



Universiteit  
Leiden  
The Netherlands

## **Responsibility to Protect as Epistemic/Expert Authority: a discursive analysis through Global Knowledge Networks**

Veen, David Clemente van der

### **Citation**

Veen, D. C. van der. (2022). *Responsibility to Protect as Epistemic/Expert Authority: a discursive analysis through Global Knowledge Networks*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master thesis in the Leiden University Student Repository](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3421227>

**Note:** To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Name: David Clemente van der Veen

Student number: s1812823

Supervisor: Dr. Rutger Hagen

Second reader: Dr. Nicolas Blarel

Assignment: Final thesis

Master of International Organisation

Submission date: 12/06/2022

Word count: 10,078 (including bibliography; excluding tables and figures)

Title:

**Responsibility to Protect as Epistemic/Expert Authority: a  
discursive analysis through Global Knowledge Networks**



Universiteit  
Leiden



Photo front page: Max Bell School of Public Policy. Retrieved from: <https://maxpolicy.substack.com/p/half-a-decade-later-rohingya-refugees?s=r>

### **Abstract:**

R2P (Responsibility to Protect) is an international norm set up by the international community to set out against mass genocide prevention. It is socially relevant given the Rohingya migration crises calling out R2P to be invoked. However recent media and academic debates have cast doubts on R2P's application. Regardless of these doubts, R2P advocacy has grown globally with more international research partners and their own research journal. This brings forth the question: how does the organization of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) reflect epistemic/expert authority? This is an explorative thesis that makes use of a single case study of R2P employing qualitative research methods. Academic debate shows R2P as either an extension of unilateral humanitarian intervention or a replacement for it. Proponents argue it as a replacement due to its increasing popularity through its authority. This thesis adds to the authority argument with the use of Global Knowledge Networks which explains whether knowledge production of an organization has expert-legitimacy. Using the transnational discourse community and coalition approach it is shown that R2P's knowledge production has *independent force* and *power* among experts, and *simplification* and *impact* towards nonexpert. This gives R2P's knowledge production expert-legitimacy and therefore establishes R2P's epistemic/expert authority.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor for the clear and supportive guidance throughout the thesis. I also would like to thank my good friends Rona and Sytske, and my mother Elis for their support throughout the duration of the project. Last, I would also like to dedicate this thesis to my father, Arnold, who inspired me to pursue my passion for politics and society. The completion of this project would not have been possible without any of you.

# **Table of content**

Acknowledgements .....	iii
<b>1. Introduction</b> .....	4
<b>2. Literature Review</b> .....	6
2.1 <i>Responsibility to protect</i> .....	6
2.2 <i>Authority</i> .....	8
<b>3. Theoretical framework</b> .....	10
3.1 <i>Epistemic/expert authority</i> .....	10
3.2 <i>Global Knowledge Networks</i> .....	11
3.2.1 <i>Approaches</i> .....	11
3.3 <i>Transnational discourse community and coalitions approach</i> .....	13
3.3.1 <i>Transnational discourse community</i> .....	14
3.3.2 <i>Discourse coalition theory</i> .....	15
3.4 <i>R2P as an actor</i> .....	17
<b>4. Methodology</b> .....	18
4.1 <i>Case selection</i> .....	18
4.2 <i>Operationalization: discourse analysis</i> .....	18
4.2.1 <i>Transnational qualities</i> .....	18
4.2.2 <i>Boundary-drawing</i> .....	20
4.2.3 <i>Storyline building</i> .....	20
4.2.4 <i>Discursive struggle</i> .....	22
4.3 <i>Data collection</i> .....	23
<b>5. Analysis</b> .....	24
5.1 <i>Independent force of knowledge</i> .....	24
5.2 <i>Power of knowledge</i> .....	25
5.3 <i>Simplification of knowledge</i> .....	28
5.4 <i>Impact of knowledge</i> .....	31
<b>6. Discussion</b> .....	35
<b>7. Conclusion</b> .....	38
<b>8. Bibliography</b> .....	40
<b>9. Appendices</b> .....	46
Appendix A - Transnational quality indicators.....	46
Appendix B - Discourse community indicators.....	46
Appendix C – Discourse coalition indicators .....	48

Appendix D - Summary of research .....	49
Appendix E1 – Transnational practices analysis .....	50
Appendix E2 – Transnational organization analysis.....	52
Appendix F1 – Discourse community: Main themes.....	53
Appendix F2 – Discourse community: Analysis .....	53
Appendix G – Discourse coalition: Utilization of knowledge Data Analysis.....	92
Appendix H – Primary source list.....	98

### **List of abbreviations**

APPAP.....	Asia Pacific Partnership for Atrocity Prevention
EDA.....	Epistemic Discourse Analysis
GAMAAC.....	Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes
GKN.....	Global Knowledge Network
HI .....	Humanitarian Intervention
ICISS report.....	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report
R2P.....	Responsibility to Protect
LDPD.....	Levels, detail and precision of description

## 1. Introduction

*“The refugee issue is not only their problem; it is our problem. When I say ‘we,’ it could be taken as a limited meaning, but it is a problem (for all) of humanity and we belong to it”* ~ Jung Woo-sung, a Goodwill Ambassador for the UN Refugee Agency (Hyun-Ju, 2019).

*“There is an urgency for collective action”* ~ Christine Schraner Burgener, UN Special Envoy for Myanmar (Besheer, 2021)

By the end of 2021 more than 890,000 persons, of which 460,000 are children, were forced to flee their homes from Myanmar to Bangladesh (UNICEF, n.d.). This represents an unprecedented human security collective action dilemma whereby international figures and Goodwill Ambassadors from across the globe bring attention and call out action to the issue. One international collective action known as R2P (Responsibility to Protect) has been called upon to be invoked within Myanmar to put an end to the exile and genocide of the Rohingya minority (Evans & Wilson, 2022). However, R2P has been criticized, debated, and doubted by the media and academia due to its vagueness and inconsistent implementation. Its vagueness stems from its unclear prescription and step-by-step guideline for when and how states can react to human rights violations. Because of its vague interpretation, R2P is applied by some states in some cases and in other cases it is not. This is dependent on each state’s own interpretation of when R2P is relevant enough to be applied (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011; Brosig, 2012; Sukma, 2012; Esslemont, 2016; Renshaw, 2021; Auto, 2021).

Regardless of R2P’s vagueness and inconsistent application, it remains relevant. As recent as 2021, a resolution to include R2P on the annual agenda in the UN General Assembly passed with 115 states voting in favor of it while only 28 abstained and 15 voted against it. The resolution passed (Alexandra, 2021). This calls to question, how can R2P continue to reveal



such support amongst the international community despite its vagueness and applicatory inconsistencies. R2P as an international organization continues to develop by committing to research in addition to advocacy, whereby they now include their own book series and research journal (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011).<sup>1</sup> They also started to expand globally working with multiple universities around the world including; the Asia Pacific Centre for R2P – University of Queensland Australia<sup>2</sup> and the European Centre for the R2P – University of Leeds<sup>3</sup>. These developments further call into question the realm of R2P within the domain of expertise and epistemic power, given the investment in research through their journal and research partnerships around the world. This leads to the research question: how does the organization of the Responsibility to Protect reflect epistemic/expert authority? This is an explorative research question, whereby the reflection of epistemic/expert authority entails unpacking the legitimacy of R2P as an organization through evaluating their knowledge and power.

Starting with the literature review, this thesis first explores the academic debate about whether R2P is an extension of HI (humanitarian intervention) or a replacement. Previous literature has shown different forms of R2P legitimacy that allow R2P to replace HI. This thesis adds to the argument of R2P as a HI replacement by exploring expert-legitimacy. This expert-legitimacy is shown through knowledge production in a GKN (Global Knowledge Network). The GKN shows how and where knowledge is produced and for whom. This is useful for understanding how expertise is built through knowledge and power. The discursive analysis involves two approaches, namely, transnational discourse community and discourse coalition theory.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Global Responsibility to Protect*. (n.d.). Brill. Retrieved May 3, 2022, from <https://brill.com/view/journals/gr2p/gr2p-overview.xml?language=en>

<sup>2</sup> *Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*. (n.d.). The University of Queensland Australia. Retrieved May 3, 2022, from <https://r2pasiapacific.org/>

<sup>3</sup> *European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (ECR2P) : A partnership between Polis Leeds and Protection Approaches*. (2022, May 16). University of Leeds. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from <https://ecr2p.leeds.ac.uk/>

Through transnational discourse community and discourse coalitions, this thesis predicts that R2P within the GKN produces knowledge that has an *independent force* and *power* amongst experts and is *simplified* and *impactful* to non-experts. These four components show expert-legitimacy which further establishes epistemic/expert authority and contributes to the argument of R2P replacing HI.

## **2. Literature Review**

### **2.1 Responsibility to protect**

R2P is a collective action norm that is set up to prevent mass genocide of populations. At its essence, it entails that if a state fails to prevent its own population from the four mass atrocity crimes; genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, then the international community must take the responsibility and step in to intervene and assist the state to achieve that responsibility (Global Centre for R2P, n.d.).

Amongst scholars, R2P remains debated between being a new collective action replacement of unilateral HI or simply an extension of unilateral HI. Unilateral HI by definition is similar to R2P whereby it is a mechanism of intervention for humanitarian purposes such as mass genocide prevention (Henderson, 2020; Hassan, 2015; Grieycz, 2010; Jemirade, 202; & O'Connell, 2010). The difference between HI with R2P is that the intervention has no collective agreement. Meaning it involves the intervention from a single state without consent from surrounding states or the state being intervened. Due to the lack of consent from other states and the intervened state itself, Evans et al. (2013) define unilateral HI as a mechanism of intervention that prioritizes the interests of intervening states, whereas R2P centers on the interests of victims of atrocities before intervening powers.

Henderson (2020), Hassan (2015), and Grieycz (2010) discuss R2P as being the replacement for unilateral HI. Henderson (2020) claims that unilateral HI, commonly implemented in the

1990s, is a mechanism for intervening based on the intervening state's own justification. This is similar to Evans' et al. (2013) definition of unilateral HI referring to the interest of the intervening power. Rather than giving single states the right to unilaterally intervene in other states based on their own justifications, R2P is meant to be a guideline for a multilateral effort of intervention which leaves intervention not as a right but as a last resort option in the cases of atrocities that are being committed, while sovereignty is a responsibility (Henderson, 2020). Hassan (2015) agrees in a similar manner explaining it as the new political security doctrine in the protection of human rights. Gierycz (2010) gives a more historical context to unilateral HI, defining it as having no fixed definition or procedure. Gierycz (2010) argues that because of the lack of definition and procedure, individual powerful states and regional organizations would fill the gap and intervene unilaterally by themselves, further causing concern among states of the Global South of a resurgence of imperial interventions (Gierycz, 2010). This, Gierycz (2010) argues, is what led to the creation of the ICISS report (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) in 2000, which is the basis of R2P, and a replacement of unilateral HI.

Critical scholars like Jemirade (2021) and O'Connell (2010) remain skeptical of R2P as the replacement for HI. Jemirade's (2021) argument shows that the ICISS and R2P are just an extension of HI found in the 1990s. They claim that although R2P is generally accepted among states in the international community as a moral and political concept, its interpretations as a legal concept remain largely the same as in HI of the 1990s. Jemirade (2021) specifically points out that the ICISS, even with its multilateral approach, remains unclear within its procedures to determine who possesses the authority to intervene in the absence of UNSC and which state can do this without violating international law with respect to state sovereignty. Furthermore, O'Connell (2010) rejects the whole principle of R2P altogether. They argue that even if R2P leaves intervention as a last resort decision, intervention in itself is a contradiction to peace.

Both R2P and unilateral HI, regardless of (un)clear procedures or the lack thereof respectively, require intervention that according to them is antithetical to building peace, and therefore R2P is not a collective action replacement for HI (O'Connell, 2010).

## 2.2 Authority

Regardless of the unclear procedures of R2P, it is still argued to have increasing popularity by having more authority. Locke and Shapiro (2003) explain legitimacy as the governance over a body of people through consent. They further assert that “nobody owns his or her authority; rather, power must be “authorized” to be legitimate” (Lock & Shapiro, 2003, p.299). Therefore, legitimacy is achieved by governance through consent. This is what creates power, and power further establishes authority. This consent is given to R2P through a procedural-legitimacy, as argued by Newman (2015). The procedural-legitimacy comes from its multilateral framework within collective action, which is a consensus decision-making procedure. This assumes that choices are made by popular will, hence providing a more structured procedure that legitimizes R2P's authority which was previously not present within unilateral HI (Newman, 2015).

The procedural-legitimacy, however, does not by itself satisfactorily explain how R2P's authority and increasing popularity alone. Newman (2015) admits that for procedural-legitimacy to afford R2P's authority by itself it still needs to be improved by addressing the critiques. In particular, how there is still a need for safeguards for smaller states to prevent bigger states from abusing R2P and the vagueness of its step-by-step guide with regards to last resort intervention and respect to state sovereignty. Aside from procedural-legitimacy there can be other venues of legitimacy that can explain R2P's authority and increasing popularity.

An interesting point Crossley (2018) raises on part of R2P's mainstreaming among international states includes its influence from epistemic communities and expert knowledge

affecting policymakers. Crossley (2018) argues that the critiques of R2P have reduced amongst states. The main critique is that it is an extension of the previous unilateral HI with countries of the global south citing it as an imperialist doctrine. Crossley (2018) only focuses on R2P advocacy's influence on the scholarly community as part of the mainstreaming of R2P. They do not further conceptualize the authority and legitimacy of the epistemic community in the way Newman (2015) argues for a particular kind of authority through procedural-legitimacy in R2P's increasing popularity. Crossley merely assumes, stating "given the influence of these [advocacy] networks in a wide range of issue areas, it can be assumed that the epistemic community of R2P could—at least in theory—have a similar kind of impact" (Crossley, 2018, p.417). This presents an opportunity to further explore and conceptualize the epistemic communities and expert knowledge through legitimacy and authority. It also bridges into Newman's (2015) argument of R2P's increasing popularity, which can provide an additional lens through which R2P has legitimacy and authority. While it does not address the critiques on R2P, conceptualizing epistemic community through authority provides an additional lens through which R2P is increasing in popularity and replacing unilateral HI.

As a further contribution to the debate on R2P's replacement of unilateral HI, this thesis expands on Newman's (2015) argument of R2P's increasing popularity through its specific procedural-legitimacy authority link. Expanding on Crossley's (2018) argument of mainstreaming R2P, this thesis further conceptualizes the assumption of epistemic communities surrounding R2P within legitimacy and authority. This expert legitimacy leading towards epistemic authority adds to Newman's explanation of R2P's increasing popularity replacement of unilateral HI as an additional lens towards its popularity within the international community.

### **3. Theoretical framework**

#### *3.1 Epistemic/expert authority*

Barnett and Weiss (2018) link specific types of legitimacy to types of authority, which helps explain Newman's (2015) procedural-legitimacy and also helps further conceptualize Crossley's (2018) epistemic community assumption. Barnett and Weiss' (2018) framework further contributes to helping Newman's (2015) procedural-legitimacy argument by satisfying the first type, rational-legal authority. Rational-legal authority is based on rules and procedures casting efficiency and goal-based governance. An example of this is democratic elections. Its legitimacy is based on bureaucratic procedures and rules that legitimize the ruling when an actor is elected (Barnett & Weiss, 2018). Newman's (2015) argument of legitimacy built through "democratic credentials and the constitutive values of the multilateral organizations" (Newman, 2015, p.2) explains what satisfies R2P as a principle and its decisions as a rational-legal authority. The consensus-based multilateral framework provides a procedure and rules among states for collective action for intervention, although with its limitations as discussed earlier. However, R2P's increased international popularity discussed by Newman (2105) can be explained by R2P's rational-legal authority.

