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## **The Radical Right in Europe's Left: Continuity & Change in the Welfare Discourses of VOX and CHEGA!**

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**The Radical Right in Europe's Left**

*Continuity & Change in the Welfare Discourses of VOX and CHEGA!*

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# Abstract

The choice of focus for this thesis is motivated by an interest in the rise of the West-European Populist Radical Right (PRRP), particularly focusing on the recency of political developments in the Iberian Peninsula. The lack of academic literature on this subject, in large part due to its recency, is both a complicator of analysis and a rationalization of further interest in the subject. As Portuguese myself, and admittedly critical of the populist radical right as a party family, I would like to take this opportunity to distance personal politics from the subject at hand. Beyond striving for academic objectivity, excerpts were on the most part interpreted quite literally as to not establish connections the parties would, themselves, deny. Given the nature of discourse analysis, an immediately literal interpretation is not always possible.

The rise of these parties, both generally and expectedly in the Iberian context, has featured the operationalization of the welfare state as a point of contention between their electoral base and its enemy, the welfare dependent. The party family identifies this as a combination of highly dissociated social minorities, like the Roma in Portugal and generally non-nationals supposedly leeching on social support. The differing applications of a principle I'd seen internationally on my domestic political sphere further intrigued me.

The possible electoral consequences of these rising political forces are another motivator for analysis, as both parties seem to increasingly fill the vacancies left by the mainstream right's falling electoral popularity. This becomes particularly relevant in contexts of coalition governance, where a parliamentary majority might eventually become mathematically difficult, if not impossible, for a PRRP-less coalition of the right<sup>1</sup>.

This theme's applicability towards welfare state analysis is logical in the sense that, as a result of the changing positions of PRRPs towards the welfare state at the turn of the century, the welfare state has become an increasing focus of this party family's discourse. Furthermore, this has seemingly proven effective, as parties across the continent learn from their contemporaries' political victories, encouraging further coopting of the welfare state as a

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<sup>1</sup> If interested, this notion is directly explored in Afonso (2021).

focus of discourse for PRRPs. The recognition of welfare chauvinism as a repeating ideology or salient issue amongst these parties further motivates this study.

The research objective at hand is to overarchingly analyze continuity and change in the discourse of Iberian PRRPs. More specifically, this analysis aims to establish how VOX and *CHEGA!* employ the themes inherent to most European PRRPs (nationalism, authoritarianism, and liberalism) in their welfare state discourse. Furthermore, it aims to account for elements of change, particularly in the effects of COVID-19 on the exclusionary welfare discourse of the PRR.

The structure of this analysis matches its aims. More concretely, it starts with a contextualization of West European PRRPs and the themes discussed. This is followed by particularities of the two cases and the resulting theoretical expectations. Upon completion of the methodology and research design, the bulk of the analysis will be presented in an order of with section 6.1 overseeing VOX's *Manifiesto Fundacional*, section 6.2 analyzing *CHEGA!*'s *Manifiesto Político Fundador*, section 6.3 outlining VOX's *100 Medidas para la España Viva*, and section 6.4 evaluating the since-deleted elements of *CHEGA!*'s controversial *Programa Político Chega 2019*. In order to evaluate changing discourse as a result of COVID-19 as a circumstantial, exogenous pressure, we present VOX's *Plano Protejemos España* and a compilation of Andre Ventura's (*CHEGA!*'s leader and founder) presidential addresses. These two documents are sections 6.5 and 6.6 respectively. Final overarching conclusions are drawn to address the research questions.

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# 1 Introduction

The evolution of VOX and CHEGA! into prominent political actors (or at least threatening prominence) has been marked by elements of continuity and change within its welfare discourse. More concretely, the latter has become relevant in the context of COVID-19, particularly in how the pandemic shifted existing perceptions or provided new justifications to existing policy plans.

Before investigating changing discourse resulting from extraneous factors, this analysis must establish a baseline discourse for both parties. To do so, we conceptually focus primarily on how the parties employ notions of *nationalism*, *liberalism*, and *authoritarianism*. The prominence given to these themes is rooted in both a relevancy in current literature and their prevalence when engaging in the sources' pre-coding, something further explored in the *Operationalization*. In terms of a significance rooted in literature, one acknowledges the importance of authoritarianism and nativism to the ideology of European populist radical right parties (PRRPs) (Arzheimer, 2005; Mudde, 2010). Nativism, conceptualized as a combination of nationalism and xenophobia, is expanded to nationalism to more broadly cover the sources at hand. The importance of liberalism when focusing on the exclusionary welfare discourse of PRRPs was highlighted in *The New Liberal Dilemma*, warning of a challenge in the future of welfare state management: governments must balance substantial influxes of immigration with the sustenance of social provisions (Newton, 2007). This dilemma is hypothesized to contribute to the othering, and subsequent welfare under-provision, of non-nationals.

Understanding the application of these principles can help further our understanding of how these interact<sup>2</sup>, to result in a series of overarching discourses. This leads us to the following main research question (RQ): *What are the main elements of continuity and change in the welfare discourse of VOX and CHEGA?*

A closer look at the goal of this work leads to the identification of the following sub-research questions:

**RQ1:** What are the similarities and differences in the application of nationalism, authoritarianism, and liberalisms in the discourses of VOX and CHEGA!?

**RQ2:** How did extraneous factors impact the discourses of VOX and CHEGA!?

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<sup>2</sup> The prime example would be how nationalism and authoritarianism can combine to result in a series of diverse political talking points for the PRR, from the basic securitization of borders to the government-led promotion of local culture, customs, or society.

**RQ2.1.** How did the pandemic impact the discourses of VOX and CHEGA!?

**RQ2.2.** How did other societal factors impact the discourses of VOX and CHEGA!?

**RQ3:** How does the pre-pandemic discourse of the Iberian PRR differ from its European contemporaries?

## 2 Review of Relevant Literature

### 2.1 *Welfare Chauvinism & the Discourse of the Populist Radical Right*

The PRR has, in the past, been oft associated with socio-cultural nativism hand-in-hand with neo-liberal economic arguments. The latter are somewhat anticipatable when considering the history of these parties; often initially associated with a neoliberal backlash to welfare state expansion typically associated with leftist politics (Betz, 1994). This ideology was justified as economic liberalization and increased efficiencies, further promoting the already-prominent Washington Consensus and defending large cuts to welfare. These characteristics developed as the party family, and more importantly the demands of its shifting electoral base, changed. The coming decades noted drift away from full-fledged retrenchment as parties increasingly appealed to a working-class base (Mudde, 2007). This drift falls-in-line with Arzheimer's (2009) economic anxiety theory<sup>3</sup>, suggesting that the discourse of PRRPs would become increasingly effective as a result of economic hardship (increasing unemployment, lowering incomes, general economic decline). Economic hardship, in accordance with Arzheimer, facilitates the process of blaming or scapegoating "outgroups" for social tensions, promoting the divisionary discourse often employed by the PRR. The prominence of this theory relies on its applicability to the Brexit case study (UKIP voters) and Donald Trump's success in the economically underdeveloped and socially disregarded "Rust Belt" (Afonso, 2021).

The changing welfare-preferences of PRR voters have resulted in lesser pressure for retrenchment, a position fueled primarily by neoliberal and anti-tax affinities (Careja et. al, 2016). Promoting retrenchment fell in line with the preferences of liberal or neo-liberal voters, both in a weakened fiscal state and, socially speaking, an uninvolved, de-centralized state (p. 439). This changed as the working class grew progressively dissociated with the established

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<sup>3</sup> Initially, Jackman and Volpert (1996) agreed on this predicament.

left that, in large part, had formed as political representation for workers. PRRPs have increasingly framed their liberalism — and arguments in general — as social issues of non-economic focus. As per Bakker et al. (2015), these parties employ the GAL/TAN division of Green/Alternative/Left v. Traditionalist/Authoritarian/Nationalism, promoting messages of economic neo-liberalism as pro-individual claims towards minimizing state size and competent mechanisms.

The ideological nativism still dominant is typically operationalized through appeals towards welfare nationalism and welfare chauvinism (Ivaldi, 2015 & Ennsner-Jedenastick, 2016). The latter proposes the agenda of the PRR in terms of welfare positioning can be understood through three elements: populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. These elements each directly link to strands of economic policy: economic populism seeks to limit economic elitism, economic nativism opposes the economic interests of immigrants, and economic authoritarianism is the active opposition to the interests of the poor.

The development of welfare chauvinism as a focal point of both PRR discourse and the academic debate overseeing it go hand in hand; the ideology that welfare benefits must be restricted to a native group, ensuring as little support outside it as possible (Anderson and Bjørklund, 1990). This has been rationalized as necessary to maintain the present levels of solidarity (De Koster et al., 2012).

## 2.2 *Welfare Stances of the Populist Radical Right on a European Scale*

The development of welfare exclusionary discourse on a European context is primarily dictated by the same forces this analysis intends to analyze; nationalism, liberalism, and authoritarianism.

Electoral relevance for the majority of European PRRPs has occurred primarily since the turn of the millennia<sup>4</sup> (Greve, 2018). Since then, PRRPs have grown across-the-board, with Hungarian Orban-led *Fidesz* dominating electorally since its joint victory with the Christian-Democrats in 2010. The role of the positioning of established Christian Democrats (CD) on the electoral success of PRRPs is, in itself, a question of converging policy preferences. The presence of a CD actor has typically been expected to minimize voter shift to PRRPs, expecting CD voters to remain inaccessible to PRRPs as a result of their expectedly firm political

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<sup>4</sup> The only PRRP to break 5% electorally by 2009 was the French Front National (FN), now Rassemblement National (RN).

attachment. This, however, seems to be weakening over time as de-alignment increases (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009).

Theoretical explanations presented for the growth of PRRPs has mostly focused on the demand-side of the electoral equation, assuming the supply as a result of growing demand (Ejrnæs & Greve, 2018). On that front, the most prominent theories are the economic insecurity perspective and the cultural backlash thesis (p. 138).

The economic insecurity perspective theorizes how post-industrial economics have, over time, furthered economic inequality and divided society into “winners and losers”. This is furthered by the mechanization of industry and society, creating a fertile ground for scapegoating “outgroups” (targets of social grievances), typically ethnic/social minorities. This dichotomy is operationalized by the PRR by establishing “makers and takers” within society. This dichotomy focuses on distributive deservingness amongst society, meaning either the excess or the lack of individual gains pertaining to social distribution (Rathgeb, 2021).

The cultural backlash thesis instead attributes increasing popularity to a general shift away from traditional societal values and towards post-material priorities; multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, or shared European identities (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). This focus is also applied to increasing levels of immigration and asylum-seeking, predicting hostility towards these populations as a result of both their association to a multi-cultural society and their perception as a threat to an already-challenged value system.

