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Political Discourse in Times of Crisis: The Impact of the 2015-2016 Refugee Crisis on the Parliamentary Discourse in the Netherlands and Greece

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Master Thesis

Political Discourse in Times of Crisis

*The Impact of the 2015-2016 Refugee Crisis on the Parliamentary Discourse in the
Netherlands and Greece*



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Abstract

This thesis aims to understand the impact of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis on the parliamentary discourse in the Netherlands and Greece. It does so by drawing on Triandafyllidou's (2018) work on media and political discourse, which proposed an important distinction between three discursive frames developed in response to the refugee crisis: 1) a moralizing frame; 2) a security frame; and 3) a rationalizing frame. The goal is to trace these frames in Dutch and Greek parliamentary debates, as parliaments have not received much attention in the academic debate. The analysis covers transcripts of plenary sessions in parliamentary debates between August 2015 and April 2016. Following the work of Triandafyllidou (2018), the key hypothesis is that the longer a refugee crisis lasts, the more parliamentary debates become dominated by a rationalizing frame, regardless of how affected countries are by refugee inflows. The findings identify that no particular frame dominated the parliamentary debates, indicating that political parties remained stable on the left-right dimension. Thus, against the expectations from the literature on the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, the thesis demonstrates that the refugee crisis did not impact the political discourse in EU member states.

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1. Introduction

In 2015, more than one million refugees arrived at the borders of the European Union (EU) as they needed protection from war, violence, and persecution in their home countries (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2022). The unprecedented number of new arrivals impacted political discourse across the EU. So far, the academic debate on the 2015-2016 refugee crisis focused on the intensification of political polarization within EU member states (Heisbourg, 2015, p. 8). The polarization was visible in two respects. Firstly, there was division on the political spectrum, where on average the left placed more emphasis on aid provision to refugees, while the right placed more emphasis on protecting the safety of EU citizens (Van Prooijen, Krouwel and Emmer, 2018, p. 143). Secondly, media in countries directly affected by refugee inflows generally portrayed refugees as vulnerable outsiders, while countries indirectly affected generally portrayed refugees as dangerous outsiders (Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017, p. 3). Moreover, the majority of studies focus on discourses relating to the refugee crisis in media and political speeches made to the public (Colombo, 2018; Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017; Krzyżanowski, 2018a; Krzyżanowski, 2018b; Rheindorf and Wodak, 2018).

In this context, scholars working on media and political discourse proposed an important theoretical distinction between three discursive frames developed in response to the refugee crisis: 1) a moralizing frame highlighting the notions of solidarity and responsibility; 2) a security frame portraying migration as a threat; and 3) a rationalizing frame identifying what the problem is and how it should be addressed (Triandafyllidou, 2018, pp. 211-213). The distinction is significant, as it indicates how various actors responded to the refugee crisis. Although, the distinction between the frames is promising, it has not been examined systematically across countries.

To address this gap, my thesis focuses on how the refugee crisis impacted the parliamentary discourse in the Netherlands and Greece. During the crisis, refugees arrived in Southern European countries and crossed Europe to reach Northern European countries. Herein, Greece is considered an arrival country, while the Netherlands is considered a destination country (Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak, 2018, p. 8). Accordingly, Greece is characterized as a country directly affected by refugee inflows, while the Netherlands is characterized as a country indirectly affected. The comparative analysis is based on parliamentary debates regarding the 2015-2016 refugee crisis. Since the refugee crisis impacted the discourse on migration in society, it also impacted the discourse in parliamentary debates. However, understanding the way in which it happens is missing. Therefore, my thesis addresses the following research question:

How did the 2015-2016 refugee crisis impact the political discourse in Dutch and Greek parliamentary debates?

The question is relevant as the analysis of parliamentary debates has not received much attention in the academic debate. The merit of studying political discourse in general, and parliamentary debates in particular, is that parliaments represent and articulate the interests of society (Von Beyme, 2000, p. 72). Following the work of Triandafyllidou (2018), the key hypothesis is that the longer a refugee crisis lasts, the more parliamentary debates become dominated by a rationalizing frame, regardless of how affected countries are by refugee inflows. Thus, against the expectations from the literature on the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, the thesis demonstrates that the refugee crisis did not impact the political discourse in EU member states. Instead, no particular frame dominated the parliamentary debates, indicating that political parties remained stable on the left-right dimension.

The thesis continues as follows. The first part reviews the academic literature on migration in the EU in general, and the 2015-2016 refugee crisis in particular. The second part introduces the main theoretical approaches regarding discourse, frames and the influence of crises. The third part introduces the main tenets of frame analysis and outlines the methodological approach taken in the thesis. The fourth and fifth parts summarize the findings of the empirical analysis and reflect on the theoretical expectations. The conclusion reflects on the implications of the findings and discusses possible avenues for future research.

2. Literature Review

The 2015-2016 refugee crisis is part of the broader phenomenon of political responses to migration in Europe after the Second World War. Accordingly, migration is not a new phenomenon in the European context. Since the second half of the twentieth century, immigrants have been part of society in the majority of Western European countries. In these years, attitudes toward migration were permissive, but since the 1980s, migration was seen as a danger to domestic society (Huysmans, 2000, pp. 753-756). This indicates that the discourse on migration changed and became more restrictive. These developments coincided with the negotiations on the 1990 Dublin Convention, where migration was not a national issue anymore as EU law determined which EU member state is responsible for examining asylum applications (Hurwitz, 1999, p. 648).

Broadly speaking, the discourse on migration can be classified into two approaches. On the one hand, the security discourse is defined as ‘discourse of fear and proliferation of dangers with reference to the scenarios of chaos, disorder, and clash of civilizations’ (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 22). Herein, migration is perceived as a threat to society. On the other hand, the humanitarian discourse is ‘expressed through a deep concern with human rights, cooperation and humanitarian intervention’ (Buonfino, 2004, p. 25). Herein, migrants are

perceived as victims. These two approaches are on average associated with the left-right divide, as the humanitarian discourse is often adopted by left-wing actors, while the securitization discourse is often adopted by right-wing actors. However, the division is not clear-cut and depends on the domestic circumstances of the country under focus.

The differentiated political framing of migration is thus not a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the 2015-2016 refugee crisis has intensified the debate around migration and polarization has deepened. Moreover, the refugee crisis has been a highly politicized and mediatized issue. Politicization is the process in which every issue becomes political, while mediatization is the process whereby politics becomes dependent on mass media and more recently on social and online media (Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak, 2018, pp. 4-6).

