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China's rise is what Great Powers "make of it": The US, France, and the perpetual constitution of unique identities through the rise of China

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
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Universiteit Leiden

**China's rise is what Great Powers "make of it": The US, France,
and the perpetual constitution of unique identities
through the rise of China**

Leiden University

BSc Political Science: International Relations and Organisations

BAP: The Return of Great Powers in Politics

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Abstract:

Regarding the relationships of France and the US with China, Bruno Le Maire, the French minister of the economy and finance, stated in 2021 that contrary to Washington's confrontational approach, Paris seeks to engage Beijing. This paper argues that this difference between France and the US stems from their unique identities. Using a realist constructivist approach, the paper investigates the foreign policy of both France and the US toward China. The theoretical expectations of the paper are that France's foreign policy toward China is guided by *Grandeur*, whereas the US' foreign policy is guided by "Exceptionalism". The paper then analyses a total of 30 foreign policy documents bounded between the years 2017 and 2020, using a Most Similar System Design and a Qualitative Content Analysis. The results of the analysis are in line with the theoretical expectations. These results can be of interest to policy makers in both France and the US, as well as to students and scholars interested in great power politics and realist constructivism.

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1 Introduction

Regarding the relationships of France and the US with China, Bruno Le Maire, the French minister of the economy and finance, stated in 2021 that contrary to Washington's confrontational approach, Paris seeks to engage Beijing (Alderman & Cohen, 2021). The difference – this paper argues – stems from each state's constitution of a unique understanding of itself through the new "Other" that China represents. In other words, the difference is due to the unique identities that inform the foreign policy of both France and the US. Accordingly, this paper's research question is: *How do the unique identities of France and the US affect their foreign policies towards a rising China?* To investigate this question, the paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2. reviews the literature on the main state objectives that shape foreign policy. Section 3. conceptualizes "great power" and "foreign policy" while section 4. presents the theories and assumptions used to investigate the claim. Section 5. lays down the research design and section 6. presents and discusses the result of the analysis. In the final section, the paper presents its conclusion and its suggestions for future research.

2 Literature Review

In this section, the paper reviews the literature on the main objectives of great powers to shed light on what may explain the different behavior of France and the US. Starting from the realist view that great powers are motivated by the need for survival and behave, therefore, similarly under anarchy, the paper then addresses how the advent of nuclear weapons dramatically increased the odds of survival and enabled great powers to increasingly focus on recognition. Importantly, this is not to say that survival and recognition are dichotomous. Rather, as the threat to survival is reduced through increased material capabilities, great powers increasingly focus on recognition. Power, therefore, is what enabled the studied states to perpetuate the constitution of their unique identities through the new "Other" that China represents. As for the seeming contradiction that may stem from the paper's use of both realism and constructivism, it is addressed in section 4.2.

2.1 Great Powers' objective: survival

The survival of the state is viewed by realism as the ultimate objective of great powers. Under anarchy – that is, the absence of a higher authority that states can rely on for their security (Sørensen, 2009) – great powers exist in a self-help system. Indeed, the inability of states to assess both the current and future intentions of their counterparts (Rosato, 2014), and the

capacity of great powers to inflict harm to others through their offensive capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2001), forces states to secure their survival by increasing their relative power. Furthermore, this objective trumps all others because without survival, a state cannot exist and, subsequently, cannot achieve other objectives such as cooperation or recognition (Mearsheimer, 2001). Therefore, the main objective of great powers is survival.

This objective engenders two developments. First, because all great powers live under anarchy, they all act similarly (Mearsheimer, 2001). Great powers are constrained by the structure of the international system to continuously increase their relative power to survive (Waltz, 1979). A state that decides otherwise may eventually be conquered. Consequently, anarchy constrains great powers to act in a similar manner. Second, great powers have a rational incentive to initiate wars in the aim of safeguarding their survival when they feel threatened (Mearsheimer, 2001). Gilpin (1981), for instance, argues that the established power is incentivized to start a preemptive war against the rising power before it no longer possesses the means to win such a war. Therefore, fear can incentivize great powers to initiate a conflict in the sake of guaranteeing their survival (Gilpin, 1988).

However, these arguments do not account for how increasing the state's power for the sake of surviving eventually affects the levels of fear negatively. In fact, factors such as a defensive military strategy and the possession of nuclear weapons render the fear that stems from the desire to survive negligible.

2.2 When survival no longer means war

Tang (2010) for instance argues that seeking security through war is no longer a rational strategy for great powers. The author reasons that due to states conquering their peers for the sake of survival, two developments occurred. Firstly, the number of states in the international system decreased. States that were incapable of defending themselves from larger neighbors died. Secondly, as a state succeeds in conquering its neighbor, it increases its strategic depth, its human resources, and its access to wealth. In sum, as the number of states dwindled and their defensive capabilities increased, decreasing the security of other states to secure one's own became increasingly difficult. In the case of a war where the belligerents are great powers, no side can expect to decrease the other's security without greatly risking its own survival.

Likewise, Waltz (1990, p. 739) reasons that due to nuclear weapons, war as a strategy to safeguard one's own survival becomes "the worst possible one". The Mutually Assured

Destruction (MAD) that the possession of nuclear weapons provides removes any incentive a great power may have to initiate a military conflict with a counterpart. As Tunander (1989) argues, the credible possibility that a nuclear war between great powers may happen if escalation takes place, as well as the impossibility to survive such a war due to its destructiveness, significantly reduces the incentive for using war as a solution to contentions with nuclear peers. Moreover, great powers have the capacity and the resources to keep modernizing their arsenal to safeguard MAD's stability (Reny, 2020). Consequently, the second-strike capabilities of great powers significantly increase their security without the necessity for a costly war (Waltz, 1993).

2.3 *Recognition*

With their survival significantly less threatened, great powers allocate greater importance to other objectives. Buzan (2010) asserts that in the absence of great power wars, great powers seek recognition by their peers and other members of the international system. Likewise, Wendt (2003) argues that in addition to survival, the main objective of great powers is to be recognized by others for their unique identities.

In contrast, liberal institutionalist scholars argue that the main objective of great powers is to achieve cooperation because states are incentivized by the benefits of interdependence (e.g., Keohane, 1984). However, a precondition for cooperation, even when the threat to survival is significantly low, is the possession of a reputation for reliability (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). States, therefore, require information about a counterpart's expected behavior and the unique identities that states constitute, and seek recognition for, include this information (Hopf, 1998). Indeed, predictable patterns of behavior are ensured by stable intersubjective identities (p. 174). Thus, states' unique identities ensure predictability and order. Without these identities, states would be incapable to cooperate.

Similarly, other scholars assert that the main objective of great powers includes the achievement of a certain social status (Wohlforth, 2009), glory, and prestige (Dore, 1975; Jakobsen, Ringsmose & Saxi, 2018). Yet, to achieve these objectives, states need to be recognized by other members of the international community as having achieved them. Both prestige and status, for instance, are dependent on recognition (MacDonald & Parent, 2021; Wohlforth, Carvalho, Leira & Neumann, 2018). Therefore, all these objectives rest on the recognition of the state's unique identity by other member of the international community.

When their survival is not threatened, great powers allocate greater importance to the recognition, by other states, of their unique identity.

Recognition, as an objective, refers to the attribution of a meaning to the difference between a “Self” and an “Other” (Wendt, 2003, p. 511). This “Other” through which the state constitutes its own identity is perceived as an equal in its nature (p. 511). In the case of great powers, states have a limited number of peers through which they can constitute their unique identity (Wohlforth et al., 2018). A state seeking to be recognized as a great power will seek recognition principally among other great powers (Brown & Zagefka, 2006). Crucially, even if recognized as a great power, a state will still seek to differentiate itself from its peers. Indeed, Wendt (2003) differentiates between two types of recognition. The first, known as “thin recognition”, concerns the acknowledgement of the state as a member of the community by other states but sheds no light on the particularity of the state (p. 511). The second, known as “thick recognition”, refers to the state’s desire to be recognized by its peers as unique (Wendt, 2003, pp. 511-512). Consequently, the objective of great powers is to achieve thick recognition.

This thick recognition is achieved through practice in the foreign policy realm (Hopf, 1998). Within a social structure such as the international system (Buzan, 2010), great powers produce “intersubjective meanings” (Hopf, 1998, p. 179). A great power’s practice, in foreign policy, rests on the presence of “intersubjective precedents and shared symbolic materials” for the imposition of specific interpretations on an event and render alternative interpretations improbable (p. 179). Consequently, no two great powers act similarly.

Nevertheless, this difference in the foreign policy of relatively similar great powers has yet to be theorized regarding these powers’ behavior to the rise of a third great power. Whereas case studies on the role of recognition and identity’s effects on foreign policy have been conducted (e.g., Nymalm & Plagemann, 2019), no comparative study focusing on the role of identity in the context of two great powers’ approach to the rise of a third great power, while their survival is not threatened, has yet been conducted. Therefore, this paper endeavors to address this gap by comparing the approaches to the rise of China of both France and the US. To this end, this paper seeks to investigate the following question: *How do the unique identities of France and the US affect their foreign policies towards a rising China?*

The answer to this research question can be of interest to policymakers in both France and the US. Indeed, a greater understanding of the role played by identity and recognition may be

helpful in crafting policies. For instance, accounting for how American identity shapes the perception of China as a threat, contrary to France's perception of China as a potential partner, may enable US policymakers to adopt less confrontational foreign policies in certain areas of cooperation and, eventually, achieve mutually beneficial goals. It may also enable the US and France to better understand each other's position on China, opening the door to better cooperation on the issue. In sum, the answer to the question may be of interest to policymakers.

3 Conceptualization

3.1 Great Power

Traditionally, the conceptualization of great power emphasizes the states' material capabilities (Heimann, 2015, p. 191, Nye, 2011, p. 18). For example, Mearsheimer (2001) conceptualizes great powers as states with sufficient military strength to "put up a serious fight" in a conventional conflict with the world's most powerful state. Importantly, the great power needs not come out victorious (p. 5). It only needs to be powerful enough to make the war costly. Moreover, in the context of nuclear weapons, great powers are states that possess both a nuclear deterrent and "formidable conventional forces" (p. 5). However, such a conceptualization ignores the factors that affect the military capabilities of a state (e.g., Blagden, 2021; Tang, 2010).

Indeed, Waltz (1993) argues that states do not acquire the rank of great power by solely excelling in the military realm or possessing nuclear weapons. A great power needs to enjoy political stability, a strong economy, a large population, a large territory, and be endowed with resources. Similarly, Brooks and Wohlforth (2016) identify military strength, economic and technological capabilities as the key dimensions for the conceptualization of great powers. Yet while these authors propose more dimensions, none of them determines the thresholds that a state needs to reach to be deemed a great power.

Heimann (2015) reasons that the rank of great power rests on a subjective dimension because the literature provides no threshold for a state to become a great power. States are therefore recognized, by others and their peers, to be great powers and are expected to act accordingly as their function within the international system is to uphold the international order. This entails safeguarding the balance of power, mitigating crises, and decreasing the numbers as well as the propensity of wars (p. 189) – the same objectives that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been institutionalized to deal with (Voeten, 2005, p. 530). In fact, the UNSC is

“an institutional manifestation of a central coalition of great powers” (p. 541). The five permanent members of the UNSC – that is, France, the US, China, Russia, and the UK – are recognized by all members of the UN as great powers with the legitimacy to authorize the use of force to safeguard international peace (Lemke, 2004; Voeten, 2005). Consequently, by investigating France’s and the US’ foreign policies towards China, this paper focuses exclusively on the foreign policies of great powers.

3.2 *Foreign Policy*

In its simplest form, foreign policy is conceptualized as “the state’s management of its interactions with other international actors” (Alolaimy, 2020, p. 41). Ranging from war to the maintenance of peace and cooperation, foreign policy enables states to achieve their national interests in the international system. Moreover, foreign policy remains relatively stable throughout domestic political changes because of the state’s identity that informs and constitutes the policy (Bratberg, 2011). Indeed, the state’s foreign policy is decided and understood through the “stable body of ideas” that the state holds of itself (p. 328). However, this means not that foreign policy cannot be changed. The identity of the state is a social construction and is, as a result, dependent on the understanding that the constituencies of the state have of it. Consequently, while dramatic changes in the foreign policy of states are rarely undertaken by domestic constituencies, if these decide to change the foreign policy then they have the agency to change it (p. 328).

It is also important to note that while certain authors do not draw a clear distinction between foreign policy and grand strategy (e.g., Porter, 2018), both differ in two key dimensions. While grand strategy is quintessentially long-term in its scope and solely concerned with the state’s ultimate and/or security interests, foreign policy is “temporally indeterminate” (Silove, 2020, p. 46) and can be concerned with both “high-” and “low-politics” with the former concerning national interests and the latter concerning other interests such as trade and foreign aid (Souva, 2005, pp. 152-153). Consequently, by focusing on foreign policy, this paper is neither constrained by the necessity for policies to be long-term nor by those policies being related solely to the state’s ultimate interests.

4 **Theoretical framework**

This section presents the paper’s assumption before addressing the relevant theories regarding the identities of the studied states. These are the “American Exceptionalism” theory and the

“French *Grandeur*” (Greatness of France) theory. The paper then draws two hypotheses from these theories.

4.1 Assumptions

Prior to discussing the theories that inform this research’s hypotheses, it is important to shed light on two key assumptions. The first concerns the rationality of the state. Drawing from a large set of literature (e.g., Fearon, 1995; Wendt, 2003), this paper assumes that states base their decisions on cost-benefits calculations. This assumption is crucial for the mutually assured destruction that dramatically reduces the threat to the survival of great powers (Tow, 2014), and enables them to focus more on recognition. The second assumption is that states are unitary actors (Mearsheimer, 2001; Wendt, 2003). Therefore, the paper focuses not on the domestic constituencies of states as the constant nature of the ideas that states hold of themselves (Bratberg, 2011), and that shapes states’ foreign policies, indicates that domestic constituencies share a common understanding of how their state ought to act internationally. Consequently, this paper assumes that states are rational and unitary actors.

4.2 Theories

This paper is theoretically grounded in both Realism and Constructivism. Multiple studies consider these two theories to be incompatible (e.g., Kratochwil, 1993; Sørensen, 2009). However, this paper follows the theoretical approach of Barkin (2003) which he defines as “Realist Constructivism”. This theoretical approach “combines realist power politics with an emphasis on ideas and identities” (MacKay & Levin, 2018, p. 75). It gives power a central role in “shaping international politics” (p.88) while it accounts for the role that “ideas and identities” play in shaping great power politics. In other words, “power and ideas are mutually constitutive” (p. 81). For instance, in the US’ case which will be further discussed below, the US’ unique identity engenders the adoption of a confrontational foreign policy toward China because it now represents the most capable power rivaling Washington. But this unique identity is itself dependent on the material power of the US that makes it the world’s established superpower since WWII (Nymalm & Plagemann, 2019). Without the material power, the identity itself would not be one that engenders such an approach to China (Wendt, 2003, p. 524). In sum, this paper assumes that material power and the unique identity of each of France and the US are intimately linked (Barkin, 2003; MacKay & Levin, 2018; Michael, 2018).

Accordingly, this paper's causal mechanism stems from the Recognition theory and stipulates that great powers, having significantly reduced the threat to their survival in the context of the rise of a new great power, seek recognition within the international system for their unique identities (Buzan, 2010; MacKay & Levin, 2018; Wendt, 2003). Great powers, therefore, constitute their unique identities through their foreign policies. As a result, France and the US' foreign policy toward China is affected by their identities and require the presentation of two key theories to investigate it.

The first is the "American Exceptionalism" theory. It propounds that the American identity rests on the self-understanding that the US has of itself as an exceptional state with a special destiny; namely, as the shining "city upon a hill" to which all of humankind looks up to (Nymalm & Plagemann, 2019; Pan, 2004; Restad, 2012; Walt, 2011). Furthermore, the US is understood as differing from the rest of the world and, contrary to other great powers, will not rise and then fall. This exceptionalist understanding of the self stems, on the one hand, from the "historical belief in America's exceptionalism" caused by both the perception held by the protestant puritans arriving to the New World as having God on their side and the US' constitution which differs from the rest of the world by prioritizing the citizen's rights (Nymalm & Plagemann, 2019; Walt, 2011). On the other hand, it also stems from the global superpower status that the US achieved after the end of WWII (Nymalm & Plagemann, 2019). Importantly, this exceptionalist understanding of the US is perpetually reproduced by politicians, the media, and citizens (Pan, 2004), resulting in American exceptionalism being "deeply [and persistently] embedded within elites and popular circles" (Nymalm & Plagemann, 2019, pp. 13, 21). Consequently, the US' identity is the "widespread and deep belief in American exceptionalism" (Restad, 2012, p. 54).

On the international scene, American exceptionalism constitutes and informs the US' foreign policy (Nymalm & Plagemann, 2019; Restad, 2012). The American exceptionalist discourse is "articulated and enacted through" the US' foreign policy (Nymalm & Plagemann, 2019, p. 14) as it constitutes itself through the "other" in the international system (Pan, 2004, p. 314). Therefore, the US' identity necessitates the existence, or construction, of a specific external evil "other" that represents a threat to the US (Nymalm & Plagemann, 2019; Pan, 2004), making the US' foreign policy inherently conflictual and unilateralist (Holsti, 2010). In sum, American exceptionalism enables the US to understand itself as exceptional and constitutes both the identity of the nation as well as its foreign policy (Nymalm & Plagemann, 2019).

The second theory of interest to this paper is the “French *Grandeur*”. It stipulates that France endeavors to restore its greatness within the international system (Gheciu, 2020). This unique perception of the self, inherited from President de Gaulle, entails the maintenance of the great power status of France (Pannier, 2017) and is characterized by a non-alignment with other powers, especially the US. Similarly to American exceptionalism’s historic roots, the roots of *Grandeur* are found in the revolutionary legacy of the French state and the perceived role of France as the “spearhead of human rights” (Bratberg, 2011, p. 335). Furthermore, this understanding of the French-self “has remained (...) an enduring reference” for France’s foreign policy (Pannier, 2017, pp. 480). French presidents, and their subsequent foreign policies, have all been driven by this understanding of France since de Gaulle. Therefore, the French identity within the international system rest on *Grandeur*.

Internationally, the foreign policy of France rests on this unique identity and is characterized by four key factors. The first concerns an endeavor to be independent from the US, the world’s superpower (Pannier, 2017). Opposition to American understandings of world politics have characterized the foreign policy of France since de Gaulle, as illustrated by France’s opposition to the US’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Bratberg, 2011). This opposition is linked to the second factor which concerns France’s strong commitment to multilateralism in world affairs. The third factor that characterizes France’s foreign policy is its support for a “European Europe” (Bratberg, 2011; Pannier, 2017). Paris understands its international position as dependent on the formation of a strong and strategically independent EU, under “French guidance” (Bratberg, 2011, p. 334), whose foreign policy is independent from, and serves as a counterweight to, Washington. The fourth and final factor is France’s understanding of its role in the world as consisting in the promotion of human rights and the democratic system that emerged from the French Enlightenment (Bratberg, 2011).

Consequently, the “American Exceptionalism” theory and the “French *Grandeur*” theory allow this paper to hypothesize that the foreign policies of France and the US vis-à-vis China are different. Therefore, the hypotheses are:

H₁: The foreign policy of the US towards China is informed by American Exceptionalism

H₂: The foreign policy of France towards China is informed by French *Grandeur*

5 Research Design

5.1 Most Similar System Design

To investigate how the unique identities of both France and the US affect their foreign policies towards China, this paper follows a Most Similar System Design (MSSD) (Gerring, 2008). In such a design, the variation occurs, *ceteris paribus*, in both the independent variable, which in this paper is the identity of each state, and the dependent variable, which in this case refers to the foreign policies adopted by these two states towards China. Accordingly, while France and the US differ not in the factors that affect the foreign policies of great powers towards a rising power, they differ in their identities and, subsequently, their foreign policies towards China with France being less confrontational and more engaging than the US (Alderson & Cohen, 2021).

Indeed, three key determinants of states' foreign policy are similar for both the US and France. The first is the state's political system (Brewer, 1973). Democracies and autocracies differ in their foreign policies towards other states. For instance, while autocracies support other autocracies (Von Soest, 2015; Way, 2015), democracies adopt a more confrontational approach to non-democracies (Levy & Razin, 2004). In the cases of France and the US, both are democracies facing China, a rising non-democratic power (International IDEA, 2019). The second key determinant is geography (Pickering, 2017). Both France and the US share no land border with China. This is not to say that the geography of the US and France are similar in the absolute. In fact, while the US exists on a continent where no other power has threatened its survival and where the US is isolated from European and Asian powers by two oceans (Blagden, 2021), France's position at the heart of Europe meant that, until the institutionalization of the European Community, Paris has always been under threat of attacks from powerful neighbors. Therefore, France's geography is very different than that of the US. But in regard to China, both France and the US are similar in that they share no border with Beijing. In the Pacific Ocean however, both have territories hosting troops, on the one hand, and interests, on the other hand, that may clash with China's (Meick, Ker & Chan, 2018; Scott, 2021). Consequently, France and the US' geographies are similar regarding China. The third key determinant is the distribution of power (Brewer, 1973). Both France and the US are nuclear powers with second-strike capabilities (Hironaka, 2017) and both are members of NATO (Holslag, 2019). As a result, China does not represent a military threat to either of them.

In sum, France and the US are relatively similar regarding their nuclear capabilities, geography, and political system.

It is also important to account for economic interdependence as a variable that could affect the foreign policies of states. Although no consensus on its effect on foreign policy exists, with realists rejecting the liberal premise that trade ties decrease the propensity for conflictual relations between trading nations (Maoz, 2009), accounting for it enables the paper to strengthen its MSSD. In fact, for both France and the US, trade volumes with China are high with the US and China being the largest trading partners of each other in 2020 (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2022) and France being one of the largest trading partners of Beijing as well (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères, 2019). Therefore, both great powers have strong trade relations with China.

In conclusion, the two great powers differ most significantly in their unique identities, and their foreign policies. Indeed, the US' identity is grounded in American Exceptionalism whereas France's identity is grounded in *Grandeur*. Therefore, the two great powers have a different understanding of themselves and, subsequently, a different foreign policy towards China.

5.2 Qualitative Content Analysis

To investigate the effect of identity on the foreign policy of France and the US, this paper employs a qualitative content analysis (QCA) (Schreier, 2012). QCA is preferred to its quantitative counterpart for it enables the paper to better grasp and understand the “latent” meaning of the conveyed message (p. 15). Therefore, this paper is not interested in how many times a word is repeated. Instead, it is interested in understanding the meaning that the word, or the recording unit, conveys. QCA, as a method for analysing the data, is also preferred to Discourse Analysis (DA) because QCA focuses specifically on what the research seeks to investigate using a coding frame. Indeed, contrary to DA's more holistic approach where the analysis focuses on both what is present and absent from the text and how the discourse constitutes a reality, QCA focuses on describing the text using a coding frame in the aim of rejecting a hypothesis set out by the research. Therefore, QCA allows for a more systematic analysis of the data (Bratberg, 2011), which in turn increases the external validity of the research.

To conduct the analysis, the paper collected 15 documents for each of the US and France, resulting in a total of 30 documents. These include transcripts of speeches by Presidents and

members of the foreign policy apparatus, and official foreign policy documents. Because the analysis focuses on the foreign policy approaches of each state to China, these 30 documents could not be randomly selected. Importantly, these documents are temporally bounded between February 2017 and December 2020. The decision to limit the analysis to only four years stems from two reasons. The first concerns the change in the balance of power of the international system. According to Mearsheimer (2019), the world became multipolar during the year 2016. Because the author does not specify the date when that change occurred in 2016, this paper decided to start the analysis in 2017. The second reason stems from the practical limitations faced by the paper. Because the paper is limited in its ability to properly analyse many documents in detail, the period of four years has been deemed the most appropriate because it is the longest manageable period for the analysis.

