Priorities in Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case of Somalia (2013-2021)

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Abstract

This bachelor thesis considers the prioritisation and sequencing of policies in the process of post-conflict state-building. It starts by considering existing literature of both state-building and sequencing to outline how it has informed the main theoretical framework on the topic: Timilsina's (2007) three phases for the sequencing of priorities in state-building. The thesis then analyses the replicability of this framework in the case of Somalia (2013-2021), for which it finds that priorities were largely set according to the theory, but also that the sequencing of individual policies saw unequal implementation. It concludes with a discussion from which it is clear that the unequal implementation resulted in unequal long-term state- and peace-building outcomes.

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Cover image: Ugandan soldiers serving with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) play football with young Somali boys in the central Somali town of Buur-Hakba following its capture the day before from the Al-Qaeda-affiliated extremist group Al Shabaab by the Somali National Army (SNA), supported by AMISOM forces. Retrieved from '2013_02_28_Buur-Hakba_Town h' by U-UN IST Photo / Stuart Price (2013) on Flickr under CC0 1.0 licence.

Introduction

One can say that the recent withdrawal of the United States and its allies from Afghanistan has sparked a scholarly debate about what exactly went wrong in the reconstruction process and, more generally, what constitutes proper state-building. Where some argue that the United States itself had no clear democratic goal in mind (Ali, 2021), others even say it should not have engaged in state-building in the first place (Biscop, 2021). Different clarifications cover the broad range from the asymmetric nature of the insurgency (Khan, Wazir & Ali, 2021), to issues with centralisation (Daudzai, 2021), to the simple notion that state capacity is more often than not decreased through American intervention (Abad & Mauer, 2021).

This renewed academic attention for state-building dynamics, visible with nearly every large-scale event of foreign intervention, state collapse and state reconstruction, should not come as a surprise. Foreign actions in the state-building process often receive extensive media coverage and are closely related to public opinion at home (Pew Research Center, 2021), making them interesting phenomena to study. But maybe even more important, as post-conflict situations often require state-building to start from scratch, researching the priorities set in the process can provide a unique insight into the elements that are deemed fundamental to the modern nation-state. This goes for a normative point of view, indicating what the different actors involved in state-building believe the polity should look like, as well as for a practical point of view, indicating what it takes for a state to be stable, peaceful and successful.

Following the latter reasoning of importance, this thesis will be investigating the **priorities in post-conflict state-building**. Regarding this particular topic, both the priorities element as well as the state-building element have a rather large body of literary coverage already, but theorising on the combination of the two can be further developed. Hence, the thesis will start by drawing on both sequencing and state-building literature and then continue to explore the connection between these two fields with the formulation of an overarching research question. It will then apply existing prioritisation and sequencing theory to a newly relevant state-building case: Somalia (2013-2021). The consequential analysis aims to see if and how the prescribed prioritisation and sequencing were applied in the two cases and with which results. The thesis will conclude with a discussion of the wider implications and limitations of these observations on priority-setting in state-building.

Literature Review

The topic of state-building is surrounded by a large body of literature, with many scholars arguing how this process, which aims to improve the effective functioning of the state (Whaites, 2008, p. 4), should take place. One could argue however, that in terms of structure, the literature on state-building is much characterised by waves: with every round of state collapse, formation and (re-)construction events, a new body of state-building literature emerges around a relevant theme (Figure 1). Firstly apparent is the theorising, related to the emergence of new sovereign states in the last decades of the 20th century, specifically around nationhood. In this light, Linz (1993) outlines the historical development of states as well as nations and attempts to argue that the creation of nations and nation-states is difficult and comes at a great cost in terms of human wellbeing. He concludes that most contemporary societies, because of their leadership, elites, and coercive methods involved, would not be able to successfully complete the nation-building process (Linz, 1993, pp. 364-367). However, Hansen (1996) for example, argues differently by outlining how national identity was created in the state-building process through various narratives of a shared past in the case of Slovenia.

Secondly, after the western interventions of the early 2000s in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, a new wave of state-building literature emerged, this time around the ideology and practice of the process. Worth mentioning here is Jessop (2006), who claims that there is no single theory of state-building that can fully capture the complicated process. He argues that a good theory of state elements requires theory about the society surrounding it, thus taking the broader context of the process into account. At the height of this second wave, Hehir and Robinson (2007) edit an entire volume devoted to the theory and practice of state-building, in which the contributors criticise the top-down interventionist approach of many projects. The various authors study the presumptions of the process, after which they recommend a more administration-oriented approach. Chandler (2010) then adds to the discussion by exploring the contribution of post-liberal insights on state-building. He outlines that these insights criticise the implementation of western liberal policy in ill-suited non-liberal contexts after intervention (Chandler, 2010, pp. 40-41). However, he then concludes that this new approach does not necessarily do better at addressing the problems associated with the state-building process, but is mainly a political shift in world vision (Chandler, 2010, pp 194-195).

Thirdly, with the visible collapse and rebuilding of regimes in the second decade of the 21st century, most notably in the context of the Arab Spring, a new wave of state-building literature started focussing on the longevity of the process. Marquette and Beswick (2011) look at state-

building as the new dominant form of development. They draw on other contributions in the work to argue that state-building, if it has indeed become the dominant mode of development, should take into account that differences in existing local practices do not always support western governance arrangements and alternatives need to be considered (Marquette & Beswick, 2011, p. 1711). Caplan's (2012) work then, looks at the exit strategy element of state-building. Inspired by the never-ending state-building operations at the time of publication, the contributors emphasise that there are multiple possible strategies for withdrawal, but also that involvement is almost never finite. The more general success or failure of state-building operations is studied by Miller (2013). He concludes that a focus on the different dimensions of a state – security, legitimacy, capacity, prosperity, and humanity – as well as on the different types of state-failure, is required for a successful state-building process (Miller, 2013, p. 176).