Accordingly, the discourses on the 2015-2016 refugee crisis in media coverage are quite diverse in the EU (Eberl et al, 2018, p. 217). For instance, in Austria, the securitization discourse was more prominent than the humanitarian discourse, especially starting the fall of 2015 (Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017, p. 1749). In a similar vein, the Hungarian media, encouraged by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, was mainly concerned with the securitization discourse (Heidenreich et al, 2019, p. 178). Conversely, in Germany, the media focused more on how to deal with the arrival of refugees, recalling the ‘Wir schaffen das’ statement by Chancellor Angela Merkel (Heidenreich et al, 2019, p. 178). In Italy, the securitization discourse moved to the background when refugees arrived and the humanitarian discourse received more attention (Colombo, 2018, p. 164). Overall, three patterns are identifiable: i) in Eastern Europe, the media focused on the securitization discourse, considering the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia); ii) in Northern Europe, the media focused on dealing with the refugee crisis; and iii) in Southern Europe, the securitization and humanitarian discourse were present in the media, but this varied across time. These studies

discuss general media coverage, but there are important differences between news reporting depending on their political inclinations and whether they constitute mainstream or new media.

Relatively similar patterns are identifiable in the discourses adopted by political parties toward their electorate. In Poland, right-wing populist parties used the media to spread anti-immigration messages (Krzyżanowski, 2018a, p. 79). The Swedish political discourse was centered on governance-driven solutions across the left-right divide (Krzyżanowski, 2018b, p. 112). In Greece, the leader of the conservative party in the opposition emphasized the government's responsibility in dealing with the refugee crisis, while the left-wing prime minister focused on the issue of solidarity (Boukala and Dimitrakopoulou, 2018, p. 190). It is important to note that political discourses depend on the ideological orientations of political parties, and that there are cross-country and in-country variations.

Overall, previous studies have disproportionately focused on media and opposition, and the debate took place outside public institutions. For example, these studies have not focused at all on parliaments. Parliaments have to be studied, as they are among the most dynamic political institutions within the political sphere. Generally speaking, parliaments have four functions: 1) representation and articulation of interests in society; 2) controlling the government; 3) proposing legislation; and 4) recruiting candidates to form the government (Von Beyme, 2000, p. 72). Furthermore, parliaments form a place for dialogue among elected politicians. These parliamentary debates are formal discussions that involve exchanges of opinion and aim to facilitate informed collective decision-making (Ilie, 2015, p. 4). My thesis focuses on the first two functions of parliaments, as discursive frames have been identified in society, and parliamentary debates involve the interaction between government and opposition. Since parliaments have fundamental tasks in upholding the functioning of democratic processes, it is important to understand the direction of parliamentary debates

(Müller and Narud, 2013, pp. 1-2). Along these lines, the functions of parliaments and the parliamentary debates are part of the parliamentary discourse.

Given the societal importance of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, one could question in what way did parliaments fulfill their functions during the refugee crisis. Thus, understanding the impact of the refugee crisis in politics and analyzing the discourse in parliamentary debates is of great importance. The next section outlines the main theoretical approaches.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Discourse Theory - Conceptual Building Blocks

The literature review demonstrated that existing studies in the field have focused on various discourses regarding migration. However, the meaning of discourse is not yet clearly defined. Discourse can be defined as ‘a particular way of talking about and understanding the world’ (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 1). This stems from a constructivist logic, which assumes that reality is socially constructed. Following this definition, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theory is one of the various approaches to discourse theory that has been developed. Their discourse theory follows a poststructuralist logic in which the whole social field is understood as a network of processes wherein meaning is created (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 25). No discourse stands on its own as it is constantly in transformation through contact with other discourses. Therefore, central to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is the concept of ‘discursive struggle’, which means that different discourses compete with each other to achieve hegemony, indicating that meaning is always contested (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, pp. 6-7). The ‘field of discursivity’, then, indicates all potential constructions of meaning other than the specific construction of meaning that belongs to one particular discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 111). In other words, the migration field of discursivity is unlimited as it includes every meaning that is not related to the migration

discourse. Therefore, a second approach to discourse theory has to be incorporated to narrow the scope.

The concept 'order of discourse' from Fairclough's critical discourse analysis refers to the 'totality of discursive practices of an institution and relationship between them' and is usually associated with particular institutions or domains of social life (Fairclough, 1993, p. 138). The order of discourse is more specific than the field of discursivity, as it includes only the discourses that compete in the same domain. Although, the three concepts – discursive struggle, field of discursivity, and order of discourse – are derived from different approaches, they can still be combined. The concepts antagonism and hegemony are helpful in this regard to describe the competition between various discourses within a specific field. Antagonism occurs when different discourses mutually exclude each other and thereby undermine the meaning of discourse, while hegemony occurs when one discourse dominates all others in the discursive field (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, pp. 135-136).

Having defined discourse and its underlying premises, frames and framing enter the discussion. A frame is 'a central organizing idea or storyline that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them' (Gamson and Modigliani, 1994, p. 376). Frames are the core of the overall discourse. They conceptualize and construct elements of a text that are part of a specific discourse (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 59). Framing, then, is to select 'some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described' (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

In respect to the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, previous studies identified three discursive frames in media and political discourses: 1) a moralizing frame; 2) a security frame; and 3) a rationalizing frame (Triandafyllidou, 2018, pp. 211-213). Firstly, the moralizing frame relates

to the humanitarian discourse which is ‘expressed through a deep concern with human rights, cooperation and humanitarian intervention’ (Buonfino, 2004, p. 25). This frame highlights the notions of solidarity. Secondly, the security frame relates to the security discourse which is defined as ‘discourse of fear and proliferation of dangers with reference to the scenarios of chaos, disorder, and clash of civilizations’ (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 22). This frame portrays migration as a threat to society. These two approaches are on average associated with the left-right divide, as the securitization discourse is often adopted by right-wing actors and the humanitarian discourse is often adopted by left-wing actors. However, the division is not clear-cut and depends on the domestic circumstances of the country under focus.

Thirdly, the rationalizing frame identifies what the problem is and how it should be addressed. This relates to Foucault’s notion of governmentality combining the terms government and rationality. Herein, government refers to a form of power, specifically the form of leading, and rationality refers to a form of thinking that aims to be systematic and clear about how things are or ought to be (Foucault, 1991, pp. 102-103). Furthermore, this notion relates to Mair’s concepts of responsiveness and responsibility. The government has the responsibility to fulfill its humanitarian duty regarding refugees and at the same time the duty to protect its citizens to which it has to be responsive (Mair, 2009, p. 14). Therefore, the rationalizing frame reconciles solidarity with public order, in other words, the reconciliation of the moralizing and security frame.

