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Friends, Enemies, or Frenemies? The European Union & Trump: Transatlantic Relations in Tough Times

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**Universiteit
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Friends, Enemies, or Frenemies?

*The European Union & Trump: Transatlantic Relations
in Tough Times*

Bachelor Thesis

BSc Political Science: International Relations and Organisations

Bachelor Project: Grand Strategy in the 21st Century

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Frenemies (plural of the word **frenemy** *noun*)

“a person or organization that you are friends with because it is useful or necessary to be their friend, even though you really dislike or disagree with them.”¹

¹ “Frenemy Noun - Definition, Pictures, Pronunciation and Usage Notes | Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.Com,” accessed April 21, 2022, <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/frenemy>.

1. Introduction

Trump's transactionalist approach to international politics, including relations with allies, exemplifies a short-term deviation from a decades long grand strategy of deep engagement. The transatlantic partnership between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) is an important component of deep engagement. Yet, the transatlantic bond was subject to US transactionalism, which largely focuses on the private sector as a driver of trade policy.² Trump's move to hand Angela Merkel, now former German Chancellor, a bill for security services owed to NATO negatively surprised Europeans, especially since the EU had no records of debts.³

The literature on transatlantic relations under Trump largely focuses on assurance in US security provisions for Europe. The gap in the literature fails to consider how transatlantic trade is affected during Trump. The aim is to address this gap by (1) examining the EU's approach in transatlantic trade relations during Trump, (2) considering possible approaches with different implications for transatlantic trust relations, and (3) comparing the state of transatlantic relations during Biden. Hence, the following research question: *What is the impact of US transactionalism under Trump on the EU's approach to transatlantic trade relations?*

Existing literature suggests that US transactionalism inspired European hedging against the US concerning security cooperation. Trade is a major area of transatlantic cooperation which faced US protections during Trump – making it a valuable research venue as it may as well inspired a European response or failed to do, depending which issues are prioritized by Europeans.

This research utilizes selectorate theory to emphasize the agency in shaping the EU's approach to transatlantic relations. (S)electorates, in return for their vote, influence policymaking through their representatives.⁴ The EU is subject to such influence as the European Parliament (EP), and member-states depend on popular vote and can transfer dominant preferences to EU-level policymaking – thereby, influencing the EU's approach to transatlantic relations in specific directions in response to US transactionalism.

² Steven Davidoff Solomon and David Zaring, eds., "Transactional Administration," *Georgetown Law Journal* 106, (2018): 1097-1138, <https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/1128659>

³ "Trump Handed Merkel 'Outrageous' NATO Bill: Report," POLITICO, March 26, 2017, <https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-handed-angela-merkel-outrageous-nato-bill-report/>.

⁴ Kevin Narizny, "Economic Interests and Grand Strategy," *The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy*, September 1, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840299.013.15>.

Three expectations rise from theory: (H₁) *The EU responded with hedging to US transactionalism during Trump* - as a major loss of confidence in the US' commitment to the partnership; or (H₂) *the EU responded with counter-transactionalism to US transactionalism during Trump* – to dissuade future US transactions as it hurts the interest of European stakeholders. However, it is also possible the EU's and US' common threat perception of rising powers does not inspire a European response to US transactionalism. The third theoretical expectation suggests (H₃) *the EU maintained a multilateral approach to transatlantic relations during Trump*.

This research shows that the European tone in transatlantic relations shifted from counter-transactionalism during Trump to a multilateral approach during Biden. Although the EU disapproves US transactionalism, because of significant gain and dependence on the US it is crucial to maintain close trade relations. Yet, Europeans use their leverage in the transatlantic partnership to safeguard their interests.

This research is relevant as it looks at the EU's response to US transactionalism which shows how choosing a particular grand strategy by the US affects its relations with partners. Getting a better understanding of the dynamics is crucial as it gives insights into the resilience/volatility of partnerships and potentially the triggers thereof. How transatlantic trade relations evolve is consequential for global trade, as the US and EU are the biggest trading partners globally.

2. Literature Review

What happens when a state suddenly shows deviating behavior from its long-term grand strategy? Literature on US grand strategy and transatlantic relations is subject to review in this thesis. In simple terms, grand strategy can be understood as the mobilization of all state resources (military, economic, political, diplomatic) towards the goals a state deems to be of utmost significance.⁵ US grand strategy has long followed a pattern of deep engagement with the rest of the world – meaning it spends significant resources overseas.⁶ One key aspect of US

⁵ Van Hooft, Paul. "Grand Strategy." In Oxford Bibliographies Online in International Relations. (2017). doi: 10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0218

⁶ Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Chapter 4," In *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

strategy of deep engagement is the important role alliances and partnerships play in achieving US objectives internationally.⁷

The Trump administration largely changed the course of US grand strategy compared to previous administrations, which manifested as a short-term deviation, for now. However, studies show that great divergence is present between the US and EU on problems concerning the transatlantic partnership, like climate change, the Iran deal, US negligence of NATO, and failed negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.⁸ Studies also show that alternation in the US' pattern of behavior from cooperation to transactionalism had consequences for transatlantic trust observable in the EU hedging against the US in the security realm.⁹

How did Trump's approach to transatlantic relations look like? Demonstrated through trade wars and protectionism, US grand strategy during Trump had a highly zero-sum outlook to international politics where relative gains and power increases were prioritized even in the transatlantic partnership.¹⁰ Under Trump, US grand strategy shifted from deep engagement towards offshore balancing, according to Desmaele¹¹ and McKay.¹² Maintaining close relations with the Middle East and Europe is central to a strategy of deep engagement, being a world leader, and achieving particular objectives to that end.¹³ If Trump were following a grand strategy of deep engagement, it is odd how during Trump's presidency attention largely shifted away from these regions and was refocused towards Asia. Per McKay, the focus shift is observable in rechanneling resources, diplomatic and military activities in the previously described direction.¹⁴

⁷ Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Chapter 5," In *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

⁸ Asma Sana Bilal and Nabiya Imran, "Emerging Contours of Transatlantic Relationship under Trump Administration," *Policy Perspectives*, January 1, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.13169/polipers.16.1.0003>.

⁹ Kristian L. Nielsen and Anna Dimitrova, "Trump, Trust and the Transatlantic Relationship," *Policy Studies* 42, no. 5–6 (November 2, 2021): 699–719, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2021.1979501>.

¹⁰ Linde Desmaele, "Unpacking the Trump Administration's Grand Strategy in Europe: Power Maximisation, Relative Gains and Sovereignty," *European Security* 0, no. 0 (October 18, 2021): 1–20, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2021.1987224>.

¹¹ Desmaele. "Unpacking the Trump Administration's Grand Strategy in Europe: Power Maximisation, Relative Gains and Sovereignty,"

¹² McKay, James. "How Transatlantic Is The Trump Administration?." *Journal Of Transatlantic Studies* 17, no. 4 (2019): 532-553. doi:10.1057/s42738-019-00030-0.

¹³ Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Chapter 5," In *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

¹⁴ McKay. "How Transatlantic Is The Trump Administration?."

The European approach to transatlantic relations resembled hedging in response to deteriorated trust relations concerning US security provision.¹⁵ Nielsen and Dimitrova's¹⁶ argument suggests that it is Trump's transactionalism that resulted in uncertainty in the transatlantic partnership. However, Larres suggests that a deteriorated transatlantic trust relationship does not necessarily signify European disloyalty and detachment from the partnership evening considering Trump's approach to transatlantic relations is unfavorable to Europeans.¹⁷ Importantly, being overall loyal to the transatlantic partnership does not necessarily mean there are no instances of uncertainty or distrust in response to Trump's economic and trade policy, and the EU's approach to transatlantic relations could differ in this respect as well.

While it is plausible the EU enacted hedging in the security realm as security is a state's top priority in an anarchical system - it is unclear whether this is applicable to trade since it is not as vital to a state's wellbeing. Nielsen and Dimitrova's¹⁸ inquiry is, however, limited to looking whether the EU is hedging on security related matters.

Trade is another major area of cooperation in transatlantic relations besides security cooperation, which therefore should be subject to research. There is a gap in the literature that (1) does not explore whether alternative approaches to hedging or a mix of approaches were enacted by the EU in transatlantic relations in response to US transactionalism during Trump, just as (2) predominant focus on hedging on security matters and thus neglecting how the EU's approach changed in transatlantic trade relations during Trump. Additionally, it is unclear whether the EU's approach is expected to change, having in mind its strong commitment to the liberal order and multilateralism.

Smith and Youngs argue that the EU's commitment to multilateralism became selective with emerging problems – like Trump's transactional approach, where the EU started debating the transatlantic partnership.¹⁹ Smith and Youngs suggest that the EU is strategically concerned in that it disagrees with the rising powers, but also increasingly so with a long-standing ally under

¹⁵ Nielsen and Dimitrova, "Trump, Trust and the Transatlantic Relationship."

¹⁶ Nielsen and Dimitrova, "Trump, Trust and the Transatlantic Relationship."

¹⁷ Klaus Larres. "Trump's Trade Wars: America, China, Europe, and Global Disorder," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 18, no. 1 (2020): 103–29, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00040-y>.

¹⁸ Nielsen and Dimitrova, "Trump, Trust and the Transatlantic Relationship."

¹⁹ Smith and Youngs. "The EU and the Global Order: Contingent Liberalism," *The International Spectator* 53, no. 1 (2018): 45–56, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1409024>.

Trump.²⁰ Since trade is major sector affected by US transactions, it is unclear how those shaping EU trade policy reacted to Trump's leadership. Studies suggest that societal stakeholders, either through lobbying their national institutions or EU institutions, influence the EU's preferences in trade policy.²¹ Therefore, it is intriguing to find out whether US transactionalism in transatlantic trade triggered a particular European response, and if so, how did it look?

Beeson²² and Drezner²³ suggest US transactionalism alienated Europeans. For instance, European leaders called for increasing strategic autonomy and balancing against the US²⁴ as Smith and Youngs²⁵ mention too. Further, discussing decreasing dependence on US dollars and concluding more trade agreements were also apparent among Europeans facing US transactionalism, but also imposing tariffs on certain goods²⁶ – which only suggests different elements are present in the EU's approach to transatlantic relations during Trump. Yet, these studies do not perform a direct test on whether Trump's transactionalism inspired a specific European response. Which approach is dominant, why, and which actors are predominantly responsible for choosing the specific trajectory of the European approach is subject to research in this thesis.

2.1 Research Question

Existing studies do not delve into the European (non)response to US transactionalism as there is no direct test on the European approach to transatlantic relations in response to US transactionalism. Transatlantic trade is a curial artery in US-EU cooperation, which during Trump most notably faced US tariffs and violation of trade rules.²⁷ Thus, while existing studies emphasize how transactionalism affected security relations in the transatlantic bond and how

²⁰ Smith and Youngs. "The EU and the Global Order: Contingent Liberalism."

²¹ Andreas Dür and Hubert Zimmermann, "Introduction: The EU in International Trade Negotiations*," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 4 (2007): 771–87, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00747.x>.

²² "Donald Trump and Post-Pivot Asia: The Implications of a 'Transactional' Approach to Foreign Policy," *Asian Studies Review* 44, no. 1 (2020): 10–27, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2019.1680604>.

²³ "Economic Statecraft in the Age of Trump," *The Washington Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 7–24, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1663072>.

²⁴ Beeson, "Donald Trump and Post-Pivot Asia."

²⁵ Smith and Youngs. "The EU and the Global Order: Contingent Liberalism"

²⁶ Drezner, "Economic Statecraft in the Age of Trump."

²⁷ Riccardo Alcaro, "Europe's Struggle in the Fraying Transatlantic Order," *Survival* 61, no. 6 (2019): 77–88, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1688568>.

the EU is faces dilemmas about the transatlantic partnership and adequate reaction,²⁸ trade requires academic attention.

This research fills a gap in the literature in three ways. (1) It examines the EU's approach to transatlantic relations, focusing on trade; (2) looks at how transatlantic relations evolve Biden, and (3) aims to explain the EU's approach through the agency, or preferences of societal actors. Transatlantic trade increasingly faced US protections during Trump, which resulted for losses for European producers and consumers making it intriguing to examine whether a European response is observable, and if so, how that response manifested itself.

Looking at the state of transatlantic relations during Biden allows for contrasting the findings with the Trump administration, as the two differ in their approach in transatlantic relations – which suggests the European approach may differ in this respect too. This is done considering the role Europeans, representatives and policy-elites played in shaping the EU's approach. Additionally, this research firstly puts focus on examining the EU's approach during Trump, and then considers the implications for transatlantic trust relations. Hence, the corresponding research question: *What is the impact of US transactionalism under Trump on the EU's approach to transatlantic trade relations?*

A European response to US transactionalism is plausible as domestic stakeholders have agency in shaping EU trade policy and might react by retaliating or hedging against the US – since they are the primary target of US protections. The dominant approach depends on the potential effect US transactionalism has on the interests of Europeans. Alternatively, a European non-response is equally possible considering the economic relevance the transatlantic bond has for Europeans, but especially if long-term threats of rising powers like China and revisionist states are perceived as more concerning over Trump's transactionalism which can be considered a short-term threat to the multilateral order.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Theories, hypotheses, and conceptualization

The theoretical framework builds upon selectorate theory. Namely, policy-elites in EU organizations are largely responsible for shaping EU trade policy – yet with the Lisbon treaty

²⁸ Smith and Youngs, “The EU and the Global Order: Contingent Liberalism.”

European citizens got an increasing influence over bureaucrats in charge of trade policymaking in the EU.²⁹ EU policymaking is subject to member-state influence and both member-states and the EP are subject to intra-state influence over policymaking as they depend on public votes. Therefore, it is plausible national elites and EU policy-elites need to respond to the preferences of their public, following the logic of selectorate theory.

Studies suggest that the US deviated from its grand strategy of deep engagement under Trump due to the interests of domestic stakeholders - i.e., Trump's electorate which requests favorable policies in return for their loyalty.³⁰ Narizny argues that the electorate of Trump simply prioritizes different interests which the Trump administration delivers upon and thus explains the deviation in grand strategy from previous administrations.³¹ In the US, domestic power struggle between stakeholders is a large driver of foreign economic policy.³² Selectorate theory serves to emphasize the influence over the EU's approach to transatlantic relations.

The EU's supranational nature suggests policymaking is autonomous considering the distance between citizens and bureaucrats – yet this is debatable as studies show how economic interests guide EU trade policy.³³ Some scholars suggests that European decision-makers increasingly interact with economic interests, and that the EU's trade liberalization also results from demands of domestic stakeholders.³⁴

While domestic influences may not be decisive to EU trade policy, they policymaking process is certainly subject to them. Depending on the goods member-states import/export their

²⁹ Sophie Meunier and Rozalie Czesana, "From Back Rooms to the Street? A Research Agenda for Explaining Variation in the Public Salience of Trade Policy-Making in Europe," *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 12 (December 2, 2019): 1847–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1678058>.

³⁰ Narizny, "Economic Interests and Grand Strategy."

³¹ Kevin Narizny, "American Grand Strategy and Political Economy Theory," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, June 28, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.316>.