With regards to sequencing literature, process sequencing as considered by political science considers the order of events and actions over time (Blanchard, 2020) and is supported by a still substantial, yet somewhat smaller body of theory than state-building. In essence, this chronological ordering can be seen as concentrated on two levels (Figure 1). First, on a global scale, scholars have been looking at how important international events are ordered and unfold over time. As this level might be less relevant for state-building decisions, it will not be considered elaborately here, but worth mentioning is the edited volume by Fioretos (2017) which provides many examples of global event sequencing theory. Within the work, Sikkink (2017) for instance researches what the critical point in time for the implementation of human rights institutions in Latin America was. In a different contribution, Solingen and Wan (2017) look at important turning points and choices that were made in the development, and thus the ordering, of international security institutions.

Second, on the smaller and more relevant scale of the state, the sequencing debate unfolds mainly around the dilemma of democracy versus institutions. Mansfield and Snyder (2007) observe that peaceful democratisation requires the establishment of solid institutions predating the organisation of mass elections. Hobson (2012) however, argues that some forms of democracy, suited to the context, can already early on be implemented, and do not need to wait for full institutionalisation. These perspectives relate very much to the discussion on which institutions should be prioritised to ensure stable and peaceful state-building. In their often-cited "From War to Democracy", Jarstad and Sisk (2008) look at the interaction between democratisation and peace-building. Their edited volume argues that democratisation is often employed as a means to move away from the conflict nature of a peace-building situation, but

also that this prioritisation undermines the peace process itself. Finally, McFate (2010) even looks at priorities within the security sector. He notes that Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament-Demobilisation-Reintegration (DDR) should be coordinated and implemented together, otherwise the policies will be counteracting instead of reenforcing each other's long-term effects.

The combination of state-building and sequencing theory (Figure 1), in other words the priorities set in (post-conflict) state-building, has only received little academic attention. Nonetheless, important ground work was done by Hamre and Sullivan (2002) who outline the four main sectors that require reconstruction after conflict or failed-state situations: security, justice/reconciliation, social/economic wellbeing, and governance/participation. The scholars go on to develop several general rules for state-building, but do not go into depth regarding their prioritisation (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002, pp. 92-93). Furthermore, in terms of sequencing, Lund (2003) advances that the start of any reconstruction project should be a safe local environment. According to him, one can thus sequence actions based on their necessity in peace-building (Lund, 2002, p. 40). Wolff (2011) agrees with this vision when he argues that security should have priority and is enhanced by choosing the right institutions. The author proposes consociational institutions, based on power sharing and self-government, as the preferred method for building democratic states in divided societies (Wolff, 2011, pp. 1797-1798).

Crucial in the end however, is the doctoral dissertation by Timilsina (2007), which builds on the theoretical insights mentioned above. It makes use of three case studies as well as expert opinions to indicate what important state-building policies are, and how they should be prioritised in post-war reconstruction. Among other things, the study argues in favour of the following policy attention and resource hierarchy: security – humanitarian/relief – governance – economic stabilisation – large/long term infrastructure/development (Timilsina, 2007, p. 136). Timilsina (2007) thus provides a good blueprint of what an inquiry into priorities of post-conflict state-building could look like, but she also leaves room for further study, including on cases for which state-building occurred after the writing. In the end, it remains interesting to look if the prioritisation proposed by Timilsina (2007) stands firm in the face of a newly relevant instance of post-conflict reconstruction such as Somalia (the choice of which will be discussed under methodology). This study thus asks:

How does the prioritisation of state-building policies in Somalia affect its long-term state- and peace-building outcomes?

State-Building

1990s: nation-building

- Linz (1993): nation-building complicated process
- Hansen (1996): national identity possible in state-building

2000s: ideology & practice

- Jessop (2006): theory needs to take context into account
- Hehir & Robinson (2007): less top-down, more administration
- Chandler (2010): post-liberal not better solving issues

2010s: longevity

- Marquette & Beswick (2011): dominant mode development?
- Caplan (2012): foreign involvement rarely finite
- Miller (2013): focus on required dimensions state

Sequencing

Global level

- Fioretos (2017): critical moments of implementation (Sikkink, 2017); important decisions in international institutions (Solingen & Wan, 2017)

State level

- Mansfield & Snyder (2007): institutions before elections
- Hobson (2012): right type of democracy from start
- Jarstad & Sisk (2012): prioritisation democracy undermines peace
- McFate (2010): coordinate DDR and SSR

Priorities in State-Building

- Hamre & Sullivan (2002): prioritised sectors for reconstruction: security, justice/reconciliation, social/economic wellbeing, governance/participation
- Lund (2003): security as foundation and guideline for state-building
- Wolff (2011): first peace, then consociational institutions
- Tilmasina (2007): security – humanitarian/relief – governance – economic stabilisation – large/long term infrastructure/development

Figure 1: Graphic display of state-building and sequencing literature feeding into theory on state-building priorities

Theoretical Framework

In its review of recent state-building developments, this study draws upon Timilsina's (2007) policy-guiding framework of priorities in post-war reconstruction. The framework consists of a hierarchy for the prioritisation of attention and resources, as well as a sequencing suggestion for implementation of the policies. Regarding the former, the framework holds that security serves as the first priority in reconstruction and is – certainly in a post-conflict context – favoured over development. Security involves a broad spectrum of actions: providing peacekeeping forces, withdrawing international forces, conducting disarmament, conducting mine clearing, disarming groups, reintegrating former combatants, and reforming the security sector (Timilsina, 2007, p. 134). Second, humanitarian relief, focussed on addressing immediate health concerns and the needs of dislocated people, requires the devotion of attention and resources and is deemed more important than immediate rebuilding. Afterwards, the construction of legitimate modes of government, both at the national and local level, is prioritised. This involves adequate services to the citizens by solid executive institutions, which provide the foundation for the subsequent democratisation process. Then, in dialogue with this strengthening of government but depending on the requirements of the situation, solid financial policies should be favoured to facilitate the return of the market economy. Finally, with firm economic and political institutions receiving sufficient attention, large-scale and long-term infrastructural development can be considered that will keep the state running over time (Timilsina, 2007, p. 135).

