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The Political Influence of Platinum Mines: Cronyism and the South African National Assembly

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**The Political Influence of Platinum Mines: Cronyism and the South African
National Assembly**

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Abstract

Primary goods make the world go round, and one that makes cars go round is platinum, which is needed in exhaust catalysts. It is a valuable precious metal, and 80 percent of all of the world's platinum can be found in South Africa. Despite this, very few South Africans actually benefit from its lucrative platinum mining sector. In fact, this sector appears to cause more problems for most of the people in mining regions, from bad working conditions to air and water pollution. In this thesis I will argue that the lucrateness of the platinum mining sector and its many negative externalities are related through the *Resource Curse*. I hypothesize that the owners of platinum mines will use a specific form of lobbying – cronyism, also known as the ‘revolving door’ – to influence members of the National Assembly of South Africa to adopt policies favorable to the mining sector. My research will focus specifically on the case of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002 (MPRDA).

Introduction

Primary goods make the world go round. While the need for primary goods such as agricultural produce is indisputable for any sedentary society to function, in advanced industrial societies the necessity of such primary goods as oil, gas, and nonfuel minerals such as rare earth or precious metals is of equal importance. We need oil (refined into gasoline) to power our cars, we need gas to heat our homes, and we need various other minerals and metals to produce highly complicated pieces of hardware such as exhaust catalysts and computer chips. Given the fact that the mining of such primary goods is needed to sustain industrial societies, one could expect the mining sector to have an outsized influence on the policy-making process from a neo-pluralist perspective (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009: pp. 39-40). If the mining sector in a particular country has a large influence on policy-making in comparison to other groups such as trade unions representing mine workers or environmental groups which criticize the effects of mining on the environment, then the results can quite easily be checked by simply studying what policies have been adopted in a particular country and how much these policies are in the interests of the mining sector. Steven Lukes has stated that power relations, of which influence on policy-making is one, are more complicated than mere behaviorism. That is, simply looking at policy decisions taken does not provide us with a full picture of the power relations – it could also be the case that certain policy issues never even made it onto the policy agenda (Lukes 2005: p. 25). Nonetheless, my research will look at policy-decisions, specifically legislation adopted and not-adopted, in order to research what influence the mining sector has in a particular country. Lukes' other dimensions of power are a topic well beyond the scope of my intended research, since researching them would require at the least interviews with a lot of different people in a short time period. In any case, even following Lukes' perspective, any study into the adoption of certain policies can be important for coming to a deeper

understanding of power relations in a particular country, which is the intended merit of my research. In what follows, I will discuss the case selection – which particular mining industry in which particular country and which particular policy I intend to research.

The importance of, among other things, exhaust catalysts to industrialized societies was mentioned in the preceding paragraph. What is it that exhaust catalysts do? Simply put, they filter the exhaust of a car in order to prevent unburned fuel molecules from being emitted by separating them into CO₂ and water molecules (Krebs 2006: p. 164). The necessity of catalysts to cars is therefore obvious, and the main part of an exhaust catalyst is a platinum component. Platinum has to be mined and can be found in clumps together with other metals – ruthenium, rhodium, palladium, osmium, and iridium – often referred to as the ‘Platinum group metals’ (PGM) (Harris and Cabri 1991). It just so happens to be the case that most of the deposits of these PGM’s are, by an extraordinary margin, found in South Africa: 80 percent of all known platinum reserves are found in that single country alone (Claassens and Matlala 2018: p. 114). The profits of nine platinum mining companies in the Madibeng region – where most of the PGM-deposits are located – added up to \$4.5 billion in 2011 (Bond 2014: p. 3). The biggest platinum mining company operating in South Africa – Anglo American plc. (commonly abbreviated as ‘Amplats’) – reported a gross revenue of R214,6 billion, or approximately \$13,3 billion, over the year 2021, doubling their revenue from the year before (Anglo American plc 2021: p. 24). Another company, Impala Platinum (abbreviated: ‘Implats’), reported a gross revenue of R129.6 billion (\$8 billion) in 2021, whereas their revenues in 2020 amounted to a mere R69.9 billion, also nearly doubling their revenues in a single year (Implats 2021: p. 86). Sibanye Stillwater reported a revenue of R172.2 billion (\$11.6 billion) in 2021, compared to R127.4 billion the year before (Sibanye Stillwater 2022: p. 97). Northam Platinum earned R32.6 billion (\$2 billion) in 2021, another near doubling from their earned revenue the year before: R16.7 billion (Northam 2021: p. 64). African Rainbow Minerals, which also mines for iron ore

and coal besides PGM's, reported a revenue of R21.5 billion (\$1.33 billion) in 2021, a sharp increase from the R12.4 billion they reported as revenue in the year 2020 (African Rainbow Minerals 2021: p. 46). In short, platinum mining is becoming increasingly lucrative in South Africa, and is expected to provide the South African economy with 1 million jobs and an increase of R8.2 trillion in value (Minerals Council South Africa 2018). As of 2019, the export of platinum encompassed 7.5% of the total export of South Africa at a worth of \$8.8 billion, while South Africa produces 72.2% of the world's platinum (United States Geological Survey 2018: p. 124-5). Given such vast mineral wealth, and the immense value that PGM's have for the world economy, one could expect South Africa to be a relatively wealthy country. It is indeed one of the wealthiest countries in Africa. However, a closer look at South Africa's internal affairs reveals major problems that are absent from developed countries such as in the Global North. Mining companies in South Africa, including those companies mining PGM's, have consistently underpaid their workers and failed to provide them with proper housing, and have consistently caused environmental problems in the areas of operation and surrounding areas. Both the mining companies and the government have been lax in doing anything about such issues (Bond 2014: pp. 4-5).