The economic insecurity theory, in particular, logically lends itself to the realm of welfare/state expenditure: incoming immigration<sup>5</sup> is perceived as a threat to the longevity of European welfare. This, in part, relates to the PRR’s discourse on distributive deservingness as it applies the primary logics of welfare: equity, need, and equality (Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2018). While the principle of equality more naturally lends itself to social division on the basis of citizenship (through equal, universal provision for citizens and lower/non-provision for non-natives), Ennsner-Jedenastik argues need and equity are both orthogonal to nativism in the sense they struggle to promote the differentiation between natives and non-natives (p. 12). In practice parties have found ways of justifying their exclusionary discourse within principles of both need and equity, framing earnings-related contributions as equitable despite disproportionately harming non-natives that, within a West-European context, have averagely lower incomes and shorter employment (Sainsbury, 2012).

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<sup>5</sup> Primarily the case from culturally and racially dissimilar or non-European countries (as sourced from Verdugo & Swanson, 2011).

Even though perception of immigration occurs on an individual level, analysis of changing attitudes on a national scale points to a decrease in the perception of immigrants as net social spenders<sup>6</sup>. Interestingly, the only countries displaying a higher perception of immigrants as net social spenders in 2014 were Austria, Portugal, and Spain (Ejrnæs and Greve, p. 139). Data<sup>7</sup> on proposed government generosity towards asylum-seekers, however, points at the Iberian Peninsula as the 2 most generous countries surveyed (European Commission, 2018). An immediate requirement to further make sense of these seemingly opposing realities would be to differentiate between asylum-seekers and immigrants, naturally carrying differing emotional association<sup>8</sup>.

### 2.3 *The Iberian Populist Radical Right*

VOX's self-proclaimed anti-feminist stance has tied into their discourse on the role of the welfare state, primarily targeting government spending and the — proclaimed wrongful — allocation of social funds to abortion procedures, investigations of sexual harassment, and “women's services” like state provision of harassment therapy (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). This approach has seemingly carried electoral success, primarily in the context of the party's rise in the 2018 Andalusian elections with the party presenting a strong stance opposing the Andalusian government's budget pertaining to gender violence policies<sup>9</sup>. The party's criticism of this spending is justified by its traditionalist appeal in the GAL-TAN socio-cultural cleavage, portraying this spending as failing progressive politics. These focal points allow VOX to frame their economic preferences towards the welfare state as a social question on the socio-cultural axis (Bakker et al., 2015). In doing so, VOX pragmatically promotes its conservative economic agenda, focusing on market liberalism, and reduced state spending/intervention (Rama, 2020). This offers a more advantageous frame for party discourse (that of a green-alternative-libertarian v. traditional-authoritarian-nationalist dispute), allowing the focus to move towards social debate and away from economic policy (Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2020). The traditionalist identification within this socio-cultural cleavage could further prove politically successful if

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<sup>6</sup> When compared to a perception of “net social spenders”, a study conducted over 18 European countries, from 2002 to 2014.

<sup>7</sup> Concretely sourced from the European Social Survey

<sup>8</sup> Could be understood as a combination of framing and socially constructed humanitarianism, with asylum-seekers connotating dire necessity and a generally understood lack of agency pertaining to their present condition (in contrast to other groups in need like those struggling with homelessness or substance abuse)

<sup>9</sup> Specific opposition focused on the allocation of 33.5 million euros for the Andalusian Women's Institute (IAM), an organization that distributed subsidies and services to over 102,000 women in 2018 alone

strong enough to draw in a working class potentially disillusioned with the mainstream left's prioritization of cultural values over economic values. The radical right is made an even more appealing option by the left's value-based embrace of globalization and modernization, two economic processes that have mechanized and economically undercut a previously comfortable working class in the Global North. While these trends in employment can help justify voter disillusionment and changing preferences, one must avoid overrelying on these arguments given their applicability to the UK and US cases, especially considering the relevance of location to job market. This has generally resulted in a working class moving rightward, a trend particularly pertinent in the subset of unskilled males anecdotally hit hardest by changing economies (Eatwell, 2003 & Abou-Chadi & Immergut, 2019).

The arguments employed by *CHEGA!* acknowledge the importance of migratory patterns as well as societal perception of migrants themselves. Despite influences in both cases of East-European immigration, Spanish immigration has been primarily from Morocco and Ecuador (González-Enrique, p. 292). In Portugal's case, non-Eastern European immigration is primarily sourced in Brazil, Cape Verde, and Angola (Peixoto, p. 345). Note the comparative prevalence of Portuguese ex-colonial immigration; immigration from once-colonies could make for expectedly easier adaptation, given some sense of shared language and culture.<sup>10</sup> This could, however, also instead promote increased conflict; two opposing expectations set out by Stockemer (2018) as a binary set of outcomes regarding how significant increase in minority populations may influence perceived group threat. On one hand, minorities can serve as a target for grievances easing the process of exclusionist framing carried out by PRRPs, making this discourse theoretically advantageous in areas of increased immigration (Stockemer, p. 608). On the other hand, group contact between majority and minority populations can facilitate mutual understanding and diminish the perception of group threat, making it harder for PRRPs to capitalize electorally. This electoral success could be further fueled by expected electoral opposition from the "othered" social groups, making them naturally less electorally viable in diverse locations. This is evidenced recently (BREXIT) in the context of UKIP's electoral appeal (or lack thereof) in constituencies with higher shares of ethnic minorities (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020). Furthermore, one should acknowledge these parties' own application of the aforementioned socio-cultural axis. As the primary political actors<sup>11</sup> have gone to strengthen their political power and capital, the once primarily worker-focus parties have increasingly

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<sup>10</sup> Anecdotal examples would be the musical influence of ex-colonies in Portuguese culture and the influence of Portuguese football in the ex-colonies (primarily the African ones).

<sup>11</sup> Examples include the Communist party (PCP), the Socialist Party (PS), or the Social Democrats (PSD).

dissociated themselves with the political preferences of an increasingly tightened working class, instead engaging on a socially-progressive schedule increasingly detached from economic hardship. The theory of Luso-Tropicalism could be relevant in its contribution to dictating Portuguese societal perception of colonial (and now ex-colonial) relations (Bastos, 2019). This theory, positively painting Portuguese colonialism as “friendly”, has served as a tool in the context of Portuguese authoritarianism, oft-utilized by Salazar and the Estado Novo (p. 246). In a context of welfare expenditure, positive memories of colonial history (as well as remnant feelings of national — or socio-racial — superiority) could rationalize a lack of responsibility assumed towards ex-colonial immigrants.

### 3 Methodology

#### 3.1 Theoretical Expectations

The themes of **authoritarianism**, **liberalism**, and **nationalism** — and their influences — have been separate focuses in theorizing the rise of PRRPs (Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2018; Greve, 2018; Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2019). The three have yet to be employed as principal pillars of analysis, much less in the still-shallow context of analysis on *CHEGA!* as a political movement. That said, this analysis employs a more exploratory approach to these concepts in forming party discourse.

These three concepts will be highlighted in a discourse analysis focused on **continuity** and **change**; an area explored further when justifying the research design. The expectations derived are as follow: a mainstreaming of *CHEGA!*'s welfare discourse over time (due to both backlash and new opportunity structures), differing targets of non-national “othering” between parties given particular patterns of immigration, and dissimilar approaches/extents to anti-democratic or more generally anti-system discourse.

An anticipated mainstreaming of *CHEGA!*'s discourse towards provision of welfare is particularly relevant to the electoral manifesto *Programa Político Chega 2019*. The analysis of this document focuses on elements it once-contained (removed after, depending-on-source, public opposition or technical malfunctions<sup>12</sup>). The focus on change inherent to an “elastic” approach to discourse analysis (Salter & Mutlu, 2012) is, in this case, not solely of transforming

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<sup>12</sup> As put by Fernanda Cândia and João Pedro Henriques (Diário de Notícias, 05/12/19): <https://www.dn.pt/poder/chega-prepara-inversao-do-seu-programa-anti-estado-social-11586784.html>

discourse but the disappearing thereof. Mainstreaming is further expected to coincide with an attempt to move into the electoral space in the center-right recently lost by CDS-PP and, to an extent, PSD<sup>13</sup>. This analysis further anticipates a heightened focus on Christian values in the framing of *CHEGA!*'s discourse, albeit unsure of its influence on non-nationals. This reasons that Christian voters naturally hover to CD parties, meaning the weakening of CDs in Portugal could result in the PRR thematically adopting their values and discourse (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009).

Recognizing the “othering” of a minority group as a mainstay of chauvinistic dialogue, this analysis anticipates representations of these “others” to portray deviant groups of people or threatening ideologies (Sakki & Pettersson, 2015). This analysis theorizes differing patterns and practices between both cases as a result of distinct patterns of immigration, more concretely focusing on Islamophobia and ex-colonial sentiment. Variations in these patterns directly impact both the societal integration of these communities and their perception to the majority population (Keskinen, 2016). Increased socio-cultural “othering” of Islam is to be anticipated on VOX’s behalf considering Spain’s yearly influx of North-African seasonal work and the country’s North-African territory.<sup>14</sup> One further expects difficulties in employing Islamophobic discourse, particularly through a lens of threats to securitization, in a Portuguese context. This is rooted in the significant penetration, both in society and business, of both Muslim and more generally Arabic immigration.<sup>15</sup> This shared history is most recently rooted in post-colonial emigration out of Northern-Mozambique, with comparative economic/social success making the “othering” of Islam expectedly difficult. One lastly anticipates less focus on nationality and nativism towards ex-colonial immigration in Portugal, as isolating nationality cannot “other” communities that have in large part achieved citizenship, be it as second or third-generation immigrants.

Finally, one expects increased anti-democratic sentiment, and discourse, on *CHEGA!*'s behalf. Despite the trend of undermining-political-order in PRRP growth, this can be approached in a multitude of ways, and to a plethora of extents. The theoretical expectation of increased systemic subversion in *CHEGA!*'s welfare discourse is rooted in supposed desensitization of Spanish electors to the subversion of order.<sup>16</sup> In contrast, a comparative lack of significant structural anti-system discourse in Portugal since the April 25<sup>th</sup> revolution (and

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<sup>13</sup> A party family strongly upheld by PP in Spain

<sup>14</sup> North African territorial claims, beyond the disputed Gibraltar, are namely Ceuta and Melilla

<sup>15</sup> The Great Mosque of Lisbon, for example, is the 3rd largest in Turkey-less Europe.

<sup>16</sup> Strengthened by decades of anti-monarchism and regional independence like that of the Basques or Catalans

subsequent establishment of the Third Republic) could mean increased mediatic attention and electoral shock value in coopting these principles into elements of their welfare discourse. This expectation could be difficult to logically coexist with an expectation of ideological mainstreaming.