Accordingly, since my thesis focuses on parliaments, the question is in what way parliaments are involved in discursive struggles. The parliamentary discourse is audience-oriented as it is enacted by members of parliament, but also involves members of the electorate, society, and the media (Ilie, 2015, p. 13). This assumes that if the media discourse on migration is reflected in society and becomes dominant, then the government has to consider this discourse on migration (Buonfino, 2004, p. 31). Thereafter, the discourse on

migration is going to be addressed by the parliament, which represents the interests of society and controls whether the government functions properly. Therefore, it is assumed that discourses in society are part of the parliamentary discourse.

3.2 Discourse in Times of Crisis

Since discourses are part of all domains of social life, they can be influenced by external events such as crises. Crises are perceived as disruptive events, which are conflicting in nature and can therefore potentially transform media coverage (Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017, p. 1752). Frame variation, then, is related to the salience of an issue, as increased attention from the media allows for the use of multiple frames (Muschert and Carr, 2006, p. 748). Salience means that an issue becomes more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences (Entman, 1993, p. 53). Issue salience can be linked to the five stages of the 'issue-attention cycle': 1) the pre-problem stage; 2) alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm; 3) realizing the cost of significant progress; 4) gradual decline of intense public interest; and 5) the post-problem stage (Downs, 1972, pp. 39-41). This model illustrates the process in which a domestic issue is discovered by the media, gains prominence by the public, and eventually fades away from public attention.

Furthermore, the geography of crises is related to discourse. In this respect, the European member states can be categorized into three groups: i) first arrival countries such as Greece, Spain, and Italy; ii) transit countries such as Slovenia, Croatia, and Hungary; and iii) final destination countries such as Austria, Germany, and Sweden (Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak, 2018, p. 8). Accordingly, first arrival countries are characterized as directly affected by refugee inflows, while transit and final destination countries are characterized as indirectly affected. Generally, countries directly affected by refugee inflows focused on the humanitarian discourse, while countries indirectly affected focused on the securitization discourse.

Moreover, how the length of the crisis affects the discourse on migration has to be addressed. This is a defining element as the emergence of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis received great attention. However, the longer the crisis lasted, the more the attention eventually faded away. Hereby, the work of Triandafyllidou (2018) is considered, wherein the refugee emergency is described through five major events of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis. The author suggests that there is a common storyline of events that is relevant in all countries, but the selection of what is the turning point depends on the geographical location and political relevance of a certain event for each country, which ultimately affects the discourse on migration (Triandafyllidou, 2018).

Correspondingly, in my analysis the period that is being analyzed is divided into three stages: i) August 2015 until October 2015; ii) November 2015 until January 2016; and iii) February 2016 until April 2016, which relates back to the five stages of the ‘issue-attention cycle’. Following the work of Triandafyllidou (2018), I select three of the events and add another three to ensure the temporal spread of the period: 1) the death of the boy Aylan Kurdi in the crossing from Turkey to Greece on September 2, 2015; 2) the closure of the Hungarian-Serbian border on September 15, 2015; 3) the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015; 4) the incidents of sexual harassment on New Year’s Eve in Cologne; 5) the closure of the Balkan route on February 18, 2016; and 6) the agreement of the EU-Turkey deal on March 18, 2016 (Triandafyllidou, 2018, pp. 208-209; Rheindorf and Wodak, 2018, pp. 19-20). Subsequently, two major events occurred in each stage to identify in what way these affected the presence of the discourse during the 2015-2016 refugee crisis.

3.3 Summary and Hypothesis

In conclusion, various theoretical approaches need to be combined to answer my research question. Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory examines the dominance between discourses and how they relate to each other. Following this theory, Fairclough’s critical

discourse analysis narrows down my thesis to the ‘order of discourse’ that belongs to the field of migration. Discourses involve framing and the interpretation of frames that are present in society. These become part of the parliamentary discourse, as parliaments represent and articulate the interests of society. Lastly, the occurrence of crises influences discourses on migration, wherein geographical variations and time differences have to be considered. From this perspective, my thesis takes on a constructivist ontological approach in which discourse is analyzed in a positivist logic. In short, building on these approaches, the following hypothesis is advanced:

H The longer a refugee crisis lasts, the more parliamentary debates become dominated by a rationalizing frame, regardless of how affected countries are by refugee inflows.

If the hypothesis is not confirmed, then, it is important to discuss alternative explanations. In this regard, an alternative explanation could be that frames remain constant during the refugee crisis. In this context, one cannot underestimate the ability of political parties to adapt to crises. Accordingly, it has been noted that ‘parties are strategic actors, surveying the political landscape, evaluating threats, and responding in such a way as to resolve them’ (Dalton, Farrell and Mcallister, 2011, p. 231). This indicates that political parties can remain stable on the left-right dimension during crises, as they can adapt to various challenges. As discussed in section 2, it is expected that left-wing parties adopt the moralizing frame, while right-wing parties adopt the security frame. The next section outlines the elements in the research design.

4. Research Design

4.1 Case Selection

The thesis has two case selection moments, including the choice of 1) countries; and 2) events.

For the first, the universe of cases is composed of the countries directly and indirectly affected by refugee inflows. A small-N case study is conducted using the comparative method, specifically the most-different systems design (MDS). The MDS compares two cases with common outcomes (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 111). The two cases are different in every relevant respect, but are the same in one independent variable and the dependent variable. If the dependent variable is the same, then this similarity may be said to be the result of the antecedent variable that has stayed the same (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 298). The cases for analysis are the Netherlands and Greece, as these are representative of countries that were affected by refugee inflows, and represent the Northern and Southern parts of the EU. The two countries differ on three dimensions, which are the control variables.

The first difference is the degree of affectedness by refugee inflows. Greece was one of the arrival countries in the Mediterranean and 861,630 refugees arrived in 2015 (UNHCR, 2022). The Netherlands was dealing with asylum applications, as refugees arrived in Southern European countries and crossed Europe to reach Northern European countries. As explained in section 3.2, arrival countries are characterized as directly affected by refugee inflows, while transit and final destination countries are characterized as indirectly affected. Thus, Greece was directly affected by refugee inflows, while the Netherlands was indirectly affected.

The second difference is the government in power. The Greek government consisted of the left-wing Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) which had 145 seats, and the national-conservative Independent Greeks (ANEL) which had 10 seats (Hellenic Parliament,

2015). The Dutch government consisted of the liberal-conservative People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) which had 41 seats, and the social-democratic Labour Party (PvdA) which had 38 seats (Parlement, n.d.). The VVD was the senior coalition partner and its restrictive immigration policy became evident in the coalition agreement (Regeerakkoord, 2012, p. 29). Despite the nuances, it can be said that Greece had a left-wing government, while the Netherlands had a right-wing government.

