Viktor Orbán's European Identity Frame

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Abstract

This study focuses on how Euroscepticism is transforming in the rhetoric of one of the most prominent national populists in Europe, namely Hungary's prime minister, Viktor Orbán. Although he expresses aggressive EU criticism and displays a continued prioritization of nationhood, it is evident that the contour of a European vision is becoming more apparent. I position myself in a gap in the literature, which overwhelmingly focuses on Euroscepticism in national populist discourse as anti-European. There is a complexity lost in much of today's scholarship regarding populist's attitudes towards a European collective identity. By conducting a frame analysis of Orbán's speeches between 2019-2022, I trace the European identity frame emerging in his national populist discourse, which I anchor in Roger Brubaker's theory on the civilizationist nature of national populists in Europe (Brubaker, 2017).

Introduction

There is a common thread in much of the relevant literature, revealing an assumption that nationalism inherently contradicts European integration, which results in its treatment as an opposing force, instead of an internal, legitimate, political threat (Lugasi, 2018; Csehi & Zgut, 2020). In contrast, Brubaker (2017) demonstrates the meaningful impact nationalist discursive logic can have on the framing of Europe, observing how its logic expands from the national context to a European level, creating a European in-group that is antagonized by a non-European out-group. In national populism this leads to a civilizationist framing of Europe, which tends to be contrasted with a backwards, unmodern, uncivilized Islam (Brubaker, 2017). The problem with Brubaker's analysis, however, is that by comparing cases of national populists in West Europe and the US to the Hungarian case, nuances in Hungary's case are glossed over. This in-depth analysis of the Hungarian case aims to search for this nuance.

Hungary is generally considered an outlier in the literature, which disregards the development of Euroscepticism and national populism that makes it interesting in the first place (Kalmar, 2018; Lugosi, 2018), and its implication for other national populist movements in Europe (Kalmar, 2018; Csehi & Zgut, 2020). I position myself in this gap by searching for more nuance in the content of national populist ideas of Europeanness. I approach this gap by conducting a qualitative frame analysis of Viktor Orbán's speeches between 2019-2022. By contesting an uncritical approach to Euroscepticism in the study of national populism (Csehi & Zgut, 2020), the thesis question asks, what elements of a European identity frame can be identified in Orbán's national populist rhetoric? I work within the theoretical framework of Brubaker's analysis of how national populist discourse transforms national identity into a civilizationist identity frame, constructing an imagined community that encompasses Europe (Brubaker, 2017; Anderson, 2016). The aim of this paper is to understand how the extreme antagonizations, the xenophobia, the homophobia and illiberalism merge with other identity markers, to construct a cohesive identity frame of Europe.

The selection of Orbán is driven by the extremity, longevity, and popular appeal of his national populist rhetoric in Hungary, which has once again won him and his Fidesz party a landslide election on April 3, 2022. This election included a further shirking of sexual orientation and gender rights (SOGI) in the country, as they attempted to get through a referendum to ban any mention of homosexuality and gender identity issues in children's education. Orbán represent a typical case of a national populist "soft Euroscepticism" (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004). While Orbán's soft Euroscepticism targets aspects of the EU, he still openly supports the project of European integration (Csehi & Zgut, 2020). As a ruling party with strong national populist framings of Europe, Orbán's discourse is an important case to understand European identity constructions. I have included a discussion on how the results of the frame analysis apply to Orbán's attitude towards Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Russia is becoming an instrument for Orbán's framing of a European identity, and the relevance this has for other national populist figures and movements across Europe is a matter of precedence. Due to scope, this is only briefly mentioned in the discussion chapter and points to an area for further research.

The paper is structured in two parts. The first part consists of a literature review, the theoretical framework, and a chapter on the methodology. There are subsections in each chapter. the frame analysis, the case selection, and an explanation of the structure of the analysis. At the end of the methodology chapter, the reader will find a table demonstrating the findings of the inductive analysis, which show the themes applied in the deductive analysis. All speeches that have been used in the analysis can be found in appendix A and B. Part II includes the results of the frame analysis, organized according to the themes in table 1, and a discussion of the findings. The paper ends with a brief concluding chapter, with some final reflections on the study.

Part 1

Literature Review

National populism

National populism is a contested phenomenon that has garnered a lot of attention in academic literature (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Brubaker, 2017; de Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017). Mudde defines populism as a thin-layered ideology that depicts the pure people, antagonized by the corrupt elite, led by a charismatic leader who speaks for the general will of the people (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). This definition has has become the golden standard in the literature. Expanding on its connection to nationalism, Brubaker (2017) and de Cleen & Stavrakakis (2017) discuss how nationalist and populist discourses interconnect around the idea of a homogenous, pure people, antagonized on a horizontal/vertical axis, that depicts the elite and the migrant as enemies of the in-group, or the subject group, i.e., "the people" (Brubaker, 2017; de Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017).

When we talk about the radical right today, it predominantly refers to radical right national populism. As a well-established governing politician, Orbán represents the shift from the national populism that was traditionally treated as radical right parties on the fringes, to legitimate, popular and governing political parties (Csehi & Zgut, 2020). This shift means that the traditional right has appropriated the populist rhetorical repertoire, explains Betz (2018). Consequently, national populist movements mix ideological content that can no longer be delineated on a right-left spectrum (Betz, 2018). For instance, national populist

discourse often includes fierce rebuttal of globalization and capitalism, merging policy concerns that are often typically found on the economic left (Kalmar, 2018). Whereas the radical right parties used to embody ethnonationalist stances more exclusively, the current national populist parties combine ideas of law and order and family values with ethnonationalism and populist anti-establishment, anti-elitist stances (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007; Caiani & Kröll, 2017).

Context

Even though national populist criticisms against liberal values in Western Europe have existed prior to the phenomenon emerging in contemporary politics, Merkel and Scholl (2018) emphasize that Hungary remains an exception. No other parties in Europe that share an illiberal ideal of society have been as dominating as Orbán's Fidesz party, ruling Hungary since 2010, making Orbán the longest ruling national populist politician in a European government (Merkel & Scholl, 2018; Kalmar, 2018; Lugosi, 2018). The case of Orbán and the Fidesz party defies consolidation theories whereby national populists are expected to compromise on their radical politics once in government (Kalmar, 2018; Csehi & Zgut, 2020; Hegedüs, 2019). Although national populists in Western and Northern Europe do not have the same majority appeal, they have become an established part of the political landscape in Europe (Merkel & Scholl, 2018). I agree with Kalmar (2018) that a shared political, social, cultural and economic environment is cultivating the phenomenon that we are seeing across Europe today. It is in light of this that Orbán's enduring appeal offers insights into a national populist framing of Europe that is spreading across Europe through the national populist movement.

