



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Peacekeeping Complex Conflicts: Investigating the impact of UN peacekeeping on bi-communal in Cyprus

Hjiantoniou, Chloe Arlette

Citation

Hjiantoniou, C. A. (2022). *Peacekeeping Complex Conflicts: Investigating the impact of UN peacekeeping on bi-communal in Cyprus*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master thesis in the Leiden University Student Repository](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3309425>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Bachelor Thesis: BSc International Relations and Organizations

Peacekeeping Complex Conflicts:
Investigating the impact of UN Peacekeeping on bi-communal relations in Cyprus



Chloe Arlette Hjiantonou – s2438704

BAP: Inclusiveness, Peacebuilding & State-building

Instructor: Dr Arlinda Rustemi

Second Reader: Dr Wouter Veenendaal

Word Count: 7997

Leiden University – Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences

Contents

Introduction	3
Literature Review	5
Theoretical Framework	9
Methodology	11
Coding Framework	12
Chapter 1 - Exogenous factors	14
Violence	14
Recovery	15
Cooperation.....	16
Discussion.....	18
Chapter 2: Endogenous Factors	23
Status Quo.....	23
Threat	24
Accessibility.....	25
Discussion.....	27
Conclusion	31
Appendix 1: Coding Framework – Exogenous Factors	33
Appendix 2: Coding Framework – Endogenous Factors	34
Reference List	35

Introduction

From the 1950s until the 1990s, Cyprus has experienced tensions, and conflict between two local communities, the Turkish Cypriots, and Greek Cypriots (Alexandrou, 2020). Cyprus gained constitutional independence from British occupation in 1963, with Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey remaining guarantor powers, i.e., countries that reserve the right to intervene in the event of a violation of the Treaty of Guarantee (Alexandrou, 2020; Cuhadar & Kotelis, 2010). The key event occurred in July 1974, when Turkish forces “intervened” in the island, occupying 37% of the land, which in 1983 was declared as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), unrecognized by the international community (Cuhadar & Kotelis, 2010; Kliot & Mansfield, 1994). This caused a societal and an institutional divide between the communities of the Turkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots (Souter, 1984). As a result of this division, the United Nations (UN) coined the term bi-communal relations discussing the Cyprus problem and tensions between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots (United Nations [UN] Security Council, 1990). The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been present on the island since 1964, yet there has been negative peace, i.e., an absence of violence for over 40 years (Galtung, 1976). The communal divide remains unresolved, and the Cyprus problem has become one of many ‘forgotten’ conflicts (Cuhadar & Kotelis, 2010; Hughes-Wilson, 2011). Consequently, there is little scholarship by non-Greek or non-Turkish-Cypriot scholars, disincentivized by a long-lasting ceasefire, providing a limited variety of research on the topic.

From a theoretical perspective, Paris (1997) discusses the liberal institutionalist approach of international organizations in their peacebuilding missions. Paris recalls how Boutros-Ghali (1992), during the creation of the Agenda for Peace maintained how the peacekeeping force

“linked Western notions of democracy to the achievement of peace” (Paris, 1997, p. 61), scholars such as Hazen (2007) contend that “while the liberal model is appropriate, it is unlikely to be sufficient if it simply reforms the status quo” (p. 325). Consequently, reforms that delve into the causes of the conflict such as institutional imbalance, economic factors and societal issues should also be taken into consideration (Hazen, 2007). Moreover, it has been argued that dialogue between belligerents and changes in inter-communal relations are needed, but advocates for this, claim that it must be encouraged nationally rather than imposed from an external force, as is done through liberal peacebuilding (Hazen, 2007). This thesis aims to question the peacekeeping capabilities of the UN in a complex conflict. Whilst there indeed has been over 40 years of dormancy, societal tensions remain in Cyprus and thus it begs the question:

What is the impact of UN peacekeepers on bi-communal relations in Cyprus?

This thesis will employ the following structure. First, relevant scholarship on the issue will be discussed, and built upon in the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework will outline and conceptualize the key concept of Stage 1 exogenous, and Stage 2 endogenous peacekeeping. The selected methodology will be justified, with its limitations outlined. The analysis will be divided into two chapters, one for exogenous factors and one for endogenous factors, within these two chapters, an analysis will provide insight into the Cypriot case study. In the conclusion, significant findings will be triangulated, aiming to evaluate the impacts of peacekeeping in Cyprus, with particular attention to improving bi-communal hostilities.

Literature Review

Fortna & Howard (2008) discussed the three waves of literature on peacekeeping: the classics, critiques of peacekeeping, and advocates of peacekeeping. In the era of the classics, authors such as James (1989) analysed the necessity of the UNFICYP and whether the presence of the peacekeepers is useful in fostering a solution to the Cyprus problem. Assessing the UNFICYP in terms of crisis diffusion, truce maintenance, military confrontation, and peace maintenance James (1989) argues that overall stability on the island would not be increased by a more active UN peacekeeping force, since the conflict mostly reflects the policies of the belligerent parties themselves rather than the strength of the UN border.

Scholars who advocate for peacekeeping centralise on its ability to keep the peace and prevent fighting between belligerents at the local level. Smidt (2020) discusses how international actors influence peacebuilding through engagement with the locals, specifically discussing UN peacekeepers. She argues that peacekeepers can reduce communal violence via two pathways: solving information and coordination problems and reducing negative feelings and biases (Smidt, 2020). However, it must be said that Smidt's (2020) analysis does not consider other variables that authors such as Bratt (1997) consider when analysing the effectiveness and performance of UN peacekeepers. For example, the role of the parties to the conflict, the role of regional powers and the existence of a Comprehensive Settlement Agreement (Bratt, 1997). Smidt (2020) does address certain factors that may result in the failure of local peacekeeping in mitigating violence, yet it is a limited analysis, neglecting to include the factors that Bratt (1997) examined. The article distinguishes between internal factors, such as the consent and cooperation of the combatants and a comprehensive settlement agreement, and external support, referring to support from other countries and regional powers (Bratt, 1997). Thus, this thesis aims at taking all of the aforementioned factors into account and thus creating a medium

between Bratt (1997) and Smidt's (2020) work, strengthening the current literature by incorporating all potential variables and applying it to the complex Cypriot case.

Alternative critical approaches to peacekeeping missions, specifically concerning international peacekeeping institutions such as the UN, have argued that peacekeepers can be considered as "riot control against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace" (Pugh, 2004, p. 41), hence deeming the UNFICYP unnecessary as Cyprus is considered to be in accord with the liberal dimensions of peace since it is mostly a democratic country (Pugh, 2004). Thus, this critiques the overall institution of peacekeeping as well as the relevance of the UNFICYP.

