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## **Legitimacy and Development Aid Allocation: A Matter of Recipient Merit or Donor Interests?**

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# Legitimacy and Development Aid Allocation

## *A Matter of Recipient Merit or Donor Interests?*

A case study on the European Union's decision on development aid allocation in

Afghanistan



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## Abstract

In August 2021, the Taliban took control over the Afghan government. Subsequently, the EU halted development aid to Afghanistan. This research seeks to explain what motivated this decision and how Afghanistan's illegitimacy has influenced the EU's decision. Two aid allocation models based on recipient merit and donor interests are used to explain this puzzle. Drawing on an in-depth qualitative content analysis, this research illustrates how both aid allocation models sufficiently explain the EU's decision considering Afghanistan's illegitimacy.

**Keywords:** *European Union; Afghanistan; Development aid allocation; Legitimacy;*

*Recipient Merit; Donor Interests*

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## 1. Introduction

Official development aid (ODA) from donors has skyrocketed to 178.9 billion dollars in 2021 (OECD, n.d.-a). The influx of development aid has helped developing countries build and maintain economic progress and welfare during the COVID-19 crisis. In contrast, Afghanistan has succumbed under the pressures of an economic crisis, the COVID-19 crisis, a severe drought and a hunger crisis (United Nations, 2021). Moreover, the Taliban took control over Afghanistan's government in August 2021. The Taliban's arrival was welcomed by an abrupt decrease of development aid influx. Nonhumanitarian funding was suspended, billions of dollars of Afghan assets were frozen and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced Afghanistan no longer has access to the lender's resources (Goldbaum, Padshah & Shah, 2022; Sifton, 2022; Timmins, 2021). The international community is grappling with whether they should engage with the fundamentalist government or cut all ties at the expense of millions of Afghans (Lawder, 2021; Turak, 2021). The Taliban started to pursue international recognition and asked NGOs to stay and continue their work (McLaren, 2021). A few NGOs started negotiations with the Taliban, but others have fled the country. Most members of the international community have denied recognition of the Taliban's legitimacy (Jami, 2022).

The European Union (EU) is one of the members of the international community that has decided to halt its development aid to Afghanistan. The EU's decision was instigated by its refusal to recognize the Taliban-led government as a legitimate state (Green, 2021; Reuters, 2022). In his article, Hurd (1999) discusses the importance of legitimacy within the international context. He notes that legitimacy is one of many crucial mechanisms of social control and that legitimacy is an important concept as it signals the presence of authority (1999, p. 399). The better part of legitimacy consists of social recognition dependent on the audience's

perception (Collingwood, 2006, p. 454; Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 160). Thus, perceiving and labeling a government as illegitimate can have great effects on a state's authority, particularly in the international context. Unsurprisingly, the EU's refusal to recognize Afghanistan's new-led government as legitimate has had its consequences. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President of the European Commission (EC) shared that no development aid will be sent to Afghanistan until the situation is clarified. The EC has announced a 1 billion dollars support package to provide need-based humanitarian assistance, but continues the freeze of overall EU ODA to Afghanistan (Council of the European Union, 2021; European Commission, 2021-a; Reuters, 2022). This means that the change in Afghanistan's legitimacy has, in some way, affected the EU's decision on its provision of development aid. It is, however, unclear what motivated the EU's development aid to Afghanistan and how this exactly was influenced by Afghanistan's illegitimacy.

In this research, the EU's decision on development aid allocation in connection with legitimacy in the case of Afghanistan will be explored. This research's scientific relevance is mostly based on its intention to connect research on EU's aid allocation with literature on legitimacy. It connects literature on determinants of development aid allocation to literature on legitimacy and contributes to the debate about the EU's attitude towards illegitimate states by studying the case of Afghanistan. Furthermore, this research holds societal value. It is important to explore if the EU's development aid is conditional and it would be valuable to uncover which conditions and factors are at play. Considering the broad implications legitimacy may have, it is necessary to research *how* it could influence the EU's decisions with regard to development aid allocation. This research will therefore attempt to answer the following research question:

*How does recipient legitimacy influence the European Union's decision on development aid allocation?*

The following chapter discusses the existing literature on legitimacy and development aid allocation. Furthermore, the theory chapter describes the two development aid allocation models based on recipient merit and donor interests, which is followed by the discussion of the methodology. Subsequently, the empirical analysis is guided by the aid allocation models previously discussed. Evidence found in press releases, statements and speeches and European parliamentary (EP) resolutions are in support of the claim that the recipient's legitimacy influences the causal relation of both allocation models. The research is concluded with a subchapter on discussions and recommendations and future research.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1 Development Aid Allocation

There is a wide variety of literature on development aid. Some studies focus on factors that are affected by development aid (Hagmann & Reyntjens, 2016; Zürcher, 2017), while others explore determinants of aid allocation (Fink & Redaelli, 2011; Kevlihan, DeRouen Jr & Biglaiser, 2014; Lio Rosvold, 2020; Lumsdaine, 1993; Sohn & Yoo, 2015). Scholars also explore how and under what conditions effectiveness can influence development aid allocation (Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015; De Juan, Gosztonyi & Koehler, 2020; Narang, 2015; Zürcher, 2017). Narang (2015) and Zürcher (2017) found that a stable environment can improve the effectiveness of development aid and that development aid in conflict zones is likely to have an exacerbating effect on violence. The claim that development aid is solely effective under certain conditions is further supported by the *Assessing Aid* report published by The World Bank (1998). They found that development aid is only effective in states with sound economic institutions or good governance, which led governments to take good governance into consideration when selecting recipient states (Hermes & Lensink, 2001, p. 4). For example, a good amount of money has been invested in Afghanistan under the assumption that good governance is a precondition for development (Goodhand, 2018, p. 93). Goodhand (2002) also concludes that donor interests as a driver of development aid runs the risk of endangering peace (p. 853). Karell and Schutte (2018) zoom in on this matter and argue that exclusive development projects can foster civil war onset in Afghanistan. In addition to the project design, Dadasov (2017) argues aid effectiveness can be impacted by who the donor is. Aid can more effectively promote good governance when it is allocated on EU level rather than member state level. Donor's blindness, specifically in regard to the complexity of the Afghanistan situation, can also hinder aid effectiveness (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010).