Regarding its suggestion for the sequencing of these priorities, Timilsina (2007) envisions three phases (Figure 2). They embody the policy focus for the short-, mid- and long-term respectively. Each phase contains all of the priority sectors mentioned above, but differs from the other two in the specific policies within those sectors that receive attention at the point in time (Timilsina, 2007, p. 137). For example, the security sector starts with many capacity-building policies in the first phase (estimated to be the first one or two years), but ends with the reduction of military expenditure in the last phase (estimated to be five to ten years from the start), while reform, disarmament and mine-clearing remain present throughout the entire process (Timilsina, 2007, p. 141). The author stresses that this sequencing of priorities is based on the goals of "economic growth, peace and stability, poverty reduction, and state capacity-building" (Timilsina, 2007, p. 137), which makes that it might not fit every situation. As a result, state-building projects with different goals might require different priorities.

In predictive terms, since the framework advanced by Timilsina (2007) draws upon expert opinions and is in line with much of the literature reviewed above, it would make sense to extrapolate Timilsina's (2007) causal mechanism of state-building prioritisation and outcomes to the case of Somalia. In practice, this would mean that in this instance of state-building, adherence to the approximate sequential order as outlined above, would result in a stable situation, while mixing-up the priorities would result in continued disorder.

Short-Term	Mid-Term	Long-Term
Security Peacekeeping, disarmament demobilisation reintegration, capacity-building, mine-clearing, reform planning **Humanitarian** Refugee resettling, food security, health, redistribution (integrate/reconcile), basic services **Government** Institutions, accountability, reform planning, electoral support **Economy** Stabilise currency and budget, financial regulation, encourage FDI, limited liberalism **Infrastructure** Reconstruction planning, restore productive capacity and essential infrastructure	**Security** Mine-clearing, disarmament demobilisation reintegration, security sector reform **Humanitarian** Refugee resettling, agricultural assistance, primary health/education services **Government** Political reforms, elections, corruption control, civil service reform **Economy** Financial stabilisation, revenue generation, limited liberalism, budget management **Infrastructure** Long-term investments, development infrastructure, export promotion	**Security** Reduce military expenditure, security sector reform, mine-clearing **Humanitarian** Reform education, health and land **Government** Corruption control, civil service reform **Economy** Full liberalism, membership of free trade organisations **Infrastructure** Construction and maintenance of infrastructure

Figure 2: Adapted and summarised version of Timilsina's (2007) three phases for the sequencing of priorities in state-building

Methodology

With a general theory on prioritisation in post-conflict state-building already developed in the literature, mainly by Timilsina (2007), it becomes interesting to see if the theory is applicable beyond the cases by which it was developed. The consequential theory testing that this study faces, can be conducted using a comparison to one or multiple new cases. Halperin and Heath (2020) point out that such a comparative design is useful both to see if theories can be replicated in different contexts and to explain diverging outcomes in different contexts (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 233). Especially the former, but also the latter use are relevant in meeting the research question which asks to see if and how state-building priorities are similar in a different case. Among the comparative designs are evidently large- and small-sample comparisons, but also single case studies (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 234). In general, small-sample comparisons employed for theory generation, while large-sample comparisons can be used to both generate and test the theory (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 234). However, given the very limited availability of statistical data in the case of state-building priorities, large-sample comparison is not possible here. As a result, this study will test the replicability of existing theory through a small sample.

Regarding suitable data about state-building priorities, strategic planning documents as well as implementation reports, published by both governments and international organisations, are available in many cases (for example see the variety of documents by the United Nations in Iraq, 2021). Whereas policy strategy documents generally are concerned with the planning of state-building actions, implementation reports say more about how state-building events actually took place, both of which are useful in informing priorities in state-building. However, where policy strategies and development plans tend to state their priorities rather clearly (for example see: United Nations, 2017, pp. 20-21), implementation reports require a close reading and description. Given the short time and space available for this description, this study deems it wise to consider a single case in depth instead of multiple cases superficially.

In addition, the main theory being tested here, was developed by Timilsina in 2007 based on state-building cases of Haiti, Mozambique and Cambodia in the 1990s and expert opinions with experience of the early 2000s in mind. Hence, the theory-testing sample should consist of a case which has shown (renewed) relevance after this period. At the same time, the state-building process in the case should have been going on for long enough to fully apply Timilsina's (2007) framework with the distinction of three phases and to give insight into the outcomes of the process already. Consequently, this study will consider state-building in Somalia in the 2013-

2021 period. This decision results from a change in the trajectory of the country, which has been politically unstable since its independence and characterised by civil war since 1991 (Shay, 2014), but was able to make a new start in state-building with important victories over terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab and the establishment of a federal government in late 2012 (Williams, 2018, pp. 153-156).

Like in other instances of state-building, for the case of Somalia, planning and reporting documents on the reconstruction process are available. From national development strategies, published by the Somalian Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (2018) and the United Nations (2021), it is possible to derive and describe priorities in state-building planning directly. To find out how policies were prioritised in practice, a more detailed analysis of reports published by the United Nations (2021) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (2021) is required. As these priorities are not easily observable nor entirely hidden in the documents, this study will make use of a middle way between the respectively applicable quantitative and qualitative content analysis (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 376). Hence, this thesis employs a framework (Appendix 1) for which the coding is derived directly from the general sequencing pattern as proposed by Timilsina (2007, p. 141). The coding framework is divided into categories and subcategories similar to the proposed prioritisation of sectors and policies respectively. In the end, each subcategory can be indicated in the data on the basis of the occurrence of an act which is general enough to allow close reading and specific enough to allow coding into Timilsina's (2007) categories.