The analysis is conducted using themes as recording units. Contrary to the constraints imposed by the necessity to code a particular unit such as words or sentences, themes permit a better identification of the latent message while allowing the texts' analysis to be conducted in a flexible manner (Halperin & Heath, 2020). The paper's coding frame has a total of nine categories.

For the US, this paper's coding frame follows the work of Holsti (2010). The author presents five characteristics of American Exceptionalist foreign policy discourse. The first characteristic is a mission or responsibility to liberate "others" from evil. The national interest of the US is "defined in terms of subordinating self-interest to a larger (...) universal good" (p. 384). This characteristic constitutes the first category of the coding frame and is to be coded as *Messianic*. The second characteristic is the unilateral approach to world politics. The US is to be unconstrained by international norms and institutions. As a result, this characteristic constitutes the second category for the coding frame and is to be coded as *Unconstrained*. The third characteristic is the universalization of threats. The US perceives itself as existing in a hostile world and, subsequently, exaggerates threats and makes them global. This characteristic is to constitute the third category of the coding frame and is to be coded as *Universalization of threat*. The fourth characteristic is the necessity for the US to have an external enemy. This characteristic differs from the previous one in that, contrary to the universalized threat that may threaten the international liberal order or international peace, the external enemy is directly defined as a threat to the US itself. Consequently, this characteristic constitutes the fourth category of the coding frame and is to be coded as *Necessary Enemy*. The final characteristic

is innocence. The US is never the source of international instability or insecurity. Consequently, this characteristic represents the fifth category of the coding frame and is to be coded as *Innocent*.

For France, the paper draws its categories from the work of Bratberg (2011) and Pannier (2017), as shown in the theoretical framework. Five categories emerge from these studies. The first category is *Multilateralism*. France's identity rests on a strong commitment to multilateral institutions. The second category is *Non-Alignment*. France's identity rests on an independent foreign policy. Drawing from this category, the paper expects France to conceptualize China as a potential partner in contrast to the US' conceptualization of China as the most potent threat. Emphasis is expected to be put on the benefits of the relationship. This leads to the third category named *Potential Partner*. The fourth category is *European France*. France understands its identity as intimately linked to an EU that Paris guides on the international scene. The fifth and final category is *Messianic*. Similarly to the US, France understand its role in the world as consisting in the promotion of democracy and human rights (Bratberg, 2011, p. 336).

5.3 Limitations

Prior to presenting the analysis' findings, it is crucial to address the two limitations of this paper. The first is statism. Indeed, while the paper focuses on the state as a unitary actor with a unique identity, an expansive literature contradicts this simplistic view. For instance, Hameiri and Jones (2016) criticize statist approaches for ignoring how the domestic struggles between the different constituencies of a great power shape its foreign policy. Similarly, McNamara and Newman (2020, p. 5) argue that "globalization has (...) broken the monopoly of authority held by the nation-state". Therefore, the foreign policy of great powers is influenced by both domestic and transnational actors and this paper accounts not for their effect on the foreign policies of France and the US toward China. Further studies ought to investigate how these domestic and transnational actors shape the foreign policies of great powers and how these actors relate to the understandings that the state holds of itself.

The second limitation is the generalizability of the findings. Comparative designs that make use of qualitative methods, as in this paper, tend to have a low external validity (Halperin & Heath, 2020). Indeed, the generalizability of the findings is limited solely to the US and France during the studied 4 years. Other great powers may have different approaches to the rise of China with identity playing a less important role than factors such as the balance of power.

Further studies should investigate and compare how the different identities of each great power affects its foreign policy towards the rising power. In sum, this paper is limited in both its statist approach and in the generalizability of its findings.

6 **Results**

In this section, the paper presents the findings for both the US and France. In 6.1 and 6.2, the paper summarizes the key findings of the QCA. For a fully comprehensive view of these findings and the coding frame used, refer to the Appendix. In section 6.3, the paper discusses the findings and concludes that the hypotheses are upheld.

6.1 *Washington's foreign policy*

As expected, all five categories linked to American Exceptionalism are found. First, in 12 documents, “messianic” arguments are identified. Indeed, the US understands its role within the international community as consisting in “standing for liberty”, “democracy [...] and the rule of law” (Pence, 2019; Trump, 2019b). This duty to “secure those rights” (Pompeo, 2020d) “that are at once universal and at the heart of the American national spirit” (PPS, 2020) means that “America will always be a leader in human rights” (Trump, 2020c). Consequently, regarding China, the US emphasizes the difference between the “great and noble Chinese people” (Pompeo, 2019) and the “Chinese Communist Party (CCP)” (Pence, 2019) “whose biggest lie” is “claiming “that they speak for 1.4 billion people who are surveilled, oppressed, and scared to speak out” (Pompeo, 2020d). This differentiation between the CCP and the “freedom-loving” (Pompeo, 2019) Chinese citizens allows the US to harshly criticize and punish the CCP’s for its “human rights abuses” (Pence, 2019) that include the “oppression of its own people” (Pence, 2018) and “human rights violation of ethnic minorities” (PPS, 2020; Pompeo, 2019). Concurrently, the US “continue[s] to support human rights defenders and independent civil society working in or on China” (NSC, 2020). In sum, the confrontational foreign policy that the US adopts toward China stems, in part, from Washington’s messianic self-understanding.

Second, in 14 documents, the “necessary enemy” conceptualization of China is identified. Beijing is depicted as a “strategic and economic rival” (Pence, 2019; PPS, 2020, Pompeo, 2019) that “harms vital American interests” (NSC, 2020), conducts “espionage to steal [American] industrial secrets” (Trump, 2020a), threatens the “privacy of American citizens and their information” (Pompeo, 2020a), builds “a massive military” (Trump, 2020b) that will

“eventually surpass the U.S. military” (PPS, 2020), and ultimately seeks to “raid the United States of America” (Pompeo, 2020d). Furthermore, Beijing is the US’ “competition” (Trump, 2020b) as “what the Russians [for instance] are doing pales with what China is doing in [the US]” (Pence, 2018). Moreover, “America’s economic entwinement with China dwarfs U.S. commercial relations with the former Soviet Union” (PPS, 2020) and enables China to engage in “economic aggression” (Pence, 2018) that “put[s] America’s national security at risk” (Pompeo, 2020c). In sum, the “CCP’s ambition is to prevail in great-power rivalry with the United States” “by displacing the United States as the world’s foremost power” (PPS, 2020).

Third, this rivalry is not due to the US’ actions, but rather to China’s. Indeed, the category “innocent” is found in 14 documents. The United States is depicted as “not seek[ing] conflict” (Trump, 2019b) or “confrontation with China” (Pence, 2019). Instead, Washington “want[s] China to be successful” (Pompeo, 2019). But it is Beijing that “forced [these issues] upon” the US (Pompeo, 2019). The US, therefore, only “respond[s] to China” (Pence, 2018) because it is “the strategic choices China’s leadership is making [that compels] the United States” to acknowledge “the relationship with the PRC as the CCP has always framed it internally: one of great power competition” (NSC, 2020). Furthermore, as Beijing “does not offer compromises in response to American display of goodwill” (NSC, 2020), the US undertakes actions to “encourage China to change its unfair practices” (Trump, 2018). Consequently, the US is not the source of the rivalry with China.

Fourth, China is also depicted as a threat to the whole world as the category “universalization of threat” is identified in 13 documents. Beijing is depicted as seeking to “advance its strategic interest across the world with growing intensity” (Pence, 2018). Furthermore, “its approach to its neighbors [...] has remained increasingly provocative” (Pence, 2019) by claiming “the entire South China Sea” (Pompeo, 2018). Therefore, China is seen as focused on “international domination” (Pompeo, 2019) and hence represents a challenge that “resembles the one presented by the Soviet Union to the free world” (PPS, 2020).

Fifth, the US understands itself as “unconstrained” by any international institution. In four documents, the US criticizes, and even opposes, international institutions. Regarding the World Health Organization, the US decided to terminate its “relationship with the [...] organization” because it “failed to make the requested reforms” (Trump, 2020a) considering the institution’s “long history of corruption and politicization” (Pompeo, 2020a). Likewise, the US withdrew for the “Paris Climate Accord [...] [which] would have crushed American manufacturers” and

has been “tough on the World Trade Organization” (Trump, 2020c). The US, therefore, understand itself as unconstrained.

Nevertheless, while the analysis did identify the five expected categories linked to American exceptionalism, two other categories have been found. The first category is “multilateralism”. Indeed, in six documents, the US stresses the importance of multilateralism and the necessity to work with other democracies and allies to counter the rise of China (Pence, 2018; PPS, 2020; Pompeo, 2020b, 2020c). The second category is “potential partner”. The US presents its cooperation with China on the North Korean nuclear problem, as well as on the fentanyl problem stemming from China and the signing of the Phase 1 deal (Pence, 2018, 2019; Pompeo, 2019; Trump, 2018) as positive. The seeming contradiction that stems from the identification of these two categories is addressed in section 6.3. below.

In sum, the analysis identified seven categories within the fifteen analyzed foreign policy documents. Five of those categories are linked to American exceptionalism. The two other categories are not (directly) linked to the exceptionalist foreign policy of Washington.

6.2 *Paris' foreign policy*

As for France, all five anticipated categories associated with *Grandeur* are identified. First, “multilateralism” is identified in 13 documents. France understands itself as a “multilateralist great power” (Le Drian, 2018; Macron, 2018a). As such, Paris is “committed to ensure (...) [the] full respect (...) [of] the different multilateral commitments” it has (Macron, 2018b). Furthermore, it seeks to “construct a strong and efficient multilateral framework” (Macron, 2019a) by working “with as much partners as possible” (Parly, 2019). Finally, regarding the South China Sea, Paris “affirms its support for international law” and “opposes (...) any unilateral action that aims to change the status quo” (Delphine & Reitzer, 2019).

Second, “Non-alignment” is found in 12 documents. Paris emphasizes its position as a “not aligned (...) power” with an “own strategy” (Macron, 2019b). Consequently, France “reaffirms [its] attachment to independence” (Macron, 2019a) and aims to “play the role of a mediating” (Delphine & Reitzer, 2019) and “balancing power” (Macron, 2019b). Concerning China, in “contrast to the US' confrontational approach”, Paris “does not seek confrontation” (Delphine & Reitzer, 2019). France, therefore, considers that it is “important to maintain [its] different position from the US” in world politics (Delphine & Reitzer, 2019).

Third, this non-confrontational approach to China is complemented by a strong partnership. Indeed, in 12 documents, France depicts China as a potential partner. In 2019, Macron (2019a) stated that “France wants to be, to China, a reliable, clear and consistent partner”. As a result, the “development of the partnership with China is a key priority for [Paris’] foreign policy” (Cazeneuve, 2017). This partnership includes working with China on the fields of “nuclear technology, aeronautics, finance, environment, energy, healthcare and tourism” (Le Maire, 2019). Furthermore, Paris seeks to further “deepen the partnership with China” (Delphine & Reitzer, 2019). Finally, internationally “China has (...) become [France’s] ally on [the] multilateralist agenda” (Macron, 2019b).

Fourth, this partnership is not limited to Paris and Beijing solely as France also champions a stronger EU-China partnership. In fact, the category “European France” is identified in 11 documents. Macron (2018a) argues that “France is and will remain at the heart of Europe” and that “beyond the bilateral relationship, France has placed the topic of EU-Chinese cooperation at the heart of its discussions” with Beijing (Macron, 2019a). Beyond partnership, France also seeks to play a leadership role to “develop an Indo-Pacific vision within the EU” (Delphine & Reitzer, 2019). Consequently, France understands itself as both European and the leading power within the Union.

Finally, the category “Messianic” is identified. Indeed, in six documents, France advances a foreign policy informed by the “spirit of the Enlightenment” (Macron, 2019b). This foreign policy *des Lumières* entails a responsibility for Paris to be a “key actor” that promotes “new obligations in terms of human rights, (...) and that ensures that [French] values are defended everywhere” (2019b). As a result, Paris discusses the situation of human rights in China with Beijing (Macron, 2019a), “in particular [the situation] in Hong Kong and Xinjiang” (Macron, 2020; Ministère de l’Europe et des affaires étrangères, 2020; Présidence de la République, 2020). In sum, the analysis identified five categories for France and these categories are all associated with *Grandeur*.

6.3 Discussion of the results

Regarding the US, the paper concludes that H_1 is upheld. This conclusion stems from three factors. First, the paper identified the five characteristic categories of American exceptionalism, and these categories are found in a significantly higher frequency than the two other categories. Second, “multilateralism”, one of the categories not linked to American exceptionalism, does not engender a rejection of H_1 . Indeed, that the US engages in multilateral

institutions means not that it no longer is “unconstrained” in its foreign policy. The US has been the main architect of the post-WWII international order (Hopewell, 2021) and has played a key role in the creation of institutions that suit its interests, such as the WTO, the International Monetary Fund, and the UNSC. As a result, the US participates to these institutions to advance its interests. For instance, to counter China’s “unfair (...) trade practices that are subject to dispute settlement at the WTO, the United States continues to pursue and win multiple cases” (NSC, 2020), benefiting therefore from its membership to the organization. In parallel however, the US has “blocked appointments” to the WTO’s Appellate Body and threatened to withdraw from this international institution, among others (Hopewell, 2021). The US can ignore the same institutions it helped to create because of its position as the world’s superpower (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005; Mearsheimer, 1994, 2001). Therefore, the category “multilateralism” cancels not the category “unconstrained”. Rather, the US is unconstrained in its foreign policy specifically because it can create an international institution and subsequently ignore it. Third, similarly to the previous category, the category “partner” does not engender a rejection of the hypothesis because its frequency is significantly lower than the other categories and because the US puts a significantly greater emphasis on China as its “necessary enemy”. Consequently, the American exceptionalist hypothesis is upheld.

As for France, the paper concludes that H_2 is upheld as well. The five categories associated to *Grandeur* are identified while no other category has been found. The French *Grandeur* hypothesis, therefore, is upheld. Consequently, the findings of the analysis are in line with the theoretical expectations of the paper. Both France and the US adopt a different approach to China with Washington basing its approach on the exceptionalist understanding that it holds of itself and Paris adopting an approach guided by *Grandeur*.

Because these two identities are inherently different, the foreign policies vis-à-vis China that they inform are also different. For example, informed by American Exceptionalism, the US decided to withdraw from the legally binding Paris Climate Accord that it signed in 2015 (Uperlainen & Graaf, 2018). The US deemed it in its interest to withdraw from an institution that would have “crushed American manufacturers” on the one hand, and disadvantaged the US vis-à-vis China, its principal enemy and threat, on the other hand (Trump, 2020b, 2020c). The decision, therefore, stemmed from both the unconstrained nature that characterizes Washington’s self-understanding and from its constitution, and subsequent perception, of China as its most threatening enemy. As a result, any institution that could hand China the

slightest advantage over the US is seen as going against the US national interest. In contrast, France, informed by *Grandeur*, committed itself to strengthen its support to the agreement, a behavior in line with Paris' strong commitment to multilateral institutions, such as the Paris Accord (Christoff, 2016). Moreover, Paris perceives China as its most important partner in the fight against climate change and in the strengthening of multilateral institutions (Macron, 2019b), a position that contradicts the one adopted by Washington.

Likewise, *Grandeur* and Exceptionalism also explain the opposing approaches that Paris and Washington want NATO to adopt towards China. Indeed, the US pushed for a confrontational approach (Holslag, 2019; Oertel, 2019) by attempting to convince its allies that China, Washington's greatest enemy, threatens both the interests and the coherence of the alliance (Strategic Comments, 2021), universalizing the Chinese threat in the process. Concurrently, the US, unconstrained, also questioned its commitment to Article 5 of the treaty, putting pressure on the survival of the alliance which Washington increasingly saw as an "expensive" liability (Schreer, 2019, p. 10). Contrarily, France, seeking to maintain its non-aligned role of balancing and "mediating power" (Macron, 2019a), opposed the American endeavor and increased its calls for a strategically independent and sovereign EU capable of defending itself independently of the US (Gheciu, 2020).

In sum, in both cases, the unique identities that inform the foreign policy of Paris and Washington cause them to adopt significantly different approaches to Beijing. The rise of China, therefore, is what Great Powers "make of it" (Wendt, 1992).

7 Conclusion

This paper sought to investigate how the unique identities of France and the US affect their foreign policy vis-à-vis China. To this end, the paper conducted a MSSD in which the foreign policies of France and the US toward China are analyzed using QCA. Despite their overarching similarities, France and the US differed in their unique identities. Drawing from the "American exceptionalism" theory and the "French *Grandeur*" theory, the paper expected the US to adopt a foreign policy towards China grounded in the exceptionalist understanding that Washington holds of itself. Similarly, the paper expected France to adopt a foreign policy grounded in *Grandeur*. These theoretical expectations have been upheld by the analysis. Indeed, the results indicate that the foreign policies of France and the US toward China are informed by their respective unique identities. Consequently, both France and the US perpetuate the constitution

of their unique identities through their foreign policy toward the new “Other” that China represents.

However, this paper remains limited in its generalizability as the findings are generalizable solely to the analyzed cases. Furthermore, the paper is limited due to its statist approach to the analysis of foreign policy. Consequently, further studies ought to investigate the role of unique identity in the foreign policy of other great powers and to investigate how domestic and transnational constituencies play a role in the constitution of these unique identities.

Finally, the socially constructed nature of the relationship between the US and China, and France and China, indicate that this paper can be of interest to policymakers. Indeed, understanding how the unique identities of their countries influence their foreign policy may help policymakers in the crafting of more pragmatic policies. This paper can also be of interest to scholars and students interested in the study of great powers politics through a Realist Constructivist theoretical lens that accounts for the importance of both power and identity.

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Appendix:

Coding Frame

<u>Theme (categories)</u>	<u>Description of the theme's indicators</u>	<u>Colour code</u>
Messianic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsibility to protect other peoples, including China's population • Emphasis put on the distinction between a good Chinese people and an evil Chinese government • The state's actions are undertaken for the greater good of the whole world and all peoples • Criticism of China's lack of respect for human rights, individual liberties, and free speech • Emphasis put on the Messianic values that guide the foreign policy of the state 	Teal
Unconstrained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criticism of international organizations, international fora, and international institutions • Unilateral decisions 	Violet
Universalization of threat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • China's actions are represented as a threat to the whole world and to democracies 	Bright Green
Necessary enemy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • China is defined as direct threat to the state's national security, interests, population, and values 	Red
Innocent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The state is never the source of conflict or instability in its relationship with China • Actions taken by the state against China are the result of China's conflictual behaviour – that is, the state only reacts to China • The state has never sought confrontation and seeks benefits for itself and for China and only wishes the best for China • Any conflict or issue is due to China 	Turquoise
Multilateralism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State puts emphasis on multilateralism and cooperation with other states, including with China • State puts emphasis on the necessity to respect and uphold international law 	Green
Non-Alignment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State differentiates its approach to China from the approach of other states • State pushes back against pressure to act in a specific way toward China • State defines its approach to China as independent 	Yellow

Potential Partner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State underlines the benefits of cooperation with China 	Pink
European France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> France puts emphasis on the EU 	Grey
Residual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Statements that fit none of the above-mentioned themes 	White

US Foreign Policy toward China

<p><i>Document 1:</i> <u>Statement from the President Regarding Trade with China (Trump, 2018)</u></p> <p><i>Date: June 18, 2018</i></p>	Messianic	X
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	X
	Necessary enemy	<p>“China apparently has no intention of changing its unfair practices related to the acquisition of American intellectual property and technology. Rather than altering those practices, it is now threatening United States companies, workers, and farmers who have done nothing wrong.” ; “This latest action by China clearly indicates its determination to keep the United States at a permanent and unfair disadvantage, which is reflected in our massive \$376 billion trade imbalance in goods” ; “the United States will no longer be taken advantage of on trade by China”</p>
	Innocent	<p>“These tariffs are being imposed to encourage China to change the unfair practices identified in the Section 301 action with respect to technology and innovation. They also serve as an initial step toward bringing balance to our trade relationship with China” ; “However and unfortunately, China has determined that it will raise tariffs on \$50 billion worth of United States exports” ; “Further action must be taken to encourage China to change its unfair practices, open its market to United States goods, and accept a more balanced trade relationship with the United States” ; “Therefore, today, I directed the United States Trade Representative to identify \$200 billion worth of Chinese goods for additional tariffs at a rate of 10 percent” ; “these tariffs will go into effect if China refuses to change its practices, and also if it insists on going forward with the new tariffs that it has recently announced. If China increases its tariffs yet again, we will meet that action by pursuing additional tariffs on another \$200 billion of goods. The trade relationship between the United States</p>

		and China must be much more equitable” ; “We will continue using all available tools to create a better and fairer trading system for all Americans”
	Multilateralism	X
	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	“We will continue working together on many issues”
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 2:</i> <u>Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China</u> (Pence, 2018)</p> <p><i>Date: October 4, 2018</i></p>	Messianic	“American leadership lights the way” ; “Previous administrations made this choice in the hope that freedom in China would expand in all of its forms — not just economically, but politically, with a newfound respect for classical liberal principles, private property, personal liberty, religious freedom — the entire family of human rights” ; “The dream of freedom remains distant for the Chinese people. And while Beijing still pays lip service to “reform and opening,” Deng Xiaoping’s famous policy now rings hollow” ; “Nor, as we had hoped, has Beijing moved toward greater freedom for its own people” ; “China has taken a sharp U-turn toward control and oppression of its own people” ; “China has built an unparalleled surveillance state, and it’s growing more expansive and intrusive” ; “What they call the “Great Firewall of China” likewise grows higher, drastically restricting the free flow of information to the Chinese people” ; “China’s rulers aim to implement an Orwellian system premised on controlling virtually every facet of human life — the so-called ‘Social Credit Score’” ; “And when it comes to religious freedom, a new wave of persecution is crashing down on Chinese Christians, Buddhists, and Muslims” ; “Beijing is also cracking down on Buddhism” ; “in Xinjiang, the Communist Party has imprisoned as many as one million Muslim Uyghurs in government camps” ; “deliberate attempt by Beijing to strangle Uyghur culture and stamp out the Muslim faith” ; “America will always believe that Taiwan’s embrace of democracy shows a better path for all the Chinese people” ; “the Chinese people deserve nothing less”
	Unconstrained	X

**Universalization
of threat**

“The Chinese Communist Party began to pursue authoritarian expansionism” ; “And the Chinese Communist Party has also used an arsenal of policies inconsistent with free and fair trade, including tariffs, quotas, currency manipulation, forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and industrial subsidies that are handed out like candy to foreign investment” ; “the Communist Party has set its sights on controlling 90 percent of the world’s most advanced industries” ; “Chinese ships routinely patrol around the Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan” ; “Beijing has deployed advanced anti-ship and anti-air missiles atop an archipelago of military bases constructed on artificial islands” ; “Beijing also aims to extend its reach across the wider world” ; “China uses so-called “debt diplomacy” to expand its influence. Today, that country is offering hundreds of billions of dollars in infrastructure loans to governments from Asia to Africa to Europe and even Latin America” ; “Beijing pressured Sri Lanka to deliver the new port directly into Chinese hands” ; “Beijing is also impacting some nations’ politics by providing direct support to parties and candidates who promise to accommodate China’s strategic objectives” ; “These actions threaten the stability of the Taiwan Strait” ; “China has sought to advance its strategic interests across the world, with growing intensity and sophistication”