Ever since McKinley and Little (1977), it has become a common practice in literature to distinguish two aid allocation determinants, namely recipient needs and donor interests. Discussions about which one is the decisive factor in aid allocation are common in literature (Dudley & Montmarquette, 1976; McKinley & Little, 1977, 1979). Kevlihan et al. (2014, p. 851) argue aid is based more upon needs than self-interests. In contrast, some scholars argue that donor interests outweigh recipient needs (Lewis, 2003, p. 144). Fink and Redaelli (2011) found that political and strategic factors influence aid allocation. Furthermore, considerable evidence indicates that political and strategic considerations, economic interests and good governance and sound institutions influence aid allocation (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy, 2006; Dollar & Levin, 2006). In addition to donor interest and recipient needs model, Weiler and Sanubi (2019) applied the recipient merit model, which positively associates aid allocation with good governance. Good governance ensures that the aid is used to benefit the people it is intended for, which will increase aid effectiveness (United Nations, 2002, p. 6, p. 14).

Lio Rosvold (2020, p. 798) found that development aid is political and that favoritism on the part of the recipient state can bias its distribution, even if the donor is a multilateral aid agency. Schneider and Tobin (2013) zoom in on multilateral aid allocation and argue that national interests of member states affect the EU's aid allocation independent of recipient needs. In contrast, Olivié and Pérez (2021) did not find robust evidence of a strong influence of self-interest on EU aid flow. Frot, Olofsgard and Berlin (2014) add the maturity level of the relationship between the donor and the recipient as a critical factor in determining whether donor interests or recipient needs influence foreign aid motivation. These aid determinants also hold relevance in the EU context. Scholars found that aid allocation by the European Community is shaped by both the EU's interests and the recipient's needs (Bowles, 1989; Grilli

& Riess, 1992; Tsoutsoplides, 1991). Bowles (1989), in particular, found that donor interests outweigh recipient needs in the EU context. Hoang (2014, p. 320) found similar results in his research on EU aid allocation in Vietnam. Not only long-time donors, such as the EU, take their own interests into consideration. New donors also seem to allocate their aid based on their foreign political and economic interests, specifically in the case of Afghanistan, which possibly has a hand in Afghanistan's aid-dependency (De Toledo Gomes, 2017, p. 511; Szent-Iványi, 2011).

## **2.2 Legitimacy**

While Afghanistan is often labeled as a fragile state, donor governments have not come to a universal definition of fragile states (Barakat & Larson, 2014, p. 22; Toh & Kasturi, 2014, p. 6). Some scholars argue state fragility consists of authority, capacity and legitimacy (Carment, Prest & Samy, 2011; Carment, Samy & Prest, 2008, p. 363). Kraemer (2010, p. 650) claims Afghan citizens associate state legitimacy with accountable leaders that act in accordance with the law, keep them safe and provide necessary services. There is ample academic discussion regarding legitimacy specifically and its relation to aid allocation. McGillivray (2007) found that aid positively impacts growth in fragile states and that fragile states are generally under-aided, whereas the most fragile states are over-aided. According to Carment et al. (2008, p. 366), states receive aid regardless of its level of legitimacy as there is no correlation between aid effectiveness and state legitimacy. They, however, point out that states may become fragile because questions of legitimacy are not included into aid programming at all (p. 367). Babayan (2016, p. 221) subscribes to the notion that donors, specifically the EU, do not factor in state fragility in their policies.

In contrast to the findings of Carment et al. (2008), other scholars (Böhnke & Zürcher, 2013, p. 426; Dolan, 2020) found that development aid has a positive effect on the recipient state's legitimacy, specifically in Afghanistan. Here, the logic is that development aid allows the recipient state to provide services to its citizens, which in turn leads citizens to believe the state is more legitimate (Blair & Roessler, 2021, p. 315; Brass, 2016). Stollenwerk (2018) provides empirical evidence of the positive impact of perceptions of goods and service provision on state legitimacy. On the other hand, aid can also undermine recipient legitimacy as citizens perceive its government as incapable of providing services without outside help. However, research across multiple contexts suggest that aid does not decrease the recipient's legitimacy (Blair & Roessler, 2021, p. 352; Dietrich, Mahmud & Winters, 2018; Dietrich & Winters, 2015). Schmelzle and Stollenwerk (2018) doubt the simplicity of the governance-legitimacy relationship. They argue that in order to convert effective governance into legitimacy, four conditions need to be met: the state's citizens need to have performance-based legitimacy beliefs, the government and its citizens need to share goals and values, governance effectiveness needs to be attributed to a governance actor, and governance success needs to be generalized (p. 463). Gulrajani and Swiss (2019) claim legitimacy can also be a motivator for countries to participate in aid allocation. New donor countries contribute to aid allocation in their pursuit of legitimacy as advanced and influential states. Generally, the influence of legitimacy on political outcomes remains poorly articulated in practice (Alexander, Doorn & Priest, 2018, p. 397; Imerman, 2018, p. 96).