Connecting with Bratt's (1997) work, Sambanis (1999) takes a new, pessimistic perspective on the peacekeeping-peace-making relationship, particularly focusing on the UNFICYP. He builds upon Bratt's (1997) differentiation between internal and external factors and re-conceptualizes it as endogenous vs exogenous factors with stage 1 and stage 2 peacekeeping respectively, with stage 1 comprising of exogenous factors and stage 2 comprising of endogenous factors (Sambanis, 1999). Endogenous factors are internal factors, which include factors such as "peacekeepers' interpretation of their mandate", consent of the parties, the military and political status quo, and perceptions of the impartiality of the UNFICYP and others (Sambanis, 1999, pp. 83-84). Exogenous factors are external factors that influence the peacekeepers' mandates, strategies, and capabilities, such as conflict type and troop contributors' interests (Sambanis, 1999). Thus, based on the antecedent relationship between the Stage 1 exogenous factors and Stage 2 endogenous factors, he iterates that peacekeeping may have "unanticipated and counterintuitive effects on peace-making" (Sambanis, 1999, p. 84), resulting in ineffective peacekeeping and a "failure" in Cyprus (Sambanis, 1999, p. 103). He claims that the argument that peacekeeping undermines the parties' incentives for

negotiations, as James (1989) concludes, is simplistic due to the complex nature of the peacekeeping-peace making relationship (Sambanis, 1999). The article begins to examine the complexities of the peacekeeping missions yet analyses the overall conflict rather than specific aspects, such as the relations between the two communities, thus it would be interesting to take this framework and apply it to one specific angle of the Cyprus conflict.

Several authors have discussed the Cyprus problem and involvement of the UNFICYP in the conflict at length, including Cuhadar & Kotelis (2010) who discuss the overall situation within the Cypriot civil society. One major contribution of this paper for this thesis includes identifying three key features of the Cyprus problem: 1) Labelling it as an inter-communal conflict with an interminable stalemate 2) Hosting the longest-lasting UN peacekeeping mission despite debatable effectiveness 3) The dependence and influence of external Greek and Turkish politics on the conflict (Cuhadar & Kotelis, 2010). The conclusion maintains that the division of the communities since 1974 alongside the presence of the UN peacekeepers has created a “peculiar situation” (Cuhadar & Kotelis, 2010, p. 202). In addition, Bolkubasi (1998), amongst other scholars, argues that the UN’s peace settlement efforts in Cyprus are unsuccessful in creating a formalised settlement agreement. However, one crucial point unmentioned in other literature on Cyprus was the potential benefit of using the functionalist theory when analysing this conflict. He states that “according to this approach, cooperation between the conflicting parties in non-political areas, including economic, social and technical fields, may lead the parties in the long run to have a stake in improved political relations” (Bolkubasi, 1998, p. 430). This will be further built upon in the theoretical framework. Moreover, Bolkubasi (1998) agrees with the aforementioned authors that the interests of the conflicting parties overpower the abilities of the UN Peacekeepers to create a successful settlement.

Scholars including Di Salvatore (2017) and Ruggeri et al. (2016) have taken quantitative and qualitative approaches to evaluating peacekeeping. Whilst Di Salvatore concludes that the presence of peacekeepers does limit uncertainty and create conditions for normalization under specific circumstances (2017), in collaboration with Ruggeri et al. (2016), they conclude the deployment of peacekeepers to a more localized area can make conflict episodes of violence shorter yet argue how their ability to stop the onset of conflict locally is “inconclusive” (Ruggeri et al., 2016, p. 165). This occurs in Cyprus where peacekeepers are unable to prevent the onset of local conflict, as the 1974 invasion occurred during their deployment. However, their research examines the short-term effects of peacekeeping but not the long-term, and future necessity of peacekeeping missions.

Theoretical Framework

To conceptualize UN Peacekeeping, this thesis utilizes the framework established by Sambanis (1999). As previously stated, this consists of Stage One & Stage Two peacekeeping, aligned with exogenous and endogenous factors, where the former are factors that influence the formation and capability of the mission and the latter are internal factors within the UNFICYP itself, such as “perceptions of threat and expectations of feasible outcomes of the conflict” (Sambanis, 1999, p. 84). These are both highly influential variables to be explored at greater length concerning the UNFICYP.

Concerning bi-communal relations, Bolkubasi (1998) identifies two main tenets contributing to the Cyprus problem: inter-communal hostilities, and cooperation of the governments of both sides. In this work, he discusses the cooperation of the governments in the creation of a peace settlement (1998). As there is no peace settlement nor progress towards such, in the interests of this research, this thesis will focus on only the tenet of inter-communal hostilities, as the conceptualization for bi-communal relations. Barak (2002) defines inter-communal hostilities as a consequence of the political choices of different ethnic leaders living in a state combined with the effects of the choices between groups which results in a “vicious cycle” of violence and tension between the communities. (Barak, 2002, p. 620). Therefore, this combined with Bolkubasi’s (1998) discussion allows for a well-rounded conceptualization of bi-communal relations for this research.

To operationalize this variable, functionalist theory as discussed by Bolkubasi (1998), Mitrany (1994) and Benson & Kathman (2014) will be explored, which suggests that “the norms and stated purpose of an [intergovernmental organization] should be what drives its actions” (2014, p. 352). The operationalization consists of three categories for this analysis: violence,

cooperation, and recovery, since functionalist theory as per Bolkubasi (1998) centralizes on cooperation in the non-political sphere, specifically in the economic, social, and technical aspects. These categories were also selected based on the mandate of the UNFICYP mission, as discussed by Sambanis (1999). The main doctrines of which are: to prevent a recurrence of fighting, contribute to the restoration of law and order, contribute to a return to normal conditions, and maintenance of ceasefire and status quo (UN, Security Council, 1986).

Therefore, since the research question is being analysed on two separate levels, there will be several hypotheses, for both endogenous factors and exogenous factors:

Endogenous factors:

H0: Endogenous factors are ineffective in reducing bi-communal hostilities

H1: Endogenous factors are mostly ineffective in reducing bi-communal hostilities due to the prevalence of the interests of the belligerents

H2: Endogenous factors are less effective than exogenous factors in reducing bi-communal hostilities

Exogenous factors:

H0: Exogenous factors are ineffective in reducing bi-communal hostilities

H1: Exogenous factors are partially effective in reducing bi-communal hostilities due to the prevalence of the interests of the belligerents

H2: Exogenous factors are more effective than endogenous factors in reducing bi-communal hostilities as the belligerents themselves contribute to the scope of the mission.

Methodology

The selected method of analysis is qualitative content analysis (QCA), using a coding framework. Bryman (2004) defines QCA as an approach that emphasizes analysing documents and allowing categories to emerge out of data as well as recognizing the significance of analysing the data based on the meaning of the context of the document (Kohlbacher, 2006). Specifically, this thesis employs an in-depth case study, which has become “one of the most common ways to do qualitative inquiry” (Kohlbacher, 2006; Stake, 2000). This is the most optimal approach as the case study maintains the comprehensive characteristics of real-life events as will be done in this paper (Kohlbacher, 2006; Yin, 2009).