Further, within Barnett and Weiss' (2018) authority framework, they show three more types. First, is delegated authority, whereby an actor works on behalf of another actor who hires them, also called borrowed authority. Second, moral authority is where an actor is viewed as a speaker for the interests and values of a community, in defense of vulnerable people. Last, expert authority, entails legitimization of an actor's voice based on being credible because of specific knowledge they might have. The last type of authority, expert authority, is the most applicable concept from Barnett and Weiss' (2018) authority framework to expand on Crossley's (2018) work of epistemic communities and the expertise surrounding R2P.

### *3.2 Global Knowledge Networks*

The concept of expert authority from Barnett and Weiss' (2018) has previously already been explored by Stone (2004) using GKN. Stone (2004) specifically focuses only on the expert authority of think tanks which they distinguish from other NGOs with more advocacy-oriented goals, like R2P. The concept focuses on knowledge production. It bases itself on the idea that knowledge is not neutral, rather, it influences policymakers and advocates (Flyverbom, 2006). Stone states the "...network mutually confers legitimacy and pools authority and respectability in a positive-sum manner" (Stone, 2002, p.3). GKN aid in legitimizing organizations and policies by allowing consent to expert-led governance, which gives the organization or policy epistemic/expert authority (Stone, 2004).

#### *3.2.1 Approaches*

There are three approaches for analyzing expertise in GKN suggested by Stone (2002). Firstly, a (dis)embedded knowledge networks approach, second the epistemic community approach, and last transnational discourse communities and coalitions. This thesis makes use of the last approach. First, Stone (2002) explains (dis)embedded knowledge networks as an approach that uses knowledge and discourse as a tool used by dominant interests to reproduce current hegemonic orders, which currently entails reproducing a capitalist neoliberal order. While the reproduction of the nexus of R2P and neoliberal-capitalist order cannot be dismissed, the research shifts focus from a network-building epistemic/expert authority to an authority based on the neoliberal-capitalist order. This approach in research is beyond the scope of this thesis and also not applicable for the case of just analyzing R2P's increasing popularity through epistemic/expert authority.

The second suggested approach is the epistemic community approach that Haas (1992) first theorized. Epistemic communities look at the interaction between policymakers and scientific knowledge. The literature on this concept grew, spurring academic debates about climate

scientist groups in their pursuit of translating scientific knowledge to policymakers (Gough & Shackley, 2001; Hrabanksi & Le Coq 2022; Maliniak et al., 2021). However, one of the main criticisms of Haas' original conception of epistemic communities meant that only natural scientists produce positivistic, therefore statistical scientific-based knowledge could be included in epistemic communities.

Despite the criticism, it is worth mentioning that there has been research using the epistemic community approach beyond the traditional scientific community, like experts in migration, feminist experts, and also experts in humanitarian action (Milwertz & Bu, 2007; Schneiker, 2017; Kofman, 2020). Furthermore, Cross (2013) revisits and reconceptualizes the concept of epistemic communities to include more than just groups of natural scientists. Focusing on the international cohesion and professionalization of expert groups leaves more space for epistemic communities beyond traditional scientists. Schneiker (2017) takes this reconceptualized version of epistemic communities' approach and applies it NGOs in for humanitarian action. Schneiker (2017) analyses the professionalization of multiple NGOs focused on human security, allowing for differentiation between regular NGOs and NGOs with epistemic communities. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that the focus shifts towards the internal components of the NGO, by understanding its internal professionalization. This leaves no space for identifying the humanitarian NGOs within a larger network that allows epistemic/expert authority to be seen, instead, it already is assumed as an authority because of its emphasis on technocratic policymaking.

Last, the transnational discourse community and discourse coalition approach are two parts of a theory that discursively explains legitimacy and epistemic/expert authority within the GKN. The transnational discourse community and discourse coalition approach is similar to the (dis)embedded knowledge networks, where knowledge and discourse produce power, legitimacy, and therefore epistemic/expert authority. The difference between (dis)embedded




knowledge networks is that ideas have more independent power rather than reproducing ideas and values of hegemonic systems.

### 3.3 Transnational discourse community and coalitions approach

This thesis uses the last approach to conceptualize GKN by looking at the *state* of knowledge within an organization or policy. The *state* of knowledge refers to the four components of knowledge that indicate its expertise. The four components of the *state* knowledge are *independent force* and *power* of knowledge, and its *simplification* and *impact* (see figure 1). *Independent force* and *power* are analyzed through the transnational discourse community which shows knowledge production amongst experts. *Simplification* and *impact* of knowledge are analysed through discourse coalition showing knowledge production from experts to non-experts. When each component is successfully demonstrated, then the *state* of knowledge is considered to have expert-legitimacy. This expert-legitimacy is what establishes epistemic/expert authority (see figure 1), the same way procedural-legitimacy establishes rational-legal authority (Newman, 2015; Barnett and Weiss, 2018).

Figure 1- GKN conceptualization



### 3.3.1 *Transnational discourse community*

As per Stone's (2006) interpretation, the transnational discourse community approach is a way of identifying language, symbols, and policy narrative as sources of power around knowledge. Knowledge production amongst experts takes place through relations between agents who participate in transnational links to expand their forms of expertise and knowledge through this chain (Bislev et al., 2002). The approach utilizes Foucault's conception of power and knowledge through discourse. It stresses the significance of boundary-drawing within global networks. Through boundary-drawing it can be perceived who is in and who is out. This exclusionary approach ties in with power, allowing for global networks to have influence and establish authority (Flyverbom, 2006).

The transnational discourse community is divided into two parts that legitimize epistemic/expert authority. Firstly, the 'transnational qualities of professional groups' and secondly the role of discourse, through boundary drawing, which would, in this case, be the discourse community. Firstly, the concept of transnational qualities involves professionals who no longer are inclined to view and work within domestic boundaries while instead of taking a more international perspective on issues. More specifically Stone notes,

“...global networks are venues where national identities of researchers, donors and international civil servants are complicated by the professional commitment to questions of development or reform that are increasingly less questions of national determination under the impact of globalisation” (Stone, 2006, p.95).

She further notes that the transnational identity is brought forward further by global and regional interaction facilitated by in person communication within international meetings and meetings that take place online. Transnationality highlights that knowledge is not limited to

domestic boundaries and is, therefore, able to transcend that by taking a force that goes beyond those boundaries which creates knowledge as an *independent force*.

Second, drawing upon Foucault is discourse community. The concept places discourse at the nexus of power and knowledge (Matsuda, 2002). Discourse creates ‘effects of truth’ (Stone, 2006, p.95). This involves naturalizing and normalizing ways of thinking and doing. She explains it as

“...power and knowledge operate through discursively informed social and institutional practices such as networks: Professionals create a transnational community through a boundary-drawing discourse that defines who and what is to be considered inside and outside the community, establishing a distinction between professionals and non-professionals, and between good and bad professionals” (Stone, 2006, p.95)

As a result, boundary-drawing allows the community to bring forth certain viewpoints at the cost of alternative viewpoints that allows them to be elevated to a higher status, hence displaying *power*.

By highlighting transnationality, it can be seen how knowledge has an *independent force*, where it is not limited to geographic boundaries. This couples with boundary drawing of who possesses that specialized knowledge and information, and exclusivity, displaying *power*. Epistemic/expert authority is partly established through the transnational discourse community within the GKN when the *state* of knowledge is *independent* and *powerful* amongst experts producing knowledge.

### 3.3.2 *Discourse coalition theory*

The second part of the approach looks at the knowledge production amongst non-experts, connecting with the last two components of the *state* of knowledge, *simplification* process, and *impact* on policymakers. Seeing the *simplification* of complex issues and their

*impact* on policymakers allow for the last two components of the *state* of knowledge to confer legitimacy and thus establish epistemic/expert authority. This is due to how useful the specialized information is to outsiders. Proposed by Hajer (1993), it entails a group of actors who share a social construct that becomes enforced in reality through the maintenance of a discourse. Multiple actors with different discourses combine within a single discourse coalition they share. Actors do not necessarily have the same views within their own discourse but they have an agreed-upon coalition that serves as the dominant discourse and counters any alternative discourse that challenges its dominance. This is not necessarily done with a coordinated intention (Hajer, 1993).

Discourse coalition is comprised of two parts, first, storylines. The storyline is to see whether there is a single discourse between different actors that defines and distinguishes itself from any previous or alternative discourse. This reality suggests particular social practices and positions and is critical of any alternative social arrangements (Hajer, 1993). These include concepts and specific definitions that are simplified to enforce a particular reality unto people at the cost of others. Told as a story through its *simplification* it enforces a discourse by maintaining its terms and definitions within the discourse coalition. If knowledge is not *simplified* and therefore not translatable to policymakers it cannot hold power to influence and impact other actors (Pautz, 2018). Epistemic/expert authority depends on the *simplification* of knowledge in order for it to be legitimate.

Second, after seeing whether there is a storyline produced against any alternatives comes the discursive struggle. The discursive struggle is the *impact* on policymakers. This is when various actors aim to secure as many intellectual resources to validate their interpretation of a politicized issue. The focus of the discourse coalition is the construct of the research object. The extent towards which a policy is problematized against existing dominant policy discourse shows how much of an impact a discourse coalition has on policymakers (Pautz, 2011). This

shows how important the discursive struggle is next to storyline building, attesting to the *impact* of a complex issue that is translated and *simplified* to non-experts to produce a dominant narrative among non-experts (Hajer, 1993). The *impact* of the discourse coalition is seen through discourse structuration (Hajer, 1993) which entails a dominant discourse that policymakers retrieve concepts and categories from to explain particular issues (Bréthaut et al, 2022).

Using the transnational discourse community and coalition framework, it can be seen how epistemic/expert authority for R2P is established within the GKN when the four components of the *state* knowledge - *independent force*, *power*, *simplification* and *impact* are successfully demonstrated and therefore have expert-legitimacy.

#### 3.4 R2P as an actor

Within this thesis, R2P is considered an actor. The analysis studies R2P as a single unit, examining the discourse of R2P as an organization. An actor is defined as an entity, which in this case represents the institution behind a policy, that has the capacity of forming decisions and acting. This capacity shows the interaction between understandings of internal capabilities, internal character, and external opportunities (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). R2P as an international policy has formed an international organization that contains different organs, including advocacy, research partnership, and relations with regional bodies, governments, and NGOs, allowing it to act within the capacity to form collective decisions with specific goals under which they are united (Global Centre for R2P, n.d.).

## 4. Methodology

### 4.1 Case selection

This thesis employs a qualitative in-depth single case study. R2P is a unique case because of its recent developments and debates as mentioned in the introduction. It is the only internationally recognized alternative to the previous principle of unilateral HI. Therefore, this thesis deems R2P as one specific unit of analysis defined largely by interests in an individual case rather than by the used method of inquiry.

The analysis of R2P will be taken from 2005 to the present. The rationale is that 2005 was the year when the World Summit took place and the first major solemn commitment to defining the pillars of R2P was pronounced (Pitsuwan et al., 2014). This has made R2P internationally recognized and more relevant regarding mass genocide prevention and interventionist policies beyond domestic borders.

### 4.2 Operationalization: discourse analysis

Neither Stone (2006) nor Bislev et al. (2002) or Flyverbom (2006) explicitly outline the guidelines to methodologically investigate epistemic/expert authority using the transnational discourse community approach within the GKN. Therefore, this thesis builds on the respective researchers' own points as indicators and several indicators based on previous literature cited by them as well, in particular the 'discourse community,' which is elaborated below.

#### 4.2.1 Transnational qualities

Transnationality highlights the *independent force* of knowledge as it is produced amongst experts. The indicators legitimize epistemic/expert authority by showing how knowledge remains uninfluenced by domestic boundaries. There are two indicators worth exploring within transnationality – organizational practices and organizational ties. Bislev et al. (2002) in their description of the GKN mention the autonomy of expert practices in direct

relation to territorial space, whereby transnationality is highlighted by how an actor extends beyond two or more national territories (Bislev et al., 2002, p.208). They cite Bieler et al. (2000) in their explanation of transnational qualities;

“...the emergence of a set of sequences and processes that are increasingly unhindered by territorial or jurisdictional barriers and that enhance the spread of trans-border practices... (Bislev et al., 2002, p.206).

This can be seen by the first indicator “Practices” (see Appendix A). Practices include activities such as conferences, workshops, meetings and the processes of the network involved. This involves knowing whether they are offline or online, as they indicate:

“The friction of geographical distance, in terms of transaction costs and time, has been drastically reduced and, as a result, organisational forms that operate on a transnational scale have multiplied, taking the shape of countless networks, associations, fora and private corporations” (Bislev et al., 2002, p.206).

In both online and offline practices, it can be asked, “does the meeting involve several nationalities? Is there an explicit indicator of transnationality/internationality? Explicit international indicators of practices? (See Appendix A).

The last indicator is understanding the organizational component of the network, since networks themselves are not an organization (Bislev et al., 2002). It is necessary to look at how several organizations are tied together beyond domestic borders, therefore highlighting the transnationality of not just the organization but the network it is in. This further displays the *independence* of knowledge beyond state limits within a GKN (see Appendix A).

Seeing whether the practices and organization indicators show how activities and external ties are not bound to domestic boundaries and therefore have *independent force* legitimizes R2P’s

expertise with transnational knowledge production partly establishing epistemic/expert authority.

#### 4.2.2 *Boundary-drawing*

Boundary drawing shows the *power* of knowledge as a further legitimizing factor in epistemic/expert authority. This is done by analyzing themes that fall under identifying discourses as mentioned by Stone (2006). These identifying discourses are ‘established goals of reform’, ‘justifying necessity to change’, and ‘describing means to achieve better results’ (see Appendix B).

To aid in finding themes that fall under the identifying discourse, this thesis employs EDA (epistemic discourse analysis) as a tool. The EDA uses evidentiality, levels of detail and precision of description, topics, and arguments to identify specific themes within the discourse. While there are multiple tools offered with EDA, the four chosen ones are picked on the basis that they allow for specific themes to be found using what Van Dijk (2013) describes as the “ways knowledge is interactively ‘managed’, activated, expressed, presupposed, implied, conveyed, construed, etc.” (p.497, Van Dijk, 2013).

When themes are identified using the EDA, it can be seen that multiple researchers have identical discourses which is an indicator of a specific expertise group only known to R2P researchers. This creates a boundary that runs on exclusivity. It grants knowledge production *power* that further legitimizes R2P expertise and establishes epistemic/expert authority.

#### 4.2.3 *Storyline building*

This thesis follows similar indicators used by Scholten (2017) in their employment of discourse coalition theory. The first two indicators are part of identifying the storyline, this involves looking first at ‘actors’ and then at ‘utilization of knowledge’. Following Scholten’s (2017) example of their indicators for a discourse coalition, the first indicator includes looking



at the authors behind the discourse. Scholten states: “experts, scientists and intellectuals are considered parts of discourse coalitions rather than operating above or beyond discourse coalitions” (Scholten, 2017, p.350). This first starts by identifying the number of authors and their specializations. The authors are considered experts due to specific specializations in career, research expertise, or occupation (see Appendix C).

The second indicator is the ‘utilization of knowledge’ which looks at the discourse by identifying themes that seek to distinguish and differentiate R2P from the previous discourse of HI. By identifying the different authors and experts together with the different themes that distinguish and define R2P (relative to HI), a discourse coalition can be found. If there are multiple differentiating themes identified within R2P among two or more experts, this is an indicator of a successful storyline discourse coalition. A successful storyline discourse coalition shows R2P’s knowledge production in one single document that is *simplified* through collective agreed-upon definitions and conceptualizations among several experts. Seeing a *simplified* document that differentiates and defines R2P agreed-upon by different experts further legitimizes R2P as an epistemic/expert authority.

