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Foreigners in custody: The implications of the securitization of immigration in the Netherlands, 2010-2015

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Universiteit Leiden

Foreigners in custody

The implications of the securitization of immigration in
the Netherlands, 2010-2015

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Preface

This is my master's thesis to complete the master's in International Relations at Leiden University.

I would like to thank a number of people. First of all, thanks to my thesis supervisor dr. Vineet Thakur for his commitment, help and patient guidance. I would also like to thank prof. dr. André Gerrits for reading my thesis as second assessor.

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Bernice Franssen

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List of abbreviations

ACVZ	Advisory Committee for Immigration Affairs (<i>Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken</i>)
AVIM	Aliens Police, Identification and Human Trafficking (<i>Vreemdelingenpolitie, Indentificatie en Mensenhandel</i>)
BZK	Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (<i>Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties</i>)
CBS	Central bureau for Statistics (<i>Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek</i>)
CDA	Christian-Democratic Appeal (<i>Christen-Democratisch Àppel</i>)
CoS	Copenhagen School
DJI	Custodial Institutions Agency (<i>Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen</i>)
DT&V	Repatriation and Departure Service (<i>Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek</i>)
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union
GL	GreenLeft (GroenLinks)
IND	Immigration- and Naturalization Service (<i>Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst</i>)
KMar	Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (<i>Koninklijke Marechaussee</i>)
LPF	Pim Fortuyn List (<i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i>)
MinJus	Ministry of Justice (<i>Ministerie van Justitie</i>)/ Ministry of Security and Justice (<i>Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie</i>)
PvdA	Labour Party (<i>Partij van de Arbeid</i>)
PVV	Party for Freedom (<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>)

SCP	Social and Cultural Planning Office <i>(Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau)</i>
SP	Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij)
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (<i>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</i>)

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction to the research subject and question

Dear Sir / Madam,

On behalf of the detainees, I would like to inform you that we are all fed up with the long-term detention. We would like to know more about this. We cannot even imagine that we as innocent people who fear for their lives, and everyone has their own story as you know, that we have been ravaged by the Dutch authorities and have to be held in prison for so long with so much uncertainty about what to expect.¹

Those were the first lines of a letter sent on September 1, 2011 from immigrants in detention center Noord-Holland as part of a signature campaign with the aim of finding out how long they would be detained. In the Netherlands, detention may last six months in specifically defined situations, and can be extended to a maximum of eighteen months (Kox & Leerkes, 2013, p. 49). In practice, however, there is quite a bit of uncertainty about the duration of the deprivation of liberty of undocumented immigrants. The quote above presents a distressing picture of the condition of undocumented immigrants with regard to the Dutch immigration policy. In public discourse, however, the perspective and voices of undocumented immigrants are often lacking. They are merely portrayed as “dangerous others” and “undesirable intruders”, and therefore their experiences and stories seem to fade into the background (Albrecht, 2002).

Since the end of the Cold War the immigration discourse has slowly but surely shifted to a discourse with an emphasis on security. During the Cold War, security studies solidified as an International Relations subfield centered on how states protected their central values from military threats imposed by other states (Coutin, 2015; Krause & Williams, 1996). The area of security studies broadened and deepened as threats became more diverse in form in the post-Cold War period, and security as a concept has developed ever since (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Coutin, 2015). Over time, the immigration debate has turned to one about security, resulting in the “securitization of immigration” (Ibrahim, 2005).

Immigrant-receiving countries across the world tightened their compliance tactics in the early 1990s, limiting illegal immigrants’ access to jobs and facilities, militarizing border crossings, enforcing tougher penalties on anyone who disobeyed laws, and expanding surveillance (Cornelius et al., 1994; Coutin, 2015; Fassin, 2011; Nevins, 2002; Perea, 1997;

¹ This quote has been translated from the Dutch original. See Appendix 1 & 2 for the original letter and the signature list attached to it in Dutch.

Walters, 2002; Welch, 2002). Among other things, this resulted in an increase in detention and deportation of undocumented immigrants. The increase in immigrant detention and deportation has piqued the interest of security experts, both because it is part of a larger trend of infusing security concerns into a larger number of domains and because the security threat posed by undocumented migrants is usually low or non-existent, making the security measures in place rather disproportionate (Chavez, 2008; Coutin, 2015; Doty, 1998; Simon, 1998).

