Recognition vs. redistribution - a false dichotomy?

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Abstract

Recognition has been established as a right in political theory, with the argument that it is connected to justice since misrecognition can inflict injury to one's identity. Meanwhile in political theory there is debate about whether recognition drives out redistribution or that redistribution will eventually follow from recognition, however empirical evidence is scarce. One cross-national analysis by Banting et al. (2006) analysed the effect of multicultural recognition policies on redistribution, but concluded that there was no correlation between recognition and redistribution. Nancy Fraser (2000) made a distinction between two different kinds of recognition politics: *status* and *identity* politics. She claims that the latter drives out redistribution, while status politics does not. This thesis looks at whether the difference between identity politics and status politics can explain why recognition and redistribution are not correlated in the study by Banting et al., and if identity recognition policies indeed drive out redistribution. The performed cross-national statistical analysis does not support the hypothesis that multicultural identity policies drive out redistribution. However the data does hint in this direction.

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1. Introduction

Recognition has been established as a right in political theory. Charles Taylor connected the need for recognition to justice, by showing that it is a vital human need (2004, p. 26). Based on the idea from Hegel that identity is constructed dialogically, nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict injury to one's identity (Taylor, 2004; Fraser, 2000, p. 109). Within political theory however, there is debate about whether recognition drives out redistribution or that redistribution will eventually follow from recognition. The idea behind the latter position is that maldistribution essentially is a problem of nonrecognition. Thus if recognition finds place, redistribution will automatically follow (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). This theoretical debate has not translated in much empirical research. Meanwhile, scholars such as Fraser (2003) and Fukuyama (2018) argue that there is a surge in politics concerning recognition. This means that we should be able to research the theoretical debate whether recognition drives out redistribution.

Fukuyama does not use the word recognition in his analysis, but uses the term identity politics. It is clear however that he discusses the same contrast as Fraser and Honneth: politics on economic issues versus identity politics, respectively redistribution versus recognition politics (Fukuyama, 2018). Fukuyama argues that there is a trend towards identity politics since the turn of the century (2018). He states that politics in the twentieth century was about economic issues: the left pleaded for redistribution, social welfare and workers' rights, while the right argued for privatisation and a small public sector (Fukuyama, 2018). Since 2000 both politics on the left and right spectrum focusses more on identity issues: the left focusses more on groups such as women and ethnic minorities, promoting their specific interests and the right turned more towards defining and promoting the national identity (Fukuyama, 2018, p. 91).

This is often connected to ethnicity or religion. According to Fukuyama, the left thus focusses less on economic inequality because it devotes time to cultural issues of marginalised groups, which makes it easier for the right to ignore the inequality and to respond to the cultural issues from a national identity perspective (2018). Fraser also notices a trend in politics from redistribution to recognition (2003). I claim that while there may be more politics of recognition, this does not have to mean that there is less politics of redistribution. In other words: a trend towards more recognition does not automatically establish an inverse relationship between recognition and redistribution. Maybe politics does not have to be a zero-sum game trading redistribution for recognition, but instead identity politics is just added to the realm of politics in which redistribution politics also still takes place.

The empirical research is scarce in this area. Yet in 2006, Banting and Kymlicka edited a book that did dive into this, focussed on Western democracies using data from 1980 to 2000. With a cross-national analysis, Banting et al. (2006) show that there is no negative correlation between a country having more multicultural policies and its ability to sustain welfare spending or economic redistribution. The multicultural policies are a kind of recognition policies and the state of the welfare state is the proxy for economic redistribution in this research. This outcome thus does not support the hypothesis of Fraser that recognition drives out redistribution, at least not in the domain of multicultural policies. However the analysis of Banting et al. just looks at how many multicultural policies are in place, not into what kind of multicultural recognition policies are in place. This brings me to the theory of Nancy Fraser which differentiates between two kinds of recognition: *status* and *identity* politics.

Fraser claims that recognition does not *necessarily* replace redistribution, as long as the recognition claim is one of status politics and not of identity politics (2000; 2003). What requires recognition differs in these two kinds of politics, because the respective goals of recognition differ. With identity politics a particular group identity requires recognition in order

to remedy depreciation and deformation of group identity and thus harm to the identity of the self. This follows from the argument made by Taylor (2004) and Honneth that a certain level of recognition ought to be seen as a right because disrespect can be just as harmful to the individual as material deprivation (Fraser, 2003, p. 28; Lauer, 2012, p. 25). This is what Fraser calls recognition as matter of self-realisation (2003, p. 28).

In contrast, Fraser posits that self-realisation should not be the right on which recognition is based. Rather, participatory parity should ultimately be the foundation for recognition, which then leads to another kind of recognition politics (Fraser, 2003, pp. 28-29). This is what she calls status politics. With status politics what thus requires recognition is not the particular group identity, but the status of individual group members as full partners in social interaction (Fraser, 2000, p. 113). Status politics goes further than identity politics in that it not merely symbolically recognises a specific culture. Rather, it examines whether institutionalised cultural values impede or foster parity of participation in social, economic and political life (Fraser, 2000, pp. 115-116). According to Fraser, this type of recognition politics leaves the possibility for redistribution open while identity politics drives out redistribution (2000; 2003).

The distinction between these two kinds of recognition can possibly explain why Banting et al. find no negative or positive correlation between redistribution and recognition. This thesis tries to shed more light on the question whether recognition indeed drives out redistribution. Using the distinction from Fraser between identity politics and status politics (2000), we will specifically look into the particular kind of policies involving recognition that would drive out redistribution and those that leave the possibility for redistribution open. The question it thus tries to answer is *Can the difference between identity politics and status politics explain why recognition and redistribution are not correlated in the study by Banting et al.*? In a time in which scholars such as Fraser and Fukuyama see a proliferation of recognition politics, this is an interesting question: is there a right way of doing recognition politics, now that

recognition is widely seen as a right? A way that does not infringe upon economic rights? Or is there also no correlation between identity recognition politics and redistribution and can we conclude that there is possibly no trade-off between redistribution and either kind of recognition?

The question will be answered by adjusting the cross-national statistical analysis that Banting et al. did, on the same time period: 1980-2000. The multicultural policies they used will be divided into status and identity policies to see whether this changes the outcome of the research. Therefore we will first look into the hypotheses that could explain why recognition would drive out redistribution. After that, the distinction made by Fraser between status and identity politics will be explained and connected to the hypotheses. We will look at how the distinction can help us to take a more specific look at the data, to see if a negative correlation arises between identity recognition politics and redistribution.

2. Hypotheses on redistribution vs. recognition

Banting and Kymlicka explicate three different mechanisms on how recognition could replace or prevent redistribution and show how these explanations can be countered. The first one is the crowding-out effect. This effect hypothesises that multicultural policies involving recognition would weaken pro-redistribution coalitions by "diverting time, energy, and money from redistribution to recognition" (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006, p. 10). This is based on the idea that there is only a specific amount of time that can be used, and political actors thus invest this in either redistribution or recognition. An example is given by Todd Gitlin in 1995, about left-wing students who fought for a more inclusive educational environment through representation, all the while ignoring budget cuts to the educational system that made it difficult for minorities to even get into the university (Banting & Kymlicka, p. 10). Crowding-out however assumes that there is a coalition that is willing to protect and/or proliferate

redistribution policies. Scholars such as Anne Phillips and Brian Barry argue that a lot of citizens and the political left in general have lost hope for economic equality policies (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006, p. 16). This could then also explain why there is less focus on redistribution and more on recognition. This has nothing to do with recognition politics itself. Another counter-claim is that political mobilisation is not zero-sum: if people get involved in politics irrespective of whether this is about recognition or redistribution, they can perceive a sense of political efficacy and mobilise on more issues. This means that if people now mobilise around recognition issues, it would reinforce the idea that citizens have political agency and could result in mobilisation on other issues (Van Cott, 2006; Banting & Kymlicka, 2006, p. 16). This in turn would mean that recognition politics could actually reinforce redistribution politics, or at least would put it back on the table.

The second hypothesis is based on the corroding effect, given by amongst others Wolfe and Klausen (2000) and Barry (2001). It posits that trust and solidarity between citizens would be undermined by recognition policies which emphasise differences instead of commonalities, or which erode the common public space, in turn eroding support for redistribution policies (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006, p. 11). This assumes that before the policy, there was trust and solidarity between citizens. However, as Banting and Kymlicka state: historically many Western countries adopt recognition policies precisely because there is little trust or solidarity, to show minorities that they will be protected by the state and that they can trust the larger society (2006, p. 17).

Next to this version of the corroding effect – the erosion of trust and solidarity, which is a kind of social corrosion – I want to add a different version of this hypothesis which is *organisational* corrosion. Banting and Kymlicka do not mention this effect, but other authors do give examples that point to this. Lilla notes how the focus on the individual identity and difference between identity groups by the Democrats in the United States has left the Democrats

unprepared to persuade people very different from themselves to join a common effort (2018, p. 10). Recognition politics gives "vocabulary to discuss mine and thine", but not to discuss commonalities (Lilla, 2018, p. 31). According to Lilla, the focus on particular identities works centrifugal: it encourages splits into smaller and smaller factions focussing on differences between them (Lilla, 2018, p. 77). Fraser also notices that the focus on difference encourages separatism and group enclaves. It is likely that political mobilisation will then also occur along these group lines, making collective political mobilisation on for example class redistribution less likely (Fraser, 2000, p. 113). This could lead to political fragmentation, what I will call organisational corrosion, because this could lead to less force to fight for redistribution. Since the right often focuses on majority identity, nationalism, this is politically a bigger group, while the left is in danger of fragmentation, being divided between different minority groups. However like Fraser, this organisational corrosion is noticed by Lilla in the context of a politics of recognition as self-realisation. Lilla describes it as radical individualism, politics concerned about recognition of the feeling self (2018, p. 9, 78). As we will see below however, Fraser claims that it is also possible to base recognition on participatory parity which would enable groups to still work together and create coalitions.