Literature Review

My research question can now be stated: how do the owners of platinum mines affect public policy in South Africa? The figures mentioned in the introduction, regarding the profits of South African platinum mining companies, showcase that the platinum mining sector is a lucrative one and that platinum mining companies are increasingly wealthy companies. Their importance to the South African economy, combined with their large profits, would suggest that they could be an influential player in the policy-making game and thus be a reason for why a lot of the societal and environmental problems associated with platinum mining are barely dealt with.

A theoretical approach which will aid me in answering this question is the so-called *Resource Curse* theory. The resource curse refers to a field of research within political science that has shown that countries that are rich in a particular mineral resource – mostly oil or gas, sometimes in combination with alluvial diamonds – tend to have either very low-quality institutions or repressive regimes (Auty 2002; Ross 2013). Richard M. Auty came up with the term ‘resource curse’ which he used to describe the counterintuitive relation between vast mineral wealth and bad economic and political performance. He lists three ways in which mineral abundance leads to underperforming economies. First, the mining of resources requires huge initial investments in capital and does not require a large number of people to occur. This means that the mining sector, despite its profitability, does not generate broad wealth among the population through wide-spread employment. Second, mining leads to modest local production linkages, such as factories. Finally, a big portion of the profits of mining companies flows overseas “to service the foreign capital investment” (Auty 2002: p. 3). These three mechanisms do not, however, explain the link between resource abundance and bad policies.

Other explanations are found by Michael L. Ross, where he does take a closer look at the policy-side of the resource curse. He recognizes three kinds of explanations for the resource curse among the studies he reviewed, and two explanations which he thinks have high potential

but have not been often looked at within the literature (Ross 1999). Firstly, a lucrative resource extraction industry makes policymakers myopic in the sense that they forgo to plan for the long term.

Second, the export of such resources strengthens the political influence of “sectors, classes, or interest groups that favor growth-impeding policies” (Ross 1999: p. 298). He goes on to state that “when an export sector has a small number of large firms, high barriers to entry and exit, and greater asset-specificity – such as many minerals industries – it will have greater difficulty coping with international market fluctuations and will be more prone to seek government help.” (Ross 1999: p. 314).

The third common explanation is the state-centric one, which holds that so-called “resource booms” lead to a weakening of government institutions. The two often-ignored explanations are also closely related to the role the government plays in resource extraction. The first uncommon explanation holds that the resource curse is due to resource extraction being executed by state-owned companies. The second holds that the resource curse could be the result of low protection of property rights (Ross 1999: p. 298) All of these explanations are focused on policy failure, but do not explore the ways in which the mining sector could influence policy-making in detail. This is where I aim to add to the literature on the resource curse theory.

Research like Auty’s or those cited by Ross have been focused mostly on middle-eastern countries or sub-Saharan African countries besides South Africa, and very little research has been done into the causal link between nonfuel minerals alone (not in combination with oil or gas) and state failure. Jason Sorens’ 2011 article is an example of a study which has done exactly that, and in it Sorens researches the link between mineral wealth and intrastate conflict (Sorens 2011). He shows that mineral abundance in a particular region of a country can lead to secessionist movements and territorial conflict among regional ethnic groups rather than

governmental conflict among such groups. The data he uses relate not only to resources such as oil and diamonds, but also to rare-earth metals (Sorens 2011: p. 572). Sorens also finds that mineral richness actually tends to decrease conflicts over who has influence over policy-making (Sorens 2011: p. 583), an interesting finding since it suggests that there is no empirical link between resource richness and, for example, lobbying the government. The dataset he makes use of however, the UCDP PRIO Armed Conflict dataset of 2002, only includes those cases where there has been any conflict since 1946, and therefore does not include South Africa, meaning that separate research into the specific case of South Africa is still required.

A study which specifically looks at South Africa through the resource curse perspective is Ainsley Elbra's 2013 article *The forgotten resource curse* (Elbra 2013). In it, she explains how South Africa can be classified as a resource cursed economy because it is unique in the sense that it has seen poverty increase despite economic growth, stating that a large part of the population resembles "the profile of citizens of low-income countries" (Elbra 2013: p. 554). The one way in which South Africa does not come across as a resource cursed state is its comparatively low level of military spending, although Elbra mentions that "the increasing reliance on the army to keep domestic law and order resembles resource cursed states in the region" (Elbra 2013: p. 555). Elbra concludes by observing that "South Africa's mineral wealth has failed to alleviate poverty, or improve the livelihoods of most of its citizens, instead that country faces many of the issues confronting other resource cursed states [...]" (Elbra 2013: p. 556).

In what follows I will briefly go over some of the literature on the mining sector in South Africa, explaining more thoroughly which kinds of negative externalities and bad effects the mining of PGM's has.

