2009). The concept puts central that a state should be able to protect its citizens in order for its sheer survival, meaning that people will refuse to be governed if a state proves to be unable to protect them. This will cause a state of chaos, which could imply a possible collapse of the state which would turn it into a 'failed' one. Although the concept of failed state is highly controversial, it is often used to discuss the upholding of citizen security, government performance and the perception of (in)security in countries dealing with terrorism such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Congo.

### 1.3 PERCEPTION OF INSECURITY IN RELATION TO MIGRATION

As a result of the international terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, migration has been brought into direct connection with insecurity. Borders and the entry of unknown individuals have become security issues per se and facilitated the invention and implementation of new security techniques such as biometrics and matrix of databanks to assess the risk of individuals and migrants as potential criminals or terrorists (Humphrey, 2013). Whereas the attacks caused the world to be covered in a blanket of fear for months, the terrorist attacks also served as the catalyser for the securitization of migration, or put in other words, the constitution of migration as a risk (Edjus et al., 2021). Securitization usually happens within the political realm by framing policy questions or situations in such a way that the survival of the state and the sentiment of fear stand central (Huysmans, 2006). Securitization has become emblematic for 21<sup>st</sup> century politics and is an incredible powerful device, as it is actively associated with generating political priority that justifies extraordinary measures in the legal, policy and policing domains (Leonard, 2007). This has given rise to what is known as the concept of 'politics of insecurity'.

The concept involves the manners used by political actors to name and rename perceived threats, while at the same time, offering a promising answer to this threat (Béland, 2020). As a result of this, a sense of collective insecurity within a given society is being constructed.

The creation of collective insecurity often affects large segments of society and has the force to affect the ontological and existential nature of human beings, as presented in the theory of human existence by Anthony Giddens. Due to migration, we see that large segments enter a stage of ontological insecurity and existential anxiety. This entails that people lose their basic sense of trust and confidence in the world, as they are no longer able to perceive the world as they once did through affecting their lived and imagined experience (Giddens, 1991).

However, it is important to highlight that the media also has a crucial role in diffusing a particular view within the migration-security debate. Within our globalized world, the (social) media could arguably be seen as one of the most powerful apparatuses, as they have transformed in what are called ‘cultural authorities’ (Kristensen et al., 2018). This implies that they shape and represent current events which are of paramount importance in the forming of our attitudes towards certain subjects, as well as how we understand the world around us (Berry et al., 2015). Generally, this influence is exerted through bringing the news using a technique known as ‘framing’. Framing implies the selection of certain aspects from a perceived reality and their subsequent enhancement or exaggeration in all forms of media (Entman, 1993). This can have substantial influence on the point of view of an individual or collective, as shown in the research of Gottlob and Boomgaarden (2020), which explored the effect of framing in Austrian and French media during the 2015 European refugee crisis.

In addition, the media also use a certain narrative, which should be understood as the stories that are constructed by people in order to make sense of their reality (Andrews et al., 2015). Narratives are very useful, as they allow us to understand who we are and where we come from (Gaffey, 2021). Nonetheless, narratives are most powerful when they start to provide truths that are perceived as paradigmatic, meaning imperative and given (Kōnstantopoulou, 2021). Patterson and Monroe (1998) showed that these narratives actively constrain action, as they have the capacity to both create and maintain that what is thought to be right in a specific context. This also means that if a certain narrative becomes institutionalized, which implies that the narrative has been adopted by a government or other authorities, it is very unlikely that it will be challenged or questioned. This is something which is very problematic, especially in the field of migration, as it is of utmost importance that context-specific action is taken within the migration field.

When this is not done accurately, the outcomes can be very unpleasant for migrants. One of the most prevalent unpleasant outcomes is xenophobia, which is created and maintained by framing techniques and narratives. Xenophobia is an attitude and strong behavioural prejudice, or even disdain, towards immigrants and individuals perceived as foreign often stemming from fear (Olowu, 2008). This notion

is strongly related with the feelings of both ethnocentrism and nationalism, which both holster strong sentiments of being superior to others which do not belong to the given nation-state. Extensive research has been devoted to trying to unravel the foundations of this feeling and attitude. Research of Esses et al. (2005), pointed out that so called 'nativistic' features are to be seen as leading in the forming of xenophobic sentiments and tendencies. Nativistic features relate ones belonging to a group or identity solely to birth. This implies that one's sense of being is demarcated during birth, something which causes enhanced negative feelings towards foreigners. Although xenophobia is a notion which has been consistently present throughout history, it is especially pertinent in times which are marked by economic or political instability (Yakusho, 2009). Both situations often ignite large movements of people that start to cross borders or relocate somewhere else within the country. This movement often creates friction due to large segments of society perceiving that this movement will cause economic strains (Timmer and Williamson, 1998; Meyers, 2007). In addition, many also perceive that these people will be unable to assimilate culturally, will cause rapid demographic changes, and will lessen their influence in politics (Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco, 1995).

These views also enable the creation of a certain stigma surrounding migrants. Here, a stigma should be understood as a mark of disgrace that is associated with immigrants and is given prematurely. A stigma can be recognized by two features. The first feature signifies the characterization of a group of people as being different due to having a social feature which all members of this group have, and which the 'naming' group does not have (Eijbarts et al. 2016). This enables the second feature of the stigma, namely, that the carriers of the stigma are being devalued or even dehumanized, 'from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one (Goffman, 1968: 3). Research of Roggeband and Verloo (2006), and Brünig and Fleischmann (2015) on stigmas around the veiling of Muslim women and migrants in France and the Netherlands has shown that stigmas can be very troublesome as they almost dictate the rules of the game with regards to how Muslim women and migrants should be treated and viewed, prohibiting both entry and integration into society.

## CHAPTER 2: COLOMBIA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS: HISTORICAL MUTUAL DEPENDENCY AND COMPLEXITY

This chapter provides the historical background necessary in order to fully grasp the context in which this research is embedded. This will be done through three different sections in which the most important events are named and is explained what their impact was on migration and citizen security. The first section describes the start of the armed internal conflict and the war on drugs in Colombia and highlights the dependency of Colombian migrants on Venezuela during this period. This is followed by a section in which is explained how the relationship between the two countries changes drastically after the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1999 and Álvaro Uribe in Colombia in 2002. The last section of this chapter describes how, after the death of Chávez in 2013 and the rise of Nicolás Maduro, increased tensions between Colombia and Venezuela led to a deadlock in bilateral relations and contributed to the outbreak of the current humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and subsequent migratory streams to Colombia.

### 2.1: COLOMBIA (1948-1998): DEPENDENT UPON WEALTHY VENEZUELA DUE TO PERSISTENT CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

For many decades, Colombia's political system solely consisted out of two political parties: the Conservatives and the Liberals. Although the two parties existed side-by-side, the Conservative party was all-powerful and dictated in all realms of society (Uribe-Castro, 2019). This was possible due to the interests of all large landowners (*Latifundistas*), uniting in the political party during a period in which Colombia was still an agrarian society at large (Gómez, 2016). As a result of this, power remained insular and was only distributed to those believed to be standing at the top of society. Similarly, this strong sense of entitlement towards power, stemming from coloniality, came with the attitude that it was acceptable to eliminate anyone or anything ought to pose a threat to this (Quijano, 2005). Eventually, this thought led to the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948, who was the candidate of the Liberal Party for the presidential elections of 1949. Following his murder, Colombia entered a civil war known as *La Violencia* which lasted until 1960. During this period, the Conservatives and Liberals fought over the political control of the country which costed the lives of 200.000 people, corresponding to around 2% of the total population (Chacón et al., 2011). In addition, it is estimated that around one million Colombians were forcibly displaced, with the vast majority relocating somewhere else in the country.

After both parties formally decided to end their dispute in the beginning of the 60s, various leftist dissident groups had already been established. Most notably, it is believed that the conflict provided the birth ground for Colombia's most notorious guerrilla group: *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), best known by their Spanish acronym FARC-EP (Livingstone, 2004). The guerrilla group was formed directly around the Marxist-socialist ideology and vocalized the wishes and needs of peasants and others situated at the

bottom of society (Marks, 2017). They did so via making specific demands towards the Colombian government focusing on large-scale land reform, base prices for agricultural goods, provision of agrarian credit, and the provision of healthcare and education (Rochlin, 2003). Simultaneously to the establishment of the FARC-EP, was the formation of another guerrilla group that fought out of the same leftist ideology and for the same principles, namely the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) (National Liberation Army). The rise of the FARC-EP and ELN caused the rule of the central government to be heavily undermined, as it was the first time that a radical political alternative gained significant momentum (Feldmann, 2017).

Attempting at halting the influence of the guerrilla groupings and the further spreading of Marxist ideology in Colombia, rural landowners were encouraged by the government to form paramilitary groups (Holmes et al., 2021). The government did this through acknowledging that it was incapable to provide security for citizens residing in the countryside. Following this acknowledgement, Decree 3398 of 1965 in combination with Law 48 of 1968, transformed this confirmation into an actual policy (Cubides Cipagauta, 2008). The signing of this decree and law meant that the paramilitary groups were officially part of the counterinsurgency war fought by the Colombian government against the guerrilla groups, something which is also formally stated in the government's Operation Manual of Contraguerrilla (*Manual de Operaciones de Contraguerrilla*) (Pérez Pérez, 1999). This entailed that the groups were supported by the national government and also received funding for their practices. Due to their existence being tolerated and their expansion being encouraged, paramilitary groups evolved as the official extension of the Colombian government outside of the urban areas (Rueda et al., 2016). The battles between the two groupings were ferocious and were next to gaining (renewed) control over land, also related to gaining control over natural resources such as nickel, coffee, coal, and petroleum, as these were among Colombia's primary export products (Molleda et al., 2008). These continuous bloody battles caused a significant decline in overall security in Colombia, resulting in the first visible migratory streams of Colombians towards Venezuela (Ibid.).

Those forced to leave Colombia due to the conflict chose for neighbouring Venezuela, as it had in sharp contrast to Colombia, been experiencing a very pleasant transformation. Due to the discovery of the world's largest oil reserves near the Orinoco basin, Venezuela's position vis-à-vis the rest of the world had changed drastically (Portillo, 2016). The newly found resource converted the Latin American country into one of the key players in the worldwide energy market (Toro Hardy, 1992). Furthermore, the discovery of oil caused the country to gain significant leverage in the international arena, as the energy supply of many countries depended upon Venezuelan oil, especially the United States (Herbstreuth, 2014). Additionally, due to high oil prices, Venezuela experienced an unprecedented financial transformation. This caused the country's economy to be the most stable and prosperous in the region (De La Peja, 2016). The stability experienced in the economic realm spilled over into the political one, exemplified by Venezuela possessing the strongest and most transparent democracy



during a period in which various Latin American nations experienced the rise of a military dictatorship (Arenas, 2010). This political and economic stability, in combination with an abundance of labour opportunities, were the pull-factors for thousands of Colombian migrants at the time.