In the case of Hungary, Kalmar (2018) identifies three critical catalysts for the rise in national populism. First, the end of the cold war in 1989. Second, the financial crisis of 2008. And third, the refugee crisis of 2015 (Kalmar, 2018). A common thread through these events has been the neo-liberal economic ideology, which in many countries in the east and the south of Europe left people disillusioned of the promises of liberal democracy. In fact, countries in East Central Europe saw the largest transfer of public to private ownership, according to Kalmar (2018), giving a small economic elite access to unprecedented wealth and leaving the majority population, especially in the countryside, feeling robbed and left behind. This

situation prompted "rural and small-town populism, the old, and the less educated" to be "seduced by the anti-liberal, neo-nationalist stance of the populists" (Kalmar, 2018, p. 2). While national populism has been a common feature of East Central European popular politics since the end of the Cold War, Hungary is still an extreme, in that national populist polarization dominates the entire party system. Above all, as a national populist party leader that has moved into the mainstream, Orbán's discourse is of great significance (Lugosi, 2018).

Contesting Euroscepticism

The development of Euroscepticism in national populist rhetoric dates back to the 1990s. After the fall of communism, the concern of European integration and the democracy deficit that the supranationality of the EU cultivates, has been an increasingly important issue for national populist parties (Merkel & Scholl, 2018). Whether in the form of 'soft Euroscepticism' or 'hard Euroscepticism', this has become a prominent feature of most national populist discourse in Europe (Mudde, 2012; Merkel & Scholl, 2018; Csehi and Zgut, 2020). Nevertheless, Csehi & Zgut (2020) make the keen observation that populism and Euroscepticism tend to be uncritically conflated in scholarly literature, as literature began focusing more on the growing fusion between national populism and Euroscepticism, after national populist parties began blaming the EU and its institutions for the migration crisis (Öner, 2020).

To the detriment of understanding the identity producing meanings that these political actors are constructing around Europe as an ideal community, the focus in the scholarly literature continues to highlight the sceptic elements in national populist attitudes towards Europe (Merkel & Scholl, 2018; Csehi and Zgut, 2020),. I position myself in this gap in the literature by contesting the approach to euroscepticism in Orbán's national populism through a frame analysis, I search for themes relating to European identity consisting of positive images (who Europeans are) with negative images of Europe (who they are not). A part of this strategy has been to search for Orbán's ideal type Europe and what solutions he proposes to the problems that define the soft Euroscepticm in his speeches. I follow Brubaker (2017), who deviates from the emphasis on Euroscepticism by highlighting a civilizationist frame.

European Identity

Furthermore, I have drawn inspiration from the literature on collective identity in Europe. Collective identities are important because without them, support for the political project becomes weak (Yuval-Davis, 2011). The criticism found in literature on collective identity and Euroscepticism on the EU's ability to offer a meaningful sense of belonging, has been of great importance for my formulation of the thesis question. I support the explanations that derive from these theories, which describe the EU as a complex bureaucratic structure that leaves a vacuum for the identity generating discourse of national populism to gain support (Albetrazzi & Mcdonnel, 2008; Eder, 2009; Brigevich, 2018). Peter Mair predicted that the perceived weakening of representative democracy when decision making is brought to the supranational level, would strengthen populist claims (Mair, 2013). Moreover, Eder (2009) argues that the salience of a European identity is more important than ever, due to the complex landscape of social relations (Eder, 2009, p. 432). National populist actors take advantage of this perceived gap between citizen and political elite, when a meaningful collective identity is lacking, which is why understanding national populist identity frames is important (Cmeciu & Cmeciu, 2014; Eder, 2009; Albetrazzi & McDonnel).

Theory

Roger Brubaker's Civilizationism

The theoretical framework for my thesis draws predominantly on Roger Brubaker's analysis of what he defines as a "religio-civilizational" European identity in national populist discourse (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1212). The aim of Brubaker's paper is to explain how typically nationalistic elements, such as xenophobia, are transforming into a civilizationist discourse that come to embody the European collective, rather than the nation. To some extent, the phenomenon of civilizationism must be understood as an expansion of nationalism, yet it still includes and mingles with the original nationalist discourse, Brubaker explains (2017, p. 1211). By challenging expectations of national populist discourse, Brubaker makes a considerable contribution to the scholarship, demonstrating how national populism constructs a European identity frame, which he identifies as civilizationist.

The crux of Brubaker's argument relates specifically to North-West European national populism, which constructs a Christian identity frame of European civilization that revolves around secularism and liberalism as properties of the modernity and superiority of that civilization, as opposed to illiberal, fanatic, backwards, undemocratic Islam. Contrary to expectations of national populism, Brubaker observes a change on the discursive reliance on liberal values relating to gender equality and LGBTQI+ rights. NWE national populists argue that these liberal values are threatened by the brutality and illiberal attitudes of Muslim immigrants (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1203). Secularism, is not considered a threat or a contradiction to the new emphasis on Christianity but is instead treated as a property of it. As with liberalism, secularism is woven into the fabric of the Judeo-Christian tradition and the civilization ladder of modernity and progress it is build on (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1200).

The civilizationist Europe Brubaker identifies is based in a Judeo-Christian tradition that is cultural and identarian, rather than scriptural. It is, in that sense, a secular Christianity. However, when Brubaker compares this secular-Christian Islamophobia in NWE national populism with East-Central European national populism, the positive claim to liberal values and institutions under attack by Muslim migrants does not appear. In the case of Viktor Orbán, liberal values in Europe and SOGI rights promotion, is treated with suspicion and contempt (Brubaker, 2017, pp. 1208-1209). Orbán's rhetoric does encapsulate the secular Christianity that "functions as a marker of identity rather than as a sign of religious practice or belief" (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1208), and the depiction of a shared European civilization threatened by Muslim migrants (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1209).

The civilizationist idea that the white-majority population in Europe is at risk of cultural extinction as an immigrant population replaces them, reflects "the great replacement" conspiracy that is often associated with white supremacist violence (Obiadi, et al., 2021). As Obiadi et al's article points out, this theory has been an established frame in national populist discourse, deriving from the idea of Islamification of Europe, of which Orbán is a prominent example (Obiadi, et al., 2021, p.3). Moreover, it represents the 'new type of racism' that emerged in the post-war era (Rydgren, 2003), which emphasizes the separate nature of culturally defined ethnic groups, rather than the superiority of one culture over another

(Rydgren, 2003, p.3). Whereas Brubaker focuses on the "backwardness" of Islam in the national populist European frame, the frame analysis conducted in my paper, suggests that Orbán's antagonization has a more horizontal function. Moreover, it shows that the threat of Islam and liberalism are interwoven in an ideological battle for a Europe, and that it is the "suicidal liberalism of the West" that functions as the main threat to European civilization (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1209).

Method

Qualitative Frame Analysis

By performing a content analysis of speeches and interviews, I apply a frame analysis, drawing on Brubaker's theory of how nationalism transforms into civilizationism in national populist approaches to European identity (Brubaker, 2017). The framing analysis in this paper is a qualitative analysis, and thus, anchoring it in theory helps to ground its methodological robustness (Kuypers, 2009). The imagery of a frame is illustrative of what it does – a picture frame brings our attention to what is within the frame, drawing our attention to some aspects, drawing our attention away from others, and as such framing becomes "a function of simplifying an area of reality" (Scheufele & Scheufele, 2009, p. 128). The concept of framing recognizes that there are "clusters of ideas that guide individual's processing of information" (Entman, 1993, p. 53), which through framing is determined by the way in which some information is elevated in salience over other information.