First off, I will review the literature concerning the ownership of mines and efforts on the side of the South African government to transfer ownership in the form of shares to

disadvantaged people. The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act of December 2002 (MPRDA) appears at first glance to be intended to, among other things, nationalize the mining sector, since it stipulates that the government alone can decide what gets mined, where, when, by whom, and under which circumstances (Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 2002). It has not actually resulted in the nationalization of the mining industry, however, it merely changed the legal structure of mineral ownership and thereby kicked nationalization of mines off the political agenda. It merely increases capital accumulation and does not significantly aid in reaching the ANC-policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which calls for a larger share of black ownership in business. The mostly white owners of platinum mines stood to lose the most from nationalization and BEE, and therefore the MPRDA seems like an appeasement in their direction (Capps 2012a). In fact, the mineral property system which was set up during the apartheid era and greatly benefited the white-dominated platinum mining companies has not been significantly changed in the post-apartheid era, something the mining companies have been able to benefit greatly from and which helped create the platinum mining boom in the 1990s (Capps 2012b). To add to that, the aforementioned BEE initiatives, set in place by the MPRDA, have actually had a negative effect on the growth of a black owner class. This is because such initiatives often led to companies lending money to black investors with which they could then buy shares in those same companies, leading to the development of a black capitalist class which is for a big part indebted to the still mostly white-owned companies (Bowman 2019). The aforementioned MPRDA did however transfer ownership rights of minerals in the ground from private landowners (mostly mining companies) to the South African government, a move which was opposed fiercely by the Minerals Council of South Africa at the time, a lobby organization representing 90 percent of South Africa's mine owners (Dansereau 2005: p. 56). This raises the question: what influence does lobbying have in the South African policy-making process?

Another way that South African mining corporations negatively affect broad economic development is the restructuring and offshore listing of their companies, mostly in London, in order to increase shareholder value. Such undertakings have to be approved by the South African government, which allowed it to happen on the basis of a neoliberal economic policy (Mohamed 2020: p. 441). Under the Nelson Mandela years, the South African government instituted neoliberal policies such as opening the country up to international trade and finance as well as privatization measures and austerity. These policies are directly related to a failure to stimulate economic growth however, as well as inequality between the (mostly black) poor and the (mostly white) wealthy, and have been related to a setback in human welfare as well (Mohamed 2020; Schneider 2018).

A third negative externality of mining concerns tribal authorities. In the South African mine belt, some land is still held by so-called traditional authority areas, which belong to tribes which are themselves part owner of local platinum mines. These traditional authority areas are the direct descendants of the Apartheid era Bantustans, first established in the Natives Land Act of 1913 (Claassens and Matlala 2018). In return for a stake in these mines, the tribal authorities allow mining operations to continue. Not all people living in these areas agree with this, however, and seek to change these circumstances by creating separate communities to challenge the current relationship between tribal authorities and PGM-mining companies (Capps and Mnwana 2015). The South African government has proposed paying platinum royalties to tribes whose lands are being mined on as part of the BEE-framework and as an alternative to nationalization (Macmillan 2017: p. 276), but empirical evidence has shown that the paying of such royalties had led to inter-tribal competition and financial mismanagement (Manson 2013).

The fourth negative externality is that of the environment. Platinum mining leads to immense natural destruction including waste rock and tailings. Tailings are residual substances which are often harmful to the environment. The mining of platinum in South Africa has also

led to air and water pollution and, in mineworkers, increased levels of disease such as silicosis – the result of breathing in too much silicon dust from the mining process (Cairncross and Kisting 2016). Besides this, the mining sector's extensive need for fresh water has left local population without adequate access to portable water, and with a continued failure on the South African government's part to provide its citizens with drinking water, violent crime and racial tensions are expected to rise (Adler et al. 2007).

The fifth negative externality concerns workers' rights and working conditions. The working conditions of South African mineworkers have improved barely since the end of apartheid, with mineworkers often living in informal settlements made of low-quality building materials and no clean water, access to electricity, or sewage (Macmillan 2017: pp. 274-5). Farmers of lands with valuable mineral resources are forcibly evicted, their former farms "enclosed with razor wire and vigorously patrolled by private security personnel, excluding workers from still-arable land and denying them access to crops left to wither through neglect or under the impact of air polluted by smelter emissions [...]" (Cairncross and Kisting 2016: p. 515).

The final negative effect has to do with financial markets in South Africa. Mining companies have been known to use a part of their profits to speculate in South African equity markets, having a negative impact on job creation and channeling money not to productive investments but to mining companies themselves, ending up "as cash holdings on corporate balance sheets" (Karwowski 2015).

The status of South Africa as a resource cursed country is clear, mainly because of its inequality but also due to environmental degradation, and bad working conditions. So far though, research into a potential link specifically between PGM-wealth and a lack of adequate public policy to alleviate inequality and other negative externalities of the mining process in South Africa has not been done from a resource curse perspective. This is the gap that I aim to fill with my thesis.

Based on the above literature review, my research will be focusing on the case of the MPRDA, since it turned out to be such a beneficial law for the mining sector (Capps 2012a).

Theoretical Framework

What could be the theoretical justification for a causal chain between PGM-wealth and lack of adequate public policy? A possible causal chain is the following: PGM-mining companies profit from their ownership in such companies, and therefore are financially able to lobby parties in the National Assembly of South Africa to adopt policies which are in the favor of mining companies and stall policies which are disadvantageous to mining companies. In the case of the United States, for example, companies invest millions of dollars into lobbying firms to influence the behavior of congressmen and -women through campaign contributions (Seymour and Seymour 2013). In the instance of South African mining companies, there exists the aforementioned Minerals Council of South Africa, which lobbies on the behalf of mining companies.