Aiming at being able to guarantee these high levels of stability and prosperity, Venezuela's oil industry was nationalized under President Pérez in 1976 (Almandoz, 2017). This decision brought forth the positioning of the oil industry as Venezuela's backbone. Slowly but steadily, the country started to abandon production in other sectors, which increased dependency on imports. Most notably, at the end of the 80s, the country had lost a significant degree of its food independency (Felicien et al., 2018). Subsequently, a wide range of basic food items such as rice and frozen meat had to be imported from Colombia (Ibid.). This strengthened the mutual dependency between the two countries, as they became each other's most important trade partner, with trade figures between the two countries increasing ever since (Mario Battaglino, 2012). During this same period, resistance from citizenry against the oil-backed Venezuelan democratic project started to out itself. This resistance was provoked due to heavy fluctuations in oil prices, causing severe economic and political turmoil following the spread of an extensive economic crisis throughout the Latin American region known as the 'lost decade' (Fraga, 2004). Food prices went up dramatically and the national currency had to be devalued for the first time, highlighting the volatility of the Venezuelan economy. Consequently, for the first time Venezuelans were confronted with empty shelves in the supermarkets. Responding to the economic and political crisis, the Venezuelan government invited transnational oil corporations to join in the country's oil sector through *Petroleos de Venezuela* (PdvsA), the national oil corporation (Philip, 1999). This inclusion brought back the peace and stability that the country was known for.

Whereas Venezuela was experiencing relative stability and calmness, the situation in Colombia had taken a turn for the worse. Despite its efforts and help from paramilitaries, the government had not been successful in stopping the guerrilla movements. On the contrary, both the FARC-EP and ELN had grown substantially in size and had become more powerful, which caused a significant intensification in the conflict. The gaining of power of both parties was intrinsically related to becoming active in the drug-industry in the beginning of the 80s. Both groupings had resorted to the cultivation and smuggling of cocaine in order to be able to fund their practices (Thoumi, 2002). Due to demand for the drug being at an all-time high in the USA and Europe during that period, Colombia's cocaine industry rapidly turned into a multi-billion-dollar business. This development intertwined with the rise of the notorious drug cartels of Cali and Medellín, who along with the FARC-EP and ELN, also fought over control in both rural and urban areas, cocaine production plants, and against the central government and paramilitaries (Gutiérrez et al., 2020). Consequently, Colombia entered the most bloody and violent phase of its civil war. During this phase, the Colombian government had completely lost its monopoly over violence and was totally incapable to provide any form of security for its citizens (Bedoya, 2006). This was largely caused due to the paramilitary groups, who once fought on the side of the government,

had evolved into death squads, hired assassins, and self-defence groups that carried out their own justice (Nussio, 2011). Hence, during these years, Colombia was persistently ranked as the most dangerous country in the world, due to its extortionate high murder rate (Gutiérrez-Sanin, 2008).

Colombia had turned into a lawless country in which murder, forced disappearances, kidnapping, and rape had become daily occurrences. This led to President Vargas issuing Decree 1194 in 1989, which ended the cooperation between the government and the paramilitaries and turned them into illegal entities (Holmes et al., 2021). Nevertheless, this was not enough to halt the widespread insecurity, as exemplified by the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Galán, the bombing of the headquarters of newspaper *El Espectador*, and the in-flight bombing of Avianca flight 203, all within a 2-month period. Following these events, it became evident that the country's political institutions were broken, which led to sustained calls for constitutional reform. Eventually, these calls were answered and facilitated the introduction of the 1991 Constitution. This constitution ended the two-party system that had been in place for decades and aided the decentralization of politics, something with which the central government hoped to restore security and stability in the country (Benson, 2021). However, this did not happen, resulting in the country continuing to be in a constant state of absolute insecurity and emergency. This resulted in millions of Colombians to be forcibly displaced (Dueñas et al., 2014). Due to relative security and political stability being present in neighbouring Venezuela, many Colombians decided to resettle there, creating the first colossal migrant stream between the two countries.

While receiving large amounts of Colombian migrants, Venezuela was already in a process of transformation. At the beginning of the 90s, Hugo Chávez had emerged as the alternative political leader and was challenging the status-quo through his Marxist inspired ideology. Through his anti-imperialist rhetoric, he spread messages against US involvement in Venezuela and against the country's economic elite who had kept power and wealth insular since the discovery of the country's oil reserves (Andrade, 2020). As a consequence, Chávez gained immense popularity among poor Venezuelans. This increase in support caused him to gain significant bargaining power, leading to Chávez attempting to take power for the first time in 1992 through the coup d'état against President Pérez. This attempt failed, resulting in Chávez being imprisoned for two years. After his release, he continued his quest for far-reaching changes, bringing forth unprecedented levels of political complexity in the country (Heath, 2009). Nonetheless, the situation in Venezuela was still considered much better than in Colombia. The political apparatuses of the country had still been unable to find a solution for the country's armed internal conflict, which contributed to the emergence of another far-right paramilitary group, the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (United Self-Defenses of Colombia) (AUC) in 1997 (García Pérez, 2016).

Under the presidency of Andrés Pastrana, who assumed office in 1998, Colombia initiated official peace talks with the FARC-EP and ELN for the first time. Initially, these peace talks seemed successful, exemplified by the establishment of a demilitarized safe haven for the guerrilla groups. Nevertheless,

shortly after starting these peace talks, Pastrana decided to end them. This abrupt end to an already fragile attempt at establishing peace, resulted in the worsening of security and a heavy decline in Pastrana's approval ratings (Kline, 2007). As a consequence, the desire for a radical political alternative started to develop among many Colombians.

## 2.2: RELATIONS UNDER THE PRESIDENCIES OF HUGO CHÁVEZ (1998 - 2013) AND ÁLVARO URIBE (2002 – 2010): POLARIZATION, UBIQUITOUS DISAGREEMENT, AND NEW MIGRANT STREAMS

Following upon his failed coup attempt, Chávez continued his quest for a radical political alternative in Venezuela. This radical alternative consisted out of disassembling both the political parties in power and the foundation upon which it had been constructed (López Maya and Panzarelli, 2011). According to Chávez, this foundation consisted out of the country's elites, which he perceived to be corrupt to the bone and responsible for the failure of the political system. Thus, highlighting the dire need for dismantling (Rodríguez, 2003). Eventually, this resulted in him being elected as president in 1998. His election caused a political landslide in the region, as it was the first time that the radical left had come to power by popular vote. Subsequent to his election, Chávez consolidated his ideas in a new constitution which was introduced and implemented in 1999. The introduction of the constitution was the starting point of what Chávez called 'the Bolivarian Revolution', a revolution named after the liberator of the Latin American region, Simón Bolívar. Through this revolution, Chávez sought to nullify Western influence in the region and to build an inter-American coalition with countries in the region. These ideas stemmed from his firm belief in Bolivarianism, an ideology constructed upon pan Hispanic, socialist, and national-patriotic ideals (Strønen, 2020). This ideology is also the base upon which Chávez expressed his profound discontent relating to the involvement of foreign actors and companies in Venezuela. Principally, this referred to the involvement of the US in the foreign relations of Venezuela as well as the presence of US companies in its oil sector (Sagarzazu et al., 2019).

His rhetoric stated that the opulence derived from the sector should contribute to the welfare of the Venezuelan people, and not to those he considered to be part of the country's elite. In addition, he stressed that the involvement of foreign (mostly US) companies had caused Venezuela to lose its autonomy and agency in the international realm. In order to change this, Chávez forced a total breakage with the economic status-quo by imposing a largely state-led economic model, in which the state would regulate and correct market failures (Hellinger et al., 2017 ; Rodriguez, 2017). This entailed the nationalization of the economy's key industries and its leading financial institutions. By making this decision, Chávez's power and influence consolidated substantially, leading to his government being actively associated with authoritarianism and hyper-populism for the first time within the international realm. Whereas these developments were watched apprehensively internationally, the opposite had occurred on the national level. Chávez had become a true hero for vast segments of society due to the introduction of the so-called 'Bolivarian missions'. These missions, founded upon a tenacious belief of

egalitarianism, were social programs aimed at providing free access to public services such as education and healthcare (Cannon, 2013). Additionally, the programs included a redistribution of wealth, which was realized through large-scale redistributions of land and the establishment of autonomous worker-owned cooperatives (Ibid.).

Due to these programs and initiatives totally changing the architecture and functioning of the Venezuelan State, the government was confronted with costs that were immense. However, due to oil prices being at a record high, financial resources for social programs were available in abundance (Teran-Mantovani, 2017). Likewise, these advantageous prices caused the country to enter a period of unparalleled macroeconomic stability, something which Chávez used to further increase Venezuela's autonomy from the US. These developments, together with the colonization of all sectors of the economy and the banning of US dollars from the economy, made the economic elite of the country realize that their future and investments in Venezuela were all but safe. Hence, this created the first migrant stream from Venezuela towards Colombia. This migrant stream consisted out of highly schooled and wealthy Venezuelans as well as Venezuelan businesses who opposed the regime of Chávez. These migrants and renown companies such as *Locatel*, *Farmatodo*, *Alimentos Polar*, and *Cosméticos Valmy* embodied the 'capital flight' occurring as a direct result of Chávez having it made almost impossible to do business freely in a 'capitalist' manner (González et al., 2011; FIP, 2018). Furthermore, security fears relating to possibly being captured and prosecuted for opposing his rule coincided with the economic motives. The decision to choose for Colombia was a rather easy one, due to the relative stability being guaranteed. Additionally, due to the thought that these individuals and companies would be beneficial for the Colombian economy, they were accepted with open arms.

The stability present in Colombia, originated from having made the choice to align with the United States. Despite the numerous efforts made by various administrations, the Colombian government had not been able to impede the internal conflict nor prevent a surge in the production and selling of drugs. This allowed Colombia to evolve as the biggest producer of illicit goods worldwide, resulting in more than 70 percent of consumed cocaine worldwide coming from Colombia (Sachseder, 2020). This constrained the functioning of the Colombian State in every thinkable realm, showing the necessity for extraordinary measures to be put in place. These measures came together in one of the most extensive and controversial policy programmes of the 21<sup>st</sup> century orchestrated by Colombia and the United States named *Plan Colombia* (Franz, 2016). This policy programme, which was the main tenet of US foreign policy to Colombia between 2000 and 2006, was a US\$ 7.5 billion strategy aimed at eradicating the illegal drug industry, and to stop the internal conflict as well as the widespread insecurity and human rights violations (Plan Colombia, 1999).