In practice, this method implicates that both the strategic planning documents and the implementation reports are chronologically outlined and assigned to the short- (2013-2014), mid- (2015-2017), or long-term (2018-2021) state-building phase, which is defined through the application of Timilsina's (2007, p. 141) timeline to the case of Somalia, starting in 2013 for the reasons indicated above. Subsequently, within these phases, the prioritisation and sequencing of policies are described per priority sector as defined by Timilsina (2007, 136). For the planning documents, these are obtained and described directly. For the implementation reports, codes are applied to the text, after which the frequency of policy occurrence can be used to derive priorities and sequencing. Importantly, each code is only applied once per document to avoid overrepresentation of policies in time when analysing longer files.

State-Building Priorities in Somalia (2013-2021)

In the case of Somalia, state-building priorities have mainly been outlined by the national government in three policy documents. The 'New Deal Compact for Somalia' (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013) for the 2014-2016 period covers the largest part of short- and mid-term state-building, the 'National Development Plan 2017-2019' (Federal Government of Somalia, 2016) covers the largest part of mid- and long-term state-building, and the 'Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024' (The Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 2019) covers the last part of long-term state-building. These Somalian national strategies – which for the sake of simplicity will be referred to as NDCS, NDP-8 and NDP-9 respectively – are complemented by two strategic frameworks of the United Nations: the 'United Nations Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework 2014-2016' (UNISF) (2014) and the 'United Nations Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020' (UNSF) (2017). In addition, the reports published by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) provide an useful insight into the actual implementation of reconstruction plans and are thus crucial to gain understanding of the state-building priorities.



Figure 3: Implemented state-building policies per sector, counted in state-building reporting documents, displayed as proportion of the total count of each state-building phase

When considering the policy counts for each sector over the entire Somalia case, it becomes clear that empirical data about the implementation supports the prioritisation as proposed by Timilsina (2007). As explained earlier, this theoretical framework holds that most attention and resources should be devoted to security policies, followed by the humanitarian, governmental,

economic and infrastructural aspects of state-building, in that order of priority. Consequently, empirical data (Figure 3) shows that in the short-term phase, counts for security policies (~38%) are the largest share of the total, followed by humanitarian (~28%), governmental (~20%), economic (~8%) and infrastructural policies (~9%). In the mid-term phase a comparable image is visible with only government (~21%) increasing its share at the cost of infrastructure (~8%), and security (~37%), humanitarian (~27%) and economy (~17%) remaining relatively stable. In the long term, the empirical evidence slightly diverts from Timilsina's (2007) prioritisation as the share of governmental policies (~25%) becomes larger than that of humanitarian policies (~22%). The other state-building sectors – security (~30%), economy (~15%) and infrastructure (~8%) – however, keep adhering to the theoretical framework. Yet, in order to determine if the individual policies within these sectors were also sequenced in the way outlined by Timilsina (2007), it is necessary to look at the way in which state-building events were planned and implemented in each sector separately.

Security

Regarding short-term objectives, the NDCS lists security as one of the five main goals and features capacity building, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament-demobilisation-reintegration (DDR) together with accountability and the development of a maritime security strategy as policy priorities (2013, pp. 6-7). In the international perspective of the UNISF 2014-2016, the objectives in security similarly prioritise capacity building of state institutions to recover territory, SSR to integrate forces into the federal framework and DDR to reduce the threat of Al-Shabaab resurgence (2014, pp. 12-13). However, when considering the empirical narrative presented by the reports of implemented security policy (Figure 4) it becomes clear that more policies are actually implemented. Here, counts for capacity building (~23%), SSR (~11%) DDR (~10%) are indeed apparent, but peacekeeping (~30%), mine clearing (~17%) and planning for further reform (~7%) are clearly also implemented.

Consequently, both the national and international strategy follow Timilsina's (2007) prioritisation of capacity building and DDR for the short-term but neglect other policies such as mine clearing. In addition, they focus on SSR actions already, which are reserved by Timilsina (2007) for the mid-term state-building. Taken with the empirical data however, it seems like all aspects of Timilsina's (2007) framework for the short term were implemented, but then supplemented with SSR policies.

In terms of mid-term state-building, the NDP-8 takes security conditions as a starting point, concentrated in a National Security Architecture, which again involves accountability of the

security forces, capacity building and SSR (2016, pp. 21-24). After this starting point, security does not feature prominently in the rest of the plan. In the UNSF 2017-2020 strategic priorities are largely focussed on the strengthening of institutions, indicating SSR in terms of security policy (2017, p. 21). The empirical account is again more diverse than the national strategies, showing that the same policies being implemented as in the short-term (Figure 4): capacity building (~22%), DDR (~13%), mine clearing (~14%), peacekeeping (~21%), reform planning (~16%) and SSR (~11%). These counts also signify that whereas most policies remained stable, peacekeeping decreased, and reform planning increased significantly compared to the short-term.

With SSR added by Timilsina (2007) as a priority for mid-term policy, state-building in Somalia adheres to the framework rather well. Again, the national frameworks describe a more limited spectrum of policies than is visible in the actual implementation, but together they touch upon all described policy aspects. Interesting however, is the increase in reform planning from the short- to the mid-term phase, of which the national strategies are an example themselves. This trend is not described by Timilsina (2007) and reform planning is actually not recommended for the mid-term at all.



Figure 4: Implemented security policies, counted in state-building reporting documents, displayed as proportion of the total count of each state-building phase

On the long-term with the NDP-9 then, security reappears together with the rule of law as the second pillar of the development framework. It focusses on basic security provision for the Somali citizens but remains centred around the strengthening of security forces and the integration of these forces into the national framework which makes that nearly all policies can

still be related to capacity building, SSR or DDR (2019, pp. 160-164). Regarding the accounts of implemented policies, military expenditure reduction (~4%) features for the first time, whereas capacity building (~23%), DDR (~13%), mine clearing (~18%) and peacekeeping (~17%) remained equally present. In addition, reform planning (~6%) and SSR (~21%) respectively decreased and increased sharply compared to the mid-term state-building phase.