It is unavoidable that the process for schematizing and codifying questions to infer a frame will suffer some degree of arbitrary selection (Ransan-Cooper, et al., 2015; Braun, 2019). By shaping these questions against civilizationism as described above, and being transparent about the selection process, I hope to navigate these challenges. I have conducted a close reading of available speeches from the period between 2019-2022. Speeches that have not been coded from this period have been left out due to irrelevance. Most of the discarded speeches revolve around the economy and covid measures. These have all been read and considered. The collected speeches number [100] and have been analysed around themes of European identity and civilizationism. While the result of the frame analysis confirms that the

European identity frame established by Orbán is civilizationist, it suggests that this frame specifically promotes an idea of Central East Europe as the protector of this civilization, based on Judeo-Christian values and nationalism. The analysis brings a more in-depth explanation for the civilizationism presented in Roger Brubaker's theory. Guided by this theory, the aim of the frame analysis has been to determine the constituent parts of this European identity frame and the discursive process through which it is emerging.

Case Selection

Frames allow us to establish both implicit and explicit interpretations of social meaning. Because frames are usually attributed to actors, it offers a valuable tool for understanding not only how reality is perceived, but by whom, making a frame analysis an appropriate method for a speech analysis of this kind, focusing on political elites as social agents (Braun, 2019; Kuypers, 2009). Viktor Orbán is the architype of the national populist politician in Europe, expressing ethnonationalist and xenophobic attitudes, especially apparent in anti-immigration policies, depictions of a mass invasion by Muslims, scepticism to an EU bureaucracy, and hatred for "the corrupt elite". Orbán has been one of the leading voices constructing an image of the impeding threat faced by Hungary and by Europe by masses of Muslim migrants and the cultural threat of Islam (Kalmar, 2020). As such, Orbán constitutes a highly relevant typical case with regards to civilizationism (Brubaker, 2017). As mentioned, a qualitative frame analysis is highly compatible with social agents as objects for research and are therefore suitable for the nature of this thesis (Kuypers, 2009). These have been key arguments in my case selection process.[1]

Structure of analysis

I have structured the coding based on Entman's definition of frames: "Frames define problems… diagnose causes; make moral judgments… and suggest remedies. A single sentence may perform more than one of these four framing functions, although many sentences in a text may perform none of them. And a frame in any particular text may not necessarily include all four functions." (Entman, 1993, p. 52). As the table will show, I have

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[1] On a practical note, knowledge of Hungarian offers valuable accessibility to primary sources, which has supported the analysis by not having to depend on translations and secondary sources.

structured the frames according to which function it adheres to, and thus, attached the relevant codes to each frame under each function. As Entman's definition explains, these may overlap, and as such, it must be noted that there is an arbitrariness that is inescapable in the coding process. Nevertheless, it allows a clear overview of how Orbán frames a European identity and goes a long way in demonstrating the nuances that emerge from his 'soft Euroscepticism'.

The analysis consists of an inductive analysis of 56 speeches in the period between 2019-2022 and a deductive analysis of 80 speeches, applying the findings from the inducive analysis, guided by Brubaker's theory on civilizationism. Table 1 shows the themes that were collected on the basis of the inductive analysis. These themes were applied to the deductive analysis and the subsequent chapters on the results are divided according to the deductive analysis. Minor adjustments were made after completing the deductive analysis, which mostly included adding minor codes to specify the major themes, as well as simplifying the relationship between problems and causes. Because these changes did not vary considerably from the original table, I have not included the adjustments in my final report, except for the addition of the anti-communist frame, which went from being a minor part of the initial table to a transversal theme in the final table. I have indicated this by including a bracket in orange under each category. This adjustment derives from findings in the deductive analysis. All translations of speeches are my own.

Table 1

Ideal type Europe	Judeo-Christian	EU embodies all European peoples	Political vision of Europe (EU)
	Illiberal	Community of Nations	Further expansion and integration
	Conservative	Primordial	Autonomous
	Nuclear family	Exclusionary	Hard external border
Anti-communist frame			

Problems with Europe	Brussels	Abandoned Europeanness	Misguided political agenda
	Bureaucratic	Post-national	Unrealized potential
	Corrupt	Post-Christian	In retreat
	Elitist	Gender insanity	Privilege and ignorance
	Ideological		Federalist
Anti-communist frame			

Causes of problems	Liberalism	George Soros
	Ideological imperialism	Ideological dictator
	Tolerance of migrants	Plot to bring migrants
	SOGI rights promotion	Architect of gender insanity
Anti-communist frame		

Hungary as protector of the ideal type Europe and model of the solutions	Involuntary heart of Europe	Alternative allies and new power axis in Europe
	Border castle	Visegrad 4
	Freedom fighters	National populists
	Where the Judeo-Christian tradition contained	Israel
		Serbia
		Russia
Anti-communist frame		

Part 2 : The Results of the Frame Analysis

1. Ideal-type Europe

1. 1. Judeo Christian: Illiberal, Conservative and in Protection of the Nuclear Family

The framing analysis concludes that the most prevalent theme in Orbán's ideal-type Europe is Judeo-Christianity. As the table indicates, the Judeo-Christian Europe is illiberal, conservative and based on the preservation of the nuclear family. These themes are well-known components in Orbán's rhetoric and politics (Brubaker, 2017; Hésova, 2021; Glied, 2020). Conservatism and illiberalism in Orbán's speeches generally function as the positive opposite of some ultra-liberal, progressive movement that does not express much by itself, apart from constructing a notion of Orbán's self-proclaimed centrism. By mocking how his political project is framed by the left as belonging to the extreme right, Orbán asserts that it is in fact the liberal flank in EU that operate as the real fringe: "We want to put an end to that ridiculous political practice, that ridiculous political geometry, that wants to explain that the right only ever exists on the fringe and the left always only exists in the middle" (Orbán, April 1, 2021). In this way, Orbán promotes the ideal-type Europe as a centrism true to the Judeo-Christian tradition that privileges the nuclear family over the individual.

1.2. Community of Nations: Primordial and Exclusionary

Alongside the Judeo-Christian ideal of Europe, it is a Europe as a community of nations that features most predominantly in Orbán's speeches. Nations emerge as the pre-determined, distinctive collective, that carries a latent potential edging towards its own realization. Thus, the nation is the ultimate expression of a pre-determined people: "we not only believe that this [community of nations] is a good thing, not only do we believe that it is inevitable, not only do we believe that it is the foundation of our existence… we believe there will be a renaissance throughout Europe" (Orbán, April 6, 2022). This process is a distinct feature of Europe's civilization that is treated as an inevitability for the future of Europe based on a community of nations. This echoes the 19th century nationalist movement that considered the national people as constituted by a telos that is ultimately realized through nations (Smith, 2017; Recchia & Urbinati, 2009). In my analysis I have defined this theme as primordial.