This sweeping approach demanded Colombia to be led by someone who was not afraid of ruling hardhandedly nor of applying unorthodox approaches to complex problems. This happened in 2002

with the election of Álvaro Uribe as president, who won the elections through promising to implement 'Democratic Security' (Henderson, 2011). His election caused Colombia to be led by the embodiment of hard-line conservative and far-right politics, causing Colombia and Venezuela to be on the total opposites of the political spectrum (Shifter et al., 2004). Immediately after his election, Uribe started to implement Plan Colombia, which resulted in the increase of both air and ground offenses against coca cultivation plants and guerrillas. This involved increasing US presence in Colombia, something which was watched carefully from Venezuela. Due to being polar opposites politically, both countries also started to perceive each other as active threats to their security and territorial sovereignty. This became apparent through the rhetoric of both presidents, who continuously expressed their total opposition with respect to the political projects and allies of their neighbour. This created an awful hostile situation between the two countries, one which was marked with remarkable levels of tension.

This tension was primarily built up around the internal conflict in Colombia. While Uribe embarked on a stern mission to eradicate guerrillas and coca cultivators, Chávez had taken a different stance. Due to him and the guerrillas adhering to a leftist ideology and opposing the projects of Uribe, he started to use the conflict as an apparatus through which he could pressure the Colombian government. Chávez did so by interfering in the internal affairs of Colombia and expressing his support for the ideals of the guerrillas. As a result of this, 2008-2010 was a period in which the countries broke-off diplomatic relations various times. This happened for the first time in March of 2008, after Colombian air forces had carried out an air- and ground offense against FARC-EP rebels 1.9 kilometres from the Ecuadorian border. After the airstrike had occurred, it became evident that the Colombian forces had entered Ecuadorian territory without permission. Responding to the event, Chávez publicly announced that if the Colombian government decided to carry out such an event in Venezuelan territory, that it would be a just reason to go to war with Colombia (Waisberg, 2009). Following his announcement, Chávez further increased military presence among the Colombian border and ordered the Venezuelan Embassy in Bogotá to be closed immediately. Following these events, ties were re-established about a week later. In support of the FARC-EP, Chávez also publicly pleaded to the European Union and other Latin American nations to remove the FARC-EP from their lists of terrorist organizations, something which did not happen. In July of that same year, tensions reached a new height following allegations made by Colombia relating to involvement of Venezuela in anti-tank rockets that were being used by the FARC-EP. Colombian officials stated that the weaponry used by the FARC-EP had previously been bought by Venezuela, insinuating that Venezuela had sold or given the weaponry to the FARC-EP in order to continue their battle against the government of Uribe (Engelhart, 2009). As a response to these allegations, Chávez imposed various economic sanctions and removed his Ambassador from Bogotá. The dispute was settled after a few weeks.

Nonetheless, at the beginning of 2010, a new diplomatic stand-off arose amidst the last months of Uribe's presidency. The stand-off was the direct result of allegations made by Uribe with regards to

Chávez actively allowing members of the FARC-EP and ELN to enter Venezuelan territory in order to seek safe haven and avoid confrontation with the Colombian armed forces (Martínez, 2017). The allegations were presented publicly by Uribe at the Organization of American States (OAS) and were based upon evidence derived from laptops taken from FARC-EP camps in 2008 during the ground offense which had caused the first severe diplomatic crisis between the two countries. Following these allegations, Venezuela and Colombia experienced their most intense crisis. Chávez broke off diplomatic relations for the 3<sup>rd</sup> time, resulting in there even being speculations about the two countries going to war with each other (Tullos, 2010). The dispute caused Uribe to leave the presidential office in a controversial way. His irreconcilable way of ruling for a period of 8 years had created a divide within Colombian society. He was loved among the elites of the country, but condemned by the poor, farmers, landless, and other lower segments of society.

Although his mandates were far from being free of contestation and controversy, Colombia did experience an improvement in security under the rule of Uribe. Estimates show that, through the implementation of Plan Colombia, the total land area occupied by coca cultivation was reduced from 144,800 hectares in 2001 to 81,000 hectares in 2008 (Rincón-Ruiz et al., 2013). Additionally, security policies implemented under Uribe are also perceived as having contributed majorly to the improvement of security throughout the country. During his time in office, Colombia's murder rate fell by 49 percent, and presence of police was restored in over 170 municipalities (Henderson, 2011). This was primarily made possible due to the budgets for police and the military being increased tremendously, resulting in academia stating that Colombia experienced a militarization of the national security forces under the presidency of Uribe (Ospina et al., 2014). Due to these efforts, Colombia regained an overall sense of stability, something which had been absent for many decades. This allowed Uribe to restore and resolidify the base of the Colombian State, which resulted in economic stability, exemplified by the extensive increase in foreign direct investment under his mandate (Livingstone, 2004).

In contrary to Colombia, Venezuela had experienced a less positive change. At the end of 00s, it became evident that levels of insecurity as well as the murder rate had risen tremendously, especially in urban areas. This surge in insecurity is often seen as a direct effect of Chávez consolidating his rule in every possible realm, resulting in the establishment of a mature socialist authoritarian regime during the late-2000s (Brewer-Carías, 2010; Mainwaring, 2012). Besides this determining the stance of the country in the international domain, implications also became visible within the economic one. According to his ideals, Chávez had completely closed off the entry ways to the Venezuelan market for foreign companies and had embarked on a mission to artificially control the country's economy hoping to establish macroeconomic stability. However, soon it became evident that imposing tariffs and import quotas and banning foreign currency had a reverse effect and that they had contributed to Venezuela's uncommonly high annual inflation percentage of 20+ percent since the early 2000s (Heath, 2009).

Due to oil prices being at a record high during the mid-2000s, the Venezuelan government was able to outpace the climbing inflation. However, when the oil prices plunged in 2008, this was no longer possible (Hidalgo, 2009). As a consequence, increasingly, the Venezuelan government was not able to pay for food imports. This had a devastating effect, seen that food imports in Venezuela had increased from US\$ 17 billion in 1999 to US\$ 60 billion in the mid-2010s (Hernández, 2015). Hence, this resulted in Venezuelans being confronted with empty shelves in supermarkets as experienced before in the 70s, leading to Chávez declaring an economic war against the United States (De La Peja, 2016). Moreover, the fluctuating oil prices also caused the Venezuelan State to have fewer financial resources for its Bolivarian missions and the provision of public services such as security. This overall decline in economic and social well-being coincided with another stream of migrants leaving for Colombia. This stream, consisting out of Venezuelan university students, was the answer to the persistent economic instability and the impossibility of attaining employment which paid according to educational levels (FIP, 2018). This inability to find employment stems from the fact that Chávez's government controlled all the companies in the country including which position was taken by who within these companies. This was done in order to avoid positions being taken by individuals who were not in line with the Bolivarian ideology. Furthermore, this ideology also brought forth the idea that the government-controlled salaries, resulting in many Venezuelans being underpaid severely in their professions, contributing to many wanting to leave the country.

### **2.3: COLOMBIA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS (2010-2021): PEACE AGREEMENT WITH THE FARC, COLLAPSE OF THE VENEZUELAN STATE, AND STALEMATE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS**

Following the arrival of this new group of migrants, Colombia and Venezuela entered a period of relative calmness in their bilateral relations. This calmness was installed due to the efforts of Juan Manuel Santos, who was elected as president of Colombia in 2010. Paradoxically to his predecessor Uribe, Santos' political stance was more moderate, which allowed for dialogue and inhibited public attacks from happening. With this stance in mind, Santos also commenced peace negotiations with the FARC-EP in September of 2012 (Tappe Ortiz et al., 2021). These negotiations were ground-breaking, as it was the first time in many years that the internal armed conflict was being approached from a constructive approach instead of a zero-sum one, allowing both the Colombian State and the FARC-EP to use their bargaining powers in order to jointly negotiate towards a peace accord. Although it was clear from the beginning that the negotiations were going to be lengthy and challenging, it brought a very-welcome sense of hope and relief to the Colombian people.


Whereas the future for Colombia was looking promising, the opposite occurred in Venezuela. In the beginning of 2013, Chávez was elected for his fourth 6-year term in the presidential office. However, shortly after his election, it was announced that the father of the Bolivarian missions and socialism of the 21<sup>st</sup> century had died from cancer. Following his passing, vice-president Nicolás Maduro became

acting president and was later elected president by popular vote. Maduro's electoral victory was heavily disputed due to polls showing that he had beaten his opponent by a mere 1,5 percent, resulting in widespread allegations of electoral fraud (Gutiérrez, 2017). Despite the allegations made against him, he was sworn in during April of 2013. After becoming president, Maduro was confronted by economic pandemonium. Due to the continuous decrease in oil prices since the 2008 global financial crisis in combination with plummeted oil production, it had become evident that Venezuela's economy had started to falter, exemplified by prominent levels of poverty, inflation, and shortages of food and medicine. Consequently, these alarming shortcomings had proven that the tactics of continuous overspending and the imposing of tariffs and quotas were highly unsustainable. Therefore, it became undisputable that Maduro had to impose all-encompassing measures in order to successfully transform what had then become the most dysfunctional economy of the Americas.

However, did this not happen. Instead of implying adequate measures, Maduro continued the economic policies that had been implemented by Chávez. He waived away criticism, stating that capitalist conspiracies were the factors behind inflation and food shortages. As a consequence, he imposed various economic sanctions against the political opposition, stating that they were responsible for the international conspiracy against Venezuela. Due to not taking appropriate measures, Venezuela officially entered a severe recession in 2014, illustrated by the inflation percentage topping 800 percent (Pittaluga et al., 2020). This caused the national currency, the Bolivar, to be worthless and the purchasing power of the Venezuelan government to vanish at large. As a result, the import of goods and services per capita declined by around 75 percent (Hausmann, 2017). Venezuela did not have any food reserves itself, as the national production of agriproducts was basically inexistent, following years of sustained antagonistic policy (Ibid.). At this point, all segments of society were severely affected by the shortages, as a spill-over effect had also caused items such as medicine and hygiene products to be unavailable. Consequently, the country entered a stage of severe unrest in which citizens started to revolt against the policies of Maduro. During this period, large-scale anti-government protests became the vehicles of citizen representation that demanded for all-encompassing change. However, these protests were beaten down hardhandedly, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. Coinciding with these events was an extensive decline in security, exemplified by alarming increases in murders, kidnappings, and acts of violence. These increases in violence were directly related to the food shortages, as growing amounts of Venezuelans were forced to resort to violent means in order to secure food for themselves and their families. During this period, many international actors and organizations started to express their profound concerns relating to the events that had occurred in Venezuela, causing the eye of the international public to increasingly focus on Latin America.