It is worth mentioning however that the ICISS report, from which the discourse coalition data will be collected, already includes an explicate statement that indicates R2P’s differentiation from unilateral HI:

“The commission recognizes the long history, and continuing wide and popular usage, of the phrase “humanitarian intervention,” and also its descriptive usefulness in clearly focusing attention on one particular category of interventions – namely, those undertaken for the stated purpose of protecting or assisting people at risk. But we have made a deliberate decision not to adopt this terminology, preferring to refer either to

“intervention,” or as appropriate “military intervention,” for human protection purposes”  
(Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.9)

Although it has been explicated in one statement, it is still a general statement. The analysis for themes is necessary to further establish exactly what differentiation R2P is making in order to further define itself.

#### 4.2.4 *Discursive struggle*

The last indicator builds on the first two indicators. This is where the *impact* of the storyline discourse coalition gets assessed through discourse structuration. Discourse structuration evaluates whether the discourse coalition has dominated the discursive space, meaning, actors central to the issue are forced into accepting the rhetorical power of a new discourse (Stevens, 2007). Discursive structuration demonstrates the extent of the *impact* of R2P’s storyline (discourse coalition) made among experts to nonexpert policymakers. This is a way that further legitimizes R2P expertise to nonexperts allowing expert-legitimacy and the establishment of epistemic/expert authority.

Discursive structuration can be evaluated by looking at the justifications and the framing of R2P from the states that vote against or abstained from the R2P motion during the 66th UNGA plenary meeting. This means looking at whether they make any reference to the themes in the second indicator when defending themselves. The themes identified in indicator 2 are topics and arguments related to the concepts and definitions used to distinguish R2P discourse from any alternative discourse. Using these themes as reference is a measure of whether R2P discourse has reached policymakers, paying lip service to it as a potential dominant discourse (Hajer 1993). Additionally, it also includes looking at how they talk about R2P in general; do they continue to support it regardless of the opposing vote? If they do then it can be said that they pay lip service to R2P as a general concept.

### *4.3 Data collection*

The data for the transnational indicator is collected from the “Global Network of R2P focal points” on their main website where there is general information on locations for conferences and workshops. The R2P focal points networks explicitly seek to build an international network of experts on mass genocide prevention. Here governments from around the world appoint an R2P specialist within one of their existing ministries or produce an entirely new unit dedicated to R2P, building capacities and expertise of R2P within national governments. They meet annually along with experts from the Global Centre of R2P to discuss better practices and capacities for R2P. This makes it a suitable place to collect data on transnationality. For the second indicator of organizational ties and projects, data is collected on their “events and global engagement” page where they indicate who they work with and the activities they do in specific locations and times.

The data collection for boundary drawing takes from 8 research papers within the R2P journal, specifically from the ‘occasional papers’ available on R2P’s website, this amounts to around 200 pages. These are R2P research papers that provide deep analysis of particular mass atrocities or other themes related. They are published annually. These research papers are produced and also cite the experts and specialists from the Global Centre for R2P involved in the capacity building of the annual meetings for R2P focal points (Global Centre for R2P, n.d.).

In identifying a storyline, this thesis will analyze the ICISS report of around 81 pages. The ICISS report is also considered the backbone of R2P’s definition and application document, therefore, being the most applicable source for key concepts and explanations (Cunliffe, 2016). The data collection for the discursive struggle includes looking at the R2P motions raised at the UNGA. The most recent 2021 motion of implementing R2P discussions within the UNGA provides a 12-page account of all states who voted against R2P and their statements as to why

they voted against the R2P-related motion (see Appendix H for a summary of the data collection sources).

## 5. Analysis

### 5.1 Independent force of knowledge

For R2P practices the data shows that there are annual meetings that started 5 years after the 2005 World Summit, between 2011 to 2019. From 2020 to 2022 no physical meetings have taken place due to the COVID19 pandemic, there are also no indications of online meetings for R2P focal points throughout the entire period.

Between 2010 to 2019, in total 10 gatherings have taken place whereby nine are meetings and one is a workshop. The first meeting in 2011 included R2P specialist representatives from 31 states in New York, USA. In 2012 that number increased to 36 specialists during the second meeting, however, it still took place in the USA. Additionally, 2012 is the year where the workshop took place, also in the USA. For the workshop there is no data available with regards to how many states were present however one explicit indicator of transnationality is given stating:

“Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the Stanley Foundation convened R2P Focal Points and other national representatives, UN mission ambassadors and experts, UN officials, and mass atrocity specialists for a preparatory workshop to address the challenges faced by individual R2P Focal Points and their developing global network (Global Centre for R2P, 2020)”

Specifically, the individual R2P focal points are each an R2P specialist represented by different states. The number of states present and exactly which states were present are not explicated, however, the members of R2P focal points in 2010 was already higher than 30, and it is

explicitly mentioned that R2P focal specialists were present for the preparatory workshops along with other specialists and experts represented by the UN.

In 2013 the first meeting outside of the USA took place in Accra, Ghana whereby 35 nationalities were present. Subsequently, all meetings took place outside of the USA. This includes Gaborone, Botswana in 2014, Madrid, Spain in 2015, Seoul, South Korea in 2016, Doha, Qatar in 2017, Helsinki, Finland in 2018 and finally, Brussels, Belgium in 2019. Each meeting has at least more than 30 national R2P specialists. The highest was in 2016 during the Seoul, South Korea meeting whereby more than 50 specialists were present. Each meeting including the R2P workshop in 2012 has an explicit indicator referring to itself at the “Global Network of R2P focal points”, indicating a network of R2P specialists from each nation that is present (see Appendix E1).

There are two organizational ties with the Global Centre for R2P, these are Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes (GAMAAC) and the Asia Pacific Partnership for Atrocity Prevention (APPAP). With the GAMAAC, the Global Centre for R2P has working meetings that took place in Argentina, 2008, Tanzania, 2010, Switzerland, 2011, and Cambodia, 2013. With the APPAP, the partnership indicates more explicitly and specifically that it is focused on dialogue, collaboration, early warning and risk assessment, mediation, policy analysis, and development of prevention training, education and capacity building for prevention. The meetings have taken place in Singapore, 2016, Jakarta, Indonesia in 2019, and Manila, the Philippines in 2020 (see Appendix E2).

## *5.2 Power of knowledge*

In total 10 themes were identified. For the ‘established goals of reform’ it was found that researchers refer to R2P pillars, or the process of R2P when discussing established set of goals. This includes the necessary implementation of the steps of R2P to prevent mass genocide,

starting with domestic responsibility of the state to protect the population, secondly, the responsibility of the neighboring states to encourage the protection of local populations, and last is the intervention in case of a failure in taking the first two steps. Simultaneously one of the other established goals of reform includes the international community, which is referred to by researchers as international engagement, and the involvement of multiple states in the process of halting or removing mass atrocities, their responsibility and willingness to take part in R2P.

As for the ‘justifying necessity for change’ two common themes have been found whereby researchers commonly agree on first, the failure of the UNSC, and second, non-Western obstacles. Failure of the UNSC includes references to vetoing from the permanent members of the UNSC and the slow decision making. Non-Western obstacles include references to China, Russia, and non-member, non-Western states like Myanmar who block initiatives for mass atrocity prevention or criticize intervention initiatives undertaken.

The last six themes found for ‘describing the means to achieve better results and predict outcomes’ include accountability, preventative diplomacy, other UN bodies (outside of the UNSC) and grassroots movements, multilateralism, institutionalization, and the international community (see Appendix F1). Each of these themes is found consistently in the research papers and they overlap. First, accountability involves the agreement that states need to punish perpetrators of mass atrocities in order to prevent further spillover of crimes into other countries or the encouragement of more mass crimes within domestic borders, this involves an effective legal system.

Second, preventative diplomacy is an agreed-upon method as steps before a mass atrocity takes place to prevent it from happening and avoid direct intervention altogether through diplomatic means. This is through the regional bodies like the UN and the deployment of UN peacekeepers

or grassroots movements involving NGOs with measures like early warning systems as an agreed-upon method. Third, is the involvement of grassroots movements from journalists, humanitarian workers, NGOs, and civil society, and other UN bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council are considered important factors agreed-upon commonly for R2P to achieve better outcomes. They are part of the accountability process and raising awareness that is necessary before mass atrocity crimes take place and after it.

Fourth, multilateralism is also an agreed-upon method through bodies such as the EU (European Union), ECOWAS (Economic Community of Western African States), or ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) that are necessary for accountability, preventative diplomacy, and as a last resort case, an agreed-upon multilateral intervention in mass genocide. Fifth, institutionalization refers to the effective response or organizational preparedness from NGOs, organizations or regional bodies such as the International Criminal Court, the UN, or plan proposals from civil society or NGOs. Last is the ‘international community’ which is understood in terms of preventative diplomacy or direct actions. This includes direct actions it can take, such as economic sanctions or votes for specific R2P proposals at the General Assembly and recognition of threats.

### 5.3 *Simplification of knowledge*

The first indicator shows that the commission is comprised of 12 people with various specializations, expertise, and careers. One person can have multiple specializations and more than one career as can be seen in table 1 below.

Table 1- *ICISS commission discourse coalition*

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Career/occupation/research expertise:</b>
Gareth Evans	“President and Chief Executive of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.77) and diplomat.
Mohamed Sahnoun	“Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, former member of the World Commission on Environment and Development and diplomat” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.77).
Gisèle Côté-Harper	“Professor of law at Laval University, Quebec” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.77).
Lee Hamilton	“Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, and Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.77).
Michael Ignatieff	“Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.78).



Vladimir Lukin	“Deputy Speaker of the Russian State Duma” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002). (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.78)
Klaus Naumann	“Chairman of the North Atlantic Military Committee of NATO” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.78).
Cyril Ramaphosa	“Executive Chairman of Rebserve, a major South African service and facilities management company” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.78).
Fidel V. Ramos	Chairman of the Ramos Peace and Development Foundation dealing with security in the Asia Pacific region, democratic governance, sustainable development, and economic diplomacy (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.78).
Cornelio Sommaruga	“President of the Caux Foundation for Moral Re-Armament as well as President of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.79).
Eduardo Stein Barillas	“Worker at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.79).
Ramesh Thakur	“Vice-Rector of the United Nations University, Tokyo. Head of the University’s Peace and Governance Programme” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p.79).

There are over three people working for NGOs focused on security, sustainability, and crises management, two UN specialists, three state diplomats, four university employees, ranging from professor to rector, one person in a research institute, and one private company owner.

Table 2 - *Discourse coalition themes*

<b>Utilization of knowledge themes</b>				
Depoliticized intervention	Sovereignty as responsibility	Sovereignty-intervention link	Bottom-up prevention	Moral policy

Throughout the ICISS report, 5 main themes have been uncovered that differentiate R2P from unilateral HI. They are listed above in figure 3. Firstly, unilateral HI is differentiated from R2P by the claim that R2P only reserves military intervention as a last resort, and through an agreed-upon multilateral process of decision-making. This means that intervention is done without any of the intervening state’s domestic political interests. Secondly, the paper reiterates a definition of ‘sovereignty as a responsibility’ of the state, and moves away from the notion of ‘sovereignty as control’. The first two themes link to the third theme. The third theme is the sovereignty-intervention link. This link is what the ICISS report tries to make by showing that R2P is not a divider of sovereignty and intervention, rather it makes them both more defined and therefore more linked than in the previous definition of unilateral HI. Because intervention is not without domestic political motives and sovereignty is treated as a responsibility, this is necessarily a ‘bridge’ between sovereignty and intervention, reiterated throughout the report whereas unilateral HI is the divider of the two.

Fourth is that R2P is a bottom-up prevention method. This is because of the emphasis on civil society through the process of accountability with the public and also the local understanding of internal dynamics (domestically). Whereas unilateral HI involves intervention from an external force, intervention with R2P is only done in the context whereby there is a local understanding of the situation, through civil society, local NGOs, and local people. Last, R2P is differentiated from unilateral HI as a moral policy. The morality argument sets to distinguish R2P by asking what other alternatives there are available. Even in cases where R2P fails because intervention did not help the situation or it did not take place at all, its depoliticized motives mean that any action is better than no action when preventing mass atrocities. Any action with unilateral HI would involve politicized motives, which is better of not being executed at all as compared to R2P.

#### 5.4 Impact of knowledge

In total, the draft resolution A/75/L.12 calling on the annual implementation of R2P within the UNGA was voted in favor by 115 states, with 28 states that abstained and 15 that opposed. Only some of the states that opposed and abstained made clarifications as to why they are against the annual adoption of R2P within the UNGA. In total 5 states' reactions were analyzed in relation to one of the themes identified that seek to differentiate and define R2P.

Table 3 - UNGA state reactions

<b>Country:</b>	<b>(Theme) statement:</b>
Russia ( <i>voted against</i> )	(Depoliticized intervention) “Thanks to major diplomatic efforts, the elements of the concept of the responsibility to protect populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity were formulated in general

	<p>terms in the 2005 World Summit outcome document... The consequences of such humanitarian operations, which are supposedly intended to lessen the suffering of civilian populations are well known to all — illegal armed intervention, regime change, the destruction of statehood and economic collapse.” (UNGA, 2021 p.4-5).</p>
<p>Nicaragua (<i>votes against</i>)</p>	<p>(Depoliticized intervention) “will continue to stand firmly with the international community and the United Nations against the commission of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”</p> <p>“We would like to remind the Assembly of the continuing serious concern that we see in the manipulation of the concept of the responsibility to protect by powerful countries and the actions of interventionists, however disguised, that in various ways attempt to justify interference and the use of force to destabilize and replace legitimately elected Governments” (UNGA, 2021, p.5).</p>
<p>Indonesia (<i>voted against</i>)</p>	<p>(Sovereignty as responsibility) “... Indonesia’s vote today should not be taken to be a vote against R2P as a concept... The principles and norms that underlie R2P are not alien to Indonesia, nor are they specific only to certain or particular groups</p>

	<p>of States or regions. In that context, strengthening a country’s normative prevention framework at the national level is critical. It is a corollary to the principle that the primary responsibility to protect populations lies with the States concerned” (UNGA, 2021, p.5).</p>
<p>Cuba (<i>voted against</i>)</p>	<p>(Depoliticized intervention) “Ensuring a response from the international community aimed at preventing acts of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity is a goal that Cuba shares. However, it is well known that certain States have manipulated the so-called concept of the responsibility to protect to impose interventionist agendas and attempts at regime change that have had dire consequences for the countries concerned” (UNGA, 2021, p.6).</p> <p>(Depoliticized intervention) “We encourage delegations to reflect on the danger posed by the adoption of the draft resolution when profound gaps remain on issues such as... how we prevent the issue from being used as a justification for a supposed and non-existent right to intervene” (UNGA, 2021, p.6)</p>
<p>Pakistan (<i>abstained</i>)</p>	<p>(Moral policy) “It is also in Palestine that the failure of the international community to uphold those norms has been most evident... The inaction</p>

	<p>of the Security Council is due not to the inadequacy of any legal norms in preventing egregious crimes but rather a lack of political will to action on the part of some...What is needed is not an abdication of the collective responsibility to prevent those crimes, but consistent and uniform action carried out objectively and impartially against all transgressions, wherever they are committed and by whomever. That is the standard against which any initiative on the responsibility to protect must be calibrated”</p> <p>(UNGA, 2021, p.7)</p>
--	--

As can be seen above in table 3, Russia, Nicaragua, Indonesia, and Cuba are the ones who voted against the draft and Pakistan abstained. While Russia, Indonesia, and Pakistan provide their own criticism against the R2P concept, they also continue to endorse its adoption. Russia for example heralds the diplomatic efforts of the international community for coming together to define R2P in ‘general terms’ in 2005 during the World Summit. Indonesia makes mention of its history as being one of the states that supported R2P’s adoption in 2005 while making its opposing vote. Indonesia also states multiple times that its vote against R2P is not a sign of it being against R2P, but rather it is for it. Pakistan also states that R2P as a collective action should not be dropped nor abandoned, rather redefined. Cuba and Nicaragua are both the only states that give their general support against mass genocide; however, both do not explicitly endorse R2P.