Accordingly, Orbán's ideal-type Europe, with its essentialism, emerges as an exclusionary political space. The ethno-cultural, ethno-religious people of Europe cannot mix with other peoples (Rydgren, 2003). A growing Muslim population in Europe is seen to threaten the true, cultural demos of Europe, undermining its demos. The Christian civilization of Europe must be saved: "The great historical role and mission that Judeo-Christian European civilization has played over the past five hundred years is now weakening and disintegrating. They gave up their sense of mission, their cultural and spiritual heritage, they simply threw away their future... churches are no longer being built, only mosques" (Orbán, Sep 26, 2021). The analysis confirms that the discursive logic underpinning the ideal Europe based on a community of nations is a civilizationist construction of Europe – one that is Judeo-Christian and derived from nations, and one that must be exclusionary (Brubaker, 2017).

1.3. Political Vision of Europe – the EU

The analysis, moreover, confirms the "soft" aspects of Orbán's Euroscepticism, indicating that he that he does not oppose the EU: "The European Union is not in Brussels, so we are not arguing with the European Union. The European Union is in Warsaw, in Budapest, in Berlin, in Paris, because Europe is the union of nations, the European Union is the community of nations… there is a difference between the European Union of nations and the individual European institutions; and our issue is with the institutions." (Orbán, Sep. 21, 2021) In this speech, we see how the idea of "the real people", whose voices are represented in the capitals across Europe, are the voices of the demos of Europe, thus, constructing the idea of a "real-people" that relies on national populism, into his vision Europe. Orbán supports further expansion and integration in the EU, as seen in his emphasis on building a European defence system (Orbán, Jan 9, 2022), on the need for the EU to become more economically competitive and self-sufficient (Orbán, Dec 13, 2021), and on expanding the EU to include the Balkan countries (Orbán, Jul 8, 2020).

2. Problems with Europe

2.1. Brussels: Bureaucratic, corrupt, elitist, and ideological

As the ideal-type Europe shows, Orbán takes issue with the EU institutions, rather than the EU itself. The umbrella-term for all that is problematic with the EU is 'Brussels', where we find "the agents of György Soros, the Judases who are available for thirty pieces of silver… experts and advisers who see nation-states as enemies, or as a thing of the past, and, of course, the wolves of global capital sniffing for money." (Orbán, Feb 12, 2022) By speaking of the corruptibility of the people embedded in the Brussels system, Orbán blames the fabric of institution and the elitism it cultivates. The main problem for Orbán is the "dangerous imperial tendencies of Brussels" (Orbán, Sep 9, 2021). Drawing on the anti-communist frame, Orbán talks about the "Sovietisation of the European Union and the blurring of Brussels" (Orbán, Jun 19, 2021). By drawing on Hungary's history with communism, Orbán incorporates the anti-communist frame into his antagonization of Brussels.

2.2. Abandoned Europeanness: post-national, post-Christian, gender insanity

Furthermore, the problem with Europe is that Western civilization is in a crisis because it has "gradually lost faith in its own mission" and has abandoned Europeanness for the sake of the misguided "ideology of open society," which prevents people from finding "special value and historical mission in his own nation or political community" (Orbán, Sep 9, 2021). Having chosen to believe this idea, The liberal West "no longer seeks meaning in his own history, but rather talks about it coming to an end soon. He reinterprets or deletes certain periods, is downright ashamed, considers them to be excluded, and in the meantime cannot replace anything" (Orbàn, Sep 9, 2021). This abandoned Europeanness is characterized by Orbán as "post-national and post-Christian" (Orbán, Dec 14, 2020), alongside a growing a concern with gender identity and sexual orientation, which undermines the Judeo-Christian and nationalist core value of the nuclear family.

2.3. Misguided political agenda: unrealized potential, in retreat, privilege, and federalism

By describing a world in perpetual crisis, Orbán claims that Europe is in a steady decline, whereby it has lost its ability to compete in the global economy or wield any meaningful political influence on international arena (Orbán, Oct 26, 2021). Moreover, Orbán frames Europe as arrogantly involving itself in the policy concerns of other countries and regions,

when it is itself in decay (Orbán, Jul 8, 2020). This theme returns in his discourse around Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Instead of making tactical decisions, the EU responds reactively to these crises (Orbán, Jul 8, 2020). Orbán describes the European People's Party, the main political group in the European Parliament from which he withdrew in 2021, as "constantly retreating" (Orbán, Mar 4, 2021). A lack of vision in this political group has eroded EU's potential. Related to this, Orbán depicts Western Europe as ignorant of the stakes at play in European politics. Once again, Orbán draws on the communist past, explaining that in contrast to East-Central Europe, the West, "inherited their freedom" (Orbán, Feb 12, 2022).

Whereas the analysis of the ideal-type Europe reveals that Orbán expresses a positive attitude towards further integration, nonetheless, a key problems Orbán identifies relates to the incompatible definition the EU has of integration, leading him to demand that the phrase "ever closer union" be deleted from the EU Treaty (Orbán, Jun 19, 2021). The root of the problem is the ideological premise of the term integration – which, according to Orbán, has a different meaning in the EU, one that connotes a federalist ideal, and thus represents the intention of creating a European superstate that does away with nations altogether (Orbán, November 23, 2021), which contradicts Orbán's ideal type Europe, based on a community of nations.

3. Causes of the Problem

3.1. Liberalism

The liberalist agenda aggressively pursued by Brussels and the Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros is what Orbán frames as the root cause of all the problems with Europe. The destructive forces of liberalism are liberal attitudes to Muslim migrants, tolerance of Islam and migrants, and the promotion and the pursuit of sexual orientation and gender identity rights (SOGI-rights). Liberalism is considered the destructive force breaking down Judeo-Christian values, the family structure, and nations. Still building on the anti-communist frame, Orbán compares liberalism to communism, behind which are "powers that do not recognize pluralistic ideological and freedom of opinion" and claiming that the EU

represents a modernized form of what used to be "intervention with Soviet tanks" (Orbán, Oct 26, 2021). What communism was to the Soviet Union, liberalism is to the EU.

3.2 Soros

Whereas the cause of the problems in Europe is liberalism, the cause of liberalism in Europe is the capitalist-philanthropist, George Soros. Soros is framed as spreading the "ideology" of liberalism through his NGO's, by lobbying Brussels, and through the international liberal media (Orbán, Dec 13, 2020). Soros is framed the architect of the "gender insanity", i.e. the SOGI rights promotion, and as the mastermind orchestrating the refugee crisis. As the ideal-type Europe chapter indicates, Orbán does not treat the cultural threat of Islam and migrants as a cause – it is rather a symptom of liberalism that has brought Islam into its midst. But more specifically, it is a ploy by George Soros to water out the Judeo-Christian tradition of Europe. In a speech leading up to the elections, Orbán claimed to have stopped "the troops of György Soros on the southern borders", when talking about the migration issue (February 12, 2022). In the same speech, Orbán rages against the "gender insanity" that he attaches to the Soros-led liberalists in Brussels. Orbán refers to the discourse on SOGI-rights as the Soros-plan (Orbán, Dec 14, 2021). Throughout the speeches, Soros is prevalent in all the issues Orbán frames.