However, this increase in focus on the continent was not only provoked by what was happening in Venezuela. Colombia became the centre of worldwide attention after it had become clear that President Juan Manuel Santos had succeeded in negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC-EP, which was signed during a ceremony in June of 2016 in Havana, Cuba. The agreement, which included bilateral ceasefire, the surrender of weaponry, and ending of kidnappings was monumental as it formally marked the end of the longest running civil war on the Western Hemisphere. Since its beginning during the 60s, the internal armed conflict had completely disrupted Colombian society and dictated in every possible realm. Additionally, the conflict costed the lives of over 200,000 people and displaced over 7,5 million, causing Colombia to have the largest number of internally displaced peoples after Syria (Cantor, 2018). After the peace deal was signed, a referendum was held in Colombia in which society initially rejected the deal made with the FARC-EP. Nevertheless, a revised version was passed in November of 2016. This version addressed the key areas of the conflict and allowed the FARC-EP to join the political system as a legitimate party. Furthermore, members of the FARC-EP were given the chance to re-enter Colombian society through rehabilitation programmes funded by the Colombian government (Hernández Zapata et al., 2021). Although the peace accord was perceived as a milestone, it was far from being free of contestation. The peace accord was perceived as backstabbing by former President Uribe, the conservatives, and the elite of Colombia. This, as they believed that the Colombian State should, under no circumstance, answer or give in to the demands of the FARC-EP. Furthermore, the peace accord did not address the presence of the ELN, the AUC, drug gangs known as *Bandas Criminales*, and the FARC-EP members who did support the signing of the peace accord and continued their fight against the government as dissident groups. Hence, this resulted in various parts of Colombian territory to continue to house armed groups as pictured in figure 1.



**Figure 1:** armed groups present in Colombia after signing of peace accord between Colombian State and FARC-EP in June of 2016.<sup>1</sup>

During the presidency of Santos, the situation in Venezuela continued to deteriorate. Attempting at forcing a change in conduct of the Venezuelan government, hefty financial and economic sanctions were put in place by the United States, the European Union, and the Lima Group (Galbraith, 2019). Nevertheless, this did not achieve the desired outcome as Maduro continued his authoritarian rule. Consequently, Venezuela entered hyperinflation, illustrated by monthly inflation percentages of more than 3000 percent and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) loss of 62 percent between 2013 and 2019 (Bull et al., 2020). These immense inflation percentages caused a severe humanitarian crisis to break out in Venezuela, due to there being absolute shortages of every imaginable product in the country. Concurrent to these shortages was the collapse of the country's electricity network and all public services. Due to public services such as police being absent, Venezuela experienced an unprecedented decline in overall security. This caused Caracas to quickly become the most dangerous city worldwide, illustrated by having the highest murder rate per capita worldwide (Aburto et al., 2020). Additionally, disease infections skyrocketed, causing uncommon surges in the country's mortality rate. In response to these events, around 4,6 million Venezuelans have fled their country in search of better living conditions, constituting the biggest migratory crisis in the Western Hemisphere (Torres et al., 2019).

This migratory crisis has been at the centre of widespread attention worldwide. Due to the crisis and its subsequent extensive migration streams severely affecting every country in the Latin American region, there have been various attempts at making the Maduro regime fall. However, due to Venezuela being close allies with military world powers such as Russia, China, and Iran, it has not been possible to force

<sup>1</sup> Image derived from: [https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Areas-of-operation-of-the-three-main-armed-groups-active-in-Colombia-in-2018\\_fig2\\_333657855](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Areas-of-operation-of-the-three-main-armed-groups-active-in-Colombia-in-2018_fig2_333657855)

a breakthrough by using hard power (Goforth, 2012; Cardozo Uzcátegui et al., 2020). Therefore, many Western actors waited for an opportunity through which they could exert soft power, minimizing the risk of confrontation. This opportunity arose when presidential elections were called out prematurely by then incumbent president Maduro. Not surprisingly, shortly after the election, it was declared that Maduro had won and that he would be installed for another 6-year-term. However, after this announcement, the National Assembly of Venezuela stated that the elections were illegitimate and fraudulent. These statements received support worldwide from humanitarian and human rights organizations after it had become evident that many of Maduro's political opponents had been subject to extrajudicial killings and widespread human rights abuses in the months prior to the election (Candia, 2019). Consequently, the National Assembly refused to acknowledge Maduro as President. Alternatively, they declared Juan Guaidó as the acting president of the country. Following this declaration, Venezuela entered a power vacuum which created the presidential crisis that continues to this very day (Emersberger et al., 2021; Boersner, 2020). The Guaidó presidency has since evolved into a soft power tool of the European Union, the United States, the OAS, and the majority of Latin American countries. They hope, by acknowledging Guaidó as the legitimate president, that undermining the position of Maduro becomes possible. Nevertheless, since the Venezuelan army still supports Maduro, this has remained an illusion rather than a reality. Colombia, under the presidency of Iván Duque, often executed a vital role in the initiatives against Maduro and in favour of Guaidó. This caused the bilateral relations between the neighbouring countries to be a ticking time bomb. Eventually, this bomb exploded over a border dispute in early 2019, causing both countries to close their respective embassies in Bogotá and Caracas (Rettberg, 2019). Consequently, a complete cut-off in bilateral relations was established. This stalemate continues to this very day and is perceived as a factor that seriously hinders the finding of an appropriate solution to an intersectional and multidimensional problem.

## CHAPTER 3: VENEZUELAN MIGRATION AS SCAPEGOAT FOR A MANAGEMENT CRISIS

This chapter will present the empirical analysis of the investigation. Subject to analysis is the data from online field research gathered through literary research, conducting interviews, and the usage of an online survey. The first section of this chapter will provide the necessary information on the city of Bogotá, which is the case study standing central in the investigation. Likewise, the first section will provide a historical overview on the topic of security, highlighting the most important changes and events during the last two decades. The section is followed by one in which is explained how security in Bogotá complexified under the rule of Claudia López, and how this sketched a rather deceptive reality which has been used against her constantly. The last segment of this chapter explains how this deceptive reality caused López to turn towards Venezuelan migrants as the possible solution and how this has affected the perception of Bogotá residents.

### 3.1. BOGOTÁ: THE HEART OF COLOMBIA

Bogotá is the capital of Colombia and is situated between the Andean mountains on 3000 meters height. The city and its outskirts are home to around 9,7 million people, making it the largest city in Colombia and the 4<sup>th</sup> largest city in the Latin American region. Due to its size, Bogotá has transformed into one of the most important hubs of the region, hosting many international economic entities and organizations. Likewise, the city is the political heart of Colombia as well as its economic motor, generating around 26% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), accounting for 33% of the total value made in foreign trade, and employing around 20% of the formal working force on the national level (Caporale et al., 2018). Consequently, Bogotá is of vital importance for the further development of Colombia in all realms. Nevertheless, it is also important to understand that Bogotá is a city of painful contrasts, as the differences between poor and rich are extensive. Hence, as in accordance with many other Latin American cities, Bogotá is known for its far-reaching spatial and social segregation (Thibert et al., 2014). This has caused the different economic groups to all have their ‘own’ place in the city, with the rich living in the north and the poor in the south.

In order to be able to administer the city in an efficient manner and to guarantee further development, Bogotá has been divided into 20 local municipalities (*localidades*), which are shown in figure 2. These local municipalities operate under the umbrella of the general Mayor’s office known as the *Alcaldía Mayor*. The *Alcaldía Mayor* is led by the general Mayor, which at the moment, is Claudia López. Due to the importance of Bogotá for the functioning and development of the Colombian State, the position of Mayor of Bogotá is the second most powerful and influential position one can attain in Colombian politics after the presidency of the Republic (Farnsworth-Alvear et al., 2017). Therefore, in order to succeed in achieving further stages of development successfully, it is desirable that the President of the Republic and the mayor are supportive of each other.



**Figure 2:** division of local municipalities (*localidades*) in Bogotá in 2021<sup>2</sup>

### 3.1.1. SECURITY IN BOGOTÁ: THE TOPIC OF LASTING CONCERN

Due to its history, size and the many people that live in Bogotá, security has always been a primary concern (Palma Gutiérrez, personal communication, 6 September 2021). This concern was especially present during the 80s and 90s, when, as a part of the internal armed conflict, several armed groups fought for control over the city and its political institutions. During this period, security deteriorated tremendously, causing Bogotá to be one of the most violent and dangerous cities worldwide. Attempting at changing this, the 1991 constitution completely re-modelled the country's security structure and apparatuses (Velasco, 2011). This change brought forth that the executive power acquired full responsibility for the preservation of 'public order'. As a consequence, the President, governors, and mayors are responsible for maintaining the public order in their respective jurisdictions. This entails that the mayor holds the highest position within the police force of the jurisdiction in which they are elected. This causes mayors to be responsible for the strengthening of security, the regulating of police bodies, and the implementation of strategies that contribute to the upholding of human rights and civic values (Restrepo Florez, personal communication, 18 September 2021). In order to do so in the best way possible, the Security Council, Public Order Committee, and Security Fund have been included in the new security structure (DCAF, 2018). Within this new structure, these bodies serve as advisory organs for the mayor during the decision-making process. Additionally, these bodies work together with the mayor to develop multisectoral policies and security plans that are in consonance with both

<sup>2</sup> Image derived from: [https://twitter.com/colombia\\_hist/status/1423825973796130816](https://twitter.com/colombia_hist/status/1423825973796130816)

municipal plans and national security policies (Ibid.). Following the introduction of this new structure in Bogotá, the city's policies and security plans have had a strong focus on re-establishing and strengthening the relationship between citizenry and the local government. However, in order for these policies and plans to succeed, it is key that the different security bodies and levels of government are cooperative. This is due to the complexity involved in the matters at hand and the tremendous area in which the plans and policies are ought to be implemented.