**Necessary
enemy**

“Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, economic, and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its interests in the United States” ; “China is also applying this power in more proactive ways than ever before, to exert influence and interfere in the domestic policy and politics of this country” ; “These policies have built Beijing’s manufacturing base, at the expense of its competitors -- especially the United States of America” ; “China’s actions have contributed to a trade deficit with the United States that last year ran to \$375 billion -- nearly half of our global trade deficit” ; “To win the commanding heights of the 21st century economy, Beijing has directed its bureaucrats and businesses to obtain American intellectual property -- the foundation of our economic leadership -- by any means necessary” ; “Beijing now requires many American businesses to hand over their trade secrets as the cost of doing business in China. It also coordinates and sponsors the acquisition of American firms to gain ownership

of their creations. Worst of all, Chinese security agencies have masterminded the wholesale theft of American technology — including cutting-edge military blueprints. And using that stolen technology, the Chinese Communist Party is turning plowshares into swords on a massive scale” ; “China now spends as much on its military as the rest of Asia combined, and Beijing has prioritized capabilities to erode America’s military advantages on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. China wants nothing less than to push the United States of America from the Western Pacific” ; “China’s aggression was on display this week, when a Chinese naval vessel came within 45 yards of the USS Decatur as it conducted freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea” ; “China has chosen economic aggression, which has in turn emboldened its growing military.” ; “Within our own hemisphere” ; “the United States of America has been defending our interests with renewed American strength” ; “we’re also implementing tariffs on \$250 billion in Chinese goods, with the highest tariffs specifically targeting the advanced industries that Beijing is trying to capture and control” ; “we will levy even more tariffs, with the possibility of substantially more than doubling that number” ; “our administration has been standing strong against Beijing’s trade practices” ; “China’s rulers, thus far, have refused to take that path” ; “Beijing is pursuing a comprehensive and coordinated campaign to undermine support for the President, our agenda, and our nation’s most cherished ideals” ; “what we know about China’s actions here at home — some of which we’ve gleaned from intelligence assessments, some of which are publicly available” ; “coercive ways to interfere in the domestic policies of this country and to interfere in the politics of the United States” ; “The Chinese Communist Party is rewarding or coercing American businesses, movie studios, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and federal officials” ; “China has initiated an unprecedented effort to influence American public opinion” ; “China is targeting U.S. state and local governments and officials to exploit any divisions between federal and local levels on policy. It’s using wedge issues, like trade tariffs, to advance Beijing’s political influence” ; “Beijing has mobilized covert actors, front groups, and propaganda outlets to shift Americans’ perception of Chinese policy” ; “what the Russians are doing pales in comparison to what

		<p>China is doing across this country.” ; “Beijing is also taking steps to exploit its economic leverage, and the allure of their large marketplace, to advance its influence over American businesses” ; “the Chinese Communist Party is also spending billions of dollars on propaganda outlets in the United States” ; “The Communist Party has also threatened and detained the Chinese family members of American journalists who pry too deep” ; “the Chinese Students and Scholars Association [...] alert Chinese consulates and embassies when Chinese students, and American schools, stray from the Communist Party line” ; “major cyberattack, originating from Shanghai” ; “the Chinese Communist Party is trying to undermine academic freedom and the freedom of speech in America today” ; “we’ve recently strengthened CFIUS — the Committee on Foreign Investment — heightening our scrutiny of Chinese investment in America to protect our national security from Beijing’s predatory actions” ; “Beijing’s malign influence and interference in American politics and policy”</p>
	<p>Innocent</p>	<p>“the United States has taken decisive action to respond to China with American action” ; “the United States of America has adopted a new approach to China. We seek a relationship grounded in fairness, reciprocity, and respect for sovereignty, and we have taken strong and swift action to achieve that goal” ; “As the President said last year on his visit to China, in his words, “we have an opportunity to strengthen the relationship between our two countries and improve the lives of our citizens.” Our vision of the future is built on the best parts of our past, when America and China reached out to one another in a spirit of openness and friendship” ; “When China suffered through indignities and exploitations during her so-called “Century of Humiliation,” America refused to join in, and advocated the “Open Door” policy, so that we could have freer trade with China, and preserve their sovereignty” ; “When the Second World War arose, we stood together as allies in the fight against imperialism. And in that war’s aftermath, America ensured that China became a charter member of the United Nations, and a great shaper of the post-war world” ; “we re-established diplomatic relations and began to open our economies to one another, and American universities began training a new generation of Chinese engineers, business leaders, scholars, and officials” ; “we assumed that a free China was inevitable. Heady with optimism at the turn of the 21st Century,</p>

		America agreed to give Beijing open access to our economy, and we brought China into the World Trade Organization” ; “Much of this success was driven by American investment in China” ; “forcing our ship to quickly maneuver to avoid collision. Despite such reckless harassment, the United States Navy will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows and our national interests demand” ; “America had hoped that economic liberalization would bring China into a greater partnership with us and with the world” ; “we don’t want China’s markets to suffer. In fact, we want them to thrive. But the United States wants Beijing to pursue trade policies that are free, fair, and reciprocal. And we will continue to stand and demand that they do” ; “It’s for those reasons and that reality that, last month, the Department of Justice ordered that network to register as a foreign agent” ; “we want a constructive relationship with Beijing where our prosperity and security grow together, not apart”; “China’s rulers can still change course and return to the spirit of reform and opening that characterize the beginning of this relationship decades ago. The American people want nothing more” ; “Today, America is reaching out our hand to China” ; “Faith in the enduring friendship between the American people and the Chinese people. And Faith that heaven sees the future — and by God’s grace, America and China will meet that future together”
	Multilateralism	“And to advance our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, we’re building new and stronger bonds with nations that share our values across the region, from India to Samoa. Our relationships will flow from a spirit of respect built on partnership, not domination”
	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	“Our President has forged a strong personal relationship with the President of the People’s Republic of China, and they’ve worked closely on issues of common interest, most importantly the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
	Messianic	X
	Unconstrained	X

<p>Document 3: <u>Donald Trump States "I am the Chosen One" in Front of White House in China Statement to Press</u> (Trump, 2019a)</p> <p>Date: August 19, 2019</p>	Universalization of threat	X
Necessary enemy	“China’s made \$500-billion. 500-billion. Ripped it out of the United States. And not only that, if you take a look, intellectual property theft, add that to it and add a lot of other things to it.” ; “I’m taking on China. I’m taking it on China on trade” ; “one thing I have to do is economically take on China because China has been ripping us off for many years” ; “We are winning against China. They’ve lost two and a half million jobs in a very short period of time. They want to make a deal. It’s got to be a deal that’s good for the United States where they want to make it deal” ; “It was the worst year they’ve had in a half a century, and that’s because of me”	
Innocent	“We’re winning because we’re the piggy bank. We’re the one that all these countries, including the European union, wants to rob and takes advantage of” ; “President Clinton, President Bush, and President Obama and others should have done this long before me” ; “This isn’t my trade war. This is a trade war that should have taken place a long time ago by a lot of other presidents”	
Multilateralism		X
Non-Alignment		X
Potential Partner		X
European France		X
Residual	All non-coloured text	
Messianic	“the elected leader of a nation that prizes liberty, independence, and self-government above all” ; “Americans know that in a world where others seek conquest and domination, our nation must be strong in wealth, in might, and in spirit. That is why the United States vigorously defends the traditions and customs that have made us who we are” ; “It is why we in the United States have embarked on an exciting program of national renewal. In everything we do, we are focused on empowering the dreams and aspirations of our citizens” ; “As we endeavor to stabilize our relationship, we’re also carefully monitoring the situation in Hong Kong” ; “fully expects that the Chinese government will	

<p><i>Document 4:</i> Remarks by President Trump to the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Trump, 2019b)</p> <p><i>Date: September 24, 2019</i></p>		<p>honor its binding treaty, made with the British and registered with the United Nations, in which China commits to protect Hong Kong’s freedom, legal system, and democratic ways of life”</p>
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	<p>“This is happening to other countries all over the globe” ; “The second-largest economy in the world should not be permitted to declare itself a “developing country” in order to game the system at others’ expense”</p>
	Necessary enemy	<p>“The most important difference in America’s new approach on trade concerns our relationship with China” ; “Not only has China declined to adopt promised reforms, it has embraced an economic model dependent on massive market barriers, heavy state subsidies, currency manipulation, product dumping, forced technology transfers, and the theft of intellectual property and also trade secrets on a grand scale” ; “To advance the Chinese government’s five-year economic plan, a company owned by the Chinese state allegedly stole Micron’s designs, valued at up to \$8.7 billion. Soon, the Chinese company obtains patents for nearly an identical product, and Micron was banned from selling its own goods in China. But we are seeking justice” ; “The United States lost 60,000 factories after China entered the WTO” ; “I will not accept a bad deal for the American people”</p>
	Innocent	<p>“Hopefully, it will never have to use this power.” ; “In 2001, China was admitted to the World Trade Organization. Our leaders then argued that this decision would compel China to liberalize its economy and strengthen protections to provide things that were unacceptable to us, and for private property and for the rule of law. Two decades later, this theory has been tested and proven completely wrong” ; “To confront these unfair practices, I placed massive tariffs on more than \$500 billion worth of Chinese-made goods” ; “The American people are absolutely committed to restoring balance to our relationship with China. Hopefully, we can reach an agreement that would be beneficial for both countries” ; “The United States does not seek conflict with any other nation. We desire peace, cooperation, and mutual gain with all” ; “The United States has never believed in permanent enemies. We want partners, not adversaries. America knows that while anyone can make war, only the most courageous can choose peace” ; “Around the world, our message</p>

		is clear: America’s goal is lasting, America’s goal is harmony, and America’s goal is not to go with these endless wars — wars that never end”
	Multilateralism	X
	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	X
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 5: <u>Vice President Pence Delivers Inaugural Frederic V. Malek Public Service Leadership Lecture</u> (Pence, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>Date: October 24, 2019</i></p>	Messianic	<p>“to achieve, in his words, a more just secure and peaceful world” ; “it’s repression of people of faith, construction of a surveillance state” ; “human rights abuses” ; “China’s authoritarian state into a free and open society that respects private property, the rule of law, and international rules of commerce” ; “to set our relationship on a more fair stable and constructive course for the good of both our nations and the world.” ; “The United States in the last year has increased the tempo and scope of our freedom of navigation operations and strengthened our military presence across the indo Pacific to uphold the values of freedom loving people every year” ; “We’ve also called out the Chinese Communist party for suppressing freedom of religion. The Chinese people, millions of ethnic and religious minorities in China are struggling against the party’s efforts to eradicate their religious and cultural identities. The Communist Party in China has arrested Christian pastors, banned the sale of bibles, demolished churches, and imprisoned more than one million Muslim Uighurs. We’ve held Beijing accountable for its treatment of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang when just last month President Trump imposed visa restrictions on Chinese Communist party officials as well as sanctions on 20 Chinese public security bureaus and eight Chinese companies for their complicity in the persecution of Uighurs and other Chinese Muslims and we’ve stood by Taiwan in defense of her hard won freedoms” ; “we’ve spoken out on behalf of the people of Hong Kong and president trump has made it clear from early on that there must be a peaceful resolution that respects the rights of the people of Hong Kong as outlined in the 1984 Sino British joint declaration” ; “today China’s Communist Party is building a surveillance state unlike anything the world has</p>

ever seen. Hundreds of millions of surveillance cameras stared down from every vantage point. Ethnic minorities must navigate arbitrary checkpoints where police demand blood samples, fingerprints, voice recordings, and multiple angle headshots and even iris scans and China is now exporting to countries in Africa Latin America and the Middle East the very same technological tools that it uses in its authoritarian regime tools that is deployed in places like Xinjiang” ; “America will always believe that Taiwan’s embrace of democracy shows a better path for all the Chinese people” ; “Chinese Communist party's antipathy to liberty so much as the unrest in Hong Kong Hong Kong” ; “Beijing has increased its interventions in Hong Kong and engaged in actions to curtail the rights and liberties of its people rights and liberties that were guaranteed through a binding international agreement “one country two systems”” ; “the United States stands for liberty” ; “The United states will continue to urge China to show restraint to honor its commitments and respect the people of Hong Kong to the millions in Hong Kong who have been peacefully demonstrating to protect your right” ; “when it comes to the freedom and rights of the people of China and siding with the Chinese Communist party and silencing free speech” ; “United States values run deep but our commitment to these values remains as strong as it was for our founding fathers and that there will never be a day with the bright light of democracy and freedom goes out in America. America was born out of rebellion against repression and tyranny. Our nation was founded, settled in, pioneered by men and women of extraordinary valor, rugged determination, faith, fiery independence in an iron will and nothing's changed much in the centuries that have passed. Americans believe that all men and women are created equal. We are endowed by our creator with certain unalienable rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And nothing will change these beliefs. They are who we are, they are who we will always be, and we will continue to believe that the values of democracy of individual liberty freedom of religion and conscience the rule of law serve American and global interests because they are and will ever be the best form of government to unleash human aspirations and guide the relations between all the world's nations and peoples despite the many

		challenges we face in the United States.” ; “We will defend our interests we will defend our values of charity and good will for all.”
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	<p>“China's debt diplomacy” ; “China's arsenal of policies inconsistent with free and fair-trade including tariffs quotas, currency manipulation, forced technology transfer, and industrial subsidies” ; “China's military action in the region and its approach to its neighbors over the past year has also remained increasingly provocative” ; “Beijing has deployed advanced anti-ship and anti-air missiles atop on archipelago of military bases constructed on artificial islands. And Beijing has stepped up its use of what they call maritime militia vessels to regularly menace Filipino, Malaysian sailors and fishermen and the Chinese Coast Guard has tried to strong arm Vietnam from drilling for oil and natural gas off of Vietnam’s own shores in the East China Sea” ; “China's Coast Guard has sent ships for more than 60 days in a row into the waters around the Senkaku islands which were administered by Japan. China is also using its one belt one road initiative to establish footholds in ports around the world ostensibly for commercial purposes, but those purposes could eventually become military” ; “China has induced two more nations to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, increasing pressure on the democracy in Taiwan” ; “China has exercised its influence across the region and across the world” ; “the Chinese Communist party continues to resist a true opening or convergence with global norms. All that Beijing is doing today from the party's great firewall in cyberspace which were that Great Wall of sand in the South China Sea from their distrust of Hong Kong’s autonomy or the repression of people of faith, all demonstrate - but it's the Chinese Communist party that has been decoupling from the wider world” ; “XI himself [...] said that China must conscientiously prepare for all aspects of long-term cooperation and struggle between the two social systems”</p>
	Necessary enemy	<p>“Beijing’s policies most harmful to America's interests and values” ; “military expansionism” ; “China's economic aggression” ; “as each factory closed in the heartland of America, as each new skyscraper went up in Beijing, American workers grew only more disheartened, and China grew only more emboldened” ; “Beijing’s actions have contributed to the United States trade deficit with</p>

China that last year ran to more than 400 billion, nearly half of our global trade deficit” ; “The United States now recognizes China as a strategic and economic rival” ; “China's economy would surpass the United states economy in just a few short years” ; “America has added trillions of dollars of wealth to our economy while China's economy continues to fall behind” ; “we've made the strongest military in the history of the world stronger still and to make it clear to Beijing that no nation has a right to claim the maritime Commons as territorial seas.” ; “America's interests in our relationship with China” ; “the great power competition that is underway” ; “Beijing has still not taken significant action to improve our economic relationship and on many other issues we raised Beijing’s behavior has become even more aggressive and destabilizing.” ; “there's a whole range of structural and significant issues between are two countries” ; “China continues to aid in a bet the theft of our intellectual property” ; “the director of the FBI told Congress that of his agency's 1000 active investigations into intellectual property theft the majority involved China. American enterprises continue to lose hundreds of billions of dollars each year in intellectual property theft” ; “The product of their labor is stolen when the sweat of their brow is made futile. It undermines our entire system of free enterprise. Last year alone there's been case after case of intellectual property theft involving China. In March, Tesla filed suit against a former engineer who's been accused of stealing 300,000 files related to its own American developed autopilot system before bolting for a job at a Chinese self-driving car company, and last December the Justice Department revealed that it had broken up a nearly four year operation by a notorious hacking group within China's ministry of state security” ; “These Chinese government officials stole the names and data of 100,000 US Navy personnel as well as ship maintenance information with grave implications for our national security” ; “deadly drugs also continue to flood across our borders claiming the lives of thousands of Americans every month” ; “the Chinese Communist party is also continuing to reward and coerce American businesses, movie studios, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local state and federal officials to influence the public debate here in America” ; “China is not only exporting hundreds of billions of dollars in unfairly traded goods to the United

		<p>States but lately China is also been trying to export censorship, the hallmark of its regime” ; “Beijing is attempting to influence American public opinion” ; “Beijing's economic and strategic actions it's attempts to shape American public opinion” ; “China wants a different American president” ; “China should never underestimate the resilience of the freedom loving people of America or the resolve of the president of the United States”</p>
	<p>Innocent</p>	<p>“President Trump has been determined to build a relationship with China on a foundation of candor, fairness, and mutual respect” ; “Much of this success was driven by American investment in China” ; “we rebuilt China over the past 25 years” ; “No longer will America and its leaders hope that economic engagement alone” ; “to hold Beijing accountable” ; “president trump has stood strong for free and fair trade” ; “To level the playing field for the American worker against unethical trade practices, President Trump levied tariffs on \$250 billion in Chinese goods in 2018 and earlier this year the president announced we would place tariffs on another 300 billion of Chinese goods if significant issues in our trading relationship were not resolved by December” ; “To protect intellectual property rights, the privacy of our citizens, and our national security, we've taken strong steps to curtail illegal behavior of Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE and we've urged our allies around the world to build secure 5G networks that don't give Beijing control of our most sensitive infrastructure and data” ; “we want better for China” ; “the United states is treating China's leaders exactly how the leaders of any great world power should be treated with respect yes but also with consistency and candor” ; “, China backed away from a 150-page agreement sending both sides back to square one” ; “we will continue to respect the one China policy” ; “the United States does not seek confrontation with China. We seek a level playing field, open markets fair trade and respect for our values. We are not seeking to contain China's development - we want a constructive relationship with China's leaders like we have enjoyed for generations with China people” ; “President Donald Trump is ready and willing to begin that new future just as America has done in the past when Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening policy encouraged engagement in exchange with the outside world. The United States responded with open arms – we welcomed China's rise, we celebrated the remarkable</p>

	<p>accomplishment of 600 million people lifting themselves out of poverty, and America invested more than any other nation in China's economic resurgence” ; “The United States seeks engagement with China and China's engagement with the wider world but engagement in a manner consistent with fairness mutual respect in the international rules of commerce” ; “We will continue to negotiate in good faith with China to bring about long overdue structural reforms in our economic relationship” ; “America will continue to seek a better relationship with China and as we do so we will speak plainly because this is a relationship that both the United States and China have to get right. America will continue to seek a fundamental restructuring of our relationship with China and under the leadership of President Donald Trump America will stay the course the American people and their elected officials in both parties we'll stay resolved” ; “We fervently believe The United States and China can and must work to share a peaceful and prosperous future together but only honest dialogue in good faith negotiations can make that future reality” ; “As we go forward let us pursue a future of peace and prosperity with resolve and faith in President Trump's leadership and vision for our economy and our place in the world facing the relationship that he's forged with president Xi of China and in the enduring friendship between the American people and the Chinese people”</p>
Multilateralism	X
Non-Alignment	X
Potential Partner	“China and the United States will also continue in a spirit of engagement to work together to secure the full final verifiable denuclearization of North Korea”
European France	X
Residual	All non-coloured text
Messianic	“We have a long-cherished tradition of friendship with the Chinese people. We continue to do so today. We have a Chinese American community here in America that we love and treasure. I’ve known them through business and personal ties; I’ve known many of them. But I must say that the communist government in China today is not the same as the people of China” ; “we did an awful lot that accommodated China’s rise in the hope that communist China

<p><i>Document 6:</i> <u>Secretary Pompeo – The China Challenge</u> (Pompeo, 2019)</p> <p><i>Date: October 30, 2019</i></p>		<p>would become more free, more market-driven, and ultimately, hopefully more democratic.” ; “China’s regime trampling the most basic human rights of its own citizens – the great and noble Chinese people. We’ve seen this in Hong Kong, where they need to live up to their promises and commitments, and we’ve seen it in the gross human rights violation of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang” ; “which a Leninist Party rules and everyone must think and act according to the will of the Communist elites. That’s not a future that I want, I think it’s not a future that anyone in this room wants, it’s not a future that other democracies want, and it’s not a future that the people of China – the freedom-loving people of China everywhere don’t want this model” ; “We want to preserve our freedoms – our freedom of speech and we want to make sure that information flows freely everywhere” ; “And we want to see a liberalized China that allows the genius of its people to flourish. And we want to see a China that respects basic human rights of its own people, as guaranteed by its own constitution”</p>
	<p>Unconstrained</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">X</p>
	<p>Universalization of threat</p>	<p>“and for the world” ; “even when that rise was at the expense of American values, Western democracy, and security, and good common sense” ; “China never followed through” ; “China threatened its neighbors like Vietnam, and like the Philippines, and when they claimed the entire South China Sea” ; “And these aren’t just our problems. They’re problems for all nations that share our values” ; “When we see Beijing use coercion as a preferred tool of statecraft, it’s not good for those of us who believe in democracy and sovereignty as the fundamental norms that ought to dominate world commerce and the way nations interact. These ideas, they threaten the free and open international order by making extrajudicial territorial and maritime claims in places like the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait” ; “Beijing entwines its neighbors and others in its state-led economic model, often closing deals with bribes, often trapping many in debilitating debt levels, threatening their own sovereignty” ; “The Chinese Communist Party is a Marxist-Leninist Party focused on struggle and international domination” ; “The party’s intelligence agencies, the United Front Work, and its propaganda outlets have embarked on a global campaign to change public opinion in favor of Beijing” ; “China has engaged in unfair</p>

		<p>predatory economic practices and it's utilizing state assets to build its economic footprint all around the world”</p>
	<p>Necessary enemy</p>	<p>“The challenge from the People’s Republic of China” ; “They’re reaching for and using methods that have created challenges for the United States” ; “to confront these challenges from the PRC head-on, and along each of the many facets” ; “It is no longer realistic to ignore the fundamental differences between our two systems and the impact, the impact that those two systems have, the differences in those systems have on American national security” ; “we’ve been slow to see the risk of China – the risk that it poses to American national security” ; “U.S. companies that invested heavily in China were forced to comply with China’s terms. This includes just about any topic that the Chinese Communist Party deemed controversial” ; “Beijing’s intransigence creates a permanent class of China lobbyists in the United States” ; “Meanwhile, Beijing controlled and limited access to our diplomats, journalists, and academics to the main – when they were traveling to mainland China. They still do that today.” ; “And China’s state-run media and government spokespeople filled the gaps, routinely maligning American intentions and policy objectives” ; “we’re finally realizing the degree to which the Chinese Communist Party is truly hostile to the United States and our values, and its worse deeds and words and how they impact us” ; “he called China’s WTO membership “the greatest job theft in history” ; “China weakens America’s manufacturing base by conducting massive intellectual property theft” ; “China threatens American freedoms by demanding our companies self- censor to maintain access to that Chinese market” ; “China threatens America’s national security by developing asymmetric weapons that threaten our strategic assets too” ; “recognizes China as a strategic competitor. That means there’s challenges” ; “they interfere with the things we take most for granted here in the United States” ; “the capabilities that China has built up that far exceed what they would need for self-defense”</p>
	<p>Innocent</p>	<p>“We wanted friendship with the People’s Republic from the very start. And because we, as Americans, always continue to hope for that” ;” in our efforts to achieve this goal, we accommodated and encouraged China’s rise for decades” ; “We downgraded our relationship with our long-time friend, Taiwan, on the condition that the “Taiwan question” would be resolved peacefully, to</p>