4. Hungary as the Protector of the Ideal-Type Europe and Model of the Solutions

4.1 Hungary as Involuntary Heart of Europe

Hungary becomes the model European nation. Presented as the involuntary heart of Europe, where the true European tradition has remained unspoiled through decades of ideological conflict between the East and the West, Orbán presents Hungary as a David fighting against a Goliath (Orbán, Oct 23, 2021). Following the anti-communist trope, Orbán frames East-Central Europe as the real people, who have always, and continue to, fight for Europe's freedom. The image of Hungary as a "border castle" a "gateway" to Europe, is by far one of the most established themes in Orbán's discourse. This frame solidifies Hungarians as shapers and defenders of Europe, which not only positions them as protectors of Europeanness, but as the ones who are fighting for its future. Orbán positions himself as the

voice of the fight to "protect and strengthen the way of life that grew out of the Christian faith: human dignity, family, homeland and our church communities" (Orbán, May 17, 2021). As the voice of Christian democratic Europe, Orbán frames Hungary as the model of the solutions.

4.2. Alternative allies: National populists & Visegrád 4; Isreal, Serbia & Russia

With Hungary positioned at the forefront of the fight towards an ideal Europe, and the embodiment of the Judeo-Christian European tradition, constructs the idea of a cooperation with political movements, regions and countries that share Orbán's vision. I define this frame as "alternative allies", since the partnerships Orbán frame operate in opposition to the established power structure in the EU. It is evident from the frame analysis that Orbán primarily views himself and his political vision in the context of East Central Europe, and the Visegrád countries specifically, which alongside Hungary consists of Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland. In this context, the anti-communist frame is predominant, as Orbán draws on a shared, Cold War history. Orbán suggests an alternative power axis with these countries, alongside Germany and France (Orbán, Oct 14, 2020).

Orbán also leans on the potential of a cooperation between national populists in Europe, wanting to create an alternative political group in the European Parliament that is based on a national populist ideal of Europe (Orbán, Oct 26, 2021). Although this has not crystallized as of yet, it is evident in his speeches that creating a political group along this political movement is one of the key ambitions Orbán has in the European political arena: "Now, without the EPP, we need to build a European democratic right that is home to European citizens who do not want migrants, do not want multiculturalism, have not fallen into LGBTQ madness, defend Europe's Christian traditions, respect the sovereignty of nations and their nation is not their past, but as part of their future" (Orbán, March 4, 2021). The discursive effect of this project, I argue, is to establish an image of the national populist umbrella in Europe as the political voice of "the real people" of Europe. In addition to the alternative allies within the EU, Orbán draws heavily on some external partners that he frames as European. Here, the blurring lines between Europe and the EU in Orbán's vision surfaces, exemplified by his alliance with Israel. This alliance is framed in spiritual terms,

with Orbán drawing the line between Christianity and Judaism as natural partners, sharing in the Judeo-Christian tradition (May, 21, 2021).

Serbia has also become a crucial ally for Orbán. The amount of attention that Orbán focuses on Serbia and the inclusion of Balkan countries was the most surprising finding to come out of the frame analysis. The Balkan countries are used as an argument to against EU definition of integration, since it is not including countries that they do not agree with, according to Orbán's rhetoric. Moreover, Serbia is framed alongside Russia as protectors of the future of Christian Europe, which is, I suspect, the reason Serbia is highlighted so frequently in the speeches: "Christian Europe is in big trouble because of its own internal weaknesses and the power of external plagues. It seems to me that Latin Christianity in Europe can no longer stand on its own two feet. Without orthodoxy, an alliance with Eastern Christians, we will hardly survive for decades to come." (Orbán, Jun 19, 2021) Importantly, this implies Russia as well, which is consistently portrayed as a necessary ally for Hungary. In Russia, Orbán recognizes a force that believes in its own destiny, in its own civilization, making it more aligned with true European values (Orbán, Sep 9, 2021). In sum, this theme suggests that the path of civilization, which builds on Judeo-Christian, Latin Europe, is more aligned with peripheral countries and political movements, than it is with West Europe.

Discussion

The anti-communist frame

I had not initially included the anti-communist frame in the analysis, yet, upon concluding the deductive analysis, it was impossible to ignore how integrated the communist past is in Orbán's framing process, a well-known aspect of his rhetoric (Kalmar, 2018; Csehi & Zgut, 2020). By drawing on the existing anti-communist frame, the European Union performs as a parallel to the Soviet Union in Orbán's speeches. The international liberalism of Brussels marks the ideological centralization that once used to be the international communism of the Soviet Union. Liberalism, like communism, is an attack on Christian tradition, deriving from an intellectual elitist minority. Furthermore, Orbán evokes an image of the domestic left seeking to form a puppet government for Brussels in the name of Soros – mirroring Soviet Union's puppet states (Orbán, Oct 23, 2021). This parallel further helps to cement the image

of Hungary as the involuntary heart of Europe. Here, the Christian civilization is contained and protected against forces from all sides – communism from the East, liberalism from the West, and Muslim migrants from the South – with Soros's network in the fabric of the European system. Importantly, Orbán utilizes the anti-communist frame and the ideological competition between the East and the West in the Cold War to depict Hungary as an ideological battleground, and thus, the only place able to withstand the destructive forces of ideology.

2. Interpretation and implications

2. 1. The real people on the path of civilization

The analysis confirms that the most prevalent frame in Orbán's approach to European identity is civilizationism. By depicting European civilization in crisis, he argues that it has stopped believing in its own destiny, embodied in nation states, and now, would rather denounce and erase parts of its history, than be true to itself. Meanwhile, the West arrogantly, and fallaciously, considers itself as the civilized part of Europe, painting Orbán's opposition in the EU as "backwards". Orbán, in turn, weaponizes this argument by claiming that it is the West that has abandoned its own Europeanness. Orbán frames Hungary as a beacon of hope, continuing forwards along European civilization's path, and the West falling behind. Remaining a pocket, it is implied that Hungary is where European civilization has been kept in its purest form, uncorrupted, contained within this impenetrable core.

Moreover, by framing Hungary as a border castle and as the involuntary heart of Europe in this way, Orbán effectively constructs an image of the "real people" that exist on the periphery – a people that are ignored and taken advantage of, a characteristic construction of "the people" in national populist discourse, especially in East Central Europe (Kalmar, 2018, p. 11). The West is framed as a privileged, rootless elite, in comparison. These discursive elements validate the prevalence of a European identity along national populist discursive logic (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1191). By similarly drawing on countries on the peripheries of Europe, whether politically, culturally, or even geographically, Orbán doubles down on this construction of a "real people" that is peripheral and the heartland. Promoting a vision of a European alliance that functions as the voice of the unheard demos, Orbán sets out to form a

collaboration of Eurosceptic national populists and countries that are not members of the EU, as the representatives of "real Europe". This constructed alliance supports the European identity frame that emerges in Orbán's speeches. The function of the political alliances that take up an overwhelming amount of space in the speeches, are consistent with the interpretation of the construction of Orbán's European identity frame.