The third difference is the wealth of the countries, measured in income per capita. The GDP per capita in 2015 and 2016 in Greece was \$18,076.6 - \$17,911.8, while in the Netherlands it was \$45,175.2 - \$46,007.9 (The World Bank, 2020). This relates to the ability of a country to absorb refugee inflows. Furthermore, Greece had budgetary deficits and austerity measures were imposed on the country during the Euro crisis (Monastiriotis, 2013, p. 5). The Netherlands was to a lesser extent affected by the Euro crisis, indicating that the country was able to absorb new arrivals to a greater degree than Greece.

Next, the two countries are similar in two dimensions. Firstly, the evolution of the crisis in time, which is the independent variable. Secondly, the predominance of rationalizing frames over moralizing and security frames, which is the dependent variable. Based on the literature on the three frames discussed in section 3.1, the moralizing and security frames competed to achieve hegemony at the beginning of the refugee crisis, and these became obscured by the rationalizing frame the longer the refugee crisis lasted. This suggests that the rationalizing frame dominated parliamentary debates, regardless of the affectedness by refugee inflows or the government in power.

The values of the five variables are displayed in Table 1 below, to depict the similarities and differences in one glance. On a final note, the limitation of a small-N case study is that it is hard to generalize, as the analysis of each country depends on domestic


circumstances. On the contrary, the advantage of a small-N case study is that the two countries can be analyzed in-depth.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Degree of affectedness by refugee inflows</i>	<i>Government in power</i>	<i>Income per capita</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Frame</i>
Greece	Directly affected	Left-wing government	\$18,076.6 - \$17,911.8 (GDP per capita)	The evolution of the refugee crisis	The predominance of rationalizing frames over moralizing and security frames
The Netherlands	Indirectly affected	Right-wing government	\$45,175.2 - \$46,007.9 (GDP per capita)	The evolution of the refugee crisis	The predominance of rationalizing frames over moralizing and security frames

Table 1. Most-different systems design.

Following the country selection, the event has to be selected. The universe of cases consists of all refugee crises in Europe after the entry into force of the Dublin Convention in 1997. This EU law determines which EU member state is responsible for examining asylum applications, whereas before that migration was strictly a national issue (European Commission, n. d.). Following the logic of an influential case design (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 297), the case for analysis is the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, specifically the period between August 2015 and April 2016. The beginning of this period corresponds with the increase of refugee arrivals in August, September, and peak in October 2015. There was an increase in the arrival of refugees during the summer and autumn of 2014, but it was not as extensive as during the same period in 2015. The decreases in March and April 2016 coincided with the negotiations around the EU-Turkey deal, which was agreed upon on March 18, 2016 and corresponds to the end of the period that is being studied (European Council, 2016). These trends are visible in Graph 1 below.

In the influential case method, cases with influential configurations of the independent variables are selected (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 297). The 2015-2016 refugee crisis is an influential case, as the crisis lasted long and contributed to framing variation comparing the beginning and end of the time period. However, the limitation of an influential case is that it is not representative of the universe of cases. On the contrary, the advantage of an influential case is that the event can account for its influence in Greece and the Netherlands, as these are the countries being studied. Having outlined the choices regarding case selection, the next subsection describes the operationalization of the variables.



Graph 1. The number of refugee arrivals per month in the Mediterranean. (UNHCR, 2022)

4.2 Operationalization

The independent and dependent variables identified are operationalized as follows.

The independent variable is the evolution of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis in time. This is operationalized in the duration of the crisis and the number of refugee arrivals in the period between August 2015 and April 2016. A refugee crisis is considered to last long when it lasts (longer than) three months and the number of refugee arrivals per month is at least 100,000. The 2015-2016 refugee crisis fulfills these criteria as during a period of five months, from August 2015 until December 2015 specifically, the number of refugee arrivals was more than 100,000. This trend is visible in Graph 1 above. Furthermore, the six major events during the three stages of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, as outlined in section 3.2, relate to the independent variable in two ways. Firstly, the events comply with the period that is being analyzed. Secondly, four of the six events occurred during the five-month period in which the number of refugee arrivals per month was more than 100,000. Thus, the 2015-2016 refugee crisis can be considered to have lasted long.

The dependent variable is the predominance of rationalizing frames over moralizing and security frames. The rationalizing frame identifies what the problem is and how it should be addressed. Moreover, this frame reconciles solidarity with public order, in other words, the reconciliation of the moralizing and security frame. The rationalizing frame is considered to be predominant when it exceeds the other two frames in absolute numbers. Having outlined the operationalization of the variables, the next subsection describes the research method.

4.3 Method of Data Analysis

The method selected for my thesis is frame analysis. Frame analysis is ‘a technique for approaching a text by attending to its diverse idea elements’ and the goal is to understand ‘how certain idea elements are linked together into packages of meaning’ (Creed, Langstraat

and Scully, 2002, p. 37). This method is suitable, as transcripts of parliamentary debates are analyzed to identify at which point in the crisis rationalizing frames are predominant over moralizing and security frames. In this regard, based on the definitions of the three frames discussed in section 3.1, a codebook is developed based on the literature and contains the subcodes for each frame.

Accordingly, the moralizing frame consists of the subcodes: 1) aid provision; 2) refugees/migrants/asylum seekers as vulnerable outsiders; 3) humanitarian duty (legal obligation); 4) moral duty; and 5) solidarity. The security frame consists of the subcodes: 1) national safety; 2) refugees/migrants/asylum seekers as dangerous outsiders; 3) national border; 4) threat; 5) fear; and 6) demands of national citizens. The rationalizing frame consists of the subcodes: 1) practical solutions; 2) rationality; 3) problem-solving; 4) responsibility; and 5) responsiveness. The codebook is displayed in Appendix 1 and contains examples for each subcode of how these were used to analyze the transcripts. Having outlined the research method, the final subsection describes the data collection.

4.4 Data Collection

Data sources consist of transcripts of Greek and Dutch parliamentary debates from August 2015 until April 2016. More specifically, the transcripts of plenary sessions are analyzed and an overview of the documents is depicted in Appendix 2. These transcripts are suitable as the debates have open access for political actors, the media, and the public. Moreover, politicians participating in the debates fulfill their representative and controlling functions. Despite the fact that most of the time, only one spokesperson per party actively participates in the debate, the politician still brings forward the beliefs of the party and reveals the way in which meaning is constructed.

To collect the Dutch transcripts, the websites ‘Tweede Kamer’ and ‘Officiële Bekendmakingen’ were used (Tweede Kamer, n.d.; Overheid, n.d.). This website provides the

parliamentary debates of the House of Representatives and these are collected in the period between August 2015 and April 2016. The total number of debates identified is eighty-nine. However, not all debates are relevant to the topic of migration. Upon closer investigation, eighteen debates are selected across the three stages of the refugee crisis, as explained in section 3.2.