The third hypothesis claims that policies involving recognition would lead people to misdiagnose the problems of minorities, which are actually problems that are shared by people of the majority (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006, p. 12). This hypothesis claims that recognition politics imply that cultural recognition would solve minorities' problems. This is a nonsolution according to this hypothesis, since the real problems lie elsewhere (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006, p. 13). There are two versions of this argument. One is that race is the actual problem instead of cultural difference concerning for example African-Americans (Barry, 2001, p. 306). Another is that often class is the actual problem instead of cultural or ethnic difference, displacing attention from the class struggle.

This is different from the crowding-out effect in that it not simply states that time is spent on recognition politics instead of on redistribution politics, but that the understanding of the problem becomes distorted altogether. It is different from organisational corrosion in that it is not about the fact that the political left loses force because of organisational fragmentation, but that the minorities themselves actually misunderstand the problem. The solution then is not to adopt recognition policies, but to improve people's economic standing in society and to counter maldistribution, using pan-ethnic alliances. However it seems to me that having recognition policies does not necessarily drive out redistribution or lead to misdiagnosis of problems; recognition can be seen as a complementary form of justice, next to redistribution. It is not entirely clear why having recognition policies in place would lead to misdiagnosing. This would mean that these policies inherently blind you to other injustices, which seems unlikely to me.

In fact, as we have seen, for all hypotheses there is a counter-claim and for both the hypotheses and counter-claims scholars have found case evidence. Therefore Banting et al. decide to look systematically into the evidence and perform a statistical cross-national analysis. They find that there is no correlation between a country having more multicultural policies in place and the erosion of redistributive policies over a time period of 20 years (Banting et al., 2006). They even find hints in the data that adopting multicultural policies sometimes strengthens the welfare state (Banting et al., 2006). This raises the question how it can be that there are so many hypotheses around the link between recognition and redistribution, while Banting et al. did not find a correlation between these two concepts.

In the research by Banting et al., all kinds of multicultural policies were taken into account. My hypothesis is that it is a particular kind of multicultural policy that drives out redistribution and a kind that can strengthen redistribution, feeding into all three hypotheses above. The kind of multicultural policy determines whether redistribution is crowded out,

whether a corroding effect occurs, or whether misdiagnosing happens. To explain this hypothesis, I turn to the difference between identity politics and status politics made by Fraser.

3. Identity politics vs. status politics

Nancy Fraser has written a lot about the need for recognition, its relation to redistribution and the problem of reification of groups. She coins two different models of claims for recognition: an *identity* model and a *status* model (2000). In the *identity* model, identity is constructed dialogically based on mutual recognition, whereby mis- or nonrecognition can inflict injury to one's identity (Fraser, 2000, p. 109). To restore ones identity in a positive way, members of a nonrecognised group reject the dominant idea about this group, cast off their negative identity, construct their own identity and represent themselves as such (Fraser, 2000, p. 109). This would in turn generate respect and thus recognition from the society at large according to this model (Fraser, 2000, pp. 109-110). The problem with this identity politics according to Fraser is that it abstracts misrecognition from its institutional matrix. It treats misrecognition purely as a cultural discourse problem, resulting in the replacement or obscuration of redistribution for/by recognition.

This replacement is caused by two different ways of conducting identity politics. The first is that misrecognition is purely seen as a cultural problem, that is as a discourse problem, missing the economic, social-structural side of misrecognition. This aligns with the misdiagnosing effect as described by Banting and Kymlicka. A second explanation of how redistribution is obscured is that people conducting identity politics do see the link between maldistribution and misrecognition, but mistake maldistribution purely as a secondary effect of misrecognition (Fraser, 2000, pp. 110-111). In this view recognition would attack the source of inequality, preventing the need for redistribution (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). However, as Fraser rightly points out, economic markets have their own logic, apart from cultural values, and

economic inequality is not purely an expression of identity hierarchy (Fraser, 2000, pp. 111-112). Thus according to her there should be both recognition and redistribution policies, with the same level of importance. This means that recognition politics should not inherently drive out redistribution, as is the case with identity recognition.

Another problem with identity politics according to Fraser is that it stresses the need for the self-generated collective identity in order to get recognised. This results in pressure on the members of the group to conform to the group culture. Furthermore, there is no place for 'other' identities next to the group identity: intragroup divisions should not be explored in order to get recognised (Fraser, 2000, p. 112). Cultural criticism is discouraged from within the group itself (Fraser, 2000, p. 112). This all could result in misrecognition from within the group instead of from the society at large. This single group identity which is reified by these politics also obscures struggles within the group for authority (Fraser, 2000, p. 112).

Through identity politics, differences in society are accentuated, since the group is defined by its authentic and different culture to get recognised. This feeds into the corroding hypothesis mentioned by Banting and Kymlicka, in that solidarity gets undermined through this and thus support for redistribution ceases. The emphasis on differences furthermore scarcely fosters social interaction across differences, leading to reification of groups (Fraser, 2000, p. 113). This reification in turn can cause a proliferation of recognition claims: all groups retreat to themselves and want to be recognised. For example, class-struggles are obscured or at least groups do not mobilise along class-lines anymore, which in turn can lead to driving out redistribution from politics. This feeds into the organisational corrosion hypothesis mentioned before and could also feed into the crowding-out effect, in that all time there is in politics is now devoted to recognition politics.

Yet Fraser claims that recognition does not necessarily have to reify groups and replace redistribution. We just need another kind of politics for that. Fraser advocates *status* politics,

consisting of an account of recognition that does not lead to reification but that can accommodate the full complexity of social identities. For this she proposes to look at recognition as a question of social status instead of identity (Fraser, 2000). Not a group-specific identity requires recognition, but the status of an individual group member as a full partner in social interaction (Fraser, 2000, p. 113). Misrecognition is thus *social subordination* instead of depreciation of group identity. This way both maldistribution and misrecognition are framed as injustices to participatory parity, making it possible to reintegrate the two in the realm of politics and to see how misrecognition sometimes leads to maldistribution and vice versa. In contrast to treating redistribution and recognition as different injustice issues, here redistribution and recognition are positioned at the same level of importance, since both are about participatory parity. This means one cannot replace or subsume the other.

Status politics turns the focus to institutions and their norms and how they affect the relative standing of social actors. Politics in this case is focussed on levelling the misrecognised individual as a full member of society, on status equality (Fraser, 2000, pp. 113-114). This still requires recognition, but not purely on identity. If institutionalised patterns constitute all individuals as peers, there is reciprocal recognition and status equality (Fraser, 2000). If this is not the case and some people are constituted as inferior, are invisible or are excluded from social life, there is misrecognition and status subordination (Fraser, 2000). According to Fraser, misrecognition exists not because of cultural discourse, but because of institutionalised patterns with particular parity-impeding cultural norms (Fraser, 2000, p. 114).

These norms can be institutionalised formally through law, policy or professional practice, or informally through associational patterns, customs and social practices. An example of institutionalisation through policy or professional practice is ethnic profiling by the police, in which non-whiteness is institutionalised as dangerous or criminal, and whiteness as law-abiding, or ethnic profiling by an institution such as the tax authority. An example of

institutionalisation through law is when same-sex marriage is not allowed, meaning that gay couples cannot enjoy the federal matrimonial benefits that heterosexual couples enjoy such as social security and tax benefits. Informal institutionalisation can be seen in for example that feminine work such as caregiving is often economically valued less than masculine work.

This brings me to my hypothesis. As we saw: the identity model of recognition refers to the hypotheses mentioned by Banting and Kymlicka. But the status model of recognition does not, it focusses on status equality between individuals as peers in society and looks at institutionalised cultural norms that prevent individuals from being able to be participate as a peer in social life. With status politics, there should be no crowding-out. I posit that equalising individuals as peers in society enables them to participate in political life, enabling them to mobilise on every issue they want, without enclosing them in one group, enabling to form all kinds of alliances with different people from different groups. Since this does not reify the groups and does not accentuate differences, it does not have the corroding effect. And finally the misdiagnosing effect should not take place, since status politics does not only focus on cultural recognition, but on what an individual member of a group needs to be a full member of society. This thus means that it also looks at the economic standing of an individual (class) and at institutional discrimination (race).

In sum, Fraser's theory claims that identitarian recognition politics drives out redistribution, while status recognition politics does not do this necessarily. Maybe the difference between identity politics and status politics can explain why recognition and redistribution are not correlated in the study by Banting et al., since they used all kinds of multicultural policies and did not differentiate between status and identity multicultural policies. If some of the chosen policies are status policies, these would have a zero or positive effect on redistribution, while identity policies would have a negative effect on redistribution. I will therefore replicate the study by Banting et al, to see whether a correlation arises between

recognition and redistribution if we differentiate between status and identity multicultural policies.