These newly developed policies were first introduced during the late 1990s and early 2000s, under the administrations of Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000) and Antanas Mockus (2001-2003). Both mayors implemented a wide array of policies aimed at strengthening Bogotá's civil culture and recapturing many of the city's deprived public places (Lascar Posada et al., 2018). As a consequence, the overall state of security in the city improved remarkably, exemplified by a sharp decline in the number of homicides, thefts, and acts of violence. However, this strategy was not continued during the period 2004-2015 when Bogotá was governed by three different mayors from the political party *Polo Democrático Alternativo*. During this eleven-year-period, there was no coordination nor cooperation between the different levels of government and security bodies, causing a durable and thoughtful long-term approach to be lacking. The absence of thought-out long-term approach was caused by a problem that has been present in Colombian politics for many years. Research has found that with the ascending of a new administration in Bogotá, also came a completely new way of governing (Gonzalez, 2016). This new way of governing was solely based upon the interests and realities of the mayor in question, causing it to be very hard to guarantee continuity in the way of ruling. This was aggravated further by the type of policies that were introduced under the various administrations. Due to security being a topic of prime concern and a topic which largely determines approval ratings of the mayor in question, a wide array of reactive policies were implemented (Moncada, 2013). These policies were implemented out of the aim to find short-term solutions to continuous problems such as theft and violence without combatting the root of the problem. Consequently, citizens of Bogotá were given the illusion that security was being dealt with accurately. However, often this was not the case, as the topic of security was rather used as a marionette to keep approval ratings artificially high in order to possibly secure an electoral victory during elections. Hence, during this period, a vicious circle had been created which inhibited the establishment and execution of a long-term action plan once present under Peñalosa and Mockus.

Accordingly, during this same period, the state of security declined. This caused widespread dissatisfaction and made security fears among citizenry grow. Although this increased the pressure on the mayor to take adequate actions, this did not occur until Peñalosa was elected again as mayor in 2016. During his second term, he introduced the Security Secretariat, which was tasked with addressing security issues, peaceful coexistence, and access to justice in Bogotá (DCAF, 2018). Similarly, it is this organ through which the mayor started to design and execute policies at the local level.

With the re-election of Peñalosa as mayor, the cooperation between the different security organs and levels of government was restored. However, due to the fact that this cooperation and a thought-out long-term security policy had been lacking for over a decade, the security landscape in Bogotá had changed to such an extent that the policies of Peñalosa were not able to fully break with this trend. A major factor that contributed to the new security dynamics in Bogotá, was the massive influx of Venezuelan migrants that had started to come to Colombia since the end of 2015. Estimates show that, at the beginning of Peñalosa's second term, Bogotá was already home to around 150,000-200,000 migrants (FIP, 2018). Aiming at handling these migrant streams and documenting these migrants, Colombia first introduced the *Permiso Especial de Permanencia* (PEP) in 2017. This gave the first cohort of thousands of Venezuelan migrants' access to healthcare and education (Grillo Rubiano, personal communication, 20 October 2021). Many Venezuelans had chosen to come to Bogotá, due to the chances of finding employment being the highest in all of Colombia. Consequently, migrants were now present on virtually every street, causing a complete re-modification of the city's social dynamics. Due to political cooperation, facilities, and financial resources for adequate attention and care not being sufficient for all the migrants that were present in the city, there were also large groups that were forced to live on the streets or the city's slums in unbearable living conditions (Dib Ayesta, personal communication, 14 October 2021). This caused a considerable decay in the liveability of the city, which contributed to the construction of a very negative perception towards Venezuelan migrants. This negative perception was primarily formed around economic concerns, as many Colombians perceived the presence of Venezuelan migrants to be a factor contributing to hindering access to the formal labour market and contributing to further degradation of the national economy (Robaya Leon, personal communication, 3 September 2021). These ideas and perceptions were being reinforced by the fact that Colombia was experiencing economic turmoil, which had led to the national government implementing various economic reforms. Additionally, rumours about Venezuelan women being prostitutes and Venezuelan men operating in criminal gangs further supported and enabled the establishment and spread of this negative perception (del Mar Acevedo, personal communication, 10 September 2021).

Especially the rumour between criminal gangs and Venezuelan migrants caused societal unrest. This was largely due to Bogotá experiencing sharp increases in theft during the second term of Peñalosa, shown in figure 3.

Bogotá. Personal theft and theft of motorbikes, motor vehicles, and theft from residences and commercial enterprises during the period 2015-2018						
Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	Variation percentage 2015-2018	Variation percentage 2017-2018
Theft from persons	27535	37722	76904	103792	+276.95	+34.96
Theft of motorbikes	3265	3099	3412	3772	+15.53	+10.55
Theft of automobiles	2282	2651	3406	3468	+51.94	+1.82
Theft from residences	3606	3639	9048	9725	+169.69	+7.48
Theft from commercial enterprises	5917	4305	4559	7104	+20.06	+55.82

Source: Policía Metropolitana – Secretaría de Seguridad

**Figure 3:** Table showing the number of registered thefts in five different realms during the second term of Enrique Peñalosa as mayor of Bogotá.

In addition, Venezuelan migrants were also strongly associated with homicides, acts of violence, and being active in the drug industry. Interestingly, both the number of homicides and acts of violence showed a decrease during Peñalosa’s second term. Nevertheless, these developments reiterated the complexity of security in Bogotá and the urgent need for a thought-out long-term approach, something which many hoped Claudia López would do after she was elected as mayor in late 2019. Her election caused a political landslide, as it was the first time that a woman adhering to a leftist party, who is openly gay, was elected to the second most powerful position in a system that is traditionally dominated by macho and elite politics (Croda, 2019). Prior to her election, López had been campaigning relentlessly against corruption in Colombian politics. During this campaign, the ruling far-right party *Centro Democrático* which ex-president Uribe founded and to which incumbent president Duque adheres, was the main target. This caused significant tension to rise within the political system, exemplified by President Duque and mayor López attacking and accusing each other in speech and during public appearances. Hence, ever since her election, Duque and López have been diametrically opposed to each other, causing further complication in cooperation within the security realm (Parra, personal communication, 8 September 2021).



### 3.1.2. SECURITY IN BOGOTÁ UNDER CLAUDIA LÓPEZ: DISAGREEMENT, COMPLICATION, AND DETERIORATION

Moreover, ever since her instalment as mayor in January 2020, López has been confronted by several factors which further complexified the security landscape of Bogotá. The first factor which had a significant impact on this, was the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic. Shortly after the first cases had been registered in the beginning of March 2020, Bogotá entered a lengthy mandatory 3-month lockdown. During this period, citizens were only allowed to leave their house for a hand-full of reasons, causing mobility to be severely restricted. Estimates show that due to these measures being put in place, 70 to 80 percent less people were on the streets on a daily basis (Acero Velásquez, 2021). Evidently, the imposing of a lockdown also had far-reaching implications on criminality. Due to there being far less people on the streets, common crimes such as theft, acts of violence, as well as the number of murders declined (Restrepo Florez, personal communication, 18 September 2021). Whereas the implementation of the lockdown prohibited certain criminals from acting, it enabled others. This enabling was visible primarily in the drug industry, which thrived during the lockdown due to being able to operate almost freely without being checked (Gaitán Gómez, personal communication, 13 September 2021). This freedom in movement of criminals is the direct result of the balancing act of López in which she had to make decisions in which she considered the risk of infection, as well as her obligation to maintain the public order. Ultimately, López removed 3400 police officers from the streets, which corresponded to 20% of the total man-force at the time (Acero Velásquez, 2021). While this was done with the aim to be able to guarantee continuation in the upholding of public order during the pandemic, the direct effect was a significant reduction in the presence of police and thus a loss in the ability to maintain public order. Additionally, criminals also adapted their modus operandi to the new circumstances. To exemplify, during the lockdown, extortion became the primary mode of operation for many criminals, as shown by the sharp increase in reported cases during 2020 (ProBogotá, 2021).

A few months into the pandemic, it soon became evident that the lockdown imposed in March would not suffice in halting the very inflated infection rate. Therefore, after the initial lockdown ended in May, Bogotá entered a period in which the different localities went into lockdown on a rotating basis. This measurement was put into place on top of a package of substantial measures, such as limiting citizens' access to public transport and imposing a curfew in the localities in which a complete lockdown was not in place. Whereas these decisions were made out of the need to protect the overall state of public health, the implications for vast segments of Colombian society were immense. Following the implementation of the measures, unemployment in the formal sector surged to above 30 percent (CEPAL, 2020). These newly unemployed came on top of Colombia's informal sector, which comprises out of over 50 percent of the national workforce, which all were out of work as well. As a consequence, millions of Bogotanos were confronted with severe financial instability which led to extensive food and medicine insecurity (Urón Durán, personal communication, 29 September 2021). Additionally,

thousands of families faced eviction or were evicted, due to not being able to pay rent. During these distressing events, the López administration failed to respond swiftly and adequately, primarily shown by the long waiting times before emergency social plans were approved and executed.

In response to the increasing insecurity and lacking of the government to take adequate action, thousands and thousands of Bogotanos united in social protest during the pandemic when the city was still predominantly in quarantine. These massive protests served as vehicles of citizens representation and expressed the discontent felt by many, as they did not receive any assistance from the López administration (Al Jazeera, 2021). Different to other protests was the violent and unplanned nature of the protests that occurred during the pandemic. López's response to these protests was the issuing of a decree which prohibited protests as well as the use of the heavily disputed anti-riot police squadron *Escuadrón Móvil Anti-Disturbios* (ESMAD). This decision provoked an antagonistic reaction, resulting in an intensification of social protests and confrontations between citizenry and national security forces. Due to the ESMAD and other security forces using excessive force against civilians, López's decisions became the centre of heavy debate. Similarly, her way of responding to the events, also had a devastating effect on the feeling of security of Bogotanos, exemplified by an investigation of ProBogotá in which 76% of the interviewees stated that they felt insecure during quarantine and the pandemic (ProBogotá, 2021). These events extremely weakened the legitimacy of López and her administration, something which was reinforced by the fact that other important government and security bodies were not supportive of her. Considering that many of the government and security bodies consist out of men who do not believe in nor support the leftist rule of a gay woman, the pandemic provided the perfect opportunity to strategically undermine her rule (Lleras Ronderos, personal communication, 21 September 2021). Reconciling or making concessions was also not an option, due to López's unwillingness to do so, shown by her inflammatory language and rather unpredictable behaviour.