### 3.2 *Conceptualizations*

Given the open-ended, exploratory nature of this analysis, the framework utilized, and all subsequently relevant conceptualizations are grouped from a series of sources, aiming to maximize the applicability of these concepts. Despite the further importance of conceptualizing this analysis' focus on change and continuity, these principles will be further explored when presenting the research design. For now, this analysis conceptualizes the trifecta of nationalism, authoritarianism, and liberalism. Beyond that, it will also establish the reasoning for employing the term *PRRP*, as opposed to its varied alternatives.

**Nationalism** has the associated conceptual difficulty of being relied on heavily across subjects and areas of focus, resulting in a plethora of available conceptualizations to consider (Barrington, 1997). Primarily, diverging approaches characterize it as either a process or an ideal (p. 713). Given the idea-focused nature of discourse analysis, we employ the latter. More concretely, we adopt Ignatieff's conceptualization of nationalism as a "combination of the political idea of territorial self-determination, the cultural idea of the nation as one's primary identity, and a moral idea of justification of action to protect the rights of the nation against the other" (Ignatieff, 1993). With this in mind, we wish to further conceptualize *New Nationalism* as the association of traditional discourse on nationalism and national preference with elements of populist politics (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2019). Better put, new nationalism describes a phenomenon in which political actors pledge a combination of the following: to speak on behalf of the 'pure people', restore national sovereignty, 'take back control' from power-shifts towards supranationalism, and the promotion of 'national preference' through discourse and policy on immigration and citizenship (The Economist, 2016).

**Authoritarianism** oversees individualized political action<sup>17</sup> and voter preferences, outlining a psychological profile increasingly prone to messaging of law and order, hierarchy, and the of "othering" of outsiders (Glasius, 2018). Given inherent difficulty in conceptualizing

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<sup>17</sup> Individualized political action can be, for example, labelling an election-free regime as authoritarian in a context of comparative politics

such a widely-applied notion, one relies on guiding notions like the erosion of the rule of law, the division of powers, and democratic voting procedures” (Cerutti, p. 17).

**Liberalism** as a set of principles characterized by a tripartite focus on individualism, private property, and political democracy (Lichtenstein, 1984). Given the range of conceptualizations and adoptions of the term, our analysis expects particular focus on how PRRPs employ liberalism as a tool for economic shrinking of welfare services or, more generally, as a justification for ideological divergence (oft-portraying non-European cultural and democratic functioning as non-liberal, in part further fueling a feeling of Euro-centric cultural and religious superiority)<sup>18</sup>. The conflict hypothesized in Newton’s (2007) New Liberal Dilemma is further anticipated to be relevant in shaping exclusionary welfare discourse.

In terms of justifying the use of PRRP as a descriptor for this party family, the choice is rooted in Mudde’s proposed combination of populism, authoritarianism, and nativism/exclusionary nationalism as necessary factors in distinguishing the modern populist radical right from the extreme right of the past (2016, p. 5). The latter two are incorporated as focuses of this analysis while populism is overlooked given its general applicability to PRRP discourse in non-welfare realms. Despite anticipating this wave of the party family to generally accept democratic principles, Mudde anticipates support for the weakening of government and a hybrid socio-economic agenda merging deregulation and lowering of taxes with economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism, further differing the economic position of these parties from their purely neo-liberal, *laissez-faire* 20<sup>th</sup> century predecessors (2016, p. 96).

### 3.3 Research Design

The academic landscape on theorizing the rise of PRRPs has been approached from a series of analytical angles and by a plethora of disciplines, from comparative politics (Betz, 1993) to linguistics/communication (Ekström, Patrona & Thornborrow, 2018). Despite this, and the resulting quantity of literature generated on the topic, the Iberian cases still remain comparatively under analyzed, assumingly in large part to their recency. The question of recency resurfaces in terms of acknowledging the outdated assumptions and conclusions in studies of the Iberian PRR conducted before the rise of its current representatives (VOX was

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<sup>18</sup> This would compare to the theoretically established *radical liberalism* as the latter seeking the liberation of individuals from economic and political power, with the “radical” perspective of a necessary overturning of social order (Lichtenstein, p. 333)

founded in 2013 but only achieved electoral prominence as of 2018, with *CHEGA!*'s foundation and rise occurring in quick succession in the second half of 2019).

Given the two realities outlined above, this analysis recognizes the academic community's contributions to the general issue and themes at hand, whilst acknowledging Iberian recency. Focusing on ideology and discourse relates to demand-side explanations of this phenomenon, choosing not to focus as much on supply-side factors like political structure as these are out of direct control for PRRPs (Golder, 2016). One comparatively analyzes the discourse employed by both parties through themes of liberalism, authoritarianism, and nationalism. In contrast to a more quantitatively driven text-based approach like content analysis, the preference for discourse is rooted in the importance of context to properly establish party messaging; discourse analysis concentrates on context and meaning over simply observing the recurrence of specific terms or themes (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

This analysis understands discourse analysis as outlined by Salter & Mutlu (2012), as a method to analyze spoken, sign-based, or other "significant markers that provide meaning to the social world" (p. 263). The meaning derived from the text will acknowledge both the persistence of a term or concept and the development of linguistic practices (p. 270). This led to three primary strategies to approaching discourse analysis: namely continuity, change, and rupture (p. 264). These strategies result in three approaches: plastic, elastic, and genealogical (p. 266). Analysis will focus on the first two when establishing discourse dynamics, as rupture focuses on accounting for marginalized perspectives. Albeit interesting, this analysis would be insufficient<sup>19</sup>.

The plastic approach is relevant in identifying continuous representations/themes/policy proposals or identifying a lack of change in discourse over time. The elastic approach, however, focuses on changing arguments (over time/between groups). The latter is anticipated to be particularly relevant when analyzing the non-manifesto sources, while the former should provide useful in discussing the influence of COVID-19.

In conclusion, these approaches are not mutually exclusive and structured categorization becomes eventually difficult (Dunn and Neumann, p. 105).

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<sup>19</sup> A rupture analysis of ex-colonial sentiment, for example, could be an interesting progression of the themes discussed here. This analysis had neither the scope nor length to account for this.

## 4 Case and Data Selection

The case selection is dually motivated by future socio-political implications and the recency/rapidness of Iberian political developments. The latter is particularly interesting considering the perception of the Peninsula as-late-as 2011, with scholars hypothesizing a population “vaccinated” against the authoritarian/nationalist discourse of the radical right given their fascist/ authoritarian past (da Costa, 2011). Party immaturity comes into play, once more, in justifying data selection. The focus on ideology resulted in choosing a series of party documents and, in wanting to incorporate the influence of the pandemic on *CHEGA!*'s discourse (alongside aforementioned lacking source-material) a compilation of speeches from André Ventura's presidential candidacy.

The first two sources analyzed will be the party manifestoes of VOX and *CHEGA!* respectively, aiming to assemble a compendium of party positions and streamline agenda (Eder, Jenny, & Müller, 2017). VOX's *100 Measures for a Lively Spain* further this focus. Additionally, the influence of COVID-19 towards discourse is explored through Ventura's speeches and VOX's *Plan Protect Spain*. Lastly *CHEGA!*'s since-removed anti-welfare positions will be presented, in all trying to identify possible changing discourse.

## 5 Operationalization

The analysis is structured around the principles of nationalism, authoritarianism, and liberalism, without assuming a quantitative focus on word recurrence. The primary themes are visually depicted in Figure 1 along with related sub-compositions .




Figure 1: Three focuses of analysis and their expected sub-compositions

The reasoning behind highlighting these three themes as principal pillars of analysis originated in the initial layer of textual pre-coding inherent to qualitative textual analysis (Saldana, 2016). These themes will be used intertwiningly with a focus on continuity and break in discourse. Three themes and two states, resultingly, will guide this analysis.

## 6 Analysis of the Results

This chapter delineates VOX and CHEGA!’s employment of nationalism, authoritarianism, and liberalism in their discursive welfare positions while exploring change in this discourse. The chapter’s structure is outlined in the Forward.

### 6.1 *Manifiesto Fundacional* (VOX)

VOX’s *Manifiesto Fundacional* outlines both the past and future of the party, justifying the urgent need for its existence in Spanish society —socio-culturally, politically, economically— whilst presenting its future visions. This chapter follows the same justification-to-roadmap progression; *nuestro manifiesto*, *razón de ser*, and *principios inspiradores* justify their existence and ideology, whilst *agenda para el cambio* and *compromisos de funcionamiento* set their platform and generally regulate their political existence and interactions.

### **6.1.1 Nuestro Manifiesto, Razón de Ser & Principios Inspiradores**

This section grounds the party's principles and politics within the context of their rise and justifies their existence. The primary concepts will be presented thematically: nationalism, liberalism, authoritarianism.

The party's focus on nationalism circles around national cohesion and cultural superiority, an employment of citizenship-based exclusion, and the "othering" of non-nationals. VOX's appeal to a sentiment of national pride is direct; the party stands for the acknowledgement of Spain's cultural and historical contributions (Nuestro Manifiesto, 4) whilst aiming to replicate this success in modernity through a sense of national pride and cohesion (Nuestro Manifiesto, 1). Pro-nationalism has developed into commonplace, especially in justifying societal division between natives and non-natives (Halikiopoulou, Mock, & Vasilopoulou, 2013). Through this framing of domestic socio-cultural superiority, PRRPs can identify outsiders as threats to a cohesive, superior nation. Once the threat to said greatness is identified, a solution is fitted to the ideological requirements inherent to a welfare system; in wanting to promote "equality", VOX demonstrates its support of social provisions on the basis of citizenship (Nuestro Manifiesto, 1; Principios Inspiradores, 8). This exemplifies indirect opposition to welfare provision towards non-citizens.

Liberalism (typically alongside tolerance and cultural-diversity) has been a core principle and identity of European democracies. Liberty has been paradoxically coopted by the PRR, "attempting to annex these values toward its agenda" (Halikiopoulou, Mock, & Vasilopoulou, p. 108). This approach's appeal is in justifying a minimized state and a slashed political ruling class, both in economic capabilities and social appeal (Principios Inspiradores, 4). More concretely, VOX employs an anti-system perspective in its reasoning, framing government inefficiency as both dependent and independent variables depending on whether it is used to justify the presence of, or the need for, change (Halikiopoulou, Mock, & Vasilopoulou, p. 111). These claims of inefficiency/corruption associate this negativity to government spending and general functioning, creating an environment where cutbacks and restructuring are necessary.

The anti-elite discourse employed also applies more generally to the empowered structures —not solely elected individuals — especially in their characterization of society as needing "liberation from the pathological domination of parties over public life and the institutional structure of the state" (Principios Inspiradores, 4). The choice of liberal values as a discursive tool towards the minimization of state entities (Principios Inspiradores, 5) and the further regulation of their practices, like an increased management of public expenditure

(Principios Inspiradores, 7). This furthers the divide between native Spanish society and its present governance.