Looking at the main criticism from Russia, Nicaragua, and Cuba all address the R2P concept of depoliticized intervention. Russia questions the ‘humanitarian operations’ and military

intervention of R2P by addressing the results of such an intervention. It associates the results of such an intervention with negative humanitarian outcomes. Nicaragua and Cuba also question the intervention of R2P by addressing the motives of an intervention, associating it with the manipulation of intervening states. Cuba also indicates the ‘non-existent right to intervene’ as a counter to R2P. This is a point the ICISS report has been critical of and is trying to avoid when defining intervention.

Indonesia’s justification mainly points towards the need to further focus on the concept of sovereignty as responsibility as opposed to adopting R2P annually. Indonesia indicates that by mentioning the prevention framework at the domestic level. Last, Pakistan is critical with regards to its inaction of R2P with Palestine, addressing directly the theme of moral policy of R2P. They point better action than no action, but one that has been called for in the international community such as Palestine remains an inaction. Pakistan mentions the ‘lack of political will’ by the UNGA in applying R2P therefore questioning the differentiating factor of R2P as a moral policy.

## **6. Discussion**

Transnationality found in Bislev et al. (2002) study of GKN shows knowledge production in direct relation to territorial space as being a necessary component to look at when highlighting the *independent force* of knowledge production of an organization. They also note that because networks themselves are not an organization, the organization within a network needs ties beyond one territorial space to be transnational within a GKN. The analysis shows this same *independent force* of R2P’s knowledge production within the GKN through its practices and organization. For its individual practices, there are 30+ nationalities at each meeting taking place in a different country annually after 2013, this has been shown through the focal point meetings along with the explicit descriptions that indicate transnationality. The fact that there are more than two nationalities involved in a single setting already highlights

transnational knowledge production. Similarly, the setting of the meetings is not limited to one particular area after 2013. The organizational ties of R2P include cooperation with organizations located in multiple countries that include meetings that take place in more than two countries. With R2P being tied to other organizations in several different states, this indicates the transnationality of the network. R2P's knowledge production as practices by themselves and with ties to other organizations both indicate transnationality that further highlights the *independent force* of their knowledge production.

In order to find a discourse community Stone (2006) has highlighted the need for there to be exclusivity. This is knowledge that is exclusively only known by the group involved in the discourse. The analysis of R2P knowledge production demonstrates clear boundaries that show exclusivity. Whether the paper discusses successful intervention in Libya (2015), the failure and late action in Syria (2012), or preventing mass atrocities within West Africa in general (2015), the researchers all follow 10 common agreed-upon themes. Just as in Stone's (2006) analysis of the GKN, the discourse community necessarily requires agreed-upon goals, justifications and mechanisms in order for there to be a knowledge boundary. The analysis shows 2 common goals, 2 justifications and 6 mechanisms to achieve better results that the researchers have in common within R2P discourse. Through the transnational discourse community it can be seen that the knowledge production within the GKN has expert-legitimacy because the state of knowledge is both *independent* and *powerful* amongst experts.

Furthermore, for there to be a discourse coalition there needs to be at least one identified theme that distinguishes the discourse, and at least two authors with distinct specializations and expertise forming one coherent expert discourse. There are 12 people within the commission behind R2P's main concepts and definitions comprised of a variety of specializations and expertise. Together these different experts and specialists create one single document known as the ICISS report that defines R2P and forms the main discourse. The commission's



definition of R2P is done through differentiation with unilateral HI, indicated both explicitly, as briefly mentioned in the methodology section, and implicitly through the 5 identified themes. The 5 identified themes that differentiate R2P from unilateral HI are essential to understanding how R2P attempts to define itself in *simplified* terms. As previously seen, Henderson (2020) and Evans et al. (2013) all claim R2P's replacement of unilateral HI by defining its concept as a multilateral intervention, lack of self-interest intervention and sovereignty as responsibility. This aligns with the commission's discourse coalition definition of R2P, through the themes of 'depoliticized intervention', and 'sovereignty as responsibility'. The commission's combined and agreed-upon definition of R2P through differentiation in one single document demonstrates a successful discourse coalition amongst expertise that *simplifies* R2P's knowledge production.

Last, to see how far the discourse coalition dominates the discursive space of nonexperts there needs to be an assessment of the lip service paid to the concepts and the general policy outline (Hajer, 1993). From the reactions of the states who oppose the A/75/L.12 R2P proposal it can be seen that their justification is a form of paying lip service to the R2P discourse by clarifications. All 5 states including Russia, Nicaragua, Indonesia, Cuba, and Pakistan referenced one of the five common themes used to differentiate R2P from unilateral HI. Their reference of these themes is an indicator of these states paying lip service to R2P's definition of itself. For example, Pakistan questions the notion of R2P's morality whereas the discourse coalition tries to redefine and differentiate R2P as a moral policy over unilateral HI. Furthermore, though not all states show support for the general concept of R2P, namely Cuba and Nicaragua, the majority of states, 3 out of 5, still show general support for the concept in general regardless of voting against it. All states have paid lip service towards R2P referencing one of the R2P concepts while the majority also show continued signs of support. This

discourse structuration shows that R2P's discourse coalition does have an *impact* on nonexpert policymakers within discourse to a larger extent.

## 7. Conclusion

Thus, the findings confirm that R2P has an epistemic/expert authority based on the analysis. Because of R2P's increasing relevance with regards to mass-genocide prevention given the ongoing Rohingya crises, and its expansion within research with university partnerships and research journals, this thesis set out to explore the epistemic/expert authority of R2P. Within previous literature research on R2P shows that it is either extending on previous unilateral HI or replacing it. Proponents of its replacement claim increasing popularity of R2P amongst international states due to rational-legal authority built on a procedural-legitimacy. However, because of R2P's inconsistency and unclear procedures, this does not fully explain its increasing popularity. This thesis set out to explore an additional lens of authority, namely epistemic/expert authority to add to the argument of its replacement of unilateral HI and increasing popularity.

Analyzing the GKN, using the approach of the transnational discourse community, it is found that R2P's knowledge production demonstrates *independent force* and *power* amongst experts. Transnationality is demonstrated through its individual practices shown by the focal points and organizational ties within the network, not bound to a single territorial space, which is necessary for *independent* knowledge production. For the latter, R2P has a clear discourse community where 10 overarching themes are covered by R2P expertise agreeing on its established goals, justifications, and means of achieving the goals. The specific themes found indicate an exclusivity for R2P researchers that is necessary for knowledge production to have *power*.

The discourse coalition of R2P's knowledge production demonstrates *simplification* and *impact* from experts to nonexperts. *Simplification* is demonstrated by a single 100-page ICISS report on R2P, considered its backbone. Numerous experts with different specializations indicate explicitly R2P's differentiation from unilateral HI, and this was also indicated implicitly through depoliticized intervention, sovereignty as responsibility, the sovereignty-intervention link, bottom-up genocide prevention, and R2P as a moral policy. The differentiations are necessary to *simplify* how R2P is defined against the backdrop of unilateral HI. How far that discourse coalition *impacts* nonexpert policymakers was demonstrated through the reactions to the proposal A/75/L.12 at the UNGA. Opposing votes justified their positions through defensive justification with reference to at least one of the themes, including depoliticized intervention, sovereignty as responsibility, and R2P as a moral policy. At the same time, three of the states explicitly indicate their support of R2P regardless of the abstained and opposing vote. These indicate the *impact* of R2P which suggests a discourse structuration happening.

Therefore, with indicators of R2P's knowledge production demonstrating *independent force*, *power*, *simplification*, and *impact*, it can be seen that R2P's *state* of knowledge within the GKN has expert-legitimacy and therefore can establish epistemic/expert authority. This adds an additional lens to R2P's authority and increasing popularity as a replacement for unilateral HI through expert-legitimacy in addition to the procedural-legitimacy and rational-legal authority.

Due to the limited time and the scope of the research, one area that is not covered in this thesis is R2P's internal professionalism, which is its epistemic community rather than epistemic/expert authority. This was one of the approaches suggested by Stone (2006) that could further contribute to understanding R2P expertise through the GKN. It provides an avenue for further research with regards to studying the expertise of mass genocide prevention policy groups or humanitarian organizations in general.

## 8. Bibliography

- Alexandra, L. (2021, May 22). *Indonesia and R2P: Why so paranoid?* The Jakarta Post. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2021/05/21/indonesia-and-r2p-why-so-paranoid.html>
- Auto, H. (2021, March 6). *Foreign military intervention in Myanmar looks unlikely, despite protesters' pleas.* The Straits Times. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/united-nations-foreign-military-intervention-looks-unlikely-despite-protesters-pleas>
- Barnett, M., & Weiss, T. G. (2018). Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present. In *Humanitarianism in Question* (pp. 1–48). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. <https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801461538-003>
- Bellamy, A. J., & Drummond, C. (2011). The responsibility to protect in Southeast Asia: between non-interference and sovereignty as responsibility. *Pacific Review*, 24(2), 179–200. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.560958>
- Besheer, M. (2021, March 5). *UN Envoy Calls for Collective Action to Stop Myanmar Repression.* VOA. <https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific-un-envoy-calls-collective-action-stop-myanmar-repression/6202918.html>
- Bieler, A., Higgott, R., & Underhill, G. (2000). Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System. In *Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System* (1st ed.). London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203165041>
- Bislev, S., Salskov-Iversen, D., & Hansen, H. K. (2002). The Global Diffusion of Managerialism: Transnational Discourse Communities at Work. *Global Society : Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations*, 16(2), 199–212. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09537320220132929>
- Bretherton, V. & Vogler, J. (2006). The European Union as a global actor (2nd [rev. and updated] ed.). London [etc.]: Routledge.

- Bréthaut, C., Ezbakhe, F., McCracken, M., Wolf, A., & Dalton, J. (2022). Exploring discursive hydropolitics: a conceptual framework and research agenda. *International Journal of Water Resources Development*, 38(3), 464–479. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2021.1944845>
- Brosig, M. (2012). R2P: Not Evasive but Still Reluctant Action. In M. Brosig (Ed.), *The Responsibility to Protect 2 From Evasive to Reluctant Action? The Role of Global Middle Powers* (pp. 119–124). Institute for Security Studies.
- Cross, M. K. D. (2013). Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later. *Review of International Studies*, 39(1), 137–160. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210512000034>
- Crossley, N. (2018). Is R2P still controversial? Continuity and change in the debate on 'humanitarian intervention'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 31(5), 415–436. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018.1516196>
- Cunliffe, P. (2016). From ISIS to ICISS. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 51(2), 233–247. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836715612854>
- Esslemont, T. (2016, October 26). *The complete failure of 'responsibility to protect'* <https://www.bangkokpost.com>. <https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1119293/the-complete-failure-of-responsibility-to-protect>
- Evans, G., Thakur, R., & Pape, R. A. (2013). Correspondence: Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. *International Security*, 37(4), 199–214. [https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\\_c\\_00119](https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_c_00119)
- Evans, G., & Wilson, B. T. (2022, January 6). *Most Read of 2021: The Responsibility to Protect the People of Myanmar*. Australian Institute of International Affairs. <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-responsibility-to-protect-the-people-of->

myanmar/#:~:text=Most%20Read%20of%202021%3A%20The%20Responsibilit  
y%20to%20Protect%20the%20People%20of%20Myanmar,-  
07%20Jan%202022&text=Myanmar's%20post%20coup%20crisis%20unequivocally  
,most%20robust%20available%20external%20measures.

Flyverbom, M. (2006). *Making the Global Information Society Governable: on the governmentality of multi-stakeholder networks* (Doctoral dissertation). Copenhagen Business School, Denmark.

Gierycz, D. (2010). From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to Protect (R2P). *Criminal Justice Ethics*, 29(2), 110–128.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2010.504424>

Global Centre for R2P. (n.d.). *WHAT IS R2P?* Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect. Retrieved March 31, 2022, from <https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/>

Gough, C., & Shackley, S. (2001). The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: The Epistemic Communities and NGOs. *International Affairs (London)*, 77(2), 329–346.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00195>

Haas, P. (1992). Epistemic Communities and International-Policy Coordination – Introduction. *International Organization*, 46(1), 1–35.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300001442>

Hajer, M. (1993). Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Great Britain. In F. Fischer & J. Forester (Eds.), *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning* (pp. 43–76). UCL Press Limited.

- Hassan, O. (2015). Political security: from the 1990s to the Arab Spring. *Contemporary Politics*, 21(1), 86–99. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2014.993907>
- Henderson, S. (2020). Humanitarian Intervention and R2P. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 22(1–4), 325–343. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18754112-0220104019>
- Hrabanski, M., & Le Coq, J. F. (2022). Climatisation of agricultural issues in the international agenda through three competing epistemic communities: Climate-smart agriculture, agroecology, and nature-based solutions. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 127, 311–320. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2021.10.022>
- Hyun-Ju, O. (2019, May 29). *Refugee crisis 'our problem' too: actor Jung Woo-sung*. The Korea Herald.  
<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190529000423#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20refugee%20issue%20is%20not,and%20we%20belong%20to%20it.%E2%80%9D>
- Jemirade, D. (2021). Humanitarian intervention (HI) and the responsibility to protect (R2P): The United Nations and international security. *African Security Review*, 30(1), 48–65. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2020.1847153>
- Kofman, E. (2020). Unequal internationalisation and the emergence of a new epistemic community: gender and migration. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 8(1), 1–6. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-020-00194-1>
- Locke, J., & Shapiro, I. (2003). *Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Maliniak, D., Parajon, E., & Powers, R. (2021). Epistemic Communities and Public Support for the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. *Political Research Quarterly*, 74(4), 866–881. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920946400>
- Matsuda, P. K. (2002). Negotiation of identity and power in a Japanese online discourse community. *Computers and Composition*, 19(1), 39–55.  
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S8755-4615\(02\)00079-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S8755-4615(02)00079-8)
- Milwertz, C., & Bu, W. (2007). Non-Governmental Organising for Gender Equality in China - Joining a Global Emancipatory Epistemic Community. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 11(1-2), 131–149. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642980601176308>
- Newman, E. (2015). *The Responsibility to Protect, multilateralism and international legitimacy*. In *Theorising the Responsibility to Protect* (pp. 125–143). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139644518.007>
- O'Connell, M. E. (2010). Responsibility to Peace: A Critique of R2P. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 4(1), 39–52. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970903541671>
- Pautz, H. (2011). Revisiting the think-tank phenomenon. *Public Policy and Administration*, 26(4), 419–435. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076710378328>
- Pautz, H. (2018). Think tanks, Tories and the austerity discourse coalition. *Policy & Society*, 37(2), 155–169. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2017.1397395>
- Pitsuwan, S., Nguyen, H., Wibisono, M., Mahathir, M., & Romulo, A. (2014, September). Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Pathways Towards a Caring ASEAN Community.
- Renshaw, C. (2021, June 2). *R2P: An idea whose time never comes*. The Interpreter. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/r2p-idea-whose-time-never-comes>



- Scholten, P. (2017). The limitations of policy learning: a constructivist perspective on expertise and policy dynamics in Dutch migrant integration policies. *Policy & Society*, 36(2), 345–363. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2017.1322263>
- Schneiker, A. (2017). *Humanitarian NGOs, (In)Security and Identity: Epistemic Communities and Security Governance (Global Security in a Changing World)* (1st ed.). Routledge.
- Stevens, A. (2007). When two dark figures collide: Evidence and discourse on drug-related crime. *Critical Social Policy*, 27(1), 77–99. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018307072208>
- Stone, D. (2002). Introduction: global knowledge and advocacy networks. *Global Networks (Oxford)*, 2(1), 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-0374.00023>
- Stone, D. (2004). Private authority, scholarly legitimacy and political credibility: Think tanks and informal diplomacy. In A. Bieler, R. Higgott, & G. Underhill (Eds.), *Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System* (pp. 211–225). Taylor & Francis.
- Stone, D. (2006). Knowledge networks and global policy. In S. Maxwell & D. Stone (Eds.), *Global Knowledge Networks and International Development: bridges across boundaries* (1st ed., pp. 89–105). Routledge.
- Sukma, R. (2012). The ASEAN political and security community (APSC): opportunities and constraints for the R2P in Southeast Asia. *Pacific Review*, 25(1), 135–152. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.632975>
- UNICEF. (n.d.). *Rohingya crisis*. <https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/rohingya-crisis>
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2012). A note on epistemics and discourse analysis. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 51(3), 478–485. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02044.x>

## **9. Appendices**

### Appendix A - Transnational quality indicators

<b>Transnational quality indicators</b>		
<p>1. Practices (conferences, workshops, meetings, projects etc.)</p>	<p><b>Online:</b> Does the meeting involve several nationalities? Is there an explicit indicator of transnationality/internationality? In what domain does this practice take place?</p>	<p><b>Offline:</b> Does the meeting involve several nationalities? Is there an explicit indicator of transnationality/internationality? In what domain does this practice take place?</p>
<p>2. Organizational</p>	<p>Are there ties/cooperation between several organizations? Are the ties/cooperation based in more than two countries? (Through meetings)</p>	

### Appendix B - Discourse community indicators


<b>Indicators</b>		
1. Established goals of reform		
2. Justifying necessity of change		
3. Describing the means to achieve better results and predict outcomes		
<i>Discourse community: epistemic discourse analysis</i>		
<b>Tools:</b>	<b>Explanation:</b>	<b>Boundary-drawing:</b>
Evidentiality	Discourse involving giving references to recognized experts, as reliable sources of knowledge. This can be authors or other organizations that are cited.	Citing expert people and organizations with the particular specialization areas to explain a phenomenon, this is part of knowing who people to refer to in the community to disseminate knowledge.