³² G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy," *International Organization* 42, no. 1 (ed 1988): 1–14, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300007116>.

³³ Andreas Dür, "Bringing Economic Interests Back into the Study of EU Trade Policy-Making," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 27–45, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2007.00316.x>.

³⁴ Andreas Dür, "Bringing Economic Interests Back into the Study of EU Trade Policy-Making," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 27–45, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2007.00316.x>.

preferences may support trade liberalization or protectionism,³⁵ - meaning they can push the European approach to take a specific course according to the dominant domestic preferences.

Policy-elites are influential due to their expertise in trade policymaking – according to the conceptualization of elites.³⁶ Policy-elites and EU representatives are subject to influence of European stakeholders – especially through lobby. National elites – i.e., representatives of EU member-states are highly influential as of their mandate and engage in EU policymaking.

Trump's transactionalism is unfavorable to the interest of European domestic stakeholders, which in return may inspired European hedging – for instance, due to a skeptical outlook on the future of transatlantic trade. Theory suggests that uncertainty and untrustworthiness inspire hedging.³⁷ Europeans face uncertainty as they do not know when and if transactionalism will stop or will further escalate. Untrustworthiness marks the transatlantic partnership during Trump since transactionalism is an unexpected attitude from the US side considering a history of cooperation and multilateralism in transatlantic relations. Accordingly, this research puts forward the following hypothesis: (H₁) *The EU responded with hedging to US transactionalism during Trump*. Whether Trump's transactionalism shook the foundations of transatlantic trust and inspired hedging by Europeans instead, remains to be seen from the analysis.

The EU has multiple venues through which European traders and consumers can exercise influence over policymaking. This is done, for instance, through their national and EU representatives or lobby member-states and the EU, among others.³⁸ Thus, Europeans hurt by US protections have the means to request change in the EU's response but also the motive to do so – which is limiting future trade losses by more protectionism. Hence, the following hypothesis: (H₂) *The EU responded with counter-transactionalism to US transactionalism during Trump*. If Europeans have both the motives and means to act and adjust the state of the transatlantic partnership, it is plausible a European response - i.e., a counter-transactional response to US transactionalism to follow.

³⁵ Sean D. Ehrlich, "How Common Is the Common External Tariff?: Domestic Influences on European Union Trade Policy," *European Union Politics* 10, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 115–41, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116508099763>.

³⁶ Lasse Folke Henriksen and Leonard Seabrooke, "Elites in Transnational Policy Networks," *Global Networks* 21, no. 2 (2021): 217–37, <https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12301>.

³⁷ Nielsen and Dimitrova, "Trump, Trust and the Transatlantic Relationship."

³⁸ Dür and Zimmermann, "Introduction: The EU in International Trade Negotiations*."

The first hypothesis (H₁) suggests the EU is hedging in trade relations as of experiencing decrease in trust in the concerned sector due to US transactionalism – because it is an unexpected deviation from the normal US pattern of behavior in relations with partners. Per trust theory, hedging measures inter-state trust relations.³⁹ When states are reluctant to adopt hedging strategies/decide to remove them it signifies signs of trust in the relationship.⁴⁰

The conceptualization of hedging entails adopting strategies by one state making it less reliant on another state in case of uncertainty or distrust in the relationship.⁴¹ The conceptualization entails considering alternative states to rely on/cooperate and adoption of policies to make one state less reliant on the unpredictable/untrustworthy partner-state. Per Hoffman, hedging signifies lack of policies that give another state room to determine outcomes and limited freedom in decision-making due to lack of rules within treaties/agreements.⁴²

The second hypothesis (H₂) suggests that the EU enacted counter-transactionalism in response to US transactionalism. Counter-transactionalism serves predominantly as a weapon, but also suggests that transatlantic trust is somewhat affected in that the EU faces uncertainty whether or when US transactionalism will stop. Since counter-transactionalism serves to dissuade future US transactional behavior, Europeans show their resolve by influencing EU policymaking to reciprocate with transactionalism and avoid future losses from US protections.

Essentially, counter-transactionalism serves to redirect US trade policy and prevent a future transatlantic partnership marked by protectionism. The conceptualization entails approaching interstate relations in a business-like manner,⁴³ striving for short-term, relative gains, and viewing international relations as a zero-sum game.⁴⁴ The conceptualization also entails not necessarily following a previously thought-out grand strategy,⁴⁵ which is plausible considering

³⁹ Vincent Charles Keating and Jan Ruzicka, “Trusting Relationships in International Politics: No Need to Hedge,” *Review of International Studies* 40, no. 4 (October 1, 2014): 753–70, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000059>.

⁴⁰ Keating and Ruzicka. “Trusting Relationships in International Politics: No Need to Hedge.”

⁴¹ Nielsen and Dimitrova. “Trump, Trust and the Transatlantic Relationship.”

⁴² “A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 3 (September 1, 2002): 375–401, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066102008003003>.

⁴³ Beeson, “Donald Trump and Post-Pivot Asia.”

⁴⁴ Galib Bashirov and Ihsan Yilmaz, “The Rise of Transactionalism in International Relations: Evidence from Turkey’s Relations with the European Union,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 74, no. 2 (March 3, 2020): 165–84, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1693495>.

⁴⁵ Bashirov and Yilmaz. “The Rise of Transactionalism in International Relations: Evidence from Turkey’s Relations with the European Union.”

transactionalism prioritizes the mere process of 'winning' without equating winning with the achievement of specific objectives.⁴⁶

3.1.1 Rival explanation: Common threat perception

US transactionalism under Trump may not inspire a European response, despite being unfavorable. The rival explanation is common threat perception by the EU and US, which concerns rising powers like China, or Russian revival. Riddervold and Rosén show that the US and EU have a largely unified and coherent approach as they share security concerns about China and Russia.⁴⁷ Common threat perception by the US and EU goes beyond China's growth in power and encompasses the threat authoritarian practices pose to the liberal order.⁴⁸ The liberal order is at the heart of the EU and US and together they encompass the biggest capacities to constrain instability as of rising and revisionist powers.⁴⁹ The importance of upholding the liberal order makes it plausible the two would stick together.

Facing a short-term threat like Trump could be neglected by Europeans because of common threat perception, or simply prioritizing the long-term threat of rising powers. It is plausible that the EU neglects some distress in transatlantic relations as of US transactionalism having in mind the EU's dependency on US security guarantees, which also explains close security cooperation with the US.⁵⁰ In an anarchic international realm, states seek to secure themselves having no overreaching authority to constrain others from harming them. International instability caused rising powers which seeks to expand influence also disturbs trade flows which hurts European traders and consumers.

Essentially, Europeans perceive the rise of revisionist powers as a security threat and a threat to trade. China is known for unfair trade practices and does not respect human rights meanwhile

⁴⁶ Michelle Bentley and Maxine David, "Unpredictability as Doctrine: Reconceptualising Foreign Policy Strategy in the Trump Era," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 34, no. 3 (May 4, 2021): 383–406, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2021.1877616>.

⁴⁷ Riddervold and Rosén. "Unified in Response to Rising Powers? China, Russia and EU-US Relations," *Journal of European Integration: Transatlantic Relations in Times of Uncertainty: Crises and EU-US Relations* 40, no. 5 (2018): 555–70, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.1488838>.

⁴⁸ Robert Wang, "US and EU Perspectives and Responses to China's Strategic Challenge," in *A New Beginning or More of the Same? The European Union and East Asia After Brexit*, ed. Michael Reilly and Chun-Yi Lee (Singapore: Springer, 2021), 69–99, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9841-8_4.

⁴⁹ Hang Thi Thuy Nguyen, "The US–EU Partnership: More Necessary than Ever," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 28, no. 2 (May 3, 2016): 225–35, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2016.1155545>.


⁵⁰ Riddervold and Rosén, "Unified in Response to Rising Powers? China, Russia and EU-US Relations."

increasingly grows in power,⁵¹ which suggests its grip over global governance expands. Trading rules and practices may largely start to reflect Chinese interests and visions about trade which can be disadvantageous to Europeans. For instance, China forces technology transfers,⁵² which is not something welcomed by European producers. Hence, the third hypothesis: (H₃) *The EU maintained a multilateral approach to transatlantic relations during Trump.*

Multilateralism is conceptualized as an approach that upholds liberal values and cooperation - meaning trade liberalization, participation in multilateral institutions, cooperation on shared issues, negotiation, and respect for liberal norms and values are essential.⁵³

The EU's approach has potentially implications for transatlantic trust relations. Namely, if the EU's approach to transatlantic relations remained multilateral (H₃), it is plausible transatlantic trust relations are not necessarily damaged from the trade aspect. Counter-transactionalism (H₂) suggests some uncertainty/distrust in the partnership as Europeans can be skeptical about whether or when US transactionalism will end – yet counter-transactionalism is firstly a weapon of foreign policy. Alternatively, if the EU enacted hedging (H₁), it indicates significant distrust in the partnership, as prior studies argue that hedging is a sign thereof.⁵⁴

Figure 1. Link between the EU's approach and trust in transatlantic relations



4. Research Design

4.1 Research method

This thesis examines transatlantic relations during Trump to examine the link between deviating from a long-term grand strategy and the effect on relations with partners. Trump is a

⁵¹ Gustaaf Geeraerts, "The EU-China Partnership: Balancing between Divergence and Convergence," *Asia Europe Journal* 17, no. 3 (September 2019): 281–94, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-019-00554-2>.

⁵² Chi Hung Kwan, "The China–US Trade War: Deep-Rooted Causes, Shifting Focus and Uncertain Prospects," *Asian Economic Policy Review* 15, no. 1 2020: 55–72, <https://doi.org/10.1111/aepr.12284>

⁵³ Mike Smith, "The EU, the US and the Crisis of Contemporary Multilateralism," *Journal of European Integration* 40, no. 5 (2018): 539–53, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.1488836>.

⁵⁴ Nielsen and Dimitrova, "Trump, Trust and the Transatlantic Relationship."

crucial case of deviating from a long trend of deep engagement. Additionally, this research makes a comparison to the EU's approach in transatlantic relations during Biden.

The data is analyzed using qualitative content analysis (QCA). QCA is appropriate for this research because it allows for a systematic way of analyzing the actual content of text rather than its underlying meaning.⁵⁵ Additionally, QCA allows to get an overview of the frequency of quotes per category and compare the findings. The aim is to get a sense how the EU's approach to transatlantic relations manifested itself during Trump by creating a concept-driven coding framework where the hypothesized approaches and their measurement are presented, and the data is accordingly categorized to get insights into the dominant themes and patterns.⁵⁶

Since trust is difficult to observe in speeches and statements, these are supplemented with a survey targeted to diplomats, which is carried out originally for this research. Diplomats represent EU member-states – therefore, they provide a solid picture of the attitudes of Europeans and their potential involvement in shaping the EU's approach. The survey is analyzed using discourse analysis which allows for interpretation of the answers of diplomats and understand the latent meaning thereof.

4.2 Data

Prior studies on transactionalism in transatlantic relations use speeches, statements, and polling data, among others, to get insights into hedging.⁵⁷ Accordingly, this research utilizes a total of 59 press releases, speeches, and statements – mostly delivered by the Commissioner for Trade and President of the European Commission (EC), among other EU officials, which are available at the EC's Press Corner⁵⁸ (see *Annex 2*). The documents serve to see which actions were undertaken by the EU in trade during the Trump and Biden administration.

The survey, specifically created for this research, totals 13 responses, and is disseminated across embassies of all EU member-states in The Netherlands and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representation to the EU. Consent was asked from diplomats before taking

⁵⁵ Halperin, Sandra, and Oliver Heath. "Chapter 14: Textual Analysis." In *Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills*. Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 2020.

⁵⁶ Halperin, Sandra, and Oliver Heath. "Chapter 14: Textual Analysis." Essay. In *Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills*. Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 2020.

⁵⁷ Nielsen and Dimitrova, "Trump, Trust and the Transatlantic Relationship."

⁵⁸ "Press Corner," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 27, 2022, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/home/en>.

part in the survey. The survey discourages satisficing by including 'don't know' options, and open questions which also reduce satisficing, but equally serve to lessen response order effects of multiple-choice questions.⁵⁹

4.3 Operationalization

The independent variable is the US approach to transatlantic politics – i.e., transactionalism under Trump, and the dependent variable is the EU's approach in transatlantic relations because this research concerns the effect of Trump's transactionalism on the EU's approach in transatlantic relations. For the dependent variable, this research puts forward three theoretical expectations: hedging, counter-transactionalism, and multilateralism, which are hypothesized to reflect the European approach to transatlantic relations during Trump.

A key aspect of hedging is reducing a state's dependence on another state. Hence, hedging is operationalized as adoption or the intention to adopt policies such as considering US trade alternatives, more investment in EU industries and reluctance to deepen trade relations with the US. The key element observable in these indicators is that they suggest distancing/increasing independence from the party considered untrustworthy. The operationalization also includes introducing trade rules and rules within agreements to limit the US' freedom in determining outcomes. Looking at whether the EU considers US trade alternatives is convenient to measure hedging, given the types of data this research utilizes.

Counter-transactionalism is operationalized as a tit-for-tat response by the EU – i.e., enacting policies and actions that hurt the US economically or ensure short-term economic wins for the EU. Since counter-transactionalism is a broad concept and this research focuses on trade, counter-transactionalism is recorded by looking whether the EU engaged in a tit-for-tat situation with the US – i.e., responding proportionately to US protections. The reason is that a tit-for-tat response shows some level of assertiveness and primarily serves to dissuade future noncooperative behavior.⁶⁰ Indicators include, *inter alia*, enacting trade barriers against the US, improving trade defense, and cases against the US. Cases against the US and improved trade defense fall under counter-transactionalism and not under hedging since the two serve as

⁵⁹ Josh Pasek and Jon A. Krosnick, "Optimizing Survey Questionnaire Design in Political Science," *The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior*, February 25, 2010, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235476.003.0003>.

⁶⁰ Barbara Dluhosch and Daniel Horgos, "(When) Does Tit-for-Tat Diplomacy in Trade Policy Pay Off?," *The World Economy* 36 (February 1, 2013), <https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12012>.

countermeasure to US transactions and ought to limit it, but they do not suggest distancing from the US.

Multilateralism is operationalized as an approach that favors trade liberalization, cooperation in international institutions, and enacting policies that uphold the multilateral order. Thus, indicators include free trade, multilateral diplomacy, cooperative foreign trade policy, coordinated responses to external threats, deepening trade relations, lifting trade barriers, resolving issues through diplomatic dialogue, concluding trade agreements, proposing/achieving joint initiatives. Trade cooperation is how multilateralism is recorded in this research since the focus is on the trade aspect of transatlantic relations.

Table 1. Summary of research method & sources

Period	Data sources, types, amount	Analysis
Trump (2017-2020)	Speeches, statements, press releases (59 total) Available on the European Commission Press Corner	QCA
Biden (2021-present)	Survey (created for the thesis - Spring 2022) Target group: Diplomats of EU member-state embassies in The Netherlands, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Representation to the EU Responses: 13	Discourse Analysis

N.B. For full table of QCA data sources and references, see Annex 2.