This alliance, furthermore, is consistent with the East vs West antagonization that draws on the established anti-communist frame. Orbán pushes for a national populist political group in the European Parliament, which aims to collect the political voice in the EU system, but a far more dominant feature in his speeches is the image of Central East Europe and the Balkan countries, against Western Europe. The conservative East is set as a counterbalance to the liberalism of the West. What this frame does, is that it merges the image of migrants pushing on the border from the South, which explains the prevalence of Serbian integration in his speeches, and of liberalism seeping through the continent from the West, and through the EU. Hence, the European civilization is conceptualized as under attack from all sides – even from within. Building new alliances founded in a shared belief in illiberal values becomes the key ingredient to Orbán's solution to save European civilization.

2.2. Migration and LGBTQI+ issues

Following the refugee crisis in 2015, much of the literature has been devoted to how migration has become a key factor in Orbán's rhetoric, accompanied by exclusionary policies (Kalmar, 2018; Glied, 2020; Tóth, 2021). Orbán's civilizationist construction of the Judeo-Christian tradition of Europe under threat by Islam does not place Islam on a lower step in the ladder of a hierarchy of civilization. Instead of framing the issue of migration as a threat posed by Islam as a corrupt and backwards religion, migrants emigrating from their countries are framed as morally corrupt, having abandoned their home, and thus embodying a rootlessness that is suspicious to the primordial nationalist ideal Orbán endorses (Brubaker, 2017). Subsequently, the issue of migration is not associated with the corrupt nature of Islam, but an ethnocultural threat to an already at-risk Judeo-Christian civilization (Rydgren, 2003). The threat of Islam or of Muslim migrants is usually framed in context of liberalism. In this frame, as the analysis shows, Islam is invited into the continent as a further plot by

liberalism's mastermind, George Soros, to speed up this process of undermining Judeo-Christianity (Kalmar; 2018).

Orbán utilizes the political plight of Israel's government to imply that a similar existential threat is shared by Israel and Europe, in the wake of Islam's influence. Furthermore, by using Israel in his framing process, multiple agendas combine. Orbán distances himself from the antisemitic rhetoric of the radical right discourse that his national populism draws on, which is an antisemitism that he implicitly accommodates through the Soros-conspiracy (Kalmar, 2018. George Soros made his money shorting the British pound in the 1990s and is known for his charitable Open Society Foundation. As a Jewish businessman, his function in Orbán's rhetoric evokes the 20th century, antisemitic conspiracy, that the world is secretly run by a Jewish elite conducting economic manipulations and masterminding crises for personal gain (Kalmar, 2018). By maintaining this implicit antisemitism, he openly supports Israel when it faces international scrutiny (Orbán, May 21, 2021), using Israel to frame the idea of a Judeo-Christian tradition under attack by Islam, suggesting that Israel is culturally and spiritually European. Moreover, by alluding to the Holocaust, Orbán issues a warning of what can happen to a people when it becomes a minority – they face the threat of extinction, further feeding into the great replacement theory.

Orbán is most concerned with is the LGBTQI + issue, which he refers to as "the gender insanity" of the West. While this issue is used to frame the EU as imperialistic and ideological, with Soros as the mastermind behind it, in the context of European civilization it turns into the apex of the liberalism that will destroy Europe from within, as it attacks the fundamental family structure that, as coarse as it sounds, breeds the European demos. Orbán never speaks of individuals and claims to respect people's individual freedoms – and their SOGI rights. What he has a problem with, as in the case of migration, is the ideology behind its place in Europe. In this way, he avoids making extremist claim, while appealing to homophobic attitudes, always manipulating his politics to be about what is protected, rather than what is attacked, as Kalmar observes (Kalmar, 2018, p. ?). The problem is the ideology of LGBTQI+ and Islam once it has eroded the demos. The former being of much more fundamental importance, because, although never explicitly saying it, Orbán implies that

Europeans will stop having European babies, and thus, it too poses a fundamental threat to European civilization.

The idea of a homogeneous ethnocultural and ethnoreligious Europe under threat of extinction, is the main takeaway from how Orbán frames a European identity. Presented as the consequence of EU's 'suicidal' tendencies, Orbán's rhetoric is entirely consistent with "the great replacement" conspiracy, just as Obiadi et al, observe in their paper (2021). Moreover, Orbán vaguely weaves what he frames as the LGBTQI+ agenda into this conspiracy, which becomes another force slowly eradicating the European population. Understanding the implication of this conspiracy is lacking, as Obiadi et al. note (2021, p. 2). It is important to take this seriously when considering Orbán's apparent ambitions on the European political arena, the alternative allies he leans on, his political appeal, and the appeal of national populism across Europe, which all indicate a serious challenge in the years to come. While Orbán might lose some allies in his stance on Russia, the European identity frame he has constructed will likely continue gaining support in East Central Europe and by national populist parties, which, if the EU is not capable of responding to with a meaningful project of belonging, will affect elections, which voting patterns across Europe already suggest (Zulianello & Larsen, 2021).

3. Implications for the war in Ukraine

The selection of speeches that cover the period since the breakout of war, as well as issues of scope, have put limitations to the extent to which I am able to cover the invasion of Ukraine in this paper. Nonetheless, Orbán's extraordinary stance in the EU on Russia in tandem with the implications of Russia's role in protecting the Judeo-Christian tradition, means that it deserves to be mentioned. Considering Orbán's uncompromising stance on national sovereignty, his concern with imperialist tendencies, and the communist history that Hungary shares with Russia, which he consistently draws on, it strikes as surprising that Orbán would take a pro-Russian stance on the invasion of Ukraine. Raging against the world's response to the conflict, Orbán claims that the reactions against Russia have been completely inacceptable. In a twist of irony, Orbán opposes the sanctions as "policies of punishment" that disrespect Russia's national sovereignty (citation). Orbán's civilizationist frame, his conviction that Judeo-Christian Europe must rely on its Orthodox friends for its survival,

suggest how Orbán's has been constructing an association to Russia that is integrated into his European identity frame.

Since the breakout of war, Orbán has eased pro-Russian sentiment in his speeches, choosing instead to emphasize the imperialistic misstep of involving oneself in another country's affairs through sanctions and military support instead. Instead of focusing on his political affinity for Russia, Orbán has framed the war by focusing his attention on Ukrainian refugees, the Ukraine's people, and their president, Volodymyr Zelensky. In his victory speech on April 3, Orbán exclaimed that he had won against an army of enemies, which, alongside Soros and the Brussels bureaucrats, included the Ukrainian president (Orbán, Apr 3, 2022). Whereas in a later speech Orbán expressed sympathy for the president, he reproaches him for trying to pull every country into war with him. The implication being that Europe is allowing itself to be manipulated into war (Orbán, Apr 30, 2022). Moreover, by warning that the worst is yet to come in the years to come, Orbán find a justification for his militant and extremist rhetoric as a consequence of war. Vague description of how poorly Hungarians have been treated in Ukraine, of the resulting refugee crisis, and of the unreasonable demands made by the Ukrainian president, is framed as a complete lack of respect for Hungary's sovereignty (Orbán, Apr 1, 2022). Following whether or how Visegrád countries ideas of Europeanness differently by drawing on the war in Ukraine would be an interesting topic for future research.