As a result, the emergence of military expenditure reduction, however small, is very well in line with Timilsina's (2007) advise of moving away from a completely military-centred security. In essence, it is even in contradiction with the continuing prominence of implemented capacity building, which is not prescribed for the long-term phase at all. Equally, the presence of DDR, although not very prominent, should not really be required at this stage anymore. Overall, however, the state-building developments mirror Timilsina's (2007) recommendations relatively well.

Humanitarian

The short-term humanitarian aspect of state-building does not feature prominently in NDCS. In essence it is only embodied in the aims to provide better social services and respect human rights (2013, pp. 11-12) and the pledge to be committed to resilience building and smooth access for aid providers related to continually recurring challenges (2013, p. 16). In the UNISF 2014-2016, humanitarian policies are visible in the aims of providing good social services and the stimulation of employment among the young segment of the population (2014, p. 14), but not framed in the same categories as considered here. That the categories are indeed present, is illustrated by the empirical account (Figure 5), which features the implementation of every single category: food security (~23%), health (~23%), redistribution (~15%) and refugee redistribution (~18%) prominently, as well as agricultural assistance (~4%), basic health care/education (~10%) and education/health/land reform (~4%) to a lesser extent.

As Timilsina (2007) argues for a rather broad spectrum of humanitarian policies on the short-term, the limited consideration of this sector by national strategies is a bit off-track. However, complemented with the empirical data from the reports, the policy in fact adheres to the framework quite well. It must be said that policies like agricultural assistance and humanitarian reforms are prioritised earlier than advised but given their limited presence, the overall fit of the implementation is quite neat.

By contrast, in the mid-term NDP-8, all of Timilsina's (2009) policies – with the exception of redistribution and refugee resettling – are discussed elaborately. Here, under the broad objective

of social and human development, the relevant health, nutrition, education and sanitation sectors are considered separately even receive their own justification and goals (2016, pp. 104-120). The UNSF 2017-2020 is less elaborate, but still specifies the aim of reducing poverty and providing basic services through supporting socio-economic opportunities for the population (2017, pp. 20-21). The broad spectrum of the NDP-8 is also reflected in the empirical data (Figure 5) which, like in the short-term phase, features all categories: food security (~21%), health (~18%), education/health reform (~2%) and redistribution (~19%) remained of similar proportion while agricultural assistance (~11%), basic healthcare/education (~18%) and refugee resettling (~11%) incurred some sharp in- or decreases.

The planning and implementation of mid-term humanitarian policies does not adhere to Timilsina's (2007) guidelines that well. This time around the framework, only describing refugee resettling, agricultural assistance and primary services, is more limited than the implemented policies. Consequently, Somalia's state-building is still prioritising actions for the short term such as food security and redistribution, while commencing with long-term reforms already.



Figure 5: Implemented humanitarian policies, counted in state-building reporting documents, displayed as proportion of the total count of each state-building phase

On the long-term, this trend of elaborate descriptions continues in the NDP-9 where the same policies still feature prominently but are divided over two pillars: agricultural support and food security under economic development, and health, education and food security under social development (2019, pp. 180-279). In reality however, three policies are prominently

implemented (Figure 5): food security (~27%), health (~27%) and redistribution (~30%). As a result, three other policies are still present, but far less prominent: agricultural assistance (~6%), basic health care/education (~6%) and refugee resettling (~6%). These latter three have decreased significantly compared to the mid-term and policies of education/health/land reform have even become completely absent.

With regards to applicability to Timilsina's (2007) framework, the absence of education/health/land reform is rather remarkable as this the only type of policy prescribed for the long-term. Evidently, planning and implementation does not apply well to the framework, especially since many short- and mid-term policies are prioritised on the long-term.

Government

For the short-term, in the NDCS, governmental policies are mainly visible around the topic of inclusive politics, involving dialogue, constitutional reform and elections by 2016, but also around the aim of providing access to judicial and civil services for ordinary citizens (2013, pp. 5-10). Similarly, the UNISF 2014-2016 acknowledges the priority of state formation and constitutional review, which are characteristic for political reform, as well as of elections and improved civil services (2014, pp. 11-12, 14). This focus on political reform is also visible in the empirical data (Figure 6), which shows prominent counts for both the planning (~28%) and the implementation (~36%) of reform. Policies like electoral support (~15%), elections (~7%) and the strengthening of institutions (~15%) also occur, but are less prominent.

Consequently, the governmental aspect of the state-building process in Somalia seems to be antedating Timilsina's (2007) prescriptions. Whereas preparations for elections and reforms with support and planning are indeed recommended for the short-term, the actual implementation of these events is supposed to take place in the mid-term phase. However, the strengthening of institutions correctly starts as early as possible.

With regards to the mid-term phase, the NDP-8 primarily envisions the building of strong institutions as well as the distribution of executive power over the government levels as important policies (2016, pp. 19, 78-101). Equally, the UNSF 2017-2021 places a strong emphasis on the government aspect in its state-building priorities. In particular, policies of federalism, reconciliation, accountability and civil services are all linked to the strengthening of governmental institutions (2017, pp. 20-21). This emphasis is still visible in the empirical results (Figure 6), which show a strong representation of institution strengthening (~20%) and political reform (~31%) among the implemented policies. Whereas elections (~13%) and

electoral support (~18%) have maintained a stable or increasing presence, reform planning (~3%) has decreased significantly compared to the short term. Newly encountered policies in the mid-term phase are civil service reform (~8%) and corruption control (~3%).

The applicability of mid-term state-building in Somalia to Timilsina's (2007) description for this phase is good in general, but its continued focus on institution strengthening renders it somewhat off-track. The framework spells out that this strengthening should take place in the short-term but not the mid-term phase anymore. However, the other policies, such as political and civil service reform, corruption control and elections, are much in line with Timilsina's (2007) advise.