A case study is an evaluation of an aspect of a historical event to create explanations that may be generalizable to other events (George & Bennett, 2005). Case studies “examine the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases in detail” (George & Bennet, 2005, p. 21), thus is beneficial for answering the research question. This thesis uses a single in-depth case study which Siggelkow (2007) argues similarly to George & Bennet (2005) allows for detailed analyses of phenomena (Gustafsson & Gustafsson, 2017). Thus, as the phenomenon of UN peacekeeping is being explored, this methodology is ideal for this research.

The focal point for this case study is Cyprus, for two reasons: (1) Cyprus has the longest-running peacekeeping operation, running now for 58 years and yet no Comprehensive Settlement Agreement (CSA) has succeeded despite many attempts, such as the 2004 Annan Plan (Cuhadar & Kotelis, 2010). Thus, the role and competencies of the UNFICYP should be studied and evaluated. (2) As researched by Lindley (2001) and Cuhadar & Kotelis (2010), the UNFICYP is largely contested in its effectiveness and “whether they do more harm than good” (Lindley, 2001, p. 77). Lastly, when exploring inter-communal conflict, Cyprus is a key case

study, as the last divided capital in Europe, to discuss the impact of peacekeepers on bi-communal relations (Oktay, 2007).

The data of this thesis consists of Secretary-General reports from over a series of years, starting from 1964 until 2004, following a pattern of every 10 years allowing for consistency and to provide a significant time gap to allow for change. The justification for this time frame is that it begins from the first year of the peacekeeping mission and ends when Cyprus joined the European Union, as this enabled the predominance of the EU Common Foreign & Security Policy, which coordinates Europe's military policies and peacebuilding operations (Krupnick, 1996), thus overshadowing the prevalence of the UNFICYP. This will be triangulated with various academic articles, and reports from NGOs to confirm or disconfirm the findings. The level of analysis is sentences, thus allowing for enough specificity to convey detailed findings within each report.

Coding Framework

Stengenga (1970) distinguishes between the two types of functions of the UNFICYP, pacification and normalisation. Pacification includes military tasks and objectives whereas normalisation refers to non-military objectives, surrounding more human rights, economic issue resolution, restructuring of critical infrastructures such as schools and public services, reforming the judicial sector and facilitating cooperation in different sectors such as trade and agriculture (Aksu, 2003). This alongside the UNFICYP mandate that was created in 1964 and expanded in 1974 ("UNFICYP mandate", 2015) will be used to create the categories. As per Sambanis' (1999) framework, due to the analytical distinction between endogenous and exogenous factors, there will be two separate coding frameworks for each set of factors.

The exogenous coding framework consists of three main categories, derived from functionalism by Mitrany (1999) and from Stengenga (1970), namely: violence, recovery, and cooperation. For violence, there are two subcategories, derived from the mandate: observance of the ceasefire, and civilian security, coded with a plus or minus sign to indicate a positive step in improving these factors or a provocation or violation of the ceasefire. For recovery, there are two main subcategories, derived by the original as well as the revised mandates of the mission (UN, Security Council, 1986): social recovery and economic recovery also marked with a plus or minus, with indicators for all categories included in Appendix 1. Lastly, the category cooperation has two subcategories: economic cooperation, and humanitarian cooperation, devised from the specific part of the mandate stating, “restoration to conditions of normality” (Security Council, resolution 186, 1964).

The endogenous coding framework comprises of 3 main categories, derived from Sambanis’ (1999) endogenous factors, specifically: status quo, threat, and accessibility. In the category of status quo, there are two sub-categories: military and political, derived both from the mandate in “maintenance of the ceasefire” (Security Council, resolution 186, 1964) and from the framework of Sambanis (1999). The following categories, threat and accessibility were derived from literature, including the sub-categories.

It should be reiterated that in the following chapters, the findings and analysis will be conducted in separate chapters for exogenous and endogenous factors, respectively. In the conclusion, these analyses will be discussed holistically, answering the research question.

Chapter 1 - Exogenous factors

Violence

In 1964, the primary concern with regard to violence was civilian security as there were several incidents of shooting and fighting within the villages (UN, 1964, pp. 15-16). According to the reports, “hardly a day [passed] without one or several incidents” (UN, 1964, p. 16). Whilst the UNFICYP did intervene during the shootings, its presence in that year did not deter the shootings from occurring. As a result, many violations of the ceasefire also occurred (UN, 1964).

In 1974, there was slight progress as “the intercommunal military situation remained quiet” (UN, 1974, p. 11). However, despite fewer incidents than in 1964, there were still breaches of the ceasefire, which continued throughout the year (UN, 1974).

1984 displayed further improvement than in 1974, the ceasefire was observed to the same extent as in 1974, conveying no increase in hostilities (UN, 1984). Moreover, the report stated that “the increased patrolling by UNFICYP has helped to maintain the calm in the sensitive area of Nicosia” (UN, 1984, p. 6), showing that the increased presence has created a sense of deterrence. There were also no signs of a threat to civilian security and thus displaying a vast improvement over 20 years. In 1994, civilian security was a primary concern, with an increase in demonstrations leading to casualties (UN, 1994). Despite this, overall there was limited violence between the sides and the ceasefire was well maintained (UN, 1994, p. 4). Therefore, overall a similar situation to 20 years prior.

Finally, in 2004, “the military situation along the ceasefire lines remained generally calm and stable. The number of incidents such as construction, ill-discipline and moves forward into the buffer zone was negligible” (UN, 2004, p. 1) demonstrating clear advancement from the arrival of the peacekeepers and throughout their time in violence levels on the island.

Recovery

In 1964, initiatives towards recovery were negligible. There was very little freedom of movement from the North to the South and vice versa and as a result, there were large disruptions to the restoration of normal conditions (UN, 1964). In civil services, although internally the employees had a feeling of longing to work with their colleagues, the governments restricted the recovery socially of public services, and thus there was little that the peacekeepers could do (UN, 1964). Economically, payment of salaries and benefits was restricted also, thus preventing economic recovery (UN, 1964).

However, the justice system was one of the fastest sectors to recover with the assistance of the UNFICYP in safely escorting Turkish Cypriot judges (UN, 1964). Yet there remained still a lack of a return to normality as inter-communal arrests occurred and unwillingness to interact prevailed (UN, 1964). The UNFICYP assisted in the provisions of public facilities such as water throughout the island and negotiated the re-opening of certain smaller industries (UN, 1964).