		<p>normalize relations with Beijing” ; “We encouraged China’s membership in the World Trade Organization and other international organizations, premised on their commitment to adopt market reforms and abide by the rules of those organizations” ; “if you saw the difference in how Chinese diplomats are treated and how American diplomats and the access they have, you too would find the absence of reciprocity deeply inconsistent with American values” ; “a secretive regime that doesn’t respect fairness, the rule of law, and reciprocity” ; “The truth is Beijing ought to be free to run its own PR campaign; they’re a sovereign nation. But if we disagree, our companies ought to be permitted to have that disagreement. Silencing dissent simply is not acceptable” ; “there’s real opportunities, and we hope that we can engage with them in ways that are constructive” ; “It’s also the case that we didn’t choose some of these issues. China forced them upon us” ; “We want China to be successful. We want it to have a successful economy. We want a transparent, competitive, market-driven system that is mutually beneficial for all involved” ; “We want to make sure that we get that right and we want to make sure that the economic relationships are fair, reciprocal, and balanced as between us as well” ; “I’ll be clear about what the United States wants: We don’t want a confrontation with the People’s Republic of China. In fact, we want just the opposite. We want to see a prosperous China that is at peace with its own people and with its neighbors. We want to see a thriving China where the Chinese business community transact business with the rest of the world on a fair set of reciprocal terms that we all know and understand” ; “it’s critical that as Americans, we engage China as it is, not as we wish it were”</p>
	Multilateralism	X
	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	<p>“You can see the first steps towards that in the Phase 1 deal that we are close to signing. I’m optimistic we’ll get there. It’s a good thing, a place that we can work together” ;</p>
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text

Messianic

Document 7:
United States
Strategic
Approach to the
People’s
Republic of
China
(National
Security Council
[NSC], 2020)

Date: May 20,
2020

“The PRC’s rapid economic development and increased engagement with the world did not lead to convergence with the citizen-centric, free and open order as the United States had hoped” ; “The United States has a deep and abiding respect for the Chinese people and enjoys longstanding ties to the country” ; “nor do we wish to disengage from the Chinese people” ; “The CCP promotes globally a value proposition that challenges the bedrock American belief in the unalienable right of every person to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” ; “This runs counter to principles shared by the United States and many likeminded countries of representative government, free enterprise, and the inherent dignity and worth of every individual” ; a CCP-led “community” looks like in practice: (1) an anticorruption campaign that has purged political opposition; (2) unjust prosecutions of bloggers, activists, and lawyers; (3) algorithmically determined arrests of ethnic and religious minorities; (4) stringent controls over and censorship of information, media, universities, businesses, and non-governmental organizations; (5) surveillance and social credit scoring of citizens, corporations, and organizations; and (6) and arbitrary detention, torture, and abuse of people perceived to be dissidents” ; “Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, where since 2017, authorities have detained more than a million Uighurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in indoctrination camps” ; “the regime has instituted a police state employing emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and biogenetics to monitor ethnic minorities’ activities to ensure allegiance to the CCP. Widespread religious persecution – of Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Muslims, and members of Falun Gong” ; “Beijing also attempts to compel Chinese nationals to report on and threaten fellow Chinese students, protest against events that run counter to Beijing’s political narrative, and otherwise restrict the academic freedom that is the hallmark and strength of the American education system.” ; “We believe this is the treatment that the people of China want and deserve from their own government and from the international community” ; “The United States rejects CCP attempts at false equivalency between rule of law and rule by law; between counterterrorism and oppression; between representative governance and autocracy; and between market-based competition and state-directed mercantilism. The United States will continue to challenge Beijing’s

		<p>propaganda and false narratives that distort the truth and attempt to demean American values and ideals” ; “the negative trend lines of Beijing’s policies and practices threaten the legacy of the Chinese people and their future position in the world” ; “The Administration is raising awareness of and actively combatting Beijing’s co-optation and coercion of its own citizens and others in United States academic institutions, beyond traditional espionage and influence efforts” ; “The United States military will continue to exercise the right to navigate and operate wherever international law allows, including in the South China Sea. We are speaking up for regional allies and partners, and providing security assistance to help them build capacity to withstand Beijing’s attempts to use its military, paramilitary, and law enforcement forces to coerce and prevail in disputes” ; “calling on the PRC government to respect the rights of Uighur and other Turkic Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and Falun Gong adherents, all of whom face repression and persecution in China” ; “The United States also continues to support human rights defenders and independent civil society working in or on China” ; “condemning Beijing’s ongoing human rights violations and other repressive policies in Xinjiang that threaten international peace and security” ; “The United States will continue to take a principled stand against the use of our technology to support China’s military and its technology-enabled authoritarianism” ; “These efforts demonstrate United States commitment to the fundamental values and norms that have served as the foundation of the international system since the end of the Second World War” ; “The United States is expanding its role as an Indo-Pacific nation that promotes free enterprise and democratic governance”</p>
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	<p>“Beijing openly acknowledges that it seeks to transform the international order to align with CCP interests and ideology” ; “The CCP’s expanding use of economic, political, and military power to compel acquiescence from nation states” ; “undermines the sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the world” ; “those of our allies and partners” ; “the steps allies and partners have taken to develop more clear-eyed and robust approaches toward the PRC” ; “distort global markets, violate international norms, and pollute the environment” ; “Beijing [...] exploited the benefits of WTO membership to</p>

become the world's largest exporter, while systematically protecting its domestic markets" ; "Beijing's commitments to cease its predatory economic practices" ; "and a dozen other countries" ; "Since the 1980s, Beijing has signed multiple international agreements to protect intellectual property. Despite this, more than 63 percent of the world's counterfeits originate in China, inflicting hundreds of billions of dollars of damage on legitimate businesses around the world" ; "China self-designates as a developing country to justify policies and practices that systematically distort multiple sectors globally" ; "and other countries" ; "One Belt One Road (OBOR) is Beijing's umbrella term to describe a variety of initiatives, many of which appear designed to reshape international norms, standards, and networks to advance Beijing's global interests and vision, while also serving China's domestic economic requirements" ; "OBOR projects frequently operate well outside of these standards and are characterized by poor quality, corruption, environmental degradation, a lack of public oversight or community involvement, opaque loans, and contracts generating or exacerbating governance and fiscal problems in host nations" ; "Beijing's increasing use of economic leverage to extract political concessions from or exact retribution against other countries" ; "Beijing uses a combination of threat and inducement to pressure governments, elites, corporations, think tanks, and others – often in an opaque manner – to toe the CCP line and censor free expression" ; "Beijing has restricted trade and tourism with Australia, Canada, South Korea, Japan, Norway, the Philippines, and others, and has detained Canadian citizens, in an effort to interfere in these countries' internal political and judicial processes" ; "China, however, has been the world's largest greenhouse gas" ; "The PRC is also the world's largest source of marine plastic pollution, discharging over 3.5 million metric tons into the ocean each year. The PRC ranks first in the world for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in coastal nations' waters around the world, threatening local economies and harming the marine environment. Chinese leaders' unwillingness to rein in these globally harmful practices" ; "Beijing is clear that it sees itself as engaged in an ideological competition with the West" ; "Xi called on the CCP to prepare for a "long-term period of cooperation and conflict" between two competing systems and declared that "capitalism is

	<p>bound to die out and socialism is bound to win” ; “The CCP’s campaign to compel ideological conformity does not stop at China’s borders. In recent years, Beijing has intervened in sovereign nations’ internal affairs to engineer consent for its policies” ; “and other open democracies” ; “and around the world” ; “engaging in provocative and coercive military and paramilitary activities in the Yellow Sea, the East and South China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and Sino-Indian border areas” ; “and allied” ; “creating security vulnerabilities for foreign countries and enterprises utilizing Chinese vendors’ equipment and services” ; “our allies, and our partners” ; “Beijing’s actions that weaken a free, open, and rules-based international order”</p>
<p>Necessary enemy</p>	<p>“Harms vital American interests” ; “Beijing’s challenge” ; “the Administration has adopted a competitive approach to the PRC, based on a clear-eyed assessment of the CCP’s intentions and actions” ; “our goal is to protect United States vital national interests” ; “competitive approach to the PRC” ; “the challenges the PRC presents” ; “to compel Beijing to cease or reduce actions harmful to the United States’ vital, national interests” ; “the CCP’s malign behavior” ; “the United States Government to take the actions to achieve our strategic objectives” ; “The PRC today poses numerous challenges to United States national interests” ; “Economic challenges” ; “Beijing’s poor record of following through on economic reform commitments and its extensive use of state-driven protectionist policies and practices harm United States companies and workers” ; “the United States Trade Representative (USTR) determined that numerous acts, policies, and practices of the PRC government were unreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict United States commerce” ; “the PRC: (1) requires or pressures United States companies to transfer their technology to Chinese entities; (2) places substantial restrictions on United States companies’ ability to license their technology on market terms; (3) directs and unfairly facilitates acquisition of United States companies and assets by domestic firms to obtain cutting edge technologies; and (4) conducts and supports unauthorized cyber intrusions into United States companies’ networks to access sensitive information and trade secrets” ; “in 2018, the United States attributed global computer intrusion campaigns, targeting intellectual property and confidential business information, to operators affiliated with the PRC’s</p>

Ministry of State Security” ; “harming the United States” ; “Challenges to our values” ; “propaganda tools” ; “Beyond the media, the CCP uses a range of actors to advance its interests in the United States” ; “CCP United Front organizations and agents target businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and Federal officials in the United States” ; “Beijing regularly attempts to compel or persuade Chinese nationals and others to undertake a range of malign behaviors that threaten United States national and economic security, and undermine academic freedom and the integrity of the United States research and development enterprise” ; “Security challenges” ; “Beijing’s military buildup threatens United States” ; “threaten foreign countries, including United States allies” ; “creating security risks for American communities” ; “the PRC’s violations of our bilateral consular treaty puts United States citizens at risk in China, with many Americans detrimentally affected by the PRC government’s coercive exit bans and wrongful detentions” ; “spread false information to create divisions among ourselves” ; “we are in a strategic competition and protecting our interests appropriately” ; “United States policies are designed to protect our interests and empower our institutions to withstand the CCP’s malign behavior and collateral damage from the PRC’s internal governance problems” ; “We acknowledge and respond in kind to Beijing’s transactional approach with timely incentives and costs, or credible threats thereof. When quiet diplomacy proves futile, the United States will increase public pressure on the PRC government and take action to protect United States interests by leveraging proportional costs when necessary” ; “The United States Department of Justice (DOJ)’s China Initiative and Federal Bureau of Investigation are directing resources to identify and prosecute trade secrets theft, hacking, and economic espionage; and increasing efforts to protect against malign foreign investment in United States infrastructure, supply chain threats, and foreign agents seeking to influence American policy” ; “CCP propaganda in the United States” ; “PRC government’s exploitation of our free and open society to push a CCP agenda” ; “we are improving processes to screen out the small minority of Chinese applicants who attempt to enter the United States under false pretenses or with malign intent” ; “To prevent foreign malign actors from gaining access to United States information networks” ;

		<p>“companies associated with or answering to the intelligence and security apparatus of foreign adversaries from, for example, readily accessing the private and sensitive information of the United States Government, the United States private sector, and individual Americans” ; “growing national security concerns over foreign exploitation of investment structures” ; “preventing Chinese companies from exploiting access to United States innovation through minority investments in order to modernize the Chinese military” ; “shipments containing 53,000 illegal Chinese gun parts and electronics that could have compromised the security and privacy of American businesses and consumers” ; “pose a danger to American consumers” ; “Beijing’s practices that have contributed to a hollowing-out of the United States manufacturing base” ; “the United States is confronting China’s market-distorting forced technology transfer and intellectual property practices by imposing costs in the form of tariffs levied on Chinese goods coming into the United States” ; “long-term competition with China” ; “to counter the PLA’s technological advancements, force development, and growing international presence and assertiveness” ; “prioritizing the modernization of the nuclear triad, including the development of supplementary capabilities designed to deter Beijing from using its weapons of mass destruction or conducting other strategic attacks” ; “these capabilities are intended to deter and counter Beijing’s growing ambitions and the PLA’s drive toward technological parity and superiority” ; “The United States recognizes the long-term strategic competition between our two systems”</p>
	<p>Innocent</p>	<p>“United States policy toward the PRC was largely premised on a hope that deepening engagement would spur fundamental economic and political opening in the PRC and lead to its emergence as a constructive and responsible global stakeholder, with a more open society” ; “Even as we compete with the PRC, we welcome cooperation where our interests align. Competition need not lead to confrontation or conflict” ; “We do not seek to contain China’s development” ; “The United States expects to engage in fair competition with the PRC, whereby both of our nations, businesses, and individuals can enjoy security and prosperity” ; “The NSS demands that the United States “rethink the policies of the past two decades – policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and</p>

global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners” ; “the United States is responding to the CCP’s direct challenge” ; “our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region does not exclude China” ; “The United States holds the PRC government to the same standards and principles that apply to all nations” ; “Given the strategic choices China’s leadership is making, the United States now acknowledges and accepts the relationship with the PRC as the CCP has always framed it internally: one of great power competition” ; “Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not offer compromises in response to American displays of goodwill” ; “the United States responds to the PRC’s actions rather than its stated commitments” ; “the United States responds appropriately to the CCP’s insincere or vague threats, and stands up alongside our allies and partners to resist coercion. Through our continuous and frank engagement, the United States welcomes cooperation by China to expand and work toward shared objectives in ways that benefit the peace, stability, and prosperity of the world. Our approach does not exclude the PRC. The United States stands ready to welcome China’s positive contributions” ; “We engage with the PRC to negotiate and enforce commitments to ensure fairness and reciprocity; clarify Beijing’s intentions to avoid misunderstanding; and resolve disputes to prevent escalation. The United States is committed to maintaining open channels of communication with the PRC to reduce risks and manage crises. We expect the PRC to also keep these channels open and responsive” ; In an effort to achieve reciprocity of access, the Department of State has implemented a policy requiring Chinese diplomats to notify the United States Government before meeting with state and local government officials and academic institutions” ; “The United States has updated its export control regulations, particularly in light of Beijing’s whole-of-society MCF strategy and its efforts to acquire advanced technologies related to hypersonics, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and other emerging and foundational technologies” ; “In response to the PRC’s documented unfair and abusive trade practices and industrial policies, the Administration is taking strong actions to protect American businesses, workers, and farmers” ; “In response to Beijing’s repeated failure to reduce or eliminate its market-distorting subsidies and overcapacity, the United States

		<p>imposed tariffs to protect our strategically important steel and aluminum industries” ; “the United States continues to urge China’s leaders to come to the table and begin arms control and strategic risk reduction discussions as a nuclear power with a modern and growing nuclear arsenal and the world’s largest collection of intermediate range delivery systems” ; “Beijing’s failure to honor its commitments under the communiqués, as demonstrated by its massive military buildup, compels the United States to continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible self-defense, which deters aggression and helps to ensure peace and stability in the region” ; “The United States remains committed to maintaining a constructive, results-oriented relationship with the PRC” ; “we remain open to constructive, results-oriented engagement and cooperation from China where our interests align. We continue to engage with PRC leaders”</p>
	<p>Multilateralism</p>	<p>“The United States is also building cooperative partnerships and developing positive alternatives with foreign allies, partners, and international organizations to support the shared principles of a free and open order” ; “The United States is working in concert with mutually aligned visions and approaches such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s <i>Outlook on the Indo-Pacific</i>, Japan’s free and open Indo-Pacific vision, India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region policy, Australia’s Indo-Pacific concept, the Republic of Korea’s New Southern Policy, and Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy” ; “We will continue to refute the CCP’s narrative that the United States is in strategic retreat or will shirk our international security commitments. The United States will work with our robust network of allies and like-minded partners to resist attacks on our shared norms and values, within our own governance institutions, around the world, and in international organizations” ; “the United States is actively engaging with our allies and partners, including in multilateral fora, to promote a set of common standards for secure, resilient, and trusted communications platforms that underpin the global information economy. To compel Beijing to adhere to norms of responsible state behavior, the United States is working with allies and like-minded partners to attribute and otherwise deter malicious cyber activities” ; “We are also engaging allies and partners to develop their own foreign investment screening mechanisms,</p>

		<p>and to update and implement export controls collaboratively through multilateral regimes and other forums” ; “For those unfair Chinese trade practices that are subject to dispute settlement at the WTO, the United States continues to pursue and win multiple cases” ; “Together with other likeminded nations, the United States promotes an economic vision based on principles of sovereignty, free markets, and sustainable development. Alongside the European Union and Japan, the United States is engaged in a robust trilateral process to develop disciplines for state-owned enterprises, industrial subsidies, and forced technology transfers. We will also continue to work with our allies and partners to ensure that discriminatory industrial standards do not become global standards” ; “the United States engages extensively with allies and partners to evaluate shared challenges and coordinate effective responses to ensure continued peace and prosperity” ; “Stronger alliances and partnerships are a cornerstone of the NDS. The United States is building partner capacity and deepening interoperability to develop a combat-credible forward operating presence, fully integrated with allies and partners to deter and deny PRC aggression”</p>
	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	<p>“The United States is working with Chinese authorities to stem the deadly flow of illicit Chinese fentanyl from the PRC to the United States” ; “In December 2018, the President secured a commitment from his Chinese counterpart to control all forms of fentanyl in the PRC. With the Chinese regulatory regime in place since May 2019, United States and PRC law enforcement agencies are sharing intelligence and coordinating to set conditions for enforcement actions that will deter Chinese drug producers and traffickers. The United States is also working with China’s postal agencies to improve tracking of small parcels for law enforcement purposes” ; “In January 2020, the United States and the PRC signed Phase One of an economic and trade agreement that requires structural reforms and other changes to China’s economic and trade regime, addressing several longstanding United States concerns. The agreement prohibits the PRC from forcing or pressuring foreign companies to transfer their technology as a condition for doing business in China; strengthens protection and enforcement of intellectual property in China in all key areas; creates new market</p>

		opportunities in China for United States agriculture and financial services by addressing policy barriers; and addresses longstanding, unfair currency practices. The agreement also establishes a strong dispute resolution mechanism that ensures prompt and effective implementation and enforcement”
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 8:</i></p> <p><u>Remarks by President Trump on Actions Against China</u></p> <p>(Trump, 2020a)</p> <p><i>Date: May 29, 2020</i></p>	Messianic	“Several of the most significant actions we’re taking pertain to the deeply troubling situations unfolding in Hong Kong.This week, China unilaterally imposed control over Hong Kong security” ; “The Chinese government’s move against Hong Kong is the latest in a series of measures that are diminishing the city’s longstanding and very proud status.” ; “It extends the reach of China’s invasive state security apparatus into what was formerly a bastion of liberty.China’s latest incursion, along with other recent developments that degraded the territory’s freedoms, makes clear that Hong Kong is no longer sufficiently autonomous to warrant the special treatment that we have afforded the territory since the handover.” ; “The United States will also take necessary steps to sanction PRC and Hong Kong officials directly or indirectly involved in eroding Hong Kong’s autonomy and — just if you take a look, smothering — absolutely smothering Hong Kong’s freedom” ; “The people of Hong Kong hoped that in the years and decades to come, China would increasingly come to resemble its most radiant and dynamic city. The rest of the world was electrified by a sense of optimism that Hong Kong was a glimpse into China’s future — not that Hong Kong would grow into a reflection of China’s past”
	Unconstrained	“Because they have failed to make the requested and greatly needed reforms, we will be today terminating our relationship with the World Health Organization”
	Universalization of threat	“China has also unlawfully claimed territory in the Pacific Ocean, threatening freedom of navigation and international trade. And they broke their word to the world on ensuring the autonomy of Hong Kong” ; “and so many other nations” ; “The world is now suffering as a result of the malfeasance of the Chinese government. China’s cover-up of the Wuhan virus allowed the disease to spread

		<p>all over the world, instigating a global pandemic” ; “and over a million lives worldwide” ; “Chinese officials ignored their reporting obligations to the World Health Organization and pressured the World Health Organization to mislead the world when the virus was first discovered by Chinese authorities” ; “Countless lives have been taken, and profound economic hardship has been inflicted all around the globe” ; “The world needs answers from China on the virus. We must have transparency” ; “The death and destruction caused by this is incalculable. We must have answers not only for us but for the rest of the world” ; “This is a tragedy for the people of Hong Kong, the people of China, and indeed the people of the world”</p>
	<p>Necessary enemy</p>	<p>“They have ripped off the United States like no one has ever done before. Hundreds of billions of dollars a year were lost dealing with China, especially over the years during the prior administration. China raided our factories, offshored our jobs, gutted our industries, stole our intellectual property, and violated their commitments under the World Trade Organization” ; “The Chinese government has continually violated its promises to us” ; “cost more than 100,000 American lives” ; “China has total control over the World Health Organization” ; “the government of China has conducted illicit espionage to steal our industrial secrets” ; “secure our nation’s vital university research and to suspend the entry of certain foreign nationals from China who we have identified as potential security risks” ; “defend and protect the workers, families, and citizens of the United States of America”</p>
	<p>Innocent</p>	<p>“My administration negotiated and fought for what was right. It’s called: fair and reciprocal treatment” ; “The United States wants an open and constructive relationship with China, but achieving that relationship requires us to vigorously defend our national interests” ; “We have detailed the reforms that it must make and engage with them directly, but they have refused to act” ; “We will be revising the State Department’s travel advisory for Hong Kong to reflect the increased danger of surveillance and punishment by the Chinese state security apparatus. We will take action to revoke Hong Kong’s preferential treatment as a separate customs and travel territory from the rest of China”</p>
	<p>Multilateralism</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">X</p>
	<p>Non-Alignment</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">X</p>

	Potential Partner	X
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 9:</i> <u>Mike Pompeo</u> <u>Press</u> <u>Conference July 8: Talks Possible</u> <u>TikTok Ban</u> (Pompeo, 2020a)</p> <p><i>Date: July 8, 2020</i></p>	Messianic	<p>“Beijing fears, its own peoples freethinking more than any foreign foe” ; “We were deeply troubled to learn this week that the CCP detained Xu Zhangrun for criticizing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s oppressive regime and the CCPs mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic. He should be released. He was simply telling the truth. He should be released as soon as possible” ; “Beijing described Xinjiang internment camps as vocational training camps, new reports of forced abortions and sterilizations add to a body of evidence that contradicts that” ; “Beijing said that for 50 years, they give the people of Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, and you all have seen what’s happened after only 23 years” ; “the CCPs use of slave labor in Xinjiang, and providing them with a set of governance recommendations for how they should ensure that they are not part and parcel of this terrible practice” ; “It’s our job, the responsible nations of the world to increase those costs, document the human impact of these decisions and use this example to remind the world of what these two regimes stand for” ; “The infrastructure of this next a hundred years must be a communications infrastructure that’s based on a Western ideal of private property and protection of private citizens information in a transparent way” ; “the Chinese Communist Party was simply incapable. And you see it with the arrests that I referred to in my remarks, they’re incapable of being transparent, of accepting criticism, of allowing reporters to ask them questions that they find uncomfortable that elicit the truth and the facts.” ; “the Chinese Communist Party, that authoritarian model simply can’t prevent the inquiry or has to prevent that inquiry because they’re afraid. They’re afraid that the truth will be something that will not shine a happy light on what took place” ; “This is a fundamental and fatal flaw for authoritarian regimes, and it’s why the Chinese Communist Party has to be held accountable”</p>

Unconstrained

“The WHO needs to be free to do it’s real work” ; “intent to withdraw from the World Health Organization” ; “we are not going to underwrite an organization that has historically been incompetent and not performed its fundamental function. There’s a real focus on the failures that took place around Wuhan and the World Health Organization’s fundamental, inability to perform its basic core mission of preventing a global pandemic spread” ; “This is an institution that got it wrong on SARS had got it wrong on Ebola. The United States had to create its own system, PEPFAR to do the work, to prevent and come up with solutions to the HIV/AIDS problem. We did that. The United States did that. The World Health Organization has a long history of corruption and politicization” ; “But the WHO leadership clearly has been able to execute and implement them in a way that can prevent the global pandemic that has destroyed hundreds of thousands of lives and costs the global economy, trillions and trillions of dollars. That is not an organization that the administration has any intention of underwriting”