Lobbying through organizations is not the only type of lobbying there is, however. A second form of lobbying is cronyism, where former employees of companies go and work in the government and vice versa – this is also referred to as a ‘revolving door’ (Seymour and Seymour 2013). A final form of lobbying which is endemic in liberal democratic societies is the communicating of “private information about the likelihood of adverse effects of a pending policy to the policymaker...” (Bernhagen and Bräuninger 2005: p. 44). This final type of lobbying is very difficult to research, unfortunately, since it would require extensive interviewing with policymakers, something which cannot be achieved within the scope of my master’s thesis. The second type of lobbying, cronyism, appears at first glance to be more applicable to the case of South Africa. Although the campaign contributions form of lobbying is happening in South Africa (Independent Electoral Commission 2021a, 2021b, 2022), cronyism appears to be more important simply because it is so much out in the open. Consider the case of the South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, one of the richest men in the country. He used to be a member of the board of a mining company – Lonmin – that mined, among other

things, PGM's. His call for help to the South African police minister in the face of workers' strikes for higher wages was immediately met and resulted in the Marikana massacre, in which many mine workers lost their lives at the hands of police intervention (Bond 2014: p. 8).

Therefore, I will be researching the role that cronyism as a form of lobbying plays in the context of policy-making in South Africa. The concept of cronyism remains vague, however. It was mentioned above that cronyism refers to the 'revolving door' where either former employees of private companies go work in the government or former government officials or parliamentarians go work for private companies. A distinction between government ministers and parliamentarians is not needed in the context of this research, because South Africa does not have a dualist system: as in the UK parliament, all ministers and deputy ministers are at the same time sitting members of the South African National Assembly. They carry the governmental responsibilities of ministers but also possess the privilege of voting on bills. Since the adoption of the MPRDA was perceived to be a negative development for the mining sector, but turned out to be a positive one, I will be researching whether there exists a revolving door where members of the National Assembly, including government ministers, become members of the board of mining companies or of investment firms which own a share in such mining companies. If this is the case, this implies political influence by mining companies on the legislative process since they could promise politicians a job after their retirement from politics. Based on the review of literature in the preceding paragraphs, a causal chain for my thesis can therefore be summarized graphically as follows:

Control of mining companies → Cronyism → Advantageous policy outcomes

This causal chain clearly shows that there are three concepts at the core of my research: control, lobbying, and policy outcomes. What I mean by cronyism I have explained in the paragraph above, and what I mean by policy outcomes I have explained in the first paragraph (namely, legislation adopted or not adopted), and whether policy outcomes are advantageous to the

mining sector I have detailed in the literature review above, after which I settled on the case of the MPRDA as an advantageous policy outcome from the perspective of mining companies.

Next, I will need to define what I mean by control. I had previously quickly mentioned that the causal chain begins with the mining companies. That is exactly what I meant by control within the confines of this research. Control here means one thing: the legal authority to execute the operations of a company by the board of directors. I will limit my research to the boards of mining companies, as found on either the sites of mining companies themselves or their annual reports.

To summarize all of the above, the theoretical expectation is that platinum mining companies in South Africa, will lobby members of the South African National Assembly to vote in favor of bills which in one way or another are beneficial to the revenues and operations of those companies. This lobbying is done through the mechanism of cronyism, whereby politicians are able to join the board of directors of a platinum mining company as a reward after leaving the National Assembly in case they voted in favor of a policy which turned out to be advantageous for the mining sector. Thereby, mining companies are able to influence the policy-making process in order to benefit themselves.

Therefore, the hypothesis I intend to prove can be stated as follows: platinum mining companies lobby the National Assembly through cronyism, rewarding politicians for voting for advantageous policies, as a means of getting more policies passed which are advantageous to the mining sector in the future. It is not necessary for *all* assemblymembers who voted in favor of the MPRDA to have joined the board of a mining company, but finding only one former assemblymember who voted in favor of the MPRDA serving on the board of directors of a mining company after leaving public office would be a disappointing result and weak evidence for my hypothesis, since such an instance could be wholly unrelated to whether a former assemblymember voted in favor of the MPRDA. In order for my hypothesis to gain a strong

indication of its validity we should expect to see a multiple former assemblymembers who voted in favor of the MPRDA joining mining companies to serve on their board of directors after leaving politics, especially assemblymembers who could be considered to be important within their respective parties. This is the case because mining companies only have so many positions to offer; there are never many vacant spots on the boards of companies at the same time, so we should expect important assemblymembers, such as ministers, to be more likely to end up in such a position after their retirement from politics. If the aforementioned matters cannot be found through the research, the hypothesis will be undermined rather than corroborated.

Methodology

I hypothesize that platinum mining companies in South Africa, and their major institutional shareholders, lobby the national assembly through cronyism, rewarding some assemblymembers with positions on the board of directors in order to get policies approved which are advantageous to the mining sector. What I will be researching therefore is a causal mechanism, as mentioned earlier in this thesis:

Control of platinum mines → Cronyism → Advantageous policy outcomes

It is important at this point to stress that my research is not intended to say anything about how likely it is that the controllers and owners of mining companies are able to influence the legislative process in South Africa, or to what extent different types of lobbying (contributions, cronyism, information) are actually used by the controllers and owners of mining companies. The case of this thesis, the MPRDA, is a case of a policy which is beneficial to the mining sector being passed by the South African National Assembly. The way we can check if cronyism has occurred is by looking for former members of National Assembly who voted in favor of the MPRDA and seeing whether or not they are or have been employed by either the mining companies themselves or their major private institutional shareholders. This thesis is meant to say something about the way cronyism in South Africa works as a way for mining companies to influence the political process, thereby explaining more fully the role mining companies and their owners play in South Africa's resource curse.