Conclusion

Little attention has been invested into the nuance of a politically integrated Europe, which is a gap I have attempted to fill with this analysis. Orbán's speeches prove him to be dedicated to the European political project, and despite the harsh antagonizations that emerge in his rhetoric, we never see him not deterred from supporting the EU's continued expansion, intending to strengthen and expand it politically, militarily, and economically. Positing himself as the voice of the Christian democrats and the new freedom fighters of Europe, Orbán demands "a new European architecture" that, "Europeans must somehow be involved in this" (Orbán, Jan 9, 2022), cementing the us vs. them rhetoric, while at the same time

alluding to the identity generating function of his national populist approach to an ideal-type Europe.

Following the developments in Hungary after Orbán won another landslide election and the continuing war with Russia, an important concern for future research will understanding how Orbán's approach to the conflict in Ukraine affects his European identity frame, and his relationship with other East Central European countries. The frame analysis I have conducted points towards a strong identification with Europe, political ambitions for the EU, and at the same time, a vision based on alternative collaborations. Considering a comment in one of his speeches, where Orbán claims that his vision of Europe, based on traditional, Latin, Christian values, as more aligned with orthodox countries in the East, portrays a Europe that moves towards an even more pronounced antagonization between the East and the West, continuing to build on an anti-communist frame deriving from the Cold War era.

The blurring lines between the EU and Europe in Orbán's rhetoric constitutes the nuance and aspects of the 'soft Euroscepticism' determined by his national populist discourse is what has been entirely overlooked in the relevant scholarship. The aim of the analysis and the methodology I have chosen, has been to bring this element to the fore. The premise of my thesis question has been that to understand national populism's appeal, we must search for its identity generating functions. If political figures such as Orbán succeed in establishing the idea of a European demos determined by national populist discursive logic, it could very well pose a threat to the EU. Understanding that a civilizationist frame, in that it develops a national populist discourse, not only creates a European identity based on the EU but indicates a spiritual Europeanness whereby the EU is the ultimate expression of a potential that has not been realized in the form it has taken so far. As such, the blurred lines between the EU and Europe is an important starting point for the project of belonging that the civilizationist frame embodies (Yuval-Davis, 2011).

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Appendix A

Speeches, press statements and interviews used in the inductive analysis

Sorted by date, all speeches by Viktor Orbán can be accessed in Hungarian through the following online depository: https://miniszterelnok.hu/category/beszedek/

S1	Feb 19, 2019	Press statement in Jerusalem
S2	Feb 27, 2019	Speech at the opening of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
S3	May 2, 2019	Press statement following a meeting with Matteo Salvini
S4	May 17, 2019	Speech at the Thanksgiving Mass at the handover of the renovated St. George's Church
S5	May 26, 2019	Speech on the night of the European elections
S6	July 9, 2019	Speech at the US Independence Day reception
S7	Oct 30, 2019	Press release following talks with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin
S8	Oct 11, 2019	Statement before meeting with Emmanuel Macron
S9	Jan 16, 2020	Press release by following the summit of the Visegrad Four and Austrian heads of government
S10	Jan 4, 2020	EU samizdat (nr. 3)
S11	Nov 26, 2020	Press statement after talks with Mateusz Morawiecki
S12	Nov 9, 2020	Press statement
S13	Nov 3, 2020	Press statement
S14	Oct 31, 2020	Speech at service for the reconstruction of the Reformed Church "Magvető Háza"
S15	Oct 17, 2020	Speech on the occasion of the handover of the new secondary school building of the István Demjén Reformed Primary School and Gymnasium in Rózsakerti
S16	Oct 10, 2020	Speech at the opening of the Imre Kertész Institute
S17	Oct 9, 2020	Interview on Kossuth Radio
S18	Sep 21, 2020	Article in Magyar Nemzet
S19	Dec 13, 2020	Answer to George Soros

S20	Dec 14, 2020	Response in parliament
S21	Feb 5, 2021	Press statement after talks with Andrej Babiš
S22	Feb 12, 2021	The press statement after meeting with heads of government of the Visegrád four
S23	Mar 4, 2021	EU samizdat (nr. 6)
S24	Mar 30, 2021	Statement following talks with Savkat Mirzoyev
S25	May 18, 2021	EU samizdat (nr. 7)
S26	May 21, 2021	EU samizdat (nr. 8)
S27	Jun 5, 2021	Speech at the handover ceremony for the new commander of the Hungarian Armed Forces
S28	Jun 7, 2021	EU samizdat (nr. 9)
S29	Jun 9, 2021	Presentation at the World Economic Forum
S30	Jun 10, 2021	Press conference
S31	Jun 17, 2021	EU samizdat (nr. 10)
S32	Jun 19, 2021	Presentation at the conference "Thirty Years Free"
S33	Jun 30, 2021	Press statement on taking over the presidency of the Visegrad Four
S34	Jul 3, 2021	Speech at the inauguration of the National University of Public Administration
S35	Sep, 24, 2021	Speech at the Conference of Speakers of the Parliaments of the South-Eastern European Countries and the Speakers of the V4
S36	Sep 20, 2021	Response in parliament
S37	Sep 23, 2021	Speech before the agenda
S38	Sep 11, 2021	Statement on the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks in New York
S39	Sep 9, 2021	Speech at the opening ceremony of the Mathias Corvinus Collegium
S40	Sep 8, 2021	Press release after the Hungarian-Serbian summit
S41	Jul 8, 2021	Press statement following talks with Aleksandar Vučić
S42	Dec 6, 2021	EU Samizdat (nr. 14)
S43	Sep 26, 2021	Speech at the consecration of the Church of Togetherness

S44	Feb 1, 2022	Answers to journalistic questions in Moscow
S45	Oct 23, 2021	Speech on the 65th anniversary of the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence
S46	Oct 26, 2021	Statement following talks with Marine Le Pen
S47	Nov 23, 2021	Press statement after the meeting of the Visegrad Four heads of government
S48	Mar 23, 2022	Statement ahead of the NATO-EU summit in Brussels
S49	Mar 15, 2022	Speech on the 174th anniversary of the Revolution and War of Independence
S50	Jan 30, 2022	Press statement following the Madrid summit of European conservative party leaders
S51	Feb 12, 2022	Annual evaluation speech
S52	Dec 13, 2021	Press statement before meeting with Emmanuel Macron
S53	Apr 3, 2022	Victory speech following elections
S54	Apr 1, 2022	Campaign speech
S55	Apr 1, 2021	Press statement after talks with Mateusz Morawiecki and Matteo Salvini
S56	Nov 22, 2021	Open letter to Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission

Appendix B

Speeches, press statements and interviews used in the deductive analysis. There are overlaps between some speeches used in the inductive analysis.