5. Empirical Analysis

5.1 The EU's approach to transatlantic relations during Trump: Continuity or change?

5.1.1 Hedging

The analysis suggests that there is no meaningful evidence the EU hedged against the US. Overall, the EU concluded several trade agreements and started trade negotiations in Asia and Latin America. Outstandingly, the EU and China reached a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment⁶¹ and discussed reducing trade restrictions.⁶² Further, the EU concluded several trade agreements in which it stresses its stance against protectionism, like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada,⁶³ the Economic Partnership Agreement

⁶¹ "Key Elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2542.

⁶² "EU and China Discuss Trade and Economic Relations," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1419.

⁶³ "European Commission Welcomes Parliament's Support of Trade Deal with Canada," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed April 18, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_270.

with Japan,⁶⁴ or the trade agreement with Singapore.⁶⁵ The EU also started trade talks with Chile, Vietnam, and Mercosur⁶⁶, and aimed to open markets in Asia and Latin America.⁶⁷

Table 2. Quote frequency per category (QCA analysis)

Period	Hedging	Counter-transactionalism	Multilateralism
Trump (2017-2020)	18	31	18
Biden (2021-present)	3	5	10

The hypothesis (H₁) *The EU responded with hedging to US transactionalism during Trump* is rejected. The EU having concluded only several trade agreements with others falls short for drawing meaningful conclusions as hedging constitutes a deliberate choice to trade with alternatives to rely less on the US. However, the EU held cooperative outlook to transatlantic trade, and did not deliberately avoid deepening trade with the US or not resolving issues.

The EU did not distance itself from the US while concluding trade agreements with others is plausible given that the EU is an economic power and strives to increase its power. Additionally, the new trade agreements with alternatives are outnumbered by counter-transactional and multilateral elements in the EU’s approach (see *Table 2*). The influence over trade policy by stakeholders is apparent as CETA was reviewed by the EP.⁶⁸ *Table 3* shows a shortened QCA analysis in which the contrast between the three hypothesized European approaches during the Trump and Biden administration is apparent.

⁶⁴ “Trade: European Commission Proposes Signature and Conclusion of Japan and Singapore Agreements,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_3325.

⁶⁵ “Press Conference by Commissioner Malmström on the ‘Report on Trade and Investment Barriers,’” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_17_1799.

⁶⁶ “Transatlantic Trade in Turbulent Times - Speech by Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_18_4604.

⁶⁷ “Press Conference by Commissioner Malmström on the ‘Report on Trade and Investment Barriers,’” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_17_1799.

⁶⁸ “European Commission Welcomes Parliament’s Support of Trade Deal with Canada,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed April 18, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_270.

Table 3. Shortened QCA framework: Trump & Biden administration

Citizen/stakeholder involvement

Indicators: mentions of involvement/consultation with citizens, stakeholders, interest groups, businesses, civil society; mentions of democratic processes of policymaking;

Concept	Sub-category	Description	Indicators	Quotes (Examples)	
				Trump	Biden
Hedging	Trade alternatives	Hedging entails enacting actions/policies that make the EU less dependent on the US because of uncertainty in the transatlantic partnership due to US actions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trade increase with other states - Trade agreements with alternatives - Reluctance to deepen trade with US - Trade rules that limit the US' freedom of to determine outcomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said: "[...]Today we take a step forwards towards concluding agreements with two of our closest Asian partners, Japan and Singapore. The impact of these agreements [...]sends a clear and unambiguous message that we stand together against protectionism and in defence of multilateralism."⁶⁹ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "[...] The strategy includes [...] stronger global trading rules [...]. [...] Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, said: “[...] We are pursuing a course [...] emphasising the EU's ability to make its own choices and shape the world around it [...].” Responding to current challenges, the strategy prioritises [...] reinforced rules to tackle competitive distortions, and restoring its system for binding dispute settlement. [...] the EU will adopt a tougher, more assertive approach towards the implementation and enforcement of its trade agreements, fighting unfair
	Increasing independence	E.g., Considering US trade alternatives.			

⁶⁹ “Trade: European Commission Proposes Signature and Conclusion of Japan and Singapore Agreements,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_3325.

					trade [...]. This strategy is based on a wide and inclusive public consultation, including [...] stakeholders, public events in almost every Member State, and close engagement with the European Parliament, EU governments, businesses, civil society and the public." ⁷⁰
Counter-transactionalism	Tit-for-tat trade relations	Counter-transactionalism entails enacting a like-for-like approach in trade relations in response to US transactionalism during Trump - manifested with retaliatory protections in response to US protections.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introducing trade barriers: tariffs, quotas, taxes, dumping, - Responding with countermeasures - Assertive trade policy - Adopting policies to ensure wins for the EU, and/or hurt the US - Improve trade defense - Cases against US - Mentions of need to protect EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström said: "[...] <i>the unilateral and unjustified decision of the US to impose steel and aluminium tariffs on the EU means that we are left with no other choice. The rules of international trade, [...] cannot be violated without a reaction from our side. Our response is measured, proportionate and fully in line with WTO rules.</i>"⁷¹ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "[...] I am pleased to announce the proposal for an EU anti-coercion instrument today. [...] It sends a clear signal to our partners that: [...] The European Union will not hesitate to push back when we are under threat; [...]. [...] this tool is first and foremost a deterrent. [...] countermeasures will be carefully calibrated and targeted, after detailed consultation with relevant stakeholders and the green light of Member States. They will be balanced,

⁷⁰ "Strong EU Trade Enforcement Rules Enter into Force," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_601.

⁷¹ "EU Adopts Rebalancing Measures in Reaction to US Steel and Aluminium Tariffs," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4220.

			companies/citizens/businesses/stakeholders against protections and unfair trade		proportionate [...]. [...] countermeasures include traditional trade instruments linked to tariff treatment and import duties for goods. ⁷²
Multilateralism	Trade cooperation	Multilateralism entails enacting actions/policies supporting the multilateral order, institutions, cooperation, and free trade. Trade cooperation as an aspect of multilateralism entails keeping open markets, cooperating on trade related matters, and deepening trade relations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Free trade - Mentions of cooperation - Proposing/achieving joint initiatives - Lifting/No new trade barriers - Multilateral diplomacy - Cooperative trade policy - Coordination in foreign trade policy - Deepening trade with the US 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "[...] Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, said: "[...] <i>We call on the U.S. to agree to both sides dropping existing countermeasures with immediate effect, so we can quickly put this behind us. Removing these tariffs is a win-win for both sides, especially with the pandemic wreaking havoc on our economies. We now have an opportunity to reboot our transatlantic cooperation and work together towards our shared goals.</i>"⁷³ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "[...] We have successfully pressed the reset button with the Biden administration, [...] due to our shared willingness to forge a new trade agenda [...]. [...] We grounded the Airbus-Boeing dispute [...]. We launched the EU-US Trade and Technology Council [...]. [...] we will suspend the EU rebalancing measures, [...]. [...] we can move on from one of the most visible irritants imposed by President Trump."⁷⁴

N.B. For full coding frame see Annex 1.1 Trump administration, and Annex 1.2 Biden administration

⁷² "Remarks by Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_21_6696.

⁷³ "Boeing WTO Case," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2048.

⁷⁴ "Statement by Valdis Dombrovskis on EU-US Steel and Aluminium," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_5723.

5.1.2 Multilateralism

Europeans approach turbulences in the transatlantic partnership during Trump multilaterally – and most multilateral efforts proved unfruitful. It is unsurprising multilateralism is the preferred choice of actions for Europeans as the transatlantic bond is meaningful from multiple aspects, but especially since transatlantic trade is of major significance for European importers, exporters, producers, and consumers.

Assuming the dominant preference among European stakeholders is to lessen turbulences in transatlantic trade and thus continue gaining from open trade – engaging multilaterally to bounce back to the normal state of affairs is plausible to be the preferred choice of action before considering alternative remedies. The multilateral efforts are visible in diplomatic talks between the EU and US Trade Representative Lighthizer where issues like additional US tariffs, or steel and aluminum overcapacities were discussed⁷⁵ - suggesting a multilateral way of approaching issues. The EU made efforts to convince the US to cooperate on pressuring China and its unfair approach to trade.⁷⁶ The EU and Trump negotiated agreements on barrier-free trade, removing tariffs on industrial goods⁷⁷ and agreed to recognize their medical goods, which is among the few successes in transatlantic relations during Trump,⁷⁸ alongside the lowering of tariffs on exports on both sides of the Atlantic.⁷⁹

Multilateralism is the EU's preferred but not dominant choice of action – meaning H₃ is rejected. Multilateral engagement by Europeans was only practiced under the condition of negotiation without threats.⁸⁰ The EU was prepared to impose countermeasures in case of failed

⁷⁵ “EU, Japan and US Met in Brussels to Discuss Overcapacity, Steel,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_1781.

⁷⁶ “Transatlantic Trade in Turbulent Times - Speech by Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_18_4604.

⁷⁷ “EU-U.S. Trade: Commission Welcomes Council's Green Light to Start Negotiations with the United States,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2148.

⁷⁸ “EU-U.S. Trade Talks: Milestone Reached in Mutual Recognition on Pharmaceuticals,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_4090.

⁷⁹ “Trade: Joint Statement of the United States and the European Union on a Tariff Agreement,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_1512.

⁸⁰ “European Commission Reacts to the US Restrictions on Steel and Aluminium Affecting the EU,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4006.

multilateral efforts,⁸¹ - considering US non-cooperation, this resulted in Europeans adopting a counter-transactional approach to safeguard their interests.

The long-term threat of rising and revisionist powers did not overshadow Trump's short-term threat to the transatlantic partnership. Consequences of the short-term threat are immediately felt which explains why counter-transactionalism is enacted. While long-term threats like the consequences of illiberal hegemony materialize slowly meaning consequences are felt later making the threat less pressing.

5.1.3 Counter-transactionalism

The biggest support goes to H₂ – meaning the hypothesis, *the EU responded with counter-transactionalism to US transactionalism during Trump*, is confirmed. A recurring theme in the analysis is retaliating proportionately to US protections, which resembles tit-for-tat transatlantic trade relations. Counter-transactionalism implies determination to safeguard the interests of Europeans as the EU has leverage in transatlantic relation too. Whereas Europeans have both the motive and means to request a European response to US transactionalism.

Although the EU showed disapproval to Trump's transactionalism, the benefits of transatlantic trade are significant to an extent that addressing the turbulences within the transatlantic partnership through counter-transactionalism is more useful than hedging and distancing from the US – as the latter suggests even bigger losses for European traders, and consumers. Namely, the US is one of the EU's biggest trading partners,⁸² which implies that transatlantic trade is a major source of income for European stakeholders. Additionally, the tit-for-tat response outnumber multilateralism in the QCA analysis as it often failed considering US noncooperative behavior.

A counter-transactional approach by Europeans is plausible as those mostly hurt by US transactionalism are business, companies, and stakeholders engaging in trade. Some survey answers even suggest the EC being lobbied by businesses. Transatlantic trade relations are to

⁸¹ “WTO Boeing Dispute: EU Issues Preliminary List of U.S. Products Considered for Countermeasures,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2162.

⁸² “The European Union and Its Trade Partners | Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament,” accessed May 29, 2022, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/160/the-european-union-and-its-trade-partners>.

the mutual benefit of the US and EU, therefore European stakeholders can also hurt US producers and consumers.

The EU responded proportionality to the biggest issues in transatlantic relations during Trump. Notably, in the aircraft dispute concerning US subsidies to Boeing, the EU considered increasing tariffs on US exports in strong consultation with EU member-states,⁸³ publics and stakeholders.⁸⁴ The US blocked the WTO's Appellate Body and the EU did not remain defenseless meanwhile – meaning it proposed strengthening trade tools to protect itself.⁸⁵ By 2019 the EU significantly increased its trade defense measures, largely concerning the US – such as a case against US tariffs on Spanish olives and safeguard measures on steel and aluminum.⁸⁶ Often, it is companies that seek from the EU modernized trade rules to safeguard their interests.⁸⁷

On the steel and aluminum issue the EU considered enacting a proportionate response to US tariffs and lift those if the US does so,⁸⁸ – which exactly reflects the counter-transactional nature, or tit-for-tat European approach in response to US protections. The agriculture sector also subject to US tariffs, is crucial to the EU's economy – therefore, the EU promised to consider the impact of US measures on concerned stakeholders and protect Europe's farmers and producers,⁸⁹ but also counter dumping in the European market and deliver upon the expectations of European citizens and companies.⁹⁰

⁸³ “Boeing WTO Case,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1984.

⁸⁴ “WTO Boeing dispute: EU issues preliminary list of U.S. products considered for countermeasures,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2162

⁸⁵ “Commission Reinforces Tools in International Trade,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6748.

⁸⁶ “Trade Defence Report,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_780.

⁸⁷ “EU Trade Defence: Stronger and More Effective Rules Enter into Force,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_3973.

⁸⁸ “EU Adopts Rebalancing Measures in Reaction to US Steel and Aluminium Tariffs.”

⁸⁹ “Statement on U.S. Countermeasures in the Airbus Dispute,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_6132.

⁹⁰ “Commission Welcomes Agreement on New Anti-Dumping Methodology,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_3668.

Essentially, where counter-transactionalism is observable, the EU predominantly expresses retaliatory measures in direct response to a dispute in transatlantic relations or US protections, which shows the EU's dissatisfaction with the approach of the US administration in place. The survey's insights also point to counter-transactional responses to US tariffs, such as European tax imposition and more trade barriers and export bans on goods specific goods.


Given that the actors included in trade policymaking besides the EC are member-states and the EP, it is likely the latter two voice the preferences of their domestic audiences and electorates in the policymaking process and negotiations. For instance, agriculture is a sector subject to protections during Trump – thus, farmers have the motive to voice a specific stance in EU trade policy towards the US and are easy to mobilize and lobby the EC as they are a small group.

To illustrate, in a hypothetical scenario the representatives of farmers in specific member-states and the EP do not respond to their demands in face of US protections. (1) Representatives risk to lose future votes from farmers – which is especially concerning if they constitute a large portion of their votes, and so may compromise their future mandate; (2) but also risk domestic backlash and protests which further damages the legitimacy and credibility of national and EU representatives and policy-elites. The motive of European stakeholders to demand a proportionate response to US transactions are losses due to protections, whereas the motives of representatives and policy-elites to deliver upon those demands are losses in support if they neglect those demands.

Figure 2. European attitudes on the influence of Europeans on the EU's approach to transatlantic relations during the Trump administration

Do you think Europeans influenced the EU's attitude and response to Trump's approach to transatlantic relations?

13 responses



Source: Originally gathered survey data, Spring 2022

Per selectorate theory, Europeans influence the EU's approach to transatlantic relations through instances like the EP and national governments, that face elections and therefore transmit the preferences of their electorate to EU-level policymaking. Although, getting exact insights into the internal policymaking dynamics of the EU is a difficult task.⁹¹

Figure 2 shows a split result on the involvement on Europeans in shaping the EU's approach to transatlantic relations. The majority agrees Europeans played a role but differ on the extent to which this is the case. As the analysis suggests, references to involvement of European citizens and stakeholders are made in the speeches, statements, and press releases. The survey confirms observations in the QCA analysis. Diplomats brought forward efforts by Europeans to influence the EU's stance in transatlantic relations through their national parliaments. The EU's efforts to employ countermeasures on vehicles and pharmaceuticals is pointed out as a way in which Europeans influenced the EU's approach.