Universalization of threat

“They failed to tell the world the truth about this virus. And now hundreds of thousands of peoples all across the world are dead” ; “the Chinese Communist Party needs to come clean with the world about this virus” ; “Empty promises made to the people of Hong Kong and to the world” ; “Huawei is “A serial intellectual property thief with a pattern and practice of disregarding both the rule of law and the rights of its victims” ; “the CCP recently filed a boundary dispute with Butan at a meeting of the Global Environmental Facility. From the mountain ranges of the Himalayas to the waters of Vietnam’s Exclusive Zone to the Senkaku Islands and beyond, Beijing has a pattern of instigating territorial disputes. The world shouldn’t allow this bullying to take place nor should it permit it to continue” ; “the actions of [...]China to constrict the flow of life, saving supplies, medicine and food have exacerbated an already terrible humanitarian situation on the ground” ; “China once again, vetoed action at the UN Security Council that would have maintained humanitarian access to desperate Syrian communities” ; “the people’s Republic of China have repeatedly abused their veto powers and the council to support the Assad Regime strategy of

		<p>starving its own people” ; “They believe there’s no price to pay for their actions to the Security Council” ; “That is not the model that Chinese Communist Party software and hardware companies are engaged in” ; “The Chinese took incredibly aggressive action” ; “we talked about the number of both maritime and boundaries disputes of the Chinese Communist Party has engaged. And I think it’s unequaled any place else in the world. There aren’t many neighbors that can satisfactorily saying that they know where their sovereignty ends and that the Chinese Communist Party will respect that sovereignty. That’s certainly true now for the people who Butan as well” ; “This increasing revisionist effort that the Chinese Communist Party is engaged in” ; “this challenge from the Chinese communist party” ; “more than ever that the free peoples of the world will come to understand the threat that’s presented not only internally inside of China, but importantly, that the impact that General Secretary Xi has on the world is not good for a free peoples and democracy loving peoples”</p>
	<p>Necessary enemy</p>	<p>“I want to start today with the Chinese Communist Party” ; “we protect the privacy of American citizens and their information as a transit” ; “American national security” ; “the threat from the Chinese Communist Party” ; “We’ve talked about in the context of ZTE, we’ve talked about it in the context of Huawei and we are now evaluating each instance where we believe that US citizens data that they have on their phones or in their system or in their healthcare records. We want to make sure that the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t have a way to easily access that” ; “take actions that preserve and protect that information and deny the Chinese Communist Party access to the private information that belongs to Americans” ; “Something that President Trump has taken incredibly seriously.”</p>
	<p>Innocent</p>	<p>“We respond to this in a way that we think is appropriate. And we have attempted to communicate to the Chinese leadership that we are serious about this”</p>
	<p>Multilateralism</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">X</p>
	<p>Non-Alignment</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">X</p>
	<p>Potential Partner</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">X</p>

	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 10:</i> <u>U.S Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea</u> (Pompeo, 2020b)</p> <p><i>Date: July 13, 2020</i></p>	Messianic	“ The United States champions a free and open Indo-Pacific ” ; “ In the South China Sea, we seek to preserve peace and stability, uphold freedom of the seas in a manner consistent with international law, maintain the unimpeded flow of commerce, and oppose any attempt to use coercion or force to settle disputes ”
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	“ Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them ” ; “ under unprecedented threat from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing uses intimidation to undermine the sovereign rights of Southeast Asian coastal states in the South China Sea, bully them out of offshore resources, assert unilateral dominion, and replace international law with “might makes right.” Beijing’s approach has been clear for years ” ; “ The PRC’s predatory world view has no place in the 21st century ” ; “ The PRC has no legal grounds to unilaterally impose its will on the region ” ; “ Beijing has offered no coherent legal basis for its “Nine-Dashed Line” claim in the South China Sea since formally announcing it in 2009 ” ; “ Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire ”
	Necessary enemy	X
	Innocent	X
Multilateralism	“ We share these deep and abiding interests with our many allies and partners who have long endorsed a rules-based international order ” ; “ As the United States has previously stated, and as specifically provided in the Convention, the Arbitral Tribunal’s decision is final and legally binding on both parties. Today we are aligning the U.S. position on the PRC’s maritime claims in the SCS with the Tribunal’s decision ” ; “ The PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim – including any Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims derived from Scarborough Reef and the Spratly Islands – vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the Tribunal found to be in the Philippines’ EEZ or on its continental shelf ” ; “ As Beijing has failed to put forth a lawful, coherent maritime claim in the South China Sea, the United States rejects any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12-nautical mile territorial	

		<p>sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands (without prejudice to other states' sovereignty claims over such islands)"; "International law is clear: An underwater feature like James Shoal cannot be claimed by any state and is incapable of generating maritime zones"; "America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law. We stand with the international community in defense of freedom of the seas and respect for sovereignty and reject any push to impose "might makes right" in the South China Sea or the wider region"</p>
	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	X
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 11:</i> <u>Donald Trump</u> <u>Rose Garden</u> <u>Press</u> <u>Conference</u> (Trump, 2020b)</p> <p><i>Date: July 14, 2020</i></p>	<p>Messianic</p> <p>Unconstrained</p>	<p>"To hold China accountable for its oppressive actions against the people of Hong Kong"; "to hold responsible the individuals and the entities involved in extinguishing Hong Kong's freedom"; "Their freedom has been taken away. Their rights have been taken away and with it goes Hong Kong"; "the world needs American strength right now, more than ever"</p> <p>"We withdrew from the Chinese dominated, WHO"; "The WHO, World Health Organization, we were paying close to \$500 million a year. China was paying \$39 million a year. And China had too much say"; "We've been very tough on the World Trade Organization and we've been, I guess, as tough as you can get on World Health. We withdrew our money. We told them we're getting out"; "the Paris Climate Accord, which was unbelievably expensive to our country. Would have crushed American manufacturers"; "it was going to cost us hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars for the privilege of being involved in the Paris Climate Accord"; "the Paris Climate Accord. But it wasn't good for us at all"; "Paris Climate Accord, which will destroy us at the expense of many other nations who benefit"</p>

<p>Universalization of threat</p>	<p>“We convinced many countries, many countries, and I did this myself for the most part, not to use Huawei because we think it’s an unsafe security risk” ; “It’s a big security risk” ; “we hold China fully responsible for concealing the virus and unleashing it upon the world” ; “allowing China to pollute the atmosphere with impunity” ; “what China has unleashed on the world, it’s hard to even fathom.” ;</p>
<p>Necessary enemy</p>	<p>“We’re placing massive tariffs and have placed very large tariffs on China” ; “the plague pouring in from China” ; “No administration has been tougher on China than this administration. We imposed historic tariffs. We stood up to China’s intellectual property theft at a level that nobody’s ever come close. We confronted untrustworthy Chinese technology and telecom providers” ; “China has taken out hundreds of billions of dollars a year from our country” ; “They took all of the advantage away from us. They took everything away. They don’t have oil. We would have had to close up a tremendous amounts of our energy to qualify, eventually, not too far into the future. We would have had to do things that would have been unbelievably destructive to our country, including the possible closing of 25% of our businesses, think of that” ; “China is building a massive military” ; “They’re building a massive military” ; “China was taking us to the cleaners” ; “the spread of the China virus” ; “we’re using the full power of the Federal government to fight the China virus and to keep our people safe” ; “[the rise of China is] not a positive development. Not for us it’s not” ; “nobody’s ripped us off more than China over the last 25, 30 years, nobody close” ; “would cripple American industry while greatly helping China” ; “China to pillage our factories, plunder our communities and steal our most precious secrets” ; “China is our competition”</p>
<p>Innocent</p>	<p>“And I don’t want them to have a bad year. I want them to have a good year, but they were taking advantage of the United States for many, many years, and that’s stopping” ; “we rebuilt China” ; “supported China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. One of the greatest geopolitical and economic disasters in world history. If you look at China, you look at the moment they joined the World Trade, they were flatlining for years and years and years and decades. And then all of a sudden they joined the World Trade Organization and they went like a rocket ship. They were given all sorts of advantages. They were considered a developing country. As a</p>

		developing country they got tremendous advantages over the United States and other countries, and they took advantage of those advantages and then some” ; “Hope we don’t have to use them” ; “Well, we all wish well to China”
	Multilateralism	X
	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	X
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<i>Document 12:</i> <u>Mike Pompeo</u> <u>Press</u> <u>Conference</u> (Pompeo, 2020c) <i>Date: July 15,</i> 2020	Messianic	“What the CCP does to the Chinese people is bad enough” ; “There’s nothing more fundamental to who we are than our irreverence for unalienable rights. The basic God-given rights that every human being possesses. Whether defending the American people from threats, supporting international religious freedom, or encouraging countries to secure property rights by upholding the rule of law, America defends rights and does good in the world” ; “and the world” ; “the things that are happening on a human rights scale I’ve described as the stain of the century” ; “That’s the behavior that we’re trying to see changed” ; “We want good things for the people of China” ; “we will support countries all across the world who recognize that China has violated their legal territorial claims as well, or maritime claims as well” ; “we’ll support other nations of the region that do a similar thing with respect to protecting their capacity, to preserve the maritime boundaries that their people are entitled to”
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	“General Secretary Xi Jinping made a choice to violate the Chinese Communist Party’s promises to Hong Kong that were made in a UN Registered Treaty” ; “the Chinese Communist Party and its threat to free peoples around the world” ; “We have a Chinese Communist Party that is putting freedom and democracy at risk by their expansionist imperialist, authoritarian behavior” ; “hundreds of thousands across the world. Cost the global economy trillions and trillions of dollars” ; “I’ve watched the

		<p>Chinese Communist Party's behavior with respect to the virus that emanated from Wuhan. And they have simply refused. They've destroyed samples. They've taken journalists and doctors who were prepared to talk about this, and not permitted them to do what nations that want to play on a truly global scale and global stage ought to do, be transparent and open, and communicate, and cooperate"; "It's a security risk"; "This information that transits across these untrusted networks that are of Chinese origin will almost certainly end up in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party";</p>
	<p>Necessary enemy</p>	<p>"We have to deal with China as it is"; "State Department will impose visa restrictions on certain employees of Chinese technology companies like Huawei"; "we made our policy on the South China Sea crystal clear. It's not China's maritime empire"; "put the American people at risk"; "put America's national security at risk"; "we will continue to do the things we need to do to make sure that the American people are safe and secure"; "This is a regime that failed to disclose information they had about a virus that's now killed over a 100,000 Americans"; "the Secretary of State of the United States believe that China will sell weapons systems to Iran"; "the risk of this is real and that the work between Iran and the Chinese Communist Party may well commence rapidly and robustly"; "This is America standing up for its own people"; "the threat that the Chinese Communist Party"</p>
	<p>Innocent</p>	<p>"if China treats Hong Kong as one country and a single system, so must we"; "not as we wish it to be"; "If Beijing violates international law and free nations do nothing, then history shows that the CCP will simply take more territory"; "for an awful long time, our policy simply reflected allowing China to engage in behavior that was radically unreciprocal, enormously unfair to the American people"; "we have a set of fair and reciprocal relationships. That's the end state desire"; "We need to see fair reciprocal responses. We're hopeful that they'll complete their requirements under the phase one trade deal. And we're hopeful that we'll see changes in their behavior across the entire spectrum, where they have unfairly treated America for far too long"; "I regret that the Chinese Communist Party chose to make that threat against Lockheed Martin. It's</p>

		not the first time they've chosen to do that to an American contractor who was working on a program that was between the United States and Taiwan” ; “So the extent there's been a change in relationship, it is a direct result of the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party” ; “our relationship with China has changed. I think it's worth noting. The reason for that change is the Chinese Communist Party's behavior”
	Multilateralism	“we'll go provide them the assistance we can, whether that's in multilateral bodies, whether that's in ASEAN, whether that's through a legal responses” ; “the United States is prepared to do the things necessary to assist them in protecting their valid, legal claims” ;
	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	X
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text

<p><i>Document 13:</i></p> <p><u>Remarks delivered by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (Pompeo, 2020d)</u></p> <p><i>Date: July 23, 2020</i></p>	Messianic	“I want to recognize several courageous Chinese dissidents who have joined us here today and made a long trip” ; “repression in Hong Kong and in Xinjiang” ; “the CCP insist on silence over its human rights abuses as the price of admission for Western companies entering China” ; “then added a widget made of slave labor” ; “China is increasingly authoritarian at home” ; “the Communist Party's gross human rights violations” ; “Our Departments of Treasury and Commerce have thus sanctioned and blacklisted Chinese leaders and entities that are harming and abusing the most basic rights for people all across the world” ; “We know that the People's Liberation Army is not a normal army, too. Its purpose is to uphold the absolute rule of the Chinese Communist Party elites and expand a Chinese empire, not to protect the Chinese people” ; “We must also engage and empower the Chinese people—a dynamic, freedom-loving people who are completely distinct from the Chinese Communist Party” ; “I've met with Uyghurs and ethnic Kazakhs who escaped Xinjiang's concentration camp” ; “fighting for freedom for the Chinese people” ; “The biggest lie that they tell is to think that they speak for 1.4 billion people who are surveilled, oppressed, and scared to speak out. Quite the contrary. The CCP
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		<p>fears the Chinese people’s honest opinions more than any foe, and save for losing their own grip on power, they have reason—no reason to” ; “But changing the CCP’s behavior cannot be the mission of the Chinese people alone” ; “we can defend freedom because of the sweet appeal of freedom itself. Look at the Hong Kongers clamoring to emigrate abroad as the CCP tightens its grip on that proud city. They wave American flags” ; “People from all over the world still want to come to open societies. They come here to study, they come here to work, they come here to build a life for their families. They’re not desperate to settle in China” ; “this is what the United States did recently when we rejected China’s unlawful claims in the South China Sea once and for all, as we have urged countries to become Clean Countries so that their citizens’ private information doesn’t end up in the hand of the Chinese Communist Party” ; “America is perfectly positioned to lead it because our founding principles give us that opportunity” ; “our nation was founded on the premise that all human beings possess certain rights that are unalienable” ; “And it’s our government’s job to secure those rights. It is a simple and powerful truth. It’s made us a beacon of freedom for people all around the world, including people inside of China”</p>
	<p>Unconstrained</p>	<p>X</p>
	<p>Universalization of threat</p>	<p>“for the future of free democracies around the world” ; “the CCP failed in its promises to the world” ; “The free world must triumph over this new tyranny” ; “It made the world’s key waterways less safe for international commerce” ; “more aggressive in its hostility to freedom everywhere else” ; “desire for global hegemony of Chinese communism” ; “Beijing’s actions threaten our people and our prosperity” ; “Beijing threatens international agreements as— treats international suggestions as—or agreements as suggestions, as conduits for global dominance” ; “And so our Department of Defense has ramped up its efforts, freedom of navigation operations out and throughout the East and South China Seas, and in the Taiwan Strait as well” ; “Just think how much better off the world would be—not to mention the people inside of China—if we had been able to hear from the doctors in Wuhan and they’d been allowed to raise the alarm about the outbreak of a new and novel virus” ; “. Free nations have to work to defend freedom” ; “It’s time for free nations to act” ; “Every nation will</p>

	<p>have to come to its own understanding of how to protect its own sovereignty, how to protect its own economic prosperity, and how to protect its ideals from the tentacles of the Chinese Communist Party” ; “The challenge of China demands exertion, energy from democracies” ; “ultimately the CCP will erode our freedoms and subvert the rules-based order that our societies have worked so hard to build. If we bend the knee now, our children’s children may be at the mercy of the Chinese Communist Party, whose actions are the primary challenge today in the free world” ; “General Secretary Xi is not destined to tyrannize inside and outside of China forever, unless we allow it” ; “If the free world doesn’t change—doesn’t change, communist China will surely change us” ; “Securing our freedoms from the Chinese Communist Party is the mission of our time”</p>
<p>Necessary enemy</p>	<p>“Our goal was to make clear that the threats to Americans that President Trump’s China policy aims to address are clear and our strategy for securing those freedoms established” ; “detail what the China threat means for our economy, for our liberty” ; “Chinese trade abuses that cost American jobs and strike enormous blows to the economies all across America, including here in southern California” ; “Chinese military that grows stronger and stronger, and indeed more menacing” ; “if we want to have a free 21st century, and not the Chinese century of which Xi Jinping dreams, the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply won’t get it done” ; “we need a strategy that protects the American economy, and indeed our way of life” ; “the Chinese Communist Party exploit our free and open society. China sent pro-pagandists into our press conferences, our research centers, our high-schools, our colleges, and even into our PTA meetings” ; “The ultimate ambition of China’s rulers isn’t to trade with the United States. It is to raid the United States” ; “China ripped off our prized intellectual property and trade secrets, causing [1] millions of jobs all across America. It sucked supply chains away from America” ; “and here we are” ; “that the CCP regime is a Marxist-Leninist regime. General Secretary Xi Jinping is a true believer in a bankrupt totalitarian ideology” ; “America can no longer ignore the fundamental political and ideological differences between our countries, just as the CCP has never ignored them” ; “When it comes to the CCP, I say we must distrust and verify” ; “its intellectual</p>

		<p>property theft and policies that harmed American workers” ; “We’ve called it what it is—a true national security threat—and we’ve taken action accordingly” ; “Too many of them come here to steal our intellectual property and to take this back to their country” ; “And we’ve created a Space Force to help deter China from aggression on that final frontier” ; “the closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston because it was a hub of spying and intellectual property theft” ; “communists almost always lie” ; “the CCP is repeating some of the same mistakes that the Soviet Union made” ; “Communist China is already within our borders”</p>
	<p>Innocent</p>	<p>“We imagined engagement with China would produce a future with bright promise of comity and cooperation” ; “with that historic trip to Beijing, President Nixon kicked off our engagement strategy. He nobly sought a freer and safer world, and he hoped that the Chinese Communist Party would return that commitment” ; “American policymakers increasingly presumed that as China became more prosperous, it would open up, it would become freer at home, and indeed present less of a threat abroad, it’d be friendlier” ; “We opened our arms to Chinese citizens” ; “The kind of engagement we have been pursuing has not brought the kind of change inside of China that President Nixon had hoped to induce” ; “The truth is that our policies resurrected China’s failing economy, only to see Beijing bite the international hands that were feeding it” ; “We gave the Chinese Communist Party and the regime itself special economic treatment” ; “President Nixon once said he feared he had created a “Frankenstein” by opening the world to the CCP” ; “we’ll keep on talking” ; “But by insisting on fair terms” ; “President Trump’s goals for fairness and reciprocity, to rewrite the imbalances that have grown over decades” ; “We’ve called on China to conform its nuclear capabilities to the strategic realities of our time” ; “And the State Department—at every level, all across the world—has engaged with our Chinese counterparts simply to demand fairness and reciprocity” ; “But I call on every leader of every nation to start by doing what America has done—to simply insist on reciprocity, to insist on transparency and accountability from the Chinese Communist Party”</p>
	<p>Multilateralism</p>	<p>“We can’t face this challenge alone. The United Nations, NATO, the G7 countries, the G20, our combined economic, diplomatic, and military power is</p>

		surely enough to meet this challenge if we direct it clearly and with great courage” ; “it’s time for a new grouping of like-minded nations, a new alliance of democracies”
	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	X
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 14:</i> <u>Remarks delivered by President Donald J. Trump – 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Trump, 2020c)</u></p> <p><i>Date: September 22, 2020</i></p>	Messianic	“America will always be a leader in human rights. My administration is advancing religious liberty, opportunity for women, the decriminalization of homosexuality, combatting human trafficking, and protecting unborn children” ; “America is fulfilling our destiny as peacemaker “
	Unconstrained	“the World Health Organization—which is virtually controlled by China” ; “after I withdrew from the one-sided Paris Climate Accord, last year America reduced its carbon emissions by more than any country in the agreement”
	Universalization of threat	“We have waged a fierce battle against the invisible enemy—the China virus—which has claimed countless lives in 188 countries” ; “we must hold accountable the nation which unleashed this plague onto the world: China” ; “In the earliest days of the virus, China locked down travel domestically while allowing flights to leave China and infect the world” ; “The Chinese government[...]falsely declared that there was no evidence of human-to-human transmission. Later, they falsely said people without symptoms would not spread the disease” ; “The United Nations must hold China accountable for their actions” ; “China dumps millions and millions of tons of plastic and trash into the oceans, overfishes other countries’ waters, destroys vast swaths of coral reef, and emits more toxic mercury into the atmosphere than any country anywhere in the world. China’s carbon emissions are nearly twice what the U.S. has, and it’s rising fast”
	Necessary enemy	“We stood up to decades of China’s trade abuses”
	Innocent	“I only pray to God that we never have to use them”
	Multilateralism	X

	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	X
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 15:</i> <u>The Elements of the China Challenge</u> (Policy Planning Staff [PPS], 2020)</p> <p><i>Date: December, 2020</i></p>	Messianic	<p>“an order that is grounded in free and sovereign nation-states, flows from the universal principles on which America was founded, and advances U.S. national interests”; “In the face of the China challenge, the United States must secure freedom”; “oppression of ethnic and religious minorities”; “monitoring, censoring, and indoctrinating 1.4 billion people in China”; “supporting those in China who seek freedom”; “the United States must champion the principles of freedom — principles that are at once universal and at the heart of the American national spirit”; “Just as America’s commitment to a free, open, and rules-based international order composed of sovereign nation states arises from our dedication to “unalienable rights” — the language that America’s Declaration of Independence uses to describe the rights inherent in all persons” ; “the CCP has stuck to its authoritarian convictions”; “the CCP’s one-party, repressive rule”; “, the CCP has consolidated authority and — by nefarious means ranging from digital surveillance to indoctrination to concentration camps for religious and ethnic minorities — intensified the subordination of PRC citizens”; “the PRC’s brand of authoritarian governance”; “the CCP exercises repressive, single-party rule over some 1.4 billion people”; “the CCP intensified internal repression”; “erase the ethnic and religious identities of Xinjiang’s nearly 11 million Turkic Muslims, the party has damaged and destroyed mosques; imprisoned more than one million Uyghurs in so-called “re-education” camps that subject prisoners to ideological training, compulsory labor, forced sterilization, involuntary birth control, and other heinous abuses; and implemented mass surveillance, DNA collection, and other forms of coercive social control”; “risk because the CCP, unconstrained by respect for individual liberty and human rights, exploits the massive quantities of data that it collects to refine the AI algorithms that will power the next generation of networked technology”; “the United States helped to develop the Indo-</p>