1974 consisted of varying results for recovery. In the societal aspects, there remained an overall delay in a full return to normality, such as in freedom of movement and provisions of schools for both communities (UN, 1974). On the other hand, economic recovery persevered with the

UNFICYP facilitating negotiations and the restoration of more industries and public services and facilities (UN, 1974).

In 1984, whilst there was progress, recovery remained selective. For example, although freedom of movement was improved, children who attended schools on one side could not visit their families on the other (UN, 1984). Moreover, there is further improvement in the provision of public services and facilities, maintenance of law and order and inter-communal activities (UN, 1984). However, overall there is little information concerning recovery demonstrating a small number of new reports.

The 1994 report lacked sufficient data regarding recovery, focusing more on the humanitarian functions of the UNFICYP, as discussed in the next sub-section. The prevailing limitation in the report of 1994 was the property rights of citizens and a lack of progress in finding missing persons (UN, 1994). Lastly, the 2004 report was the most optimistic about the restoration of conditions of normality. There was an increase in movement across the borders and checkpoints and bi-communal events facilitated by the UNFICYP (UN, 2004).

Overall, the category of recovery seemed largely dependent on the will of the governments and authorities of each community, whilst in many issues, the UNFICYP attempted to negotiate with the authorities and often succeeded, especially in the beginning of the mission, there was a clear reluctance to accept or respect the authority of the UNFICYP by the belligerents.

Cooperation

Similarly to the other categories, 1964 was a year plagued by a lack of willingness to cooperate, within the communities. However, the UNFICYP was successful in conducting humanitarian

functions such as evacuations of refugees and citizens from villages where there was fighting, escorting citizens when necessary, and assisting refugees with food supplies and water (UN, 1964). Furthermore, for economic cooperation, despite the efforts of the UNFICYP, the lack of economic cooperation was due to the unwillingness of the authorities to cooperate, mostly in trades where there had previously been bi-communal cooperation (UN, 1964).

In pre-invasion 1974, similar to 1964, the UNFICYP was able to “adequately carry out its humanitarian functions” (UN, 1974, p.15), however, remained limited in economic cooperation (UN, 1974), due to the prevailing interests of the belligerents and tense conditions on the island (Souter, 1984).

In 1984, the UNFICYP remained successful in its humanitarian functions with the provision of services to refugees (UN, 1984). Improvements were also observed in facilitating economic activity between the two communities and monitoring agricultural activity (UN, 1984). Thus, showing improvement, especially 10 years after the invasion.

In 1994, cooperation varied, whilst to an extent, the UNFICYP managed to fulfil some of its humanitarian functions, they were often limited due to restrictions by the authorities, for example with visiting family and meetings, as well as the continuation of finding missing persons (UN, 1994). Moreover, there was more inter-communal cooperation in the economic sector such as working with the United Nations Development Programme (UN, 1994), but it is overall scarcely mentioned in the report.

Finally, as per the 2004 report, the only notable progress and thus achievements is in the humanitarian functions, such as welfare visits and public facilities and missing persons, since the Republic of Cyprus had gained entry into the European Union (UN, 2004).

Discussion

The trend indicates that over the years, the UNFICYP recorded an overall improvement in most sectors of their mandate, including observance of the ceasefire, humanitarian functions, and restoration of normal conditions (Security Council, resolution 186, 1964). Whilst the above section outlined the trends over the last 40 years, the subsequent section will decipher whether the UNFICYP was effective, based on its exogenous characteristics, namely: the mandate, the strategy, and capabilities of the mission (Sambanis 1999).

Lindley (2001) argued the following regarding the mandate of the UNFICYP: “The UNFICYP's vague mandate helped it change with the circumstances in 1974 and has allowed it to take on a range of political and humanitarian responsibilities” (p. 77). The above findings acquiesce yet find that the humanitarian responsibilities were conducted more efficiently than the political responsibilities, primarily due to a lack of cooperation between the parties (Soydemir, 2018). Evidently, over time the UNFICYP was more capable of executing its mandate as the violence subsided, fostering what was labelled by Cuhadar & Kotelis (2010) as “an interminable stalemate” (p. 184).

In terms of “preventing a recurrence of fighting” & “maintaining the observance of the ceasefire” (Security Council, resolution 186, 1964), the perceived trend aligns with scholars such as Ruggeri et al. (2016) and Smidt (2020) that peacekeeping is effective in reducing local violence. Although, it must be noted that according to the UN Review of the UN Peacekeeping

Forces, maintaining the ceasefire was simple due to the local violence virtually subsiding. It also mentions that the causes of the incidents were due to “military confrontations” and the parties’ fortifying their defences, an issue in which the UNFICYP had little success in changing (UN, 1996, p. 158). Hence, the evidence suggests that bi-communal violence is not the diagnosis of the tensions, rather a fatal side effect.

Additionally, with regard to the restoration of conditions to normality, the UNFICYP had increasingly limited capabilities due to the prevalence of the interests of the belligerents as was noted throughout the reports. This aligns with the argumentation of Bolkubasi (1998) stating that one of the root causes of the conflict was the “perceptions of interests” of each community and that the United Nations’ presence on the island can do very little to alter this, demonstrating why despite the on-going presence of the UN, there is a “deadlock” in finding a settlement between the communities, and thus in improving bi-communal relations (Bolkubasi, 1998, p. 412). Furthermore, the UN Review of the UNFICYP stated that although the UNFICYP attempted to negotiate the removal of “economic and security restrictions”, this was limited due to the prevalence of the “basic political problem” (UN, 1996, p. 158). Hence, reiterating the previously made point that bi-communal relations were often at the fate of the external political situation, and thus the UNFICYP has a limited impact.

However, according to a report from the International NGO Training and Research Center, “Under these circumstances, some Cypriot civil society organisations (CSOs) managed to maintain links to the other sides and work towards reconciliation” (Lönnqvist, 2008, p. 1). Hereby illustrating how the UN peacekeepers were not more effective than local organizations in promoting normal conditions between the communities.

The strategy of the UN Peacekeeping mission was established in the ‘guiding principles’ devised by the Secretary-General (United Nations, 1996). As a whole, the priority in the deployment of the force was to lessen the threat to international peace and security (United Nations, 1996). The urgency could partially be explained by the fact that this issue concerned four UN Member States in the early 1960s: Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the United Kingdom due to Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee (Ker-Lindsay, 2008). This could also partially be explained by the fact that Cyprus is located within an arguably politically unstable region in the Middle East, and thus the solution to the security of the island must not be conceptualized only locally and “within the framework of traditional Greek-Turkish rivalry” (Ker-Lindsay, 2008, p. 17). This prioritization of international peace and security is established also as the driving factor of the talks for a peacekeeping mission was the increase in fighting in the 1960s and to prevent Turkey’s threats of intervention from materializing (UN, 1996).