To collect the Greek transcripts, the website ‘Βουλή των Ελλήνων’ was used (Hellenic Parliament, n.d.). This website provides the parliamentary debates of the House of Representatives and these are collected in the period between August 2015 and April 2016. The debates are collected under the topic ‘migration’ and the number of parliamentary debates is fifty-two. Upon closer investigation, not all debates are relevant, because the main subject was not related to the refugee crisis. After discarding the irrelevant documents, there are still eighteen debates remaining, which are distributed across the three stages of the refugee crisis, as explained in section 3.2.

The parliamentary debates for the two countries are collected and selected in a similar way to end up with comparable material. Specifically, the number of parliamentary debates for each country is in line with the three stages of the refugee crisis. Ultimately, the same number of total documents were analyzed. On a final note, the software ‘Atlas.ti’ was used to analyze the data (Atlas.ti, n.d.). The tool assists to code all the documents more efficiently and systematically. Having outlined the elements in the research design, the next section presents the findings.


5. Findings

This section discusses the empirical analysis in three parts: 1) the Dutch parliament; 2) the Greek parliament; and 3) the comparative analysis. These parts describe the predominance of the frames in the three time periods and are followed by substantive illustrations. The graphs


below depict the distribution of political parties on the left-right dimension, as well as their position in government or opposition.

5.1 The Netherlands

In the Dutch parliament, the trend in the three time periods is that no particular frame dominated, indicating that political parties remain stable on the left-right dimension. The six events were mentioned more frequently as the time periods passed and most often by the government parties, VVD and PvdA, and the opposition party PVV. These trends are illustrated in Graphs 2 and 3 below, and a list with more information on the political parties is depicted in Appendix 3.



Graph 2. Types of frames used by members of the Dutch parliament from August 2015 until April 2016. Political parties are ordered from extreme left to extreme right. The parties in government have slightly darker nuances, which are contrasted by lighter nuances of opposition parties. The black line shows how many times an event was mentioned by the parties.



Graph 3. The number of subcodes of the three frames used by members of the Dutch parliament from August 2015 until April 2016. Subcodes in the first time period have the lightest colour and the darkest colour in the third time period.

In the first time period, the rationalizing frame was predominant and it was mostly adopted by the government parties, VVD and PvdA. This might be the case because of the geographical location. The Netherlands was characterized as a destination country, which could mean that the Netherlands was able to deal with the refugee crisis in a rational manner. This is confirmed by the subcodes, as ‘practical solutions’ and ‘rationality’ were frequently used. For example, the government party VVD adopted the rationalizing frame:

“We are just trying to solve a problem in a practical way.” (Handeling Europese Top van 15-16 Oktober 2015, 2015, p. 33).

Furthermore, there is a discrepancy between the predominant frame and the types of frames used by political parties on the left-right dimension. Although, the rationalizing frame

was the most frequent, there is still a difference between the parties. The left-wing parties adopted the moralizing frame and the right-wing parties adopted the security frame, especially the opposition party PVV. This is in line with the literature discussed in section 2. Regarding the dynamics between government and opposition, the opposition parties adopted the two frames on the left-right dimension, while the government parties adopted the rationalizing frame. This discrepancy probably occurred, because the government parties were in charge and wanted to solve the refugee crisis.

Moving on to the second time period, the security frame was predominant and it was mostly adopted by the VVD and PVV. This is probably because of the two events, the Paris attacks and Cologne incidents, which generated feelings of fear and insecurity. This is confirmed by the subcodes, as ‘national border’ and ‘national safety’ were frequently used. The opposition party PVV adopted the security frame in a strong way:

“As far as the PVV is concerned, the only correct solution to the problem is: to close the borders.” (Handeling EU-Turkije Top op 29 November 2015, 2015, p. 3).

Similarly to the first time period, the left-wing parties adopted the moralizing frame and the right-wing parties adopted the security frame. This is in line with the literature discussed in section 2. Regarding the dynamics between government and opposition, there is no discrepancy, as the political parties adopted the two frames on the left-right dimension.

Finally, in the third time period, the total numbers of the frames are very similar. The moralizing frame was mostly adopted by the PvdA, the security frame by the PVV, and the rationalizing frame by the VVD. The refugee crisis was ending and political parties adopted the two frames on the left-right dimension. This is confirmed by the subcodes, as ‘moral


duty’, ‘national border’, and ‘rationality’ were frequently used. For example, the government party PvdA adopted the moralizing frame:

“We have to protect those refugees, but it also has to be manageable.” (Handeling Europese Top van 18-19 Februari 2016, 2016, p. 17).


During this time period, most events were mentioned. This indicates that there is a reflection of previous events and that parties are looking for lessons to learn from the past, which might provide guidance for the future. Furthermore, similarly to the first two time periods, the left-wing parties adopted the moralizing frame and the right-wing parties adopted the security frame. This is in line with the literature discussed in section 2. Regarding the dynamics between government and opposition, there is no discrepancy, as the political parties adopted the two frames on the left-right dimension. Having outlined the trends in the Dutch parliament, the next subsection describes the trends in the Greek parliament.

5.2 Greece

In the Greek parliament, the trend in the three periods is that no particular frame dominated, indicating that political parties remain stable on the left-right dimension. The six events were mentioned more frequently as the time periods passed and most often by the government parties, Syriza and ANEL, and the opposition party ND. These trends are illustrated in Graphs 4 and 5 below, and a list with more information on the political parties is depicted in Appendix 3.



Graph 4. Types of frames used by members of the Greek parliament from August 2015 until April 2016. Political parties are ordered from extreme left to extreme right. The parties in government have slightly darker nuances, which are contrasted by lighter nuances of opposition parties. The black line shows how many times an event was mentioned by the parties.



Graph 5. The number of subcodes of the three frames used by members of the Greek parliament from August 2015 until April 2016. Subcodes in the first time period have the lightest colour and the darkest colour in the third time period.

In the first time period, the moralizing and security frames were both predominant and they were mostly adopted by Syriza and XA, respectively. This might be the case because of the geographical location. In contrast to the Netherlands, Greece was characterized as an arrival country, which was probably overwhelmed by the refugee inflows and was divided between the two frames. This is confirmed by the subcodes, as ‘moral duty’, ‘solidarity’, ‘national safety’, and ‘dangerous outsiders’ were frequently used. For example, the government party Syriza adopted the moralizing frame:

“The translation of our own core values of human rights into policies for the reception and accommodation of refugees has transformed Greece ...” (Πρακτικά Βουλής Συνεδρίαση Ε’, 2015, p. 79).