### **2.3 Bridging the Literature Gap**

Recipient merit and donor interests are aid allocation determinants that dominate discussions in development aid allocation literature. Scholars have, however, fallen short in the application of the allocation models in Afghanistan. Literature concerning legitimacy mostly covers the

impact of development aid on recipient and donor legitimacy. Legitimacy is often approached as the dependent variable (Mahadeo, Oogarah-Hanuman & Soobaroyen, 2011). The exploration of *if* and *how* legitimacy may influence aid allocation deserves more attention. This research intends to explore legitimacy in connection with the two development aid models – recipient merit and donor interests. It contributes to discussions on the use of legitimacy in empirical studies and the application of aid allocation models. Furthermore, this research attempts to answer the research question using qualitative methods. By doing so, this research attempts to expand the explanatory power of the aid allocation models. In conclusion, this research explores *if* and *how* recipient legitimacy influences the EU's decision on development aid allocation.


### 3. Theoretical Framework

#### 3.1 Recipient Merit Model

Recipient merit is used as an umbrella term for rules, norms, and behaviors. Hall and Jones (1999) call this 'social infrastructure'. The 'narrow' understanding of the concept good governance is the efficient and effective functioning of the state. Principles such as accountability, the level of corruption or sound financial management are important elements of good governance (Andrews, 2013). The 'broad' understanding of good governance is more in line with a normative dimension linked to human rights (Burnell, 2000; Santiso, 2003). Studies found evidence of positive effects of good institutions on financial aid assistance (Dollar & Levin, 2006, p. 2036). The recipient merit aid allocation model suggests that donors tend to reward democracy and human rights (Neumayer, 2006, p. 250). Legitimacy and good governance are quite different from each other, although both have characteristics in common, such as the 'absence of corruption, discrimination, and similar violations of the principle of impartiality in exercising political power that serves to create political legitimacy' (Rothstein, 2009, p. 325). Good governance solely refers to the outcome of a government, such as transparency in its decisions, the protection of human rights and the inclusive and representative composition of the government. Legitimacy takes all factors into account that might possibly influence actor's perception of a state's authority to rule, such as the manner in which the government is constituted. A government that is violently overturned without the use of a fair and democratic election might not be internationally perceived as a legitimate state, but can still provide good governance. Legitimacy is really set into social norms, whereas good governance is focused on government outcomes. According to this logic, a state that is legitimate indicates it is in possession of good governance.

If the EU decides to label a state as illegitimate due to a lack of human rights, the lack of transparency or shortcomings in regard to the government’s inclusivity and representation, this merely indicates the EU believes a state needs to meet these standards to be entitled to rule and in turn to be considered a legitimate government. Thus, the recipient’s illegitimacy, which indicates a lack of good governance, negatively affects the EU’s aid allocation. The effect of illegitimacy on the aid allocation model is central to the first hypothesis. The analysis is divided into two time periods, namely the period before the Taliban takeover in August 2021 and the period afterwards, in order to determine the presence or absence of an effect. Therefore, based on the described causal mechanism, the following hypothesis is deduced:

*H1: Recipient illegitimacy has adverse effects on the EU’s decision on development aid allocation, because illegitimacy indicates a lack of good governance in the recipient government.*




### 3.2 Donor Interests Model

Although donors often claim to aiding the ‘poorest of the poor’, aid allocation seems to be influenced by donor interests rather than recipient needs (Hagmann & Reyntjens, 2016, p. 4; Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998, p. 302). Political and economic interests, such as trade relations, are proven to have more influence on aid allocation compared to recipient needs or merit (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Davis & Swiss, 2020, p. 1328; Hoeffler & Outram, 2011, pp. 238-249). In this research, donor interests will be limited to political interests. According to

Berthélemy (2006, p. 188), donor governments are more likely to provide assistance when the recipient government is more democratic. Democracy can easily be confused for recipient merit. However, here, the focus does not lie on the promotion of democracy. The focus lies on the donor's decision to allocate aid to the recipient government, *because* the recipient is democratic. Thus, conditionality plays an important role. If a state does not meet democratic standards, such as fair and just national elections, it can be labeled as illegitimate. The ability to cooperate is higher amongst democracies, because cooperation requires trust and democracies find it harder to trust commitments by opposing leaders who lack domestic legitimacy (Doyle, 1983; Moaz & Abdolali, 1989). The donor interests aid allocation model argues donors provide more democratic recipients with more aid. A state can be perceived as illegitimate, when it does not meet conditions and requirements to be considered democratic. Thus, the recipient's illegitimacy indicates it is not democratic (enough) and therefore will not be supported by the EU by means of development aid. Here, the analysis also pays extra attention to changes in the recipient's legitimacy, specifically in the period before and after the Taliban's takeover in August 2021. Therefore, based on the described causal mechanism, the following hypothesis is deduced:

*H2: Recipient illegitimacy has adverse effects on the EU's decision on development aid allocation, because the EU acts in accordance to its own political interests.*



### **3.3 Alternative theory**

Recipient needs are also explored as an aid allocation determinant (Dudley & Montmarquette, 1976; Kevlihan et al., 2014; McKinley & Little, 1977, 1979). Aid allocation is, at least in part, based on altruistic or moral justifications, especially in the eyes of the recipient government's citizen (Neumayer, 2006, p. 250; Noël & Thérien, 1995). This logic claims that aid is proportional to the recipient's economic and welfare needs (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984, p. 881). This sentiment aligns with the main objective of ODA, namely the promotion of economic development and welfare of the recipient government (OECD, n.d.-b). The recipient's illegitimacy might call attention to the recipient's need to pursue self-reliance and independence. This theory would argue that the EU would increase its development aid to Afghanistan after its illegitimacy, which does not correspond with empirics. This reality complicates the theory's applicability. With this in mind, this research will go forward without the recipients needs aid allocation model. Not due its unimportance, but merely due its complex applicability.