Figure 6: Implemented government policies, counted in state-building reporting documents, displayed as proportion of the total count of each state-building phase

The national strategies do not change drastically with the long-term. In the NDP-9, it is again inclusive politics with political reform and elections which features prominently. In particular, the planning document keeps devoting much attention to reconciliation and constitutional review related to federalism in Somalia (2020, pp. 116-129). In practice this political reform (~36%) remains the largest proportion of implemented policies (Figure 6). Each of the other government policies is still present, but in smaller numbers: electoral support (~20%), elections (~17%), institutions (~9%), reform planning (~9%), corruption control (~7%) and civil service reform (~3%).

For the long-term, the planned and implemented policy diverts further from Timilsina's (2007) advice. For this phase only corruption control and civil service reform are prescribed, which happen to be the two least implemented policies. The other actions, in particular the strong emphasis on political reform, are more characteristic to the earlier state-building phases.

Economy

With regards to short-term economic policy, national strategic planning in the NDCS has specifically emphasised productivity through revenue and employment generation (2013, p. 9). The UNISF 2014-2016 too, sets priorities in economic development related to employment, resources and financial management (2014, pp. 14-15). From the empirical data (Figure 7) however, it becomes clear that aside from budget stabilisation (~17%), revenue generation (~17%) and financial regulation (~33%), policies like limited liberalism (~17%) and trade organisation membership (~17%) are present as well, although all in very limited numbers.

The policies mentioned above in planning and implementation are not exactly the ones prioritised by Timilsina (2007) for the short term. Whereas budget stabilisation, financial regulation and limited liberalism should indeed take place in the short-term phase, revenue generation and trade organisation membership are supposed to wait until the mid- or even long-term. Instead, the theoretical framework prescribes currency stabilisation and foreign direct investment (FDI) promotion for the starting phase of the state-building process.



Figure 7: Implemented economy policies, counted in state-building reporting documents, displayed as proportion of the total count of each state-building phase

For the mid-term, the NDP-8 discusses the development of each economic sector and separately considers an elaborate fiscal strategy. In particular, this description focusses on budget stabilisation, revenue generation, limited liberalism, and for some sectors export promotion as well (2016, pp. 45-77). The UNSF 2017-2020 is far more limited and only speaks about supporting socio-economic opportunities which is supposed to lead to inclusive and sustainable economic growth (2017, p. 21). In reality, it appears that mainly financial regulation (~49%) policy was increasingly implemented and to a lesser extent budget stabilisation (~17%), export promotion (~8%), limited liberalism (~8%) and trade organisation membership (~17%) as well.

Timilsina's (2007) prescriptions for mid-term economic policy are particularly focussed on financial stabilisation and revenue generation, which does not exactly mirror the planned and implemented actions in Somalia. Where this latter process should have prioritised financial regulation instead of revenue generation in the short term, it sequences the two policies in the exact opposite way. In addition, limited liberalism is supposed to appear strongly in this phase, but it remains fragile.

In the long term, the SNDP, features two large chapters which consider nearly every economic policy. However, the focus remains on financial regulation and revenue generation, creating a resilient economy profitable for (private sector) employment and investment, as well as on budget stabilisation (pp. 180-249, 280-306). Empirical findings, however, are much more limited. From the counts displayed in Figure 7, it is apparent that economic policies relating to currency stabilisation, export promotion, FDI promotion, advanced liberalism and trade organisation membership were barely implemented. Furthermore, the increase in budget stabilisation policy reflects the increased attention for economic policy in the national strategies, but not Timilsina's (2009) proposed decreasing priority of this policy. Similarly, both financial regulation and revenue generation remain relatively stable over time, which is in line with the national frameworks, but is not supposed to be the case for the long-term state-building according to the theory. This focus on budget stabilisation (~43%) and financial regulation (~27%) is certainly visible in the empirical account (Figure 7), but also revenue generation (~23%) features prominently. Furthermore, currency stabilisation (~4%) and limited liberalism (~4%) equally remain a slight presence.

Interestingly, policies such as full liberalism and trade organisation membership, which are prioritised by Timilsina (2007) for the long-term, do not appear in the empirical account at all. Even though the national strategic planning does seem to take these policies into account, the

long-term economic state-building in Somalia overall, does not seem to reflect the theoretical framework that well.

Infrastructure

Short-term infrastructure planning has received little to no attention in the NDCS. Only within plans for the economic sector, some attention is devoted to the reconstruction and expansion of critical infrastructure (2013, p. 9). Similarly, the UNISF 2014-2016 discusses water infrastructure just in the context of the high-priority agricultural sector. Empirical data equally gives a disproportionate impression of policy implementation (Figure 8) with much reconstruction planning (~72%) and a small presence of essential infrastructure (~14%) and productive capacity (~14%). Initiatives around long term investment and variety construction and maintenance are even completely absent.

Regarding the applicability to Timilsina's (2007) prioritisation recommendations, the planned and implemented reconstruction policy in Somalia fits the theoretical framework remarkably well. The three prescribed policies for the short term, reconstruction planning, productive capacity restoration and essential infrastructure construction are exactly the actions planned for and implemented in the case of Somalia. Noteworthy is however that the theoretical framework does not prescribe the disproportionate presence of planning which is visible in reality.

For the mid-term phase, with the NDP-8 there is a strong focus on the restoration of essential infrastructure and a vision for the long-term. In an elaborate chapter on infrastructure, it outlines policies around transport, the urban environment, sanitation, energy and technology (2016, pp. 134-143). By contrast, the UNSF 2017-2020 does not account for infrastructural development in its priorities at all. However it does mention that its priority of supporting socioeconomic development contributes to the Sustainable Development Goal of 'Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure' (2017, p. 21). The actual implementation of infrastructural policies does not reflect the broad spectrum as planned by the NDP-8 and has become even more disproportionate compared to the short-term with about 93% of the counts attributed to reconstruction planning (Figure 8). The construction of essential infrastructure (~7%) remains a small presence, but long-term investments, productive capacity and variety construction and maintenance are absent completely.