The liberalist appeal most employed by PRRPs relates to the promotion of neo-liberal economies focused on efficiency and output (Principios Inspiradores, 7). Beyond pro-market positions assumed, VOX focuses on characterizing the state of Spanish tax collection as “confiscatory”; immediate area of restructuring (Principios Inspiradores, 7). This pro-market position has, in the past, been synonymous with PRRPs, attempting to confound state reduction and the minimization of social provision towards discursive outgroups with principles of freedom and liberty.

Beyond their calls for a reduction of state influence economically, politically, and judicially, VOX simultaneously employs authoritative messaging towards cultural preservation, law and order, and welfare provisions.

Spanish society as culturally superior and establishes their self-determined role in the promotion and preservation of that cultural identity, a description in line with cultural nationalism as a movement focused on defending and regenerating the national community (Hutchinson, 2015). Perhaps trying to convey an even stronger feeling of national belonging, or instead present a framework to more successful cultural “othering”, VOX appeals to a Spanish sense of morality and ethics critical to its national success insofar (Nuestro Manifiesto, 4) and roots part of the party’s existence in the necessity of rekindling it (Razón de Ser, 4; Principios Inspiradores, 12).

Ethical superiority directly supports arguments of securitization and the vilification of non-nationals by portraying a fleeting concept in need of defending, be that morally or physically. This framework further allows for a binary distinction between change and preservation, firmly assuming its position in maintaining the latter. This argumentative thread be particularly useful in how it allows itself to be stretched across targets, be it in a nationalist context — the opposition to outside influences as threats to the domestic culture — or non-nationalist divisionary practices like VOX’s support of the traditional family unit as “morally sane”, indirectly labelling any differing practice as “morally insane” and incoherent with the national sense of ethics (Principios Inspiradores, 10).

An authoritarian prioritization of respect for law and order is further present in its more traditional, migration and securitization-centered lens. Albeit general, these claims primarily focus on consolidating the rule of law (Principios Inspiradores, 12) and the aforementioned depoliticization of the judiciary in the ambit of establishing said rule of law (Principios Inspiradores, 6) and more generally, democracy (Principios Inspiradores, 1). These appeals

further contribute to the aforementioned perception that a cutback and restructuring of government<sup>20</sup> are necessities.

Beyond self-proclaimed shrinking of government, VOX further promotes implementing means-testing methods to assure against the “mortgaging of future generations” (Principios Inspiradores, 7).

### **6.1.2 Agenda para el Cambio & Compromisos de Funcionamiento**

This portion of the manifesto focuses on immediate courses of action for national improvement and resultingly best conveys, of all themes discussed, the party’s attempt to “other” the political elite and assume an anti-establishment connotation electorally. This messaging identifies the primary culprits as the political establishment, calling for cuts to political subventions (Agenda para el Cambio, 3) and additionally for legislation to ensure transparency and good governance focusing on the administration of funds and abuses of political power (Agenda para el Cambio, 9).

This criticism is further applied, as expected, to the aforementioned judiciary subject to political corruption and interference, as well as and the immediate necessity in assuring the independence of these pillars (Agenda para el Cambio, 7).

## *6.2 Manifesto Político Fundador (CHEGA!)*

*CHEGA!*’s Manifesto Político Fundador opts for a conversational structure. The manifesto presents twenty-nine of these ideological points whilst using linguistic repetition, structuring each point as: “O Chega \_\_\_\_\_”, or “party name” “action term”.

*CHEGA!*’s applications of nationalism are similar to VOX’s in how they focus on assuring a defense of history, culture, language, and values (22); the two differ in their dimension of cultural pride, with *CHEGA!* assuming instead a “European cultural matrix” (7) set on recognizing — and coopting — the Greek contribution of liberty and the Roman “heritage of justice and security” (4). These concepts are waning upon subjected to the tyranny of a “community robbed of their customs/traditions/institutions” (3). The conclusion preemptively opposes criticism of colonialism — “we will never apologize for existing, having had existed, or how we existed” (26, 25) — and tying together the party’s purpose with longing for greatness and national identity one last time, with “*CHEGA!* has come to return Portugal to the Portuguese and to the Portugal of always” (28).

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<sup>20</sup> And more generally the influence and power awarded to government,

The concept of tyranny carries over to the party's focus on liberalism, portraying governmental tyranny interfering in all-facets-of-life, from government monopolies of education and healthcare (3), to "government-imposed Marxist public-school curriculum" (9). The party assumes a neo-liberal position towards market intervention and the role of the state (16). Overall, no idea exemplifies the promotion of traditionally liberal talking points than the constant calls for state reduction (15, 17).

In their criticism of government-provided services like education and healthcare the party assumes opposition in a more expected liberal sense, the pretext of supporting freedom of choice. In dealing with taxation, *CHEGA!* identifies the elite as complicit in excessive redistribution towards unproductive communities, "harming those that produce to give to those that choose to be unproductive" (14). Albeit not explicitly identifying this group, this framing falls in line with the party's dialogue insofar on minority communities, particularly the Roma.

As a proposed tool to undermining the continuation of this cycle of taxation, the party suggests the flattening of income-tax levels, aiming to remove their progressive element. Despite appeals for an uninvolved state, the party uses the pretext of nationalism to rationalize intervention in housing, arguing societal preservation of traditional communities is at risk of being eliminated by economic actors and market speculators (23). Lastly, the document employs the pretext of freedom of speech to address its opposition to all forms of being "politically correct", especially in reference to "illegal immigration, fragility in the control of our borders (...) and the impunity of organized crime" (10). This quote exemplifies the authoritarianism towards national security, questioning Portugal's immigration and portraying "growing insecurity in large cities" (12). This framework, as in the case of VOX, provides an outgroup for social unrest whilst also identifying this sense of unrest in the first place; independent of the argument's merit or lack thereof, it allows for separation from the political establishment. *CHEGA!* has also proposed significant change to the legal system, primarily in the chemical castration of pedophiles and the removal of Portugal's penitentiary maximum of twenty-five years (20).

The loosely defined sense of *cultural Marxism* has provided the platform with a placeholder for mediatically-relevant progressive societal change, or alternatively "absurd alternate realities", like the taxpayer funded provision of abortion or gender reassignment surgery (25). One should further note the use of language employed in these criticisms, vividly outlining "the borders swinging open, leading to traffickers of human meat looking for their merchandise" and the "deformed aberrations courted by cultural Marxism".

The most distinguishing feature of *CHEGA!*'s authoritarian stance is their opposition to the political structure and elite that governs it; while VOX (and most PRRPs) promote significant change to the system, *CHEGA!* strives to fully replace it (13). More concretely, they label the Third Portuguese Republic – the current system – as “asphyxiating”, decadent/degrading, and beyond-saving. *CHEGA!* refuses to assume the metaphorical life-vest the system needs, instead working towards a system immune to both opposing socio-economic ends of society, namely “the dictatorship of elites” and the “minorities and their impunity” (13).

### 6.3 *100 Medidas para la España Viva (VOX)*

This document focuses less on ideological justifications behind each policy proposal. This text will be presented to focus on the implications of nationality and coexisting the party's stance on state reduction with nationality-based social support.

Nationality is crucial as it serves as a mechanism of internal division, establishing righteousness based on nationality. This is furthered by the promise to prioritize the interests and wellbeing of “Spain and the Spanish” (83). In maximizing the clarity of this separation, VOX proposes the inability of self-described “illegal immigrants” to ever legalize their residence status (17). The indirect consequence is, beyond discouraging future attempts at undocumented immigration, disclaiming any responsibilities towards undocumented immigrants.

VOX promotes the removal of the fast-track mechanism (19) and heightened requirements in language, an undefined sense of “integration”, and past tax collection towards nationality. This last point is particularly applicable to the party's promise to link immigration with economic progress domestically (20), accepting only an “economically justifiable” amount while further implementing quotas on a national and linguistic basis (22). With the amount of consideration on the topic, the mechanism for the loss of citizenship is unsurprisingly also empowered (20).

Prioritizing nationality could further prove beneficial in a context of state reduction, waiving responsibility for non-nationals. The proposed elements focus on political expenditure (35), local political representation (36) and taxation (37-41).

Despite employing reductionist arguments, VOX also acknowledges the government's responsibility towards providing social support, namely in employment, healthcare, and education. This promotes a comparatively-large governmental mechanism, in large part

contrasting with *CHEGA!*'s more neoliberal promotion of market power. VOX promotes an active state in the job market, endorsing employment schemes for young Spaniards (50) and anyone unemployed over the age of fifty (49). This combination allows a prioritization of nationality where it matters most (the majority of unemployment is shouldered by younger generations) and of those likely to be structurally unemployed.

VOX focuses on family expansion and penitentiary justice. VOX accompanies a promotion of the traditional family unit with economic encouragement for family expansion like fiscal benefits increasing by child (44), in stark contrast to the position assumed by other contemporaries like the Dutch PVV. By arguing that only the first two children should qualify for assistance, the PVV's 2012 electoral manifesto assumes an indirectly chauvinistic position considering the fertility rate of "native" Dutch women is below two, while the average amongst Turkish and Moroccan mothers in the Netherlands is significantly above two (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018). Although unclear how these divergent positions arrived from similar realities — fertility-wise — the suggested reasoning would be rooted in VOX's dependence on the traditional family unit, making fertility one of its primary benefits. Despite this, the party promotes a cheque-based system to maximize, within limits, individual choice (72). The party line on penitentiary justice follows the same prioritization of nationalism as both a value and method of exclusion. More concretely, VOX promotes the elimination of penitentiary privileges, salaries, or social security, for "anyone imprisoned for terrorism or illegal immigrants". The two are treated almost interchangeably and oft-associated with Islam, reflected in an overwhelming fear of Islam when discussing border defense (23-33). The promoted erection of a border wall for North African territories heavily contrasts the Schengen relationship Spain has with Portugal and France (26, 28), though the latter is criticized as a security threat (33).

The cheque-based system has further proved useful in the arena of education. The argument employed is one of individual choice, long as that choice is not public education. Beyond the educational cheques, VOX proposed the implementation of a "generous yet demanding" system of educational grants (65). Like with *chega!*, a reliance on cheque-based redistribution in domains such as education might grant a sense of individual choice, even if at the cost of isolating the most vulnerable. In other words, if the demands are performance-based, and not application/ effort-based, one risks disenfranchising the students least statistically likely to remain in the educational system.

Lastly, the position taken towards the provision of healthcare is more in line with the theoretical expectations for the PRR. More specifically, VOX advocates for the widespread

rejection or undermining of non-nationals by eliminating the access to healthcare for illegal immigrants. Furthermore, targeting non-nationals domestically, VOX proposes a copayment healthcare strategy for the first 10 years of Spanish residence (59).