In this thesis I will investigate how the securitization of immigration has affected immigrants in Dutch detention centers. The main research question is the following: what implications has the securitization of immigration in the Netherlands had for immigrants in detention centers? The time period of this study is between 2010-2015. By discussing the implications of the securitization of immigration for immigrants in detention centers, I will refute the existing negative view on undocumented immigrants. In addition, this analysis will focus on the experiences of the immigrants. Hopefully, therefore, more ethical objections to the current immigration policy will be recognized.

1.2 Context, relevance and selection of the case study

On a global scale, “illegal” immigration and supposedly “bogus”² asylum claims have become a key and sometimes fundamental focus of immigration policy discussions in immigrant-receiving countries in recent decades. The practical consequence of immigration legislation is that the so-called “illegal aliens” are considered ineligible for citizenship and are being increasingly criminalized. It also means that specific immigration law enforcement missions have resulted in an ever-growing quantity and variety of immigrants being arrested, detained, and deported (De Genova & Peutz, 2010, p. 1; Neumeyer, 2005). A way of dealing with immigrants is changing people’s status by allowing or prohibiting them from traveling and staying in the country, as well as declaring their entry and stay legal or illegal (Bigo, 2020, p. 70). In many liberal democratic states, including the Netherlands, detention and deportation as a means of coping with “illegal” undocumented immigrants has become more significant (Anderson et al., 2011, p. 547). Recently, Matteo Salvini, a right-wing politician and former Minister of the Interior in Italy, blocked many boats from docking in Italy during his 14 months in office in an attempt to prevent immigrants from entering the country. Some accused Salvini of kidnapping the immigrants. The case against Salvini is, however, dropped by an Italian judge in Sicily earlier this year, saying “no crime had been committed” (Al Jazeera, 2021). The

² Bogus asylum seeking is requesting for refuge not out of necessity, but out of a desire to make money and succeed economically (Neumeyer, 2005).

biopolitical method of kidnapping immigrants, according to De Genova and Tazzioli (2020, pp. 867, 880), is another political technology of capture utilized by state authorities to reclaim control over migration movements. It is carried out in a variety of methods, including arbitrary detention or holding people hostage. Such measures are consequences of the securitization of immigration.

The Copenhagen School (CoS) is most typically connected with the concept of securitization. Securitization, in securitization theory, is viewed as an act that must meet three basic conditions. Firstly, a securitizing actor must assert that a referent object is threatened with extinction. Secondly, a securitizing actor must assert the authority to take extraordinary actions in response to the threat. Thirdly, the audience must be convinced that this drastic action is essential to resist the threat and is thus justified (Van Munster, 2012; Wæver, 2014).

Security is interpreted as the result of a social mechanism in securitization theory, which means that the social construction of security problems (what or who is being protected, and from what) is investigated by analyzing securitizing speech-acts, which are used to perceive and recognize threats (Williams, 2003, p. 513). To put it another way, speech acts have the ability to transform non-security issues into security issues by portraying them as such (Buzan et al., 1998). Since the position an individual occupies has the capacity to affect the audience, the enunciator of the securitizing speech-act must be in a position of authority. A state president or a leader of a political party, for example, has a better chance of persuading an audience that a certain problem is an existential security danger than a random individual (Adamides, 2012, pp. 23-24; McDonald, 2008, p. 565). Additionally, according to Williams (2003, p. 524), political communication is becoming increasingly entwined with images and “televsual communication is an essential element of communicative action”. Therefore, not only the securitizing speech acts, but visuals as well are important in the securitization process. Huysmans (2006) gives examples of how immigration is securitized by framing it as a threat capable of wreaking havoc. In this scenario, the security framing is as follows: (1) the distribution of fear and trust, (2) the management of inclusion and exclusion, and (3) the institutionalization of estrangement and violence proclivity (Huysmans, 2006, p. 51).

In what ways immigrants are securitized and how this is done in the Netherlands will be discussed in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, but it is important to understand that the impact of speech acts on the Dutch public has not yet been investigated much. Political speech acts of the Prime Minister often gain most attention, especially in times of crises, such as the immigration crisis of 2015. As a result of the increased influx of refugees and the increased number of terrorist attacks, especially from 2014 onwards, refugees have become increasingly

feared and perceived as a threat, not only in the Netherlands, but across Europe (Bakker & Obbema, 2015). It is often argued in the Dutch political debate that immigration is a danger to the nation, especially by right-wing politicians (See, for instance, PVV, 2010, pp. 13-16; VVD, 2010, pp. 36-37). One might argue that, in addition to political speech acts, media coverage of events has a significant effect on public opinion as well (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 94-96). How speech acts and media attention in the Netherlands contribute to the securitization of immigration in the Netherlands and to what extent the securitization of immigration in the Netherlands revolves around a “logic of exception” or a “logic of routine” is analyzed in chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. An extensive literature review on the securitization theory and the securitization of immigration follows in chapter 2.