### 3.4 Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a very multidimensional concept, which allows different interpretations among international relations scholars. Weber (1994, pp. 310-312) defines legitimacy as the state's successful monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory, which can be based on traditional, charismatic or legal rule. The institutionalists link legitimacy to the state's capacity, performance or perceive it as a concept that refers to a state in power (Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert, 2016, p. 1471). This interpretation, however, disregards the importance of the political, cultural and historical contexts of states (Lemay-Hébert, 2009). Others, such as Adams (2018, pp. 98-99), argue a state needs nothing more than non-inference to be legitimate, because legitimate states have *de facto* authority.

In this research, the focus lies on relational legitimacy (Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert, 2016, p. 1474). This approach centers around the interaction between state and society and the process of the constitution of social order. It builds on the *belief* in the state's right to rule and to have monopoly of the use of force (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 158; Roth, 1978). A state is seen as legitimate when its behavior is perceived to be "desirable, proper, appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). There is a common understanding of legitimacy as subjective and intersubjective normative beliefs about appropriateness of particular rules governing state behavior (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 166; Bukovansky, 2002, p. 70; Coicaud, 2002, p. 10; Franck, 1992, p. 50; Imerman, 2018, p. 75; Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Social recognition is an essential part of a state's legitimacy (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 160). In a sense this implies a state's legitimacy is in the eyes of the beholder, may the beholder be its domestic constituency, the international community or the EU (Collingwood, 2006, p. 454). As raised by Biermann and Gupta (2011, p. 1858), "a critical question becomes legitimacy in the eyes of whom?".

## 4. Methodology

### 4.1 Case Selection

This research conducts a single case study of the EU's decision on development aid allocation in Afghanistan in August 2021. A single case study allows for a detailed look at the causal mechanisms in a specific context. It enables the obtainment of findings that contribute to growing information and knowledge about broader political patterns (Gerring, 2009). The detailed exploration allows the (dis)confirmation of causal mechanisms (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 299). The case selection is strongly driven by its relevance to the research's objective. It is an appropriate case to explore the goal of the research, because it can be considered to be a *typical* case. The case illustrates an instance of a broader phenomenon. The international response to the 'illegitimate' Afghan government was similar to that of the EU. Close to 10 billion dollars was frozen by foreign governments and institutions as a response to the Taliban's takeover (Menon, 2022; Mohsin, 2021). Moreover, the IMF blocked Afghanistan's access to over 460 million dollars in reserve funds and the World Bank stopped funding of several Afghanistan projects (Rappeport, 2021; Zumbun, 2021). Similar to other countries, the EU continues to provide Afghanistan with humanitarian aid, but has halted development aid (BBC, 2022; Euronews, 2021). So, it can be said that the EU's response to Afghanistan's takeover is not atypical and can be considered to be a typical case.

### 4.2 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

In order to explore *if* and *how* Afghanistan's illegitimacy influenced the EU's decision to stop its development aid flow to Afghanistan, this research applies content analysis to a number of relevant secondary sources. The data collection consists of 36 documents, namely 21 press

releases by the EC concerning Afghanistan<sup>1</sup>; 11 reports of statements and speeches from the President of the EC and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President of the EC regarding Afghanistan<sup>2</sup>; and lastly, 4 EP resolutions addressing Afghanistan<sup>3</sup>. The reports of statements and speeches from the Commission's president and the High Representative and the EC published press releases can illustrate what motivates the EU's development aid to Afghanistan. Furthermore, the EP resolutions can offer valuable insights into the rationales that lead up to the EU's decision. The parliament is the place where politicians can exchange their point of views and scrutinize and question the EC's decisions on behalf of the European population. This research includes three different types of data sources due to limited availability of data. The collected data are published in the time period between May 2019 and May 2022. This time frame has been selected, because it allows a comprehensive illustration of the EU's narrative in the two-year-period before and the 10-month-period after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan and the EU's decision to halt development aid in August 2021.

This research uses qualitative content analysis to systematically analyze certain aspects of meanings according to the research question (Schreier, 2013, p. 171). The analysis focuses on subject and context of the text, emphasizes variation and “offers opportunities to analyse manifest and descriptive content as well as latent and interpretative content” (Graneheim, Lindgren & Lundman, 2017, p. 29; Schreier, 2013, p. 174). This approach suits the research purpose as it allows in-depth analysis of the themes, main ideas and context information of the texts (Mayring, 2000). The content analysis will use categories and indicators that are linked to the previously conceptualized variables in order to test the causal mechanisms described in the

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<sup>1</sup> The press releases can be accessed through the links listed in Appendix 1.

<sup>2</sup> The reports of statements and speeches can be accessed through the links listed in Appendix 2.

<sup>3</sup> The reports of EP resolutions can be accessed through the links listed in Appendix 3.

hypotheses. Lastly, a mixed approach, both deductive and inductive, will be followed for the development of the coding frame as the theoretically supported causal mechanisms need to be connected to the data (Mayring, 2000).

### **4.3 Operationalization and Hypotheses**

The first hypothesis expects the EU's decision on development aid allocation to be influenced by the illegitimacy of Afghanistan, because its illegitimacy indicates that Afghanistan does not meet the EU's standards of good governance. The broad understanding of good governance includes respect for human rights and democracy. The main focus is on how recipient illegitimacy is an indicator of the recipient's protection of human rights and the democratic degree of its institutions. The way in which this affects the EU's decision on aid allocation will also be explored. Furthermore, the second hypothesis also expects the EU's decision on development aid allocation to be influenced by the Afghanistan's illegitimacy, because providing development aid to an illegitimate government is not in the EU's political interests. The EU's political interests include its efforts to support the development of the recipient's economic dependency and the promotion of European norms and values. This research focusses on how recipient illegitimacy affects the donor interests and how this, in turn, negatively affects the EU's decision on development aid allocation.