#### 6.4 *Programa Eleitoral 2019 (CHEGA!)*

Despite being the primary electoral document for its inaugural participation in October 2019's legislative elections, it went largely unnoticed/uncriticized until December of that same year, when an opinion piece by left-leaning columnist Daniel Oliveira attacked the platform as “an attempt to put an end to the Social State” (the Portuguese term most commonly employed as an equivalent of *welfare state*).<sup>21</sup> The document was then removed from *CHEGA!*'s website for alleged technical reasons, followed by an eventual reupload with significant omissions. This portion of the analysis will focus concretely on the elements of the text since-omitted, available in Footnote 2. The main domains of the welfare state covered are healthcare, education, tax-collection, and affordable housing.

The primary, since-omitted proposal pertaining to healthcare suggest the complete non-interference of the state as a provider of goods and services (PE2019, 2). It further suggests the private managing of public hospitals with the aim of reducing the bill for taxpayers. The particularly exclusionary element of the party's discourse pertaining to healthcare is approaching the national health service (SNS) as a service of very last resort and setting citizenship as a qualifying criterion. Considering the new target audience of the SNS to be of similar economic conditions to the othered non-nationals, setting nationality as a condition somewhat circumvents that (although, as mentioned in the theoretical expectations, the question of nationality shouldn't be as generally applicable in the Portuguese case). *CHEGA!* further promotes the principle of methods-testing in their distribution of SNS resources, arguing for a cheque solely cashable on privatized healthcare services. In healthcare as in other domains, the mentality employed is one of “subsidizing the user and never the institution” (PE2019, 1).

The cheque-based approach to the subsidization of basic services follows through to education, coming hand in hand with the privatization of universities (PE2019, 3). By subsidizing the student and not the educational institute, the door is open for funder conditionality tied to the provision of these services. More concretely, the party promotes the

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<sup>21</sup> Original article sourced from: <https://expresso.pt/opiniao/2019-12-02-O-Chega-de-que-nao-se-fala-1>

halving of said cheque upon a first schoolyear failed, with the complete removal of assistance after a second academic holdback. To better understand the implicit consequences of this conditionality, one needs to note that the socio-economic conditions most correlated with academic holdbacks and socio-economic marginalization are often the same; the unwavering conditionality proposed could quickly stop covering those who most need the help. More concretely, reapproval rates amongst the children of PALOP (Portuguese-speaking ex-colonial countries) immigrants is two to three times the rate of their Portuguese counterparts, depending on the level of education analyzed (Seabra, 2016). Furthermore, PALOP participation in secondary education is falling, worsening the disparity (Seabra, p. 17). Even though the communities less economically empowered often tend to correlate with increased educational struggle, this issue is compounded by the intersectionality of race and economic power widespread amongst the PALOP community (Seabra, 1996).

The issue of tax-collection has proved a valuable question in minimizing the functional role of the welfare state from a supply-side rather than demand-side equation. In other words, limitations to the capacity of governmental fund collection limit welfare expenditure by generally restricting spending (forcing opponents to consider the political calculation of fighting for increased taxation). In trying to justify a general opposition to progressive taxation, *CHEGA!* portrays the notion of equality as a fabrication aimed at rationalizing a self-perpetuating continued need for the welfare state, in turn fighting the fabricated enemy identified (PE2019, 4). They further call for the removal of *impostos-mais-valia* and IMI/IMT<sup>22</sup>.

Aside from education, the other predominant case of exclusionary discourse when discussing welfare eligibility is on the issue of affordable housing. More concretely, the platform promotes a total (or at least majoritarian) end to the state-imposed rent control aimed at making elderly and long-term renters less subject to recent price-hikes in the main urban centers (PE2019, 5). It further promoted the removal of safeguards directed at making housing affordable for the physically impaired.

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<sup>22</sup> **IMI** is an annual tax on property value, usually about 0.3% - additionally, property transactions (purchases) are taxed **IMT** (Imposto Municipal sobre Transações) at about 6% of the transaction value. **Impostos-mais-valia** refer to taxes on profits from the sales of assets (financial assets such as shares or bonds or fixed assets such as property).

## 6.5 *Programa Protejemos España (VOX)*

Labeled “ten urgent measures the health and economy of the Spanish”, this program’s release was explicitly intended to address the economic and sanitary concerns relating to COVID-19. The expectation on a researcher’s behalf, resultingly, would be some shift in discourse or a degree of coopting the pandemic into the existing discourse.

The primary instances of contrasting discourse to VOX’s welfare positions insofar pertained to the target audience. Typically, reliant on nationality or citizenship for the provision of care, VOX instead promotes the large-scale testing of the entire population (1) and, when calling for the government to compensate worker salaries for a minimum of three months, requests this be done for all workers (9).

Despite this shift in discourse, there was a comparatively larger coopting of the pandemic to fit existing positions. First, the rationale of an economic emergency was provided when calling for the suspension of tax collection, the reduction of consumption taxes for basic necessities, and a full suspension of all social security payments for the totality of confinement (4A, 4D). A health-centered justification, meanwhile, was used to request the reinforcement of border control. Despite being a circumstantial event, the sanitary close-off of the country mirrors the intention to wall off Ceuta and Melilla.

Last but not least, the primary example of coopting towards the pandemic was in the repeated attacks at state size and functioning. VOX calls for the drastic reduction of political expenditure, a call issued numerous times before, while taking it a step further and further requesting the immediate paralyzing of “non-essential” governmental structures and functions (8). The use of the pandemic as a new justification to a preexisting policy proposal is perhaps no better exemplified than the request for the destitution of all regional autonomies in the name of “national solidarity and easing a response to the pandemic” (9).

## 6.6 *Compilation of Presidential Campaign Speeches (Ventura, CHEGA!)*

To attempt to address RQ2.1 in a Portuguese context, differing source material was necessary. The combination of speeches analyzed seem to indicate similar thematic adoptions to their Spanish counterparts. More concretely, Ventura (hence, CHEGA!) uses circumstantial events to reinforce the base idea whilst also accepting the normalization of government interference.

In terms of reinforcing base dialogue circumstantially, Ventura’s discourse promotes a focus on border security and presenting an “outsider threat”, in this case directly health-related. In a context of validating CHEGA!’s support for obligatory confinement, Ventura calls for the

shutting of national borders, justifying the virus as a threat that “knows no frontiers” (1). He furthers the base notion of necessary border control more literally when criticizing that “controlling Portugal without controlling the entry to Portugal is not understandable” (2). Albeit in part referring to the context of pandemic control, it reinforces the more general idea present throughout the documents analyzed. The discourse further varies from its usual framing in Ventura’s exemplification of outsider threats. Perhaps conscientious of mainstream politics’ attacks on racial stereotyping, Ventura warns of threats from COVID-19 hotspots within a European context, like the Netherlands and England (3). Despite complaints about Dutch/British immigration being circumstantial, the base idea prevails.

The normalization of government interference occurs as centralized coordination becomes an immediate necessity across countries. State minimization wasn’t a claim present in any of the speeches analyzed, instead targeting specific state spending like political patronage (4) and welfare-consuming criminals (5).

## **7 Conclusions**

The overarching similarities between the two parties, and when compared to West European PRRPs (RQ3), is the defining focus on themes of nationalism, authoritarianism, and liberalism (RQ1). In contrasting both cases, one notes the increased use of freedom of speech as a tenet of liberalism in the Portuguese case, in part as a blame-avoidance-strategy. If solely focusing on the documents analyzed, a series of theoretical expectations seem misplaced if not incorrect, particularly in the increased cultural othering of Islam in Spain (increased issue attention, albeit minimal) and in the significance of varying levels of anti-system discourse. The theorized coopting of Catholicism in the Portuguese case, on the other hand, seems present; though important to note correlation is not causation. Other than that, large-scale takeaways in terms of differentiation between the parties are difficult to assess.

More interestingly, the focus developed by RQ2 resulted in significant differentiation of both parties from their baseline discourse, whilst also coopting the circumstantial opportunity re-justify existing positions (resulting in changing discourse despite similar messaging content-wise). More concretely, both parties appropriate a circumstantial event as an opportunity to reinforce their base discourse. We further note a normalization of government interference in both cases, interesting considering the platform of governmental undermining and minimization typically employed.

A first focus of further research should be in expanding the source material at hand. Despite acknowledging speeches in the Portuguese context, a targeted analysis of solely verbal discourse could better explore the more tacit or implicit elements of PRR discourse. Seeing as this element limited this analysis, addressed this would be imperative.

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## Appendix I

This appendix lists the relevant text excerpts of the analyzed documents for VOX (Table 1) and CHEGA! (Table 2) making a correspondence between those excerpts and the themes under study (Authoritarianism, Liberalism and Nationalism) with respect to similarities and differences as well as .

Table1. Overview of documents for Vox (Spain)

Document	Excerpt	Interpretation
	1. VOX es un proyecto político para la renovación y el fortalecimiento de la vida democrática española con el objetivo de <u>cohesionar la Nación, conseguir la eficiencia del Estado</u> , mejorar la calidad de las instituciones, garantizar la honradez de los	National Cohesion  State Efficiency

<p>Nuestro Manifiesto (Our Manifesto)</p>	<p>responsables públicos e <u>impulsar el crecimiento económico</u> en beneficio de todos los ciudadanos.</p> <p>2. VOX constata que ante la degradación del Estado constitucional a Estado de partidos y la <u>incapacidad de las dos grandes fuerzas políticas de ámbito nacional</u> para diseñar y realizar las profundas reformas que necesitan tanto nuestro sistema institucional y jurídico como nuestro modelo productivo, es imprescindible que surjan nuevas opciones emanadas de la sociedad civil capaces de dar respuesta a la actual crisis estructural que atraviesa España.</p> <p>3. VOX propone, en consecuencia, una Agenda de Renovación concretada en un conjunto de medidas que hagan realidad el proceso de transformación democrática que los ciudadanos españoles vienen reclamando a través de numerosas plataformas e iniciativas civiles desde el inicio de la crisis.</p> <p>4. VOX llama a todos los españoles que <u>desean una España unida</u> en permanente progreso material y moral, y dotada del prestigio y la influencia que le corresponden en el mundo por su <u>envergadura histórica, cultural y económica</u>, a sumarse a un nuevo proyecto basado en la firmeza de las convicciones democráticas y en los valores propios de la sociedad abierta.</p>	<p>Economic Growth-focus</p> <p>Political Incapacity</p> <p>Importance of nationality in use of “Españoles”</p> <p>Cultural supremacy</p>
<p>Razón de Ser (Purpose of Existence)</p>	<p>P2. (...) escándalos que se vienen acumulando y que afectan a <u>los principales partidos políticos del país, involucrados en graves casos de corrupción</u>, han sumido a la sociedad española en el desaliento y han suscitado su indignación.</p> <p>P3. (...) con <u>centenares de procedimientos judiciales abiertos</u> mientras se extiende la sensación de que tan</p>	<p>Political Undermining</p>