Either way, the securitization of immigration has a number of important consequences. In securitization studies it is often investigated who is securitized, in which areas the securitization takes place, and for whom, why, and under what conditions (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). So far, much of the literature on securitization of immigration has been about *how* securitization takes place (See, for instance, Balzacq, 2010; Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995). In this thesis, however, the focus is on the implications of securitizing immigration through a case study of the immigration policy in the Netherlands, 2010-2015. Recently, an important work on bureaucratic processes that are a result of the securitization of immigration by Wissink was published. Wissink (2020, p. 13) describes bureaucratic knowledge practices in European deportation sites and argues how undocumented immigrants are made into “illegal and removable subjects”. This is a clear example of a consequence of the securitization of immigration on the lives of immigrants in detention centers. This thesis will contribute to current knowledge by zooming in on Dutch immigration policy in particular, and by exposing more concrete implications of the securitization of immigration, especially for immigrants in detention centers. Attention is paid to policy implications of securitization on the one hand and their concrete implications for immigrants in detention centers on the other. Consequently, in this thesis, a connection is made between immigration *policy* and *experiences* of immigrants.

The year 2010 is the starting point of my research. In 2010 a follow-up to a critical report (2008) by Amnesty International was published, which pointed out that the promise of improvement of conditions in detention centers in the Netherlands was not fulfilled (Amnesty International, 2010). How did policies towards immigrants (especially undocumented immigrants in detention centers) take shape from the moment of this second critical report from Amnesty International? The year 2015 is taken as the end point, because of the global dissemination of images of the washed-up body of the 3-year-old Syrian child, Alan Kurdi, in

September 2015. This moment briefly disrupted the mainstream European media's persistent animosity towards refugees and asylum seekers. For a brief time after that, the undocumented immigrant, normally portrayed as a dangerous 'other', got a face: the face of innocence and vulnerability (Bhambra, 2017, p. 397). The year 2015 also marked a peak of the European immigration crisis due to the enormous influx of refugees. In 2015 there were twice as many asylum seekers and following relatives registered in the Netherlands as in 2014 (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2016). This makes the period up to and including 2015 interesting for my research.

1.3 Methodology and chapter scheme

One of the consequences of the securitization of immigration is immigration detention. Detention is considered to be an *ultimum remedium* in the Netherlands: the Return Directive lays as the policy which has also been confirmed several times by successive Dutch Ministers of Justice. Further, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled that detention may only be used as a last resort (ECtHR, 2010; European Parliament, 2008; Hirsch Ballin, 2010). In practice, however, this does not always seem to be the case. Immigrants are taken into immigration detention almost by default when the (broad) criteria of Article 6 and 59 of the Aliens Act 2000 respectively are met (Amnesty International, 2010). Chapter 2 of this thesis looks into how detention and deportation of immigrants is perceived as a legitimate means. In this thesis a mixed-method approach is applied. In order to answer the main research question, it is first of all crucial to analyze the literature on the securitization theory and the securitization-migration nexus. Chapter 2 of this thesis is a literature study and a theoretical base of my research. How does securitization take place generally and how is immigration securitized?

Chapter 3 looks into the securitization of immigration in the Netherlands and the Dutch immigration policy. The ways in which immigration was presented as an existential threat will be examined. Discourse analysis is applied here and both secondary and primary sources, such as parliamentary debates, party programs and government agreements are examined. Host countries in various regions of the world have enhanced their compliance techniques as part of the securitization of immigration from the early 1990s onwards (Cornelius et al., 1994; Coutin, 2015; Walters, 2002). What were the policy implications of the securitization process in the Netherlands? This chapter looks into extraordinary measures taken against the "existential immigrant threat". Mainly annual reports from the Ministry of Justice (and Security) and Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations on the immigration chain will be examined. By which actors and on what bases was immigration securitized? What extraordinary measures are

taken against immigration and how are they considered legitimate? These are clarificatory questions related to the social processes involved in securitization, and they will be explored in chapter 2 and 3 of this research.