4. Methods

A cross-national statistical analysis will be performed to see whether it matters if a policy is focused on status or identity in how this affects redistribution. The countries incorporated in the analysis will be the same as the ones in the study from Banting et al.: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK and US. This way we are able to compare the results. For the same reason, data of the same time period as in the study of Banting et al. will be used: 1980 to 2000.

4.1. Operationalising politics of redistribution – dependent variable

There are two concepts that have to be operationalised: politics of redistribution and politics of recognition. First the *politics of redistribution*, the dependent variable. This variable has to measure change over time, since the hypotheses do not state that the absolute level of redistribution will be lower when there is recognition, but that it lowers as soon as recognition comes in. Therefore Banting et al. measure redistribution as changes in strength of the welfare state and changes in social outcomes. To measure this, they use five indicators (Banting et al., 2006, pp. 63-64):

(1) social public spending as a proportion of GDP (OECD Social Expenditure dataset (OECD, 2022a)).

(2) the difference in level of poverty before and after government taxes and transfers (from Mahler and Jesuit, as used by Banting et al. (2016))

(3) the difference in level of inequality in market incomes and inequality in disposable incomes before and after government taxes and transfers (from Mahler and Jesuit, as used by Banting et al. (2016))

(4) the level of child poverty, with the poverty line at 50% of the median adjusted disposable income for the total population (LIS, 2022)

(5) the level of income inequality, using the Gini coefficient (LIS, 2022). The Gini coefficient ranges between zero (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality), so the higher the number, the greater the level of inequality.

For our first look at the data, the same indicators and data collected by Banting et al. will be used for the dependent variable, the level of redistribution policies. This means we will look at how the politics of recognition impact these five different dependent variables. Data for social public spending, child poverty and income inequality have changed or are methodologically adjusted (for example weighted) since the analysis by Banting et al. in 2006. The analysis here will use the updated data. A comparison with the analysis by Banting et al. is still possible, since the differences are not major.

Since a multivariate regression analysis cannot be done with multiple dependent variables, one dependent variable has to be chosen for the regression analysis.[1] Banting et al. used indicator 1 – social public spending as a proportion of GDP – to do their multivariate analysis, since this is the only indicator for which data is available for all twenty countries. However, there is discussion in the literature about whether to include private social spending to measure social effort of the state. Adema (2001) concluded that accounting for private social expenditure equalises levels of social effort across a number of countries. For example in the

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[1] An often used solution to this is to combine the indicators into one variable, by creating an additive or average scale. However data on indicators 2-4 are lacking for nine countries (Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain) and data on indicator 5 is lacking for four of these countries (Greece, Japan, New Zealand and Portugal). An additive or average scale of all indicators would then be misleading, since for five countries it would just show a combination of public social expenditure and the Gini coefficient and for four it would only include indicator 1.

US and in the Netherlands there is a lot of private social spending on health care and pensions. This would plead for including private social expenditure as a factor on top of public spending. However, Caminada and Goudswaard have found a negative relationship between public social expenditures and income inequality, but a positive relationship between private social expenditures and income inequality, meaning that private social expenditure increases inequality (2005). Since for redistribution the outcome of social expenditure is more important than equalising social effort between states, in this research we choose to only look at public social expenditure.

Since there is a lack of data on other indicators, I will also do the multivariate analysis with indicator 1 as dependent variable. While a negative relationship was found by Caminada en Goudswaard between public social expenditure and income inequality, social public spending as a proportion of GDP in itself does not say much about the extent of redistribution resulting from this spending. Indicator 3 - reduction in inequality before and after government taxes and transfers - seems to me to be the most important to measure the level of redistribution policies, however this data is not available for Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain. Therefore the multivariate analysis will also be performed excluding these countries, using indicator 3 as dependent variable, to see how this influences the results.

4.2. Operationalising politics of recognition – independent variable

Operationalising *politics of recognition* involves making choices. In this case, I focus on policy, not on claims for specific policies which never translate to policy, which is also part of politics. While it is interesting for future research to see whether claims for recognition actually lead to policy on recognition, and whether claims for recognition without policy on recognition are

maybe enough to drive out redistribution[2], this research focuses on whether policies on recognition drive out policies on redistribution. Recognition can be asked for by all types of groups, for example ethnicity, gender, race and sexual preferences. To limit this research for time and space reasons and to be able to compare results, we will focus only on multicultural policies (MCPs), just like Banting et al.

As Lægaard points out, one can categorise something as a multicultural policy based on several criteria: it can be based on formal features, on the underlying justification or ideology of multiculturalism or on the consequences that it would have for ethno-cultural groups or their members (2013). While the status politics as defined by Fraser would call for using the latter as categorising mechanism, since that looks at the consequences of policy for the individual, this is not feasible for this analysis. It would mean all policies of the selected countries have to be analysed on how it effects individuals, specifically individuals from a ethno-cultural group, taking too much time for this thesis. Therefore the policies to be analysed are selected on formal features that are arguably likely to affect the position of individuals, on the following specific features:

(1) Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary policy on multiculturalism, at the central and/or regional and municipal levels;

(2) the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum;

(3) the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing;

(4) exemptions from dress codes or accommodations on religious grounds (either by statute or by court cases);

(5) allowance of dual citizenship;

(6) the funding of ethnic group organisations to support cultural activities;

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[2] See discussion in chapter 6

(7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction;

(8) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.

These are the policies that Banting et al. use to measure the strength of MCPs for immigrants (2006). All these policies are targeted on small groups, not requiring a territory where a group is based. We also choose these policies in this research, because as Fukuyama and Fraser notice, recognition claims are proliferating and not just for indigenous people or sizeable national minorities with a territory. Banting et al. also perform their analysis for these last two groups, selecting different MCPs. This is not necessary for my analysis, since I want to show the relation between redistribution and recognition for all groups. In light of global transformations like climate change in a globalised world which will probably create more migration in the future, coupled with the right to recognition as coined by Taylor, it is important to see whether general policies for small groups have effect on redistribution. Therefore we will look at the policies mentioned above.

The analysis does not look at identity politics in other policy areas than multiculturalism, such as gender and LGBTQ-issues. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse all these policies too for twenty countries and it would make it harder to compare results with the study of Banting et al. (2006). Yet I believe it is not a big problem for the time period 1980 to 2000 that only immigrant recognition policies are analysed. Fukuyama describes how feminists and gay men and women before 2000 mainly focussed on being treated equality instead of as being recognised in their difference (2018, pp. 97-98). Struggles for redistribution were already integrated in their demands, meaning these were more of the status kind already. Analysing multiculturalist policy for immigrants is one of the policy areas that could include identity politics instead of status politics, since it was more focussed on difference instead of equality. However it is important to keep in mind that it is possible that identity politics other than recognition policies for immigrants could have influenced redistribution levels.

The politics of recognition will subsequently have to be operationalised into two different kinds of politics of recognition: status politics and identity politics. Banting et al. gave a country 1 point for every policy that was adopted and implemented for much of the time between 1980 and 2000, 0.5 if the policy was implicit or incomplete and 0 points if it did not have a policy. My research does the same, but only if the policy is a policy regarding identity as such and not the status of an individual in society. Thus the policies selected on the formal features mentioned above, will subsequently be scored on the consequences that they would have for immigrant minority groups or their members.

To make this more clear: in this research a country gets 1 point for every policy that was adopted and implemented for much of the time between 1980 and 2000, only if that policy is focussed on the *group* as such and not on the *status of an individual* of that group within society. For the decision rules on when to rank something as an identity policy, we again turn to Fraser.[3] From her theory, we distil the following characteristics of identity policies:

- It reduces a problem to a cultural problem and does not leave room to see the redistributive effects of the policy (Fraser, 2003, p. 63)

- It reifies groups, by focussing on difference from other groups. For example it accentuates a rigid opposition such as black/white (Fraser, 2003, p. 76)

- It sharpens divisions it sought to reduce, by for example stigmatising the needy by casting them as deviants (Fraser, 2003, pp. 65, 86)

- It encourages separatism of groups, preventing possibilities to mobilise on cross-cutting issues (Fraser, 2003, p. 92)

- It corrects inequitable outcomes without disturbing the underlying social structures that generate them (Fraser, 2003, p. 74)

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[3] For the elaborate decision rules on when to score multicultural policies as identity policies, see Appendix A

The score on identity MCPs will be used as the independent variable. This enables us to see whether a negative correlation emerges between recognition and redistribution when we only select *identity policies* and exclude *status policies,* in other words whether identity policies as described by Fraser do drive out redistribution.

Since there are eight policies that will be analysed, the maximum score for a country would be 8.0 and the minimum score 0.0. However, policies on exemptions for dress codes involving recognition are always a status policy, since by the dress exemption they can participate at an equal level in society. Thus a country can never score a point on this policy. The same counts for policies on dual citizenship: if a country allows dual citizenship, it does not affect the status of the individual, but it does recognise the individual. This is a status policy, since allowing dual citizenship creates the possibility for fluid identities instead of rigid identities. Because countries only get a point for identity policies and not for status policies and dress exemption and dual citizenship are always status policies, a country cannot score on these two policies. This leaves six policies on which a country can score, resulting in a maximum score for a country of 6.0 and a minimum score of 0.0. The data from the ongoing project *The Multiculturalism Policy Index Project* (Wallace et al., 2021) is used, which describes multiculturalism policies per country.