Levels, detail and precision of description (LDPD)	Describing the actions of actors as well as social and political events varying in numerous semantic ways. The level of detail determines expertise, the more vagueness the less expertise. This includes facts with numbers and figures, descriptions of actions, for example; “action must take place, specifically military intervention with armed troops for the duration of “X”. General statements are excluded from levels, detail and precision of description.	An expert group of people and researchers forms when the evidence presents itself in detail whereas vague information may render the produced information as an item that can be produced by anyone.
Topics	This represents which discourse information, topic or theme is most important to the people. These are strategies to persuade and manipulate beliefs as knowledge and facts. The indications of such “‘knowledge’ are factive verbs such as “recognize”, “note” and “regret”, definite expressions as well as factive prepositions (“despite”)” (van Dijk, 2012, p.21)	This is what is considered important and recurring in a community’s discourse by
Argumentation	The structures of discourse are made to defend points of view. This type of knowledge is a partisan view of reality. Arguments base themselves on explicit and implicit premises, they are shared and accepted representations of facts. This centers a strategy of showing beliefs that are in fact factual knowledge.	The argumentation style is particular and show what is considered factual knowledge within the community.

Appendix C – Discourse coalition indicators

Discourse coalition theory	Indicators:	Case of ICISS Report: <i>humanitarian intervention to Responsibility to Protect</i>
Storylines: <i>simplification</i>	1. Actors involved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Career</li> <li>- Occupation</li> <li>- Research expertise</li> </ul>
	2. Utilization of knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Identified themes (that differentiate R2P from HI)</li> </ul>
Discursive struggle: <i>impact</i>	3. Discourse structuration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- UNGA vote and counter discourse – references to themes identified in indicator 2 of storylines</li> </ul>

Appendix D - Summary of research



Appendix E1 – Transnational practices analysis

No/ (Date)	Meeting type	Location of meeting	Online/Offline	Participant countries	Explicit international indicators
1. (17-18/05/2011)	Meeting	New York, USA	Offline	Total: 31 states Australia, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Mexico, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, and the United States, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Côte D'Ivoire, Indonesia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Rwanda, South Africa, and the United Kingdom	Title: Global Network of R2P Focal Points
2. (02/02/2012)	Workshop	Tarrytown, USA	Offline	-No data-	Description: "...the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the Stanley Foundation convened R2P Focal Points and other national representatives, UN mission ambassadors and experts, UN officials, and mass atrocity specialists for a preparatory workshop to address the challenges faced by individual R2P Focal Points and their developing global network."
3. (29/09/2012)	Meeting	New York, USA	Offline	Total: 36 states, 1 regional body Australia, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Germany, Switzerland, United States, Côte d'Ivoire and Slovenia European Union -Incomplete data-	Title: Global Network of R2P Focal Points  Description: "...Participants also discussed the need to collaborate internationally through a global network of the national R2P Focal Points."
4. (11-12/05/2013)	Meeting	Accra, Ghana		Total: 35 states, 3 regional organizations Denmark, Ghana	Title: Global Network of R2P Focal Points Description: "This document provides a summary of key issues discussed in Accra and

				African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and European Union (EU). -Incomplete data-	recommendations on how to further strengthen the role of R2P Focal Points, their Global Network and relevant regional organizations in preventing mass atrocities.”
5. (12-13/06/2014)	Meeting	Gaborone, Botswana	offline	Total: 30 states Australia, Botswana, Netherlands, United States -Incomplete data-	Title: Global Network of R2P Focal Points
6. (23-24/06/2015)	Meeting	Madrid, Spain	offline	Total: 50 states Canada, Chile, Hungary, Nigeria, Spain -incomplete data-	Title: Global Network of R2P Focal Points
7. (20-22/06/2016)	Meeting	Seoul, South Korea	offline	Total: >50 states Austria, South Korea, Timor-Leste, Senegal, United Kingdom, Burundi, Philippines, Kenya, Spain, Cambodia -incomplete data-	Title: Global Network of R2P Focal Points Description: “Through roundtable discussions R2P Focal Points identified best practices and challenges in the prevention of mass atrocities and discussed ways in which they could better operationalize the Global Network.”
8. (24-25/04/2017)	Meeting	Doha, Qatar	offline	Total: 40 states Qatar, Croatia, Chile, United Kingdom, Liechtenstein -incomplete data-	Title: Global Network of R2P Focal Points
9. (12-14/06/2018)	Meeting	Helsinki, Finland	offline	Total: 39 states Finland, Mexico, Ghana, Pakistan, Australia -incomplete data-	Title: Global Network of R2P Focal Points
10. (13-14/05/2019)	Meeting	Brussels, Belgium	offline	Total: 45 states, 4 regional organizations Belgium, Sweden, Senegal, South Africa European Union (EU), Organization of American States (OAS), African Union (AU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe -incomplete data-	Title: Global Network of R2P Focal Points

Appendix E2 – Transnational organization analysis

Organizational ties	Type of cooperation	Based on how many countries	Link
1. Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes (GAMAAC)	Working meeting	Argentina (2008), Tanzania (2010), Switzerland (2011) and Cambodia (2013)	
2. Asia Pacific Partnership for Atrocity Prevention (APPAP)	Promoting dialogue and collaboration in areas such as early warning and risk assessment, mediation, policy analysis and development for prevention, training and education, capacity building for prevention	Singapore (2016) Jakarta, Indonesia (2019) Manila, Philippines (2020)	<a href="https://appap.group.uq.edu.au/about/meetings">https://appap.group.uq.edu.au/about/meetings</a>



Appendix F1 – Discourse community: Main themes

	Established goals of reform		Justifying necessity for change		Describing the means to achieve better results and predict outcomes					
<b>Identified themes</b>	R2P (pillars)	International community	Failure of UNSC	None-Western obstacles	Accountability	Preventative diplomacy	UN bodies and grassroots movements	Multilateralism	institutionalisation	International community

Appendix F2 – Discourse community: Analysis

Established goals of reform		
<b>Occasional Paper:</b>	<b>R2P (pillars):</b>	<b>International community (goal):</b>

<p>Adams, S. (2019). "If Not Now, When?": The Responsibility to Protect, the Fate of the Rohingya, and the Future of Human Rights. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i>.  <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319491">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319491</a></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Topic:</i> It was this political reality that former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was alluding to when he spoke of the need for a reformed twenty-first century UN to confront "problems without passports," such as poverty, climate change and "the persistence of deadly conflicts in which civilians are primary targets." It was also this thinking that led to the development of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a means of mobilizing "timely and decisive action" by the UN Security Council (Adams, 2019, p.6)</li> <li>2. <i>Topic:</i> 6 November statement emphasized that the "Security Council stresses the primary responsibility of the Government of Myanmar to protect its population including through respect for the rule of law and the</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Topic:</i> It was this political reality that former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was alluding to when he spoke of the need for a reformed twenty-first century UN to confront "problems without passports," such as poverty, climate change and "the persistence of deadly conflicts in which civilians are primary targets." It was also this thinking that led to the development of ... the broader international community to prevent or halt mass atrocities wherever they may occur. (Adams, 2019, p.6)</li> </ol>
---	---	---

	<p>respect, promotion and protection of human rights. (Adams, 2019, p.8)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. <i>Topic:</i> Similarly, Australia's Foreign Minister, speaking at the UN during September, argued that the "Government of Myanmar has a responsibility to protect all citizens in its territory, and where human rights violations have taken place, those responsible must be held to account. (Adams, 2019, p.9)</li></ol>	
--	---	--

<p>Streitfeld-Hall, J. D. (2015). Preventing Mass atrocities in West Africa. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 6, 1–30. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_WestAfrica_Final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_WestAfrica_Final.pdf</a></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Topic:</i> Ghana also facilitated the spread of mass atrocity prevention values internationally, and particularly among its West African neighbors, by launching the Global Network of R2P Focal Points alongside the government of Denmark in 2010 and hosting the third meeting of the network in Accra during June 2013 (Streitfeld-Hall, 2015, p.8)</li> <li>2. <i>Topic:</i> First, the UN maintained a long-term presence via a gradual transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. This transition was a strong display of Pillar II efforts to help a country build mechanisms for prevention, early warning and conflict mediation. (Streitfeld-Hall, 2015, p.12)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Argument:</i> The relationship between Sierra Leone and the international community following the country’s 1990-2002 civil war provides one of West Africa’s best examples of sustained international engagement in the spirit of Pillar I and Pillar II of the Responsibility to Protect (Streitfeld-Hall, 2015, p.11)</li> </ol>
<p>Cinq-Mars, E. (2015). Too little, too late: Failing to prevent atrocities in the Central African Republic. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 7, 1–26. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_CAR_Final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_CAR_Final.pdf</a></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Topic:</i> Every state has the Responsibility to Protect its populations and the wider international community has a</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Topic:</i> Moreover, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner and in</li> </ol>

	<p>responsibility to encourage and assist them in this regard. (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.5).</p>	<p>accordance with the UN Charter when a state is found to be manifestly unable or unwilling to protect its populations (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.5)</p>
<p>Adams, S. (2015). Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 5, 1–30.  <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/syriapaper_final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/syriapaper_final.pdf</a></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Topic:</i> The Responsibility to Protect is an international norm, but it does not possess independent agency. The failure to end atrocities and protect civilians in Syria is not a failure of R2P, but of the imperfect actors and institutions charged with its implementation. (Adams, 2015, p.3)</li> <li>2. <i>Argument:</i> Beyond the primary responsibility of the Syrian government to stop killing its own people, responsibility rests with the one body entrusted and mandated by the 193 members of the United Nations with the maintenance of international</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Argument:</i> In this context, perhaps the most glaring diplomatic deficiency during the first year and a half of the Syrian conflict was the failure of the Security Council to reinforce an attempt by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to broker a ceasefire and negotiate an end to the conflict. (Adams, 2015, p.11)</li> </ol>

	peace and security – the Security Council. (Adams, 2015, p.3)	
Halake, A. B. (2013). “R2P in Practice”: Ethnic Violence, Elections and Atrocity Prevention in Kenya. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i> , 3, 1–23. <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-in-practice-ethnic-violence-elections-and-atrocity-prevention-in-kenya/">https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-in-practice-ethnic-violence-elections-and-atrocity-prevention-in-kenya/</a>	1. <i>Argument:</i> The Kenyan government, along with every other United Nations (UN) member state, committed to protect populations from these crimes at the 2005 UN World Summit when affirming its support for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Halake, 2013, p.5)	2. <i>Topic:</i> In keeping with R2P, international actors responded swiftly to the violence in Kenya (Halake, 2013, p.5)
Adams, S. (2012). Libya and The Responsibility to Protect. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i> , 3, 1–21. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LibyaAndR2POccasionalPaper.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LibyaAndR2POccasionalPaper.pdf</a>	1. <i>Argument:</i> The Special Advisers also reminded Libya of its pledge at the 2005 UN World Summit to protect populations “by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement (Adams, 2012, p.6). 2. <i>Topic:</i> The Responsibility to Protect focused the international response. Resolution 1970, unanimously adopted by the	1. <i>Topic:</i> The Responsibility to Protect focused the international response. Resolution 1970, unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 26 February, explicitly invoked the “Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population.” (Adams, 2012, p.6) 2. <i>Topic:</i> The Secretary-General argued that the international community had “advanced the Responsibility to Protect” in Côte

	<p>Security Council on 26 February, explicitly invoked the “Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population (Adams, 2012, p.6).</p> <p>3. <i>Topic &amp; argument:</i> Even though the Responsibility to Protect features in just three paragraphs of the 40-page outcome document of the 2005 UN World Summit, historian Martin Gilbert has suggested that it constituted “the most significant adjustment to national sovereignty in 360 years.”<sup>61</sup> R2P’s core idea is that all governments have an obligation to protect their populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It is primarily a preventive doctrine (Adams, 2012, p.11)</p>	<p>d’Ivoire and Libya, both of which were “important victories for justice and international law (Adams, 2012, p.17)</p>
--	--	--

<p>Mthembu-Salter, G., Berger, E., &amp; Kikoler, N. (2011). Prioritizing Protection from Mass Atrocities: Lessons from Burundi. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series), 2, 1–20.  <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Occasional-Paper-Prioritizing-Protection-from-Mass-Atrocities.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Occasional-Paper-Prioritizing-Protection-from-Mass-Atrocities.pdf</a></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Topic:</i> The responsibility to protect norm seeks to ensure that the international community of states never again fails to act in the face of genocide and other gross human rights violations. (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.2)</li> <li>2. <i>Argument:</i> at states have an obligation to protect their citizens from these crimes; second, that the international community should assist them in doing so; and, third, that if a state fails to appropriately exercise this obligation, the responsibility to do so falls to the larger community of states. This entails a responsibility to use “appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter,” (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.2)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Topic:</i> Regional and international efforts in Burundi pre-date the adoption of the responsibility to protect at the 2005 World Summit. Yet the situation in Burundi can aptly be characterized as one where R2P would have applied. (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.2)</li> <li>2. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> Paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) states that the international community “has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.4)</li> <li>3. <i>Topic:</i> pursuant to paragraph 139 of the WSOD, the international community can employ economic</li> </ol>
--	---	---