These two hypotheses are tested using the analysis of 21 press releases, 11 statements and speeches and 4 EP resolutions. The information extracted from the texts and the theoretical arguments provide the basis for the main categories, the subcategories and the indicators, which help recognize the presence of the researched phenomenon (Schreier, 2013). Table 1 describes the coding frame for the content analysis.

Table 1. *Coding Frame for Content Analysis*

| <b>Hypothesis</b>      | <b>Main category</b>                      | <b>Subcategories</b>  | <b>Indicators</b>   |
|------------------------|---|---|---|
| <i>Recipient Merit</i> | Good governance in Afghanistan            | - Democratic procedure<br>- Democratic substance                                    | Inclusive and representative government, rule of law, transparency, women's right to employment and education, migration policy |
| <i>Donor Interests</i> | Political aspects the EU can benefit from | - Developing recipient economic dependency<br>- Promoting European norms and values | Conditionality, debt, cooperation, partnership, principles, democracy   |

In this research, recipient merit is interpreted as good governance. Good governance can be divided into democratic elements of procedural and substantial nature (Freyburg, Skripka & Wetzel, 2007, p. 8). Democratic procedure concerns modes of governance, for example the representation of women in the government apparatus. Amongst other indicators, voice and accountability and rule of law are indicators of good governance (Charron, Dijkstra & Lapuente, 2014, p. 71). Democratic substance refers to rights and principles, for instance refugee rights in migration policy and women's right to employment and education (Freyburg et al., 2007, p. 8).

Donor interests are interpreted as political aspects the EU can benefit from. The EU's political interests (partly) lie in the development of the recipient's economic dependency and the promotion of European norms and values. As to economic dependency, development aid is an essential element of the facilitation of trade and investment and "the gradual integration into the global economy" (Holland, 2008, p. 355). Economic partnership can also be seen as a strategic ploy to include European norms and values, such as democratization (Danner, 2019,

p. 88). The EU is leading the way in democracy promotion (Youngs, 2002; Youngs, 2008a; Youngs, 2008b). According to Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008), EU political conditionality significantly influences democratization. Schimmelfennig's 'leverage' model sees promotion of democracy as a conditionality-induced process in which the EU offers certain incentives to a third country in an effort to make them comply with the imposed requirements for democratic development (Freyburg et al., 2007, p. 4; Schimmelfennig, 2005; Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, 2003).

#### **4.4 Limitations**

In order to best evaluate and interpret the findings of this research, it is important to be aware of its limitations. Firstly, the choice of a single case study enables an in-depth and detailed look into the causal mechanisms and contexts, but complicates the generalization of the results (Zainal, 2007, p. 2). Secondly, the study uses purposive sampling, which also has limited generalizability (Lacy, Watson, Riffe & Lovejoy, 2015, p. 793). Furthermore, the reports of statements and speeches and the press releases may paint an inaccurate picture as the sources most likely contain biases in which the EU presents itself in a positive manner. This can be nuanced, however, by the EP resolutions that may add less biased data to the research. Lastly, the level of subjectivity linked to qualitative content analysis should be taken note of, as the application requires subjective interpretation from the coder (Vaismoradi, Turunen & Bondas, 2013, p. 403).

## 5. Empirical Analysis

The 36 analyzed documents are about the EU's attitude, motives and actions regarding its development aid allocation in Afghanistan. The documents give an insight to what or who the EU perceives to be important. They also contain information regarding EU's perception of Afghanistan as a third world country. Utilizing the recipient merit model and the donor interests model, the analysis attempts to give an impression and interpretation of the EU's narrative. It specifically highlights the change in EU narrative after Afghanistan's illegitimacy, which coincided with the EU's stop on development aid. Table 2, table 3 and table 4 list the number of analyzed press releases, statements and speeches, and EP resolutions in chronological order and show the outcome of the application of the coding scheme to the data sources<sup>4</sup>. The "X" under recipient merit and donor interests indicates what motives were identified with the help of the indicators in the EU's narrative. The division into two time frames (from now on referred to as time frame I and time frame II) allows the possible identification of a shift in the EU's arguments over time. Time frame I refers to the period from May 2019 until July 2021, whereas time frame II refers to the period from Afghanistan's illegitimacy in August 2021 until May 2022.

### 5.1 Recipient Merit

The first hypothesis argues recipient illegitimacy to negatively affect EU development aid allocation due to the lack of the recipient's good governance. The analysis found 4 press releases, 2 statements and speeches and 3 EP resolutions to mention recipient merit. In statements and speeches and EP resolutions, recipient merit is more often mentioned in time frame II whereas its mentions in press releases decreased in time frame II. The press releases

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<sup>4</sup> The full coding schemes in table 4, table 5 and table 6 can be retrieved in Appendix 4.

and statements and speeches contain references to the lack of protection of human rights in Afghanistan, specifically when it comes to women's right to employment and access to education. Furthermore, Afghanistan's incapability to mitigate the wave of outgoing refugees is mentioned. The EU seems to mostly point out that the situation in Afghanistan is very unsafe for women and girls. The EP resolutions tend to focus on the lack of protection of women and girls, and the lack of a transparent and inclusive government. This sentiment is reflected by the following citation from a recent EP resolution on the situation in Afghanistan, in particular the situation of women's rights:

The de facto authorities of Afghanistan pledged on 15 January 2022 to allow girls to return to school at all levels after the start of the new school year in the second half of March 2022. However, the Taliban have indefinitely extended the ban on allowing female students to attend seventh grade and above until they can decide which uniforms are most appropriate for girls. This denies secondary level education to over one million girls and is a violation of the fundamental right to education for all children as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Against this background, Parliament is deeply concerned about the humanitarian and human rights crisis that has been unfolding in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover as well as the deteriorating situation of women and girls (European Parliament, 2022).