While López already found herself in a stuffy position, pressure was intensified by the continuation of Venezuelan migration towards Bogotá during the pandemic. Even during the peak of infections, hundreds of Venezuelans arrived in the city on a daily basis. This caused the population of Venezuelan migrants to grow to around 350,000 which is equivalent to around 20 percent of the total Venezuelan population in Colombia (Migración Colombia, 2021). As many migrants arrived with almost nothing in a city that was in complete lockdown, many called upon the Bogotá government for help. As the city was already struggling to provide for its own citizens, adequate aid and protection materials for the migrant population were largely absent (Robaya Leon, personal communication, 3 September 2021). Consequently, Venezuelan migrants were confronted with an incredible high risk of contracting COVID-19 and other infectious diseases, causing them to be branded as biohazards in public discourse (Marquéz Ramírez, personal communication, 3 October 2021). However, once images of Venezuelan migrants and their living conditions during the pandemic were spread by the international press, international organizations also started to mingle in the debate. This caused the rule of López to be

under duress from multiple points. This increased even further after it became clear what the effect of the pandemic had been on the crime rates. The new statistics showed slight decreases in crime but nullified the idea that security had improved substantially in the city. The main take away was that 2020 was an exceptional year due to the pandemic. Hence, conclusions and comparisons about crime based upon these statistics would be misleading ones, reiterating that López should put primary focus on the topic of security (Restrepo Florez, personal communication, 18 September 2021).

actual behaviour of high impact crimes due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, 2019-2020		
Crimes with greatest impact	Variation 2019-2020 according to reports of high impact crimes following reports of MEBOG	Actual change in high impact crimes 2019-2020 without quarantine and isolation effects
Theft from persons	-35%	-14%
Personal robberies	-31%	-16%
Theft of automobiles	-11%	+5%
Theft from residences	-21%	-5%
Theft of motorbikes	-19%	-4%
Theft from commercial enterprises	-46%	-9%

Source: Office of information analysis and strategic studies, District Secretariat of Security, Co-existence, and Justice. May of 2021.

**Figure 4:** Table showing the effects of quarantine and isolation on official crime statistics.

### 3.2. SECURITY IN BOGOTÁ POST LOCKDOWN: A DECEPTIVE REALITY CAUSING DESPAIR

After months of restrictions and various lockdowns, life in Bogotá started to return to normal at the end of 2020. Due to the severe economic and social damage caused by the lockdowns, it had become evident that restraining measurements caused more harm than good. Eventually, this led to the last hefty restrictions being lifted in the beginning of 2021. Consequently, people returned to the streets en masse, which led the city to be the bustling megalopolis it was before the arrival of the pandemic. Likewise, the restarting of the city also enabled criminals to resume their work. This became visible when the crime statistics of the first half year of 2021 had been published by the District Secretariat for Security, Co-existence, and Justice. These statistics showed in comparison to the same period in 2020:

Variation in major impact crimes in Bogotá during the first six months of 2021, in comparison to the same period in 2020 during lockdown	
High impact crime	Variation 2020-2021
Murder	+33.6%
Theft from persons	+77.8%
Theft from residences	+12.7%
Theft of automobiles	+50.4%
Theft of motorbikes	+81.1%
Acts causing personal injuries (i.e. robberies)	+105.8%
Acts of sexual violence	+19.4%
Theft from commercial enterprises	-19.7%
Theft of bicycles	-16.2%

Source: Informe Trimestral de Seguridad – II Trimestre de 2021, Dirección de Seguridad Urbana ProBogotá Region, Agosto 2021

**Figure 5:** Increases in criminal behaviour after the lifting of lockdown and other restrictions in the beginning of 2021.

These statistics caused the city to be in a state emergency, as it seemed that it was being starched by an uncontrollable surge in criminality. This thought and image was being reinforced by the traditional right-wing media outlets of the country, who had embarked on a campaign of fear-politics against López and her administration (Gaitán Gómez, personal communication, 13 September 2021). This campaign was fed by two remarkable differences in criminal behaviour that became visible during the first half of 2021. Firstly, committed crimes were marked by an incredibly violent nature, often through the use of firearms or personal force. Secondly, these violent crimes had also started to occur at a greater extent in some of Bogotá’s most exclusive neighbourhoods such as La Cabrera and El Nogal, which nullified the idea that these events only took place in the poor South of the city (Ibid.). It were also these thefts and armed robberies occurring in the affluent part of the city, which have been used in framing techniques in all traditional right-wing news outlets (Ibid.). This coverage existed out of numerous articles in the country’s most-read daily newspaper *El Tiempo* (Doria, personal communication, 3 September 2021). Additionally, the country’s most influential weekly magazine *Semana* also followed this path, even devoting one of their September 2021 covers to the issue and calling upon López to literally ‘do something’.



**Figure 6:** September 2021 cover of weekly magazine *Semana*.<sup>3</sup> The cover states “Insecurity in Bogotá: CLAUDIA, DO SOMETHING!”. The subheading states the following: “Bogotá is surrounded by crime as never before in recent history. Instead of blaming others, the mayor should fulfil her duties and do what she promised: to be the head of the police”<sup>4</sup>

Due to these stories also being diffused rapidly on social media, it was virtually impossible not to be confronted by them. Consequently, a blanket of fear had spread over the city. In itself, this had not been something extraordinary if the crime statistics post-lockdown would still have been as alarming when compared to the statistics of 2019, a ‘normal’ pre-pandemic year. However, this has not been done. Therefore, the latest statistics that are being used against López sketch a very deceptive reality (Doria, personal communication, 3 September 2021). When compared to 2019, it becomes visible that the increases in the different types of crime are far less extensive and more coincidental. Moreover, some of the statistics of 2021 even show a decreasing trend when compared to 2019.

Nevertheless, as a result of comparing the crime statistics of 2021 to 2020, a crisis narrative had emerged. This caused the attention of Bogotanos to be derived from reality and to establish the idea that during the pandemic criminality was basically non-existent or that the overall state of security was much better (Restrepo Florez, personal communication, 18 September 2021). This was obviously not the case,

<sup>3</sup> Image derived from: <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/bogota-esta-cercada-por-la-delincuencia-claudia-haga-algo/202128/>

<sup>4</sup> Translations by author

considering the implications of the pandemic for many families and the fact that criminality is a given in a city that is home to almost 9 million people.

By using this altered reality as a base for a public discourse, the media outlets succeeded in awakening the people which resulted in the continuation and a fortification of the discourse. Consequently, López's position was on the verge of a breakdown, as the image of her being unable to control security in the city echoed in every possible realm. Due to her previous confrontations with the President, his ministers, leaders of her own party, and journalists, López was completely isolated politically and did not receive any support nor assistance in tackling the situation.

### 3.3. THE LAST RESORT? LÓPEZ'S TURN AGAINST VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS

Attempting at explaining the situation and taking responsibility as mayor of the capital and head of the police, it soon became clear whom López ought to be responsible for the supposed surge in insecurity. Through her discourse and narrative during press conferences and on social media, it became evident that the Venezuelan migrant population was to be held accountable for the increase in insecurity (Peláez Rodríguez, personal communication, 6 September 2021). López said the following during a press conference in the locality of Kennedy in October of 2020<sup>5</sup>:

*"I don't want to stigmatise Venezuelans, but there are some who are really making our lives miserable. Those who come here to work are welcome, but those who come to commit crimes should be deported immediately"*<sup>6</sup>

Directly after making this declaration, López received large amounts of criticism and the first accusations of being openly xenophobic. Nevertheless, this did not stop her from continuing this discourse. She was able to continue, considering that there was a major part of society that had started to believe in her simple-to-follow approach to a problem embedded in a crisis narrative, which she mainly demonstrated on Twitter (Bogotá, personal communication, 14 October 2021). However, due to López's Twitter account being the second most powerful in terms of followers in Colombia, this provided her with significant leverage. This leverage is derived from the tweets send out by López, as they serve as a catalyser for the further spread of xenophobic messages against Venezuelans in the online domain. This became evident after research had proven that xenophobic tweets from López between 2019 and 2021 caused overall xenophobic messaging against Venezuelans to sometimes increase by 180 to 230 percent (Barómetro de Xenofobia, 2021).

Consequently, this allowed López to use politics of fear to construct an external enemy as the answer to a complicated and intersectional problem (Marquéz Ramírez, personal communication, 3 October

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<sup>5</sup> Text derived from: <https://www.elespectador.com/bogota/no-quiero-estigmatizar-a-los-venezolanos-pero-unos-nos-hacen-la-vida-cuadritos-claudia-lopez-articulo/>

<sup>6</sup> Translation by author

2021). This enemy served as a curtain of smoke through which López could further expand her projects and waive away criticism (Nario, personal communication, 2 September 2021). This is mainly exemplified by a proposal of her made in August of 2021, which pleaded for the construction of a special police entity that is solely tasked with identifying and deporting of migrants who are involved in criminal activity (Dib Ayesta, personal communication, 14 October 2021). As a result of this announcement, so-called xenophobic cartels started to occur in the poor south of the city. These cartels, which are groupings of heavily armed Colombians operating outside of the law, started to raid neighbourhoods in search for dwellings hosting Venezuelan migrants. The aim of these attacks was to kill and evict Venezuelan migrants and their families, as it was thought that this would improve overall security.



**Figure 7:** Tweet posted by Claudia López on the 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2021, announcing her intentions to create a special police body for criminal migrants.<sup>7</sup> The tweet states the following: “We will create a body with Migración Colombia, the Police, and the Migration Command that will help us to reinforce the investigation, capture, and prosecution of criminal structures that unfortunately are being a factor of insecurity in the city #Bogotasafe”.<sup>8</sup>

Following the presentation on her idea for the new police body and the circulation of messages that this had caused the formation of the incredibly violent xenophobic cartels, López found herself in the middle of unprecedented criticism. Her plans received extremely negative feedback from virtually all levels of politics, including from members of her own party, who stated that she was wasting her progressive political identity by making statements embedded in xenophobia. Interestingly, President Duque and Vice-President Marta Lucía Ramírez also mingled in the debate. Both expressed their sincere rejection for the plans of López. Additionally, Ramírez also condemned the xenophobic

<sup>7</sup> Image derived from: <https://twitter.com/claudiolopez/status/1428019699774853123>

<sup>8</sup> Translation by author

tendencies of López, stating that the usage of fear tactics is not a way to move forward nor to resolve a problem (Semana, 2021). The fact that this statement is made by Ramírez is remarkable, considering that anti-Venezuela fear-politics were one of the main tenets present in the campaign of *Centro Democrático* during the 2018 presidential campaign. It was this election which installed Duque as President and Ramírez as vice-President.