This builds into chapter 4, which addresses the main research question of this thesis. Limited access to jobs and services for “illegal” immigrants, militarized border crossings, stricter law enforcement on anyone who disobeyed restrictions, and expanded surveillance have been part of the securitization of immigration since the last decade of the previous century (Coutin, 2015; Fassin, 2011; Nevins, 2002; Perea, 1997; Welch, 2002). Such immigration policies created by the securitization of immigration have a major impact on immigrants, especially on those who are detained and who will (possibly) be deported. In the last two decades, liberal democratic states have increased their use of deportation dramatically (Anderson et al., 2011, p. 547). Wissink (2020, p. 113) argues that “deportation is a sovereign’s act of forcefully transporting a human body out of a bounded territory”. According to Gibney (2008) it is not an overstatement to talk of a “deportation turn” in the policies of Western states in coping with unwanted “non-citizens”. Consequently, in chapter 4 of this thesis, I will discuss detention and other concrete implications that the securitization of immigration has had on this group of immigrants. What are the consequences for immigrants when the Dutch state is trying to bring about deportation at all costs? The immigration detention process and its implications for immigrants will be analyzed based on reports by Amnesty International (2010), *Justitia et Pax* (2010 & 2012) and the Advisory Committee for Immigration Affairs (*Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, ACVZ*) (2013). Also, testimonies of detained immigrants will be examined. By mapping the bureaucratic processes behind the deportation and detention of immigrants and by looking at the implications of this process for immigrants, I hope to give this issue a more human face.

By analyzing personal notes of detained immigrants, by investigating institutions such as the Aliens Police, Immigration- and Naturalization Service, Repatriation & Departure Service, detention centers and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee—each of which plays its own role in policy towards undocumented immigrants—and by examining a variety of forms and bureaucratic processes that detained immigrants had to complete and undergo, I aim to discover the concrete consequences of the securitization process for detained immigrants in the Netherlands in the period 2010-2015. Research on the securitization of immigration, its general implications, and the implications for immigrants in detention centers, which are unfortunately mainly negative, may hopefully result in the reconsideration of alternatives to detention.

Chapter 2: Theoretical chapter

When a problem is securitized, it is portrayed as an existential threat, requiring quick response and justifying actions that are outside of ordinary political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24). A threat or a security risk can be constructed and created by a number of different actors. The public, the media, and politicians (both ministers as well as elected officials) are examples of such securitizing actors (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 31-34). A distinction can be made between non-politicization, politicization, securitization, and de-securitization since these are all independent concepts. Yet, there is no such thing as “degrees” of securitization, since levels of securitization are not separated in the theory. Once a problem has entered the securitization process, the securitization theory does not give a basis for judging whether it is highly or weakly securitized (Bourbeau, 2011, p. 3).

Since September 11, 2001, security problems have grown more prominent in public discourse and politics. Since then, many new policy issues have been identified as security problems (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009, pp. 1158-1159). The widening of security studies refers to the addition of new subjects to the discipline of security studies. This process of widening is defined by the securitization theory as the discursive framing of a specific problem as a security danger (McDonald, 2008, p. 563). The post-Cold War era saw a widening of security studies. The emphasis on traditional military threats in Western civilization at the time necessitated a more holistic understanding of security (McDonald, 2008). Since the early 1990s immigration has been a frequently securitized issue. Several authors have written about the connection between immigration and security, as well as how immigration has become such a politicized and securitized subject (Balzacq et al., 2016, p. 508; Bourbeau, 2011; Broeders & Hampshire, 2013; Ceccorulli, 2010; Huysmans, 2006).

In the first section of this chapter the securitization theory is explained. This section pays attention to both the “logic of exception” and the “logic of routine”. Then, debated concepts and ideas in the securitization theory, such as securitizing speech-acts, social context and audience will be discussed. In the final section of this chapter the security-immigration nexus is examined.

2.1 Securitization theory

According to the CoS, an “act of securitization” shifts issues from the politicized to the securitized zone. Security is the step that takes politics outside of the game’s established norms and portrays the subject at hand as either a “special kind of politics” or “above politics” (Buzan

et al., 1998, p. 23). This is caused by the *framing* of an issue as a threat, which converts it into a security problem, rather than by the *presence* of an actual existential threat. In other words, security is a social construct (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24; Does, 2013). Securitizing actors must have social capital and influence to legitimize their actions, and the audience of a security speech act have to accept proposed securitizing actions as valid and legitimate (Bourbeau, 2014, p. 190).