Based on the observed findings, the only major incident that had implications for international peace and security was the Turkish invasion of 1974 and occupation of approximately 37% of the island (Souter, 1984). Although it can be argued that since this was after the deployment of the peacekeepers, it conveys the prevalence of the interests of the belligerents and the political situation (Bolkubasi, 1998; Bratt, 1997) since this was the only major incident in 40 years of the presence of the UNFICYP, it is seen as generally successful in sustaining international peace and security.

According to the guiding principles of the Secretary-General, the capabilities of the force were limited to actions outlined in the Security Council 1964 resolution and thus the mandate of the mission (UN, 1964). However, it is also worth noting that when it is crucial for the mission, the Force does reach out beyond the mission. For example, in functions related to relations

between the Governments of Cyprus and Turkey concerning Turkish national contingents (UN, 1964). Yet, this remains limited as the mandate purely extends to maintaining the ceasefire and restoration of conditions of normality (U.N. Security Council, 1964). Thus, as argued by many scholars who have studied the effectiveness of the UNFICYP, they have succeeded in this aspect, but have failed to facilitate peace or prevent tensions from arising (Bolkubasi, 1998; James, 1984; Sambanis 1999, Soydemir, 2018). Hence, it can be argued that in the aspects of the mission related to bi-communal relations, such as inter-communal violence and promoting cooperation and conditions of normality, the UNFICYP has been successful (Smidt, 2020), but only partially as they have not fully facilitated peace between the communities as political crises still cause tensions (Soydemir, 2018).

A notable local initiative alongside the work of the UNFICYP is the bi-communal movement as discussed by Peter Loizos (2006). He maintains that the usefulness of local bi-communal initiatives, such as inter-communal academic works and cinematography, has increased since 1992, and although their effectiveness may not necessarily involve a direct solution to the Cyprus problem, voices from both communities are being heard by decision-makers and thus fighting for an equal solution as well as increasing bi-communal connection and cooperation (Loizos, 2006). This is relevant to our research as it conveys that whilst the UNFICYP has been useful in facilitating this kind of cooperation, it is not to say for certain that it is crucial for this improvement in bi-communal relations.

In conclusion, exogenous factors are partially effective as the Force is capable to an extent of executing its mandate and thus contributing to the current status of negative peace between the two communities. Despite this, local initiatives and the review of the Force convey an image of limited capabilities due to prevailing political tensions and the underlying societal as well as

institutional divide. Thus, the exogenous factors, i.e. Stage 1 peacekeeping have a partial, but present impact on bi-communal relations.

Chapter 2: Endogenous Factors

Status Quo

In 1964, the military status quo was not upheld as both sides increased their military capacities consistently (UN, 1964) and any negotiations with the goal of reducing military capacities resulted in refusal by both sides. However, the political status quo remained unchanged as due to high tensions, there was little discussion of inter-communal talks or overall change in the political situation (UN, 1964).

In 1974, it was observed that “the intercommunal military situation has remained quiet during the period under review” (UN, 1974, p. 11) yet “both sides are still reluctant to reduce their military precautions on the grounds that their security might be prejudiced” (UN, 1974, p. 11). Thus, whilst an improvement is noticed, it is not entirely optimistic. The political status quo was also slightly improved due to the resuming of intercommunal talks that had previously been suspended (UN, 1974).

The report of 1984 states that “both sides continued to express concern over the alleged build-up of forces in the opposite part of the island” (UN, 1984, p. 7). In terms of the political status quo, there were “major political decisions” taken (UN, 1984, p. 14) with increasing numbers of meetings and inter-communal talks (UN, 1984).

In 1994, overall, “both sides generally respected the cease-fire and the military status quo” (UN, 1994, p. 4). However, “the excessive level of armaments and forces in Cyprus and the rate at which they are being strengthened is a cause of serious concern” (UN, 1994, p. 7), contradicting the previous statement. On the other hand, there was no mention of the political status quo in the 1994 report as there was no change nor discussion of intercommunal talks.

Lastly, in 2004, concerning the political status quo, there was a rejected plan for a settlement known as the Annan Plan, which resulted in regulation by the Council of the European Union

thus causing a shift in the political status quo (UN, 2004). Moreover, in terms of the military status quo, “the military situation along the ceasefire lines remained generally calm and stable” (UN, 2004, p. 1).

Threat

The interpretation of the mandate by the peacekeepers is overall consistent throughout the reports, in that the guiding principles from 1964 are always the basis of the function of the UNFICYP (UN, 1964; UN, 1974; UN, 1984; UN, 1994; UN, 2004). However, in the 1964 report, the following discontent was made “UNFICYP was given a very heavy responsibility without any precise definition of its general mandate to guide it so that it might know just what it is entitled to do and how far it may go...This inadequacy and lack of clarity in the mandate of the Force, has been a handicap to its operation” (UN, 1964, p. 61). The mandate was later further expanded in 1984 (UN, 1984), with the following justification: “In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions, relating in particular to the maintenance of the ceasefire” (UN, 1984, p. 5).

In addition, the peacekeepers’ perception of the threat decreases throughout the reports. In 1964, the Force states “the [UNFICYP] is in the most delicate position that any United Nations mission has ever experienced, for it is not only in the midst of a bitter civil war but it is dangerously interposed between the two sides of that war” (UN, 1964, p. 63). Throughout the remaining analysed reports, it is clear that the perception of the imminent threat in Cyprus is maintained, specifically in 1974, with “the increase in combat effectiveness of armed forces of both sides in the island, which has inevitably taken place with the passage of time, is a disturbing development..” (UN, 1974, p. 23). Latterly, it is stated that “the continuing quiet

should not obscure the fact that there is only a cease-fire in Cyprus, not peace” (UN, 1994, p. 7). Conveying that although the physical threat is not as prevalent as in previous years, the UNFICYP remains vigilant to the hostile conditions between the two sides.

This also links to the expectations of feasible outcomes for the conflict. The report of 1964 states that certain military attacks “were most unfortunate and have made the solution of the Cyprus problem far more difficult” (UN, 1964, p. 64). The overall pessimistic outlook is further sustained as the report states “the United Nations Force in Cyprus is in an unhappy position. A civil war is the worst possible situation under which a United Nations peace-keeping force can find itself” (UN, 1964, p. 66). In 1974, the resumption of peace talks allowed for a more optimistic outlook than in 1964, for instance, “the relations between the two communities in Cyprus are still marred by mutual fear and distrust, and a successful outcome of the talks can only be achieved if a high degree of statesmanship is exercised by all concerned” (UN, 1974, p. 23). In both reports, the UNFICYP was deemed “indispensable” to peace on the island (UN, 1964; UN, 1974). The notion of further development in the finding of a settlement continued in 1984 and 1994, although it is mentioned that the potential reason for a delay in such is “sudden tensions, generated by events outside the island as well as within” (UN, 1994, p. 7). A similar statement is also maintained in the 2004 report, especially with the new political developments of the Republic of Cyprus joining the European Union (UN, 2004).