Table 4. Overview of confirmed/rejected theoretical expectations

Hypotheses	Status
H ₁ : <i>The EU responded with hedging to US transactionalism during Trump.</i>	Rejected
H ₂ : <i>The EU responded with counter-transactionalism to US transactionalism during Trump.</i>	Confirmed
H ₃ : <i>The EU maintained a multilateral approach to transatlantic relations during Trump.</i>	Rejected

5.2 The Biden Administration: Wind of Change?

The data analysis covering the Biden administration suggests a revival of multilateralism in the transatlantic partnership. A returning theme in the data are calls from the European side to strengthen multilateralism, existing partnerships, and institutions - and in doing so, engage with different stakeholders from the private and public sector just as civil society.⁹²

⁹¹ Dür, Andreas, and Hubert Zimmermann. "Introduction: The EU in International Trade Negotiations*." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 4 (2007): 771–87. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00747.x>.

⁹² "EU's Renewed Multilateralism Fit for the 21st Century," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_622.

A notable step forward in transatlantic relations is lifting retaliatory tariffs by the EU and US imposed during the aircraft dispute. EU Commissioner for Trade Valdis Dombrovskis considers the mutual tariff suspension a reset of transatlantic relations with mutual gain for both sides of the Atlantic, possibility to restore trust, reach a settlement on the aircraft dispute,⁹³ and outlined the steps towards that end like eliminating countermeasures on US and EU export. The President of the EC suggests that the progress creates a positive outlook for further settlement of disputes and cooperative transatlantic relations.⁹⁴

For diplomatic efforts to be fruitful all parties to the relationship need to employ a multilateral approach, which is most likely present among European and US counterparts during the Biden administration. For instance, some European proposals made during Trump were achieved during Biden, such as the 'Trade and Technology Council (TTC)' which deepens transatlantic trade relations and coordinates EU and US counterparts on global trade.⁹⁵

The dispute on steel and aluminum tariffs was a major setback in the transatlantic partnership - yet during Biden, the EU and US tackled the dispute by negotiating the overcapacity in the sector.⁹⁶ The revival of steel and aluminum trade signifies a strengthened transatlantic bond and recovering trust relations, as the US lifted duties on European steel and aluminum exports while the EU lifted retaliatory tariffs.⁹⁷

President of the EC, Ursula von der Leyen, summarizes the progress made in transatlantic relations during Biden well: "*We put to rest our disputes on aircraft subsidies. We set up our Trade and Technology Council. We created a vaccine partnership. We reached an agreement on global minimum tax. And now, we have found a solution on EU-US steel and aluminium trade.*"⁹⁸ Thus, the state of transatlantic relations during Biden shows that disputes were resolved or steps towards resolution were taken, just as initiatives to deepen trade cooperation.

⁹³ "EU and U.S. Tariffs," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1047.

⁹⁴ "EU and US Take Decisive Step to End Aircraft Dispute," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3001.

⁹⁵ "EU-US Launch Trade and Technology Council," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2990.

⁹⁶ "Joint EU-US Statement on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5724.

⁹⁷ "Joint EU-US Statement on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5724.

⁹⁸ "EU and US Suspend Steel and Aluminium Trade Disputes," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5721.


During Trump, the aim of Europeans was to stop US transactionalism, as the analysis suggests, while during Biden Europeans exploit the opportunity of having an internationally oriented US administration to reset the transatlantic partnership from the damage done during Trump. Since transatlantic trade is a win-win situation for traders and consumers on both sides of the Atlantic, it is unsurprising that the EU's approach is more multilateral considering the Biden administration engaged multilaterally. European stakeholders change tone in transatlantic relations to engage in free trade as Biden's approach invites them to do so. The survey data points out the joint response to the war in Ukraine, as an example of a restoring transatlantic partnership and a trust-building context in which transatlantic relations are restoring. It is observable how common threat perception, or specifically the Russian threat, results in cooperation and unity among partners despite disturbances in the partnership.

5.2.1 Implications for transatlantic trust relations

Since the EU's approach to transatlantic relations predominantly reflects counter-transactionalism which is combined with multilateral efforts – it presumably suggests that the EU's trust in the partnership somewhat decreased – since a tit-for-tat response serves to dissuade future US transactionalism. Yet, trust is not affected to an extent that it motivates the EU to hedge against the US and distance itself. *Figure 3* suggests that during Trump overall trust in transatlantic relations decreased from the European side, according to the survey.

Figure 3. European attitudes on transatlantic trust during the Trump administration

Do you think Trump's approach to transatlantic relations decreased the trust of the EU and Europeans in the US and transatlantic relations?
13 responses




Source: Originally gathered survey data, Spring 2022

During Biden the EU's approach shifts towards multilateralism which implies solid trust in the transatlantic bond by Europeans. *Figure 4* shows a split result in the survey between those

seeing an improving transatlantic trust relationship and those believing it is too soon to conclude, which does not necessarily signify skepticism about improving trust. Whether the administration in place is determinant to the trust a state's partners have in the partnership is unclear from this analysis. However, the grand strategy an administration chooses to follow presumably has broader implications for trust relations with partners, although estimating the magnitude thereof is out of the scope of this research.

Figure 4. European attitudes on transatlantic trust during the Biden administration

Do you think that currently under the Biden administration, trust in transatlantic relations among Europeans is restoring?
13 responses



Source: Originally gathered survey data, Spring 2022

5.3 Discussion: Friends, Enemies, or Frenemies?

Ultimately, to put it in the metaphor the EU and US largely resemble 'frenemies' in transatlantic relations during Trump - the EU disagreed with US actions and responded proportionately but is too dependent on the US to hedge against it and prioritizes addressing the short-term threat of Trump. The long-term economic gains from the transatlantic partnership potentially are the Europeans' incentive to focus on addressing the short-term threat Trump poses to the multilateral order, rather than the threat of rising and revisionist powers which unfolds slowly. Contrastingly, during Biden the EU and US engage multilaterally in transatlantic relations, resembling 'friends' rather than 'frenemies' as some disputes were resolved, and some joint initiatives were proposed and/or achieved.

The analysis shows a noticeable change of tone in transatlantic relations depending on the US administration in place. While it may be difficult to get insights into how exactly the EU's internal policymaking processes and chains of influence look like, member-states and EU

institutions are certainly subject to societal influence, as stakeholders have venues to reach them. For instance, not only lobbying is a common way of translating dominant preferences into trade policy, but representatives strive to deliver upon the expectations of their (s)electorate, according to theory.⁹⁹ Stakeholders lobby both national and EU-level politicians and institutions.¹⁰⁰

For instance, consultation with member-states and the EP were present in deciding upon countermeasures in response to US tariffs on the EU – and both are subject to electoral support. Farmers, consumers, businesses, and stakeholders are primarily affected by US protections, which does not only damage their interest but potentially their trust as well. As observed throughout the QCA analysis and survey, citizens, companies, policymakers, and stakeholders are brought up in regards of shaping the EU's response to US transactionalism.

Europeans have both the motive and means to influence the European approach to transatlantic relations. US transactionalism invites affected European stakeholders to lobby EU institutions, their representatives, and national governments to translate their preference into specific trade policy. Having farmers or other concerned stakeholders lobby the EC is most likely to result in some influence over the policymaking process to reflect their interests.

Not only do stakeholders have influence because of their loyalty in elections, but also because the trade sectors affected by US protections are usually small and easy to mobilize, which allows for more effective lobbying. As such, the dominant preferences among the (s)electorate are those that national and EU representatives push most for in the policymaking process and negotiations.

Some trade policy matters fall within the competence of member-states,¹⁰¹ meaning domestic influences are even more apparent in such scenario, as influencing one's national representatives is easier than doing so at the EU-level. However, even trade policy matters that fall within the supranational authority of the EU are co-legislated by the EP,¹⁰² which again

⁹⁹ Narizny, "Economic Interests and Grand Strategy."

¹⁰⁰ Manfred Elsig, "European Union Trade Policy after Enlargement: Larger Crowds, Shifting Priorities and Informal Decision-Making," *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, no. 6 (September 1, 2010): 781–98, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2010.486975>.

¹⁰¹ "The European Union and Its Trade Partners | Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament."

¹⁰² "The European Union and Its Trade Partners | Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament."

can shape EU trade policy and negotiations according to the dominant interests within the electorate of the EP.

Given that transatlantic trade is the biggest flow of income for Europeans, it is unsurprising addressing US transactionalism was prioritized during Trump's presidency. Simply put, the losses of trade protections are felt vastly and instantly, while the threats posed by rising and revisionist powers unfold quietly and slowly. Having stakes in transatlantic trade motivates one to show some assertiveness to send a message that Europeans have leverage over the US and thus bring about an end to US protections. Additionally, not addressing the short-term threat of Trump could have resulted in an escalation of US protections overtime, thereby making Europeans significantly lose rather than gain from transatlantic trade.

Ultimately, the analysis stands in confirmation of H₂ – i.e., the EU responded with counter-transactionalism in transatlantic relations during Trump. Thus, the answer to the research question is the following: (1) US transactionalism under Trump did affect the EU's approach to transatlantic relations and inspired a European counter-transactional response. (2) However, during Biden, the EU's approach resembles multilateralism or largely mirrors the approach of the Biden administration.

Thus, how the EU approaches transatlantic relations largely depends on the US administration in place. Transatlantic relations during Biden only reconfirm the counter-transactional approach employed by Europeans – the priority to address US protections over other threats further confirms the importance of transatlantic trade to European stakeholders, which once in boat with a multilateral US administration take the opportunity to refresh transatlantic cooperation and ensure future mutual gain.

6. Conclusion

What is the impact of US transactionalism under Trump on the EU's approach to transatlantic trade relations? The analysis suggests that the EU's approach to transatlantic relations largely mirrored that of the US during Trump and as such is counter-transactional, which slowly bounces back to multilateralism during the Biden administration.

The implications of this research suggest that what happens domestically affects relations internationally and vice versa. Having an understanding how disturbed relations with partners can affect one's domestic interests negatively and make stakeholders reconsider who they elect once aware of how intricately connected domestic and international politics are. Disturbances in long-standing partnerships have implications for trust which is the foundation of partnerships – and shaking that foundation has consequences for the endurance of those partnerships. In a multipolar world with shifting powers, having strong partnerships is a *sin qua non* considering the intricate challenges of today's global world.

On the upside, the comparison between the Trump and Biden administration makes the connection between change of grand strategy and changing dynamics within transatlantic relations apparent, as it shows how transatlantic relations look like depends much on the US administration in place. On the downside, the effect of Trump's transactionalism does not say enough about the exact magnitude, since Trump served one term in office, and it is unclear how the length of periods of grand strategy deviation affects the effect on partnerships. Future research can look at factors which may lessen/increase the effect periods of grand strategy deviation have on partnerships and alliances.

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Annex

Annex 1. Coding framework

Annex 1.1 Transatlantic Relations during Trump (2017-2020)

Citizen/stakeholder involvement

Indicators: mentions of involvement/consultation with citizens, stakeholders, interest groups, businesses, civil society; mentions of democratic processes of policymaking;

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
Hedging	Trade alternatives	Hedging entails distancing or increasing independence from the untrustworthy partner state perceived - specific to the research, hedging entails enacting actions/policies that make the EU less dependent on the US because of uncertainty in the transatlantic partnership due to US actions. E.g., Considering US trade alternatives.	Trade increase with other states; Trade agreements with alternatives Reluctance to deepen trade with US Trade rules, that limit the freedom of the US to determine outcomes	"Welcoming the outcome of the vote held in Strasbourg, President Jean-Claude Juncker said: "[...]Today's vote by the European Parliament is an important milestone in the democratic process of ratification of the agreement reached with Canada [...]. As a result, EU companies and citizens will start to reap the benefits that the agreement offers as soon as possible. This trade deal has been subject to an in-depth parliamentary scrutiny which reflects the increased interest of citizens in trade policy. The intense exchanges on CETA throughout this process are testimony to the democratic nature of European decision making. This progressive agreement is an opportunity to shape globalisation together and influence the setting of global trade rules." [...] "Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said: <i>"This vote is the start of a new era in EU-Canada relations - together we are sending a strong signal today. By building bridges rather than walls, we can face the challenges that confront our societies together. In these uncertain times, with rising protectionism</i>

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p><i>around the world, CETA underlines our strong commitment to sustainable trade.</i>"¹⁰³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Our Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area component, is now one step closer to being ratified." (<i>European Commission, Statement, 2017</i>). [...] "The Association Agreement has already increased trade between us, has brought increased prosperity for entrepreneurs, has helped to initiate and consolidate a number of reforms in Ukraine, and has brought new opportunities to European Union and Ukrainian citizens alike. Let us harness the positive momentum generated by today's vote to further strengthen our partnership."¹⁰⁴ • "CETA is a modern and progressive agreement, underlining our commitment to free and fair trade based on values. It helps us shape globalisation and the rules that govern global commerce. [...] This agreement also vastly strengthens our relationship with Canada, a strategic partner and ally with whom we have deep historical and cultural ties."¹⁰⁵ • "President Juncker said: <i>"Today we agreed in principle on an Economic Partnership Agreement, the impact of which goes far beyond our shores. [...] Together, we are sending a strong message</i>

¹⁰³ "European Commission Welcomes Parliament's Support of Trade Deal with Canada," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed April 18, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_270.

¹⁰⁴ "Statement by President Jean-Claude Juncker on the Vote in the Dutch Senate on the Ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_17_1461.

¹⁰⁵ "EU-Canada Trade Agreement Enters into Force," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_3121.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p><i>to the world that we stand for open and fair trade. As far as we are concerned, there is no protection in protectionism. Only by working together will we be able to set ambitious global standards. This will be the message that the EU and Japan will bring together to the G20 tomorrow.</i>"¹⁰⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström added: <i>"This agreement has an enormous economic importance, but it is also a way to bring us closer. We are demonstrating that the EU and Japan, democratic and open global partners, believe in free trade. That we believe in building bridges, not walls.</i>"¹⁰⁷ • "Phil Hogan, Commissioner in charge of Agriculture and Rural Development said: <i>"This is a win-win for both partners, but a big win for rural Europe. The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement is the most significant and far-reaching agreement ever concluded in agriculture.</i>"¹⁰⁸ • ""Today marks the beginning of a new chapter in the Strategic Partnership between the EU and Japan as we celebrate the agreement in principle of the Economic Partnership Agreement and the Strategic Partnership Agreement at political level. The highly ambitious and comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement will consolidate our solid and evolving trade and economic partnership and pave the

¹⁰⁶ "EU and Japan Reach Agreement in Principle on Economic Partnership Agreement," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_1902.

¹⁰⁷ "EU and Japan Reach Agreement in Principle on Economic Partnership Agreement."

¹⁰⁸ "EU and Japan Reach Agreement in Principle on Economic Partnership Agreement."