Rather than communicating claims, the securitizing maneuver entails spouting vague and condensed words (Oren & Solomon, 2014, p. 321). Oren & Solomon therefore argue that the securitizing step should not be interpreted purely in terms of reasoning and presenting arguments or citing facts in support of an idea, just as audience acceptance should not be conceptualized in terms of intellectual persuasion or interpretation. It is easier to understand audience acceptance in terms of belief: “an acceptance that something exists or is true, especially one without proof” (Oren & Solomon, 2014, p. 321; Oxford Dictionary, 2021). Butler (2004) argues that if an individual is considered dangerous, it is no longer a question of whether illegal crimes were committed or if the threat is truly existential. The very conviction of an immigrant’s “dangerousness” puts these people beyond the limits of normal law. What counts as “dangerous” is, therefore, what the state deems dangerous and what is then accepted by the audience, according to Butler (2004, p. 76).

Securitization relies on a “logic of exception”, according to the CoS, and that is why CoS scholars focus on speech acts that legitimize *exceptional* policies and activities in the face of a national security threat (Bourbeau, 2014, p. 189; also see, Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995). The “logic of routine” stands in stark contrast to this. Based on ideas derived from key French intellectuals, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, the Paris School on securitization views securitization as “a process of establishing and inscribing meaning through governmentality and practices” (Bourbeau, 2014, p. 190; also see Bourdieu, 1990; 1991; Foucault, 1978; 1994). Securitization, understood in this way, operates through commonplace technologies and ongoing, rather than extraordinary, consequences of power (Bigo, 2002, p. 73). The securitization process is, therefore, seen as a set of standardized and routinized procedures and practices, carried out by bureaucrats and security experts, with technology playing a key role (Bourbeau, 2014, p. 190). In the case of the securitization of immigration, the logic of routine seems to apply in particular, but Bourbeau (2014, p. 195) argues that both logics are not by definition mutually exclusive. He argues that security speech acts can help to start the securitization process, while security practices help to keep it going. In this light, the “logic of exception” is useful in its ability to identify securitizing discourses that emerge at

specific points in time, while the “logic of routine” will highlight the securitization process’ reproductive mechanisms once the process has begun.

2.2 Securitizing speech acts, social context and audience

The securitizing actor will affect how a security problem is perceived. CoS scholars argue that a case of securitization is when such an actor is using a rhetoric of existential threat and by doing that, taking the topic out of what is normal politics (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 24-25). The framing of security is also of great importance for the perception of a security topic, according to Huysmans (2006). Security framing is a rhetorical technique that encourages people to take action. Furthermore, security framing will aid in the distribution of fear and trust (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 22, 51). When it comes to security, offensive security terminology is frequently employed. This security language can be used for more than only explaining perilous situations; it may also be used to change people’s minds about a problem (Huysmans, 2006, p. 147). Prins (2014, p. 66) states that securitization in itself can therefore be thought of as a form of framing; it situates an issue within the context of security and identifies key actors and tools to deal with the issue.

Security problems may be prioritized as a result of securitization. According to securitization theory, if the problem is not addressed, prioritized and managed, it can cause harm and pose a danger to the state and its survival (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 25-26). Williams (2003) states that securitization should be seen as a deliberate political decision taken by the securitizing actors, because they know that if they succeed, they will be able to “break the rules” and suspend conventional politics (Adamides, 2012, p. 36; Williams, 2003, p. 518). Actors are permitted to do so, because the expression of a security threat not only describes but also establishes a certain reality (Adamides, 2012, p. 36; Williams, 2003, p. 513). Moreover, CoS scholars state that the principle underlying securitization is that security is a speech act: when something is labeled as a security concern, something is done. Wæver (1995, p. 55, emphasis in original) states that “the utterance *itself* is the act”. Adamides (2012) counters that the actual use of the word “security” is not a requirement for a securitizing speech act. With other words or phrases, security and the need for emergency measures may be connoted or implied as well (Adamides, 2012, pp. 17-18; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27). Even without the use of vocabulary, inference could be accomplished by the use of images (Adamides, 2012, p. 18; also see Hansen, 2011; Williams, 2003).