In order to research the appurtenant causal mechanism I will be making use of process tracing. This requires, first of all, a distinction of the causal mechanism into a theoretical level and an empirical level. The theoretical level has already been explicated, but in order to know how to do the research there has to be an expectation of what the empirical manifestations of each step in the causal chain might be (Beach and Pedersen 2019: p. 32). This requires an

operationalization of each concept in the causal mechanism in order to make each concept empirically researchable.

This is a minimalist research design of process tracing, since there is a black box that we cannot get hold of within the bounds of this research: the ‘promise’ part (Beach and Pedersen 2019: p. 35). By that I mean the following: we can clearly find whether members of the South African National Assembly voted in favor or against the MPRDA, since this is a matter of public record (although not an easy matter, as will be shown later on). We can also find which persons have been serving as directors on the boards of either mining companies or their major private institutional owners since the passing of the MPRDA. Finally we can simply cross-check those two sets of data to see whether members of National Assembly who voted in favor of the MPRDA actually do join those boards. Another thing that can aid in corroborating the causal mechanism is whether such assemblymembers were important figures in their respective parties, in government, etc., and whether they defended the MPRDA in word during the debate stage. The final thing we would need in order to prove the existence of a revolving door is a promise, in word or writing, from the aforementioned companies to members of National Assembly that they could be eligible to join a board depending on how they voted. Since this is a set of data I cannot get hold of, I can only check how many members of National Assembly have joined boards after leaving office, how important they were in the party at the time of the MPRDA-vote, and whether they spoke out in debates defending the MPRDA, and from that conclude whether my thesis – that there is a revolving door in South African politics used by mining companies to influence policy – can be corroborated or not.

As a consequence of everything stated in the above paragraph, the objects of research will be various kinds of documents available to the public. In the first place, the Hansard of the South African Parliament will need to be consulted in order to check how the members of the South African National Assembly of the 23rd parliament (sitting from 1999-2004) voted on the

MPRDA in 2002. Then, the annual reports from each of the main platinum mining companies will need to be checked, as well as those of their major private institutional shareholders, from 2004 up to 2021, since such documents usually include a list of names of the board of directors in employment to the company in that year. The hansard of the South African Parliament, which details the daily business of either the National Assembly (the lower house of parliament) or the National Council of Provinces (the upper house, abbreviated: NCOP), can be found on parliament.gov.za/hansard.

Attentive readers might have noticed that so far in this thesis I have only been talking about checking how members of the National Assembly voted on the MPRDA and not how members of the National Council of Provinces voted. There is a reason for this. In principle, since any bill needs to be passed by both houses of South Africa's parliament, and signed by the president to come into effect, the causal mechanism should be checked by looking at how the members of both houses of parliament voted on the bill. This is where my research encountered an obstacle however, since South Africa's hansard does not record how each member of parliament voted when a bill is put to vote. It merely records whether the bill was adopted or rejected, and which parties dissented. A list of attending members of parliament had to be found, and in the case of the MPRDA, the adoption of which occurred on the 26th of June 2002, such a list could be found earlier on in the hansard of that day's session of the National Assembly (Proceedings of the National Assembly 2002: p. 31-34). The MPRDA is recorded as being adopted, with only the Democratic Party (DP, now called the 'Democratic Alliance'), the Freedom Front (FF), and the Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB, translated: 'Afrikaner Unity Movement') dissenting (Proceedings of the National Assembly 2002: p. 48). The document detailing the day's proceedings of the NCOP on the 26th of June 2002, however, nowhere lists which members were attending that day, although it does make reference to a vote on the MPRDA taking place with a majority approving the bill (Hansard - Parliament of South Africa

2002b). This is why I will only be able to research members of the National Assembly, not those of the NCOP, although clearly both houses are of equal importance to the legislative process.

Having compiled a list of members of the National Assembly, attending on the 26th of June 2002, into an excel file was only the first step, since this list did not detail which party each assemblymember belonged to, a piece of information which was indispensable if I was to ever find out how each assemblymember voted. In fact, nowhere in any Hansard document is the party status of an assemblymember ever mentioned. Therefore, a different way had to be found of finding out to which party each assemblymember belonged.

The following step in my research consisted of checking documents from the major platinum mining companies – mostly annual reports – to see which persons have served on their respective boards of directors, and cross-referencing this to the list of assemblymembers who voted in favor of the MPRDA. Research was done into the following platinum mining companies: Anglo American Platinum, Impala Platinum, Northam Platinum, and Sibanye Stillwater. The annual reports of Anglo American Platinum go all the way back to 2004, the cut-off point in this research since this year denotes the final year of the 23rd parliament of South Africa, the parliament which adopted the MPRDA. Northam Platinum's annual reports similarly go back to 2004, whereas Impala's annual reports are only made available online from 2010 onwards. A similar issue arises with Sibanye Stillwater. Which has only published their annual reports from 2013 onwards on their website. In the next section, the findings shall be discussed.

Assemblymembers found to have voted in favor of the MPRDA and consequently went to join the boards of mining companies will also be researched for the following: 1) whether they had an important position in government, the Assembly, or their party at the time; and 2) if they are recorded in the hansard debating the merits of the MPRDA.