Sorted by date, all speeches by Viktor Orbán can be accessed in Hungarian through the following online depository: https://miniszterelnok.hu/category/beszedek/

SB1	Apr 1, 2022	Campaign speech
SB2	Apr 3, 2022	Victory speech
SB3	Apr 6, 2022	Statement at the international press conference
SB4	Apr 25, 2022	Speech at the opening of the Star Festival
SB5	Apr 29, 2022	Press statement after talks with President János Áder
SB6	Aug 20, 2020	Speech at the inauguration of the Togetherness Memorial
SB7	Dec 5, 2019	Speech at the opening of the temporary exhibition "Treasures of Budapest" in Tokyo
SB8	Dec 10, 2020	Press release following the European Council
SB9	Dec 14, 2020	Speech before the agenda
SB10	Dec 14, 2021	Speech at the commemoration of the centenary of the Sopron referendum
SB11	Dec 13, 2020	Answer to George Soros
SB12	Dec 13, 2021	Press statement before meeting with Emmanuel Macron
SB13	Dec 14, 2019	Speech at the gala evening of the "Timisoara 30"
SB14	Dec 21, 2021	Press statement at the year-end international press conference
SB15	Feb 1, 2022	Press statement following talks with Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin
SB16	Feb 5, 2021	Press statement after talks with Andrej Babiš
SB17	Feb 12, 2022	Annual evaluation speech
SB18	Feb 13, 2020	Speech
SB19	Feb 17, 2021	Press statement after the deliberations of the heads of government of the Visegrád four
SB20	Feb 19, 2022	Speech at the opening of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
SB21	Jan 16, 2020	Press release by following the summit of the Visegrad Four and Austrian heads of government
SB22	Jan 28, 2022	EU Samizdat
SB23	Jul 3, 2021	Speech at the inauguration of the National University of Public Administration
SB24	Jul 8, 2020	Presentation at the online international conference "Uncensored Europe"
SB25	Jun 5, 2020	Statement following talks with Alexander Lukashenko
SB26	Jul 8, 2021	Press statement following talks with Aleksandar Vučić
SB27	Jun 5, 2021	Speech at ceremony for the command post of the Hungarian Armed Forces

SB28	Jun 8, 2021	Press release following talks with Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama
SB29	Jun 10, 2020	Press conference
SB30	Jun 11, 2020	Press statement after the meeting of the four heads of government of the Visegrád
SB31	Jun 19, 2021	Presentation at the conference "Thirty Years Free"
SB32	Jun 25, 2021	Speech at the 30th anniversary of the proclamation of Slovenia's independence
SB33	Mar 4, 2021	EU Samizdat
SB34	Mar 5, 2022	Speech at the congress of the Association of Hungarian Farmers' Circles and Cooperatives (MAGOSZ) and the National Chamber of Agriculture (NAK)
SB35	Jun 29, 2021	Press statement following talks with Eduard Heger
SB36	June 27, 2020	Speech at the inauguration of the National University of Public Administration
SB37	Mar 4, 2020	Statement after the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Four
SB38	Mar 6, 2020	Speech at the ceremonial staff meeting of the 100-year-old Hungarian Police
SB39	Mar 12, 2020	Press statement following talks with Ion Chicuv
SB40	Mar 15, 2022	Speech on the 174th anniversary of the Revolution and War of Independence
SB41	Mar 16, 2020	Speech before the agenda
SB42	Mar 19, 2022	Speech at the handover ceremony of the Belgrade-Novi Sad railway line
SB43	Mar 26, 2022	Speech at the handover of Rheinmetall's new factory building
SB44	Mar 23, 2022	Statement ahead of the NATO-EU summit in Brussels
SB45	Mar 30, 2021	Statement following talks with Savkat Mirzoyev
SB46	Mar 31, 2021	Speech at a video conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Turkish Council
SB47	May 1, 2022	Speech in celebration of the naming of Esztergom
SB48	May 15, 2020	Press statement after talks with the President of Serbia
SB49	May 16, 2022	Speech after the Prime Minister's oath
SB50	May 18, 2021	EU Samizdat (nr. 7)
SB51	Nov 4, 2021	Press release following the meeting of the Visegrad Four Prime Ministers and the President of Korea
SB52	May 20, 2022	Speech at the opening of the 89th Novi Sad International Agricultural Fair
SB53	May 22, 2022	Speech by Viktor Orbán at the opening ceremony for the new building of the Ethnographic Museum
SB54	May 24, 2022	Presentation of new ministers
SB55	Nov 5, 2019	Press statement before the Friends of Cohesion country group meeting
SB56	Nov 11, 2021	Speech on the occasion of the Turkish National Afforestation Day before the joint tree planting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
SB57	Nov 14, 2019	Speech at the IX. meeting
SB58	Nov 14, 2020	Speech at the funeral of Géza Szőcs

SB59	Nov 14, 2021	Speech at the congress for Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Association XXIX
SB60	Nov 17, 2019	Press conference at the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution
SB61	Nov 26, 2020	Press statement after talks with Mateusz Morawiecki
SB62	Oct 9, 2020	Interview on Kossuth Radio
SB63	Nov 22, 2021	Open letter to Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission
SB64	Nov 28, 2019	Speech at the handover of the dormitory building of the Hungarian Education and Culture Center
SB65	Nov 24, 2021	Speech on the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the Perspective Institute
SB66	Oct 11, 2021	Speech on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the construction of the Mária Valéria bridge
SB67	Oct 13, 2021	Press statement following his talks with Abdel Fathah es-Sisi
SB68	Oct 14, 2020	Speech at the ceremony for the construction of a high-voltage transmission line between Pince-Cirkovce
SB69	Oct 23, 2019	Speech on the 63rd anniversary of the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence
SB70	Oct 23, 2021	Speech on the 65th anniversary of the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence
SB71	Oct 26, 2021	Statement following talks with Marine Le Pen
SB72	Oct 27, 2020	Speech at the Inauguration of the Statue of George by the 41st President of the United States in Budapest
SB73	Sep 8, 2021	Press statement after the Hungarian-Serbian government summit
SB74	Sep 11, 2021	Statement on the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks in New York
SB75	Sep 15, 2021	Speech at the opening of the 53rd MOS International Craft and Entrepreneurship Fair
SB76	Sep 20, 2021	Speech before the agenda
SB77	Sep 21, 2020	Response in Parliament
SB78	Sep 22, 2021	Press release following a joint border visit with Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš
SB79	Sep 24, 2021	Speech at the Conference of Speakers of the Parliaments of the South-Eastern European Countries and the Speakers of the V4
SB80	Sep 26, 2021	Speech on the consecration of the Church of Togetherness