Furthermore, the predominance of the frames is in line with the literature discussed in section 2. The right-wing parties adopted the security frame and the left-wing parties adopted the moralizing frame, especially the government party Syriza. Regarding the dynamics between government and opposition, there is no discrepancy, as the political parties adopted the two frames on the left-right dimension.

Moving on to the second time period, the security frame was predominant and it was mostly adopted by ND and XA. Along the lines of the Dutch parliament, this is probably because of the two events, the Paris attacks and Cologne incidents, which generated feelings of fear and insecurity. This is confirmed by the subcodes, as ‘national safety’ and ‘dangerous outsiders’ were frequently used. For example, the opposition party ND adopted the security frame:

“... the cataclysmic event of the terrorist attacks in Paris has unfortunately transformed the migration issue from a humanitarian and economic issue to a security issue for Europe.” (Πρακτικά Βουλής Συνεδρίαση ΜΔ’, 2015, p. 3535).

Moreover, there is a discrepancy between the predominant frame and the types of frames used by political parties on the left-right dimension. Although, the security frame was the most frequent, there is still a difference between the parties. Similarly to the first time period, the right-wing parties adopted the security frame and the left-wing parties adopted the moralizing frame, especially the government party Syriza. This is in line with the literature discussed in section 2. Regarding the dynamics between government and opposition, there is no discrepancy, as the political parties adopted the two frames on the left-right dimension.

Finally, in the third time period, the rationalizing frame was predominant and it was mostly adopted by Syriza and ND. The refugee crisis was ending and Greece was able to deal with the crisis in a rational manner. This is confirmed by the subcodes, as ‘rationality’ and ‘problem-solving’ were frequently used. For example, the opposition party ND adopted the rationalizing frame:

“This is shown by the great refugee crisis. If you do not understand that in order to exercise power in these critical times, what is needed is realism ...” (Πρακτικά Βουλής Συνεδρίαση ΙΙ’, 2016, p. 6351).

Along the lines of the Dutch parliament, most events were mentioned during this time period. This indicates that there is a reflection of previous events and that parties are looking for lessons to learn from the past, which might provide guidance for the future. Furthermore, similarly to the second time period, the left-wing parties adopted the moralizing frame and the

right-wing parties adopted the security frame. This is in line with the literature discussed in section 2. Regarding the dynamics between government and opposition, there is no discrepancy, as the political parties adopted the two frames on the left-right dimension.

On a final note, during the first and third time periods, the EU negotiations about the deal with Turkey were discussed in both parliaments, which correspond to the sixth event. In the second time period, both countries were probably more concerned with security issues, while in the first and third time period the countries were more focused on finding a solution for the refugee crisis. Despite this similarity, the issue was articulated in a different manner in the two parliaments. For example, the government party VVD adopted the rationalizing frame, while the government party Syriza stressed the importance of the negotiations by adopting the moralizing frame:

“The VVD has said many times that the agreements with Turkey can in themselves be a first good step when it comes to structural solutions.” (Handeling Europese Top van 17-18 December 2015, 2015, p. 4).

“... it becomes urgent because we have to implement the European Union's agreement with Turkey on 4-4 and we have to adjust our legislation so that we are ready to respond ...” (Πρακτικά Βουλής Συνεδρίαση ΠΑ', 2016, p. 7507).

Having outlined the main features between the Dutch and Greek parliaments, the next subsection proceeds with further comparative analysis.

5.3 Comparative Analysis

The comparison between the Dutch and Greek parliaments reveals certain differences and similarities. Firstly, one thing that stands out is that over all periods the frequency of

quotations increased in both countries. This was probably because the crisis was ending and the parties were better prepared on how to respond to various developments.

Secondly, the dynamics between government and opposition vary to a certain extent. In the Netherlands, the opposition is critical of the government parties, probably because the VVD and PvdA are positioned on almost every end of the political spectrum. Conversely, in Greece, the opposition is more blaming the government parties, probably due to the elections at the beginning of the refugee crisis and because Syriza and ANEL are positioned on almost every end of the political spectrum. These grand coalitions in both parliaments, generate difficulties for the opposition to believe that the government parties were able to solve the crisis.

Thirdly, all the six events were mentioned in the Dutch debates while the fourth event, the Cologne incidents, was not mentioned in the Greek debates. The geographical proximity of the Netherlands to Cologne could be the reason for the limited focus on the topic in the Greek debates. Overall, the events that were chosen were transnational and were therefore frequently mentioned during the parliamentary debates.

Finally, the Greek political parties discuss different topics regarding the refugee crisis and this could be because the country was dealing with many issues at the same time. Conversely, in the Netherlands, the debates are more organized around certain topics and this could be because of its geographical location as a destination country. This indicates that Greek parliamentary debates were more inclusive but less in-depth, while the Dutch parliamentary debates were more topic-focused and went more into detail.

Overall, the differences between the countries are related to the geographical location, the Netherlands as a destination country and Greece as an arrival country. The similarities are that no particular frame dominated in both parliaments, indicating that political parties remain

stable on the left-right dimension. This suggests that crises do not change the main discourse of political parties.

6. Discussion

Overall, the empirical analysis does not support the theoretical expectations and thereby disconfirms the hypothesis concerning the length of crises. This implies that the findings contradict the work of Triandafyllidou (2018), as the political parties in both parliaments adopted the two frames on the left-right dimension. This indicates that political parties remain constant and adapt to crises, which was noted by Dalton, Farrell, and Mcallister (2011). It could be that the severity of a certain crisis differs. One could argue that the Euro crisis was a severe crisis, as it had great consequences in the EU member states and that the 2015-2016 refugee crisis was less severe, which could indicate that EU member states were better able to deal with this crisis. This suggests that political parties remain stable on the left-right dimension during less severe crises. The findings indicate that the rationalizing frame does not dominate in parliamentary debates as time passes by, and that crises do not change the main discourse of political parties. This becomes evident from the graphs in section 5, as left-wing parties adopted the moralizing frame and right-wing parties adopted the security frame. There were some in-country variations regarding the geographical location when it comes to the predominance of a certain frame in the three time periods, but the rationalizing frame did not dominate in the parliamentary debates the longer the refugee crisis lasted.

Furthermore, in line with the central concept of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory 'discursive struggle', the analysis identifies that the three frames competed with each other to become dominant. This indicates that discourses attempt to dominate to exclude other meanings. The 'field of discursivity', then, is unlimited as it includes every meaning that is not related to the migration discourse. Accordingly, the 'order of discourse' from Fairclough's

critical discourse analysis allowed for an in-depth analysis of the migration discourse. The findings demonstrated that the three frames were constantly competing to become dominant. Despite this competition, the analysis identified that no particular frame dominated, the longer the refugee crisis lasted, indicating that political parties remain stable on the left-right dimension.