	<p><u>reprobables comportamientos quedan impunes en una alarmante proporción</u>. El descrédito de las cúpulas dirigentes de la mayoría de fuerzas del arco parlamentario daña seriamente nuestras instituciones (...)</p> <p>P4. Es urgente una reacción vigorosa de la sociedad civil que fortalezca nuestra estructura política y <u>abra paso a un cambio profundo de nuestra perspectiva ética</u>. Hemos de guiarnos por valores fuertes (...) España no ha de ser percibida como un problema a resolver, sino <u>como un ejemplo a imitar</u>.</p> <p>P5. Um enfoque meramente economicista de nuestras dificultades es insuficiente y nos lleva al fracaso. Si las ideas que nos conducen son equivocadas, si las <u>concepciones morales</u> que nos inspiran son débiles, nunca conseguiremos volver a la senda del crecimiento material. Es imposible diseñar una política económica eficaz sin el impulso de principios sólidos. Son el esfuerzo, la perseverancia, <u>la cohesión</u>, el altruismo, la búsqueda de la excelencia, el reconocimiento del mérito, <u>la honradez y el patriotismo</u> los que crean los puestos de trabajo y traen la prosperidad.</p> <p>P6. (...) Un <u>sistema político que pone al Gobierno a merced de fuerzas cuyo propósito explícito es liquidar la unidad nacional</u> no es viable y debe ser reformado. Partidos de ámbito nacional que prefieren aliarse con los que trabajan para destruir la nación en vez de cerrar filas para preservarla (...) deben ser sustituidos por nuevas opciones que estén dispuestas a poner las libertades y derechos de los españoles por encima de su interés parcial y egoísta.</p>	<p>Ethical Superiority</p> <p>Unique Morality</p> <p>Honor and Patriotism</p> <p>Anti-Gov.</p>
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	<p>P8. Un grupo reducido, cooptado y oligárquico de dirigentes de partido maneja a su arbitrio el Estado. La separación de poderes, base de la democracia constitucional, está seriamente dañada. <u>La politización de la Justicia es escandalosa y los dos grandes partidos coinciden en su voluntad de mantenerla.</u></p>	<p>Politicization of Justice as critique of state functioning</p>
<p>Principios Inspiradores (Inspiring Principles)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. (...) <u>libertad individual, el Estado de Derecho</u> y el imperio de la ley son elementos indispensables de la democracia (...)</li> <li>2. La <u>indisoluble unidad de la Nación</u> española y la atribución de la soberanía nacional al pueblo español en su conjunto son pilares irrenunciables</li> <li>3. España está <u>llamada por su trayectoria histórica, por su envergadura cultural</u> y económica y por su posición geoestratégica singular, a jugar un papel relevante en la escena internacional a partir de su identidad europea e iberoamericana y de su doble vocación mediterránea y atlántica. Nuestra posición en la Unión Europea ha de ser de actor implicado y principal, conjugando (...) con la defensa de nuestros legítimos intereses nacionales.</li> <li>4. Se ha de abordar sin dilación una nueva Ley de Partidos (...) que <u>libere a la sociedad del patológico dominio de los partidos sobre la vida pública y sobre la estructura institucional del Estado.</u></li> <li>5. VOX propugna un Estado <u>fuerte y eficiente, administrativamente descentralizado</u> y capaz de acomodar y reconocer la pluralidad histórica y cultural de nuestra Nación.</li> <li>6. La consolidación del <u>Estado de Derecho y el correcto funcionamiento de nuestro sistema</u></li> </ol>	<p>Law &amp; Order</p> <p>Natinoal Unity</p> <p>Pathological domination of the state over public – liberalism</p> <p>Proposing strength to the expected decentralized state</p>

	<p>democrático requieren una efectiva separación de poderes (...)</p> <p>7. La economía de mercado, la libre iniciativa y el pleno reconocimiento del derecho de propiedad son las claves de la prosperidad (...) <u>El gasto público ha de estar sometido a un riguroso control</u> para impedir un endeudamiento que hipoteque a las futuras generaciones. España se ha de dotar de un modelo productivo centrado en la generación de valor añadido sobre la base de la competitividad, el desarrollo y la innovación (...) <u>La fiscalidad ha de ser una herramienta de dinamización de la economía y no ha de alcanzar nunca niveles confiscatorios</u> (...)</p> <p>8. La <u>igualdad de oportunidades</u> de todos los españoles para recibir una formación adecuada a sus capacidades y méritos es condición necesaria para articular una sociedad (...)</p> <p>9. (...)</p> <p>10. Una sociedad responsable y <u>moralmente sana</u> ha de defender y promover la cultura de la vida, ha de cuidar y proteger a la familia como institución básica y ha de mostrar su solidaridad con los sectores más vulnerables. La solidaridad no ha de ser monopolizada por el Estado (...)</p> <p>11. España <u>es una gran Nación</u> que siempre ha sabido superar las etapas duras de su historia gracias al coraje, determinación y sacrificio (...) españoles han de ser conscientes de que <u>el patriotismo crítico, ambicioso y sereno representa su mejor arma para encontrar de nuevo la senda del crecimiento material y de la fortaleza moral</u>. VOX invita a sus compatriotas a emprender sin vacilaciones la marcha hacia los altos niveles de bienestar, <u>prestigio</u></p>	<p>Control of public waste</p> <p>Confiscatory nature of taxation</p> <p>Moral Sanity for Cultural Superiority</p> <p>Critical patriotism as a justifier of nationalism and anti-establishment positions at once</p>
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	<p>y peso en el mundo que una España unida, fuerte y segura de sí misma.</p> <p>12. (...) cultura que genere un alto nivel de <u>conciencia ética y de respeto a la ley, sin excepciones</u> de ningún tipo (...)</p>	
<p>Agenda para el Cambio (Agenda for Change)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. (...)</li> <li>2. (...)</li> <li>3. <u>Supresión de las subvenciones públicas</u> a partidos, sindicatos (...)</li> <li>4. VOX promoverá aquellas medidas y reformas que (...) <u>contribuyan a la fortaleza y eficiencia del Estado, a la cohesión de la Nación y a la igualdad de los derechos y libertades</u> de los españoles, así como al cumplimiento de sus obligaciones, en todo el territorio nacional.</li> <li>5. (...)</li> <li>6. (...)</li> <li>7. <u>Despolitización</u> completa de la forma de elección y de las competencias <u>del Tribunal de Cuentas y de los Organismos Reguladores</u> para garantizar su independencia.</li> <li>8. Reforma del Régimen Local sobre la base de una <u>descentralización administrativa</u> provincial e insular conducente a una mayor eficacia y eficiencia de la administración territorial (...)</li> <li>9. Una nueva Ley de Transparencia y Buen Gobierno que establezca plenas <u>garantías de control de la gestión y administración de los recursos públicos</u> por parte de los ciudadanos posibilitando el ejercicio efectivo de sus derechos como administrados de tal forma que queden protegidos frente a eventuales arbitrariedades o abusos del poder político.</li> </ol>	<p>Distancing from Pol. Elite</p> <p>State cohesion in order to assure Law &amp; order</p> <p>Focus on increased efficiencies in functioning of state</p>

<p>Compromisos de Funcionamiento (Compromises in Functioning)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. (...)</li> <li>2. VOX se financiará mediante cuotas de sus miembros y donaciones de sus partidarios que serán <u>gestionadas por un Director económico financiero, externo a la estructura política</u> (...)</li> <li>3. (...)</li> <li>4. (...) miembros de VOX no participarán en ningún órgano político o administrativo del Estado que se <u>considere innecesario, contrario a las libertades</u> o cuya actuación no esté inspirada en el principio de transparencia.</li> <li>5. (...)</li> <li>6. (...)</li> <li>7. (...) muy singularmente, defenderá el uso libre de la <u>lengua española</u> en todo el territorio nacional, especialmente en el sistema educativo.</li> <li>8. (...)</li> </ol>	<p>Fear of politicization</p> <p>Liberty as tenet</p>
<p>Programa 100 Medidas para la España Viva (100 Measures)</p>	<p>(8) Plan integral para el conocimiento, difusión y protección de la identidad nacional y de la aportación de España a la civilización y a la historia universal (...)</p> <p>(12) Supresión de las cuotas (por sexo o por cualquier otra causa) en las listas electorales.</p> <p>(17) Acabar con el efecto llamada: cualquier inmigrante que haya entrado ilegalmente en España estará incapacitado, de por vida, a legalizar su situación y por lo tanto a recibir cualquier tipo de ayuda de la administración.</p> <p>(19) Suprimir la institución del arraigo como forma de regular la inmigración ilegal. Revocación de las pasarelas rápidas para adquirir la nacionalidad española</p> <p>(20) Elevar la exigencia en nivel de idioma, tributación e integración para la adquisición de la nacionalidad. Posibilidad de perder la nacionalidad adquirida por</p>	<p>Anti-Feminist tie</p> <p>Nation as precursor to citizenship and, in turn, assistance</p> <p>Removal of fast-tracking</p> <p>Increased criterion of acceptance</p>