Results

The full results of my research have been compiled in an excel file, which has been converted into a word-document format and can be seen in Appendix A below. The first column contains the names of all assemblymembers present during the session on June 26th 2002, when the MPRDA was adopted by both houses of parliament. The second column shows which party each assemblymember belongs to. Empty cells mean that the party status of that particular assemblymember could not be found. The third column details how each assemblymember voted on the MPRDA, based on their party membership. Finally, the fourth column is contains information on which assemblymember went on to join the board of directors of which mining company in which year. The table clearly shows that only two assemblymembers – Mr FS (‘Sydney’) Mufamadi and Ms SC (‘Susan’) van der Merwe, both from the ANC – have joined the board of directors of mining companies. Other assemblymembers were not mentioned as being members of the board of directors in any of the consulted annual reports.

Thus the discussion regarding the post-Assembly careers of these two assemblymembers. Now we will look at what their role in the government and their party was. Sydney Mufamadi turns out to have occupied a high position in the South African government at the time of the vote: he was Minister of Provincial and Local Government from 1999 to 2008 (GCIS 2008). Susan van der Merwe did not occupy a ministerial position at this time, although she did serve as a parliamentary councilor to the President, Thabo Mbeki, and later on as Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, though not at the time that the MPRDA was passed (Nielsen n.d.), making her less important within the ANC at the time in comparison to Sydney Mufamadi.

The proceedings of every session of the National Assembly were researched and checked for debates regarding mineral policy broadly and the MPRDA specifically, and

whether Mr. Mufamadi or Ms. Van der Merwe made any contributions relating to those debates.

It was found that they did not interject in any of these debates.

Conclusion

The goal of this thesis has been to research a possible way in which the resource curse in South Africa can be explained from a policy-making standpoint, namely due to lobbying by the platinum mining sector. Platinum mining companies are theorized to influence the legislative process in South Africa, namely through cronyism. Cronyism was defined to mean as much as a ‘revolving door’, meaning that former employees of mining companies go into politics or that former politicians go work for mining companies. This thesis looked specifically at the platinum mining sector due to the fact that South Africa produces so much of the world’s platinum and due to the fact that South Africa’s economy for a large part depends on platinum mines for revenues. I hypothesized that the controllers of mining companies would make use of cronyism to get policies adopted which are advantageous to the mining sector by getting members of the National Assembly who voted in favor of such policies onto executive board of mining companies.

Earlier on, in the section discussing the causal chain, I had mentioned the conditions under which my hypothesis would be corroborated. One or more former members of the National Assembly joining the board of a platinum mining company after leaving office would already be a corroboration of my thesis, although a weak one. In fact, a very low number of former members of the National Assembly joining the board of a mining company could just be a coincidence, totally unrelated to the causal chain of cronyism, if it exists in this case beyond just the theoretical level. The more former members of the National Assembly could be found on the boards of platinum mining companies, the better for corroborating the causal chain it would be. In the results section it became clear that two former members of the National Assembly of South Africa who went on to join a board could be found, and that they both appear to have been prominent members of their party, the ANC, at the time: one a minister, the other a special advisor to the president. Both, however, had nothing to add during the debates

regarding the MPRDA, and it is more obvious in the case of Mr. Mufamadi why that is so, since he was Minister of Provincial and Local Government, meaning that it was not his policy area. My hypothesis, that platinum mining companies in South Africa use cronyism to influence politicians into voting in favor of policies benefiting them, can therefore be corroborated. This is because the data align with my hypothesized causal mechanism existing: we should expect to see important members of a party that pushed for a policy benefiting the mining sector take on jobs in the mining sector after their retirement from politics.

With the corroboration of my hypothesis we are one step closer to explaining one possible way in which the resource curse has come to afflict South Africa. We know that South Africa shows signs of being resource cursed country, but the specific causal mechanism between its mineral wealth, specifically its platinum deposits, and bad policy was not yet researched in a resource curse framework. Follow-up research needs to be done by researchers in the field, conducting interviews with all the important decisionmakers at the time of a particular policy being adopted (or discontinued). Deeper archival work is yet to be done, and a discourse analysis of media-stories regarding the adoption of certain policies will supplement the discussion. Now that steps have been taken, with my thesis, to link together the resourced cursed status of some countries with a form of lobbying, an important window has opened in the resource curse literature: by researching the link between the lobbying of the resource exporting sector on the one hand and bad governance and bad economy on the other, we now have a good framework to help us understand the resource cursed status of countries that suffer no civil war and do not export fuel or diamonds.

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Appendix A: Table of Assemblymembers on June 26th 2002

NAME	PARTY	VOTE (MPRDA)	DIRECTOR
Abrahams, T	UDM ¹	Yea	
Abram, S	UDM	Yea	
Ainslie, A R	ANC ²	Yea	
Andrew, K M	DP ³	Nay	
Asmal, A K	ANC	Yea	
Aucamp, C	AEB ⁴	Nay	
Balfour, B M N			
Baloyi, M R	ANC	Yea	
Bell, B G	DP	Nay	
Benjamin, J	ANC	Yea	
Beukman, F	ANC	Yea	
Bhengu, F	ANC	Yea	
Blaas, A	NNP ⁵	Yea	
Bloem, D V	ANC	Yea	
Bogopane, H I	ANC	Yea	
Booi, M S	ANC	Yea	
Borman, G M	DP	Nay	
Botha, A J			
Botha, N G W	UDM	Yea	
Buthelezi, M N	ANC	Yea	
Cachalia, I M	ANC	Yea	
Chalmers, J	ANC	Yea	
Chiba, L	ANC	Yea	
Chikane, M M	ANC	Yea	
Chiwayo, L L			
Cindi, N V			
Coetzee-Kasper, M P	ANC	Yea	
Cronin, J P	ANC	Yea	
Cupido, P W	DP	Nay	
Da Camara, M L	DP	Nay	
Davies, R H	ANC	Yea	
De Lille, P	PAC ⁶	Yea	
Delport, J T	DP	Nay	
Diale, L N	ANC	Yea	
Didiza, A T	ANC	Yea	
Dithebe, S L	ANC	Yea	
Dlali, D M	ANC	Yea	
Doidge, G Q M	ANC	Yea	
Du Toit, D C	ANC	Yea	
Dudley, C	ACDP ⁷	Yea	
Duma, N M	ANC	Yea	