		<p>Pacific’s free and open order” ; “the PRC punishes Chinese students studying in the United States for dissenting from official CCP views and for otherwise speaking freely.” ; “For the United States [...]the aim is to preserve the freedom and sovereignty of nation-states by fortifying the established order, which is grounded in respect for human rights and in fidelity to the rule of law, understood as the impartial application of publicly disclosed, settled, and binding rules” ; “and supporting those in China who seek freedom.” ; “the United States must champion the principles of freedom — principles that are at once universal and at the heart of the American national spirit” ; “Grounded in the nation’s founding principles and constitutional traditions; invigorated by a bustling economy; undergirded by the world’s best-trained and best-equipped military; served by government officials who understand the American people and the American political system, recognize the diversity and common humanity of the peoples and nations of the world, and appreciate the complex interplay of ideas and interests in foreign affairs; and fortified by an informed and engaged citizenry — this multi-pronged approach will enable the United States to secure freedom”</p>
	<p>Unconstrained</p>	<p>X</p>
	<p>Universalization of threat</p>	<p>“China’s inroads within every region of the world, much less the specific form of dominance to which the party aspires” ; “The CCP aims not merely at preeminence within the established world order [...]but to fundamentally revise world order, placing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the center and serving Beijing’s authoritarian goals and hegemonic ambitions” ; “wields its economic power to co-opt and coerce countries around the world; make the societies and politics of foreign nations more accommodating to CCP specifications; and reshape international organizations in line with China’s brand of socialism” ; “proceeding outward through the Indo-Pacific region and encompassing the globe” ; “the threat it presents to freedom around the world” ; “the CCP’s contempt for human life, indifference to other nations’ well-being, and disregard for international norms and obligations” ; “the mounting challenge that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) poses to free and sovereign nation-states and to the free, open, and rules- based international order that is essential to their security, stability, and prosperity” ; “The CCP’s</p>

recklessness in allowing the novel coronavirus born in Wuhan to develop into a global pandemic” ; “socialism — the state control of economy and society — as a model not only for the PRC but also for other nations and as the basis of an alternative world order” ; “long-term goal of achieving global preeminence and placing a socialist stamp on world order” ; “the accumulating dangerous strategic consequences of the rise of Chinese power for world order” ; “advanced technologies not only to control its own population but also to collect data on persons across the globe and to build a world-class military” ; “militarization of, the South China Sea in brazen defiance of international law while crushing freedom in Hong Kong and threatening to do the same in Taiwan” ; “debt-trap diplomacy, and other predatory economic practices in every region of the world, the better to induce or compel sovereign nation-states” ; “the CCP’s distinctive way of empire” ; “the CCP’s paramount geopolitical aim: to achieve global preeminence by reorganizing the international order around the party’s understanding of socialism” ; “All major economies are vulnerable to the CCP’s economic co-optation and coercion” ; “the CCP set its sights on dominating the global economy” ; “China pursues control over key international supply chains and essential materials and goods” ; “China seeks worldwide industrial dominance” ; “other advanced industrial nations in these domains” ; “countries that use them as 5G vendors face substantial threats” ; “since military operations, espionage, and political warfare depend on information and data, China invests large sums to gain advantage in cyberspace, including physical architecture, operating systems, and hardware” ; “CCP uses the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)[...] to expand foreign markets for Chinese companies and as a means of drawing nations, particularly their political and economic elites, into Beijing’s geopolitical orbit” ; “Because of the heavy economic and environmental costs imposed by the CCP, host countries increasingly find these BRI projects unsustainable” ; “China’s predatory development program and debt-trap diplomacy” ; “China exploits the freedom and openness of the world’s liberal democracies to undercut their governance, prosperity, and national security” ; “CCP carries out massive propaganda and disinformation efforts” ; “the PRC wields its vast economic power globally to bring countries under its sway” ; “proceeds outward through

		<p>the Indo-Pacific to encompass the globe” ; “Prime targets include U.S. treaty-based allies” ; “The PRC is also undermining the security, autonomy, and economic interests of many others in the region” ; “China has employed campaigns of disinformation and other forms of malign interference in democracies across the Indo-Pacific” ; “aims to erode democratic institutions and norms, not least through intimidation designed to compel the adoption of policies that advance China’s interests” ; “The PLA Air Force regularly conducts long-range bomber patrols out to the second island chain” ; “the PLA Navy operates surface and sub-surface naval forces from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean, and challenges naval and law enforcement vessels in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The PLA recently provoked skirmishes along its disputed border with India” ; “to spread disinformation around the world on COVID-19” ; “PRC wants to convince European nations that their political future lies not in the free, open, and rules-based international order, but in a new multipolar arrangement that respects geopolitical spheres of influence and regards allegations of internal repression as infringements on national sovereignty” ; “Beijing would obtain access to European states’ information flows, achieve a fuller understanding of their telecommunications vulnerabilities” ; “Beijing also actively engages with the Iranian regime and Syria’s Assad regime, both of which face significant U.S. and international sanctions and also are U.S.-designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, and egregious abusers of human rights” ; “endangers regional partners’ access to U.S. military networks” ; “the China challenge resembles the one presented by the Soviet Union to the free world”</p>
	<p>Necessary enemy</p>	<p>“Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has triggered a new era of great-power competition” ; “China is a challenge” ; “the CCP is developing a world-class military to rival and eventually surpass the U.S. military” ; “Meeting the China challenge requires the United States to return to the fundamentals” ; “the China challenge because only an informed citizenry can be expected to back the complex mix of demanding policies that the United States must adopt to secure freedom” ; “the China challenge” ; “China today is a great power governed by an authoritarian regime modeled on 20th-century Marxist-Leninist</p>

dictatorship” ; “for the United States” ; “Xi means displacing the United States as the world’s foremost power” ; “the contest for supremacy launched by the CCP” ; “use of economic might to surpass the United States in influence in every region of the world as well as in international organizations, and its development of a world-class military designed to counter and eventually surpass the U.S. military” ; “that require the PRC to occupy the commanding position in world affairs” ; “the CCP’s quest for preeminence in world affairs” ; “America’s own economic entwinement with China dwarfs U.S. commercial relations with the former Soviet Union” ; “Beijing’s long-term strategy of using a “whole-of-nation” approach to achieve — including by deceptive, corrupt, and illicit means — decisive advantage over the United States” ; “China engages in massive intellectual-property theft” ; “The PRC has perpetrated the greatest illegitimate transfer of wealth in human history, stealing technological innovation and trade secrets from companies, universities, and the defense sectors of the United States” ; “China’s efforts[...]cost the U.S. economy as much as \$600 billion annually” ; “devastated small- and medium-sized manufacturing in the United State” ; “wiping out as many as 2.4 million jobs in America alone and leaving crucial international supply chains dependent on China” ; “the United States lost that advantage in many essential industries” ; “The PRC aggressively implements industrial policy” ; “displacing the United States” ; “China intends not only to acquire control over global commerce, but also to support its “Military-Civil Fusion” (MCF) strategy for leveraging legally and illegally acquired advanced and emerging technologies to drive economic and military modernization” ; “China is the only country that invokes its state security laws to block U.S. regulators from conducting these inspections” ; “Some foreign-listed Chinese companies [...]have ties to Beijing’s military modernization, espionage, and human rights abuses, and may be subject to U.S. sanctions and export control” ; “It generously funds Confucius Institutes, which specialize in disseminating CCP propaganda, at universities in the United State” ; “development of a world-class military that is intended to rival and in the long-term surpass the U.S. military” ; “Top officials in the U.S. Department of Defense have warned that the United States can no longer take for granted military superiority in East Asia” ; “which seeks

to achieve the world’s most technologically sophisticated military by acquiring, including through illegal means, advanced and emerging technologies from the United States” ; “Vast arsenals of ground-based precision missiles to penetrate U.S. defenses” ; “The PLA’s rapid progress in producing and deploying hypersonic missiles — designed to defeat U.S. [...] missile defenses — underscores Beijing’s determination to achieve asymmetric advantages” ; “Beijing seeks to at least double the size of its nuclear forces and achieve a form of qualitative equivalence with the United States” ; “The PRC also adopted non-military stratagems to complicate U.S. military operation” ; “China will use its military capabilities, operational concepts, and overall doctrine to turn the U.S. military’s technological strengths in the Indo-Pacific into weaknesses by credibly threatening to deliver massive punishment against American power-projection forces while thwarting the United States’ ability to provide reinforcement” ; “The PRC’s strategy is not only to prevail but also to demoralize America’s friends and partners by demonstrating that the United States cannot meet its security commitments in the region” ; “The PRC seeks to diminish U.S. influence” ; “weakening U.S. power and influence” ; “The PRC worked with Russia to increase use of the Chinese yuan and Russian ruble over the U.S. dollar in bilateral trade, in part to insulate both nations from U.S.-led financial sanctions” ; “strategic competition between the United States and China” ; “PRC wields its economic power to divide Europe from the United States and pull European nations toward Beijing” ; “the PRC sees a BRI-forged direct line from Beijing to Europe as a counter to what it describes as U.S. encirclement efforts and as a way to balance against U.S. or Western encroachment in the Indo-Pacific” ; “China seeks to increase its economic and security influence in the region at the expense of the United States” ; “undermines U.S. defense companies” ; “the United States will face surveillance and cyber-espionage risks” ; “disadvantaging companies in the United States” ; “China’s geopolitical influence stretches deep into America’s backyard” ; “The PRC targets key U.S. technological and economic sectors — at the national, state, and local levels — using cyberattacks, theft, and other methods to transfer to China valuable information, data, and technology” ; “China’s state-owned and state-directed companies — including those sanctioned by the United States and linked to

	<p>China’s military modernization, espionage, and human rights abuses — enjoy active and passive investment from a number of public pension funds in U.S. states” ; “the PRC exploits consulates in the United States as platforms to steal American intellectual property” ; “The PRC commits serious abuses in American higher education” ; “To advance its revisionist agenda and counter U.S. efforts to promote transparency and accountability, the PRC vigorously pursues leadership positions” ; “CCP directives proclaims the encounter between capitalism and socialism to be a matter of “you die, I live”” ; “the CCP’s ambition to prevail in great-power rivalry with the United States” ; “the CCP’s quest to make the Chinese nation the world’s greatest power” ; “must displace the United States as the world’s foremost power” ; “Strategic competition with China” ; “The United States must engage with Beijing cautiously and creatively while countering China’s economic imperialism and military adventurism and firmly opposing the brazen violations of the rule of law and the gross human rights abuses that seem to be inseparable from CCP rule”</p>
<p>Innocent</p>	<p>“the decision by the United States and nations around the world to engage, and welcome commerce with, China” ; “the United States must promote American interests by looking for opportunities to cooperate with Beijing subject to norms of fairness and reciprocity, constraining and deterring the PRC when circumstances require” ; “influential observers in and out of government viewed China’s rise as an opportunity to enlarge the world market and thereby benefit all nations through increased global commerce” ; “hoped that incorporating a rising China into the established international order would induce Beijing to fully open and privatize its state-directed economy” ; “the United States and other countries proceeded largely unaware of or indifferent to the long-term strategic competition launched by the CCP and affirmed with increasing boldness by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping” ; “U.S. administrations of both parties doubled down on a China policy focused on engagement” ; “launched by the CCP” ; “the United States must promote American interests by looking for opportunities to cooperate with Beijing subject to norms of fairness and reciprocity, constraining and deterring the PRC when circumstances require” ;</p>

Multilateralism	“the United States must fortify the free, open, and rules-based international order that it led in creating after World War II, which is composed of sovereign nation-states and based on respect for human rights and fidelity to the rule of law” ; “the United States must strengthen its alliance system by more effectively sharing responsibilities with friends and partners and by forming a variety of groupings and coalitions to address specific threats to freedom while, in cooperation with the world’s democracies and other like-minded partners, reforming international organizations where possible and, where necessary, building new ones rooted in freedom, democracy, national sovereignty, human rights, and the rule of law”
Non-Alignment	X
Potential Partner	X
European France	X
Residual	All non-coloured text

French foreign policy toward China

Messianic	X
Unconstrained	X
Universalization of threat	X
Necessary enemy	X
Innocent	X
Multilateralism	X
Non-Alignment	X
Potential Partner	“L’importance que la France accorde à ses relations avec la Chine, quelles que soient les contraintes du calendrier politique” ; “l’occasion d’échanges très constructifs avec le Premier ministre LI, qui m’ont permis de constater une nouvelle fois la qualité et la solidité de nos relations bilatérales, ainsi que notre grande convergence sur les sujets qui nous ont occupés” ; “Le développement

<p><i>Document 1:</i> <u>Déclaration de M. Bernard Cazeneuve, Premier ministre, sur les échanges commerciaux entre la France et la China, la coopération dans les secteurs du nucléaire civil et de l'aéronautique et le partenariat en marchés tiers, à Pékin le 21 février 2017.</u> (Cazeneuve, 2017)</p> <p><i>Date: February 21, 2017</i></p>		<p>du partenariat stratégique global franco-chinois est un axe prioritaire de notre politique extérieure” ; “un dialogue confiant entre nos deux pays” ; “Le renforcement de la coopération entre nos deux pays est plus important que jamais” ; “nos échanges commerciaux ont doublé depuis 2005” ; “approfondir nos coopérations dans les secteurs du nucléaire et de l'aéronautique et de donner une impulsion supplémentaire aux partenariats dans les secteurs d'avenir tels que l'agroalimentaire, la ville durable, la santé et le vieillissement et les services financiers” ; “Les nombreux contrats qui viennent d'être signés, devant nous, illustrent le potentiel de nos relations dans tous ces domaines” ; “La coopération franco-chinoise sur le nucléaire civil, qui est ancienne et solide, vient de franchir un cap majeur” ; “partenariat franco-chinois en marchés tiers” ; “nous nous sommes mis d'accord sur deux premiers projets en Afrique et en Asie” ; “des projets portés par des entreprises françaises et chinoises” ; “renforcer les échanges humains entre la France et la Chine” ; “L'accord de reconnaissance réciproque des permis de conduire” ; “nouvelles perspectives de coopération en matière de sciences, technologies et innovation” ; “nombreuses coopérations bilatérales que nous entretenons avec la Chine” ; “que les ONG françaises puissent poursuivre leur contribution au développement économique et social de la Chine” ; “La France aime la Chine” ; “coopération dans le domaine des politiques de prise en charge et d'accompagnement des personnes âgées” ; “la France est l'une des destinations préférées des touristes chinois” ; “projet d'éco-cité franco-chinois du district de Caidian” ; “la relation de confiance entre nos deux pays”</p>
	<p>European</p> <p>France</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">X</p>
	<p>Residual</p>	<p>All non-coloured text</p>
	<p>Messianic</p>	<p>“la France a toujours eu ce même rapport à travers l'universalisme qui nous a constitués” ; “Dans chaque pays où des divisions existent, où des régimes autoritaires se déploient, où parfois le pire est à l'œuvre, la France ne défendra pas des solutions militaires qui se feront contre la souveraineté des peuples” ; “nous ferons tout pour travailler avec les sociétés civiles et avec nos amis pour faire émerger les solutions politiques pluralistes qui permettront tout à la fois</p>

<p><i>Document 2:</i> Transcription du discours du Président de la République au palais de Daminggong (Macron, 2018a)</p>		de respecter chacune et chacun, d'éradiquer le terrorisme mais de construire les solutions politiques durables” ;
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	X
	Necessary enemy	X
	Innocent	X
<p><i>Date: January 9, 2018</i></p>	Multilateralism	“L’écriture du droit international de notre temps au travers du pacte mondial pour l’environnement que la France a porté aux Nations unie” ; “notre mission pour l’avenir est de définir ensemble cette nouvelle grammaire du multilatéralisme contemporain pour défendre les biens qui nous sont communs, au premier rang desquels le climat et l’environnement” ; “la Chine et la France se définissent comme des puissances du multilatéralisme” ; “réinventer le multilatéralisme” ; “ce multilatéralisme qui est à redéfinir implique de trouver les coopérations équilibrées à inventer pour le siècle qui s’ouvre” ; “dans le cadre du G20”
	Non-Alignment	“Le nationalisme aveugle qui recherche pour elle-même la confrontation brutale et mène toujours à la guerre, le repli sur soi, nourri de l’illusion de se protéger du monde”
	Potential Partner	“la France s’honore, qui a la première diaspora chinoise d’Europe” ; “Rien ne remplace ce contact fécond entre nos deux langues, nos deux univers, nos cultures, preuve constamment apportée que le dialogue est possible, et surtout qu’aucune de nos cultures n’est un bloc” ; “il y a ce respect, cette fascination réciproque, cette curiosité amicale, il y a un chemin de passage” ; “Ce palais impérial de Damingong (...) la France depuis 2016 s’est engagée à préserver et à restaurer à vos côtés” ; “nous fondons une grande amitié” ; “l’évidence d’une relation séculaire, l’évidence d’un souci conjoint d’appréhender le monde dans sa complexité, l’évidence d’un avenir partagé devant des enjeux aujourd’hui communs” ; “d’intérêts partagés” ; “l’entente (...) autour de principes et de projets définis en commun” ; “D’abord, en multipliant les projets culturels comme celui de l’exposition du musée Guimet sur les trésors de la dynastie des HAN, les Rencontres d’Arles à Xiamen, le Centre Pompidou à Shanghai, je

souhaite que nous élaborions dès maintenant plusieurs grands projets culturels communs, consacrés à la Chine d’hier et d’aujourd’hui, consacrés à l’histoire et l’actualité des routes de la soie, qui pourraient voir le jour à Paris l’année prochaine et jusqu’en 2021” ; “accélérer nos échanges universitaires et scientifiques en donnant un élan nouveau à la sinologie européenne par un grand institut européen conjoint, fédérant les compétences et les recherches, mais aussi en fondant de nouveaux partenariats dans l’innovation, le numérique et les technologies” ; “Le partenariat académique et scientifique doit être au cœur de ce cadre commun, de ce partenariat stratégique que nous voulons nouer. D’abord, en construisant des liens profonds qui permettront la formation à l’entrepreneuriat” ; “en développant un grand partenariat dans le numérique, pour combler les besoins technologiques” ; “e souhaite qu’en la matière, nous puissions renforcer nos coopérations, j’aurai l’occasion demain de le redire à Pékin, tout particulièrement sur l’intelligence artificielle” ; “les indispensables échanges qui permettront d’aller plus loin.” ; “Ce partenariat” ; “le partenariat que nous souhaitons nouer en matière d’innovation agricole et agroalimentaire” ; “La Chine doit être une terre de francophonie” ; “contribuer ensemble à l’intelligence du monde” ; “porter cette intelligence en commun” ; “fonder notre entente” ; “nous pouvons y parvenir ensemble” ; “Nous pouvons ensemble travailler à porter notamment cette clé de l’avenir qu’est l’éducation, et développer ensemble les stratégies scolaires et éducatives” ; “mener ensemble des projets” ; “l’Agence Française de Développement et la China Development Bank signeront un accord qui traduit ce renouvellement des méthodes” ; “le partenariat entre la France et la Chine” ; “je souhaite que nous travaillions ensemble au succès de la conférence du partenariat mondial sur l’éducation” ; “Après la décision américaine que je regrette, de sortir de l’accord de Paris, la Chine a joué un rôle décisif pour préserver cet acquis de 2015, pour lequel la France avait pris toutes ses responsabilités” ; “Et nous devons beaucoup à la décision de la Chine de rester dans le cadre de celui-ci” ; “Ce que nous avons fait depuis, nous l’avons fait parce que nous faisons, vous et nous, front commun” ; “Je proposerai demain au président XI de franchir une nouvelle étape du partenariat franco-chinois pour relancer la bataille climatique” ; “Je souhaite que la France puisse pleinement être à ses côtés et nous aiderons la

		<p>Chine à organiser cette conférence importante qui contribue à cette responsabilité collective mondiale” ; “Je proposerai au président XI une année franco-chinoise de la transition écologique 2018-2019 pour mobiliser nos entreprises, nos start-up, nos chercheurs, nos étudiants, nos universités, nos villes, des régions, pour démontrer au monde que nous, Français et Chinois, sommes capables de faire que notre planète soit à nouveau grande et belle” ; “ce partenariat qui nous permettra d’échanger par nos satellites les informations sur l’état de la planète et de nos pollution” ; “avancer ensemble sur ce projet” ; “en tant que membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité, en tant que grand pays ami” ; “Nous avons, sur ces biens communs, des visions profondément aujourd’hui alignées et nous marchons ensemble lorsqu’il s’agit du climat. Nous avons de plus en plus des visions qui se rapprochent et peuvent se marier lorsqu’il s’agit de la paix et de la stabilité” ; “combat commun” ; “deux grands pays, qui ont toujours pensé les équilibres du monde, travaillent ensemble” ; “La France a fait son choix et je veux ici saluer la responsabilité de la Chine” ; “Je souhaite, à cet égard, que nous puissions travailler ensemble (...) que nous puissions étroitement travailler avec la Chine” ; “Quand le multilatéralisme tel que nous le connaissons est mis au défi et quand la Chine veut s’engager” ; “ce pays de dialogue et de construction d’un partenariat nouveau pour le vingt-et-unième siècle avec la Chine” ; “les secteurs sur lesquels nous voulons coopérer ensemble” ; “Je pense également que l’initiative des nouvelles routes de la soie peut rejoindre nos intérêts” ; “Je suis ainsi prêt à travailler aux objectifs affichés” ; “construire ce partenariat, cette coopération et cette stratégie commune” ; “Nous vivons un temps où la France et la Chine peuvent se permettre de rêver ensemble” ; “la réussite d’un partenariat de confiance” ; “Nous avons besoin de cette amitié entre nos pays” ; “nouer notre relation de confiance et travailler à des projets communs”</p>
	<p>European France</p>	<p>“Entre l’Europe, la France et la Chine” ; “la France est et sera au cœur de l’Europe” ; “et avec la France, je l’espère, toute l’Europe” ; “Que cette soie dont la route nous a unis, dont l’Europe et la Chine” ; “ma détermination à faire entrer le partenariat euro-chinois” ; “L’Europe s’engagera résolument dans cette stratégie car elle a désormais conscience de son rôle et de sa place” ; “l’Europe est de retour” ; “notre Europe est de retour” ; “une Europe souveraine, unie,</p>

		démocratique, qui soit cette puissance économique, sociale, environnementale et scientifique scientifique qui puisse dialoguer avec la Chine et les Etats-Unis” ; “Cette ambition, c'est celle que j'ai portée depuis le début de mon mandat” ; “Avec elle, c'est l'Europe qui est de retour” ; “ceux de la France et de l'Europe” ; “Je suis prêt à jouer un rôle moteur dans cette direction en veillant à ce que les pays européens avancent dans l'unité” ; “ma volonté dans ce cadre c'est bien que la France et l'Europe prennent toutes leurs responsabilités”
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 3:</i> <u>Discours à Garden Island, base navale de Sydney</u> (Macron, 2018b)</p> <p><i>Date: May 3rd, 2018</i></p>	Messianic	X
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	X
	Necessary enemy	X
	Innocent	X
	Multilateralism	“To build a new dialogue with our allies and to define new rules of the game in common as we decided to do so especially run the table of the G20” ; “To be sure that rule of law is fully respected and to be sure pure that all the key liberties are respected in this region” ; “this order we know this multilateralism was the precondition of a Chinese development in the overall region that's why we have to preserve it for our interests and for the Chinese interests as well because that precondition of stability and order in the region” ; “there is no question here to challenge each other but to build a common framework where we can optimize our position and we can work efficiently” ; “to build a new strong in Indo Pacific axis” ; “to address the main crisis through dialogue and constant discussions we have to ensure the full respect of freedom of navigation liberty of all different seas and perfect as well circulation in the overall region that's how to be sure that the United nations framework and the United nations role are fully respected on the seas but as well on the air” ; “France will be very much committed to ensure I mean this full respect in these different fora and the different multilateral commitments we have” ; “I do believe that favoring multilateralism means preferring dialogue to crisis and increasing violence I

		mean it means avoiding taking any risk of escalation and precisely favoring a permanent dialogue”
	Non-Alignment	“To me the question is not to react to this initiative not too opposed to this initiative” ; “to preserve in the region this agreement after some recent decisions of other partners that longer border ship”
	Potential Partner	“China decided to fulfill its commitment and become a global power” ; “[I had] such a dialogue, such a frank and direct dialogue with them with China and including security and stability in the region” ; “we want to be seen and respected as a partner by China as an equal partner”
	European France	“Coordinated with the European Union”
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 4:</i> <u>Déclaration de M. Jean-Yves Le Drian, ministre de l'Europe et des affaires étrangères, sur les défis de la politique étrangère de la France, à Guidel-Plages le 21 septembre 2018</u> (Le Drian, 2018)</p> <p><i>Date: September 21st, 2018</i></p>	Messianic	X
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	X
	Necessary enemy	X
	Innocent	X
	Multilateralism	“Le plus important, c'est le fait que le multilatéralisme est combattu” ; “Le multilatéralisme, c'est le fait que l'on se refuse à régler les rapports entre les États par le biais de la confrontation et du rapport de force bilatéral. Et le multilatéralisme, c'est aussi le fait que l'on a tous conscience que l'intérêt général rapporte plus à chacun que ne pourrait rapporter à chacun le bilatéralisme conflictuel. Donc, c'est du gagnant/gagnant” ; “Singulièrement depuis l'arrivée du président Trump, ce multilatéralisme est systématiquement, méthodiquement, aujourd'hui, déconstruit” ; “Le multilatéralisme, c'est ce que porte la France” ; “La France doit être (...) à la tête de ce combat pour revitaliser, refonder le multilatéralisme.” ; “On peut le faire d'abord en essayant de sauver ce qui doit l'être dans le multilatéralisme sortant, c'est-à-dire rénover le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies” ; “C'est le même comportement que nous devons avoir à l'égard de l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce que les Américains bafouent, mais qui est indispensable pour assurer notre propre sécurité des