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>way for the future. [...] This agreement will allow us to renew and strengthen our joint commitment to international standards for an even closer cooperation in the future. At the same time, with this agreement in principle of the Economic Partnership Agreement, Europe and Japan demonstrate to the world - and to our citizens - that free trade, with clear and transparent rules fully respecting and enhancing our values, remains an important tool to promote prosperity in our societies. The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement will constitute the basis for a strategic partnership for free and fair trade, against protectionism."¹⁰⁹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "[...] This week we continue to pursue our strategy to open up markets in particular in Asia and Latin America. Today, another round of EU-Mexico trade talks is starting and I expect to see good progress done this week across all the areas of this deal. [...] In the current international environment an ambitious EU-Japan deal would send a powerful signal to the rest of the world that two of the largest economies are resisting protectionism, in favour of openness, of trade and investment."¹¹⁰ • "President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said: <i>"[...]Today we take a step forwards towards concluding agreements with two of our closest Asian partners, Japan and Singapore. The impact of these agreements will go far beyond our respective shores -</i>

¹⁰⁹ "24th EU-Japan Summit Joint Statement," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_17_1920.

¹¹⁰ "Press Conference by Commissioner Malmström on the 'Report on Trade and Investment Barriers,'" Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_17_1799.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p><i>it sends a clear and unambiguous message that we stand together against protectionism and in defence of multilateralism. This is more important than ever.</i>"¹¹¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Luckily, the EU is not alone in putting our faith in open global trade. Just look at our recent negotiation agenda. We have closed trade deals with Canada – which is in place – and Mexico. With Japan, signed this week, where we hope to have the agreement in effect soon. Vietnam and Singapore are also concluded. We continue negotiations with Mercosur – I'm heading back into those negotiations right after this – and with Chile and others, while opening talks with new partners like Australia and New Zealand. With New Zealand, the first round is ongoing this week. The list goes on. These are more than economic partnerships. They are strategic alliances – a circle of friends who share our values, who believe in the benefits of trade, and who believe in multilateralism."¹¹² • "European Commission Vice-President for Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness Jyrki Katainen said: "I am confident that the exchanges we have had with my new counterpart, Liu He, have been useful in paving the way towards a successful EU-China Summit in the economic and trade field. I am particularly pleased with the

¹¹¹ "Trade: European Commission Proposes Signature and Conclusion of Japan and Singapore Agreements," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_3325.

¹¹² "Transatlantic Trade in Turbulent Times - Speech by Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_18_4604.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>progress achieved in our investment negotiations and look forward to an exchange of offers at the Summit."¹¹³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Commissioner Malmström said: "Today is an important milestone in EU-New Zealand relations. Together, we can conclude a win-win agreement that offers benefits to business and citizens alike. Trade agreements are about economic opportunities but they are also about strengthening ties with our close allies.[...]"¹¹⁴ • "Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Trade, said: "<i>These agreements with Singapore - our biggest trading partner in the region - are another landmark for the EU. As the first of such agreements between the EU and a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, they will open up vast new opportunities for our exporters. [...] In this difficult period on the world stage, we need strong allies such as Singapore in order to uphold the rules-based global trade system.</i>"¹¹⁵ • "President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said: "<i>Europe and Japan are sending a message to the world about the future of open and fair trade. We are opening a new marketplace home to 635 million people and almost a third of the world's Gross</i>

¹¹³ "EU and China Discuss Economic and Trade Relations at the 7th High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue," accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4281.

¹¹⁴ "EU and New Zealand Launch Trade Negotiations," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4165.

¹¹⁵ "EU and Singapore Forge Closer Economic and Political Ties," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_6139.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p><i>Domestic Product, bringing the people of Europe and Japan closer together than ever before.</i>"¹¹⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Trade, said: "This agreement has it all: it scraps tariffs and contributes to the global rulebook, whilst at the same time demonstrating to the world that we both remain convinced by the benefits of open trade."¹¹⁷ • "Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis said: <i>“The current crisis gives us no other option but to work hand in hand with our global partners, including China. By pulling together we can recover more quickly economically, and make progress on areas of mutual interest such as trade and investment relations. However, we also need to address sticking points such as reciprocity in the way our companies are treated. We will need to make further progress on these and other issues ahead of the next leaders' summit in the autumn.”</i> Commissioner Hogan said: <i>“EU-China bilateral and trade relations must be based on the key principles of reciprocity and level-playing field based on clear and predictable rules. Today I have called upon China to engage in serious reform of the multilateral system and its rulebook and to remove the existing barriers impeding access to the Chinese market of EU exporters of goods and services as well as of European investors. Such an approach by China would show a level of responsibility which reflects its economic and trade importance.”</i> The meeting allowed the two sides to exchange views on the ongoing

¹¹⁶ “EU-Japan Trade Agreement Enters into Force,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_785.

¹¹⁷ “EU-Japan Trade Agreement Enters into Force.”

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>negotiations on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment following the last negotiating round which took place on 20-24 July. The EU registered the significant progress made on level playing field related issues, while highlighting that equally significant work that still remains to be done on key issues such as market access and sustainable development."¹¹⁸</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "As regards investment, the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) will be the most ambitious agreement that China has ever concluded with a third country. [...] In addition, the EU has negotiated further and new market access openings and commitments such as the elimination of quantitative restrictions, equity caps or joint venture requirements in a number of sectors."¹¹⁹ • "President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said: "The European Parliament's approval of the EU-Singapore trade and investment agreements marks a historical moment. This is the European Union's first bilateral trade agreement with a Southeast Asian country, a building block towards a closer relationship between Europe and one of the most dynamic regions in the world. We are forging closer economic and political ties with friends and partners who, like us, believe in open, reciprocal and rules-based trade. This is yet another win-win trade agreement negotiated by the European Union, an agreement that will create new opportunities for European

¹¹⁸ "EU and China Discuss Trade and Economic Relations," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1419.

¹¹⁹ "Key Elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2542.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				producers, workers, farmers and consumers, while at the same time promoting cooperation and multilateralism.” Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström said: “In uncertain times, we need agreements like these more than ever. They will help Europe and Singapore to prosper, boosting our trade and strengthening an already essential relationship. The agreements will benefit workers and farmers, as well as small and big companies on both sides. [...] This is yet another signal that open, fair and rules-based global trade is here to stay.” ¹²⁰
Counter-transactionalism	Tit-for-tat trade relations and policies	Counter-transactionalism entails enacting a like-for-like approach in trade relations in response to US transactionalism during Trump - manifested with retaliatory protections in response to US protections.	Introducing trade barriers: tariffs, quotas, taxes, dumping, Introducing counter-measures in response to US measures Assertive trade policy; Adopting policies that ensure wins for	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "‘Today's ruling is another victory for the EU, its industry and EU workers in this strategic sector. The panel agrees that the US has simply ignored existing WTO rulings and has continued to subsidise Boeing,’ said EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström. ‘We will continue to firmly defend our industry to ensure we have a level-playing-field. EU companies must be able to compete on fair and equal terms.’"¹²¹ • "Following the meeting in Strasbourg, President Jean-Claude Juncker said: "Europe stands for open and fair trade, but as I have said time and again, we are not naïve free traders. That's why we have to make sure that, while upholding the multilateral, rules-based trade system, our legislation allows us to ensure that our companies operate on a level playing field. This is not about any country in particular, simply about making sure that we have the means to take action against

¹²⁰ “Agreement with Singapore Set to Give a Boost to EU-Asia Trade,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_906.

¹²¹ “EU Secures Another Important Win in the WTO Boeing Dispute,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_1591.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
			the EU, and/or hurt the US Improving trade defense Cases against the US Mentions of need to protect EU industries/companies/citizens/businesses/stakeholders against protections and unfair trade	<p><i>unfair competition and the dumping of products in the EU market that leads to the destruction of jobs. Our words have to be followed by decisive actions and this is the kind of action our companies and citizens expect from us. I commend the European Parliament and our governments for having lived up to these expectations.</i>"¹²²</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström said: "We believe that the changes agreed today to the legislation strengthen EU's trade defence instruments and will ensure that our European industry will be well equipped to deal with the unfair competition they face from dumped and subsidised imports now and in the future. Having a new methodology in place for calculating dumping on imports from countries which have significant distortions in their economies is essential to address the realities of today's international trading environment. [...] With today's successful outcome, the EU will have an anti-dumping methodology in place which will deal head-on, with the market distortions which may exist in exporting economies."¹²³ • "We are taking action. We will defend Europe against those who don't play by the rules. The EU leaders in Hamburg will be very clear about this, and fight hard for the rights of our exporters by all means at our disposal."¹²⁴

¹²² "Commission Welcomes Agreement on New Anti-Dumping Methodology," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_3668.

¹²³ "Commission Welcomes Agreement on New Anti-Dumping Methodology."

¹²⁴ "Press Conference by Commissioner Malmström on the 'Report on Trade and Investment Barriers.'"

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "[...]We will not sit idly while our industry is hit with unfair measures that put thousands of European jobs at risk. I had the occasion to say that the EU would react adequately and that's what we will do. The EU will react firmly and commensurately to defend our interests. The Commission will bring forward in the next few days a proposal for WTO-compatible countermeasures against the US to rebalance the situation."¹²⁵ • "President Jean-Claude Juncker said: "[...]Our unshakable and facts-based conviction that trade brings prosperity will not prevent us from defending our workers and companies with all legitimate tools when others do not play by the rules. With this new legislation and a new set of modernised tools that will be soon in place, Europe will be able to keep pace and deal more effectively with the ever changing realities of the international trading environment."¹²⁶ • "Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, said: "[...] The EU is open for business. But we must also protect our industry from unfair competition from imports, particularly from countries whose economies are significantly distorted owing to state interference."¹²⁷ • "President Jean-Claude Juncker said: "Our actions to defend European producers and workers against unfair trading practices

¹²⁵ "European Commission Responds to the US Restrictions on Steel and Aluminium Affecting the EU," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_18_1484.

¹²⁶ "EU Puts in Place New Trade Defence Rules," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_5346.

¹²⁷ "EU Puts in Place New Trade Defence Rules."

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p><i>must be bold and efficient and today's agreement will provide us with an additional tool to do just that. We are not naïve free traders and the set of changes agreed today confirms that once again. Europe will continue to stand for open markets and rules-based trade but we will not hesitate to resort to our trade defence toolbox to ensure a level playing field for our companies and workers.</i>"¹²⁸</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said: <i>"Better late than never. It took us some time to get here, but today's deal means that the EU will have the necessary tools to tackle quickly and effectively unjust trading practices. Together with the recently-agreed changes to the anti-dumping methodology, the EU's tool box of trade defence instruments is in shape to deal with global challenges. The EU stands for open and rules-based trade, but we must ensure that others do not take advantage of our openness. We are and we will continue to stand up for companies and workers suffering from unfair competition.</i>"¹²⁹ • "[...] in some cases, the EU will adapt its 'lesser duty rule' and may impose higher duties. This will apply to cases targeting imports of unfairly subsidised or dumped products from countries where raw materials and energy prices are distorted."¹³⁰ • "President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker said: <i>"[...] The US now leaves us with no choice but to proceed with a</i>

¹²⁸ "Commission Welcomes Landmark Deal Modernising the EU's Trade Defence," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_5136.

¹²⁹ "Commission Welcomes Landmark Deal Modernising the EU's Trade Defence."

¹³⁰ "Commission Welcomes Landmark Deal Modernising the EU's Trade Defence."

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p><i>WTO dispute settlement case and with the imposition of additional duties on a number of imports from the US. We will defend the Union's interests, in full compliance with international trade law.</i>"¹³¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>"Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström said: "[...]Now that we have clarity, the EU's response will be proportionate and in accordance with WTO rules. We will now trigger a dispute settlement case at the WTO, since these US measures clearly go against agreed international rules. We will also impose rebalancing measures and take any necessary steps to protect the EU market from trade diversion caused by these US restrictions."</i>¹³² • "The EU does not want to escalate the situation. However, we have had no choice but to respond. [...] We have taken action in a way that is reasonable, proportionate and in accordance with international rules. Our response on steel and aluminium has three parts: First, we have taken out a case in the WTO. Illegal moves under the system need to be challenged through the system. Second, we have taken steps to assert our rights under WTO rules. [...] To do this, we have set a list of products on which to apply balancing tariffs on imports from the United States. [...] Third, we need to protect the EU from the spill-over effects of US tariffs. [...]To stop this from happening, we are applying safeguards to prevent any excess steel from disrupting our markets. [...] We regret that we have had to do this, but we have to

¹³¹ "European Commission Reacts to the US Restrictions on Steel and Aluminium Affecting the EU," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4006.

¹³² "European Commission Reacts to the US Restrictions on Steel and Aluminium Affecting the EU."

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>protect ourselves. A large part of protecting ourselves is enforcing trading rules, because the global rulebook is useless if it is not followed. And to be clear, we enforce the rules wherever they are broken."¹³³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström said: <i>"The US tariffs on steel products are causing trade diversion, which may result in serious harm to EU steelmakers and workers in this industry. We are left with no other choice than to introduce provisional safeguard measures to protect our domestic industry against a surge of imports. [...]"</i> "[...]"The provisional measures concern 23 steel product categories and will take the form of a Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ). For each of the 23 categories, tariffs of 25% will only be imposed once imports exceed the average of imports over the last three years.[...]"¹³⁴ • "Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström said: <i>"We did not want to be in this position. However, the unilateral and unjustified decision of the US to impose steel and aluminium tariffs on the EU means that we are left with no other choice. The rules of international trade, which we have developed over the years hand in hand with our American partners, cannot be violated without a reaction from our side. Our response is measured, proportionate and fully in line with</i>

¹³³ "Transatlantic Trade in Turbulent Times - Speech by Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade."

¹³⁴ "Trade: Commission Imposes Provisional Safeguard Measures on Imports of Steel Products," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4563.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p><i>WTO rules. Needless to say, if the US removes its tariffs, our measures will also be removed.</i>"¹³⁵</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <p>"President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said: "[...]We have shown our teeth when we had to by adopting anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. And now we have new and improved trade defence rules in our arsenal to face down some of today's challenges in global trade. Make no mistake – we will do whatever it takes to defend European producers and workers when others distort the market or don't play by the rules." [...]"Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said: "[...]European companies have been looking for a modern set of rules. I am very confident that this provides us with the necessary tools to efficiently defend our industries from unfair trade practices. [...] Now, we are better equipped to stand up for our companies if other countries don't stick to the rules."¹³⁶</p> <p>"Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström said: "This is a measured and proportionate response to the unilateral and illegal decision taken by the United States to impose tariffs on European steel and aluminium exports. [...]We regret that the United States left us with no other option than to safeguard EU interests."¹³⁷</p>

¹³⁵ "EU Adopts Rebalancing Measures in Reaction to US Steel and Aluminium Tariffs," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4220.

¹³⁶ "EU Trade Defence: Stronger and More Effective Rules Enter into Force," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_3973.