The broad planning of the NDP-8 fits Timilsina's (2007) theoretical framework much better than the implemented policy dominated by reconstruction planning. According to the recommendation, reconstruction planning is supposed to start in the short-term phase but then

decrease quickly to make room for general development and long-term investments. The national strategies do adhere to this recommendation since mainly planning is conducted in reality.

By the long-term of the NDP-9 then, infrastructure seems to have lost priority in planning again and is mainly supportive of the other development pillars. Here again infrastructural development is considered a means to achieve social development and support some economic sectors (2019, pp. 249, 279). The empirical data shows a slightly more diverse collection of implemented policies for the long-term phase (Figure 8), with reconstruction planning (~60%) still holding the absolute majority of counts but with essential infrastructure (~13%), productive capacity (~13%) and variety construction and maintenance (~13%) also playing a role.

According to Timilsina (2007), only this latter policy of variety construction and maintenance should be prioritised in the long-term phase. The substantial presence of the other policies in the long-term, both in national strategy and implementation, makes that reconstruction process in Somalia has again sequenced the various state-building actions in a different way than advised by the theoretical framework.

Figure 8: Implemented infrastructure policies, counted in state-building reporting documents, displayed as proportion of the total count of each state-building phase

Conclusion

This study has considered the topic of priorities in post-conflict state-building. In doing so, it has found that the waves and levels of theory developed in state-building and sequencing literature have informed a general understanding of prioritisation and sequencing of state-building policies as described in Timilsina's (2007) theoretical framework. This framework argues for an attention and resources prioritisation of security over humanitarian, over government, over economy, over infrastructure, and outlines sequencing of specific policies within these sectors over short-, mid- and long-term state-building phases. While assessing the replicability of Timilsina's (2007) theory for the case of Somalia (2013-2021), it has become clear that this specific state-building process overall adheres to the prescribed prioritisation of sectors, but certainly not always to the advised sequencing of individual policies.

For high-priority state-building areas like the security and humanitarian sector, policy sequencing experiences delays. Essential initial policies that are advised for the short-term continue to be implemented in the mid- and long-term. In practice, the uninterrupted presence of armed conflict and natural disaster up and until the present day (Al Jazeera, 2021; African Business, 2021) requires recurring investments in elementary security and humanitarian policies. This uninterruptedness is illustrated by the continuing prominence of coding for armed territorial conflict throughout all state-building phases in Somalia (Appendix 2). The protracted political violence, fuelled by deep fault lines in society (Ullán de la Rosa & Arrey, 2021) and exploited by actors with their own unique agendas, such as terrorist organisations, forces Somalia to keep devoting attention and resources to capacity building, planning and SSR.

Similarly, strong oppositions between groups in society effectively hinder governmental unification and meaningful administration. The local actors that are central to administration dynamics in the Horn of Africa and that have shown to interact with foreign actors for own interests (Lanfranchi, 2021) continue to divide the political landscape and complicate policies of central government. With deep societal divisions characteristic for state consolidation issues in Somalia (Ingiriis, 2021), which result in failing attempts at federalism and power-sharing agreements (Simuziya, 2021), processes of reconciliation, recurring elections and the consequential political reform, remain prioritised throughout the process (Newsroom, 2021).

By contrast, the more mixed sequencing visible in economic and infrastructural policies, with mid- and long-term state-building activities adhering to the theoretical framework more often, possibly resonates with the less direct hindering of these sectors with lower priority. Not only

has infrastructural development demonstrated continuing implementation in the later phases of the state-building process (The East African, 2021), it has also shown ability to exacerbate issues in the security realm (Tahir, 2021). As a result, these areas with much priority require revision while low-priority policies can continue, with significant achievements still being made (United Nations Somalia, 2021, pp. 4-5). This unequal progress between the areas, beautifully illustrated in Figure 9, however raises the question if state-building in one sector can continue with policies in a subsequent phase if other sectors are not able to do so yet.

In the end, this study has shown that in the case of Somalia, the different areas of state-building have been prioritised according to Timilsina's (2007) theoretical framework, but also that the individual policies often did not adhere to the prescribed sequencing. In particular, in the high-priority security, humanitarian and government areas, essential short-term policies continued to be implemented in the mid- and long-term because of recurring structural issues, while in the lower-priority economic and infrastructure areas, policies of all phases could find significant, however sequentially mixed, implementation. **Consequently, the balanced prioritisation, but imbalanced sequencing, of state-building policies in Somalia, has resulted in mixed and imbalanced achievements for the long-term peace- and state-building process.**

Figure 9: Imbalanced state-building achievements: economic development without essential security in place. A fighter of the pro-government Ras Kimboni Brigade gets a haircut inside a barber's kiosk in a market area in the centre of the southern Somali port city of Kismayo, approx. 500km south of the country's capital Mogadishu. Retrieved from '2012_1007_Kismayo_Streets_Civilians_s' by AU-UN IST Photo / Stuart Price (2012) on Flickr under CC0 1.0 licence.

To place these conclusions into perspective, several contextual factors are important to note. First, whereas the observations stem from data of various types, most of the essential frameworks and reports are produced for peace-keeping missions, which regularly have a narrower focus than general state-building as looked at by Timilsina (2007). As such, the implementation reports by the United Nations and African Union considered here devote much attention to issues around children's rights and gender, which might make them side-line and underrepresent policies that deserve focus for the theoretical framework.

Second, it is important to realise that the framework itself equally has a particular predilection. Among other things, it is much concerned with liberalist understandings of government and economics, while only in a limited manner with the development of the judiciary; a topic receiving much attention in Somalia's policy documents. On the other hand, since Timilsina's (2007) framework was directly derived from case studies and expert opinions, it also illustrates the deemed relevance of liberal economics and governance for modern nation-states.