Accessibility

In the matter of the freedom of movement for the UNFICYP, the 1964 report displayed the major limitations and how the freedom of movement interlinks with the category of the subsequent consent of the parties involved. For example, “in particular during July and early August, there were frequent cases of serious restriction of the movement of UNFICYP by the Cypriot police and the Cypriot National Guard” (UN, 1964, p. 6). However, this improves

throughout the following reports as in 1974, although there were “three incidents in which UNFICYP has been denied freedom of movement” (UN, 1974, p. 9), the incidents were settled. This is concurrent with the following reports, in 1984 the report states “during the last six months, UNFICYP continued to carry out its functions in Cyprus effectively, with the cooperation of both sides” (UN, 1984, p. 7). In the latter 20 years, there is negligible data regarding the freedom of movement of the UNFICYP, thus it can be assumed that there are few notable incidents. Lastly, according to the reports, discontent with the presence of the UNFICYP, and thus the subsequent consent of the parties, is manifested in incidents such as refusal of access to sensitive areas for investigation or patrolling. For example, “although UNFICYP is not denied access when investigating specific complaints, it considers that in order to discharge its responsibilities fully it should be in a position to patrol those areas freely” (UN, 1974, p. 9).

Concerning the access to resources, it should be noted that there is little data within the reports of the UNFICYP’s access to resources, with the exception of financing. In 1964, the lack of funding is of grave concern throughout the report. “financial support of the Force [...] has been inadequate and has been received in such manner, both as regards pledges and payment of the pledges, as to make planning, efficiency, and economical running of the Force almost impossible” (UN, 1964, p. 67). In 1974, there is less concern regarding financing due to “the reduction of UNFICYP” (UN, 1974, p. 24), however, as cited in the report, a deficit remains. In 1984, the following is stated: “I am profoundly concerned about the worsening financial situation confronting UNFICYP” (UN, 1984, p. 15), displaying depleting financial resources and ability to access resources. In the last reports of 1994 and 2004, this financial situation is unmentioned, and the mission is further extended.

Discussion

The conflict in Cyprus is characterized as a distributive conflict, consisting of collaboration problems which require third-party involvement in order for peace to be enforced (Sambanis, 1999; Stein, 1994). As a result of these collaboration problems, strong peacekeeping is optimal to promote the resolution of such problems (Morrow, 1994; Sambanis, 1999). According to Sambanis (1999), the difference between strong and weak peacekeeping, is comprised of endogenous factors, which are then constrained by exogenous factors; indicating that the endogenous, internal factors of the Force are prevented from flourishing by the exogenous, external factors. Thus, the analysis of these “instrumental variables” (Sambanis, 1999, p. 81) leans toward determining, whether the UNFICYP engages in weak or strong peacekeeping, in order to conclude whether the UNFICYP is optimally engaging in activities which enhance bi-communal relations.

The following analysis of this chapter follows the main elements of the UNFICYP mandate, namely: preventing a recurrence of fighting, restoration to conditions of normality & maintenance of law and order, with the aim of categorizing the UNFICYP as strong or weak peacekeeping.

An overarching fault of the UNFICYP mandate, as per the findings of the data, is its vagueness, lack of direction and clear scope definition. Despite previous scholars praising its vagueness as an asset, such as Lindley (2001), for allowing a vast range of capabilities, the above findings convey a contradicting sense of restriction, due to the mandate lacking direction and strict instruction for such a complex conflict. For instance, as seen above, “this inadequacy and lack of clarity in the mandate of the Force, has been a handicap to its operation” (UN, 1964, p. 61). As this resulted in poor feedback from the reports, this rigidness of functionality can be

observed as evidence of weak peacekeeping, thus justifying the later expansion of the mandate (Aksu, 2003; Sambanis, 1999).

A crucial element of the UNFICYP mandate included ‘to prevent a recurrence of fighting’ (Security Council, resolution 186, 1964). The primary relevant endogenous factor here is the military status quo, which as observed above was gradually restored over the 40 years. A secondary reflection is how the condition of the military status quo interlinks with that of the political status quo, as reflected in the reports. For instance, the high political tensions in 1964 coincided with breaches of the military status quo, as also repeated in 1974, both instances in which the UNFICYP’s negotiations were not consistently successful. Furthermore, the data reflects that, the build-up of the military resulted in several instances of fighting, such as, but not limited to, that in Tylliria and Kyrenia (UN, 1964), also considering the invasion of Turkish forces in 1974. This further illustrates that despite the UNFICYP having the capabilities to exercise more power in preventing the increase in military capacity, (Sambanis, 1999; Aksu, 2003) it exercised only weak power through negotiations, which evidently failed. Therefore, in the context of bi-communal relations, the UNFICYP has a minimal impact as violence persists despite the deployment of troops to incidents.

The secondary element of the mandate, ‘restoration to conditions of normality’ (Security Council, resolution 186, 1964) can be analysed endogenously utilizing the threat perception and expectations of outcomes for the UNFICYP. As aforementioned, the consensus throughout the reports remains that peace on the island is not absolute, but rather the conflict remains dormant. This is established within the literature as Bolkubasi (1998), Cuhadar & Kotelis (2010), & Souter (1984), collectively also reaffirm the dormant nature of the Cyprus conflict.

Moreover, the Force is predominantly pessimistic about potential outcomes of the conflict, and often attribute the need for peace in the international dimension for peace in the local dimension

(UN, 1994). This falls in line with argumentation made in the previous chapter vis-à-vis external factors and the interests of the parties involved taking precedence over the work of the UNFICYP in improving bi-communal relations (Bolkubasi, 1998; Bratt 1997).

The UNFICYP engages in de-escalation negotiations throughout the mission, specifically with respect to the aerial attacks in 1964 and the resumption of settlement talks, thus exercising soft rather than hard power, yet this still remains overall unsuccessful as there is yet to be a bilaterally agreed peace settlement (Bolkubasi, 1998; Cuhadar & Kotelis, 2010) demonstrated in 2004 with the failure of the UN-sponsored Annan Plan (UN, 2004), 40 years after the UNFICYP first deployed to the island. Hence, these failures are arguably examples of weak peacekeeping, demonstrating a minimal impact on bi-communal relations.

The final key aspect was the ‘maintenance of law and order’ (Security Council, resolution 186, 1964), which will be analysed via the UNFICYP’s freedom of movement and access to resources, primarily funding. The freedom of movement of the UNFICYP increased over the years, although, it remained that there were areas that the UNFICYP was unable to patrol despite incidents having occurred. However, the parties became more cooperative since the beginning of the mission, of their own volition, and thus the ability of the UNFICYP to maintain law and order between the communities increased.