¹³⁷ "EU-US Trade: European Commission Endorses Rebalancing Duties on US Products," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4083.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Today, the European Commission published a regulation imposing definitive safeguard measures on imports of steel products. These measures will take effect tomorrow, 2 February, and replace the provisional ones in place since July 2018. [...] The measures concern 26 steel product categories and consist of tariff-rate quotas above which a duty of 25% will apply."¹³⁸ • "The year 2018 was also notable in that the EU imposed three safeguard measures, the first since 2002."¹³⁹ • "President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said: <i>"[...] Not all of our trade partners want to play by the same rules that we do – we must not be taken advantage of and must protect the EU, its companies and its workers against unfair trading practices. [...] We have now in place tools that are better-suited for today's global economy and we will continue working to ensure our companies and workers are shielded from any unfair practices."</i>¹⁴⁰ • "Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström said: <i>"Open economies need effective tools to enforce fair competition, especially at a time where some countries don't want to play by the rules. This report shows that our trade defence team is working harder than ever to safeguard jobs and protect the EU from unfair trade practices"</i>

¹³⁸ "Commission Imposes Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Steel Products," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_821.

¹³⁹ "Report on EU Trade Defence – Effective Protection against Unfair Trade," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_1850.

¹⁴⁰ "Report on EU Trade Defence – Effective Protection against Unfair Trade."

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p><i>around the world. Thanks to our recent reforms, we are able to act quicker and our tools are more suited to the current global economic challenges.</i>"¹⁴¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <p>"The public consultation aims to gather feedback from stakeholders who may be affected by the planned measures. EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said: <i>"European companies must be able to compete on fair and equal terms. The recent WTO ruling on U.S. subsidies for Boeing is important in this respect. We must continue to defend a level-playing field for our industry. But let me be clear, we do not want a tit-for-tat. While we need to be ready with countermeasures in case there is no other way out [...]."</i> The list published today covers a range of items, from aircrafts to chemicals and agri-food products (including everything from frozen fish and citrus fruits to ketchup), that overall represent around USD20 billion of United States exports into the European Union. At an earlier stage of this dispute (in 2012), the EU made a request to the WTO to authorise the adoption of countermeasures worth up to USD12 billion, equivalent to the estimated damage caused to Airbus by the U.S. support to Boeing."¹⁴²</p> <p>"Today, the European Commission unveiled a proposal that will allow the European Union to protect its trade interests despite the paralysis of the multilateral dispute settlement system in the World Trade Organization (WTO). To further increase the focus on</p>

¹⁴¹ "Report on EU Trade Defence – Effective Protection against Unfair Trade."

¹⁴² "WTO Boeing Dispute: EU Issues Preliminary List of U.S. Products Considered for Countermeasures," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2162.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>compliance and enforcement of the EU's trade agreements, the Commission created today the position of Chief Trade Enforcement Officer. President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said: <i>“A stronger Europe in the world implies efficient EU leadership on global trade and appropriate powers to ensure that international trade rules are respected. For that reason, I start my mandate by taking swift action to strengthen our trade toolbox. Today's proposals will let us defend our interests in these particularly uneasy times for international trade. As many European jobs are at stake, the EU needs to be equipped to ensure that our partners respect their commitments and that's what this proposal aims for.”</i> Commissioner for Trade, Phil Hogan, said: <i>“This is a critical moment for multilateralism and for the global trading system. With the Appellate Body removed from the equation, we have lost an enforceable dispute settlement system that has been an independent guarantor that the WTO's rules are applied impartially. Whilst we seek to reform the WTO and re-establish a well-functioning WTO system, we cannot afford being defenceless if there is no possibility to get a satisfactory solution within the WTO. The amendments we propose will allow us to defend our companies, workers and consumers, whenever our partners do not play by the rules.”</i> Today's proposal to amend the existing Enforcement Regulation comes as a direct reaction to the blockage yesterday of the operations of the WTO Appellate Body.”¹⁴³</p>

¹⁴³ “Commission Reinforces Tools in International Trade,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6748.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Following the move by the U.S. today to apply countermeasures against imports from the EU in consequence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Airbus dispute, Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström made the following statement: <i>“We regret the choice of the U.S. to move ahead with tariffs. This step leaves us no alternative but to follow through in due course with our own tariffs in the Boeing case, where the U.S. has been found in breach of WTO rules. [...] The Commission will monitor the impact of the announced U.S. countermeasures on the European products concerned, notably in the agricultural sector. The European Commission is committed to defending European companies, farmers and consumers.”</i>¹⁴⁴ • "Following the publication today of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) award regarding the amount of U.S. countermeasures in the WTO Airbus dispute, Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström made the following statement: <i>“[...] In the parallel Boeing case, the EU will in some months equally be granted rights to impose countermeasures against the U.S. as a result of its continued failure to comply with WTO rules. A preliminary list of U.S. products to be considered for countermeasures was published last April. [...] If the U.S. decides to impose WTO authorised countermeasures, it will be pushing the EU into a situation where we will have no other option than do the same.”</i>¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ “Statement on U.S. Countermeasures in the Airbus Dispute,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_6132.

¹⁴⁵ “Statement on Publication of WTO’s Award in Airbus Dispute,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_5973.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Commissioner for Trade Phil Hogan said: <i>“A strong and effective trade defence is of key importance to protect our companies and jobs against unfair trading practices and to ensure diversity of supply. [...]”</i>¹⁴⁶ • "Continued high-level of EU trade defence activity: In 2019, the Commission launched 16 investigations (against 10 in 2018) and imposed 12 new measures (against 6 in 2018). An intensive activity in reviewing existing measures resulted in the conclusion of 18 expiry reviews, 11 more than in 2018. At the end of 2019, the EU had in place 140 trade defence measures, 5% more compared to the year before. Those included 121 anti-dumping, 16 anti-subsidy and three safeguard measures. The highest number of EU trade defence measures concerns imports from countries such as China (93 of the existing anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures), Russia (10 measures), India (7 measures) and the U.S. (6 measures). [...] Resolute action to safeguard EU steel market: Following up on the 2018 U.S. import duty on steel, in early 2019 the Commission adopted definitive safeguard measures for a range of steel products of all origin. [...] Strong defence of EU exporters targeted in foreign trade defence investigations: [...] The Commission has been very firm in intervening in foreign investigations that unfairly target EU exports. In two notable cases – anti-subsidy measures imposed by the U.S. on table olives from Spain and the measures on frozen fries - the

¹⁴⁶ “Trade Defence Report,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_780.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>Commission initiated trade dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization."¹⁴⁷</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Commissioner Hogan said: <i>“In the absence of a settlement, the EU will be ready to fully avail itself of its own sanction rights.”</i>¹⁴⁸ • "Executive Vice-President for an Economy that Works for People and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, said: <i>“We have made clear all along that we want to settle this long-running issue. Regrettably, due to lack of progress with the U.S., we had no other choice but to impose these countermeasures. The EU is consequently exercising its legal rights under the WTO's recent decision. [...]”</i>¹⁴⁹ • " [...] Regrettably, in spite of our best efforts, due to lack of progress from the U.S. side, we can confirm that the European Union will later today exercise our rights and impose the countermeasures awarded to us by the WTO in respect of Boeing. I would remind you that the U.S. has imposed its tariffs on the EU for over a year. [...]"¹⁵⁰ • "Today, the Dispute Settlement Body of World Trade Organization (WTO) formally authorised the EU to take countermeasures against the United States. The EU can now increase its duties on U.S. exports

¹⁴⁷ “Trade Defence Report.”

¹⁴⁸ “WTO Aircraft Dispute,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1405.

¹⁴⁹ “Boeing WTO Case,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2048.

¹⁵⁰ “Introductory Remarks by Valdis Dombrovskis,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_20_2062.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				worth up to \$4 billion. Today's decision follows the WTO panel announcement confirming EU retaliation rights in reaction to illegal subsidies granted to the U.S. aircraft maker, Boeing. Executive Vice-President for an Economy that Works for People and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, said: <i>"Today's formal approval by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO confirms the EU's right to impose countermeasures for illegal subsidies to the American aircraft maker, Boeing. The European Commission is preparing the countermeasures, in close consultation with our Member States. [...] In the absence of a negotiated outcome, the EU will be ready to take action in line with the WTO ruling."</i> ¹⁵¹
Multilateralism	Trade cooperation	Multilateralism entails enacting actions/policies supporting the multilateral order, institutions, cooperation, and free trade. Trade cooperation as an aspect of multilateralism entails keeping open markets, cooperating on trade related	Free trade Lifting/No new trade barriers Proposing/achieving joint initiatives Multilateral diplomacy Cooperative trade policy Coordination in foreign trade policy Deepening trade with the US	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker said: <i>"[...]Over the past months we have continuously engaged with the US at all possible levels to jointly address the problem of overcapacity in the steel sector. Overcapacity remains at the heart of the problem and the EU is not the source of but on the contrary equally hurt by it. That is why we are determined to work towards structural solutions together with our partners. We have also consistently indicated our openness to discussing ways to improve bilateral trade relations with the US but have made it clear that the EU will not negotiate under threat.[...]"</i>¹⁵² "Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström said: <i>"Today is a bad day for world trade. We did everything to avoid this outcome. Over the last couple of months I have spoken at numerous occasions with</i>

¹⁵¹ "Boeing WTO Case," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1984.

¹⁵² "European Commission Reacts to the US Restrictions on Steel and Aluminium Affecting the EU."

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
		matters, and deepening trade relations.		<p><i>the US Secretary of Commerce. I have argued for the EU and the US to engage in a positive transatlantic trade agenda, and for the EU to be fully, permanently and unconditionally exempted from these tariffs. This is also what EU leaders have asked for.[...]</i>"¹⁵³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "At the meeting, Commissioner Malmström and Minister Seko also raised with Ambassador Lighthizer US President Trump's decision to impose additional duties on imports of certain steel and aluminium products into the US under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962."¹⁵⁴ • "[...]There has been talk of "trade wars" between countries. But an important truth of trade is that ultimately countries do not trade – companies and people do.[...] Trying to undo the links between us would hurt companies, consumers and the communities built around these industries. It would do untold damage to our economies. It would also damage friendships and create tensions. And it would do all that precisely at a time when we should be working together on other issues –such as pressuring China on its unfair trading practices, for instance when it comes to global overcapacity on steel, the operation of state-controlled companies, or forced technology transfers. [...] We have been engaging deeply with the US to find a solution. I have almost lost count of my many discussions with the US Secretary of Commerce, Wilbur Ross. I tried to persuade him that Europe is not the source of American problems in steel and

¹⁵³ "European Commission Reacts to the US Restrictions on Steel and Aluminium Affecting the EU."

¹⁵⁴ "EU, Japan and US Met in Brussels to Discuss Overcapacity, Steel," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_1781.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>aluminium.[...] We want to find solutions to de-escalate the present situation and prevent it from worsening. We hope we can find ways of working together again to advance a positive, mutually beneficial trade agenda. In short – we want to create additional opportunities for trade and investment. This would benefit both sides of the Atlantic. [...] The message is: The EU is a committed global trader –and as such, we are open to ideas about opening trade. We are prepared to think outside of the box and find solutions that suit us both. Let's approach this like the allies and partners that we are."¹⁵⁵</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "[...]We firmly believe that our reform plan can transform multilateral trade. By modernising the WTO, by keeping it relevant and effective, we can get global rules-based trade back on track. [...] It is my hope that the US will join us in this investment –in creating rules for the good of the global community. This is the only way that we can guarantee stability in the 21st century, and return order to open global trade."¹⁵⁶ • "Mr Hiroshige Seko, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer, United States Trade Representative, and Ms Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Trade, met in New York on 25 September 2018. [...] The Ministers recognized the progress of their work, and the continued need to deepen their shared understanding, on the basis for strengthening rules on industrial subsidies and State Owned Enterprises, including how to develop effective rules to address market-distorting behaviour

¹⁵⁵ “Transatlantic Trade in Turbulent Times - Speech by Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade.”

¹⁵⁶ “Transatlantic Trade in Turbulent Times - Speech by Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade.”

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>of state enterprises and confront particularly harmful subsidy practices [...]."¹⁵⁷</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "We met today in Washington, D.C. to launch a new phase in the relationship between the United States and the European Union – a phase of close friendship, of strong trade relations in which both of us will win, of working better together for global security and prosperity, and of fighting jointly against terrorism. [...] We agreed today, first of all, to work together toward zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods. We will also work to reduce barriers and increase trade in services, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, medical products, as well as soybeans."¹⁵⁸ • "The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker said: <i>“The European Union is delivering on what President Trump and I have agreed on 25 July 2018. We want a win-win situation on trade, beneficial for both the EU and the U.S. Notably we want to slash tariffs on industrial products as this could lead to an additional increase in EU and U.S. exports worth around €26 billion. [...] We want to further strengthen trade between us based on the positive spirit of last July.”</i> [...] EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said: <i>“This is a welcome decision that will help ease trade tensions. We are now ready to start formal talks for these two targeted agreements that will bring tangible benefits for people and economies</i>

¹⁵⁷ “Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_18_5915.

¹⁵⁸ “Joint U.S.-EU Statement Following President Juncker’s Visit to the White House,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_18_4687.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p><i>on both sides of the Atlantic. I am convinced that breaking down barriers to trade between us can be win-win.</i>"¹⁵⁹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Commissioner Vytenis Andriukaitis, in charge of Health and Food Safety said: <i>"The completion of the Mutual Recognition Agreement is not only a step forward in the trade relations between the EU and the U.S., but it will also ensure high quality medicines for the benefit of patients.</i>"¹⁶⁰ • "On 11 April 2019, the WTO adopted its final compliance report in the Boeing dispute, confirming that U.S. subsidies to Boeing continue to cause significant harm to Airbus, including lost sales. [...] EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said: <i>"[...] While we need to be ready with countermeasures in case there is no other way out, I still believe that dialogue is what should prevail between important partners such as the EU and the U.S., including in bringing an end to this long-standing dispute. The EU remains open for discussions with the U.S., provided these are without preconditions and aim at a fair outcome.</i>"¹⁶¹ • "Following the move by the U.S. today to apply countermeasures against imports from the EU in consequence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Airbus dispute, Commissioner for Trade Cecilia

¹⁵⁹ "EU-U.S. Trade: Commission Welcomes Council's Green Light to Start Negotiations with the United States," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2148.

¹⁶⁰ "EU-U.S. Trade Talks: Milestone Reached in Mutual Recognition," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_4090.

¹⁶¹ "WTO Boeing Dispute."

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>Malmström made the following statement: "[...] <i>The EU and U.S. have both been found in breach of WTO rules. As the world's largest aircraft manufacturers, the EU and the U.S. have a joint responsibility to sit down and negotiate a settlement that is balanced and compliant with the WTO. The EU has, this July, shared concrete proposals with the U.S. on clearly identified existing aircraft subsidies and on future support to our respective aircraft sectors. This offer remains on the table. [...]</i>"¹⁶²</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Following the publication today of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) award regarding the amount of U.S. countermeasures in the WTO Airbus dispute, Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström made the following statement: "<i>The European Union takes note of the decision of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) arbitration panel in the Airbus case, and the level of possible countermeasures. We remain of the view that even if the United States obtains authorisation from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, opting for applying countermeasures now would be short-sighted and counterproductive. [...] The European Commission has consistently communicated to the United States that the European Union is ready to work with them on a fair and balanced solution for our respective aircraft industries. [...] The EU has, as recently as this July, shared concrete proposals with the U.S. for a new regime on aircraft subsidies, and a way forward on existing compliance obligations on both sides. So far the U.S. has not reacted. Our readiness to find a fair settlement remains unchanged.[...]</i>"¹⁶³

¹⁶² "Statement on U.S. Countermeasures in the Airbus Dispute."