Some countries that were scoring 0 on a policy, so they did not have that MCP in place, were now scored as 1, having an identity MCP, such as Austria for their Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary policy on multiculturalism. This shows that Banting et al.[4] already had a normative idea about what multicultural policies constitute and they mostly scored countries higher if the policy had characteristics of status policy. However this is not explained carefully in their codebook, neither in the analysis they did in 2006. This can thus explain why they do not get a correlation, since – as explained earlier – the effect of status policies cannot

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[4] Drawing on research of Vanhala (2004), (unpublished report)

easily be detected because the expected effect is positive *or zero* on redistribution. In their analysis indeed the correlation between MCPs and redistribution was not significant, which could point to a zero effect.

In this research it is deliberately chosen to select only identity policies and not to only select *status policies.* Since the theory of Fraser claims that status policies just do not impede redistributive policies, the expected effect of status policies would be zero *or* positive. An outcome of zero effect is hard to research, since in statistical analysis we can also say that something has no effect if the coefficient is insignificant. However, it is already likely to have insignificant results with this small amount of cases. Therefore only identity policies will be included for which Fraser's theory predicts a negative effect on redistribution.

4.3. Other independent variables

To prevent a spurious correlation, because social spending tends to increase due to a couple of other reasons than the absence of identitarian recognition policies, we control for the following in the multivariate analysis:

Initial level of social spending: We look at the level of public social spending as a proportion of GDP in 1980. It is likely that the expenditure of countries with a higher initial levels of spending will grow less than of countries with lower initial levels of spending, since the latter may just be catching up or the first are saturated. This means that the coefficient in the analysis should be negative: higher initial levels of spending should lead to lower growth. This data used is drawn from the OECD Social Expenditure dataset (OECD, 2022a).

The percentage of women in the work force: This is a driver of child-care costs and costs for care for elderly, since women in the labour force need to be relieved from these traditional care-giving responsibilities, and thus this influences social public spending (Huber and Stephens, 2001, p. 82). The percentage is the number of females in the labour force in

comparison to the total population of females aged 15-64. The coefficient in the analysis should be positive: the more women in the labour force, the higher social public expenditure. The data used is from the OECD Labour Force Statistics (OECD, 2022b).

The percentage of the population aged over 65: Social spending tends to increase when more people are older than 65, since more money is spend on for example pensions. This means this coefficient should be positive. The data used is from the OECD Health Statistics (OECD, 2022c).

The strength of the political left in government: This is measured by the percentage of parliamentary seats held by left parties, only when they are part of the governing coalition. According to research by Swank, the strength of the left is an important factor for social public spending growth (2002). The coefficient should thus be positive. For this the dataset *Comparative Political Parties Dataset* of Duane Swank is used (2018). If the organisational corrosion hypothesis is right, the strength of the political left would also be caused by how many identitarian multicultural policies are in place: more identity policies would mean a more fragmented political left with less strength. Therefore the strength of the political left was regressed against the MCP score and we checked for multicollinearity in the multivariate analysis. These two variables did not violate the multicollinearity test, meaning that these are not highly correlated. The regression also showed that the effect of MCPs on the strength of the political left was not significant and had a coefficient of only -0.055. From this we can deduct that the hight of the MCP score does not influence the strength of the political left and this variable can thus be used as separate independent variable in the multivariate regression.

The change in immigrant minorities share of the population: This measures the change of share of immigrant minorities of the total population in percentage points. Research has shown that in several countries with relative higher levels of immigrant minorities, public social spending on services as education and health is lower (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006, pp. 25-

26). Other research has shown that it is not the size of the immigrant minority, but specifically the change in size of the immigrant minority that is influential (Soroka et al., 2006). Therefore we add this variable to make sure that the effect on the welfare state is specifically from the selected multicultural policies, and not just from the mere change in share of immigrant minorities in a population. The data is based on estimates of the United Nations of 'foreign-born migrant stock' (United Nations, 1991; United Nations Population Division, 2019).

For the multivariate regression analysis all independent variables were rescaled to a range from 0 to 1, so all variables will have the same weight in the regression analysis.

5. Results

Table 1 shows descriptives of the different indicators on redistribution for every country, set against the score on identity policies. It shows that Australia went from the highest MCP score in the study by Banting et al., to one of the lower scores. This means that most MCPs in Australia are status policies and not identity policies. With their high relative growth in social public spending, this finding corroborates the hypothesis that it is identity policies that hamper redistribution, not status policies.

When only scoring identity MCPs, the Netherlands is the highest scoring country (4,0). In the Netherlands social spending relatively declined, which would also corroborate the hypothesis. All in all when countries are clustered in high scoring on MCPs (3,0 or higher), medium (1,0-2,0) and low (0,0-0,5) and we take averages for these clusters on the indicators (see Table 1), the data corroborates all hypotheses except the one for public social spending, in which the medium group scores higher than the lowest group. Still the high MCP countries score substantially lower than the other groups on change in public social spending, even when the Netherlands is excluded.

High scoring MCP countries did indeed get the expected low or high scores as predicted by Fraser's theory: lower levels of change in reduction in poverty and inequality, lower levels of change in public social spending and higher levels of inequality. However the data within the groups sometimes varies greatly. Look for example at the difference in inequality for the Netherlands, which is very different than for the other high scoring MCP countries. And the Ireland (MCP score 0,0) would have fitted nicely in the high scoring MCP countries on indicator 1. A visualisation of the data in figure 1 also shows how shattered the data is. Of course it could be that in for example Ireland social spending mainly declined because of the weakness of the left in government, or the low percentage of females in the labour force. Therefore we will turn to a multivariate analysis, where we can distil the effect of the identity MCP score.

**Figure 1. MCP scores and redistribution indicators**

Table 1. Identity MCPs and change in social spending, redistribution, and social outcomes, 1980–2000 or near year. Sorted on Identity MCP score

Country	MCP score		Public social spending		Redistribution				Social outcomes			
	Total policies	Identity policies	Proportion of GDP %Δ	Average	Reduction in poverty %Δ	Average	Reduction in inequality %Δ	Average	Child poverty Δ in % points	Average	Inequality %Δ	Average
Netherlands	4,5	4,0	-17,3		-14,5		-2,5		4,2		-9,0	
New Zealand	5,0	3,0	12,9									
				3,1		-8,4		-11,1		4,0		19,3
UK	5,0	3,0	8,6		-7,1		-14,6		8,2		39,0	
Sweden	3,0	3,0	8,0		-3,5		-16,3		-0,3		27,8	
Canada	7,5	2,0	18,8		20,0		15,9		1,2		11,2	
USA	3,0	2,0	9,8		5,5		-4,4		2,2		19,4	
France	2,0	2,0	37,6		4,9		11,2		2,4		-2,3	
Australia	7,0	1,0	77,8		1,0		7,6		0,9		13,5	
				34,2		3,6		6,1		2,0		10,6
Belgium	3,5	1,0	1,9		-5,9		-8,4		3,8		26,8	
Spain	1,0	1,0	30,3						3,1		5,6	
Germany	0,5	1,0	16,9		-3,8		14,8		0,1		0,0	
Greece	0,5	1,0	80,3									
Austria	0,5	0,5	17,3						-1,5		13,7	
Norway	5,0	0,0	26,6		7,7		13,0		-0,8		13,8	
Ireland	1,5	0,0	-18,5						2,0		-4,6	
Italy	1,5	0,0	30,7						5,4		8,8	
				31,1		7,6		9,1		0,4		7,1
Finland	1,0	0,0	27,4		2,0		-9,0		-0,2		22,7	
Denmark	0,0	0,0	17,3		13,1		23,2		-2,6		-12,1	
Japan	0,0	0,0	53,8									
Portugal	0,0	0,0	94,2									

Note: Zeros indicate no change; blank cells indicate insufficient data to complete the calculation. %Δ-figures measure the change between 1980 and 2000 as a % of the 1980 level. Child poverty is measured as change in percentage points. Horizontal lines between countries scoring high on identity MCPs (≥ 3,0), medium (1,0-2,0), or low (≤ 0,5).

The results of the multivariate analysis with as independent variable the change in public social expenditure as a proportion of GDP are shown in table 2, model 1. The coefficient for identity MCP score is indeed negative, meaning that more identity recognition policies lead to less public social expenditure over time. The result is not significant, but this was to be expected with an N of 20. However the coefficient is very small and the big standard error indicates that the direction of the relationship is positive instead of negative for a considerable amount of cases (coef -1.849 + SE 15.366= 13.517). This means we find no support for the hypothesis that more identity multicultural recognition policies would lead to less social public spending as % of GDP. Distinguishing between status and identity multicultural recognition policies did give a different outcome than the analysis by Banting et al., were the coefficient was positive. However in both their analysis and in model 1 the coefficient for MCP score is very small and not significant, while other more structural factors are more important in the analysis. Thus also with differentiating between identity and status policies, no correlation is found between recognition and redistribution.

The multivariate analysis is also done with 'reduction of inequality in market incomes and inequality in disposable incomes before and after government taxes and transfers' as independent variable (Table 2, model 2). As stated, it seems to me that this better represents redistribution, since it describes redistribution efforts instead of money that is spent by government on public social services, which does not accrue specifically to citizens less well-off but to the whole citizenry. The coefficient for identity MCP score in model 2 is also negative, albeit not significant. Since the effect is not significant, the hypothesis that more identity recognition policies lead to less reduction in equality through government taxes and transfers (thus redistribution) is officially not supported. The explained variance of the model is not very high. The result is however interesting, since the identity MCP score is the biggest predictor for difference in inequality reduction in this model. When all other independent variables are held

constant, the change in inequality reduction through government taxes and transfers for a country that has no identity policies is 19.407 percentage points higher than for a country that scores 4 points on identity policies. The standard error does not change the direction of the relation. The finding is however statistically fragile, thus the trend in the data is at best suggestive and deserves further study.