		échanges, régulation des échanges” ; “il nous faut aussi parallèlement engager des initiatives pour recréer un multilatéralisme d'opportunité” ; “puissent engager avec ceux-là une réflexion, une action sur le multilatéralisme”
	Non-Alignment	“Nous ne pouvons pas compter, pour refonder le multilatéralisme, sur les deux autres grandes puissances” ; “Donc ne nous épargnons pas ces interrogations même si nous devons avoir, avec la Chine, une discussion franche en mettant nos principes en avant. C'est ce que nous faisons”
	Potential Partner	X
	European France	“Nous, à la France, à l'Europe aussi” ; “la France, et l'Europe” ; “nous avons une crise majeure avec les États-Unis sur les enjeux commerciaux, l'Europe non seulement prend des contre-mesures contre les Américains, mais reste totalement unie pour mettre en oeuvre ces mesures et engage un bras de fer avec les États-Unis sur les enjeux commerciaux” ; “l'Europe lance les Universités européennes” “l'Europe a enfin commencé à parler de défense” ; “l'Europe, pas seulement l'Europe qui protège, je sais que le Président de la République redit sans arrêt « l'Europe qui protège », il faut le dire, mais l'Europe qui s'assume, l'Europe puissance, l'Europe qui n'hésite pas aux rapports de force, l'Europe qui est sûre de sa force”
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 5:</i> <u>Déclaration de M. Emmanuel Macron, Président de la République, sur les relations franco-chinoises, à Paris le 25 Mars 2019</u> (Macron, 2019a)</p>	Messianic	“Fondée sur le respect des libertés individuelles et des droits fondamentaux, de cet esprit des Lumières qui place le respect de l'individu au-dessus de tout, et qu'elle n'a jamais considéré comme une spécificité culturelle mais comme un fait universel juridiquement garanti par le droit international existant” ; “C'est pour cela que la France aborde cette question dans son dialogue avec la Chine pour exprimer les préoccupations qui sont les nôtres et celles de l'Europe sur la question du respect des droits fondamentaux en Chine, et sur plusieurs cas individuels sur lesquels nous avons discuté ensemble”
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	X
	Necessary enemy	X

<p>Date: March 25, 2019</p>	<p>Innocent</p>	<p>X</p>
	<p>Multilateralism</p>	<p>“La construction d'un multilatéralisme fort et efficace, avec, en son centre, l'action pour le climat et la biodiversité” ; “normes internationales que nous définissons au G20, et en pleine cohérence avec nos engagements climatiques” ; “La dimension multilatérale de notre partenariat stratégique global est également essentielle”</p>
	<p>Non-Alignment</p>	<p>“Réaffirmation de notre attachement à l'indépendance, au refus de la confrontation entre les blocs, à une certaine façon de regarder le monde tel qu'il est pour se donner les moyens d'y agir réellement” ; “Je ne crois pas à l'efficacité des postures de confrontation” ; “Aucun pays, si puissant soit-il, ne peut redéfinir à lui seul les règles du jeu international, et aucun pays, si puissant soit-il, ne sortira gagnant si le système multilatéral implose” ; “notre refus de la guerre commerciale préjudiciable à tous et notre volonté de travailler ensemble à la modernisation du système commercial multilatéral”</p>
<p>Potential Partner</p>	<p>“Il existe la possibilité d'une rencontre utile pour le monde” ; “nos échanges hier soir comme aujourd'hui m'ont conforté en la matière” ; “la Chine et la France (...)ont la responsabilité de tracer les voies de l'équilibre, de la coopération, dans le respect des souverainetés mais sur la base de règles du jeu définies en commun” ; “Notre relation bilatérale repose avant toute chose, je dois le dire, sur un agenda de confiance et de responsabilité” ; “le bilan des résultats obtenus sur la feuille de route que nous avons actée en janvier 2018 est bon” ; “Il faut donc à la fois maintenir la méthode et le rythme et notre partenariat se doit à cet égard aussi d'être exemplaire sur les apports de la coopération internationale” ; “En matière de nucléaire civil, la mise en service commerciale du premier réacteur EPR au monde à Taishan en décembre a été une avancée décisive amenée à se développer avec la mise en service d'un second réacteur en 2019” ; “nous avons ensemble décidé de poursuivre le partenariat qui, depuis tant de décennies, a montré son efficacité” ; “Sur l'aéronautique, la conclusion aujourd'hui d'un grand contrat en matière d'A320 et gros porteur A350 est une avancée importante et un excellent signal dans le contexte actuel, et je dois le dire dans la droite ligne de ce que vous m'aviez dit en janvier 2018, et donc de la force et de la fiabilité des échanges que nous avons noués. Partenariat exemplaire aussi en matière de rééquilibrage de nos</p>	

échanges économiques et commerciaux” ; “un plus grand partenariat de confiance dans les échanges, des progrès tangibles en matière d'environnement des affaires et de concurrence équitable et c'est cette voie que vous avez décidée, en particulier avec des lois récentes, et c'est une amélioration conjointe, partenariale que nous avons mise en oeuvre depuis un peu plus d'un an” ; “En matière d'agroalimentaire, les progrès ont été importants avec la levée de l'embargo sur le boeuf, suivie aujourd'hui de la levée de l'embargo sur la volaille, de l'octroi d'agrément dans plusieurs de nos filières et d'une réforme profonde en matière de zonage qui était profondément attendue” ; “De nombreux accords commerciaux sont également scellés aujourd'hui dans des domaines qui sont au coeur des défis de la Chine pour son développement” ; “permettra d'accompagner l'internationalisation de nos PME et ETI vers la Chine” ; “Dans le domaine des sciences, des technologies et de l'innovation, les entreprises-pilotes du plan "industries du futur" ont noué de véritables synergies avec leurs partenaires chinois” ; “Dans le spatial, après avoir lancé en octobre le premier satellite franco-chinois d'observation des océans. Nous scellons aujourd'hui un partenariat sur l'astrophysique, la surveillance du climat et l'exploration spatiale” ; “notre volonté de poursuivre notre partenariat dans ce domaine, sur Terre comme sur les corps célestes” ; “Nos coopérations dans le domaine culturel connaissent un dynamisme sans précédent, là aussi” ; “De grands projets sont actés, la plus grande exposition des oeuvres de Picasso en Chine cette année, la Chine à Versailles et la Cité Interdite” ; “Nous avons décidé que l'année 2021 serait celle du tourisme culturel entre nos deux pays” ; “Elles traduisent un état d'esprit commun, celui de retrouver véritablement ce qui fait l'essentiel de notre lien, le socle de notre capacité à nous comprendre, et d'y faire participer la jeunesse, comme nous le faisons avec la mise en place à la rentrée prochaine, à Shanghai, d'un institut franco-chinois de management de la culture et des arts” ; “nous sommes très heureux (...) d'accueillir près de 40 000 étudiants chinois en France” ; “nous avons aussi décidé de renforcer en la matière notre coopération sur la mobilité, la formation professionnelle et la coopération éducative et linguistique” ; “Nous avons enfin acté le renforcement de nos échanges sportifs pour la préparation des Jeux Olympiques de 2022 et 2024” ; “transfert de technologies avec la création d'un centre de Clairefontaine

	<p>à Pékin” ; “un partenariat (...)fort, défini sur des bases claires, exigeantes et ambitieuses” ; “nous avons acté ensemble des résultats très importants” ; “la mise en place d'un partenariat économique et commercial respectueux de nos intérêts mutuels” ; “la coopération sur des projets concrets en pays tiers” ; “coopération durable dans l'ensemble des secteurs” ; “de rester l'économie ouverte aux investissements et aux échanges, dont nous avons besoin et dont la Chine a besoin, puisque l'Union européenne est aujourd'hui son premier partenaire commercial” ; “Nous avons ainsi confirmé notre volonté de maintenir l'accord de 2015 avec l'Iran” ; “Nous avons également, je le disais, beaucoup avancé sur le climat et la biodiversité” ; “Nous avons, en effet, dégagé, lors de nos échanges et de la préparation de cette rencontre, comme durant les dernières heures, des convergences nouvelles très importantes” ; “nous allons jouer ensemble un rôle moteur pour que le sommet de New York de septembre prochain soit décisif et que les grands rendez-vous de 2020 soient tenus” ; “je veux véritablement souligner l'importance des avancées sur le climat et la biodiversité actées lors de nos échanges” ; “travail mené par la Chine et l'Union européenne” ; “Nous ne sommes pas en Afrique des rivaux stratégiques mais nous pouvons y être davantage des partenaires dans la durée sur les plans de la sécurité, de l'éducation, des infrastructures et du développement” ; “Je souhaite que nous puissions continuer à avancer ensemble sur cet agenda de sécurité” ; “la France veut être pour la Chine un partenaire fiable, clair et cohérent”</p>
European France	<p>“Au-delà de la relation bilatérale, nous avons placé au centre de nos discussions la question du partenariat entre la Chine et l'Europe” ; “euro-chinois” ; “en France comme en Europe” ; “L'Union européenne”</p>
Residual	All non-coloured text
Messianic	X
Unconstrained	X
Universalization of threat	X
Necessary enemy	X
Innocent	X

Multilateralism

Document 6:
Rapport d'information déposé en application de l'article 145 du Règlement pas la Commission des Affaires Étrangères en conclusion des travaux d'une mission d'information constituée le 17 octobre 2018 sur les Enjeux Stratégique en mer de Chine méridionale

(Delphine & Reitzer, 2019)

Date: April 10, 2019

“La France est pleinement appliquée auprès de ses partenaires australiens et néo-zélandais dans le cadre de l'accord FRANZ, pour venir en aide aux pays affectés par des catastrophes naturelles, fréquentes dans la région” ; “préserver « un développement qui repose sur des règles » et d'éviter une situation d'« hégémonie »” ; “en consolidant notamment nos partenariats stratégiques, sans exclusion mais dans le respect de nos principes” ; “renforcer nos partenariats avec les grandes démocraties de la région, qui ont également développé une vision de cet espace Indo-Pacifique : Australie, Inde et Japon en particulier, mais aussi Corée du Sud, Indonésie, Singapour, Nouvelle-Zélande” ; “promouvoir en Asie-Océanie un ordre multipolaire stable fondé sur le droit” ; “faire respecter le droit international et la liberté de navigation et d'affirmer son rôle d'acteur important de la zone” ; “Il s'agit, pour la France, de ne pas être prisonnière d'un partenariat trop exclusif avec la Chine dans cette région, et d'être en mesure de défendre fermement le respect du droit international, en s'appuyant sur ses partenaires qui partagent le même objectif” ; “valoriser notre statut de membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, qui assume des responsabilités globales pour défendre le droit international et maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationale” ; “les partenariats tissés par la France avec des pays de la région partageant nos valeurs et notre attachement pour le maintien d'un ordre international fondé sur le droit” ; “la stratégie française est également tournée vers l'ASEAN et ses membres, avec lesquels la France a noué des partenariats plus ou moins avancés : Indonésie (partenariat stratégique de 2011), Singapour (2012), Vietnam (2013), mais aussi Malaisie” ; “Notre pays cherche par ailleurs à faire reconnaître sa place au sein des forums de dialogue régionaux” ; “La France a par ailleurs systématisé sa présence au Shangri-La dialogue” ; “affirmer notre soutien au droit international” ; “la position française est qu'elle appelle tous les pays riverains de la mer de Chine du Sud à respecter le droit international” ; “La France estime que toutes les revendications maritimes doivent nécessairement s'appuyer sur les stipulations de cette convention, et ne peuvent en aucun cas lui être incompatibles” ; “Elle s'oppose à l'usage de mesures d'intimidation, de coercition ou à l'usage de la force, ainsi qu'à toutes mesures unilatérales visant à modifier le statu quo et susceptibles de menacer la liberté de navigation et de survol” ; “Néanmoins,

nous voulons insister sur deux principes essentiels de notre ordre international basé sur le droit : les différends doivent être réglés par des moyens pacifiques et par la négociation, et non par une stratégie de fait accompli; et la liberté de navigation doit être garantie” ; “L’action diplomatique de la France dans les forums internationaux (comme le Shangri-la) se double d’une affirmation politique : dans la Revue stratégique du ministère des Armées, les travaux de poldérisation entrepris par la Chine en mer de Chine méridionale sont clairement dénoncés” ; “il s’agit d’exprimer l’attachement de la France au respect du droit international aérien et maritime en mer de Chine. Le comportement des bâtiments et aéronefs français en mer de Chine reflète ainsi l’attachement de la France à l’utilisation légale, libre et sans entraves des espaces aériens et maritimes de la mer de Chine, indépendamment de la solution apportée aux différends territoriaux” ; “Ces bâtiments transitent dans les eaux internationales de l’archipel des Spratley, comme partout où le droit international les y autorise, en tant que de besoin en fonction des exigences opérationnelles” ; “Lors de leur passage, ces bâtiments mettent en œuvre les différentes libertés qui leur sont reconnues en vertu du droit international: ils s’entraînent, de façon autonome ou de concert avec des partenaires, ils mettent en œuvre leurs hélicoptères, et ils refusent de se soumettre aux exigences des États côtiers qui seraient contradictoires avec la convention de Montego Bay” ; “Cette attitude relève donc du respect du droit international combiné au souci de respecter les intérêts nationaux des autres pays” ; “apporter un soutien aux pays de l’ASEAN, dans le but d’accroître leur autonomie stratégique et ainsi de limiter l’hégémonie chinoise” ; “La coopération opérationnelle avec les pays riverains est un deuxième axe de l’implication française, via les escales de la marine nationale, voire de l’armée de l’air” ; “La France a par ailleurs des partenariats très fructueux avec des pays de l’ASEAN non riverains de la mer de Chine, en particulier Singapour, l’Indonésie et, dans une moindre mesure, la Thaïlande. Ces partenariats sont également importants en termes d’influence, pour équilibrer la position globale de l’institution, très marquée par sa dépendance économique à l’égard de la Chine” ; “la défense d’un ordre international basé sur le droit et la promotion d’un espace Indo-Pacifique multipolaire et stable, où la France aurait toute sa place” ; “La France devrait

		<p>donc expliquer, de manière plus détaillée, quels points précis du droit international maritime elle entend défendre en mer de Chine du Sud. Elle devrait répondre plus systématiquement aux protestations de la Chine, comme après le discours de la ministre des Armées au Shangri-La dialogue de 2018, en expliquant précisément sa position sur le plan juridique. Ces réponses devraient être rédigées par écrit et argumentées, afin d’obliger la Chine à exposer ses propres arguments et à ancrer clairement ses revendications et argumentaires” ; “Ce renforcement de notre position juridique permettrait d’augmenter notre capital stratégique auprès de nos partenaires de l’ASEAN et, plus largement, de la région, qui attendent de nous que nous soyons clairs sur la question” ; “La France devrait fournir un effort supplémentaire pour renforcer l’autonomie stratégique des pays de l’ASEAN et accroître son influence et sa présence auprès de cette organisation” ; “Une stratégie militaire multilatérale pourrait aussi reposer sur une coopération trilatérale Royaume-Uni – France – Allemagne” ; “Nous pourrions aussi envisager d’impliquer plus directement certains autres plus petits partenaires européens qui ont des positions assez proches des nôtres sur la mer de Chine et ont manifesté un intérêt pour la politique française” ; “cette stratégie permettrait d’affirmer un soutien collectif, donc beaucoup plus puissant, de l’Europe, via certains de ses membres, au maintien d’un système international basé sur le droit”</p>
	<p>Non-Alignment</p>	<p>“Cet axe ne sera pas tourné contre la Chine” ; “Il s’agit de « proposer une alternative” ; “la France a vocation à jouer le rôle de « puissance médiatrice »” ; “La France aurait ainsi vocation à promouvoir une troisième voie, en s’affranchissant du carcan de la rivalité Chine – États-Unis” ; “la stratégie française n’a pas pour but d’endiguer la Chine” ; “la stratégie Indo-Pacifique de la France ne doit pas être perçue comme étant tournée contre la Chine” ; “[notre position] se distingue de celle des États-Unis, nettement plus dans la confrontation” ; “La France a une position constante sur les contentieux territoriaux et maritimes en mer de Chine du Sud, qui repose sur deux piliers. Premièrement, elle ne prend pas partie dans ces différends : elle ne se prononce donc pas sur la pertinence des revendications des uns et des autres, qu’ il s’ agisse des revendications de souveraineté sur les îlots, des zones maritimes auxquelles ces îlots donnent droit, ou des règles de partage de zones</p>

		<p>économiques exclusives qui se recourent” ; “La France ne prend pas partie dans les différends territoriaux dans la zone ; elle s’en tiendra à cette position” ; “La France cherche à garantir la liberté de manœuvre militaire, mais sans provocation. Il ne s’agit pas d’aller avec la confrontation avec la Chine” ; “La Marine nationale s’engage partout là où ses besoins opérationnels le nécessitent et dans le respect du droit international, sans chercher à provoquer la Chine” ; “la France ne médiatise pas les transits de ses bâtiments militaires en mer de Chine” ; “Sur la période récente, ces opérations françaises n’ont provoqué que des réactions relativement atténuées de la part des Chinois. Les bâtiments de la marine nationale sont systématiquement escortés par des bâtiments chinois lorsqu’ils traversent les eaux contestées, mais cela ne donne lieu à aucun incident” ; “En revanche, les transits des navires des bâtiments français se distinguent en tous points des patrouilles organisées en mer de Chine par les États-Unis. Ces derniers disent également le faire au nom du respect du droit international, mais il y a, derrière cette affirmation, une indéniable confrontation de puissance avec la Chine, qui fait que ces opérations sont d’une nature très différente des transits conduits par la France” ; “Les FONOPS américaines font souvent l’objet d’une forte médiatisation, sous forme de fuites quasi instantanées dans la presse, lesquelles sont généralement suivies par de fortes protestations chinoises. Au cours des derniers mois, les Américains ont augmenté la fréquence de leurs FONOPS, jusqu’à en conduire quasiment une par mois” ; “rôle de puissance médiatrice que la France souhaite jouer dans la région” ; “essentiel que la stratégie Indo-Pacifique de la France ne soit pas perçue comme étant principalement tournée contre la Chine” ; “conserver un espace d’autonomie stratégique est dans l’intérêt de la France : nous partageons les mêmes objectifs que les États-Unis, mais il est important de maintenir notre position différenciée. À défaut, nous perdrons notre crédibilité aux yeux de la Chine, mais aussi des pays de l’ASEAN”</p>
	<p>Potential Partner</p>	<p>“parler « en partenaire égal »” ; “Au contraire, elle implique de poursuivre l’approfondissement du partenariat global avec la Chine” ; “Globalement, le comportement militaire de la France demeure respectueux du « partenariat global » entretenu avec la Chine” ; “la France a bien gagné le respect de la Chine du fait de sa constance, mais aussi de sa discrétion” ; “de l’espace pour</p>

		<p>l'épanouissement d'un partenariat fructueux et équilibré avec la Chine. Les rapporteurs pensent que les enjeux environnementaux – critiques en mer de Chine – pourraient fournir un point d'ancrage pour ce partenariat « positif » ;</p> <p>“En effet, les questions environnementales sont un champ privilégié de la coopération sino-européenne” ; “Le potentiel de collaboration avec l'Union européenne et avec les entreprises européennes est considérable dans ce domaine. Un grand partenariat Union européenne-ASEAN/Chine sur les questions environnementales pourrait ainsi devenir un axe essentiel du réinvestissement français et européen dans cette région du monde” ; “le développement de coopérations concrètes en matière de gestion commune des eaux en mer de Chine méridionale. Elles pourraient porter sur la protection de l'environnement marin, la recherche scientifique, la préservation de l'écosystème halieutique, autant de domaines dans lesquels la France dispose d'une réelle expertise”</p>
	<p>European France</p>	<p>“Ce constat incite bien évidemment la France et l'Europe à réagir” ; “également la position officielle de l'Union européenne” ; “La France devrait par ailleurs rechercher une convergence européenne” ; “la France doit faire preuve de leadership pour développer une vision Indo-Pacifique concertée au sein de l'Union européenne” ; “La communication conjointe publiée par la Haute-Représentante Federica Mogherini et la Commission européenne en mars 2019 sur les relations Union européenne – Chine énonce, à cet égard, un constat réaliste et sans concession, qui rejoint en de nombreux points la vision française” ; “la France, en tant que tête de pont de l'Union européenne dans cette zone” ; “« multilatéraliser » et d' « européeniser » nos interventions en mer de Chine” ; “Les opérations en mer de Chine conduites en coopération européenne devraient faire l'objet d'une communication conjointe et systématique”</p>
	<p>Residual</p>	<p>All non-coloured text</p>
	<p>Messianic</p>	<p>X</p>
	<p>Unconstrained</p>	<p>X</p>
	<p>Universalization of threat</p>	<p>X</p>

<p><i>Document 7:</i> Déclaration de M. Jean-Yves Le Drian, ministre de l'Europe et des affaires étrangères, sur le multilatéralisme, à Pékin le 26 avril 2019</p> <p>(Le Drian, 2019)</p> <p><i>Date: April 26, 2019</i></p>	Necessary enemy	X
	Innocent	X
	Multilateralism	“l'efficacité du multilatéralisme rénové et de l'utilité de la gouvernance mondiale renforcée que nous appelons de nos vœux” ; “réformer les institutions existantes lorsque cela est nécessaire mais toujours, toujours inscrire nos actions dans un cadre fondé sur le droit international”
	Non-Alignment	“Et devant l'ampleur de la tâche à accomplir, le repli sur soi, les efforts isolés ne peuvent être que des impasses” ; “Et face à la tentation du cavalier seul, face à la tentation du rapport de force” ; “la coopération rapporte plus que la confrontation”
	Potential Partner	“Ensemble, nous devons agir pour une mondialisation plus juste, une mondialisation qui profite à tous. Je dis bien ensemble, car il n'y a qu'en renforçant les bases de notre coopération que nous pourrons y parvenir” ; “l'occasion de réfléchir aux voies et moyens d'agir ensemble” ; “nous avons tout à gagner à unir nos forces” ; “les efforts de la France et de la Chine afin d'identifier des projets de coopération en pays tiers, et avec des pays tiers” ; “nos projets de connectivité” ; “C'est le sens de la déclaration franco-chinoise que les présidents Xi Jinping et Emmanuel Macron ont adoptée le 26 mars dernier et qui engage nos pays à développer avec leurs partenaires des initiatives concrètes pour renforcer le multilatéralisme” ; “agissons ensemble”
	European France	“Projet politique européen”
Residual	All non-coloured text	
	Messianic	X
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	X
	Necessary enemy	X
	Innocent	X
	Multilateralism	“Plaidé en faveur de l'émergence d'un axe indopacifique, avec pour pilier la France, l'Inde et l'Australie, mais avec une coopération étroite avec d'autres