Durand, J	NNP	Yea
Dyani, M M Z	ANC	Yea
Eglin, C W	DP	Nay
Fankomo, F C	ANC	Yea
Farrow, S B	DP	Nay
Fazzie, M H	ANC	Yea
Ferreira, E T	IFP ⁸	Yea
Fihla, N B	ANC	Yea
Fraser-Moleketi, G J	SACP/ANC ⁹	Yea
Frolick, C T	UDM	Yea
Gandhi, E	ANC	Yea
Gcina, C I	ANC	Yea
Geldenhuis, B L	ANC	Yea
Gerber, P A	ANC	Yea
Gogotya, N J	ANC	Yea
Gomomo, P J	ANC	Yea
Goniwe, M T	ANC	Yea
Goosen, A D	ANC	Yea
Gore, V C	DP	Nay
Gous, S J	NNP	Yea
Greyling, C H F		
Grobler, G A J	DP	Nay
Gumede, D M	ANC	Yea
Hajaig, F	ANC	Yea
Hanekom, D A	ANC	Yea
Heine, R J	DP	Nay
Hendrickse, P A C	ANC	Yea
Herandien, C B	NNP	Yea
Hlaneki, C J M	ANC	Yea
Hogan, B A	ANC	Yea
Jankielsohn, R	DP	Nay
Jassat, E E	ANC	Yea
Jeffery, J H	ANC	Yea
Joemat, R R	ANC	Yea
Jordan, Z P	ANC	Yea
Kalako, M U	ANC	Yea
Kalyan, S V	DP	Nay
Kannemeyer, B W	ANC	Yea
Kasienyane, O R	ANC	Yea
Kasrils, R	SACP/ANC	Yea
Kati, J Z	ANC	Yea
Kgarimetsa, J J	ANC	Yea
Kgauwe, Q J	ANC	Yea
Kgwele, L M	ANC	Yea
Komphela, B M	ANC	Yea
Kota, Z A	ANC	Yea

Kotwal, Z	ANC	Yea
Lamani, N E	ANC	Yea
Landers, L T	ANC	Yea
Le Roux, J W	NNP	Yea
Lee, T D	DP	Nay
Lishivha, T E	ANC	Yea
Lobe, M C	ANC	Yea
Lockey, D	ANC	Yea
Louw, J T	ANC	Yea
Louw, S K	ANC	Yea
Lowe, C M		
Lucas, E J	IFP	Yea
Luthuli, A N	ANC	Yea
Lyle, A G	ANC	Yea
Mabena, D C	ANC	Yea
Mabudafhasi, T R	ANC	Yea
Magashule, E S	ANC	Yea
Magazi, M N	ANC	Yea
Magubane, N E	ANC	Yea
Magwanishe, G	ANC	Yea
Mahlangu, M J	ANC	Yea
Mahlawe, N	ANC	Yea
Mahomed, F		
Maimane, D S	ANC	Yea
Maine, M S	ANC	Yea
Makanda, W G	ANC	Yea
Makasi, X C	ANC	Yea
Malebana, H F	ANC	Yea
Maloney, L	ANC	Yea
Maphalala, M A	ANC	Yea
Martins, B A D	ANC	Yea
Masala, M M	ANC	Yea
Mashimbye, J N	ANC	Yea
Masutha, M T	ANC	Yea
Mathibela, N F	ANC	Yea
Matsepe-Casaburri, I F	ANC	Yea
Maunye, M M	ANC	Yea
Mayatula, S M	ANC	Yea
Maziya, A M	ANC	Yea
Mbadi, L M	UDM	Yea
Mbete, B	ANC	Yea
Mbombo, N D	ANC	Yea
Mbuyazi, L R	IFP	Yea
Mfundisi, I S	UCDP ¹⁰	Yea
Mguni, B A	ANC	Yea