Table 2. Effect of identitarian MCPs on relative growth of social public spending as % of GDP (model 1) and on reduction of inequality in market incomes and inequality in disposable incomes before and after government taxes and transfers (model 2)

	Model 1	**Model 2**
(Constant)	42.296 **	24.254
	(12.787)	(18.407)
MCP identity score	-1.849	-19.407
	(15.366)	(13.985)
Initial level of social spending in 1980	-88.584 ***	n/a
	(16.251)	
Strength of the left in government	35.786 *	-12.826
	(14.105)	(18.767)
Percentage of females in labour force	7.225	4.026
	(13.607)	(22.798)
Percentage of population 65	31.782 .	-4.773
	(17.139)	(16.194)
Change in migrant share of population	-15.796	-9.713
	(17.162)	(26.835)
R^2	0.781	0.357
Adj. R^2	0.680	-0.285
N	20	11

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, . $p < 0.10$

6. Discussion and further research

The performed analysis did not render statistically significant results. However the trend in evidence seems to support the hypothesis that identitarian recognition drives out redistribution. Using inequality reduction through government taxes and transfers resulted in a bigger coefficient, albeit still not significant. This is probably due to lack of data on this variable, meaning the analysis could be performed for only 11 countries. Collecting data on inequality reduction is thus needed, so the analysis can be performed for more countries.

What is striking in the results is that only four of twenty countries score 3,0 points or higher. We see that many countries between 1980-2000 recognised minorities mainly in a status manner. While the narrative on recognition often claims that it would reify groups, create segregation and be merely symbolically and cultural, the policies often integrated redistribution and recognition and focused on transforming society, what Fraser describes as status politics. This is also something Kymlicka notices. He describes how multiculturalism is often understood as a symbolic cultural policy, ignoring political and economic issues, while actual multicultural policies actually often focus on political, economic and cultural issues for minorities (Kymlicka, 2010). The narrative about recognition policies thus does not resonate with empirical reality: it is more narrative than policy.

Therefore, it is important to research the effect of not only identity recognition *policies*, but also identity recognition *claims*. Looking at the mentioned hypotheses, identitarian claims for recognition would probably be enough to drive out redistribution. Identity recognition claims in political sphere can already reify groups, leading to organisational corrosion and no mobilisation on other issues, crowding out redistribution issues. Time would be devoted to react to these claims, to discuss whether to recognise and what kind of policies to adopt. Without translation into actual policies, already having to discuss the claims constantly in politics crowds out discussion about other issues such as redistribution. The same can be said about the

misdiagnosing hypothesis: when all claims in society are about recognition and when these ignore redistribution, it is possible that citizens start to misdiagnose problems, also without actual recognition policies. Also for the corroding effect recognition claims instead of policies could have effect: it can be said that claims already have the potential to influence societal and organisational cohesion, since differences are accentuated in these claims. Case studies should exemplify whether the difference between status policies and identitarian policies and claims has impact on redistribution and especially which causal mechanisms are important.

There are a couple of other shortcomings with this research I would like to point out. First of all: MCPs do not capture all identity politics. It could thus be that identity policies on other policy fields, such as feminism or LGBTQ-rights, distorts the outcomes. A country could have many gender identity policies, while having no multicultural identity policies, whereby it is still the identity policies that result in less relative growth in social public spending or inequality reduction. It would be interesting to see if this is maybe the case for Ireland, because Ireland is an outlier that influences the coefficient unevenly. For this one could differentiate all policies on gender, ethnicity, culture, LGBTQ and religion in Ireland between status and identity recognition policies.

Secondly, Fraser claims that status policy is a policy that looks at both spectrums: recognition *and* redistribution. Policies that only focus on recognition, without redistribution, result in a merely symbolic form of recognition whereby the status of an individual is still not at par with the majority of the population (Fraser, 2003, p. 65). It was not possible to use this criterium to rank policies in this research, because this research specifically looked at the effect of recognition policies on redistribution. Also looking at redistribution policies would have created a circular argumentation: ranking countries on having redistribution policies would have meant that they would score higher on redistribution and this would not show a link with

recognition policies. However for future, qualitative case studies, this is an important consideration.

Thirdly, the fact that there is *no* recognition of minorities could also lead to less redistribution, if we follow the theory of Fraser. No recognition of minorities is in essence reinforced recognition of the majority culture. This can reify the majority in their beliefs and create 'othering' towards minorities. It will not change underlying norms in society, needed to create more equality for minorities, but denies norms different from the majority view. It could enable institutional racism. In the analysis performed, these kinds of recognition policies (specific recognition of the majority, such as in Denmark and Ireland) could not be scored, since the analysis focussed on recognition of minorities. Using process tracing, it would be interesting to see how explicit adherence to recognition of the majority influences politics and what caused the decrease in public social spending in Ireland for example.

Fraser would claim that the nonrecognised in this case should claim recognition on the basis of status and not of identity. However it is questionable whether that is possible, if for example some groups (*Volksgruppen)* are explicitly recognised in an identitarian way – as is the case in Austria – while other groups (immigrants) are denied recognition at all. By reifying the dominant culture, such as in Denmark from 2000 on, one is inherently not recognising individuals as equals. Recognising the majority reifies that group and makes it harder to focus on commonalities between groups instead of on differences, thereby reifying other groups too. Future research could focus on whether there is indeed a centrifugal effect whereby more and more groups are reified, through identity recognition claims or policies and whether this also happens starting from majority recognition.

7. Conclusion

The statistical analysis learns there is possibly no trade-off between redistribution and either kind of recognition, since no statistical significant support is found for the hypothesis that identity politics lead to less redistribution. For the time period 1980-2000 it seems that recognition politics is just added to the realm of politics in which redistribution politics also still takes place. However the data does hint in the direction that recognition of the identity kind drives out redistribution more than recognition of the status kind. In a time in which scholars such as Fraser (2003) and Fukuyama (2018) argue that there is a surge in politics concerning recognition, this is an interesting hint. While there may be more politics of recognition, this does not have to mean that there is less politics of redistribution. For future research it is however important to see which causal mechanisms are important and what role recognition claims instead of policies play in effecting redistribution.

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Appendix A. Decision guidelines for ranking identity multiculturalism policies for immigrant minorities

The policies can be divided into two broad categories. Policies 1, 2 and 3 are all more on cultural norms and values in society, while policies 4, 5 and 6 are more economic policies.

If a country does not have policy 1, 2 and 3 at all (of the status OR identity kind), cultures and norms are not changed in society. This means that the more redistributive policies 4, 5 and 6 are mainly affirmative instead of transformative. These policies do not change the underlying structure of inequality, but stigmatise minorities as needy. Therefore if a country does not have policy 1, 2 and 3, and it does have policy 4, 5 or 6, it is scored as 1,0.

If a country does not have policy 4, 5 and 6 at all (of the status OR identity kind), redistribution does not take place along cultural lines. Multiculturalism is mainly a cultural policy in this case. However it is still possible that redistribution occurs through other policies, targeting class for example. If a country does not have policy 4, 5 and 6, it is important that the country has a policy on 1, 2 or 3 of the status kind. However if this is not the case, and the country also has no identitarian policy on 1, 2 or 3 (which would result in a 1,0 score), we still cannot score the country on policy 1, 2 or 3, since the country just does not have minority recognition policy 1, 2, or 3.

Below follow specific guidelines for scoring the policies, including some examples.

1. Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities

- 1,0 point: Country has affirmed multiculturalism and has an implementing body. The kind of multiculturalism refers mainly to culture, focusses on difference and deems the national culture still better than other cultures, and/or works mainly affirmative. It does not refer to a national identity existing from multiculturalism and so does not change the identity of national citizens. It revalues unjustly devalued group identities while leaving intact the contents of those identities and group differentiations underlying (Fraser, 2000, p. 75). When a country only has discourse on multiculturalism of the status or identity kind, but not an institution that ensures execution of this policy, it is coded as 1. In this case multiculturalism is handled as discourse instead of actual executed policy, only affirming identities while not changing cultural norms and values in institutions. New Zealand is an example of the latter.

- 0,5 point: Country has a combination of 1,0 and 0,0.

- 0,0 point: Country has not affirmed multiculturalism OR affirmed a status kind of multiculturalism. A status kind of multiculturalism is transformative, it deconstructs symbolic oppositions that underlie institutionalised patterns of cultural value. Destabilises existing status differentiations and changes everyone's identity.

2. The adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum

- 1,0 point: Country has included an identitarian version of multiculturalism in its curriculum. It is focussed on cultural difference, not on equality of cultures. It stereotypes cultures, reifies groups and affirms groups. It does not teach that the

national identity is multicultural. Or schools are free to decide on their curriculum, resulting in schools for different ethnic groups, resulting in reification/pillarisation such as in the Netherlands.

- 0,5 point: Country has not formally or extensively adopted identitarian multiculturalism in its curriculum, but has engaged in rhetoric that supports this. Or it is implemented in some districts, but not in other, because the responsibility for school curriculum is decentralised. Or the country developed identitarian multicultural education initiatives.