<p><i>Document 8:</i> <u>Déclaration de Mme Florence Parly, ministre des armées, sur la coopération militaire de la France en Asie, à Singapour le 1er juin 2019</u></p> <p>(Parly, 2019)</p> <p><i>Date: June 1st, 2019</i></p>		<p>pays de la région, et avec les Européens bien sûr” ; “nous contribuerons à la stabilité régionale par le biais de notre coopération militaire et en matière de sécurité” ; “La France soutient la construction d'une architecture de sécurité régionale et la centralité de l'ASEAN. Nous avons pris des mesures pour nous rapprocher des différentes structures de l'ANASE” ; “nous contribuerons à la stabilité stratégique par une action multilatérale” ; “Nous croyons que nous pouvons rassembler nos amis et toutes les personnes de bonne volonté qui veulent se joindre à nous pour la défense du système international fondé sur des règles. Et avec cela, de manière pacifique, multilatérale mais robuste, nous espérons accompagner le vaste rééquilibrage en cours dans la région” ; “nous espérons coopérer avec le plus grand nombre de partenaires possible” ; “nous ne serons pas intimidés pour accepter aucun fait accompli, car ce que le droit international condamne, comment pouvons-nous tolérer?”</p>
	Non-Alignment	<p>“Nous allons traiter cette question de notre propre manière, constante, non conflictuelle mais obstinée” ; “Quant à nous, nous croyons que nous pouvons tracer notre propre chemin, éviter la confrontation et avoir une voix distinctive”</p>
	Potential Partner	X
	European France	X
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 9:</i> <u>Ambassadors' conference – Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic</u></p> <p>(Macron, 2019b)</p> <p><i>Date: August 27, 2019</i></p>	Messianic	<p>“The French spirit is a spirit of resistance with a universal calling” ; “true humanism” ; “We are the only geographical region that made man with a capital M central to its project during the Renaissance, at the time of the Enlightenment” ; “this humanist project that is central to the government's agenda, reinvesting in human beings” ; “It is the profound spirit of French humanism, which we invented and upheld, and which we must reinvent today” ; “Those in the world who risk their lives to defend the right to freedom are turning their eyes to us. So when I speak of a European project of civilization and this French project, that is also what I mean. We have rediscovered the essence of this obligation and knowledge around the world, without challenging the sovereignty of any particular nation” ; “It is therefore our responsibility, in these circumstances – and I believe in our ability to revive the spirit of the</p>

	<p>Enlightenment – to be key actors promoting new obligations in terms of human rights, new obligations in terms of our democracies, and to ensure that our values are defended everywhere” ; “fighting impunity and defending civilians and humanitarian workers in combat areas; championing human rights workers everywhere; and striving, as we have in recent weeks, to ensure that the Internet respects our democracies, freedom and balance” ; “French diplomacy must also work for gender equality” ; “we must continue with genuinely feminist diplomacy” ; “The new humanism I believe in, which we need to build and which must be central to the government’s strategy, must also be central to our diplomacy” ; “that our values are upheld everywhere”</p>
Unconstrained	X
Universalization of threat	X
Necessary enemy	X
Innocent	X
Multilateralism	<p>“to try and build a new order in which not only would we have a role to play, but so would our values and interests” ; “Indo-Pacific axis” ; “establish diplomacy based on global commons and to try through the multilateral framework” ; “we first need to focus our efforts back on the multilateral framework” ; “I therefore believe that if we want to achieve proper results through this diplomacy of global commons, we must adopt this strong multilateralism, be present and strong within multilateral forums like we are at the UN, revitalize and innovate in forums that are in crisis such as the WTO” ; “If we do not innovate at the WTO, the WTO will cease to exist” ; “an alliance for a new type of multilateralism”</p>
Non-Alignment	<p>“Deeply affected by the mistakes made by Westerners in certain crises, by American decisions over the last several years which did not start with this administration” ; “We then have a choice to make with respect to this major change, this major upheaval: do we decide to become junior allies of one party or the other, or a bit of one and a bit of the other, or do we decide to be part of the game and exert our influence?” ; “this crisis may lead to withdrawal, as some are choosing, which France did not choose in spring 2017” ; “the world</p>

		<p>will be centred around two main focal points: the United States and China. And we will have to choose between the two powers” ; “The United States is in the Western camp, but it is not promoting the same brand of humanism” ; “I deeply believe that we must act as a balancing power” ; “when I say that we must be a balancing power, it means that we must have the freedom to act, as it were; we must have mobility and flexibility. We are not an aligned power. I want to emphasize this” ; “we are not a power that believes that the enemies of our friends are necessarily our enemies or that we are prevented from speaking to them” ; “that, I believe, is France’s strength” ; “We must therefore have our own strategy” ; “Incidentally, in the past we have done this, and on the issue of space, as far as I know, our main allies are not American” ; “Our role as a balancing power must also be played in Asia” ; “developing an alliance which is, as it were, complementary – non-confrontational but complementary – to this relationship with China” ; “And what is our choice when it comes to 5G? Choosing between American and Chinese technology? I am deeply convinced that we must defend genuine European sovereignty regarding this point, without condemning anyone” ; “I am not saying that we need to fight the dollar, but we need to build real economic and financial sovereignty of the euro” ; “we have taken steps to attempt to convince the Americans that solving the issue of international trade is not just about waging trade wars”</p>
	<p>Potential Partner</p>	<p>“we must build the Euro-Chinese partnership of the 21st century” ; “we have set down important milestones in recent months, in particular during the Chinese President’s visit to Paris” ; “China has very much become our ally on this multilateral agenda” ; “There was an unprecedented moment for the pact, the Carbon Neutrality Coalition for 2050, when, on the sidelines of the Osaka summit, the foreign ministers signed a strategic document in which China committed itself with us to this agenda” ; “a Eurasian agenda enabling better convergence between the Chinese Belt and Road initiative and Europe’s connectivity strategy” ; “I mentioned that China made important progress at Osaka on this issue, and I believe that the visit that I will make to China in November should continue to build on the progress on this issue, because, as I mentioned earlier, China has become a key partner”</p>

<p>European France</p>	<p>“this is what should guide our action in France, in Europe” ; “not a French system but really a European [system]” ; “this approach both in France and at the European level” ; “we must nurture it in Europe” ; “championing this European civilization” ; “we must build a new architecture based on trust and security in Europe” ; “to rebuild a real European project” ; “together we must consider a space strategy” ; “a true European strategy” ; “to adopt a European strategy” ; “China has a real diplomatic genius for playing on our divisions and weakening us. That is why I chose to invite Chancellor Merkel and President Juncker on that visit for the first time, and for the first time we had a genuine – not just Franco-Chinese but also Sino-European – strategic agenda” ; “it is essential to systematically bear this European approach in mind” ; “China must also fully respect our sovereignty and unity, and in this regard, European momentum is essential” ; “We will not criticize the Chinese for being intelligent; we can criticize ourselves for being stupid” ; “If we want to be respected by China, we must first take a European approach” ; “priority is to work on building European sovereignty” ; “This European sovereignty must involve an ambitious agenda” ; “We can have more defence sovereignty, moreover, without renouncing our national sovereignty and our strategic and operational autonomy” ; “In doing so we triggered a genuine European movement” ; “We have made a great deal of progress on this point, with an unprecedented regulation at European level”</p>	
<p>Residual</p>	<p>All non-coloured text</p>	
<p>Messianic</p>		<p>X</p>
<p>Unconstrained</p>		<p>X</p>
<p>Universalization of threat</p>		<p>X</p>
<p>Necessary enemy</p>		<p>X</p>
<p>Innocent</p>		<p>X</p>
<p>Multilateralism</p>	<p>“Au multilatéralisme” ; “Les dirigeants chinois et européens ont donné une forte impulsion politique aux travaux entre la Chine et l'Union européenne sur la réforme de l'OMC” ; “le Président de la République réaffirmera l'engagement français (...) en faveur d'une OMC adaptée aux enjeux de l'économie actuelle”</p>	

<p><i>Document 10:</i> Tribune de M. Bruno Le Maire, ministre de l'Économie et des Finances, dans "21st Century Business Herald" du 7 octobre 2019, sur les relations économiques entre la France, l'Union Européenne et la Chine</p> <p>(Le Maire, 2019)</p> <p><i>Date: October 7, 2019</i></p>	Non-Alignment	<p>“La conclusion d'un accord en 2020 constituerait un symbole fort et enverrait un message fort pour rappeler l'importance d'un libre échange juste à l'échelle de la planète” ; “se veut un partenaire responsable de la Chine”</p>
	Potential Partner	<p>“Faire entrer ce partenariat dans une nouvelle phase pour répondre aux défis actuels: croissance ralentie, tensions commerciales, changements climatiques et inégalités croissantes” ; “nos domaines de coopération stratégiques comme le nucléaire et l'aéronautique, mais aussi dans le secteur financier, de l'environnement et de l'énergie, de la santé, du tourisme” ; “la deuxième édition de la Foire internationale des importations de Shanghai, où la France sera invitée d'honneur” ; “les entreprises françaises souhaitent continuer à acheter, vendre et investir en Chine dans un climat des affaires favorable” ; “des premiers résultats ont été obtenus s'agissant de l'accord sur la sécurité de l'avion civile” ; “comme la Chine” ; “Nous comptons sur la Chine pour qu'elle approfondisse les discussions sur les subventions industrielles, pour qu'elle soumette une offre ambitieuse pour accéder à l'accord de l'OMC sur les marchés publics, pour qu'elle s'engage en faveur d'obligations de transparence renforcée, et qu'elle trouve avec l'Union européenne une solution à un éventuel blocage de l'organe d'appel” ; “Je ne doute pas de leur volonté de travailler collectivement avec l'Union européenne pour y répondre” ; “L'objectif de ma visite est de réaffirmer (...)le rôle de la France de partenaire responsable, soucieux d'un renforcement équilibré de ses relations avec l'Union européenne et la Chine dans un monde incertain”</p>
	European France	<p>“L'Union européenne” ; “La France et l'Union européenne”</p>
	Residual	All non-coloured text
	Messianic	X
Unconstrained	X	
Universalization of threat	X	
Necessary enemy	X	
Innocent	X	

<p><i>Document 11:</i> <u>Déclaration de M. Emmanuel Macron, Président de la République, sur les relations économiques franco-chinoises, le commerce international et la question climatique, à Shangai le 5 novembre 2019</u> (Macron, 2019c) <i>Date: November 5, 2019</i></p>	<p>Multilateralism</p>	<p>“redéfinir ensemble, un ordre commercial ouvert, plus équitable et plus coopératif” ; “Le système commercial multilatéral est un bien commun qu’il nous faut préserver” ; “réforme de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce pour répondre, dans un cadre coopératif, aux questions de transparence, de surcapacités, de subventions d’Etat” ; “il existe des solutions qui sont à bâtir dans un cadre multilatéral transparent, efficace, rapide” ; “Chinois, Européens, Américains, puissances du monde entier présentes ici, à oeuvrer et à prendre nos responsabilités pour parachever ce travail de modernisation et de transformation de l’OMC” ; “oeuvrer à la modernisation, la transformation du cadre commercial mondial” ; “Chine et l’Union européenne bâtissent aussi et dans le même temps, un ordre international d’équilibre durable”</p>
<p>Non-Alignment</p>	<p>“nous voulons préserver cette mondialisation ouverte” ; “Considérer que, le système commercial que nous avons bâti ensemble, au sein de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce, au motif qu’il n’a pas su apporter une réponse aussi efficace que nous le souhaitons aux distorsions du commerce international, devrait être liquidé ? Qu’il n’y aurait pas d’autre choix que de recourir à l’action unilatérale, à l’utilisation de l’arme tarifaire, à la loi du plus fort ? Je ne le crois pas” ; “Ce n’est pas le choix de la France” ; “en même temps des concurrents, du fait du succès de la Chine dans son rattrapage” ; “Nous devons aussi démontrer ensemble, que l’esprit de coopération permet d’obtenir des résultats, plus que l’esprit de confrontation” ; “Viser l’autarcie n’est une bonne solution pour personne et n’est pas possible pour tout le monde, et c’est la racine des conflits de demain”</p>	
<p>Potential Partner</p>	<p>“Nous aussi, nous avons besoin d’une plus grande ouverture de la Chine et de son marché domestique” ; “l’agroalimentaire, c’est le 3ème poste des exportations françaises en Chine” ; “le 1er marché à l’export pour la viande porcine en dehors de l’Europe et de très nombreuses entreprises françaises m’accompagnent ici, des grands groupes comme des petites et moyennes entreprises, dans tous les secteurs de l’énergie, de l’environnement, des transports, de la santé, du numérique, du tourisme, des industries culturelles et créatives” ; “Beaucoup, beaucoup, a été fait ces dernières années, avec deux révisions des listes négatives pour les investissements étrangers, des programmes de réforme dans le secteur financier, la levée dans de nombreux</p>	

secteurs, des obligations de co-entreprises. D'importantes réductions tarifaires ont également été consenties, nous appelons à leur consolidation et à leur approfondissement” ; “La réalité, c'est que l'Europe et la Chine sont des partenaires, de premier plan, dans les échanges internationaux” ; “la mise en place de mécanismes de plaintes pour permettre aux investisseurs étrangers de mieux faire valoir leurs droits et assurer une égalité de traitement pour tous les investisseurs. Je salue ces annonces, qui sont importantes et les résultats, les réalisations concrètes, qui s'inscriront dans la foulée de celle-ci” ; “La conclusion positive des négociations entre l'Union européenne et la Chine, sur l'accord sur les indications géographiques, signé demain à Pékin, est à cet égard une étape décisive” ; “Nous devons poursuivre sur cette dynamique positive, dans le cadre des négociations en cours entre l'Union européenne et la Chine, pour la conclusion d'un accord global d'investissement ambitieux en 2020. 2020 doit marquer la finalisation d'un tel accord” ; “Le sommet entre la Chine et l'Union européenne doit permettre de consacrer un tel cadre d'investissement bilatéral qui soit positif, exigeant de part et d'autre et prenne précisément en considération les défis stratégiques de propriété intellectuelle, de cadres d'investissement auxquels nous tenons” ; “bâti justement le cadre d'investissement et de commerce entre l'Union européenne et la Chine, qui soit mutuellement bénéfique” ; “si nous parvenons par nos coopérations, nos échanges, à répondre aux désordres économiques, sociaux, climatiques que j'évoquais il y a un instant” ; “De confiance et d'équilibre, oui” ; “Notre coopération (...) [avec la] Chine, est décisive, pour permettre le déploiement accéléré de ces nouvelles technologies, pour permettre premièrement leur diffusion la plus rapide et la plus harmonieuse, vous l'avez dit, pour permettre, deuxièmement, le juste respect de la propriété intellectuelle, sans laquelle il n'y a plus d'innovation, parce qu'elle vient récompenser celui ou celle qui a inventé, mais de manière juste et équitable” ; “donnera le cadre de nos développements conjoints, le cadre de nos coopérations maîtrisées, le cadre de nos volontés présentes et futures, pour faire ici davantage” ; “Et la coopération, à ce titre (...)est décisive” ; “Et le fait que la Chine ait pris cette responsabilité, ce leadership est décisif, et nous vous aideront à y réussir” ; “je souhaite que l'année 2020 soit marquée par une coopération aussi accrue, en matière de lutte

		contre le réchauffement climatique et de lutte pour la biodiversité et que d'ici au sommet entre l'Union européenne et la Chine, nous ayons un agenda très concret des résultats à construire ensemble” ; “la coopération, le dialogue, le respect, l'écoute”
	European France	“ce n'est pas le choix de l'Europe” ; “pour l'Union européenne” ; “l'Union européenne” ; “entre la Chine et l'Union européenne”
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<p><i>Document 12:</i> <u>Communiqué du ministère de l'Europe et des affaires étrangères, en date du 30 août 2020, sur les relations franco-chinoises</u></p> <p>(Ministère de l'Europe et des affaires étrangères, 2020)</p> <p><i>Date: August 30, 2020</i></p>	Messianic	“Le ministre a rappelé les graves préoccupations de la France quant à la dégradation de la situation des droits de l'Homme en Chine, en particulier à Hong Kong et au Xinjiang”
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	X
	Necessary enemy	X
	Innocent	X
	Multilateralism	“Le ministre a réitéré notre position sur le respect du droit international en mer de Chine méridionale”
	Non-Alignment	X
	Potential Partner	“marquer la volonté de nos deux pays de poursuivre leur coordination pour répondre à la pandémie et à ses conséquences sur nos échanges bilatéraux” ; “la situation de la communauté française dont le retour sur le territoire chinois dans les meilleures conditions est une priorité” ; “les progrès dans l'accès au marché, en particulier dans le secteur agroalimentaire” ; “La discussion a porté également sur les secteurs de l'aéronautique et du nucléaire civil qui structurent notre relation commerciale” ; “nos deux pays souhaitent défendre une approche ambitieuse en matière de climat et de biodiversité”
	European France	“Prochaines échéances euro-chinoises”
	Residual	All non-coloured text
	Messianic	“France asked for an international mission under the auspices of the United Nations to be able to visit Xinjiang in order to address the concerns that we share as regards the situation of the Uyghur Muslim minority”

<p><u>Document 13:</u> <u>Emmanuel Macron speaks at UN General Assembly</u> (Macron, 2020)</p> <p><u>Date: September 22, 2020</u></p>	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	X
	Necessary enemy	X
	Innocent	X
	Multilateralism	<p>“This crisis, perhaps more than any other, requires cooperation and requires us to invent new international solutions”; “the only solution will be found through our cooperation”; “we must rebuild a new order”; “We need to keep international trade and its openness, because it is good for us economically and socially, because in any case we could not bring everything back internally, and because it brings good dependencies that require cooperation”; “respect for international law and the fundamental rights of all”; “We have seen inexcusable regressions in this regard. We have seen unacceptable practices, including among permanent members of the Security Council”; “requires the establishment of functional international cooperation based on clearly defined and universally respected rules”; “Modern multilateralism must also bring together international organizations, private stakeholders, businesses, NGOs, researchers and citizens so that everyone can play a role in the actions undertaken”; “to consolidate the foundations of this new international consensus for the future of this organization”</p>
Non-Alignment	<p>“the international organizations that we crucially need, such as the World Health Organization, have been accused by some of complacency”; “because two of them preferred to declare their rivalry than to work together effectively”; “the undermining and the instrumentalization of multilateralism and the trampling of international law”; “the world as it is today cannot come down to simple rivalry between China and the United States, no matter the global weight of these two great powers, no matter the history that binds us together, and especially to the United States of America”; “we are not collectively condemned to a dance of power which would, in a way, reduce us to being the sorry spectators of collective powerlessness”; “it is up to us to make use of that space and to define the priorities that will be ours in this environment”; “We need to establish our choices clearly”; “we will not compromise on the</p>	

		activation of a mechanism that the United States, on its own initiative in withdrawing from the agreement, is not in a position to activate. This would undermine the unity of the Security Council” ; “it would be dangerous to shut ourselves away in a stutter of history, in widespread protectionism with customs duties and trade wars, in a sort of doubt driving us to isolationism or the logic of powers” ; “there is a risk of responding to this crisis of globalization with nationalist withdrawal, with the violence of populism – or rather of the extremes – and the return of powers”
	Potential Partner	X
	European France	“The European Union, which many predicted would become divided and powerless, made a historic step thanks to the crisis towards unity, sovereignty and solidarity” ; “It was Europe that (...)took the initiative at the G20 to help the most vulnerable countries to tackle the pandemic” ; “It was Europe that (...) created the ACT-A initiative so that resources to combat the pandemic would be accessible to all” ; “Thanks to Europe” ; “had the energy to build, propose and back tangible solutions through cooperation, solidarity and action” ; “Europe must accept its share of responsibility” ; “We have room to manoeuvre” ; “we, Europeans”
	Residual	All non-coloured text
<i>Document 14:</i> <u>Déclaration de M. Jean-Yves Le Drian, ministre de l’Europe et des affaires étrangères, en réponse à une question sur les relations entre l’Agence française de développement et la Chine, au Sénat le 21 Octobre 2020</u>	Messianic	X
	Unconstrained	X
	Universalization of threat	X
	Necessary enemy	X
	Innocent	X
	Multilateralism	X
	Non-Alignment	“La Chine, elle est à la fois notre partenaire, notre concurrent et notre rival”
	Potential Partner	“l’AFD est présente en Chine” ; “elle est présente en Chine parce que c’est notre intérêt” ; “Il est dans notre intérêt stratégique et politique de bâtir des partenariats permettant d’orienter le premier émetteur de CO2 dans le monde vers une économie bas-carbone” ; “Et nous agissons ensemble, avec la Chine,

<p>(Le Drian, 2020)</p> <p><i>Date: October 21, 2020</i></p>		<p>sur ce point, pour lutter contre le dérèglement climatique et, de surcroît, j'observe que cela présente des avantages pour les entreprises françaises car la présence de l'AFD et de ses outils bancaires dans ce pays, sur ces sujets-là, est une valorisation et cela permet de faire valoir leur expertise et leur attractivité. Donc, c'est en fonction de nos intérêts” ; “notre présence en Chine”</p>
<p><i>Document 15: Communiqué de la Présidence de la République, en date du 9 décembre 2020, sur les relations franco-chinoises</i></p> <p><i>(Présidence de la République, 2020)</i></p> <p><i>Date: December 9, 2020</i></p>	<p>European France</p>	<p>X</p>
	<p>Residual</p>	<p>All non-coloured text</p>
	<p>Messianic</p>	<p>“Vive préoccupation de la France et de ses partenaires européens sur la dégradation de la situation des droits de l'Homme en Chine, en particulier à Hong Kong et au Xinjiang”</p>
	<p>Unconstrained</p>	<p>X</p>
	<p>Universalization of threat</p>	<p>X</p>
	<p>Necessary enemy</p>	<p>X</p>
	<p>Innocent</p>	<p>X</p>
	<p>Multilateralism</p>	<p>“le préserver à l'échelle multilatérale” ; “Sur le plan multilatéral, le Président de la République a souligné la nécessité de renforcer l'engagement de l'ensemble des membres du G20” ; “Il s'est félicité des progrès effectués au G20 sur le moratoire sur la dette” ; “marqué l'importance d'assurer la mise en oeuvre concrète des décisions actées lors de l'Assemblée mondiale de la santé de l'OMS en mai dernier afin d'améliorer le système international de préparation et de gestion des pandémies, en tirant toutes les leçons de la crise mondiale que nous traversons, dans un cadre transparent et multilatéral”</p>
<p>Non-Alignment</p>	<p>X</p>	
<p>Potential Partner</p>	<p>“Le Président de la République a rappelé le caractère décisif du dialogue entre la France et la Chine pour obtenir cet accord” ; “accroître notre niveau d'ambition collective dans le prolongement de l'Appel de Pékin de novembre 2019” ; “Il a souligné le rôle moteur que l'Europe et la Chine doivent jouer” ; “de notre partenariat stratégique global” ; “Sur le plan bilatéral, les chefs d'Etat ont abordé les perspectives de coopération dans les secteurs du nucléaire civil, de l'aéronautique, de l'innovation, du spatial, de l'agroalimentaire et de la</p>	

		<p>culture” ; “Ils ont exprimé leur volonté commune de poursuivre à un rythme soutenu la mise en oeuvre des décisions prises lors de la visite d'Etat de novembre 2019” ; “Il a souligné en particulier notre responsabilité collective à l'égard de l'Afrique et appelé la Chine à s'engager aux côtés de la France en vue du Sommet sur le financement des économies africaines qui se tiendra à Paris en mai prochain” ; “Sur la sécurité collective, le Chef de l'Etat a souligné l'importance du dialogue entre la France et la Chine, membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, en particulier sur la question nucléaire iranienne et la crise nord-coréenne” ; “Il a rappelé le rôle joué par la France et la Chine (...) pour préserver l'accord de 2015 sur le nucléaire iranien” ; “Le Président de la République a enfin souligné sa volonté de poursuivre la construction d'un partenariat renouvelé, plus fort et plus équilibré, entre l'Europe et la Chine”</p>
	<p>European France</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">X</p>
	<p>Residual</p>	<p>All non-coloured text</p>