	<p>3. <i>Argument:</i> thus the threats of force, rather than having the result of protecting populations, probably exacerbated the risks primarily because there had never been a genuine commitment on the part of the international community to authorize a deployment or provide the necessary troops (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.10)</p>	<p>sanctions against governments who fail to protect their populations. Increasingly sanctions experts have been calling for the use of targeted sanctions against specific perpetrators, be they government officials or non-state actors as the consequences are less onerous to average citizens. In Burundi economic sanctions were one of the earliest measures employed. (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.11)</p>
<p>Traub, J. (2010). Unwilling and Unable: The Failed Response to the Atrocities in Darfur. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series), 1</i>, 1–32. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Unwilling-and-Unable-The-Failed-Response-to-the-Atrocities-in-Darfur.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Unwilling-and-Unable-The-Failed-Response-to-the-Atrocities-in-Darfur.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> protect (R2P), and thus committed themselves to act to protect peoples from mass atrocities when states are “manifestly failing” to do so. For this reason, the very word “Darfur” now evokes the failure of the international community to use the instruments at its disposal to stop war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. (Traub, 2010, p.2)</p>	<p>1. <i>Argument:</i> The violence in Darfur has forced the international community to confront the vexing issue of state sovereignty. In many settings where atrocities have been committed, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Somalia, the state has become feckless or state authority has vanished altogether, so that the international community may act without facing resistance from an</p>

	<p>2. <i>Topic:</i> The doctrine of the responsibility to protect stipulates that the international community must step in where states are “manifestly failing” to protect their own peoples from mass atrocities. (Traub, 2010, p.2)</p>	<p>incumbent regime or from its allies (Traub, 2010, p.2)</p> <p>2. <i>Topic:</i> “the international community must be prepared to take swift and appropriate action,” including “military action.”<sup>46</sup> This was the first time any major figure had broached such a possibility. (Traub, 2010, p.4)</p>
--	--	---

<b>Justifying necessity for change</b>		
<b>Occasional Paper:</b>	<b>Failure of UNSC:</b>	<b>None-Western obstacles:</b>

<p>Adams, S. (2019). "If Not Now, When?": The Responsibility to Protect, the Fate of the Rohingya, and the Future of Human Rights. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i>.  <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319491">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319491</a></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Topic:</i> Historically, no issue has done more to tarnish the reputation of the UN than the failure to halt mass atrocities (Adams, 2019, p.8).</li> <li>2. <i>Argumentation &amp; LDPD:</i> The decades-long list of examples reaches back to Indonesia during the 1960s, Cambodia and Bangladesh during the 1970s, and the genocide against the Kurds in Iraq during the 1980s, to name just a few. Arguably, however, it was not until Rwanda and Srebrenica during the 1990s that the United Nations began to grapple with that failure and with the need for the international community to better respond to such crises (Adams, 2019, p.5)</li> <li>3. <i>Topic:</i> Despite this blatant attempt at obfuscation (of Rohingya crises), there was no follow up from the UN Security Council nor the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and little accountability from major</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Argumentation:</i> Since 2011 the international community has been confronted by seemingly intractable civil wars in Syria, South Sudan and Yemen; endemic violence and instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic; the rise of the so-called Islamic State, Boko Haram and other armed extremist groups; as well as deteriorating and deadly human rights situations in Burundi, Cameroon, Venezuela and elsewhere. (Adams, 2019, p.5)</li> <li>2. <i>Evidence &amp; LDPD:</i> A report by the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition documented that there were "more than 700 attacks on hospitals, health workers, patients and ambulances in 23 countries around the globe in 2017," with 252 attacks in Syria alone (Adams, 2019, p.4)</li> <li>3. <i>Topic:</i> Despite the historic adoption of R2P at the 2005 UN World Summit, and its growing influence on the</li> </ol>
---	---	--

	<p>international donors and investors who generally turned a blind eye to the ongoing persecution. (Adams, 2019, p.6)</p> <p>4. <i>Argument &amp; Evidence:</i> UN Secretary-General António Guterres also briefed the Security Council about the crisis on 28 September, noting that the UN had received “bone chilling accounts” regarding “excessive violence and serious violations of human rights” in Rakhine State... (p.7) There was no question, therefore, that given the multiple sources of intelligence available to them, the entire Council was aware of the scale and intensity of the atrocities underway in Rakhine State. Their response was tepid at best. It took ten weeks for the UN Security Council just to release a Presidential Statement on the crisis (Adams, 2019, p.8)</p> <p>5. <i>Topic:</i> Despite the UN Security Council’s failure to act regarding</p>	<p>international response to a number of significant conflicts, implementation was always going to be most difficult in those intractable cases where a state is manifestly unwilling to uphold its responsibilities because it is itself a perpetrator. (Adams, 2019, p.6)</p> <p>4. <i>Topic &amp; LDPD:</i> With regard to the prevention of mass atrocities, the Council’s recent failures have come in many forms. The most public, dramatic and tragic have been a result of the abuse of the veto – with twelve vetoes since 2011 regarding the Syrian situation (six by China and Russia together, six by Russia alone). (Adams, 2019, p.9)</p>
--	---	---

	<p>Myanmar, at the start of September 2017 the government of Nigeria issued an official statement condemning atrocities committed against the Rohingya and calling upon “the United Nations to invoke the principle of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and intervene in Myanmar to stop the ongoing ethnic cleansing and create conditions for the safe return” of displaced Rohingya. (Adams, 2019, p.9)</p> <p>6. <i>Topic:</i> Fundamentally, the Myanmar crisis was not just a failure of the UN Security Council to uphold their collective responsibility to protect, it was a failure to challenge the calculus of lowest common denominator diplomacy, and to defend the basic norms and principles of human rights and humanitarianism. (Adams, 2019, p.9-10).</p> <p>7. <i>Argument:</i> The visit had a profound impact on several of the ambassadors and although a group of states on the</p>	
--	--	--

	<p>UN Security Council have worked to keep the issue of the Rohingya in the Council's focus, as of December 2018 there had still not been a single formal resolution adopted to name the nature of the crime committed against them, nor to hold the perpetrators accountable. (Adams, 2019, p.10)</p> <p>8. <i>Topic:</i> UN Security Council's failure to adequately respond to catastrophic crises like Myanmar has led to an exponential increase in human suffering. (Adams, 2019, p.10)</p>	
--	---	--

Streitfeld-Hall, J. D. (2015). Preventing Mass atrocities in West Africa. *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)*, 6, 1–30. [http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper\\_WestAfrica\\_Final.pdf](http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_WestAfrica_Final.pdf)

1. *Argument:* The Constitutive Act of the AU contains the first notable steps towards formalizing the norm of non-indifference to mass atrocity crimes within the organization, as opposed to the previous adherence to a doctrine of “non-intervention” in the affairs of other sovereign states (Streitfeld-Hall, 2015, p.8)
2. *Argument:* However, the head of the ministry, H.E. Mr. Diaby Gassama Kalifa, has vocally advocated for strengthening judicial institutions and accountability mechanisms, and met with the then-UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, during March 2014 regarding strategies to improve respect for human rights in Guinea. Unfortunately, the ministry’s capacity was further undermined as the government urgently shifted resources and priorities following the 2014 outbreak of Ebola (Streitfeld-Hall. 2015, p.19)

<p>Cinq-Mars, E. (2015). Too little, too late: Failing to prevent atrocities in the Central African Republic. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 7, 1–26.  <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_CAR_Final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_CAR_Final.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> Furthermore, fifty-five years after CAR’s independence, the fact that France was diplomatically pressured to muster an intervention force for its former colony does not reflect positively on the Security Council as it still relies on outdated “spheres of influence” when addressing an international crisis. (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.17)</p>	<p>1. <i>Argument:</i> The United Kingdom sided with the United States in the push for greater support to MISCA, concerned as well with the rising costs of UN peacekeeping. African calls for more time and support to be given to MISCA were also supported by both China and Russia, who preferred a regional solution. (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.14)</p>
<p>Adams, S. (2015). Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 5, 1–30.  <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/syriapaper_final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/syriapaper_final.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> Watching the discussion in the chamber after the vote, the depth of un-diplomatic emotion was palpable. In particular, Susan Rice, then United States Ambassador to the UN and now President Barack Obama’s National Security Advisor, said her government was “disgusted” by the veto of a resolution intended to help protect civilians and halt atrocities. (Adams, 2015, p.5)</p> <p>2. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> What became clear in the aftermath of the February 2012</p>	<p>1. <i>Topic, argument &amp; LDPD:</i> In particular, Russia and China have on four separate occasions employed their vetoes to block action in response to mass atrocity crimes in Syria, including most recently on a May 2014 draft resolution that would have referred the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court. As this paper shows, each veto strengthened impunity and encouraged the expansion of war crimes and crimes against humanity. (Adams, 2015, p.3)</p> <p>2. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> then on 24 July, just five days after the third double veto,</p>



	<p>veto was that Security Council inaction emboldened those inside Syria most committed to a military resolution of the conflict. The killing rate in Syria increased from approximately 1,000 per month to approximately 5,000 per month during 2012 as the civil war metastasised. (Adams, 2015, p.5)</p> <p>3. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> then on 24 July, just five days after the third double veto, fixed wing aircraft were reportedly used for the first time. During August the regime conducted more than 110 air strikes against opposition targets, including more than 60 using fixed wing aircraft. (Adams, 2015, p.6)</p> <p>4. <i>Argument:</i> The lack of sincere support from key state actors, combined with the government of Burundi's strong rejection of the idea of any international military operation, led to a weak Security Council resolution in March 1996 that merely called for</p>	<p>fixed wing aircraft were reportedly used for the first time. During August the regime conducted more than 110 air strikes against opposition targets, including more than 60 using fixed wing aircraft. (Adams, 2015, p.6)</p> <p>3. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> Protagonists begged for additional external assistance to tip the balance of power on the battlefield. For the government, this meant increased military reliance upon Iran and Hezbollah as well as the continuance of crucial supplies from Russia (Adams, 2015, p.6)</p> <p>4. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> Explaining South Africa's unwillingness to vote for the resolution, Ambassador Baso Sangqu argued that with regard to the Syrian conflict, "the templates for the solution were very clear, it was along similar lines to Libya." (Adams, 2015, p.10)</p> <p>5. <i>Argument:</i> The Security Council was divided between a majority who wanted a vigorous response in keeping with R2P</p>
--	--	---

	<p>consultations about a force (Adams, 2015, p.9)</p> <p>5. <i>Topic:</i> he Security Council has not only failed to fulfill its basic function – the maintenance of international peace and security – it has also dismally failed to uphold its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the Syrian people. (Adams, 2015, p.10)</p> <p>6. <i>Argument:</i> But the abstentions of the three emerging powers reflected a disturbing lack of consensus within the Security Council about how, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the Libya intervention, to respond appropriately to deadly internal conflicts. (Adams, 2015, p.10)</p>	<p>and a veto-wielding minority who did not, while the influential IBSA member states appeared to be abstaining, both literally and figuratively, from the process of finding a solution. (Adams, 2015, p.10)</p> <p>6. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> Of the 30 Security Council resolutions that referenced R2P since the UN World Summit in 2005, China and Russia had abstained on Resolution 1706 on Darfur and Resolution 1973 on Libya. Russia also abstained on Resolution 2117 on small arms and light weapons. But altogether, China voted for 28 of the R2P resolutions between 2005 and January 2015 and Russia voted for 27 – including two on Syria during 2014. In other words, Russia and China were certainly not as implacably hostile to mass atrocity prevention and R2P as has sometimes been assumed. (Adams, 2015, p.11)</p>
--	---	--

		<p>7. <i>Argument:</i> This announcement also had the effect of publicly linking “regime change” with ending atrocities in Syria, allowing the Russian government to loudly declare that their efforts at the Security Council were aimed at defending Syria’s sovereignty, rather than providing political cover for a dictatorship that was killing its own people. (Adams, 2015, p.13)</p> <p>8. <i>Argument:</i> Following the third double-veto by Russia and China on 19 July 2012, diplomatic initiatives aimed at trying to end mass atrocities in Syria collapsed. (Adams, 2015, p.13)</p> <p>9. <i>Argument:</i> Russia called instead for a resolution condemning “terrorist activity” and threatened to veto if a humanitarian resolution was brought to a vote. (Adams, 2015, p.18)</p>
<p>Halake, A. B. (2013). “R2P in Practice”: Ethnic Violence, Elections and Atrocity Prevention in Kenya. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series), 3, 1–23. <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-in-practice-ethnic-violence-elections-and-atrocity-prevention-in-kenya/">https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-in-practice-ethnic-violence-elections-and-atrocity-prevention-in-kenya/</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Argument:</i> Meanwhile, UN Security Council members have been urged to invoke Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which allows for a delay in the</p>	<p>1. <i>Argument:</i> Both candidates vilified the ICC as a tool of Western neo-colonialism.<sup>85</sup> Donor states, in particular the United Kingdom, were</p>

	<p>proceedings for one year. The Council rejected this request in 2011 and on 15 November 2013 rejected it again. Only seven out of fifteen UN Security Council members, none of whom is a state's party to the ICC, voted for a Rwandan resolution calling for deferral (Halake, 2013, p.18)</p>	<p>regularly criticized for their “colonialist” and “imperialist” behavior in demanding accountability for atrocities committed after the 2007 election (Halake, 2013, p.15)</p>
<p>Adams, S. (2012). Libya and The Responsibility to Protect. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 3, 1–21. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LibyaAndR2POccasionalPaper.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LibyaAndR2POccasionalPaper.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> While the failure of the Security Council to adequately respond to the crisis in Syria exposed it to intense criticism, it did invoke R2P in resolutions concerning Yemen and South Sudan. (Adams, 2012, p.16)</p>	<p>2. <i>Topic &amp; argument:</i> Despite ongoing mass atrocity crimes, on 4 October 2011 Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution that sought to impose sanctions, an arms embargo and travel bans on the Syrian government. The ostensible justification was that Russia and China were nervous that such UN-authorized measures might eventually lead to Syria becoming “the next Libya.” The double veto was, therefore, also an explicit challenge to the Responsibility to Protect (Adams, 2012, p.15)</p> <p>3. <i>Argument:</i> The reality is that Russia would have vetoed the Syria resolution even if the Libyan intervention had</p>

		<p>never happened and R2P did not exist (Adams, 2012, p.16)</p> <p>4. <i>Argument:</i> Traditionally nervous about any UN action that impinges upon state sovereignty, China had only used its veto six times since 1972. Lacking any direct interest in Libya and facing a world outraged by Qaddafi’s crimes against his own people, China abstained from the crucial Security Council resolution that led to the Libyan intervention. However, Russia’s intense lobbying convinced the Chinese to veto with regard to Syria. (Adams, 2012, p.16)</p> <p>5. <i>Argument:</i> IBSA countries had “mostly lined up with Russia and China in key debates over Libya and Syria (Adams, 2012, p.16)</p> <p>6. <i>Argument:</i> Moreover, despite Russia’s protests to the contrary, its second veto on Syria was widely perceived as not being about Libya and R2P, but as being motivated by arms, allies and strategic power (Adams, 2012, p.17)</p>
--	--	---

<p>Mthembu-Salter, G., Berger, E., &amp; Kikoler, N. (2011). Prioritizing Protection from Mass Atrocities: Lessons from Burundi. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 2, 1–20. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Occasional-Paper-Prioritizing-Protection-from-Mass-Atrocities.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Occasional-Paper-Prioritizing-Protection-from-Mass-Atrocities.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Argument:</i> he lack of sincere support from key state actors, combined with the government of Burundi’s strong rejection of the idea of any international military operation, led to a weak Security Council resolution in March 1996 that merely called for consultations about a force (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011 p.8)</p>	<p>1. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> In the wake of the coup that brought Buyoya to power, the failed military intervention efforts of Tanzania and Uganda, and the stalled mediation process, regional leaders imposed broad economic sanctions on Burundi in late July 1996 (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.11)</p>
<p>Traub, J. (2010). Unwilling and Unable: The Failed Response to the Atrocities in Darfur. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 1, 1–32. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Unwilling-and-Unable-The-Failed-Response-to-the-Atrocities-in-Darfur.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Unwilling-and-Unable-The-Failed-Response-to-the-Atrocities-in-Darfur.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Argument:</i> Both the UN Security Council and regional bodies, above all the African Union (AU), could have threatened, and then imposed, a graduated series of punishments in order to significantly raise the cost to the regime of continuing its campaign of attacks. Why were these actions not taken? Does the failure to act effectively reflect a fundamental unwillingness to confront an intransigent regime? (Traub, 2010, p.2)</p>	<p>1. <i>Argument:</i> Nevertheless, China, Russia, Pakistan, Algeria, Angola, the Philippines, and Brazil objected to the threat of sanctions. (Traub, 2010, p.10)</p> <p>2. <i>Argument:</i> Even then, China and Pakistan abstained. The Pakistani ambassador complained that the resolution placed undue blame on the government of Sudan. (Traub, 2010, p.10)</p> <p>3. <i>Argument:</i> On September 18, the council passed resolution 1564 calling upon the secretary-general to establish a commission of inquiry to determine whether the government had indeed</p>