Yet, one major limitation which is consistent through the reports is a lack of funding, which Sambanis (1999) labelled as a “macro-level constraint” (1999, p. 87). The UNFICYP stated that the Force was under-funded to carry out the functions to the best of its ability, this in combination with the consistent reduction of the Force seen throughout the reports, displays a lack of resources and manpower to fully conduct its duties (Sambanis, 1999). Thus, inviting the question of to what extent does the UNFICYP have the capacity to undertake its mandate and contribute to bi-communal relations? In the data, despite major improvement from 1964

until 2004, progress within these reports is slow, especially during the peak period of tensions, from 1964 until 1994 (Souter, 1984). Thus conveying an image of weak peacekeeping to the two opposing communities, as well as to the contributing countries.

The UNFICYP presents as a typical example of utilizing soft power, as conceptualized by Nye (2004) through negotiations despite these often failing due to tensions in the political status quo as well as in the military status quo. Moreover, this is further accentuated by resource limitations and restrictions in movement. Thus, the endogenous, “instrumental variables” (Sambanis, 1999, p. 81) contribute to overall weak peacekeeping, so with respect to improving bi-communal relations, can call the efficacy of these factors into question as with exogenous factors. Hence, the impact of the endogenous factors of the UNFICYP, and of Stage Two peacekeeping on the Cypriot bi-communal relations is limited.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the final answer to the research question is that the impact of the UNFICYP is one of deterring violence through negotiations and assisting in the restoration of conditions of normality. Although, this is through the new status quo of division and hostility for the communities, rather than creating a condition for union and positive peace.

Exogenous variables, such as strategy, capabilities and mandate are relevant in measuring the impact of the UNFICYP on bi-communal relations as the findings have demonstrated, noting several improvements over time. Yet, reports from non-governmental organizations regarding local initiatives demonstrate that the presence of the UNFICYP has assisted in improving bi-communal relations but has by no means been the main driver of this improvement.

Endogenous variables have demonstrated that the UNFICYP adopts a weak peacekeeping approach due to the use of soft power over hard power, and as a result of this, the UNFICYP is limited both in what it can do and how it can do it with regard to bi-communal relations. The UNFICYP has a deterring impact on bi-communal hostilities and provides a medium for betterment of relations to take place yet is not overall the key actor in furthering peace between the two communities in Cyprus, as other factors such as the external political situation, between Greece and Turkey, often takes precedence.

Thus, these conclusions contradict previous arguments by Sambanis (1999) stating how endogenous factors are constrained by exogenous factors. Rather, the trends shows the inverse as the lack of ability to interpret the mandate, lack of resources and other key factors, result in constraints in strategy, capabilities, and other exogenous variables.

Following the conclusions of this research, the United Nations is encouraged to revisit and restructure the mandate of the UNFICYP, and as per the current dormant status of the conflict, reconsider whether the goal of the mission should remain peacekeeping, or whether the focus should shift to peacebuilding between the two divided communities. In the context of fragile, ‘stalemate’ conflicts, the United Nations Peacekeeping force is invited to create more flexible guiding principles allowing the Force to assist in improving the political status quo to foster more effective results of peacekeeping.

From an academic standpoint, this research builds upon the concept of Stage One exogenous peacekeeping and the Stage Two endogenous peacekeeping to scholarship on the UNFICYP and scrutinizes the internal factors of the UNFICYP. From this research, future scholarship can apply this framework to other complex conflicts, in which the relationship between the belligerent parties could fall under a similar conceptualization to that of bi-communal relations. Scholars may also wish to investigate the necessity of the presence of the UNFICYP on the island post-2004.

Appendix 1: Coding Framework – Exogenous Factors

Category	Subcategory	Code	Description/Indicators
Violence	Maintenance of ceasefire	V-MC+ / V-MC-	Upholding of the ceasefire by both sides on the border/buffer zone, or purposeful shooting by militaries.
	Civilian security	V-CS+ / V-CS-	Uphold of civilian security. For example, prevention of violence during demonstrations.
Recovery	Social Recovery	R-SR+ / R-SR-	Maintenance of law and order; Return of conditions back to pre-invasion “normality”, e.g. inter-communal mixing; preservation of human rights and prevention of violations of human rights, Reformation of the judicial sector; freedom of movement
	Economic Recovery	R-ER+ / R-ER-	Administering/Restoration of public services; reopening of schools and industries; international trade agreements; payment of debts and/or benefits internally
Cooperation	Humanitarian Cooperation	C-HC+ / C-HC-	Aid to refugees such as providing food and water; locating or searching for missing persons; welfare to affected individuals
	Economic cooperation	C-EC+ / C-EC-	Trade relations and economic activity between sides of the buffer zone; facilitating agricultural activities; creation of bi-communal trade agreements; removal of economic restrictions

Appendix 2: Coding Framework – Endogenous Factors

Category	Subcategory	Code	Description/Indicators
Status Quo	Military Status Quo	MSQ+/-	The preservation of military status quo (i.e. not increasing or decreasing troops, weapons etc.) to preserve transparency and prevent provocations.
	Political Status Quo	PSQ +/-	The preservation of the political status quo (i.e. creating alliances, joining international organizations, signing peace agreements or inter-communal talks)
Threat	Perceptions of threat	PT	The perception of the peacekeepers of the situation, their personal safety, and the conditions on the grounds of the conflict.
	Expectations of feasible outcomes for conflict	FO	The ideas and expectations of the peacekeepers on negotiation settlements and the potential for the possible removal of the UNFICYP from the island.
	Interpretation of mandate	IM	The way in which the peacekeepers interpret their mandate and the functions allowed.
Accessibility	Freedom of movement	MF+/-	The ability of the UNFICYP to freely move between regions and areas where there is conflict
	Access to resources	RA+/-	Access to resources required to fulfil their mandate, such as contacts, documentation, meetings, funding, etc.
	Parties' consent	PC+/-	The consent of the parties to the presence of the UNFICYP and following their orders and regulations

Reference List

- Aksu, E. (2003). The UN in the Cyprus conflict: UNFICYP. In *The United Nations, Intra-state Peacekeeping and Normative Change* (pp. 130–155). Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Alexandrou, C. (2020). Ιστορία της Κύπρου/ Τόμος Β' - Μέλαθρον Οικουμενικού Ελληνισμού. *Μέλαθρον Οικουμενικού Ελληνισμού*.
- Barak, O. (2002). Intra-communal and inter-communal dimensions of conflict and peace in Lebanon. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34(4), 619–644.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020743802004026>
- Benson, M., & Kathman, J. D. (2014). United Nations bias and force commitments in civil conflicts. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(2), 350–363.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381613001497>
- Böyükbaşı, S. (1998). The Cyprus dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful non-settlement between 1954 and 1996. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30(3), 411–434. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800066241>
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). *An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping : report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992*. New York: United Nations.
- Bratt, D. (1997). Explaining peacekeeping performance: The UN in internal conflicts. *International Peacekeeping*, 4(3), 45–70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319708413678>
- Bryman, A. (2004). *Social research methods* (2nd ed.). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