The research expected the findings to illustrate that Afghanistan's illegitimacy indicates the lack of good governance and the lack of good governance is expected to negatively influence development aid allocation. The findings illustrate the importance of recipient merit in the EU narrative. In regard to democratic procedure, the EU focusses on the lack of an inclusive and representative government body and the need for more governmental procedural transparency.



As it pertains to democratic substance, the EU notes the severe decline in women’s rights and access to education. Its concerns about the erosion of women’s right increased after the Taliban’s takeover. The dominance of these indicators shows that the EU’s narrative is influenced by the lack of good governance in Afghanistan. This is especially notable due to the increased mentions of good governance in the documents after the Taliban’s takeover. Interestingly, good governance received little attention in the press releases in time frame II. It seems the EU turned to the use of statements and speeches and EP resolutions in order to press on the urgency and relevancy of good governance. The EU zoomed in more on the procedural and substantial dysfunctions of Afghanistan’s democratic governance after than before the Taliban takeover in August 2021, which indicates that Afghanistan’s illegitimacy has adverse effects on the causal relation between recipient merit and development aid allocation. Thus, the second hypothesis is supported by found evidence.

*Table 1. Coding scheme: recipient merit*

|                      | <b>Press releases (21)</b> | <b>Statements and speeches (11)</b> | <b>European parliamentary resolutions (4)</b> | <b>Total (36)</b> |
|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|-------------------|
| <b>Time frame I</b>  | 4                          | 0                                   | 1   | 5                 |
| <b>Time frame II</b> | 0                          | 2                                   | 2   | 4                 |
| <b>Total</b>         | 4                          | 2                                   | 3   | 9                 |

## **5.2 Donor Interests**

The analysis found 11 press releases, 4 statements and speeches and 2 EP resolutions to mention the EU's political interests. All documents refer to the EU's interests more often in time frame II compared to time frame I. The press releases are heavily focused on EU's connectivity to central Asia, including Afghanistan, cooperation, debt (relief) and principles. Both press releases and statements and speeches refer to the conditionality of development aid and the five benchmarks that need to be met to ensure future EU engagement with the illegitimate Afghan government. These benchmarks are (a) the commitment of the Afghan government that Afghanistan would not serve as a basis for the export of terrorism to other countries; (b) respect for human rights, particular women's rights, the rule of law and freedom of the media; (c) the establishment of an inclusive and representative transitional government through negotiations among political forces in Afghanistan; (d) free access for and delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid; and (f) the fulfilment of the Taliban's commitment to let foreign nationals and Afghans leave the country (Immenkamp, 2021). Furthermore, the EP resolutions mention European principles and the EU's tools to ensure Afghanistan complies with the European norms and values. The language in the speeches that mention the conditionality of development aid is quite stern and straightforward. This is illustrated in the following statement by the President of the EC:

So let me be very clear on development aid. The EUR 1 billion in EU funds set aside for development aid for the next seven years is tied to strict conditions: respect for human rights, good treatment of minorities, and respect for the rights of women and girls, just to name a few. And not a single euro of development aid can go to a regime that denies women and girls their full freedoms and rights to education and careers. We

may well hear the Taliban's words, but we will measure them above all by their deeds and their actions (European Commission, 2021-b).

The research expected the findings to illustrate that Afghanistan's illegitimacy negatively influences development aid, because the EU acts according to its own political interests. In regard to the development of recipient economic dependency, the analysis found that mentions of cooperation are either directed at economic ties or regional partnerships to mitigate the challenges Afghanistan faces, such as high-level migration. The EU's interest in migration can stem from its interest to confine the dispersion of refugees throughout Europe. Increasing Afghanistan's regional connectivity can also increase Afghanistan's economic dependency. One press release document mentions debt relief and the EU's efforts to help low-income countries deal with their debt burden to reach economic stability. Debt relief keeps Afghanistan aid-dependent and allows the EU to enjoy a reduction of transaction costs. As it pertains to promoting European norms and values, the EU uses conditionality as a tool to promote its principles. This is reflected in the previously mentioned benchmarks that are entirely in line with European norms and values. The importance of conditionality shows that the EU principles and Afghanistan's willingness to follow them influences aid allocation. The dominance of these indicators illustrates that the EU's narrative is influenced by the presence of advantageous political aspects. This is supported by the substantial increase of mentions of donor interests in time frame II compared to time frame I. When taking the time frames into account, there is an indication that Afghanistan's illegitimacy has adverse effects on the causal relation between donor interests and development aid. Thus, evidence is found in support of the second hypothesis.

*Table 2. Coding scheme: donor interests*

|                      | <b>Press releases<br/>(21)</b> | <b>Statements and<br/>speeches (11)</b> | <b>European<br/>parliamentary<br/>resolutions (4)</b> | <b>Total (36)</b> |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|---|---|-------------------|
| <b>Time frame I</b>  | 5                              | 0                                       | 1   | 6                 |
| <b>Time frame II</b> | 6                              | 4                                       | 1   | 11                |
| <b>Total</b>         | 11                             | 4                                       | 2   | 17                |

### **5.3 Overview of Results**

The results of the content analysis provide evidence that is used to test the two hypotheses. Table 5 gives an overview of the observed categories in the collected data. As for the first hypothesis, the results show some evidence of the influence of Afghanistan's illegitimacy on the causal relation between recipient merit and development aid. The data illustrates a sharp decline in Afghanistan's merit and its ability to provide good governance since Afghanistan's illegitimacy, which is in support of the first hypothesis. Previous studies illustrated the importance of good governance for effective development aid (Hermes & Lensink, 2001; The World Bank, 1998). This research shows that good governance is subordinate to other possible factors, such as a state's legitimacy. Good governance can decay if state legitimacy is questioned. Furthermore, the argument of Dadasov (2017) needs to be broadened. He states that EU aid allocation can more effectively promote good governance rather than aid allocated on the member state level. Although this still holds true, this research brings to light that international recognition can also have its effects on good governance (promotion).