¹⁶³ "Statement on Publication of WTO's Award in Airbus Dispute."

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Commissioner for Trade, Phil Hogan, said: <i>“Unjustified tariffs on European products are not acceptable and, arising from the compliance in the Airbus case, we insist that the United States lifts these unjustified tariffs immediately. The EU has made specific proposals to reach a negotiated outcome to the long running transatlantic civil aircraft disputes and remains open to work with the U.S. to agree a fair and balanced outcome, as well as on future disciplines for subsidies in the aircraft sector.”</i> The EU is strongly committed to a negotiated settlement of this long-running dispute, the longest in the history of the WTO. Especially under the current economic circumstances, the EU believes that it is in the mutual interest of the EU and the US to discontinue damaging tariffs that unnecessarily burden our industries and agricultural sectors."¹⁶⁴ • "Executive Vice-President for an Economy that Works for People and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, said: <i>“[...] We call on the U.S. to agree to both sides dropping existing countermeasures with immediate effect, so we can quickly put this behind us. Removing these tariffs is a win-win for both sides, especially with the pandemic wreaking havoc on our economies. We now have an opportunity to reboot our transatlantic cooperation and work together towards our shared goals.”</i>¹⁶⁵ • <i>“[...]We also discussed trade relations with the U.S. We offered our warm congratulations to President- elect Biden. We will have a full</i>

¹⁶⁴ “WTO Aircraft Dispute.”

¹⁶⁵ “Boeing WTO Case.”

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>“transatlantic to-do list”. Our priority will be a positive and forward-looking agenda, both bilaterally and on global challenges. The key areas are WTO reform and trade and climate change. We should also work to jointly establish a trade and technology council where we could cooperate on new technologies and digital services and be aligned on regulation and standards. We also need to tackle current disputes, notably on civil aviation. We have made clear at every stage that we want to settle this long-running issue. [...] We call on the U.S. to agree that both sides drop existing countermeasures with immediate effect, so that we can quickly put this issue behind us. Removing these tariffs would represent a strong win- win for both sides. We now have an opportunity to reboot our transatlantic cooperation and work together towards our shared goals.”¹⁶⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Executive Vice-President for an Economy that Works for People and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, said: “[...] <i>As I have made clear all along, our preferred outcome is a negotiated settlement with the U.S. To that end, we continue to engage intensively with our American counterparts, and I am in regular contact with U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer. [...]</i>”¹⁶⁷ • "Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis said: “<i>The EU and the U.S. share the most important economic partnership in the world, with trade in goods and services worth over €1.3 trillion annually. This deal provides both sides with a true win-win outcome, helping us to strengthen our partnership even further. Lowering tariffs on both</i>

¹⁶⁶ “Introductory Remarks by Valdis Dombrovskis.”

¹⁶⁷ “Boeing WTO Case.”

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p><i>sides improves access for our exporters and reduces the cost of imported goods. [...] From the EU side, we view this agreement as an important step towards improving our relationship and resolving outstanding disputes. We remain eager to deepen transatlantic cooperation wherever possible as we firmly believe that, when it comes to truly global challenges, the chances of achieving successful global outcomes are improved if the European Union and United States work together.</i>"¹⁶⁸</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "United States Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and European Union Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan today announced agreement on a package of tariff reductions that will increase market access for hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. and EU exports. These tariff reductions are the first U.S.-EU negotiated reductions in duties in more than two decades. [...] <i>“As part of improving EU-US relations, this mutually beneficial agreement will bring positive results to the economies of both the United States and the European Union. We intend for this package of tariff reductions to mark just the beginning of a process that will lead to additional agreements that create more free, fair, and reciprocal transatlantic trade”</i> said Ambassador Lighthizer and Commissioner Hogan."¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ “EU-U.S. Agreement on Tariffs,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1572.

¹⁶⁹ “Trade: Joint Statement of the USA and the EU,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_1512.

Annex 1.2 Transatlantic Relations during Biden (2021-present)

Citizen/stakeholder involvement

Indicators: mentions of involvement/consultation with citizens, stakeholders, interest groups, businesses, civil society; mentions of democratic processes of policymaking;

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
Hedging	Trade alternatives	Since hedging entails distancing or decreasing dependence on the partner state perceived as untrustworthy, specific to the research question, hedging entails enacting actions/policies that make the EU less dependent on the US in trade because of uncertainty faced as of transactions during Trump -	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trade increase with other states; - Trade agreements with alternatives - Reluctance to deepen trade with US - Trade rules, that limit the freedom of the US to determine outcomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • " [...] The strategy includes a series of headline actions that focus on delivering stronger global trading rules and contributing to the EU's economic recovery. [...] Executive Vice-President and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, said: "The challenges we face require a new strategy for EU trade policy. [...] We are pursuing a course that is open, strategic and assertive, emphasising the EU's ability to make its own choices and shape the world around it through leadership and engagement, reflecting our strategic interests and values." Responding to current challenges, the strategy prioritises a major reform of the World Trade Organization, including global commitments on trade and climate, new rules for digital trade, reinforced rules to tackle competitive distortions, and restoring its system for binding dispute settlement. In tandem, the EU will adopt a tougher, more assertive approach towards the implementation and enforcement of its trade agreements, fighting unfair trade and addressing sustainability concerns. [...] This strategy is based on a wide and inclusive public consultation, including more than 400 submissions by a wide range of stakeholders, public events in almost

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
		such as considering trade alternatives.		<p>every Member State, and close engagement with the European Parliament, EU governments, businesses, civil society and the public."¹⁷⁰</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "The new rules upgrade the EU's enforcement by introducing the following changes: empowering the EU to act to protect its trade interests in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and under bilateral agreements when a trade dispute is blocked despite the EU's good faith effort to follow dispute settlement procedures (the regulation previously only allowed action after the completion of dispute settlement procedures) [...]."¹⁷¹ • "The European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič warmly welcomes the ratification of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which will now be fully applicable as of 1 May 2021. This comes after an overwhelming vote of consent by the European Parliament on 27 April and subsequent Council decision today, thereby concluding the ratification process. [...] "The ratification of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement is good news for European citizens and businesses. It provides a solid foundation for our longstanding friendship, cooperation and partnership with the United Kingdom on the basis of shared interests and values. [...] Moreover, the Agreement includes effective enforcement, a binding dispute settlement mechanism and the possibility for both parties to take remedial measures. Democratic scrutiny will continue to be key in the implementation phase of the Agreement in order to ensure faithful

¹⁷⁰ "EU Trade Policy," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_644.

¹⁷¹ "Strong EU Trade Enforcement Rules Enter into Force," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_601.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				compliance. [...]" Vice-President Šefčovič reiterates that [...] We have far more in common than that which divides us." ¹⁷²
Counter-transactionalism	Tit-for-tat trade relations and policies	Counter-transactionalism entails enacting a like-for-like approach in trade relations in response to US transactionalism during Trump. Most likely manifested with retaliatory protections in response to US protections.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introducing trade barriers: tariffs, quotas, taxes, dumping, - Introducing counter-measures in response to US measures - Assertive trade policy; - Adopting policies that ensure wins for the EU, and/or hurt the US - Improving trade defense - Cases against the US 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "The new rules upgrade the EU's enforcement by introducing the following changes: [...] expanding the scope of the regulation and of possible trade policy countermeasures to services and certain trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (IPR) (the regulation previously only permitted countermeasures in goods). Executive Vice-President and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, said: "The European Union must be able to defend itself against unfair trading practices. These new rules will help protect us from those trying to take advantage of our openness. [...] We cannot afford to stand defenseless in the meantime. These measures allow us to respond resolutely and assertively." [...]"¹⁷³ ● "Today, the European Commission launched a 12-week public consultation to seek input from businesses, organisations and individuals in shaping a new legal instrument to deter and counteract coercive practices by non-EU countries. This instrument would empower the Commission to apply trade, investment or other restrictions towards any non-EU country unduly interfering in the policy choices of the EU or its Member States. Executive Vice-President and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, said: "As part of our new EU trade policy approach, we have committed to being more assertive in defending our interests. The new anti-

¹⁷² "Statement by Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_2045.

¹⁷³ "Strong EU Trade Enforcement Rules Enter into Force."

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
			- Mentions of need to protect EU industries/companies/citizens/businesses/stakeholders against protections and unfair trade	<p>coercion instrument could be a critically important part of this approach. It could give us a strong autonomous tool to take action when our partners do not play by the rules. We strongly encourage stakeholders, in the EU and outside, to share their views on coercive practices and how best to tackle them. We need to strengthen the EU's resilience, protect our economic interests, and enhance our legitimate rights to impose countermeasures, where necessary. This is what the initiative stands for and we look forward to receiving a wide range of contributions." The consultation seeks input on various policy issues relevant for the design of an EU anti-coercion instrument: the triggers (or the circumstances in which the EU may act); the countermeasures (types of measures the EU may employ to tackle coercion); and the likely impact of the various options."¹⁷⁴</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Executive Vice-President and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, said: "The Commission's efforts to vigorously defend the interests and rights of EU producers, in this case growers of Spanish ripe olives, are now paying off. The WTO has upheld our claims about anti- subsidy duties being unjustified and in violation of WTO rules [...]."¹⁷⁵ • " [...] I am pleased to announce the proposal for an EU anti-coercion instrument today. [...] It sends a clear signal to our partners that: The European Union will stand firm in defending itself; The European Union will not hesitate to push back when we are under threat; and

¹⁷⁴ "New Anti-Coercion Instrument," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1325.

¹⁷⁵ "EU Wins WTO Case over US Duties on Spanish Olives," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6116.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>The European Union will shape the tools we need to protect our values. The new EU trade strategy [...] sets out our ambition for the EU to act more assertively in the international trade arena. This is necessary because, simply put, we are operating in a conflictual geopolitical environment. The weaponisation of trade for other geopolitical purposes is a fact. [...] the EU and its Member States have been targets of economic intimidation. This is where one country pressures another country into changing their policies by restricting, or threatening to restrict, trade or investment. [...] We are now proposing the anti-coercion instrument to the European Parliament and Council. We have consulted widely with a broad range of stakeholders in the run-up to this proposal, we are aware of the sensitivities and we have calibrated our proposal carefully. So, I want to emphasise that this tool is first and foremost a deterrent. [...] When, and only when, dialogue and international cooperation do not result in removal of the coercion, will we apply countermeasures. The selection and design of these countermeasures will be carefully calibrated and targeted, after detailed consultation with relevant stakeholders and the green light of Member States. They will be balanced, proportionate, and within the framework of international law. And we can stop or amend our countermeasures at any time, if this is in the EU's interest. Potential countermeasures include traditional trade instruments linked to tariff treatment and import duties for goods. But we can also look at services or investment restrictions, exclusion from public procurement and access to Union-funded programmes. [...] By adopting this tool, the EU would send a clear message that we will not accept intimidation tactics that could jeopardise our key policies. There is a broad consensus among our stakeholders that this is the right thing to do. This is clear from the</p>

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>results of the public consultation.[...]”¹⁷⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “The European Commission has today proposed a new tool to counter the use of economic coercion by third countries. This legal instrument is in response to the EU and its Member States becoming the target of deliberate economic pressure in recent years. [...] The aim is to deter countries from restricting or threatening to restrict trade or investment to bring about a change of policy in the EU in areas such as climate change, taxation or food safety. [...] Any countermeasures taken by the EU would be applied only as a last resort when there is no other way to address economic intimidation [...]. [...] Executive Vice-President and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis said: “At a time of rising geopolitical tensions, trade is increasingly being weaponised and the EU and its Member States becoming targets of economic intimidation. We need the proper tools to respond. [...] The main aim of the anti-coercion tool is to act as a deterrent. [...]” With this new instrument, the EU will be able to respond to cases of economic coercion in a structured and uniform manner. [...] If the economic intimidation does not stop immediately, the new instrument will allow the EU to react swiftly and effectively, providing a tailor-made and proportional response for each situation from imposing tariffs and restricting imports from the country in question, to restrictions on services or investment or steps to limit the country's access to the EU's internal market.”¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ “Remarks by Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_21_6696.

¹⁷⁷ “EU Strengthens Protection against Economic Coercion,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6642.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
Multilateralism	Trade cooperation	Multilateralism entails enacting actions/policies supporting the multilateral order, institutions, cooperation, and free trade. Trade cooperation as an aspect of multilateralism entails keeping open markets, cooperating on trade related matters, and deepening trade relations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Free trade - Lifting/No new trade barriers - Proposing/achieving joint initiatives - Multilateral diplomacy - Cooperative trade policy - Coordination in foreign trade policy - Deepening trade with the US 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "By reinforcing its alliances, such as the transatlantic partnership, [...] the EU will be better able to shape global change."¹⁷⁸ • "[...] High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice-President for a Stronger Europe in the World, Josep Borrell, said: "Multilateralism matters because it works. But we cannot be 'multilateralists' alone. At a time of growing scepticism, we must demonstrate the benefit and relevance of the multilateral system [...]" Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jutta Urpilainen, said: "The EU has been and will continue to be the best ally of multilateralism and its institutions. [...] This new strategy spells out our ambition on inclusive multilateralism, our strong commitment to renew it and it will be underpinned by specific actions." [...] To change the multilateral landscape, we need a new generation of partnerships. The EU will build new alliances with third countries, reinforce cooperation with multilateral and regional organisations, as well as other stakeholders, especially those with whom it shares democratic values and, with others, it will seek a common ground issue by issue. It will support partner countries in engaging more effectively in the multilateral system and ensure systematic follow-up of bilateral commitments with partners to advance multilateral objectives. EU aims to build a more inclusive multilateralism. It is important to engage also with civil society as well as the private sector, social and other stakeholders."¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ "EU Trade Policy."