Some academics, unlike CoS scholars, argue that securitization is essentially an intersubjective social process: a negotiation between actors and audiences. The theory’s

intersubjectivity comes from the idea that every (supposed) danger is “negotiated” between a securitizing actor and the applicable audience, with the latter ultimately making the decision on whether or not the threat is existential (Adamides, 2012, p. 37; Stritzel, 2007, p. 363). If this is the case, Stritzel (2007, p. 364) makes an appealing point that this social process contradicts the CoS’s argument that “the utterance *itself* is the act” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26; Wæver, 1995, p. 55); threat formation cannot be “just an utterance” and an “intersubjective process” at the same time (Adamides, 2012, p. 37; Stritzel, 2007, p. 364). Stritzel thus suggests that there is an internalist and externalist position when it comes to securitization. Since CoS scholars do not really consider securitizing acts or securitizing actors to be rooted in “broader social and linguistic structures”, they take an internalist stance. It would be unreasonable to claim that the social sphere is entirely absent from CoS scholars’ work, but the theory’s integration of the social sphere is still very underdeveloped according to Adamides (2012, pp. 37-38) and Stritzel, (2007, p. 368).

As Williams (2011, p. 212) suggests, the CoS’s internalist approach, or reliance solely on speech acts, is too limited to capture the complexities, strategies, and ways of securitization. Balzacq (2005, p. 172) takes an externalist view instead, arguing that securitization should not be interpreted as the “conventional procedure” of a speech act. Instead, it should be viewed as a “strategic and pragmatic process” that happens within and as part of a configuration of circumstances, including the context and the audience’s psycho-cultural disposition. In other words, the speech acts only have the opportunity to securitize if the circumstances (historical, cultural and linguistic context) contribute to the public accepting that certain threats exist. The way issues are framed and in what context they are framed is referred to as “strategic practice” by Adamides (2012). According to him it is not only about the content of the speech act and what is being secured that is relevant, but also about how a particular problem is presented and how much the words and images resonate inside the existing society, supporting or opposing prevailing values and personal belief systems (Adamides, 2012, p. 39). A more comprehensive approach should therefore go beyond relying solely on speech acts for effective securitization. The externalist perspective will make the theory more systematic and useful in understanding political practice by focusing more on the audiences and the social context in which securitization occurs (Adamides, 2012, p. 40).

2.3 Securitization of immigration

In the post-Cold War era, the adoption of new security sectors resulted in a broader security agenda and, as a result, a major shift from the rigid view of security studies, in which the state

is the only referent object (Adamides, 2012, p. 25). According to Buzan (1991, p. 19) security of human collectivities can be undermined in a variety of sectors: the political sector, the military sector, the societal sector, the economic sector, and the environmental sector. Each sector has its own specific referent objects, such as identity, economic viability and sovereignty (Adamides, 2012, p. 25). CoS scholars do acknowledge that states still are the most important referent object and that they still have an important role to play in the securitizing process since they are ideal securitizing actors (Adamides, 2012, p. 25; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 37).

During Buzan's earlier work on the societal sector, he described societal security as the persistence of conventional patterns of language, culture, religious and ethnic identity and custom within suitable and acceptable evolutionary conditions (Buzan, 1991, pp. 19, 123). Societal threats, then, may come from both within and outside the state, but in reality, they are more likely to come from the inside than from the outside (Adamides, 2012, p. 28; Buzan, 1991, p. 123). In later work, Buzan et al. (1998) altered the emphasis of security within the societal sector and altered the referent object of societal security from the state to identity. Immigration, then, could be a potential threat to societal security through the following logic: when a society of X people is overwhelmed or diluted by a large group of Y people, the X population will change dramatically (due to demographic shifts) and in that way X's identity will be jeopardized (Adamides, 2012, p. 28; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 121). The securitization of immigration is centered on the perception of immigrants as 'others' or an out-group, whereas the host country's society is regarded as the 'self' or in-group. The out-group poses a "danger" to the in-group's cultural identity for the reason that the out-group is seen as a potential challenger to the in-group society's sense of community, (cultural) homogeneity, and collectivity (Middleton, 2016).