Similarly, the results of the second hypothesis show strong evidence of the influence of Afghanistan's illegitimacy on the causal relation between donor interests and development aid. The findings show a particular increase in the importance of donor interests in the EU's narrative regarding Afghanistan since Afghanistan's illegitimacy, which is in support of the second hypothesis. The results dispute claims made about the lack of influence of self-interests on EU aid flow (Olivié & Pérez, 2021). Studies have argued that strategic considerations and economic interests indeed influence aid allocation (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy, 2006; Hoeffler & Outram, 2011, pp. 238-249). Fink and Redaelli (2011) also found political and strategic factors to be important determinants of aid allocation. This research subscribes to these claims and illustrates that the donor's interests significantly impact EU aid allocation in Afghanistan. The findings show that donor interests, mostly indicated by conditionality tied to

development aid allocation, are negatively influenced by the recipient’s illegitimacy. In his research, Atmar (2001, p. 321) argues conditionality-based aid has proven to be ineffective in influencing the Taliban’s policies. “What is needed is an acceptance from donors that it is possible to negotiate for principled goals with ‘unprincipled people’, or those who have different principles, and work with the state structures in Taliban-controlled areas in a principled way” (Atmar, 2001, p. 328). Although this quote dates back to 2001, it is eerily fitting for the contemporary Afghanistan situation.

All in all, the recipient merit aid allocation model and the donor interests aid allocation model seem to be influenced by the recipient’s illegitimacy. The findings of this research have provided empirically supported insights on the possible influences of a recipient’s illegitimacy on the donor’s development aid allocation.

*Table 3. Coding scheme: all data*

|                      |                        | <b>Press releases (21)</b> | <b>Statements and speeches (11)</b> | <b>European parliamentary resolutions (4)</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|--------------|
| <b>Time frame I</b>  | <b>Recipient merit</b> | 4                          | 0                                   | 1   | 5            |
|                      | <b>Donor interests</b> | 5                          | 0                                   | 1   | 6            |
| <b>Time frame II</b> | <b>Recipient merit</b> | 0                          | 2                                   | 2   | 4            |
|                      | <b>Donor interests</b> | 6                          | 4                                   | 1   | 11           |
| <b>Total</b>         | <b>Recipient merit</b> | 4                          | 2                                   | 3   | 9            |
|                      | <b>Donor interests</b> | 11                         | 4                                   | 2   | 17           |

## 6. Conclusion

### 6.1 Conclusion

This research builds on literature, such as the article of Weiler and Sanubi (2019), that explored and applied the two development aid models. Their article argues that the recipient needs model is the most important for aid allocation decisions. This research, however, shows that the usefulness of the development aid allocation models depends on the presence of other factors, such as the recipient's legitimacy. Evidence found in the in-depth case of the EU's decision to stop development aid allocation in Afghanistan illustrates that the recipient's illegitimacy influences both aid allocation models – recipient merit and donor interests. Press releases, statements and speeches and EP resolutions were collected as data to conduct the content analysis and provided evidence in support of the hypotheses. The findings indicate that the recipient's illegitimacy influences the recipient's merit, which in turn negatively affects development aid allocation. Furthermore, found evidence also supports that the recipient's illegitimacy influences the causal relation between donor interests and development aid allocation. The findings indicate that the recipient's illegitimacy influences donor's interests, which in turn negatively affects development aid allocation. The outcome of this research illustrates the ways in which illegitimacy influences the EU's decision on development aid allocation, specifically in the case of Afghanistan.

This research brings attention to a fresh approach to studying legitimacy. This research specifically reinvigorates literature on legitimacy connected to development aid allocation. It also enriches existing literature on determinants of development aid by applying two underdeveloped theories based on recipient merit and donor interests. Additionally, this research has applied these theories to a very recent case, namely the EU's decision to halt development aid allocation in Afghanistan, which took place in August 2021. As far as the

societal relevance of this research concerns, the findings provide insight to the considerations that precede a decision on development aid allocation. The results shed light on the complexity of development aid allocation. The different possible outside influences are tied to the context of individual cases and the importance of context-specific information might hinder the development of the aid allocation models into robust theories as it limits generalizability.

## **6.2 Discussion**

This research illustrates the weight that the recipient's illegitimacy holds in regards to the two aid allocation models. The findings of this research are mostly in line with existing literature. Good governance is seen as an important factor in regard to the effectiveness of development aid (Hermes & Lensink, 2001; The World Bank, 1998). The found evidence shows that the effects of good governance on aid allocation is dependent on the recipient's illegitimacy. The recipient's illegitimacy is an indicator of a lack of good governance and can therefore have adverse effects on development aid allocation. This calls attention to *if* and *how* illegitimacy interacts with aid allocation motivations. Furthermore, the results regarding the importance of donor interests meet the theoretical expectations. In accordance with previous studies, donor interests seem to have a strong impact on the aid allocation models (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy, 2006; Fink & Redaelli, 2011; Hoeffler & Outram, 2011, pp. 238-249). This research specifies how the recipient's illegitimacy influences the relation between donor interests and aid allocation. Results show these effects are negative in nature. Atmar (2001) specifically argues conditionality-based aid is ineffective in impacting the Taliban's policies. Taking Atmar's argument and this research's findings into account, it might be advisable to research the contemporary effectiveness of conditionality in relation to development aid.