Middleton, N S	IFP	Yea
Mkono, D G	ANC	Yea
Mnandi, P N	ANC	Yea
Mngomezulu, G P	ANC	Yea
Mnumzana, S K	ANC	Yea
Modise, T R	ANC	Yea
Modisenyane, L J	ANC	Yea
Moeketse, K M		
Mofokeng, T R	ANC	Yea
Mogoba, M S	PAC	Yea
Mohamed, I J		
Mohlala, R J B	ANC	Yea
Mokoena, D A	ANC	Yea
Molebatsi, M A	ANC	Yea
Moloi, J	ANC	Yea
Moloto, K A	ANC	Yea
Mongwaketse, S J	ANC	Yea
Montsitsi, S D	ANC	Yea
Moonsamy, K	ANC	Yea
Moorcroft, E K	DP	Nay
Morkel, C M	NNP	Yea
Morutoa, M R	ANC	Yea
Morwamoche, K W	ANC	Yea
Moss, M I	ANC	Yea
Mothoagae, P K	ANC	Yea
Motubatse, S D	ANC	Yea
Mpahlwa, M	ANC	Yea
Mpaka, H M	ANC	Yea
Mpontshane, A M	IFP	Yea
Mshudulu, S A	ANC	Yea
Mthembu, B	ANC	Yea
Mtsweni, N S	ANC	Yea
Mudau, N W	ANC	Yea
Mufamadi, F S	ANC	Yea
		(Implats*, 2016-present)
Mutsila, I	ANC	Yea
Mzondeki, M J G	ANC	Yea
Nair, B	ANC	Yea
Nash, J H	ANC	Yea
Ndou, R S	ANC	Yea
Ndzanga, R A	ANC	Yea
Nefolovhodwe, P J	AZAPO ¹¹	Yea
Nel, A C	ANC	Yea
Nel, A H	NNP	Yea
Nene, N M	ANC	Yea
Newhoudt-Druchen, W S	ANC	Yea

Ngaleka, N E	ANC	Yea
Ngcengwane, N D	ANC	Yea
Ngubeni, J M	ANC	Yea
Nhleko, N P	ANC	Yea
Nhlengethwa, D G	ANC	Yea
Nkabinde, N C		
Nobunga, B J	ANC	Yea
Nqodi, S B	ANC	Yea
Ntombela, S H	ANC	Yea
Ntshulana-Bhengu, N R		
Ntuli, B M	ANC	Yea
Ntuli, M B	ANC	Yea
Ntuli, R S	DP	Nay
Ntuli, S B	ANC	Yea
Olifant, D A A		
Oliphant, G G		
Omar, A M	ANC	Yea
Oosthuizen, G C	NNP	Yea
Opperman, S E	DP	Nay
Pahad, E G	ANC	Yea
Phadagi, M G	ANC	Yea
Phala, M J	ANC	Yea
Pheko, S E M	PAC	Yea
Phohlela, S	ANC	Yea
Pieterse, R D	ANC	Yea
Pretorius, I J	NNP	Yea
Rabinowitz, R	IFP	Yea
Radebe, B A	ANC	Yea
Rajbally, S	MF ¹²	Yea
Ramakaba-Lesiea, M M	ANC	Yea
Ramgobin, M	ANC	Yea
Ramodike, M N	UDM	Yea
Ramotsamai, C M P	ANC	Yea
Rasmeni, S M	ANC	Yea
Reid, L R R	ANC	Yea
Ripinga, S S	ANC	Yea
Saloojee, E	ANC	Yea
Schalkwyk, P J	DP	Nay
Schippers, J	NNP	Yea
Schmidt, H C	DP	Nay
Schneeman, G D	ANC	Yea
Schoeman, E A	ANC	Yea
Schoeman, R S	ANC	Yea
Scott, M I	ANC	Yea
Seaton, S A	IFP	Yea

Seeco, M A	UCDP	Yea	
Sekgobela, P S	ANC	Yea	
Semple, J A	ANC	Yea	
September, C C	ANC	Yea	
Shilubana, T P	ANC	Yea	
Shope, N R	ANC	Yea	
Sibiya, M S M	IFP	Yea	
Sigwela, E M	ANC	Yea	
Simmons, S	NNP	Yea	
Sithole, D J	ANC	Yea	
Skhosana, W M	ANC	Yea	
Skosana, M B	IFP	Yea	
Skweyiya, Z S T	ANC	Yea	
Smith, V G	ANC	Yea	
Smuts, M	DP	Nay	
Solo, B M	ANC	Yea	
Solomon, G	ANC	Yea	
Sonjica, B P	ANC	Yea	
Sono, B N	DP	Nay	
Sosibo, J E	ANC	Yea	
Soty, M M	ANC	Yea	
Southgate, R M	ACDP	Yea	
Swart, P S	DP	Nay	
Swart, S N	ACDP	Yea	
Taljaard, R	DP	Nay	
Thabethe, E	ANC	Yea	
Tinto, B	ANC	Yea	
Tolo, L J	ANC	Yea	
Tsheole, N M	ANC	Yea	
Turok, B	ANC	Yea	
Uys, P	NNP	Yea	
Vadi, I	ANC	Yea	
Van den Heever, R	ANC	Yea	
P Z			
Van der Merwe, S C	ANC	Yea	(Sibanye**, 2013-present)
Van Deventer, F J			
Van Jaarsveld, A Z	NNP	Yea	
A			
Van Wyk, A (Anna)			
Van Wyk, A (Annelize)	UDM	Yea	
Van Wyk, J F	ANC	Yea	
Van Wyk, N	ANC	Yea	
Vos, S C	IFP	Yea	
Waters, M	DP	Nay	
Xingwana, L M T	ANC	Yea	

Zondo, R P	ANC	Yea
Zulu, N E	IFP	Yea

¹UDM = United Democratic Movement

²ANC = African National Congress

³DP = Democratic Party

⁴AEB = Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging ('Afrikaner Unity Movement')

⁵NNP = New National Party

⁶PAC = Pan Africanist Congress of Azania

⁷ACDP = African Christian Democratic Party

⁸IFP = Inkatha Freedom Party

⁹SACP = South African Communist Party

¹⁰UCDP = United Christian Democratic Party

¹¹AZAPO = Azanian People's Organisation

¹²MF = Minority Front

*Implats = Impala Platinum

**Sibanye = Sibanye Stillwater