According to Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002, p. 21), the rise in immigration flows, coupled with the creation of the European Union (EU) and the Schengen region significantly influenced the types and meanings of borders, collective and individual identities, and the meaning and essence of state sovereignty and authority within the EU. The defense of European identity and culture, fostered by the principle of "Fortress Europe"³, which is focused on free movement and the abolition of internal borders on the one hand, and restrictive external borders, concentrating on exclusion and border control on the other, was the key driving force for securitizing immigrants within the EU (Farny, 2016; Jünemann et al., 2017). Furthermore, the

³ Fortress Europe is the pejorative metaphor for an EU that restricts free movement with the core concept of restricting mobility for some (immigrants), while allowing others (European citizens) to be free (Engelbert et al., 2019).

claim that immigrants pose a danger to the EU's economy served as a justification for the development of a restrictive immigration policy and the curtailment of foreign nationals' rights, leading to the framing of immigration as a security problem (Farny, 2016; Huysmans, 2000, p. 752).

Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002) argue that Western societies generally are experiencing the emergence of several existential and philosophical anxieties and concerns about their identity, stability, and well-being. Immigration, then, is seen within the EU as posing a significant "challenge to the long-standing paradigms of certainty and order", because of its transnational structure, dynamic, and impact on populations and institutions at all levels (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002, pp. 21-22). As a result, the development of a discourse of fear and proliferation of dangers based on instability and disorder scenarios can become a governmental tool for steering and controlling citizens' behavior and attitudes towards immigrants (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002; Farny, 2016). It is worth repeating that the securitization of immigration is a process by which immigration becomes a security concern, not because of the existence or objective significance of a threat, but because it is framed as such.

In general, "desirable" and "wanted" versus "undesirable" and "unwanted" immigrants are distinguished. "Wanted" immigrants are labor immigrants who are thought to have a good impact on society and are desired for their ability to contribute to areas such as the economy and demographics. "Unwanted" immigrants are undocumented "illegal" immigrants who are linked to and blamed for a wide range of societal issues. Albrecht (2002, p. 2) mentions organized crimes, such as drug and human trafficking, as examples. The media depicts "unwanted" and "undesirable" immigrants as a threat to the host country's security and stability, claiming that they would put an undue demand on the social security system and are frequent perpetrators of violent and property crime (Albrecht, 2002, p. 6). Consequently, detention and deportation have become an increasingly serious issue in many liberal democratic countries, including the Netherlands, as a way of dealing with "unwanted" and "illegal" immigrants, such as rejected asylum seekers (Anderson et al., 2011, p. 547).

Some people's personal fears about potential risks seem to be focused on immigrants as a result of the rhetoric of existential threat and security. There is, however, a significant gap between popular fear expectations and reality. Fear arises from a determination of one's susceptibility to victimization. Both politicians and media can use this fear and politicize people by instilling distrust in them, leading them to believe that they are victims and are being oppressed by an influx of immigrants who are allegedly the source of their ills and drawbacks (Farny, 2016). Media portrayals highlighting threat, as well as the resulting dehumanization of

immigrants leads to unfavorable feelings against groups as well as bad sentiments toward immigrants. De-humanization also leads to a lack of support for government policies governing immigration and refugee admissions, as well as efforts to reduce the number of immigrants accepted each year (Esses et al., 2013, p. 532). Even though claims by journalists and politicians that “dozens of people are on their way” and will pose a security threat to the host country are exaggerated, such ideas have an effect on how immigration is viewed and dealt with in the political realm (Farny, 2016). This fear-based politics has the potential to lead to a dangerous generalization, namely, the determination of all immigrants as one group or as a whole, which has very negative consequences. In terms of real politics, each immigrant who is “different” from the host country’s culture and identity poses a threat to security (Farny, 2016). This acute and pressing existential immigrant threat, then, needs extraordinary measures to counter it.

Political agents and media agents are two types of securitizing actors. The political securitizing agent has the greatest effect on the securitization process and result, because of facilitating conditions, such as social capital and influence (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 3-5; Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 32-33). News media, on the other hand, also have the ability to affect how people view the issues addressed by them. According to Bodrunova (2010, p. 5) media are “agenda-setters” and “issue framers”, with the ability to shape public opinion and influence how people make social decisions. McCombs & Shaw (1972, p. 184) argue that the media have a strong impact on society’s political agenda too. That is because politicians can feel compelled to respond to issues raised by the media, out of fear of being chastised for failing to address or act on these issues (Van Noije et al., 2008, p. 458).