¹⁷⁹ "EU's Renewed Multilateralism Fit for the 21st Century," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_622.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="1099 280 2029 751">● "The EU and U.S. agreed today to suspend all retaliatory tariffs on EU and U.S. exports imposed in the Airbus and Boeing disputes for a four-month period. The suspension allows both sides to focus on resolving this long-running dispute. [...] European Commission Executive Vice-President and Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis said: "This is a significant step forward. It marks a reset in our relationship with our biggest and economically most important partner. Removing these tariffs is a win-win for both sides, at a time when the pandemic is hurting our workers and our economies. This suspension will help restore confidence and trust, and therefore give us the space to come to a comprehensive and long-lasting negotiated solution. A positive EU-U.S. trade relationship is important not only to the two sides but to global trade at large." [...]"¹⁸⁰ <li data-bbox="1099 799 2029 1310">● "European Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai reached an understanding relating to large civil aircraft, transforming almost 17 years of disputes into a forward-looking, collaborative platform to address bilateral issues as well as global challenges. Both sides will now seek to overcome long-standing differences in order to avoid future litigation and preserve a level playing field between our aircraft manufacturers and will also work to prevent new differences from arising. The EU and the US also agreed to suspend application of harmful tariffs worth of USD 11.5 billion for a period of five years that hurt companies and people on both sides of the Atlantic. The two sides will collaborate on jointly analysing and addressing non-market practices of third parties that may harm our large civil aircraft sectors. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said: "Today,

¹⁸⁰ "EU and U.S. Tariffs," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1047.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>with the agreement on Boeing- Airbus, we have taken a major step in resolving the longest trade dispute in the history of the WTO. I am happy to see that after intensive work between the European Commission and the US administration, our transatlantic partnership is on its way to reaching cruising speed. This shows the new spirit of cooperation between the EU and the US and that we can solve the other issues to our mutual benefit. Together we can deliver for our citizens and businesses.” European Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis said: “With this agreement, we are grounding the Airbus-Boeing dispute. It proves that the transatlantic relationship is now moving to the next level, and that we can work with the US on tackling long-running disputes. We now have time and space to find a lasting solution through our new Working Group on Aircraft, while saving billions of euros in duties for importers on both sides of the Atlantic.”¹⁸¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and President Joe Biden of the United States have launched the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) at the US-EU Summit in Brussels on June 15, 2021. The TTC will serve as a forum for the United States and European Union to coordinate approaches to key global trade, economic, and technology issues and to deepen transatlantic trade and economic relations based on shared democratic values. [...] Margrethe Vestager, European Commission Executive Vice-President and Competition Commissioner, said: “We have common democratic values and we want to translate them into tangible action on both sides of the Atlantic. To work for a human centered digitisation and

¹⁸¹ “EU and US Take Decisive Step to End Aircraft Dispute,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3001.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>open and competitive markets. I very much look forward. This is a great step for our renewed partnership.” Valdis Dombrovskis, European Commission Executive Vice-President and EU Trade Commissioner, said: “The EU-US Trade and Technology Council will open up new avenues of transatlantic cooperation. We will work together to ensure that trade and technology serve our societies and economies, while upholding our common values. The TTC is a joint commitment to strengthen our technological and industrial leadership and expand bilateral trade and investment. It also gives us tools to address threats such as unfair competition and the misuse of new technologies. This is a top priority for the EU, and we warmly welcome the fact that it is now also at the top of the transatlantic trade agenda.”¹⁸²</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="1099 799 2033 1270">● "The United States and the EU have today taken joint steps to re-establish historical transatlantic trade flows in steel and aluminium and to strengthen their partnership and address shared challenges in the steel and aluminium sector. As a part of that partnership, they intend to negotiate for the first time, a global arrangement to address carbon intensity and global overcapacity. The European Union and the United States have a shared commitment to joint action and deepened cooperation in these sectors and are taking joint steps to defend workers, industries and communities from global overcapacity and climate change, including through a new arrangement to discourage trade in high-carbon steel and aluminum that contributes to global excess capacity from other countries and ensure that domestic policies support lowering the carbon intensity of these

¹⁸² “EU-US Launch Trade and Technology Council,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2990.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>industries. In a demonstration of renewed trust, and reflecting long-standing security and supply chain ties, the United States will not apply section 232 duties and will allow duty-free importation steel and aluminium from the EU at a historical-based volume and the EU will suspend related tariffs on U.S. products [...]."¹⁸³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "European Commission President von der Leyen and United States President Biden agreed today to start discussions on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium. This marks a new milestone in the transatlantic relationship, and in EU-US efforts to achieve the decarbonisation of the global steel and aluminium industries in the fight against climate change. The two Presidents also agreed to pause the bilateral World Trade Organization disputes on steel and aluminium. This builds on our recent successes in rebooting the transatlantic trade relationship, such as the launch of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council and the suspension of tariffs in the Boeing-Airbus disputes. [...] Furthermore, following the United States' announcement that they will remove Section 232 tariffs on EU steel and aluminium exports up to past trade volumes, the European Union will take the steps to suspend its rebalancing measures against the United States. The two sides have also agreed to pause their respective WTO disputes on this issue. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said: "[...] Defusing yet another source of tension in the transatlantic trade partnership will help industries on both sides. This is an important milestone for our renewed, forward-looking agenda with the US." Executive Vice-President and Commissioner for Trade Valdis Dombrovskis said:

¹⁸³ "Joint EU-US Statement on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5724.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>“We have today agreed to hit the pause button on our steel and aluminium trade dispute, while hitting the start button on cooperating on a new Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium. This is another significant step in the wider reset of transatlantic relations. The US decision to restore past trading volumes of EU steel and aluminium exports means we can move on from a major irritant with the US. It gives us breathing space to work on a comprehensive solution to tackle global overcapacity. The EU will therefore reciprocate this de-escalation by suspending our own rebalancing measures. We can now focus on a more forward-looking transatlantic trade agenda, while also working on a final, lasting outcome to this issue.”¹⁸⁴</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Thank you very much Mr President, dear Joe, And I am also very pleased to announce that Mr President, you and I, we have today agreed to suspend the tariffs on steel and aluminium, and to start the work on a new Global Sustainable Steel Arrangement. And this marks a milestone in the renewed EU-US partnership. [...] We will work together with the United States to ensure the long-term viability of our industry, and to encourage the production and trade of low-carbon steel. This new global initiative [...] is yet another key initiative for our renewed, forward-looking transatlantic agenda with the United States. Since the beginning of the year, as you said Mr President, dear Joe, we have restored trust and communication. We put to rest our disputes on aircraft subsidies. We set up our Trade and Technology Council. We created a vaccine partnership. We reached an agreement on global minimum tax. And now, we have found a solution on EU-

¹⁸⁴ “EU and US Suspend Steel and Aluminium Trade Disputes,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5721.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>US steel and aluminium trade. I thank you Mr President, dear Joe, for your announcement that the United States will remove US tariffs on EU steel and aluminium up to previous trade levels. This will alleviate a major part of the existing trade irritants. It will allow transatlantic trade in steel and aluminium between us to come back to the levels recorded before these tariffs were put in place. Following this US decision, I am pleased to announce that the Commission will also propose to suspend the tariffs that we had introduced. I am also pleased to join President Biden in announcing the pausing of our dispute on this issue at the World Trade Organisation. [...] This is a major step forward in our renewed relationship and many thanks for that. I am looking forward to working more on this deal."¹⁸⁵</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "2021 has been a landmark year for transatlantic relations. We have successfully pressed the reset button with the Biden administration, in large part due to our shared willingness to forge a new trade agenda, both bilaterally and in the context of providing renewed global leadership. Since the the EU-U.S. Summit in June, we have succeeded in getting one breakthrough after the other. We grounded the Airbus-Boeing dispute in June. We launched the EU-US Trade and Technology Council in September, a forum to cooperate closely on joint rules and standards for the 21st century. And today, we have agreed to hit the pause button on our steel and aluminium trade disputes, while hitting the start button on cooperating on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium. [...] Today's US decision on steel and aluminium tariffs will alleviate an important trade irritant that has hampered EU-US trade relations. [...] In

¹⁸⁵ "Statement by the President on Global Steel Arrangement," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_5679.

Concept	Subcategory	Description	Indicators	Recording unit (Quotes)
				<p>response, we will suspend the EU rebalancing measures, introduced in the wake of the imposition of the US Section 232 tariffs. [...] These discussions were far from easy and this solution is not perfect. But it means we can move on from one of the most visible irritants imposed by President Trump. During the next two years we will work towards a global steel arrangement, which would allow us to remove 232 tariffs for good. I am grateful to my American counterparts, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and USTR Ambassador Katherine Tai, for the constructive relationship we have formed in such a short space of time. Thanks to the close cooperation with the Biden Administration, we can now focus on a more forward- looking transatlantic agenda."¹⁸⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "Stella Kyriakides, Commissioner for Health and Food Safety, said: "We are delighted that trustful transatlantic EU-US cooperation is reopening an important trade pathway between the EU and the US on bivalve molluscs. This is good news for food operators and consumers on both sides of the Atlantic. [...]"¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ "Statement by Valdis Dombrovskis on EU-US Steel and Aluminium," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_5723.

¹⁸⁷ "EU and US Resume Trade of Bivalve Molluscs," Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 16, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_785.

Annex 2. QCA Analysis Data Sources: References

Date & Place	Document name	Document type	Link to source
February 17, 2017 - Strasbourg	"European Commission welcomes Parliament's support of trade deal with Canada"	Press Release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_270
June 9, 2017 - Brussels	"EU secures another important win in the WTO Boeing Dispute"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_1591
May 30, 2017 - Brussels	"Statement by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, on the vote in the Dutch Senate on the ratification of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_17_1461
October 3, 2017 - Strasbourg	"Commission welcomes agreement on new anti-dumping methodology"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_3668
September 20, 2017 - Brussels	"EU-Canada trade agreement enters into force"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_3121
July 6, 2017 - Brussels	"EU and Japan reach agreement in principle on Economic Partnership Agreement"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_1902
July 6, 2017 - Brussels	"24th EU-Japan Summit Joint Statement"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_17_1920
June 26, 2017 - Brussels	"Press Conference by Commissioner Malmström on the 'Report on Trade and Investment Barriers'"	Speech	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_17_1799
March 1, 2018 - Brussels	"European Commission responds to the US restrictions on steel and aluminium affecting the EU"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_18_1484

Date & Place	Document name	Document type	Link to source
December 20, 2017 - Brussels	"EU puts in place new trade defence rules"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_5346
December 5, 2017 - Brussels	"Commission welcomes landmark deal modernising the EU's trade defence"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_5136
May 31, 2018 - Brussels	"European Commission reacts to the US restrictions on steel and aluminium affecting the EU"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4006
April 18, 2018 - Strasbourg	"Trade: European Commission proposes signature and conclusion of Japan and Singapore agreements"	Press Release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_3325
March 10, 2018 - Brussels	"EU, Japan and US met in Brussels to discuss overcapacity, steel"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_1781
July 19, 2018 - Brussels	"Transatlantic Trade in Turbulent Times - Speech by Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade"	Speech	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_18_4604
July 18, 2018 - Brussels	"Trade: Commission imposes provisional safeguard measures on imports of steel products"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4563
June 25, 2018 - Brussels	"EU and China discuss economic and trade relations at the 7th High-level Economic and Trade Dialogue"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4281
June 21, 2018 - Brussels	"EU and New Zealand launch trade negotiations"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4165
June 20, 2018 - Brussels	"EU adopts rebalancing measures in reaction to US steel and aluminium tariffs"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4220
June 7, 2018 - Brussels	"EU trade defence: stronger and more effective rules enter into force"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_3973

Date & Place	Document name	Document type	Link to source
June 6, 2018 - Brussels	"EU-US Trade: European Commission endorses rebalancing duties on US products"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4083
October 19, 2018 - Brussels	"EU and Singapore forge closer economic and political ties"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_6139
September 26, 2018 - Brussels	"Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_18_5915
February 1, 2019 - Brussels	"Commission imposes definitive safeguard measures on imports of steel products"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_821
January 31, 2019 - Brussels	"EU-Japan trade agreement enters into force"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_785
July 28, 2018 - Washington, DC	"Joint U.S.-EU Statement following President Juncker's visit to the White House"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_18_4687
April 15, 2019 - Luxembourg	"EU-U.S. Trade: Commission welcomes Council's green light to start negotiations with the United States"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2148
March 28, 2019 - Brussels	"Report on EU trade defence – effective protection against unfair trade"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_1850
July 11, 2019 - Brussels	"EU-U.S. trade talks: milestone reached in mutual recognition on pharmaceuticals"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_4090
April 17, 2019 - Brussels	"WTO Boeing dispute: EU issues preliminary list of U.S. products considered for countermeasures"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2162

Date & Place	Document name	Document type	Link to source
December 12, 2019 - Brussels	"Commission reinforces tools to ensure Europe's interests in international trade"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6748
October 18, 2019 - Brussels	"Statement by Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström on the U.S. countermeasures in the Airbus dispute"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_6132
October 2, 2019 - Brussels	"Statement on the publication of WTO's award in the Airbus dispute"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_5973
February 13, 2019 - Brussels	"Agreement with Singapore set to give a boost to EU-Asia trade"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_906
May 4, 2020 - Brussels	"Trade defence report: restoring the level playing field for European producers"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_780
July 24, 2020 - Brussels	"EU and Airbus Member States take action to ensure full compliance in the WTO aircraft dispute"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1405
November 9, 2020 - Brussels	"Boeing WTO case: The EU puts in place countermeasures against U.S. exports"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2048
November 9, 2020 - Brussels	"Introductory Remarks by Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis at the Foreign Affairs Council Trade Press Conference"	Speech	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_20_2062
October 26, 2020 - Brussels	"Boeing WTO case: the EU gets formal green light to impose duties on U.S. imports"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1984
September 8, 2020 - Brussels	"Commission adopts proposal to make EU-U.S. agreement on tariffs effective"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1572

Date & Place	Document name	Document type	Link to source
August 21, 2020 - Brussels	"Joint Statement of the United States and the European Union on a Tariff Agreement"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_1512
July 28, 2020 - Brussels	"EU and China discuss trade and economic relations"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1419
December 30, 2020 - Brussels	"Key elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2542
February 18, 2021 - Brussels	"Commission sets course for an open, sustainable and assertive EU trade policy"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_644
February 17, 2021 - Brussels	"A renewed multilateralism fit for the 21st century: the EU's agenda"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_622
February 13, 2021 - Brussels	"Strong EU trade enforcement rules enter into force"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_601
April 29, 2021 - Brussels	"Statement by Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič following the conclusion of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_2045
March 23, 2021 - Brussels	"Strengthening the EU's autonomy – Commission seeks input on a new anti-coercion instrument"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1325
March 5, 2021 - Brussels	"EU and U.S. agree to suspend all tariffs linked to the Airbus and Boeing disputes"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1047
June 15, 2021 - Brussels	"EU and US take decisive step to end aircraft dispute"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3001

Date & Place	Document name	Document type	Link to source
June 15, 2021 - Brussels	"EU-US launch Trade and Technology Council to lead values-based global digital transformation"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2990
October 31, 2021 - Brussels	"Joint EU-US Statement on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5724
October 31, 2021 - Brussels	"EU and US agree to start discussions on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium and suspend steel and aluminium trade disputes"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5721
October 31, 2021 - Brussels	"Statement by President von der Leyen on a new Global Sustainable Steel Arrangement and EU-US steel and aluminium dispute"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_5679
October 31, 2021 - Brussels	"Statement by EU Commission Executive Vice-President & EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium and EU-US steel and aluminium dispute"	Statement	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_5723
November 19, 2021 - Brussels	"EU wins WTO case over US duties on Spanish olives"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6116
December 8, 2021 - Brussels	"Remarks by Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis at the press conference on the EU anti-coercion instrument"	Speech	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_21_6696
December 8, 2021 - Brussels	"EU strengthens protection against economic coercion"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6642
February 4, 2022 - Brussels	"Food safety: EU and US resume trade of bivalve molluscs"	Press release	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_785