- 0,0 point: Multiculturalism is not included in school curriculum OR is included as status kind of multiculturalism. In the latter case the curriculum focusses on equality, identity fluidity,

3. The inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing

- 1,0 point: There is targeted programming, resulting in less exchange between groups and one does not learn about other cultural values. No ethnic representation is mentioned in the mandate of public broadcasters or media licensing next to this targeted programming.

- 0,5 point: Some representation is included by select broadcasters or in specific regions. Or implementation of what is mentioned at 1,0 point is weak.

- 0,0 point: Ethnic representation is mentioned in mandate of public broadcaster or media licensing.

4. The funding of ethnic group organisations or activities

- 1,0 point: Ethnic groups are provided state funding and with this a kind of pillarisation takes place, it pays of to be part of the ethnic group. The ethnic group organisation or activity creates a static and thick group identity. There are no conditions for receiving the money, the group does not have to exchange with other groups.

- 0,5 point: Some ethnic groups receive state funding of the kind described above, but the practice is not widespread.

- 0,0 point: Ethnic groups do not receive state support OR the ethnic groups that receive support avoid entrenching thick group identities and keep the possibility open for a changing group culture (Fraser, 2003, p. 87). There are conditions for receiving the money, for example integration in the community and organising or participating in ethnocultural exchange with other groups, or advising government on inclusion and institutional change.

5. The funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction

- 1,0 point: A language other than the main language is not needed to be an equal member in society, as status politics requires, not learning the main language puts you behind and means that one cannot participate on the same level in society as someone who does speak the main language. Therefore a country gets 1,0 point if it funds bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction either for children or adults, without the goal of learning the language of the country itself. This could encourage separatism.

- 0,5 point: Some provinces, states or areas offer bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction either for children or adults, without the goal of learning the language of the country itself, but it is not offered as a general rule.

- 0,0 point: Country does not fund bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; refers also to cases where bilingual education is provided, but only as a means of facilitating the learning of the country's official language.

6. Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups

- 1,0 point: Country has an affirmative action policy that targets immigrant minorities; this may be in the public or private sector or both. Initiatives will extend beyond human rights policies and include targeted action aimed at removing barriers or more positive action measures such as quotas or preferential hiring. The country gets one point if it does have this, but does not have status or identity policy 1, 2 or 3.

- 0,5 point: Some evidence of affirmative action policies, but may be limited in scope or ineffectual in practice. The country does not have a status or identity policy 1, 2 or 3.

- 0,0 point: Country has no affirmative action policy for immigrant minorities OR does have an affirmative action policy that can become transformative by creating possibilities to emancipate individuals in the future (Fraser, 2003, p. 78-79). For example when traits associated with femininity are revalued – affirmative – but accompanied with policy or in the context of a culture that claims that identification is constructed instead of natural (Fraser, 2003, p. 81). This way in the future the policy possibly destabilises the male/female dichotomy.

Appendix B. R Syntax

```
library(haven)

library(car)

library(psych)

library(arm)

library(vioplot)

library(ggplot2)

library(gridExtra)

library(texreg)

library(QuantPsyc)


Analysis2.all <- read_sav("Master/Thesis/Data/Analysis2.sav")


## Analysis2.all data description:

# DV: GDPchange, range 1-100

# IV: MCPscore, range? Scale?

# IV: GDP1980, range 1-100

# IV: Leftgovs, range 1-100

# IV: Femalelab, range 1-100

# IV: Age65, range 1-100

# IV: Migrst, range 1-100, change in percentage points (aftrekken)


# creating variables

GDPchange <- Analysis2.all$GDPchange

MCPscore <- Analysis2.all$MCPscore
```

```r
GDP1980 <- Analysis2.all$GDP1980

Leftgovs <- Analysis2.all$Leftgovs

Femalelab <- Analysis2.all$Femalelab

Age65 <- Analysis2.all$Age65

Migrst <- Analysis2.all$Migrst


# creating of new data frame

Analysis2.data <-

data.frame(GDPchange,MCPscore,GDP1980,Leftgovs,Femalelab,Age65,Migrst)

summary(Analysis2.data)


# remove unnecessary objects from workspace

rm(Analysis2.all)

rm(MCPscore);rm(GDP1980);rm(Leftgovs);

rm(Femalelab);rm(Age65);rm(Migrst);rm(GDPchange);


# remove respondents with missing values & attach data set

N1 <- length(Analysis2.data$GDPchange); N1

Analysis2.data <- na.omit(Analysis2.data)

N2 <- length(Analysis2.data$GDPchange); N2

cat("Cases with missing values:", N1-N2, "(", round(((N1-N2)/N1)*100, 1), "% )\n")

rm(N1); rm(N2)

describe(Analysis2.data)

attach(Analysis2.data)
```

Rescaling independent variables into a 0-1 range (all, for plotting purposes)

Analysis2.data$MCPscore <- (Analysis2.data$MCPscore-min(Analysis2.data$MCPscore)) /

(max(Analysis2.data$MCPscore)-min(Analysis2.data$MCPscore))

Analysis2.data$GDP1980 <- (Analysis2.data$GDP1980-min(Analysis2.data$GDP1980)) /

(max(Analysis2.data$GDP1980)-min(Analysis2.data$GDP1980))

Analysis2.data$Leftgovs <- (Analysis2.data$Leftgovs-min(Analysis2.data$Leftgovs)) /

(max(Analysis2.data$Leftgovs)-min(Analysis2.data$Leftgovs))

Analysis2.data$Femalelab <- (Analysis2.data$Femalelab-min(Analysis2.data$Femalelab)) /

(max(Analysis2.data$Femalelab)-min(Analysis2.data$Femalelab))

Analysis2.data$Age65 <- (Analysis2.data$Age65-min(Analysis2.data$Age65)) /

(max(Analysis2.data$Age65)-min(Analysis2.data$Age65))

Analysis2.data$Migrst <- (Analysis2.data$Migrst-min(Analysis2.data$Migrst)) /

(max(Analysis2.data$Migrst)-min(Analysis2.data$Migrst))

describe(Analysis2.data)

Statistical analysis

Checking endogeneity MCP on Leftgovs

M2 <- lm(Leftgovs~MCPscore, data=Analysis2.data)

summary(M2)

display(M2, digits=3, detail=TRUE)

Statistical analysis

estimating a linear regression model

M1 <- lm(GDPchange~MCPscore+GDP1980+Leftgovs+Femalelab+Age65+Migrst,

data=Analysis2.data)

```
summary(M1)

display(M1, digits=3, detail=TRUE)


### Assumptions check

# VIF and standard residual checks

vif(M1)

1/vif(M1)


plot(M1, 1) #residuals vs. fitted

plot(M1, 2) #normal Q-Q

plot(M1, 3) #scale-location

plot(M1, 4) #Cook's distance

plot(M1, 5) #residuals vs. leverage

plot(M1, 6) #Cook's distance vs. leverage


#distribution of residuals

boxplot(residuals(M1), horizontal=TRUE)

plot(density(residuals(M1)))        #kernel density plot

rug(residuals(M1))           #add a 'rug' (strip plot) to indicate number of observations

qqnorm(residuals(M1))          #normal Q-Q plot

qqline(residuals(M1), col="red", lwd=2)  #add linear line

shapiro.test(residuals(M1))        #formal test: H0 = normal distribution


#outliers/influential cases

plot(cooks.distance(M1))
```

influencePlot(M1)   #bubble-plot of studentized residuals against hat-values (size of

bubbles = Cook's distance)

influenceIndexPlot(M1)   #all values for Cook's distance, hat-value, p-value for outlier test,