- Cudahar, E., & Kotelis, A. (2010). Cyprus: A divided civil society in stalemate. In *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: a Critical Assessment* (pp. 181–206). Boulder, Colorado, United States: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Di Salvatore, J., & Ruggeri, A. (2017). Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.586>
- Fortna, V. P., & Howard, L. M. (2008). Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11(1), 283–301.
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.041205.103022>
- Galtung, J. (1976). Three approaches to peace: Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. In J. Galtung (Ed.), *Peace, war and defence: Essays in peace research, Volume 2* (pp. 282–304). Copenhagen: Christian Ejlens.
- George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge, United States: MIT Press.
- Gustafsson, J., & Gustafsson, J. (2017). *Single case studies vs. multiple case studies: A comparative study*. Retrieved from <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1064378/FULLTEXT01.pdf>
- Hazen, J. M. (2007). Can peacekeepers be peacebuilders? *International Peacekeeping*, 14(3), 323–338. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310701422901>
- Hughes-Wilson, J. (2011). The forgotten war. *The RUSI Journal*, 156(5), 84–93.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2011.626281>
- James, A. (1989). The UN force in Cyprus. *International Affairs*, 65(3), 481–500.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2621724>
- Ker-Lindsay, J. (2008). The security dimensions of a Cyprus solution. *Hellenic Observatory*. Retrieved from <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk>

- Ker-Lindsay, J. (2011). *The Cyprus Problem*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/wentk/9780199757169.001.0001>
- Kliot, N., & Mansfield, Y. (1994) Resettling displaced people in north and South Cyprus: A comparison. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 7(4), 328-359.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/7.4.328>
- Kohlbacher, F. (2006). The use of qualitative content analysis in case study Research. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 7(1). <https://doi.org/10.17169/fqs-7.1.75>
- Krupnick, C. (1996). Between neorealism and liberal institutionalism: The CFSP and European security cooperation. *Journal of European Integration*, 19(2-3), 143–163.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07036339608429035>
- Lemay-Hébert, N. (2011). The bifurcation of the two worlds: Assessing the gap between internationals and locals in state-building processes. *Third World Quarterly*, 32(10), 1823–1841. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.610578>
- Lindley, D. (2001). Assessing the role of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus. *The Work of the UN in Cyprus*, 77–100. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230287396_3
- Loizos, P. (2006). Bicommunal initiatives and their contribution to improved relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. *South European Society and Politics*, 11(1), 179–194. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13608740500470430>
- Lönnqvist, L. (2008). *Civil society in reconciliation: beyond the “Cyprus problem.”*
 Retrieved from <https://www.intrac.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Briefing-Paper-21-Cyprus-civil-society-in-reconciliation.pdf>
- Mitrany, D. (1994). A working peace system. *The European Union*, 77–97.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23984-9_12
- Morrow, J. D. (1994). *Game theory for political scientists*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Oktaý, D. (2007). An analysis and review of the divided city of Nicosia, Cyprus, and new perspectives. *Geography*, 92(3), 231–247.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00167487.2007.12094203>
- Papagianni, K. (2010). Mediation, political engagement, and peacebuilding. *Global Governance*, 16(2), 243–263. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800805>
- Paris, R. (1997). Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism. *International Security*, 22(2), 54–89. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539367>
- Psaltis, C., Beyodola, T., Filippou, G., & Vrachimis, N. (2014). Contested symbols as social representations: The case of Cyprus. In S. L. Moeschberger & R. A. Phillips DeZalia (Eds.), *Symbols that Bind, Symbols that Divide: The Semiotics of Peace and Conflict* (pp. 61–89). New York: Springer Cham.
- Pugh, M. (2004). Peacekeeping and critical theory. *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), 39–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1353331042000228445>
- Ruggeri, A., Dorussen, H., & Gizelis, T.-I. (2016). Winning the peace locally: UN peacekeeping and local conflict. *International Organization*, 71(1), 163–185.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818316000333>
- Sambanis, N. (1999). The United Nations operation in Cyprus: A new look at the peacekeeping-peacemaking relationship. *International Peacekeeping*, 6(1), 79–108.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319908413758>
- Sandelowski, M. (1999). Time and qualitative research. *Research in Nursing & Health*, 22(1), 79-87.
- United Nations Security Council. (1989, June 9) *Resolution 634* (1989). Retrieved from: unscr.com/en/res/634
- Siggelkow, N. (2007). Persuasion with case studies. *The Academy of Management Journal*, 50(1), 20-24.

- Smidt, H. M. (2019). United Nations peacekeeping locally: Enabling conflict resolution, reducing communal violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 64(2-3).
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719859631>
- Soss, J. (2014). Talking our way to meaningful explanations A practice-centered view of interviewing for interpretive research. In *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*. Oxfordshire: Routledge. Retrieved from
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315703275>
- Souter, D. (1984). An island apart: A review of the Cyprus problem. *Third World Quarterly*, 6(3), 657–674. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598408419791>
- Soydemir, A. (2018). The role and effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Cyprus island. *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, 14(27), 147–184.
<https://doi.org/10.17752/guvenlikstrj.432160>
- Stake, R. E. (2000). Case studies. In Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp.435-453). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Stegenga, J. A. (1970). UN peace-keeping: The Cyprus venture. *Journal of Peace Research*, 7(1), 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234337000700101>
- Stein, A. A. (1994). *Why nations cooperate : Circumstance and choice in international relations*. Ithaca, New York, United States: Cornell University Press.
- UNFICYP Mandate. (2015, December 17). Retrieved from:
<https://unficyp.unmissions.org/unficyp-mandate>
- United Nations. (1964). *Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*. Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/>
- United Nations. (1974). *Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*. Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/>

- United Nations. (1984). *Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*. Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/>
- United Nations. (1994). *Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*. Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/>
- United Nations. (1996). United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). In *The Blue Helmets - A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (pp. 147-160)*. New York: United Nations Publications. Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/228891?ln=en>
- United Nations. (2004). *Report on the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*. Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/>
- United Nations Security Council. (1964). *Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*. Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/538513?ln=en>
- United Nations Security Council. (1964). *Security Council resolution 186 [on establishment of the UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus]*. Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112185?ln=en>
- United Nations Security Council. (1990) *Security Council resolution 634 [The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus]* Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/87038?ln=en>
- Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research : design and methods*. Los Angeles, California, United States: Sage Publications.