		<p>committed genocide, and stating that it “shall consider” sanctions in the face of non-compliance. Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia abstained in voting. (Traub, 2010, p.11)</p> <p>4. <i>Topic, argument &amp; LDPD:</i> Akram was the most outspoken figure in council deliberations; but it was China, with its veto power, that consistently tipped the scales. China was then scouring Africa for new sources of oil and other key resources. In 1996, at a time when Western oil companies were pulling out of Sudan, which the US had listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, China had bought a 40 percent stake in the country’s chief oil consortium (Traub, 2010, p.11)</p>
--	--	--

**Describing the means to achieve better results and predict outcomes**

Occasional Paper	Accountability	Preventative diplomacy	UN Bodies and grassroots movements
<p>Adams, S. (2019). "If Not Now, When?": The Responsibility to Protect, the Fate of the Rohingya, and the Future of Human Rights. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319491">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319491</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> These conflicts are often the result of deep structural problems rooted in protracted disputes over the use and abuse of power, such as Myanmar where the international community failed to adequately respond to years of early warning regarding the persecution of the Rohingya. (Adams, 2019, p.12)</p> <p>2. <i>Topic:</i> Despite the failure of the UN Security Council to act with regard to atrocities committed in Myanmar during late 2017, a myriad of civil society organizations -</p>	<p>4. <i>Topic:</i> the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel described the Gambia as "a success of preventive diplomacy that has been achieved through the mobilization of regional actors in perfect coordination with the international community. (Adams, 2019, p.11)</p> <p>5. <i>Topic:</i> ECOWAS' intervention in the Gambia played an important role in preventing another violent conflict with potentially disastrous consequences for the country and for West Africa as a whole. It remains an example of how early warning, preventive diplomacy, and structural reform</p>	<p>9. <i>Argument:</i> It was due to the brave testimony of Rohingya survivors - as well as the efforts of journalists, humanitarian workers, and civil society activists - that there was international awareness and outrage regarding the plight of the Rohingya (Adams, 2019, p.8)</p> <p>10. <i>Topic:</i> These sentiments were echoed in a joint appeal from eighty-one human rights, faith-based and humanitarian organizations to the UN Security Council. (Adams, 2019, p.9)</p> <p>11. <i>Topic:</i> despite the failure of the UN Security Council to act with regard to atrocities</p>



	<p>working with Rohingya survivors and advocates - continued to push for accountability. (Adams, 2019, p.15)</p> <p>3. <i>Topic:</i> the same way that metastasizing conflicts and mass atrocities weaken international norms, justice can be contagious and accountability in one country can deter potential perpetrators elsewhere. Even in the most desperate cases, with the Security Council immobilized and inert, the international community can pursue other options to ensure that international law is upheld.</p>	<p>can make all the difference in the world. (Adams, 2019, p.11)</p> <p>6. <i>Argument, LDPD &amp; evidence:</i> Overall, the international community spent almost \$8 billion on peacekeeping and \$22.1 billion on humanitarian operations while responding to violent conflicts during 2016.<sup>61</sup> Meanwhile, research by the World Bank and UN suggests that preventing the outbreak of violent conflict could actually save “over \$34 billion in damages” at the national level and save the international community “at least 1.2 billion per year. (Adams, 2019, p.12)</p> <p>7. <i>Argument:</i> Most importantly, prevention works.</p>	<p>committed in Myanmar during late 2017, a myriad of civil society organizations - working with Rohingya survivors and advocates - continued to push for accountability. (Adams, 2019, p.15)</p>
--	--	--	---

	<p>(Adams, 2019, p.15)</p>	<p>The international community successfully supported structural reforms in Kenya after the bloody 2007 election pitted ethnic and political rivals against one another. Measures to control and punish hate speech and ethnic incitement, as well as the implementation of constitutional reforms and the restructuring of governmental power, helped ease some of the underlying sources of conflict in Kenyan society, contributing to a largely peaceful election in 2013 (Adams, 2019, p.12)</p> <p>8. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> Meanwhile in Guinea, following a notorious stadium massacre in 2009, an election in 2010</p>	
--	----------------------------	--	--

		<p>paved the way for the country's first civilian government in five decades. The UN's undervalued Peacebuilding Commission then helped mobilize funds for the retirement of more than 3,000 members of Guinea's bloated and abusive security forces. Reform of the security sector in Guinea was a key component of the overall effort to protect democracy and strengthen human rights. None of these efforts were without blemish, but they all helped prevent a recurrence of atrocities. (Adams, 2019, p.12)</p>	
<p>Streitfeld-Hall, J. D. (2015). Preventing Mass atrocities in West Africa. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 6, 1–30.  <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_WestAfrica_Final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_WestAfrica_Final.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> he failure to ensure accountability and justice perpetuates the culture of</p>	<p>2. <i>Argument:</i> For example, actions undertaken by the AU Commission and PSC thus far have largely been in</p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> Civil society can also help facilitate the decentralization of reconciliation and prevention efforts.</p>

	<p>impunity that has historically fueled recurring violence in Côte d'Ivoire. The lack of equitable justice contributes to ongoing political divisions that could hinder sustainable peace, particularly as the country prepares for elections in October 2015. ( Streitfeld-Hall, 2015, p.17)</p>	<p>response to crises rather than for the prevention of them. The AU's ability to respond to early warning remains under-developed (Streitfeld-Hall, 2015, p.21)</p>	<p>An empowered civil society can play a vital role in early warning and raising community awareness to ameliorate the risk of conflict recurrence. ( Streitfeld-Hall, 2015, p.21)</p>
<p>Cinq-Mars, E. (2015). Too little, too late: Failing to prevent atrocities in the Central African Republic. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 7, 1–26. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_CAR_Final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_CAR_Final.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> Peacekeepers struggle to contain surges in violence, and a rush to elections before the end of 2015 without significant improvements in security, accountability, dialogue and reconciliation will only increase the risk of further</p>	<p>1. <i>Topic, argument &amp; LDPD:</i> Widely considered a “neglected” or “forgotten” country, previous violence in CAR has in fact attracted significant international peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. For example, the UN had a political and peacebuilding</p>	<p>5. <i>Topic &amp; argument:</i> Initiatives such as the Secretary-General’s Human Rights Up Front Action Plan may serve to remedy this in the future. Launched in November 2013, the Action Plan seeks to ensure greater organizational preparedness by the UN to respond</p>

	<p>mass atrocity crimes. (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.3)</p> <p>2. <i>Argument &amp; LDPD:</i> Throughout this history of violence, Central Africans have had little recourse to justice. During a mission to the country in March 2014, officials from the Ministry of Justice recounted to the author the difficulty in ensuring accountability: courts had been looted and taken over by armed groups, magistrates had been murdered, and only three prisons were functioning throughout the entire country. (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.6)</p>	<p>support presence in CAR for fourteen consecutive years, first through the UN Office in CAR (BONUCA) from 2000 to 2010, and subsequently the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office (BINUCA) from 2010 until 2014. Since 2008 CAR has also been on the agenda of the UN's Peacebuilding Commission, which is tasked with preventing the relapse of conflict in countries in transition (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.7)</p> <p>2. <i>Argument:</i> None of these peacebuilding or peacekeeping efforts has had success in inoculating CAR against collapse – or protecting its civilians when collapse occurs. (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.7)</p>	<p>to evolving conflict situations, particularly when there is a risk that serious human rights violations could occur. (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.16)</p>
--	---	---	---

		<p>3. <i>Argument &amp; evidence:</i> An important study of past international engagement in CAR undertaken by the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform explains a number of factors that have contributed to this. First, the report finds that the failure to prevent conflict in CAR is specifically linked to an “overly negative and inherently flawed” perception of the country (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.7)</p> <p>4. <i>Topic &amp; argument:</i> The UN representatives highlighted the failure of the international community to prevent the situation in CAR from deteriorating after December 2012. Warning signs of a</p>	
--	--	--	--

		<p>worsening conflict were clear and both general and specific risks of mass atrocity crimes were discernable. Peacebuilding efforts by the UN were insufficient, and the world body was ill-prepared to adapt to a complex emergency in the country. Peace operations deployed to CAR lacked sufficient numbers to deter the expansion of armed violence or halt the commission of mass atrocity crimes (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p.15)</p>	
<p>Adams, S. (2015). Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 5, 1–30. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/syriapaper_final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/syriapaper_final.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> What we do know is that at each point of the conflict the absence of accountability encouraged more extreme forms of deadly violence. (Adams, 2015, p.11)</p>	<p>1. <i>Argument:</i> Two days later the Security Council adopted its first resolution since the conflict began, authorizing the deployment of a small observer team. Then on 21 April the Council</p>	<p>3. <i>Argument:</i> Other parts of the UN system also lived up to their responsibilities. The Human Rights Council in Geneva passed thirteen resolutions condemning mass atrocities in Syria</p>

	<p>2. <i>Topic:</i> Finally, there was the issue of accountability for three years of mass atrocity crimes in Syria. (Adams, 2015, p.19)</p> <p>3. <i>Topic:</i> In the absence of accountability for atrocities there can be neither peace nor justice as impunity has emboldened those on all sides who remain most resistant to a negotiated solution to Syria's conflict. As it did with the situation in Darfur in March 2005 and Libya in February 2011, the Security Council needed to refer the Syrian situation to the ICC for investigation. (Adams, 2015, p.19)</p>	<p>established a larger 90-day UN Supervision Mission (UNSMIS) to monitor the ceasefire and implementation of the Annan Plan (Adams, 2015, p.12)</p> <p>2. <i>Argument:</i> In particular, the success of the Annan Plan depended upon UNSMIS' full and rapid deployment throughout Syria, which government obstruction and increasing violence made impossible (Adams, 2015, p.12)</p>	<p>between 2011 and September 2014 and established an independent Commission of Inquiry to document grave violations of human rights. (Adams, 2015, p.11)</p>
--	--	---	---



<p>Halake, A. B. (2013). "R2P in Practice": Ethnic Violence, Elections and Atrocity Prevention in Kenya. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series), 3, 1–23.  <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-in-practice-ethnic-violence-elections-and-atrocity-prevention-in-kenya/">https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-in-practice-ethnic-violence-elections-and-atrocity-prevention-in-kenya/</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> A key component of upholding R2P is ensuring that those who aid, incite or perpetrate mass atrocities are held accountable for their actions. The Kenyan government has failed to fulfill this responsibility. (Halake, 2013, p.14)</p> <p>2. <i>Topic:</i> Highlighting the important role that accountability plays in preventing mass atrocities, he noted that, "the people of Kenya want to see concrete progress on impunity. Without such progress, the reconciliation between ethnic groups and the</p>	<p>4. <i>Argument:</i> Long-term preventive efforts were focused on reforming institutions within the security sector, judiciary and electoral commission, as well as tackling accountability and the prevalence of hate speech (Halake, 2013, p.5)</p> <p>5. <i>Argument:</i> Responding to some of these risks, the government intensified its preventive efforts. This included issuing warnings reminding the population about the legal consequences of hate speech, increasing peace messaging and deploying troops to potential conflict flashpoints (Halake, 2013, p.5)</p> <p>6. <i>Topic:</i> The platform, which</p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> Local non-governmental organization (NGO) efforts were also fostered by these projects. For example, PeaceNet, a coalition of grassroots organizations, launched the "Uwiano platform for peace."<sup>97</sup> The platform, which was supported by financial assistance from Sweden, the United Kingdom and UN Women, sought to improve early warning information sharing, sensitize the media to conflict reporting and strengthen local mediation capacities (Halake, 2013, p.17)</p>
--	---	---	--

	<p>long-term stability of Kenya is in jeopardy. (Halake, 2013, p.15)</p> <p>3. <i>Argument:</i> In September 2013 the Kenyan parliament voted to withdraw from the Rome Statute and repealed the International Crimes Act, which would allow for domestic prosecution of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide committed after 2009. This raises serious questions about the new government's willingness to tackle the culture of impunity for mass atrocity crimes in Kenya. (Halake, 2013, p.18)</p>	<p>was supported by financial assistance from Sweden, the United Kingdom and UN Women, sought to improve early warning information sharing, sensitize the media to conflict reporting and strengthen local mediation capacities. (Halake, 2013, p.17)</p>	
--	--	---	--

<p>Adams, S. (2012). Libya and The Responsibility to Protect. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 3, 1–21.  <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LibyaAndR2POccasionalPaper.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LibyaAndR2POccasionalPaper.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> The resolution included a comprehensive package of coercive measures – an arms embargo, asset freezes, travel bans and referral of the situation to the ICC – aimed at persuading the Qaddafi regime to stop killing its people. (Adams, 2012, p.6)</p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> By February 2012, therefore, despite lingering concerns regarding Libya, the emerging consensus (enabled largely by the Brazilian initiative) was that R2P’s advocates needed to develop better preventive, mediated and coercive tools as they operationalize R2P in the future (Adams, 2012, p.17)</p>	<p>2. <i>Topic:</i> The UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council also passed strong R2P-influenced resolutions condemning crimes against humanity in Syria. When a second, weaker, Syria resolution was put to the Security Council on 4 February 2012, Russia and China vetoed it again. (Adam, 2012, p.16)</p>
<p>Mthembu-Salter, G., Berger, E., &amp; Kikoler, N. (2011). Prioritizing Protection from Mass Atrocities: Lessons from Burundi. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i>, 2, 1–20.  <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Occasional-Paper-Prioritizing-Protection-from-Mass-Atrocities.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Occasional-Paper-Prioritizing-Protection-from-Mass-Atrocities.pdf</a></p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> Since then, however, President Nkurunziza and the CNDD-FDD have governed in a manner that lacks transparency and accountability (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.12)</p>	<p>2. <i>Argument:</i> These public demonstrations of government stability, led by the special representative, may have forestalled the outbreak of mass violence and may be one of the few examples of effective and immediate preventive and protective action.</p>	<p>1. <i>Topic:</i> Numerous actors were involved in the mediation efforts: NGOs, neighboring states, and regional and international organizations. (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.5)  2. <i>Topic:</i> numerous NGO initiatives complemented and/or established a parallel track for negotiations.</p>

		<p>(Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.4)</p> <p>3. <i>Topic:</i> Most recently mediation was used to stem the violence that erupted in Kenya following the country's disputed 2008 elections; this particular episode has been considered a successful application of the responsibility to protect. (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.5)</p> <p>4. <i>Argument:</i> Mediation was at the heart of international efforts in Burundi and was used to seek a sustainable political solution to the civil war by creating a power-sharing agreement between political and armed groups representing the Hutu and Tutsi communities. Numerous actors</p>	<p>(Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.7)</p> <p>3. <i>Argument:</i> Other NGO initiatives included the Political Dialogue Project, which from 1996 to 2000 facilitated conversations between major political and military stakeholders. Its founder and director, South African parliamentarian Jan Van Eck, also encouraged military groups not party to the Arusha peace talks to nevertheless engage with the mediator in an attempt to find common ground between all of the parties. (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.7)</p>
--	--	---	---

		were involved in the mediation efforts: NGOs, neighboring states, and regional and international organizations. (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2011, p.5)	
Traub, J. (2010). Unwilling and Unable: The Failed Response to the Atrocities in Darfur. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series), 1</i> , 1–32. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Unwilling-and-Unable-The-Failed-Response-to-the-Atrocities-in-Darfur.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Unwilling-and-Unable-The-Failed-Response-to-the-Atrocities-in-Darfur.pdf</a>	1. <i>Topic &amp; argument:</i> Other mechanisms of accountability, however, were also at work. Since Sudan was not a signatory of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, and thus could not be subject to its jurisdiction absent a referral from the Security Council, the commission “strongly” recommended that the council “immediately” refer the matter to the ICC.	1. <i>Argument:</i> Guéhenno asserts, “For military deployment to have worked, you would need to get to the point where they were feeling, ‘The Janjaweed is out of control; we’ve lost all our credibility.’ I think some Sudanese generally really did believe that; they would have liked to outsource the solution. But then you would have needed a real commitment from the international community (Traub, 2010, p.14) 2. <i>Argument:</i> The Security Council, unwilling to field a	5. <i>Topic:</i> By this time, the regime’s consistent denials of the scope and nature of the violence could no longer obscure the truth. In addition to growing media coverage, human rights NGOs, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, were offering regular reports from the field. (Traub, 2010, p.9).