and studentized residual in a spike-plot

#predictor-specific plots

residualPlots(M1)   #Pearson residuals against each (metric) predictor

avPlots(M1)   #partial-regression plots: for each predictor


```r
# Function for Residual Diagnostics for Multivariate OLS Regression Models
residual.checks <- function(model) {
 cat("--------- Residual Diagnostics for Multivariate Linear Models ---------- \n \n")
      # proportion of large absolute standardized residuals
      large.residual.2 <- rstandard(model) > 2 | rstandard(model) < -2
      large.residual.25 <- rstandard(model) > 2.5 | rstandard(model) < -2.5
      large.residual.3 <- rstandard(model) > 3 | rstandard(model) < -3
      ASR1 <- round((sum(large.residual.2) / nrow(model$model))*100, 2)
      ASR2 <- round((sum(large.residual.25) / nrow(model$model))*100, 2)
      ASR3 <- round((sum(large.residual.3) / nrow(model$model))*100, 2)
      if(ASR1 <= 5) { test1 <- "passed"
  } else test1 <- "failed"
      if(ASR2 <= 1) { test2 <- "passed"
  } else test2 <- "failed"
      if(ASR3 <= 0) { test3 <- "passed"
  } else test3 <- "failed"
```

```
cat("Proportion of large absolute standardized residuals (ASR): \n")

cat(" Criterion ASR>2.0 (<5%):", round(sum(large.residual.2),4),"case(s),", ASR1, "% |
Check", test1, "\n")

cat(" Criterion ASR>2.5 (<1%):", round(sum(large.residual.25),4),"case(s),", ASR2, "% |
Check", test2, "\n")

cat(" Criterion ASR>3.0 (=0%):", round(sum(large.residual.3),4),"case(s),", ASR3, "% |
Check", test3, "\n")

        # Cook's value

  cook.lim <- 4/(nrow(model$model))

        cook <- cooks.distance(model) > cook.lim

        if(max(cooks.distance(model)) < cook.lim) { test1 <- "passed"

  } else test1 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(cook))

  cat("Cook's Distance: \n")

  cat(" Largest observed Cook's Distance =", round(max(cooks.distance(model)),4), "\n")

  cat(" Criterion 4/n:", round(cook.lim, 4), "| Check", test1, "\n")

        # leverage/hat value

        AL1.crit <- model$rank / nrow(model$model)

        AL2.crit <- 2 * model$rank / nrow(model$model)

        AL3.crit <- 3 * model$rank / nrow(model$model)

        AL1 <- hatvalues(model) > AL1.crit

        AL2 <- hatvalues(model) > AL2.crit

        AL3 <- hatvalues(model) > AL3.crit

        if(max(hatvalues(model)) < AL1.crit) { test1 <- "passed"

  } else test1 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(AL1))

        if(max(hatvalues(model)) < AL2.crit) { test2 <- "passed"
```

```r
} else test2 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(AL2))

    if(max(hatvalues(model)) < AL3.crit) { test3 <- "passed"

} else test3 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(AL3))

cat("Leverage / Hat Values: \n")

cat("  Largest observed hat value =", round(max(hatvalues(model)),4), "\n")

cat("  Criterion k/n:", round(AL1.crit,4), "| Check", test1, "\n")

cat("  Criterion 2k/n:", round(AL2.crit,4), "| Check", test2, "\n")

cat("  Criterion 3k/n:", round(AL3.crit,4), "| Check", test3, "\n")

    # covariance ratio (CVR)

    CVR.lim <- 1 + AL3.crit

    CVR <- abs(covratio(model)) > CVR.lim

    if(max(abs(covratio(model))) < CVR.lim) { test1 <- "passed"

} else test1 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(CVR))

    cat("Covariance Ratio: \n")

cat("  Largest observed absolute covariance ratio =", round(max(abs(hatvalues(model))),4),

"\n")

cat("  Criterion 1+(3k/n):", round(CVR.lim,4), "| Check", test1, "\n")

    # difference statistics (DFBeta/DFFit)

dfbeta.lim <- 2/sqrt(nrow(model$model))

    dfbeta <- abs(dfbeta(model)) > dfbeta.lim

    if(max(abs(dfbeta(model))) < dfbeta.lim) { test1 <- "passed"

} else test1 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(dfbeta))

    cat("Difference Statistics (for excluded cases): \n")

cat("  DFBeta (across all coefficients): \n")

cat("   Largest observed absolute DFBeta =", round(max(abs(dfbeta(model))),4), "\n")
```

```
  cat("   Criterion 2/sqrt(n):", round(dfbeta.lim, 4), "| Check", test1, "\n")

  dffit.lim <- 2*sqrt(model$rank/nrow(model$model))

     dffit <- abs(dffits(model)) > dffit.lim

     if(max(abs(dffits(model))) < dffit.lim) { test1 <- "passed"

  } else test1 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(dffit))

  cat("  DFFit: \n")

  cat("   Largest observed absolute DFFit =", round(max(abs(dffits(model))),4), "\n")

  cat("   Criterion 2*sqrt(k/n):", round(dffit.lim, 4), "| Check", test1, "\n")

  cat("----------------------------------------------------------------------- \n")

}

residual.checks(M1)


#identifying largest cases and displaying them

which.max(abs(residuals(M1)))     #observation(s) with largest stand. residuals

which.max(abs(cooks.distance(M1)))  #observation(s) with max Cook's distance

Analysis2.data[11,]         #display specific case


#identifying cases by threshold and displaying them

Analysis2.data$large.residual.3 <- rstandard(M1) > 3 | rstandard(M1) < -3

Analysis2.data[Analysis2.data$large.residual.3,c("GDPchange","MCPscore","GDP1980","Le
ftgovs","Femalelab","Age65","Migrst")]

Analysis2.data$large.hat.value <- hatvalues(M1)==max(hatvalues(M1))

Analysis2.data[Analysis2.data$large.hat.value,c("GDPchange","MCPscore","GDP1980","Lef
tgovs","Femalelab","Age65","Migrst")]
```

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###Analysis 3, Inequality reduction as dependent variable

Analysis3.all <- read_sav("Master/Thesis/Data/Analysis3.sav")

Analysis3.all data description:

DV: Ineqred, range 1-100

IV: MCPscore

IV: Leftgovs, range 1-100

IV: Femalelab, range 1-100

IV: Age65, range 1-100

IV: Migrst, range 1-100, change in percentage points (aftrekken)

creating variables

Ineqred <- Analysis3.all$Ineqred

MCPscore <- Analysis3.all$MCPscore

Leftgovs <- Analysis3.all$Leftgovs

Femalelab <- Analysis3.all$Femalelab

Age65 <- Analysis3.all$Age65

Migrst <- Analysis3.all$Migrst

creating of new data frame

Analysis3.data <- data.frame(Ineqred,MCPscore,Leftgovs,Femalelab,Age65,Migrst)

summary(Analysis3.data)

remove unnecessary objects from workspace

rm(Analysis3.all)

```
rm(MCPscore); rm(Leftgovs); rm(Femalelab);rm(Age65);rm(Migrst);rm(Ineqred);


# remove respondents with missing values & attach data set

N1 <- length(Analysis3.data$Ineqred); N1

Analysis3.data <- na.omit(Analysis3.data)

N2 <- length(Analysis3.data$Ineqred); N2

cat("Cases with missing values:", N1-N2, "(", round(((N1-N2)/N1)*100, 1), "% )\n")

rm(N1); rm(N2)

describe(Analysis3.data)

attach(Analysis3.data)


# Rescaling independent variables into a 0-1 range (all, for plotting purposes)

Analysis3.data$MCPscore <- (Analysis3.data$MCPscore-min(Analysis3.data$MCPscore)) /

(max(Analysis3.data$MCPscore)-min(Analysis3.data$MCPscore))

Analysis3.data$Leftgovs <- (Analysis3.data$Leftgovs-min(Analysis3.data$Leftgovs)) /

(max(Analysis3.data$Leftgovs)-min(Analysis3.data$Leftgovs))

Analysis3.data$Femalelab <- (Analysis3.data$Femalelab-min(Analysis3.data$Femalelab)) /

(max(Analysis3.data$Femalelab)-min(Analysis3.data$Femalelab))

Analysis3.data$Age65 <- (Analysis3.data$Age65-min(Analysis3.data$Age65)) /

(max(Analysis3.data$Age65)-min(Analysis3.data$Age65))

Analysis3.data$Migrst <- (Analysis3.data$Migrst-min(Analysis3.data$Migrst)) /

(max(Analysis3.data$Migrst)-min(Analysis3.data$Migrst))


describe(Analysis3.data)
```

Statistical analysis

estimating a linear regression model

M1 <- lm(Ineqred~MCPscore +Leftgovs+Femalelab+Age65+Migrst, data=Analysis3.data)

summary(M1)

display(M1, digits=3, detail=TRUE)

Assumptions check

VIF and standard residual checks

vif(M1)

1/vif(M1)

plot(M1, 1) #residuals vs. fitted

plot(M1, 2) #normal Q-Q

plot(M1, 3) #scale-location

plot(M1, 4) #Cook's distance

plot(M1, 5) #residuals vs. leverage

plot(M1, 6) #Cook's distance vs. leverage

#distribution of residuals

boxplot(residuals(M1), horizontal=TRUE)

plot(density(residuals(M1)))   #kernel density plot

rug(residuals(M1))   #add a 'rug' (strip plot) to indicate number of observations