Figure 8: *Centro Democrático* campaign billboard in the city of Bucaramanga during the 2018 presidential elections.<sup>9</sup> The billboard reads “I don’t want to live as a Venezuelan, DUQUE AS PRESIDENT”<sup>10</sup>

The involvement of the highest levels of governance in Bogotá’s security debate, as well as the rather deceitful remarks made by Ramírez against López, show how the security debate is used as a puppet to stir into the country’s internal power relations (Bogotá, personal communication, 14 October 2021). While the campaigning against López caused significant damage in her political legitimacy, a substantial change in discourse remained largely invisible. This caused even more contestation, as the 2018 statistics of Migración Colombia had shown that less than 1,8 percent of the 97,000 prisoners in Colombia were Venezuelan nationals (FIP, 2018). This was reinforced by a study performed by the Secretariat of Security, which demonstrated that less than 2 percent of registered crimes had been committed by Venezuelan nationals during the period 2018-2020 (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, due to the widespread presence of the discourse in virtually all realms of society, it has had a severe effect on the perception of security of citizens of Bogotá. This became evident through the

<sup>9</sup> Image derived from: <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/foto-de-la-valla-de-ivan-duque-sobre-venezolanos-en-bucaramanga/566671/>

<sup>10</sup> Translation by author



survey which, as part of this research, has been distributed among Bogotá residents. In total, the survey has been completed by 47 individuals who had an average age of 45,7 years. Of these respondents, 26 identified as female, while the remainder (21) identified as male. Most of the respondents (15) reside in the locality of Usaquén. Other localities with significant contribution are Engativá (9), Suba (7), Teusaquillo (4) and Chapinero (4). The majority of the respondents (32) is highly educated, having completed postgraduate education (22) or having completed university (10).

Through the responses it became evident that security is a topic that preoccupies the majority of the respondents, exemplified by roughly 70 percent stating that Bogotá is an unsafe city. This is aggravated further by 91 percent of the respondents stating that they feel that they can be victim of any crime at any moment. In itself, this perception is interesting, seeing that the majority of the respondents (26) stated that they have not been a victim of any crime during the last five years. A possible answer to this perception could be the fact that 27 of the respondents do know a family member who has been a victim of a crime during the last five years.

This negative perception is inherently connected with the presence of Venezuelan migrants, as roughly 80 percent of the respondents stated that they perceive this collective to have contributed to the worsening of security in the city. Additionally, around 60 percent of the respondents also stated that they perceive that this collective has worsened security in their own neighbourhoods. Next to security, the majority of the respondents (66 percent) also believe that Venezuelan migration forms a risk for the Colombian economy, highlighting a negative perception during times of crisis. Interestingly, even though the countries are each other's neighbours and share a long history, 48 percent of the respondents stated that Venezuelan migration is a risk for the continuation of Colombian culture. Building forth on such a negative perception, one would suspect that the respondents would be supportive of the creation of the special police body by López. However, this is not the case, as only 48 percent responded in favour. Furthermore, the respondents were also less believing in the media coverage on Venezuelan migrants. This is demonstrated by roughly half of the respondents stating that they do not believe that media coverage on Venezuelan migration is objective. These interesting figures highlighted that the individuality of the respondents is something which has to be considered.

While the main take-away from the survey is that the poor perception of security of Bogotá residents is for the most part linked to the presence of Venezuelan migrants, the survey also showed results that are in accordance with citizens being aware of a management crisis within the governing structures of the city. This is mainly demonstrated by 93 percent of the respondents having stated that they believe that the individual municipalities of Bogotá do not have the ability nor capacity to handle accordingly to the current situation. Also, 94 percent of the respondents stated that Colombian society as a whole is insufficiently prepared to handle such extensive flows of migrants in an adequate manner. Although these answers illustrate that the respondents are aware of the fact there are problems in the management

bodies of the city who are responsible for the handling of migrant streams and security, they do not seem to be aware or believe that this contributes to insecurity. Instead, many have started to believe in the easy-to-follow but false answer. Namely the one that puts Venezuelan migrants forward as the sole factor causing problems in the security domain.

## CONCLUSION

It is to be expected, that when doing research on sensitive and complicated topics such as security and migration out of the aim to disclose any possible discrepancy, one has to be extremely careful. This research was no exception to this rule. Nevertheless, when comparing the data garnered from conducting interviews with sector experts and literary research with the data obtained from the survey, it is evident that there are various discrepancies present in the current ‘security versus Venezuelan migration’ debate taking place in Bogotá.

Primarily, this research has shown that the streams of Venezuelan migrants coming to Bogotá from 2017-onwards, has had a very negative influence on the perception of security of Bogotá residents. Whereas this effect seems somehow understandable, this confirmation did bring about a sense of unsettledness. This feeling arose following the realization that the influx of these people, who are in search of better opportunities, seemingly brings an overall sense of discomfort to large numbers of Bogotá residents. This sentiment would have been explicable if the presence of Venezuelan migrants would be an integral part causing the current ‘security crisis’.

However, the outcomes of this research are not in consonance with this stream of thought. This different outcome was predominantly made visible by analysing the official crime statistics. These statistics showed that the percentage of Venezuelan nationals incarcerated or involved in registered crimes in Bogotá is almost negligible when compared to the overall crime statistics. This evidence served as the first support that allowed for the questioning of the construction of the ‘security crisis’ and the existence thereof in Bogotá. This stream of thought solidified after examining the bases upon which the current ‘crisis narrative’ has been constructed. These bases, which are the various security statistics of the year 2020, are being used to portray a false reality.

This false reality has been created by using the 2020 statistics as a ‘normal’ base year for comparison, without considering the effects that the COVID-19 pandemic, various lockdowns, and wave of social protests had on criminal behaviour and the perception of (in)security of residents. Whereas this evidence also points into the direction that it is viable to state that the current crisis narrative and the existence of a severe security crisis are misplaced, the survey results demonstrated that it is indisputable that the perception and lived reality of many residents are not in agreement with this statement.

Another important outcome of this investigation is that, through various interviews, it became apparent that the crisis narrative and the tendency to state that there is a security crisis occurring in Bogotá both serve a larger purpose. This purpose is to be found in the highest political power structures of Colombia, involving the traditionally dominant right-wing politicians of *Centro Democrático* and Bogotá mayor Claudia López. For *Centro Democrático* politicians, which include incumbent president Iván Duque and vice-president Marta Lucía Ramírez, Claudia López is a thorn in the eye that needs to be removed from power as soon as possible. This is due to opposing political views and the desire to remain in

power and attain more power where possible. For López these ideas and motivations are exactly the same, as demonstrated by her many public and online altercations with a wide array of actors and individuals. These clashes have caused López to be politically isolated, implying that she does not receive any support for her plans and proposals. Moreover, this has also caused the cooperation between the different security bodies to be lacking completely. These two factors constitute the management crisis which makes it impossible to implement or execute security policies.

Consequently, what is currently occurring is that both parties and the leaders of the different security bodies are fighting for personal gain and out of their own ideals, rather than genuinely wanting to uphold or improve security in the city. In the current political climate, the topic of security is being used as an instrument to start smear campaigns against political opponents out of the aim to force a breakthrough with the status quo or to provoke hefty change in favour of nepotism. Using this method is effective, due to Colombia's violent past which scarred entire generations and installed an ever-strong desire for peace and security. López is experiencing this first-hand and is even subject to a more rapid spread of this narrative due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its many social and economic side effects providing the fear necessary in order to start to believe in such a campaign. For López it is almost impossible to stop the circulation of this narrative and image, due to all major news outlets of the country being aligned with López's opponents and thus vocalizing the narrative against her and framing their content in such a way that it conveys a message that is disadvantageous for her credibility and image.

Attempting at saving her reputation and winning back the trust of Bogotá residents, López therefore saw no other option than to place responsibility for the security problem by one of the most vulnerable groups present in Colombian society. This study highlighted that this approach has devastating effects on the well-being of Venezuelan migrants, as López's approach serves as a catalyser and enabler for xenophobic and stigmatizing behaviour. Hence, in the results of this study it is very clear that Venezuelan migrants are the victims of xenophobia and stigmatization, rather than the actors responsible for insecurity.

If the Bogotá government really wishes to effectively tackle problems that arise within the security realm, it is a prerequisite that they start to rule and make decisions out of public interest instead of their own. Additionally, it is of utmost importance that cooperation between the different security bodies and their leaders is restored, so that a long-term and well-thought-out security plan can be implemented which addresses the needs and wishes of the citizenry. Based upon current events, it is a painful realization that it is most likely that this ambition will remain an illusion rather than a reality, causing more unnecessary harm to Venezuelan migrants in Bogotá.

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## LIST OF INTERVIEWEES:

Interviewed	Affiliation or role <sup>1</sup>	Topics covered <sup>2</sup>	Place and date	Time
Ricardo Nario	Member of La Direkta - alternative news publishing agency	Venezuelan migration flows coming to Bogotá, response to these flows from the public and Colombian government	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 02/09/2021	5PM CET
Maria Clara Robaya Leon	Professor specialized in Migration, researcher at the Observatorio de Venezuela de Universidad del Rosario	Migration history between Venezuela and Colombia and its implications on current migratory crisis	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 03/09/2021	4PM CET
Paula Doria	Journalist at La Silla Vacía specialized in criminality and security	Security crisis in Bogotá, effect of various past reforms in police and judicial system of Bogotá in relation to handling of current crisis	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 03/09/2021	7PM CET
Mauricio Palma Gutiérrez	PhD candidate at the University of Warwick, specializing in cross-border migration at Colombia/Venezuela border	Implications of Venezuelan migration on Colombian state and society in times of COVID-19	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 06/09/2021	5PM CET
Diana Carolina Peláez Rodríguez	Migration professor at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá	Migration between Venezuela and Colombia from a historic perspective, role of xenophobia in public and political discourse	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 06/09/2021	8PM CET
Lobsang Parra	Sociologist from Universidad Nacional de Colombia	Migration and its effects on the feeling of insecurity, rhetoric of Claudia López in relation to insecurity and Venezuelan migration	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 08/09/2021	8PM CET
María del Mar Acevedo	Researcher specialized in migration of Venezuelan females	Trafficking of Venezuelan migrants, especially female migrants	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 10/09/2021	9PM CET
Iván Mauricio Gaitán Gómez	Senior Consultant Migration Children and Adolescents at UNICEF Colombia	Current trends in criminality in Bogotá post-pandemic, effect of mandatory quarantine on criminality, state-capacity of Colombian state	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 13/09/2021	7PM CET
Cesar Andres Restrepo Florez	Journalist specialized in crime reporting at El Espectador	Institutional responses to increase of criminality in Bogotá, role of traditional press relating to spreading of distorted images, state-capacity of Colombian state	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 18/09/2021	7PM CET
Maria Emilia Lleras Ronderos	Investigator at Ideas por la Paz - specialized in Venezuelan migration and its effect on citizen's security and perception thereof	Current trends in social and political realm relating to connecting Venezuelan immigrants to insecurity, xenophobia in political discourse and rhetoric of Claudia López	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 21/09/2021	5PM CET
Rocio Urón Durán	Investigator at UNODC Colombia, specialized in Colombia-Venezuela	Institutional response towards migratory crisis, possible effects of the PEP programme	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 29/09/2021	4PM CET

	migration and trafficking of Venezuelan immigrants	and the Estatuto Temporal de Protección		
Laura Marquéz Ramirez	Sociologist	Creation of the 'other' and 'an enemy' within Colombian political discourse, associations made towards Venezuelan immigrants in Colombian society	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 03/10/2021	6PM CET
Laura Cristina Dib Ayesta	Head of Clinica Juridica para migrantes de la Universidad de los Andes	Implications of the programa PEP and the Estatuto Temporal de Protección	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 14/10/2021	11PM CET
Felipe Bogotá	Ex-director of Bogotá Como Vamos	Responses of the Colombian government to the current migratory crisis	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 14/10/2021	11:45 PM CET
H.E. Fernando Grillo Rubiano	Ambassador of Colombia to the Netherlands	Responses of the Colombian government to the current migratory crisis	The Hague - Microsoft Teams 20/10/2021	3:30PM CET


## SURVEY RESULTS:

*Encuesta sobre seguridad e inmigración venezolana en Bogotá*

December 28th 2021, 9:19 am MST

Responses to the questions regarding the age and sex of respondents have been left out.