Due to the stability of political parties during the refugee crisis, the discourses in society were part of the parliamentary discourse since politicians referred to certain issues in society, such as moral duties and security concerns. This indicates that parliaments fulfilled their representative function, as discussed by Von Beyme (2000), during the refugee crisis. Furthermore, the parliaments did also fulfill their controlling function, as opposition parties in both countries were critical and wanted to ensure that the best decisions were taken to solve the refugee crisis. Thus, although the hypothesis is refuted, the analysis suggests that the parliaments in the Netherlands and Greece fulfilled their functions during the 2015-2016 refugee crisis.

7. Conclusion

My thesis asked how the 2015-2016 refugee crisis impacted the political discourse in Dutch and Greek parliamentary debates. The identified research problem was that since the refugee crisis impacted the discourse on migration in society, it also impacted the discourse in parliamentary debates. However, understanding the way in which it happened was missing. The empirical analysis demonstrates that the parliamentary discourse was not impacted by the refugee crisis, which is contrary to the expectations. It was expected that the length of crises, in conjunction with the geographical location of countries, would impact political discourse. Conversely, the findings contradict the work of Triandafyllidou (2018) and do not support the hypothesis. It becomes evident that no particular frame dominates the parliamentary discourse

during a crisis and that political parties remain stable on the left-right dimension. This indicates that crises do not change the main discourse of political parties. As noted by Dalton, Farrell, and Mcallister (2011), parties have the ability to adapt to crises and thereby remain constant. Furthermore, parliaments represent the interests of society and control whether the government functions properly, as discussed by Von Beyme (2000). This implies that parliaments fulfill their representative and controlling functions during crises. Overall, the main discourse of political parties does not change during crises, specifically the 2015-2016 refugee crisis.

However, the thesis has some limitations. Firstly, the analysis focused on a short time period of nine months. Although, this period covers the peak of the refugee crisis, it is not known how political parties acted before the time period and if the consequences of the crisis had any impact in the parliamentary debates after the time period. Future research could analyze the parliamentary discourse before and after the selected time period to provide stronger support for the outcomes of the empirical analysis. Secondly, the analysis focused on one arrival and one destination country, Greece and the Netherlands respectively. Although, the empirical analysis revealed similar outcomes for both countries and that only transnational issues were covered, certain national issues could have impacted the discourse in other EU member states. Future research could analyze the parliamentary discourse in other arrival and destination countries to provide stronger support for the outcomes of the empirical analysis.

Despite these limitations, the analysis offers important insights. Although, the findings contradict the work of Triandafyllidou (2018) and do not support the hypothesis, the work of Dalton, Farrell, and Mcallister (2011) is confirmed. Thus, against the expectations from the literature on the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, the thesis demonstrates that the refugee crisis did not impact the political discourse in EU member states. Instead, no particular frame

dominated the parliamentary debates, indicating that political parties remained stable on the left-right dimension.

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	<p>Humanitarian duty (legal obligation);</p> <p>Moral duty;</p> <p>Solidarity.</p>	<p><u>D66</u>: “My party is concerned about the reports that Turkey is refusing Syrian refugees at the border. The fundamental right to seek asylum is being violated by this.” (Handeling EU-Turkije Top op 29 November 2015, 2015, p. 1).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● D66 is a left-wing and social-liberal political party in the Netherlands (Parties and Elections in the Netherlands, 2021). ● Subcode: humanitarian duty (legal obligation). <p><u>PvdA</u>: “We have to protect those refugees, but it also has to be manageable.” (Handeling Europese Top van 18-19 Februari 2016, 2016, p. 17).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PvdA is a left-wing and social-democratic political party in the Netherlands (Parties and Elections in the Netherlands, 2021). ● Subcode: moral duty. <p><u>GL</u>: “It is tragic, but it is precisely in these moments of sorrow that the strength of our solidarity becomes apparent.” (Handeling Aanslagen in Brussel, 2016, p. 14).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● GL is a left-wing and green political party in the Netherlands (Parties and Elections in the Netherlands, 2021). ● Subcode: solidarity.
Security Frame	National safety;	<p><u>ND</u>: “In the meantime, of course, the cataclysmic event of the terrorist attacks in Paris has unfortunately transformed the migration issue from a humanitarian and economic issue to a security issue for Europe.” (Πρακτικά Βουλής Συνεδρίαση ΜΔ’, 2015, p. 3535).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● ND is a right-wing liberal-conservative political party in Greece (Parties and Elections in Greece,

	<p>Refugees/migrants/ asylum seekers as dangerous outsiders;</p> <p>National border;</p> <p>Threat;</p> <p>Fear;</p>	<p>2019).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Subcode: national safety. <p><u>XA</u>: “All the resources of Greece will be allocated to the foreign factor and on the other hand, at a time when the country's human resources are migrating abroad, tens of thousands of illegal immigrants enter Greece every day.” (Πρακτικά Βουλής Συνεδρίαση Ε’, 2015, p. 80).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● XA is a right-wing and nationalistic political party in Greece (Parties and Elections in Greece, 2019). ● Subcode: migrants as outsiders. <p><u>PVV</u>: “As far as the PVV is concerned, the only correct solution to the problem is: to close the borders.” (Handeling EU-Turkije Top op 29 November 2015, 2015, p. 3).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PVV is a right-wing and national-liberal political party in the Netherlands (Parties and Elections in the Netherlands, 2021). ● Subcode: national border. <p><u>SGP</u>: “This merciless terror against innocent civilians makes one thing clear: today Paris, tomorrow Berlin, the day after tomorrow our country may also be a target. In the Netherlands too, we must therefore be extremely alert. The threat level is not substantial for nothing.” (Handeling Aanslagen in Parijs, 2015, p. 12).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SGP is a right-wing and Christian political party in the Netherlands (Parties and Elections in the Netherlands, 2021). ● Subcode: threat. <p><u>SP</u>: “These attacks make people anxious, because terror is getting closer and closer. And people expect a response from</p>
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	<p>Demands of national citizens.</p>	<p>politicians: that we do everything possible to ensure our safety.” (Handeling Aanslagen in Parijs, 2015, p. 15).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SP is a left-wing and social-democratic political party in the Netherlands (Parties and Elections in the Netherlands, 2021). • Subcode: fear. <p><u>XA</u>: “There is a government that wants to make Greece a ghetto for illegal immigrants. There is a government that wants to make the Greek a minority in this country. This outrage will not pass. Golden Dawn will see to that, because Golden Dawn today is the only voice that speaks loudly what every citizen wants to say.” (Πρακτικά Βουλής Συνεδρίαση ΜΔ’, 2015, p. 3544).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • XA is a right-wing and nationalistic political party in Greece (Parties and Elections in Greece, 2019). • Subcode: demands of national citizens.
<p>Rationalizing Frame</p>	<p>Practical solutions;</p> <p>Rationality;</p>	<p><u>VVD</u>: “We are just trying to solve a problem in a practical way.” (Handeling Europese Top van 15-16 Oktober 2015, 2015, p. 33).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VVD is a right-wing and liberal-conservative political party in the Netherlands (Parties and Elections in the Netherlands, 2021). • Subcode: practical solutions. <p><u>ND</u>: “This is shown by the great refugee crisis. If you do not understand that in order to exercise power in these critical times, what is needed is realism ...” (Πρακτικά Βουλής Συνεδρίαση ΙΙ’, 2016, p. 6351).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ND is a right-wing and liberal-conservative political party in Greece (Parties and Elections in Greece, 2019).