Third, applying the timeline with state-building phases as indicated by the theoretical framework to case studies, can regularly be problematic. With armed conflict constantly recurring and disrupting the state-building process in Somalia for about 60 years, it is a challenge to define the right starting point for the analysis. Here, the decision was made for 2013 because of a military turning point and the installation of federal government. However, other starting points, for example 2009, with the creation of a technocratic government, would have been justifiable as well. Consequently, the fact that the timing of the state-building phases is not as clear-cut, further complicated the analysis.

With regards to broader implications, this study has provided a useful contribution to the literature on prioritisation and sequencing in post-conflict state-building by showing that the complex dynamics of the Somalian situation can result in imbalanced sequencing, which complicates the replicability of Timilsina's (2007) general framework. For global actors, engaged in state- and peace-building beyond Somalia, this implicates that the theoretical framework is a useful tool to apply in other cases as well, as long as they are prepared and able to confront a situation in which progress in one sector combined with setbacks in another sector destabilises the overall process. Furthermore, as stated at the start of this study, the analysis of post-conflict state-building provides a unique insight into the elements that are deemed fundamental to the modern nation-state. From Timilsina's (2007) framework and the case of Somalia, it is thus fascinating to see that security and humanitarian support are conditional elements that a state should provide to have society as a whole succeed in development.

On a final note, it is crucial for future research to keep evaluating new state-building efforts based on the theory, to learn from and improve the framework where possible. This is especially important as no replication attempt of Timilsina's (2007) framework, similar to this study, has been conducted by other researchers so far, making it difficult to compare outcomes and establish external validity. Furthermore, through the use of supplementary coding for territorial armed conflict, aside from the codes related to Timilsina's (2007) theory, this study noted continuing instability in the case of Somalia. Hence, future research could look at effective ways of handling this issue, for example by considering cases in which instability was counteracted in such a way that it did not result in imbalanced state-building. In the end, in different settings of state-building, the aim of theory should be to guide the sustainable organisation of societies with the prevention of previous mistakes through general lessons without forgetting about the uniqueness of each situation.

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Appendix

1. Coding Framework

Category (Priority)	Subcategory (Policy)	Indicator (Act)
Security	Peacekeeping	Supplying peacekeepers
	Disarmament-demobilisation-reintegration	Disarming/demobilising/ reintegrating combatants
	Capacity building	Establishing police
		Professionalising forces
	Mine clearing	Clearing landmines
	Reform planning	Developing plan for reform
	Security sector reform	Reforming military, police, judiciary
	Military expenditure reduction	Spending less on military
Humanitarian	Refugee resettling	Returning refugees to home
		Providing refugees new home
	Food security	Supplying food
	Health	Responding to health concerns
	Redistribution	Resettling ex-combatants
		Resolving land disputes
		Enabling reconciliation
	Basic health care/education	Restoring education/health services
	Agricultural assistance	Supporting agriculture
	Advanced health care/education	Improving education/health services
	Education/health/land reform	Reforming education/health/land
Government	Institutions	Strengthening institutions
	Accountability	Setting accountability standards
		Setting transparency standards
	Reform planning	Drafting plan for political reform
		Drafting plan for civil service reform
	Electoral support	Assisting election processes
	Political reform	(Re)newing constitution/government
	Elections	Conducting elections
	Corruption control	Initiating anti-corruption measures
	Civil service reform	Reforming civil services
Economy	Currency stabilisation	Cutting hyperinflation
		Solving exchange rate issues
	Budget stabilisation	Supporting and controlling budget
	Revenue generation	Mobilising revenue with tax, custom and budget system reform
	Financial regulation	Regulating financial sector
	FDI promotion	Implementing FDI stimulation

	Limited liberalism	Privatising small/non-crucial sectors
	Full liberalism	Privatising large/crucial sectors
	Trade organisation membership	Becoming part of trade organisation
Infrastructure	Reconstruction planning	Drafting reconstruction framework
	Productive capacity	Restoring production in economy
	Essential infrastructure	Constructing crucial infrastructure
	Long-term investments	Constructing long-term infrastructure
	Export promotion	Implementing export promotion
	Variety construction & maintenance	Constructing general public facilities

2. Coding Results

Subcategory (Policy)	Long-term	Mid-term	Short-term
Armed Territorial Conflict	8	10	10
ECO: Budget Stabilisation	11	2	1
ECO: Currency Stabilisation	1	0	0
ECO: Export Promotion	0	1	0
ECO: FDI Promotion	0	0	1
ECO: Financial Regulation	7	6	2
ECO: Full Liberalism	0	0	0
ECO: Limited Liberalism	1	1	1
ECO: Revenue Generation	6	2	1
ECO: Trade Organisation Membership	0	0	0
GOV: Accountability	2	1	1
GOV: Civil Service Reform	1	3	0
GOV: Corruption Control	3	1	0
GOV: Elections	7	5	1
GOV: Electoral Support	8	6	2
GOV: Institutions	4	7	2
GOV: Political Reform	15	11	5
GOV: Reform Planning	4	1	4
HUM: Agricultural Assistance	2	5	1
HUM: Basic Health Care/Education	2	9	2
HUM: Education/Health/Land Reform	0	1	1
HUM: Food Security	10	10	5
HUM: Health	10	8	5
HUM: Redistribution	11	9	3
HUM: Refugee Resettling	2	5	4
INFR: Essential Infrastructure	2	1	1
INFR: Long-Term Investments	0	0	0
INFR: Productive Capacity	2	0	1
INFR: Reconstruction Planning	9	12	5

INFR: Variety Construction and Maintenance	2	0	0
SEC: Capacity Building	12	14	7
SEC: DDR	7	9	3
SEC: Military Expenditure Reduction	2	0	0
SEC: Mine Clearing	9	9	5
SEC: Peacekeeping	9	13	9
SEC: Reform Planning	3	11	2
SEC: SSR	11	7	4

Note: frequencies of policy occurrence obtained through analysis and coding of data in Dedoose software