qqnorm(residuals(M1))   #normal Q-Q plot

qqline(residuals(M1), col="red", lwd=2) #add linear line

shapiro.test(residuals(M1))   #formal test: H0 = normal distribution

```
#outliers/influential cases

plot(cooks.distance(M1))

influencePlot(M1)      #bubble-plot of studentized residuals against hat-values (size of

bubbles = Cook's distance)

influenceIndexPlot(M1)    #all values for Cook's distance, hat-value, p-value for outlier test,

and studentized residual in a spike-plot


#predictor-specific plots

residualPlots(M1)      #Pearson residuals against each (metric) predictor

avPlots(M1)          #partial-regression plots: for each predictor


# Function for Residual Diagnostics for Multivariate OLS Regression Models

residual.checks <- function(model) {

  cat("--------- Residual Diagnostics for Multivariate Linear Models ---------- \n \n")

       # proportion of large absolute standardized residuals

       large.residual.2 <- rstandard(model) > 2 | rstandard(model) < -2

       large.residual.25 <- rstandard(model) > 2.5 | rstandard(model) < -2.5

       large.residual.3 <- rstandard(model) > 3 | rstandard(model) < -3

       ASR1 <- round((sum(large.residual.2) / nrow(model$model))*100, 2)

       ASR2 <- round((sum(large.residual.25) / nrow(model$model))*100, 2)

       ASR3 <- round((sum(large.residual.3) / nrow(model$model))*100, 2)

       if(ASR1 <= 5) { test1 <- "passed"

  } else test1 <- "failed"

       if(ASR2 <= 1) { test2 <- "passed"
```

```
  } else test2 <- "failed"

      if(ASR3 <= 0) { test3 <- "passed"

  } else test3 <- "failed"

  cat("Proportion of large absolute standardized residuals (ASR): \n")

  cat(" Criterion ASR>2.0 (<5%):", round(sum(large.residual.2),4),"case(s),", ASR1, "% |

Check", test1, "\n")

  cat(" Criterion ASR>2.5 (<1%):", round(sum(large.residual.25),4),"case(s),", ASR2, "% |

Check", test2, "\n")

  cat(" Criterion ASR>3.0 (=0%):", round(sum(large.residual.3),4),"case(s),", ASR3, "% |

Check", test3, "\n")

      # Cook's value

  cook.lim <- 4/(nrow(model$model))

      cook <- cooks.distance(model) > cook.lim

      if(max(cooks.distance(model)) < cook.lim) { test1 <- "passed"

  } else test1 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(cook))

  cat("Cook's Distance: \n")

  cat(" Largest observed Cook's Distance =", round(max(cooks.distance(model)),4), "\n")

  cat(" Criterion 4/n:", round(cook.lim, 4), "| Check", test1, "\n")

      # leverage/hat value

      AL1.crit <- model$rank / nrow(model$model)

      AL2.crit <- 2 * model$rank / nrow(model$model)

      AL3.crit <- 3 * model$rank / nrow(model$model)

      AL1 <- hatvalues(model) > AL1.crit

      AL2 <- hatvalues(model) > AL2.crit

      AL3 <- hatvalues(model) > AL3.crit
```

```
        if(max(hatvalues(model)) < AL1.crit) { test1 <- "passed"

} else test1 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(AL1))

        if(max(hatvalues(model)) < AL2.crit) { test2 <- "passed"

} else test2 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(AL2))

        if(max(hatvalues(model)) < AL3.crit) { test3 <- "passed"

} else test3 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(AL3))

cat("Leverage / Hat Values: \n")

cat(" Largest observed hat value =", round(max(hatvalues(model)),4), "\n")

cat(" Criterion k/n:", round(AL1.crit,4), "| Check", test1, "\n")

cat(" Criterion 2k/n:", round(AL2.crit,4), "| Check", test2, "\n")

cat(" Criterion 3k/n:", round(AL3.crit,4), "| Check", test3, "\n")

        # covariance ratio (CVR)

        CVR.lim <- 1 + AL3.crit

        CVR <- abs(covratio(model)) > CVR.lim

        if(max(abs(covratio(model))) < CVR.lim) { test1 <- "passed"

} else test1 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(CVR))

        cat("Covariance Ratio: \n")

cat(" Largest observed absolute covariance ratio =", round(max(abs(hatvalues(model))),4),

"\n")

cat(" Criterion 1+(3k/n):", round(CVR.lim,4), "| Check", test1, "\n")

        # difference statistics (DFBeta/DFFit)

dfbeta.lim <- 2/sqrt(nrow(model$model))

        dfbeta <- abs(dfbeta(model)) > dfbeta.lim

        if(max(abs(dfbeta(model))) < dfbeta.lim) { test1 <- "passed"

} else test1 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(dfbeta))
```

```
      cat("Difference Statistics (for excluded cases): \n")

  cat("  DFBeta (across all coefficients): \n")

  cat("    Largest observed absolute DFBeta =", round(max(abs(dfbeta(model))),4), "\n")

  cat("    Criterion 2/sqrt(n):", round(dfbeta.lim, 4), "| Check", test1, "\n")

  dffit.lim <- 2*sqrt(model$rank/nrow(model$model))

      dffit <- abs(dffits(model)) > dffit.lim

      if(max(abs(dffits(model))) < dffit.lim) { test1 <- "passed"

  } else test1 <- sprintf("failed for %d case(s)", sum(dffit))

  cat("  DFFit: \n")

  cat("    Largest observed absolute DFFit =", round(max(abs(dffits(model))),4), "\n")

  cat("    Criterion 2*sqrt(k/n):", round(dffit.lim, 4), "| Check", test1, "\n")

  cat("----------------------------------------------------------------------- \n")

}

residual.checks(M1)


#identifying largest cases and displaying them

which.max(abs(residuals(M1)))    #observation(s) with largest stand. residuals

which.max(abs(cooks.distance(M1)))  #observation(s) with max Cook's distance

Analysis3.data[11,]        #display specific case


#identifying cases by threshold and displaying them

Analysis3.data$large.residual.3 <- rstandard(M1) > 3 | rstandard(M1) < -3

Analysis3.data[Analysis3.data$large.residual.3,c("Ineqred","MCPscore","Leftgovs","Femalel

ab","Age65","Migrst")]

Analysis3.data$large.hat.value <- hatvalues(M1)==max(hatvalues(M1))
```

Analysis3.data[Analysis3.data$large.hat.value,c("Ineqred","MCPscore","Leftgovs","Femalelab","Age65","Migrst")]

##Seperate plots for descriptives

library(haven)

library(car)

library(psych)

library(arm)

library(vioplot)

library(ggplot2)

library(gridExtra)

library(texreg)

library(QuantPsyc)

Plotpovineq.all <- read_sav("Master/Thesis/Data/Plotpovineq.sav")

Plotpovineq.all data description:

DV: Ineqred, range 1-100

DV: Povred

IV: MCPscore

creating variables

Ineqred <- Plotpovineq.all$Ineqred

Povred <- Plotpovineq.all$Povred

```
MCPscore <- Plotpovineq.all$MCPscore

Country <- as.character(Plotpovineq.all$Country)



# creating of new data frame

Plotpovineq.data <- data.frame(Ineqred,Povred,MCPscore,Country)

summary(Plotpovineq.data)



# remove unnecessary objects from workspace

rm(Plotpovineq.all)

rm(MCPscore);rm(Povred); rm(Ineqred);rm(Country)



describe(Plotpovineq.data)

attach(Plotpovineq.data)



# scatter plot of DV with 'government performance' (with linear and lowess regression lines)

plot(jitter(Plotpovineq.data$MCPscore), jitter(Plotpovineq.data$Ineqred), xlab="MCP score",

ylab="Inequality reduction")

abline(lm(Plotpovineq.data$Ineqred~Plotpovineq.data$MCPscore), col="blue", lwd=3)

text(MCPscore, Ineqred,

labels = Plotpovineq.data$Country,

    cex = 1,5, pos = 3, col = "red")



plot(jitter(Plotpovineq.data$MCPscore), jitter(Plotpovineq.data$Povred), xlab="MCP score",

ylab="Poverty reduction")
```

abline(lm(Plotpovineq.data$Povred~Plotpovineq.data$MCPscore), col="blue", lwd=3)

text(MCPscore, Povred,

labels = Plotpovineq.data$Country,

   cex = 1,5, pos = 3, col = **"red"**)

Plotchildgini.all <- read_sav("Master/Thesis/Data/Plotchildgini.sav")

Plotchildgini.all data description:

DV: Childpovchange80, range 1-100

DV: Ginichange80

IV: MCPscore

creating variables

Childpovchange80 <- Plotchildgini.all$Childpovchange80

Ginichange80 <- Plotchildgini.all$Ginichange80

MCPscore <- Plotchildgini.all$MCPscore

Country <- as.character(Plotchildgini.all$Country)

creating of new data frame

Plotchildgini.data <- data.frame(Childpovchange80,Ginichange80,MCPscore,Country)

summary(Plotchildgini.data)

remove unnecessary objects from workspace

```
rm(Plotchildgini.all)

rm(MCPscore);rm(Ginichange80); rm(Childpovchange80);rm(Country)


describe(Plotchildgini.data)

attach(Plotchildgini.data)


# scatter plot of DV with 'government performance' (with linear and lowess regression lines)

plot(jitter(Plotchildgini.data$MCPscore), jitter(Plotchildgini.data$Childpovchange80),

xlab="MCP score", ylab="Child poverty")

abline(lm(Plotchildgini.data$Childpovchange80~Plotchildgini.data$MCPscore), col="blue",

lwd=3)

text(MCPscore, Childpovchange80,

labels = Plotchildgini.data$Country,

    cex = 1,5, pos = 3, col = "red")



plot(jitter(Plotchildgini.data$MCPscore), jitter(Plotchildgini.data$Ginichange80), xlab="MCP

score", ylab="Gini coefficient change")

abline(lm(Plotchildgini.data$Ginichange80~Plotchildgini.data$MCPscore), col="blue",

lwd=3)

text(MCPscore, Ginichange80,

labels = Plotchildgini.data$Country,

    cex = 1,5, pos = 3, col = "red")



library(haven)
```

```
library(car)

library(psych)

library(arm)

library(vioplot)

library(ggplot2)

library(gridExtra)

library(texreg)

library(QuantPsyc)


Analysis2plot.all <- read_sav("Master/Thesis/Data/Analysis2.sav")


# creating variables

GDPchange <- Analysis2plot.all$GDPchange

MCPscore <- Analysis2plot.all$MCPscore

Country <- as.character(Analysis2plot.all$Country)


# creating of new data frame

Analysis2plot.data <- data.frame(GDPchange,MCPscore,Country)

summary(Analysis2plot.data)


# remove unnecessary objects from workspace

rm(Analysis2plot.all)

rm(MCPscore);rm(GDPchange);rm(Country)


describe(Analysis2plot.data)
```

attach(Analysis2plot.data)

scatter plot

plot(jitter(Analysis2plot.data$MCPscore), jitter(Analysis2plot.data$GDPchange), xlab="MCP

score", ylab="Social public expenditure as % GDP change")

abline(lm(Analysis2plot.data$GDPchange~Analysis2plot.data$MCPscore), col="blue",

lwd=3)

text(MCPscore, GDPchange,

labels = Analysis2plot.data$Country,

    cex = 1,5, pos = 1, col = **"red"**)