	<p>actividades contra la soberanía, seguridad o independencia nacional.</p> <p>(22) La inmigración se afrontará atendiendo a las necesidades de la economía española y a la capacidad de integración del inmigrante. Se establecerán cuotas de origen privilegiando a las nacionalidades que comparten idioma e importantes lazos de amistad y cultura con España</p> <p>(26) Fortalecer nuestras fronteras. Levantar un muro infranqueable en Ceuta y Melilla.</p> <p>(35) Drástica reducción del gasto político.</p> <p>(36) Fusión de ayuntamientos y significativa reducción en el número de representantes locales</p> <p>(37) Simplificación de normativas, trámites y procedimientos. Derogar cinco normativas por cada una promulgada para el comercio y la industria. Eliminar todo tipo de coste público (tasas e impuestos) para la constitución y puesta en marcha de una empresa sea cual sea la forma jurídica que adopte.</p> <p>(40) Reducir el tipo general del Impuesto sobre Sociedades al 20% con una reducción del 5% en el caso que los beneficios no se distribuyan y se mantengan en la empresa como reservas.</p> <p>(41) Reducción del IVA al 4%</p> <p>(44) Amplio sistema de beneficios fiscales para las familias, en especial para las numerosas. Reducción mínima del 50% en el Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles para familias con hijos y exención del pago del mismo a las familias numerosas. Tratamiento conjunto de la renta familiar repartida entre los dos cónyuges, para no penalizar que uno de los miembros de la familia se dedique al cuidado de los hijos o de los dependientes.</p>	<p>Immigration as dependent on the needs and handles of the economy (non-humanitarian)</p> <p>Wall off North African terr.</p> <p>Political Waste</p> <p>Liberalization of industry</p> <p>Tax cut</p> <p>Tax cut</p> <p>Tax cut</p> <p>Support of family creation (contrasting w/ PVV, possibly due to increased attention on family unit)</p>
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	<p>(49) Apoyo a los desempleados mayores de 50 años y a aquellos desempleados de larga duración mediante la reducción de un 20% de las cotizaciones de la empresa para nuevos contratos de carácter indefinido</p> <p>(50) Nuevos contratos indefinidos para trabajadores de nacionalidad española en situación de desempleo</p> <p>(59) Eliminación del acceso gratuito a la sanidad para inmigrantes ilegales y copago para todos los residentes legales que no tengan un mínimo de 10 años de permanencia en nuestro suelo. Se cubrirán únicamente servicios de urgencia.</p> <p>(61) Implantar el sistema de cheque escolar.</p> <p>(65) Implantar un generoso y exigente sistema de becas para las familias con menos recursos.</p> <p>(72) Apoyo decidido a las familias numerosas y a la natalidad en general. Creación de cheques servicio que subvencionen parte de las necesidades familiares como los libros escolares, transporte público, etc.</p> <p>(83) Anteponer las necesidades de España y de los españoles a los intereses de oligarquías, caciques, lobbys u organizaciones supranacionales.</p> <p>(92) Eliminación de los privilegios penitenciarios (salarios, seguridad social) a los presos condenados por terrorismo y a inmigrantes ilegales.</p> <p>(99) Creación de una Agencia para la ayuda a las minorías cristianas amenazadas, imitando la iniciativa de Hungría.</p>	<p>Unemployment assistance dependent on age or nationality.</p> <p>Removal of aid for illegal immigrants + copayment for those around up to 10 years</p> <p>Methods-tested aid</p> <p>Check-based services</p> <p>Penitentiary privileges for undoc. Immigrants (connoted w/ terrorists)</p>
<p>Programa Protejemos España</p>	<p>(1) Plan de Emergencia Nacional Sanitaria que incluya pruebas masivas del COVID-19 <u>a toda la población</u>, distribución de equipos de protección individual (EPÍ's)</p>	<p>Entirety of population qualifies, break in discourse</p>

	<p>a todo el personal sanitario, de FCS, FFAA y a todos los trabajadores de servicios esenciales.</p> <p>(4) Aprobar un Plan de Emergencia Económica Nacional ante la parálisis económica provocada por los efectos del COVID-19 que incluya:</p> <p>(4a) <u>Suspensión de las obligaciones tributarias</u> de las empresas (IVA e IRPF y pagos a cuenta del Impuesto de Sociedades).</p> <p>(4b) Supresión de todos los <u>impuestos</u> que gravan el consumo de suministros de los hogares (agua, luz y gas) y del impuesto de sucesiones.</p> <p>(4d) <u>Suspender el devengo de cuotas de la seguridad social</u>, tanto de los trabajadores por cuenta ajena como de los autónomos con carácter retroactivo y durante todo el plazo que dure el confinamiento de los españoles.</p> <p>(6) <u>Reforzar el control de las fronteras</u> ante una posible presión en ellas cuando la pandemia se extienda en otros países. Evaluar las misiones internacionales de nuestras FFAA y repatriar a todos los efectivos posibles. Suprimir el pago de la ayuda exterior y de las misiones de cooperación internacional.</p> <p>(8) <u>Reducción drástica del gasto político</u>: eliminación de subvenciones a los partidos políticos, organizaciones sindicales, organizaciones empresariales y organizaciones no gubernamentales. Paralización inmediata de la ejecución de toda partida presupuestaria en España que no vaya dirigida a funciones básicas del Estado. Suprimir todas las partidas no esenciales. Incorporación de los liberados sindicales a sus puestos productivos en los sectores críticos como sanidad y fuerzas del orden.</p> <p>(9) Destitución de <u>toda autoridad autonómica que ataque el principio de solidaridad nacional dificultando la</u></p>	<p>Use of opportunity to push existing tax reform</p> <p>Weakening of collection mechanism of social state</p> <p>Reinforcing border security, a prevailing idea</p> <p>Reduction of political expenditure (justified in a context of COVID-19)</p> <p>Attacks on autonomous</p>
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	<p><u>respuesta a la pandemia</u> y en general de toda autoridad que haya mostrado su negligencia, pasividad o incapacidad en esta crisis.</p> <p>(10) <u>Asunción del pago por parte del Estado</u> y durante tres meses, del importe de las nóminas de <u>todos los trabajadores</u>; en el caso de los autónomos, pago de una cantidad equivalente al nivel medio de su facturación en los tres meses anteriores.</p>	<p>governance for the same reason</p> <p>Assumes the salary of ALL workers, break in discourse</p>
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Table2. Overview of documents for CHEGA! (Portugal)

Document	Excerpt	Interpretation
<p>Manifesto Político Fundador (Founding Political Manifesto)</p>	<p>(3) O CHEGA repudia toda a tirania. Tirania que é o poder, sem razão, de roubar o outro da sua propriedade, o que pode ser feito por assalto, expropriação ou tributação. Tirania que é o poder, sem razão, de roubar o outro das suas opções económicas e culturais, o que pode ser feito por monopólio ou monopsónio, sector público ou sector privado, <u>escola pública obrigatória ou saúde pública única</u>. Tirania que é o poder, sem razão, de roubar o outro da sua vida por qualquer tipo de assassínio, seja aborto, infanticídio, eugenia ou eutanásia. Tirania que é o poder, sem razão, de <u>roubar a uma comunidade os seus costumes, tradições e instituições consensualmente aceites e rectamente ordenadas para a vida livre e digna dos seus membros</u>.</p> <p>(4) O CHEGA considera como heranças indiscutíveis o valor primordial da Razão que os <u>gregos</u> estabeleceram como medida de todas as coisas; da Liberdade nas suas diversas vertentes, contra todas as formas de totalitarismo, por mais sofisticadas que</p>	<p>Tenet of liberalism in justifying their opposition to sole government provision (as tyrannical) or the loss of culture</p> <p>The party employs Greek</p>