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| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subcode: responsiveness. |
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9.2 Appendix 2: List of Transcripts

The second appendix includes a list of the transcripts for the Dutch and Greek parliament in chronological order and contains a separate table for each stage of the period that is being analyzed.

9.2.1 The Dutch Parliament

Stage 1: August 2015 until October 2015

1. Handeling: Gemeenschappelijk Asielbeleid in Europa (2015) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20142015-111-4.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
2. Handeling: Gemeenschappelijk Asielbeleid in Europa (2015) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20142015-111-7.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
3. Handeling: Gemeenschappelijk Asielbeleid (2015) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-5-3.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
4. Handeling: Europese Top van 15-16 Oktober 2015 (2015) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-14-2.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
5. Handeling: Europese Top van 15-16 Oktober 2015 (2015) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-14-5.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

Stage 2: November 2015 until January 2016

6. Handeling: Europese Top, JBZ-Raad en Migratietop (2015) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-21-9.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
7. Handeling: Aanslagen in Parijs (2015) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-27-3.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
8. Handeling: EU-Turkije Top op 29 November 2015 (2015) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-29-8.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
9. Handeling: Europese Top van 17-18 December 2015 (2015) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-37-35.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
10. Handeling: Terugkerende Syriëgangers en Infiltratie door ISIS in de Vluchtelingenketen (2016) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-47-9.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

Stage 3: February 2016 until April 2016

11. Handeling: Instroom van Asielzoekers (2016) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-54-12.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
12. Handeling: Europese Top van 18-19 Februari 2016 (2016) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at:

<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-56-5.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

13. Handeling: Europese Top van 18-19 Februari 2016 (2016) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-56-8.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

14. Handeling: Europese Top (2016) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-64-31.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

15. Handeling: Aanslagen in Brussel (2016) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-70-28.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

16. Handeling: Aanslagen in Brussel (2016) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-74-2.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

17. Handeling: Aanslagen in Brussel (2016) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-74-7.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

18. Handeling: Uitkomsten Europese Top van 17 en 18 Maart (2016) *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Online]. Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-76-6.html> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

9.2.2 The Greek Parliament

Stage 1: August 2015 until October 2015

1. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση Ε' (2015) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at:

<https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20151006.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

2. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση ΣΤ' (2015) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20151007.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
3. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση Η' (2015) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20151016.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

Stage 2: November 2015 until January 2016

4. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση ΛΗ' (2015) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20151203.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
5. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση ΛΘ' (2015) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20151204.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
6. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση Μ' (2015) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20151205.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
7. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση ΜΔ' (2015) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20151211.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
8. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση Ξ' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at:

<https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160121.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

9. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση ΞΑ' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160122.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
10. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση ΞΖ' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160129.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

Stage 3: February 2016 until April 2016

11. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση ΟΓ' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160212.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
12. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση ΟΣΤ' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160219.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
13. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση Π' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160224.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
14. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση ΠΔ' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160303.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).
15. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση]Δ' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at:

<https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160321.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

16. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση]Ε' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at:

<https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160322.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

17. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση PA' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at:

<https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160401.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

18. Πρακτικά Βουλής: Συνεδρίαση PI' (2016) *Προεδρική Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία* [Online]. Available at:

<https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160418.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

9.3 Appendix 3: List of Political Parties

The third appendix includes a list of political parties for the Dutch and Greek parliament. It also contains the ideology of the parties (Parties and Elections in Greece, 2019; Parties and Elections in the Netherlands, 2021), their political position, and their position in parliament. Their political position is based on their position on migration. The political parties are ordered from extreme left to extreme right.

9.3.1 The Dutch Parliament

<i>Name</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Political position</i>	<i>Position in parliament</i>
SP (Socialistische Partij; Socialist Party)	Democratic socialism	Left-wing	Opposition

PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid; Labour Party)	Social democracy	Left-wing	Government
PvdD (Partij voor de Dieren; Party for the Animals)	Animal welfare, environmentalism	Left-wing	Opposition
GL (Groen Links; Green Left)	Green politics	Left-wing	Opposition
CU Christen Unie; Christian Union)	Christian democracy	Left-wing	Opposition
D66 (Democraten 66; Democrats 66)	Social liberalism	Left-wing	Opposition
VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)	Conservative liberalism	Right-wing	Government
50PLUS (50 Plus; 50 Plus)	Pensioners' interests	Right-wing	Opposition
SGP (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij; Reformed Political Party)	Christian right	Right-wing	Opposition
CDA (Christen Democratisch Appèl; Christian Democratic Appeal)	Christian democracy	Right-wing	Opposition
PVV (Partij voor de	National liberalism	Right-wing	Opposition

Vrijheid; Party for Freedom)			
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9.3.2 The Greek Parliament

<i>Name</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Political position</i>	<i>Position in the parliament</i>
KKE (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas; Communist Party of Greece)	Communism	Left-wing	Opposition
SYRIZA (Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras; Coalition of the Radical Left)	Democratic socialism	Left-wing	Government
TO POTAMI (To Potami; The River)	Social liberalism	Left-wing	Opposition
PASOK (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima; Panhellenic Socialist Movement)	Social democracy	Left-wing	Opposition
ND (Nea Dimokratia; New Democracy)	Liberal conservatism, Christian democracy	Right-wing	Opposition
ANEL (Anexartitoi Ellines; Independent Greeks)	National conservatism	Right-wing	Government

XA (Chrysi Avyi; Golden Dawn)	Nationalism	Right-wing	Opposition
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9.4 Appendix 4: Bibliography

The fourth appendix includes the bibliography of the appendices.

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Available at: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20152016-27-3.html>

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Handeling: Europese Top van 15-16 Oktober 2015 (2015) *Tweede Kamer der*

Staten-Generaal [Online]. Available at:

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Staten-Generaal [Online]. Available at:

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Available at:

<https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20160224.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2022).

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