### **6.3 Recommendations and Future Research**

Finally, this research recommends further research on legitimacy in connection to development aid allocation by conducting more in-depth case studies expanding beyond the EU sphere in order to increase generalizability. Also, as press releases and statements and speeches can be as biased, it would benefit future research to broaden the data collection and include data sources that are not directly published by the EU. Although recipient needs were not part of this research's empirical analysis, it is noteworthy that recipient needs were often mentioned along with donor interests in the EU's narrative concerning Afghanistan. For future research, it could be valuable to explore if and how recipient needs and donor interests interact. It is possible that the EU tends to focus more on recipient needs when it aligns with their own interests. This correlation is certainly something worth exploring in the future.

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## Appendix 1

### List of press releases

20 March 2019

1. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_19\\_1733](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_1733)

9 April 2019

2. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_19\\_2055](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2055)

15 May 2019

3. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_19\\_2494](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2494)

7 July 2019

4. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_19\\_3829](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_3829)

26 September 2019

5. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_19\\_5851](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_5851)

26 September 2019

6. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_19\\_5873](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_5873)



21 November 2019

7. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_19\\_6314](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6314)

22 June 2020

8. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_20\\_1159](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1159)

8 July 2020

9. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_20\\_1300](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1300)

23 November 2020

10. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_20\\_2183](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2183)

24 November 2020

11. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_20\\_2193](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2193)

5 July 2021

12. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_21\\_3403](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3403)

19 September 2021

**13.** Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_21\\_4905](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_4905)

2 October 2021

**14.** Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_21\\_4994](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_4994)

6 October 2021

**15.** Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_21\\_5088](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5088)

12 October 2021

**16.** Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_21\\_5208](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5208)

16 November 2021

**17.** Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_21\\_5942](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5942)

22 November 2021

**18.** Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_21\\_6219](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6219)

17 January 2022

**19.** Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_22\\_363](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_363)

18 January 2022

**20.** Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_22\\_382](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_382)

31 March 2022

**21.** Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_22\\_2197](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2197)

## Appendix 2

### List of statements and speeches

20 May 2019

1. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_19\\_2628](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_2628)

18 August 2020

2. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_20\\_1476](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_1476)

17 August 2021

3. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/08/17/afghanistan-declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union/>

18 August 2021

4. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_21\\_4286](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_4286)

21 August 2021

5. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_21\\_4341](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_4341)

24 August 2021

6. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_21\\_4381](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_4381)

15 September 2021

7. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech\\_21\\_4701](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_21_4701)

12 October 2021

8. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_21\\_5208](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5208)

22 October 2021

9. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_21\\_5458](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_5458)

24 November 2021

10. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_21\\_6211](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_6211)

26 November 2021

11. Retrieved May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_21\\_6346](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_6346)

## Appendix 3

### List of European parliamentary resolutions

18 December 2020

1. Retrieved May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2019-0107\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2019-0107_EN.html)

8 June 2021

2. Retrieved May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0294\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0294_EN.html)

14 September 2021

3. Retrieved May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0393\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0393_EN.html)

5 April 2022

4. Retrieved May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0128\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0128_EN.html)

Appendix 4  
**Full coding schemes**

*Table 4. Full coding scheme: Press releases*

| <b>Press releases</b>                 | <b>Recipient Merit</b> | <b>Donor Interests</b> |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Time frame I: May 2019 – July 2021    |                        |                        |
| <b>1</b>                              |                        |                        |
| <b>2</b>                              | <b>X</b>               |                        |
| <b>3</b>                              |                        |                        |
| <b>4</b>                              | <b>X</b>               | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>5</b>                              |                        | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>6</b>                              | <b>X</b>               |                        |
| <b>7</b>                              |                        |                        |
| <b>8</b>                              |                        |                        |
| <b>9</b>                              |                        | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>10</b>                             |                        | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>11</b>                             | <b>X</b>               | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>12</b>                             |                        |                        |
| Time frame II: August 2021 – May 2022 |                        |                        |
| <b>13</b>                             |                        | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>14</b>                             |                        |                        |
| <b>15</b>                             |                        | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>16</b>                             |                        | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>17</b>                             |                        | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>18</b>                             |                        | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>19</b>                             |                        |                        |
| <b>20</b>                             |                        | <b>X</b>               |
| <b>21</b>                             |                        |                        |

Table 5. Full coding scheme: Statements and speeches

| Statements and speeches               | Recipient Merit | Donor Interests |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Time frame I: May 2019 – July 2021    |                 |                 |
| <b>1</b>                              |                 |                 |
| <b>2</b>                              |                 |                 |
| Time frame II: August 2021 – May 2022 |                 |                 |
| <b>3</b>                              |                 | <b>X</b>        |
| <b>4</b>                              | <b>X</b>        |                 |
| <b>5</b>                              | <b>X</b>        | <b>X</b>        |
| <b>6</b>                              |                 | <b>X</b>        |
| <b>7</b>                              |                 |                 |
| <b>8</b>                              |                 |                 |
| <b>9</b>                              |                 |                 |
| <b>10</b>                             |                 | <b>X</b>        |
| <b>11</b>                             |                 |                 |

Table 6. Full coding scheme: European Parliament resolutions

| Resolution                            | Recipient Merit | Donor Interests |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Time frame I: May 2019 – July 2021    |                 |                 |
| <b>1</b>                              |                 | <b>X</b>        |
| <b>2</b>                              | <b>X</b>        |                 |
| Time frame II: August 2021 – May 2022 |                 |                 |
| <b>3</b>                              | <b>X</b>        | <b>X</b>        |
| <b>4</b>                              | <b>X</b>        |                 |