	<p>sejam essas formas, também herdada dos Gregos, tal como a Propriedade como um direito inviolável e insubstituível condição daquela mesma liberdade; igualmente são heranças indiscutíveis a Justiça e a Segurança de pessoas e bens – herdadas dos <u>romanos</u>. Finalmente, herança da <u>nossa raiz cristã, a Dignidade da pessoa humana e a Vida desde o momento da concepção até ao da morte natural</u>. Para nós, estas heranças configuram valores inegociáveis porque matriciais na nossa Civilização. E esta nossa Civilização multimilenar é toda ela, para nós, herança indiscutível e igualmente não negociável.</p> <p>(5) O CHEGA defende um Estado neutro nas questões religiosas, mas reconhecendo e respeitando o papel decisivo desempenhado pela <u>Igreja Católica não só na estruturação da civilização europeia mas</u>, também, em toda a História de Portugal.</p> <p>(6) O CHEGA proporá a proibição de práticas políticas e religiosas que ofendam o ordenamento jurídico português e a raiz cultural europeia (mormente, o anti-semitismo, as ideologias do género, a aplicação da Sharia</p> <p>(7) O CHEGA assume, de forma inequívoca, a rejeição clara e assertiva de todas as formas de racismo, xenofobia e de qualquer forma de discriminação contrária aos valores fundamentais pelos quais se pautam as sociedades de matriz europeia. Tal como assume a rejeição da utilização abusiva e o desvirtuamento inaceitável desses termos que tem, como único resultado, o seu descrédito a a sua banalização.</p> <p>(8) O CHEGA não aceita uma oligarquia que, <u>sob os trajes de uma falsa aristocracia</u>, arremedo republicano</p>	<p>and Roman heritage to display European values are beyond just Portugal</p> <p>Catholic morality</p> <p>Recognize the role of Catholicism despite liberal attitude</p> <p>Direct opposition to Islam</p> <p>Rejection of racism to complain about the term's over-use.</p> <p>European matrix of values as foundational to society</p>
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	<p>de uma corte voraz, vai buscar uma ténue réstia de legitimidade ao voto cansado e desiludido de cada vez menos portugueses. <u>Para esta oligarquia, que há quarenta e quatro anos vive encerrada em si própria, e entre si distribuindo prebendas, cargos e mais valias vai CHEGAR a hora de prestar contas aos portugueses. É para os obrigar a essa prestação de contas que aqui estaremos mais cedo do que eles julgam.</u></p> <p>(9) <u>O CHEGA não aceita uma Educação estatizada, marxista e totalitária</u> pela qual o Estado se arroga o direito de ser capataz quando não mesmo senhor, dono, proprietário das pessoas</p> <p>(11) O CHEGA não regateará ao sistema judicial todo o apoio político e de meios que ele necessite para que investigue e, se necessário, impiedosamente condene, todos os membros da oligarquia que usaram da sua posição para enriquecerem. <u>A máquina judicial irá ser, connosco, tão apoiada e tão eficiente como o tem sido a máquina fiscal pela oligarquia</u> que há 45 anos nos controla.</p> <p>(12) O CHEGA está aqui para mobilizar os muitos descontentes. Já pouca gente espera dessa oligarquia organizada em torno dos chamados ‘partidos do sistema’ que leve a cabo as reformas imprescindíveis que os portugueses reconhecem como necessárias mas às quais a oligarquia não mete ombros porque essas reformas representariam, como é evidente, o fim do seu poder. Poder moribundo, mas ainda actuante. Mas a gritante incapacidade para <u>lidar com a crescente insegurança sentida nas grandes metrópoles, o sentimento de impunidade amplamente vigente, a desigualdade social extensiva, a carga fiscal</u></p>	<p>Opposition to, and rejection of, the political elite</p> <p>Marxist gov. education.</p> <p>Fiscal machinery serves to solely benefit oligarchy</p> <p>Focus on criminality and a promise to lessen fiscal load</p>
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	<p><u>confiscatória</u>, constituem iniludíveis sinais de que algo está prestes a mudar. É para dar voz ao descontentamento e meter ombros a essa mudança que aqui estamos.</p> <p>(13) O CHEGA não é, nem será nunca apenas “mais um” partido a integrar o sistema político que nos asfixia, mas trás consigo um núcleo de valores indispensável para a inversão do estado de decadência e degradação a que o regime democrático português chegou. O CHEGA não é o colete de salvação da III República. Pelo contrário o CHEGA trás, consigo, a IV República, tutelando uma Nação assente numa Constituição ideologicamente neutra, no primado de um Estado de Direito forte assente sobre o império da Lei e inflexível na exigência da limitação e separação de poderes e, por fim mas não em último, no fim da ditadura dos grupos de interesse, das elites, das minorias e da sua impunidade, tudo aquilo até onde nos trouxe a III República.</p> <p>(14) O CHEGA não aceita a máquina de extorsão de impostos a que hoje se resume o Estado português. Uma máquina de assalto ao cidadão, um cidadão unidimensional porque apenas visto como “contribuinte”. No estado a que chegámos, a cobrança de impostos é roubo. Roubo puro e simples. Pelo que, assim, o CHEGA coloca a reforma desmantelamento da estrutura policial subjacente ao Fisco como absoluta prioridade do partido. Será uma reforma que não deixará pedra sobre pedra do sistema tributário que onera, de forma absolutamente desproporcionada, todos aqueles que trabalham e geram riqueza. A “solidariedade fiscal”, conceito vago e impreciso, não pode ser pretexto político e jurídico para asfixiar a</p>	<p>Beyond anti-system, unconstitutional</p> <p>Application of laziness to the characterization of welfare dependency.</p>
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	<p>classe média, e todos aqueles que mais riqueza produzem, com impostos em cascata, sucessivos, cumulativos e progressivos. A solidariedade fiscal não pode ser, e connosco nunca será, sinónimo de esbulho a quem produz para benefício de quem, perfeitamente apto a produzir, nada faz limitando-se a desbaratar alegremente o produto da “redistribuição”. Este escândalo maior, connosco, terá um fim imediato. Não aceitamos a componente redistributiva da política fiscal: connosco não haverá impostos sucessivos, cumulativos e progressivos, com um IRS que passará a taxa única, numa primeira fase, e desaparecerá, numa segunda e última fase.</p> <p>(16) O CHEGA entende que quanto mais alto é o nível de intervenção do Estado na Economia, mais alto é o nível de corrupção na máquina desse Estado. Daí o altíssimo e vergonhoso nível de corrupção existente entre nós. Assim sendo, e o Estado, connosco, irá retirar-se completamente como actor no mercado também por essa razão, para se remeter à simples, mas essencial, função de regulador</p> <p>(17) O CHEGA irá, assim, reduzir drasticamente o Estado, colocando-o dentro dos estreitos limites que o liberalismo clássico desde sempre lhe traçou. O monstro burocrático em que se transformou o Estado português é uma das principais causas para o desemprego de longa duração, para a emigração e para o atraso competitivo da economia portuguesa. Contra a inércia colaborante dos partidos políticos do sistema, o CHEGA compromete-se a devolver os rendimentos àqueles portugueses que, há anos sem fim se vêm deles legal, mas ilegítimamente esbulhados. TODOS os partidos do sistema, sem excepção, passaram quarenta</p>	<p>Minimized market interference</p> <p>State Reduction.</p>
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	<p>e quatro anos a alimentar alegremente o monstro predador. Desinteressadamente? Os portugueses sabem bem que não, todos os dias as primeiras páginas dos jornais são disso a prova provada.</p> <p>(18) O CHEGA, e que sobre isso não subsistam quaisquer dúvidas, preza e mantém plena confiança no sistema democrático. Contudo, e precisamente para que esse sistema se possa manter vivo e de boa saúde, o Chega irá proceder a uma profunda remodelação na sua estrutura, reduzindo os cargos políticos – todos eles – ao estritamente necessário, com particular relevo para o número de deputados à Assembleia da República, que será apenas o indispensável para que possa ser assegurada a representatividade política. A reforma do sistema político será, assim e seguramente, uma prioridade fundamental da nossa acção.</p> <p>(20) CHEGA propõe-se introduzir alterações decisivas na nossa legislação penal. Encontra-se entre nós instalada uma cultura de impunidade que, a manter-se, irá continuamente reforçando o sentimento de desconfiança dos cidadãos face à justiça e sua aplicação. Reintroduziremos a pena de prisão perpétua para crimes bárbaros e horrendos que chocam a comunidade e propiciam um fortíssimo sentimento de perturbação constante da paz e da ordem pública. Igualmente a redefinição das penas criminais, nomeadamente em crimes de homicídio, terrorismo, corrupção, violação e abuso sexual de menores (será apresentada uma proposta legislativa para a previsão da designada castração química nestes casos), é prioridade fundamental do CHEGA, que para isso lutará arduamente em todas as plataformas políticas e institucionais a que tenha acesso.</p>	<p>Distancing of political elite</p> <p>Strengthening of the law and order argument in the case of pedophilia and maximum imprisonment</p>
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	<p>(20) O CHEGA assume a defesa da História, da Cultura e da língua portuguesas enquanto valores constitucionalmente garantidos; defenderá o reforço do papel de Portugal e a afirmação da lusofonia nos diversos patamares de acção internacional e comunitária; por fim, compromete-se a promover e a reforçar, de forma eficaz, os laços entre comunidades portuguesas espalhadas por todo o mundo, especialmente no âmbito da lusofonia</p> <p>(23) O CHEGA porá fim aos permanentes atentados ao património construído da nação, criminalizando desactos à Lei de actores do mercado imobiliário que hoje apenas caem sob a alçada do Código Civil. É inaceitável que esteja a ser destruído o equilíbrio da secular paisagem urbana das nossas cidades, vilas e aldeias. É esse um activo que ao longo das últimas décadas tem vindo a ser criminosamente desbaratado</p> <p>(28) O CHEGA veio, finalmente, para mudar. Mudar mentalidades rotineiras, gastas e vazias; mudar sistemas caducos, ultrapassados, sem destino; mudar estruturas corruptas, podres e venais. O Chega veio para mudar Portugal. Ou, melhor, o CHEGA veio para, de forma transparente, democrática, corajosa e eficaz, devolver Portugal aos portugueses; devolver os portugueses a Portugal mas, acima de tudo, devolver o Portugal de hoje ao Portugal de sempre.</p>	<p>Defense of culture and history assumed as driving goal</p> <p>Liberalism towards housing markets</p> <p>Return Portugal to the Portuguese</p>
<p>Programa Político 2019 (Removed Elements from the 2019 Legislative Manifesto)</p>	<p>Generally Speaking</p> <p>(1) "Ao Estado não compete a produção ou distribuição de bens e serviços, sejam esses serviços de Educação ou de Saúde, ou sejam os bens vias de comunicação ou meios de transporte.</p> <p>(1a) o princípio geral a ser seguido pelo Estado deverá ser o de subsidiar o utilizador dos serviços [mas]</p>	<p>Not the government's responsibility to provide goods and serves</p>

	<p>jamais a instituição que os presta (Escolas, Hospitais, Segurança Social...)"</p> <p>(1b) "Cheque-Educação, Cheque-Saúde, Cheque-Habituação serão a única forma de, desde logo, racionalizar os custos do Estado nesta área garantindo, em contrapartida, uma muito melhor qualidade e eficiência na prestação da globalidade desses serviços"</p> <p>Healthcare</p> <p>(2) Estado não deverá, idealmente, interferir como prestador de bens e serviços no Mercado da Saúde" e, para tal, deverá "promover a gestão privada dos hospitais públicos, com demonstração pública do benefício obtido e redução de custos para o contribuinte, invertendo a política que o atual Governo tem vindo a levar a cabo de reversão da gestão privada dos hospitais públicos."</p> <p>(2a) O caso específico do SNS, funcionará assim: "A Entidade Reguladora da Saúde definirá as condições genéricas de um seguro de saúde típico e dará, aos cidadãos que provem recursos insuficientes, um cheque-saúde mensal destinado a custear, em empresa escolhida pelo doente, um seguro de saúde".</p> <p>Education</p> <p>(3) Ensino superior, no qual o Estado deve iniciar "um processo de privatização de parte das instituições universitárias e politécnicas que detenha". As propinas, escreve-se, "terão em conta as necessidades de Portugal nas áreas científicas e técnicas a que essas propinas digam respeito. As propinas a pagar por um curso de engenharia civil ou informática terão necessariamente de tender para zero, enquanto que as</p>	<p>In doing so, should be cheque-based</p> <p>Government can further provision of private healthcare</p> <p>Check-based</p> <p>Targeting of lower performers, often immigrants of PALOP origin in rougher socio-economic conditions</p>
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	<p>propinas a pagar por um curso de Sociologia terão de tender para o custo real do curso." E "qualquer aluno frequentando o Ensino Superior que reprove um ano sem séria justificação passará a receber o cheque-ensino pela metade; reprovado que seja uma segunda vez igualmente sem cabal justificação, passará a custear por inteiro os seus estudos até ao final do seu curso."</p> <p>Taxation</p> <p>(4) taxa única de imposto sobre os rendimentos, acabando com a progressividade, que denomina de "fabricação da igualdade": "Várias são as medidas usadas para, através de uma ação permanente do Estado, tentar manter uma igualdade, sempre fictícia."</p> <p>(5) abolição do IMI e do imposto de mais-valias e que "o essencial da carga fiscal deverá incidir sobre o consumo, ou seja, o grosso da cobrança fiscal deverá ser originado pelo IVA." Ou seja, um imposto que penaliza por igual ricos e pobres.</p> <p>Affordable Housing</p> <p>(6) Contratos de arrendamento, com o fim de algumas ou todas as normas impostas pela lei e nomeadamente das salvaguardas atualmente existentes para idosos, deficientes e arrendatários "antigos"</p> <p>(7) "Não se aceita que o Estado considere o direito à habitação permanente em casas arrendadas. (...) A excessiva proteção destes inquilinos com rendas antigas tem tido efeitos perversos em quem procura atualmente arrendar casa nas mesmas condições."</p>	<p>General counter-tax appeal</p> <p>Affordable housing is outside the management of the state, as this could negatively affect market</p>
André Ventura's	"André Ventura Sobre o Estado de Emergência" (Link Available Below)	

<p>Presidential Speeches (Compilation)</p>	<p>1:01. “É necessário fechar fronteiras, pois o vírus não as conhece”</p> <p>1:30. “A razão destas medidas agora é a falta de terem acontecido mais cedo”</p> <p>1:59. “Controlar Portugal sem controlar a entrada a Portugal... Ninguém compreende”</p> <p>2:57. “Enquanto tivemos um presidente em fuga...”</p> <p>“André Ventura Sobre o Estado de Emergência” (Link Available Below)</p> <p>8:11. “Não aceito que enquanto portugueses passam a maior crise das vidas, sustentem um sistema gigantesco para seu autoproveito”</p> <p>8:20. “Enquanto portugueses fazem o maior sacrifício das suas vidas, continuamos a sustentar criminosos que nos deviam pagar é a nós!”</p>	
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Links for Speeches:

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_QYPgdJiVR8&ab\\_channel=HEGATV](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QYPgdJiVR8&ab_channel=HEGATV))

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmzbN6D9CBY&ab\\_channel=HEGATV](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmzbN6D9CBY&ab_channel=HEGATV))