### Q4 - ¿En qué localidad vive usted?



#	Field	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Deviation	Variance	Count
1	¿En qué localidad vive usted?	1.00	18.00	4.23	3.15	9.93	48

#	Answer	%	Count
1	Chapinero	8.33%	4
2	Usaquén	31.25%	15
3	Teusaquillo	10.42%	5
4	Suba	14.58%	7
5	Santa Fé	4.17%	2
6	Engativá	18.75%	9
7	Fontibón	6.25%	3
8	Kennedy	0.00%	0
9	Mártires	0.00%	0
10	Puente Aranda	2.08%	1
11	Candelaria	0.00%	0
12	Antonio Nariño	0.00%	0
13	Rafael Uribe	2.08%	1
14	San Cristóbal	0.00%	0
15	Usme	0.00%	0
16	Tunjuelito	0.00%	0
17	Ciudad Bolívar	0.00%	0
18	Bosa	2.08%	1
	Total	100%	48


### Q5 - ¿Cuál es su formación académica?



#	Field	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Deviation	Variance	Count
1	¿Cuál es su formación académica?	4.00	9.00	6.17	1.21	1.47	48

#	Answer	%	Count
1	Educación básica o primaria incompleta	0.00%	0
2	Educación media o secundaria incompleta	0.00%	0
3	Educación básica o primaria completa	0.00%	0
4	Educación media o secundaria completa	12.50%	6
5	Educación universitaria incompleta	16.67%	8
6	Educación universitaria completa	20.83%	10
7	Posgrado (diplomado, magíster, doctorado, posdoctorado)	45.83%	22
8	Sin escolarización	0.00%	0
9	No sabe, no responde	4.17%	2
	Total	100%	48

## Q6 - Seguridad en Bogotá




#	Field	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Deviation	Variance	Count
1	Yo y cualquier persona de mi familia puede ser víctima de un delito en cualquier momento	1.00	5.00	1.58	0.91	0.82	45


#	Question	totalmente de acuerdo	de acuerdo	no está de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo	está en desacuerdo	totalmente en desacuerdo	Total
1	Bogotá es una ciudad segura	2.17% 1	2.17% 1	8.70% 4	47.83% 22	39.13% 18	46
2	Personalmente, me siento seguro/a en mi barrio	2.22% 1	20.00% 9	15.56% 7	42.22% 19	20.00% 9	45
3	La delincuencia común es	34.78% 16	36.96% 17	13.04% 6	10.87% 5	4.35% 2	46

	el mayor problema de seguridad en Bogotá											
4	Yo y cualquier persona de mi familia puede ser víctima de un delito en cualquier momento	60.00%	27	31.11 %	14	2.22%	1	4.44%	2	2.22%	1	45
5	El barrio donde vivo cuenta con suficientes medidas de seguridad contra los delincuentes	2.22%	1	17.78 %	8	28.89%	13	26.67%	12	24.44%	11	45





## Q7 - Seguridad e inmigración venezolana




#	Field	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Deviation	Variance	Count
1	La llegada de inmigrantes venezolanos a Colombia ha aumentado mi inseguridad	1.00	5.00	1.78	1.03	1.06	45
2	La llegada de inmigrantes venezolanos en mi barrio ha aumentado mi inseguridad	1.00	5.00	2.27	1.20	1.44	45
3	La ola migratorio desde Venezuela es un problema transitorio	1.00	5.00	3.27	1.37	1.88	44

4	La seguridad ciudadana ocupa un lugar importante en la agenda política de Bogotá	1.00	5.00	3.11	1.34	1.79	45
5	La propuesta de Claudia López de crear una unidad policial especial para identificar a los inmigrantes es una idea positiva y necesaria	1.00	5.00	2.71	1.34	1.81	45
6	Las conexiones públicas que hace Claudia López entre los inmigrantes venezolanos y la inseguridad y la delincuencia no son reales	1.00	5.00	2.66	1.43	2.04	44

#	Question	totalmente en acuerdo		de acuerdo		no está de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo		está en desacuerdo		totalmente en desacuerdo		Total
1	La llegada de inmigrantes venezolanos a Colombia ha aumentado mi inseguridad	53.33%	24	26.67%	12	11.11%	5	6.67%	3	2.22%	1	45
2	La llegada de inmigrantes venezolanos en mi barrio ha aumentado mi inseguridad	35.56%	16	24.44%	11	22.22%	10	13.33%	6	4.44%	2	45
3	La ola migratorio desde	15.91%	7	15.91%	7	13.64%	6	34.09%	15	20.45%	9	44

	Venezuela es un problema transitorio											
4	La seguridad ciudadana ocupa un lugar importante en la agenda política de Bogotá	15.56%	7	20.00%	9	20.00%	9	26.67%	12	17.78%	8	45
5	La propuesta de Claudia López de crear una unidad policial especial para identificar a los inmigrantes es una idea positiva y necesaria	24.44%	11	24.44%	11	17.78%	8	22.22%	10	11.11%	5	45
6	Las conexiones públicas que hace Claudia López entre los inmigrantes venezolanos y la inseguridad y la delincuencia no son reales	29.55%	13	22.73%	10	13.64%	6	20.45%	9	13.64%	6	44

## Q8 - Inmigración venezolana en la sociedad colombiana contemporánea



#	Field	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Deviation	Variance	Count
1	La sociedad colombiana está preparada para recibir inmigrantes del otros países del continente	3.00	5.00	4.35	0.61	0.37	43
2	El Gobierno debería primero ayudar a los colombianos y luego a los inmigrantes	1.00	4.00	1.89	0.98	0.96	44
3	Los municipios no son capaces de gestionar los	1.00	5.00	1.64	0.77	0.60	44

	problemas que provoca la inmigración						
4	La cultura colombiana está amenazada por la llegada de inmigrantes venezolanos	1.00	5.00	2.61	1.39	1.92	44
5	La llegada de los inmigrantes enriquece la sociedad y la cultura colombiana	1.00	5.00	3.34	1.26	1.59	44
6	La llegada de los inmigrantes venezolanos tiene un efecto positivo para la economía de Colombia	1.00	5.00	3.75	1.19	1.41	44
7	Es importante y valioso que los inmigrantes que los inmigrantes venezolanos busquen y mantengan contacto con los colombianos	1.00	5.00	2.77	1.06	1.13	44
8	Los inmigrantes están concentrados en todas las comunas de Bogotá, sean ricos o pobres	1.00	5.00	2.32	1.26	1.58	44
9	Colombia no discrimina a los inmigrantes venezolanos	1.00	5.00	3.50	1.06	1.11	44
10	La cobertura de los inmigrantes venezolanos en los medios de comunicación en Colombia es neutral y representativa de la realidad	1.00	5.00	3.33	1.09	1.20	43

#	Question	totalmente en acuerdo	de acuerdo	no está en acuerdo ni en desacuerdo	está en desacuerdo	totalmente en desacuerdo	Total							
1	La sociedad colombiana está preparada para recibir inmigrante	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	6.98%	3	51.16%	2	2	41.86%	1	8	43


	s del otros países del continente											
2	El Gobierno debería primero ayudar a los colombianos y luego a los inmigrantes	47.73%	21	22.73%	10	22.73%	10	6.82%	3	0.00%	0	44
3	Los municipios no son capaces de gestionar los problemas que provoca la inmigración	47.73%	21	45.45%	20	4.55%	2	0.00%	0	2.27%	1	44
4	La cultura colombiana está amenazada por la llegada de inmigrantes venezolanos	34.09%	15	13.64%	6	15.91%	7	29.55%	13	6.82%	3	44
5	La llegada de los inmigrantes enriquece la sociedad y la cultura colombiana	9.09%	4	20.45%	9	18.18%	8	31.82%	14	20.45%	9	44
6	La llegada de los inmigrantes venezolanos tiene un efecto	6.82%	3	9.09%	4	18.18%	8	34.09%	15	31.82%	14	44

	positivo para la economía de Colombia											
7	Es importante y valioso que los inmigrantes venezolanos busquen y mantengan contacto con los colombianos	6.82%	3	40.91%	18	29.55%	13	13.64%	6	9.09%	4	44
8	Los inmigrantes están concentrados en todas las comunas de Bogotá, sean ricos o pobres	29.55%	13	38.64%	17	11.36%	5	11.36%	5	9.09%	4	44
9	Colombia no discrimina a los inmigrantes venezolanos	4.55%	2	13.64%	6	25.00%	11	40.91%	18	15.91%	7	44
10	La cobertura de los inmigrantes venezolanos en los medios de comunicación en Colombia es neutral y	4.65%	2	20.93%	9	25.58%	11	34.88%	15	13.95%	6	43



representativa de la realidad


### Q9 - ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún delito en los últimos 5 años?



#	Field	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Deviation	Variance	Count
1	¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún delito en los últimos 5 años?	1.00	2.00	1.59	0.49	0.24	44

#	Answer	%	Count
1	Sí	40.91%	18
2	No	59.09%	26
	Total	100%	44

**Q10 - ¿Ha sido alguna persona de su familia víctima de algún delito en los últimos 5 años?**



#	Field	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Deviation	Variance	Count
1	¿Ha sido alguna persona de su familia víctima de algún delito en los últimos 5 años?	1.00	2.00	1.39	0.49	0.24	44

#	Answer	%	Count
1	Sí	61.36%	27
2	No	38.64%	17
	Total	100%	44