	<p>(Traub, 2010, p.13)</p>	<p>peacekeeping force, had decided instead to “outsource the mission to a fledgling entity,” as a UN peacekeeping official puts it.<sup>94</sup> Finding available troops was not the chief problem, as it so often was the case with UN-led operations; African states showed impressive readiness to furnish soldiers, although actual deployment in the field often proved maddeningly slow (Traub, 2010p.16)</p> <p>3. <i>Topic:</i> The paradox of prevention is that policy makers do not normally take difficult actions until forced to do so by crisis—even though it is widely understood that the cost of action increases the longer one waits. State institutions</p>	
--	----------------------------	--	--

		<p>are typically wired for response rather than for anticipation. (Traub, 2010, p.24)</p> <p>4. <i>Topic:</i> R2P cannot be fully effective unless and until that wiring is changed. Both regional bodies and the UN need an early-warning capacity that responds to signs of impending catastrophe. More important, decision-making bodies such as the Security Council must be prepared to act on the basis of such early intelligence, rather than waiting until violence has reached its zenith (Traub, 2010, p.24)</p>	
--	--	---	--

Appendix G – Discourse coalition: Utilization of knowledge Data Analysis

**Utilization of knowledge data: ICISS report**

<b>Depoliticized intervention:</b>	<b>Sovereignty as responsibility:</b>	<b>Sovereignty-intervention link:</b>	<b>Bottom-up prevention:</b>	<b>Moral policy:</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Finding a consensus about intervention is not simply a matter of deciding who should authorize it and when it is legitimate to undertake. It is also a matter of figuring out how to do it so that decent objectives are not tarnished by inappropriate means (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.5).</li> <li>2. The challenge in this context is to find tactics and strategies of military intervention that fill the current gulf between outdated concepts of peacekeeping and full-scale military operations that may</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. In an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities, the existence of fragile states, failing states, states who through weakness or ill-will harbour those dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain internal order by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.5)</li> <li>2. All that said, sovereignty does still matter. It is strongly arguable that effective and legitimate states remain the best way to ensure that the benefits of the internationalization of trade, investment, technology and</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Thus the “responsibility to protect” is more of a linking concept that bridges the divide between intervention and sovereignty; the language of the “right or duty to intervene” is intrinsically more confrontational. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.17)</li> <li>2. It is also critical in this regard that those wanting to help from outside completely recognize and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries concerned, and confine their efforts to finding solutions within those parameters. in discussing the follow-up to military intervention, that the objective overall is not to change constitutional</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The change in law and in legal norms has been accompanied by the establishment, as has been noted, of a broad range of new international institutions and non-governmental organizations, concerned to monitor and promote the implementation worldwide of human rights and international humanitarian law – with the result that new expectations for conduct are increasingly accompanied by new expectations for corrective action. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.6)</li> <li>2. Also important has been the increasingly significant role played by NGOs, particularly in the context</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. But can the fact that effective international action is not always possible in every instance of major humanitarian catastrophe ever be an excuse for inaction where effective responses are possible? (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.6)</li> <li>2. What is at stake here is not making the world safe for big powers, or trampling over the sovereign rights of small ones, but delivering practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.11)</li> <li>3. This Commission certainly accepts that issues of sovereignty and</li> </ol>



<p>have deleterious impacts on civilians (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.5)</p> <p>3. The kind of intervention with which we are concerned in this report is action taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.8)</p> <p>4. To ensure that military intervention, when it occurs, is carried out only for the purposes proposed (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.11)</p> <p>5. The frontline defence of the rule of law is best conducted by the judicial systems of sovereign states, which should be independent, professional and properly resourced. It is only when national systems of justice either cannot or will not act to judge crimes against humanity that universal jurisdiction and other international</p>	<p>communication will be equitably shared (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.8)</p> <p>3. And in security terms, a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be achieved through the cooperation of effective states, confident of their place in the world, than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.8)</p> <p>4. The defence of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters, does not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people. The Commission heard no such claim at any stage during our worldwide consultations. It is acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In international human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself, sovereignty</p>	<p>arrangements or undermine sovereignty, but to protect them. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.17)</p> <p>3. The rule against intervention in internal affairs encourages states to solve their own internal problems and prevent these from spilling over into a threat to international peace and security. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.31)</p> <p>4. The Commission found in its consultations that even in states where there was the strongest opposition to infringements on sovereignty, there was general acceptance that there must be limited exceptions to the non-intervention rule for certain kinds of emergencies (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.31)</p> <p>5. The objective overall is not to change constitutional arrangements, but to protect them. As was noted in the discussion above of trusteeship, military intervention means endeavouring to sustain forms of government compatible with the sovereignty of the</p>	<p>of early warning efforts and helping to galvanize domestic and foreign public opinion in support of prevention measures. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.20)</p> <p>3. Effective conflict prevention depends on disparate actors working together strategically. States, the UN and its specialized agencies, the international financial institutions, regional organizations, NGOs, religious groups, the business community, the media, and scientific, professional and educational communities all have a role to play. The capacity to conduct preventive diplomacy ultimately relies on the international ability to coordinate multilateral initiatives, and identify logical divisions of labour (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.26)</p> <p>4. Moving from talk to action means greater willingness on the part of local and national communities to take the kinds of steps that are required if conflict is to be avoided (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.26)</p>	<p>intervention are not just matters affecting the rights or prerogatives of states, but that they deeply affect and involve individual human beings in fundamental ways. One of the virtues of expressing the key issue in this debate as “the responsibility to protect” is that it focuses attention where it should be most concentrated, on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.15).</p> <p>4. Generally expressed, the view was that these exceptional circumstances must be cases of violence which so genuinely “shock the conscience of mankind,” or which present such a clear and present danger to international security, that they require coercive military intervention. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.31)</p> <p>5. The Commission’s view is that exceptions to the principle of non-intervention should be limited. Military intervention for human protection purposes must be regarded as an</p>
--	--	---	---	---

<p>options should come into play (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.14)</p> <p>6. The Commission believes that the Charter’s strong bias against military intervention is not to be regarded as absolute when decisive action is required on human protection grounds (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.16)</p> <p>7. thirdly, although this point should not be overstated, the familiar language does effectively operate to trump sovereignty with intervention at the outset of the debate: it loads the dice in favour of intervention before the argument has even begun, by tending to label and delegitimize dissent as anti-humanitarian. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.17)</p> <p>8. While the state whose people are directly affected has the default responsibility to protect, a residual responsibility also lies</p>	<p>is now understood as embracing this dual responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimum content of good international citizenship (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.8)</p> <p>5. But there is a necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.13)</p> <p>6. 5 Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly recognized in state practice, has a threefold significance. First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they</p>	<p>state in which the enforcement has occurred – not undermining that sovereignty. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.44)</p> <p>6. Intervening to protect human beings must not be tainted by any suspicion that is a form of neo-colonial imperialism. On the contrary, the responsibility to rebuild, which derives from the obligation to react, must be directed towards returning the society in question to those who live in it, and who, in the last instance, must take responsibility together for its future destiny (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.45)</p> <p>7. Past debates on intervention have tended to proceed as if intervention and state sovereignty were inherently contradictory and irreconcilable concepts (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.69)</p> <p>8. We found broad willingness to accept the idea that the responsibility to protect its people from killing and other grave harm was the most basic and fundamental of all the responsibilities that</p>	<p>5. Ideally there would be a report as to the gravity of the situation, and the inability or unwillingness of the state in question to manage it satisfactorily, from a universally respected and impartial non-government source. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.35)</p> <p>6. as can be assessments made for their own purposes by other credible international organizations and non-governmental organizations, and on occasion the media. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.35)</p> <p>7. A number of non-governmental bodies have developed “justice packages,” which can be adapted to the specific conditions of a wide variety of operations, and these should be considered an integral part of any post-intervention peace building strategy, pending the re-establishment of local institutions. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.42)</p> <p>8. The Commission has sought to give clear articulation to this consensus, and calls on all members of the</p>	<p>exceptional and extraordinary measure, and for it to be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.32)</p> <p>6. Our purpose is not to license aggression with fine words, or to provide strong states with new rationales for doubtful strategic designs, but to strengthen the order of states by providing for clear guidelines to guide concerted international action in those exceptional circumstances when violence within a state menaces all peoples (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.35)</p> <p>7. Military intervention is not justified if actual protection cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of embarking upon the intervention are likely to be worse than if there is no action at all (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.37)</p> <p>8. Those who challenge or evade the authority of the UN as the sole legitimate guardian of international</p>
---	---	--	---	---

<p>with the broader community of states. This fallback responsibility is activated when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities; or where people living outside a particular state are directly threatened by actions taking place there. This responsibility also requires that in some circumstances action must be taken by the broader community of states to support populations that are in jeopardy or under serious threat (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.17)</p> <p>9. One of the increasingly evident problems with the whole strategy of prevention is that some states are becoming reluctant to accept any internationally endorsed preventive measures at all – even</p>	<p>are accountable for their acts of commission and omission (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.13)</p> <p>7. What has been gradually emerging is a parallel transition from a culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international accountability (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.14)</p> <p>8. These are all questions that will recur: for present purposes the point is simply that there is a large and accumulating body of law and practice which supports the notion that, whatever form the exercise of that responsibility may properly take, members of the broad community of states do have a responsibility to protect both their own citizens and those of other states as well. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.16)</p>	<p>sovereignty imp poses – (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.69)</p>	<p>community of nations, together with non-governmental actors and citizens of states, to embrace the idea of the responsibility to protect as a basic element in the code of global citizenship, for states and peoples, in the 21st century (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.75)</p>	<p>peace and security in specific instances run the risk of eroding its authority in general and also undermining the principle of a world order based on international law and universal norms (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.48)</p> <p>9. The UN has the moral legitimacy, political credibility and administrative impartiality to mediate, moderate and reconcile the competing pulls and tensions that still plague international relations. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.52)</p> <p>10. This means accepting limitations and demonstrating through the use of restraint that the operation is not a war to defeat a state but an operation to protect populations in that state from being harassed, persecuted or killed. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.63)</p> <p>11. As to moral appeal, preventing, averting and halting human suffering – all the catastrophic loss and misery that go with slaughter and ethnic cleansing and mass</p>
---	--	--	---	---

<p>of the softest and most supportive kind. Their fear is that any “internationalization” of the problem will result in further external “interference” and start down a slippery slope to intervention. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.25)</p> <p>10. for military action ever to be defensible the circumstances must be grave indeed. But the threshold or “trigger” conditions are not the end of the matter. There are a series of additional precautionary principles which must be satisfied, to ensure that the intervention remains both defensible in principle and workable and acceptable in practice. (p.29)</p> <p>11. The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.37)</p>				<p>starvation – are inspiring and legitimizing motives in almost any political environment. Political leaders often underestimate the sheer sense of decency and compassion that prevails in their electorates, at least when people’s attention is engaged (just as they also underestimate the public willingness, when well informed, to accept the risk of casualties in well designed military interventions aimed at alleviating that suffering (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.71)</p> <p>12. every country's national interest in being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen. There is much direct reciprocal benefit to be gained in an interdependent, globalized world where nobody can solve all their own problems: my country’s assistance for you today in solving your neighbourhood refugee and terrorism problem, might reasonably lead you to be more willing to help solve my environmental or drugs problem tomorrow</p>
--	--	--	--	--

<p>12. However, the mandate should define in clear language what the aims of the intervention in the various phases of it would be and it should spell out that the desired end state is the restoration of good governance and the rule of law. (Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.60)</p>				<p>(Evans &amp; Sahnoun, 2002, p.72)</p>
--	--	--	--	--

Appendix H – Primary source list

<b>Primary sources</b>	
Occasional paper	Adams, S. (2012). Libya and The Responsibility to Protect. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i> , 3, 1–21. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LibyaAndR2POccasionalPaper.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LibyaAndR2POccasionalPaper.pdf</a>
Occasional Paper	Adams, S. (2015). Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i> , 5, 1–30. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/syriapaper_final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/syriapaper_final.pdf</a>
Occasional paper	Adams, S. (2019). “If Not Now, When?”: The Responsibility to Protect, the Fate of the Rohingya, and the Future of Human Rights. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> . <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319491">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319491</a>
Occasional Paper	Cinq-Mars, E. (2015). Too little, too late: Failing to prevent atrocities in the Central African Republic. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i> , 7, 1–26. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_CAR_Final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_CAR_Final.pdf</a>
ICISS Report	Evans, G., & Sahnoun, M. (2002). <i>The Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</i> (G. Côté-Harper, L. Hamilton, M. Ignatieff, V. Lukin, K. Naumann, C. Ramaphosa, F. Ramos, C. Sommaruga, E. Stein, & R. Thakur, Eds.; Pap/Cdr ed.). IDRC Books.

Occasional paper	Halake, A. B. (2013). “R2P in Practice”: Ethnic Violence, Elections and Atrocity Prevention in Kenya. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i> , 3, 1–23. <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-in-practice-ethnic-violence-elections-and-atrocity-prevention-in-kenya/">https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-in-practice-ethnic-violence-elections-and-atrocity-prevention-in-kenya/</a>
Occasional paper	Mthembu-Salter, G., Berger, E., & Kikoler, N. (2011). Prioritizing Protection from Mass Atrocities: Lessons from Burundi. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i> , 2, 1–20. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Occasional-Paper-Prioritizing-Protection-from-Mass-Atrocities.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Occasional-Paper-Prioritizing-Protection-from-Mass-Atrocities.pdf</a>
Occasional Paper	Streitfeld-Hall, J. D. (2015). Preventing Mass atrocities in West Africa. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i> , 6, 1–30. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_WestAfrica_Final.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OccasionalPaper_WestAfrica_Final.pdf</a>
Occasional Paper	Traub, J. (2010). Unwilling and Unable: The Failed Response to the Atrocities in Darfur. <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Occasional Papers Series)</i> , 1, 1–32. <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Unwilling-and-Unable-The-Failed-Response-to-the-Atrocities-in-Darfur.pdf">http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Unwilling-and-Unable-The-Failed-Response-to-the-Atrocities-in-Darfur.pdf</a>

UNGA 66 <sup>th</sup> plenary session	United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (2021, May). General Assembly Seventy-fifth session: 66 <sup>th</sup> Plenary meeting <i>A/75/PV.66</i> , 1–12. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/122/25/PDF/N2112225.pdf?OpenElement">https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/122/25/PDF/N2112225.pdf?OpenElement</a>
Workshop	Global Centre for R2P. (2020, January 13). <i>Policy Memo, Preparatory Workshop for the Second Meeting of the R2P Focal Points Network</i> . Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/2510/">https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/2510/</a>