In short, in this chapter it has become clear what the securitization theory entails and about which there is debate. The main take-aways are that both speech acts and the social context are of great importance in securitization processes. Political actors and the media often play a role as securitization actors using speech acts and images, but bureaucratic processes are also of great importance, as will become clear in the next chapters. It is crucial to remember, then, that the “logic of exception” and the “logic of routine” are not mutually exclusive by definition. The exceptional speech acts and the routinized bureaucratic processes can reinforce and complement each other. Finally, it is explained how immigration has been slowly but surely securitized from the 1990s on the basis of this theoretical framework. In the next chapter, I examine the securitization process and its concrete policy implications in the Netherlands.

Chapter 3: Securitization of immigration and its policy implications in the Netherlands

In terms of the political and social atmosphere in the Netherlands, it is worth noting that the tone of the discourse against immigrants and foreigners has toughened since the year 2000. Many say that this was largely due to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, but the growth in unemployment in the Netherlands could also have played a role (Jennissen et al., 2011, p. 224). In the following section some statistics about the number of asylum seekers that arrived in the Netherlands in the period 2010-2015 will be presented. Additionally, while it may seem counterintuitive to attempt to describe or explain a society's "public opinion", a range of indicators of Dutch public opinion will be reviewed, as well as an evaluation of some key events in regard to public perception of immigration. As a result, the reader will have a better grasp of the social and political context in which the Dutch immigration debate occurred at this time. The aim of this section is to address the criticism of securitization theory's lack of context, which was addressed in the previous chapter.

In the period 2010-2013, the number of asylum seekers arriving in the Netherlands each year was no higher than $\pm 13,500$ (see figure 1). In 2014 this number almost doubled and in 2015 it doubled again when $\pm 43,000$ asylum seekers were registered in the Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2016; Van Duin & Wijkhuis, 2017, p. 6). According to a study conducted by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (*Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau*, SCP) on citizens' perceptions of national issues from 2008 to the third quarter of 2015, between 7% and 14% of Dutch people listed issues related to refugees as the most significant national problem (Dekker et al., 2015, p. 4). In the fourth quarter of 2015, this figure had risen to 44% of the total Dutch population (Dekker et al., 2015, p. 22). According to the SCP's report, the high number of refugees that arrived in the Netherlands and the growing tensions in society as a result of this inflow were the main concerns of respondents. They complained that refugees enjoyed welfare benefits that others did not, and they pointed to heightened possibilities that among the refugees were terrorists (Dekker et al., 2015, p. 4). When it comes to public opinion in the Netherlands, it is reasonable to believe that immigration was, thus, seen as a major political and security problem. Towards the end of 2015, this public perception peaked. However, it is debatable whether these views were created by people independently or were a result of the political debate about immigrants as a security threat, as will be discussed below.




Figure 1: Number of asylum seekers arrived in the Netherlands, 2002 to 2014, Vina Wijkhuijs & Menno van Duin, 2017 ©

3.1 Securitization of immigration in the Netherlands: who, why and how?

There is a lot of uncertainty concerning the advantages and disadvantages of allowing immigrants to live in one's country, as well as host countries' obligations to give refuge to asylum seekers. The number of immigrants who should be welcomed each year, the amount to which immigrants pose a threat to members of host countries, whether refugee claimants are truly seeking asylum, and the forms of support that should be provided to immigrants are all doubts that come up (Esses et al., 2013, p. 519). Because the public has no direct information to answer these concerns, political elites and the media may exploit this ambiguity to create a crisis mentality in which immigrants are depicted as "enemies at the gate" seeking to "invade Western countries" (El Rafeie, 2001; Esses et al., 2013, p. 519; Henry & Tator, 2002; Lea & Lynn, 2003). The public's attention is drawn to such depictions, which warn of potential economic, physical and cultural threats. In this sense, uncertainty can be used by politicians and the media, enabling for the turning of seemingly insignificant events into newsworthy occurrences that can be marketed to the public and used to bolster support for far-right political platforms. The dehumanization of immigrants that results, may appeal to the general public, aiding to rationalize the status quo, solidify ingroup-outgroup boundaries, and maintain the

ingroup's place in society (Esses et al., 2013, p. 519; see also Demoulin et al., 2007; Haslam, 2006).

Huysmans (2006, p. 58) gives examples of how immigration is framed as a threat capable of causing destruction with the resultant dehumanization of immigrants. To begin with, immigrants are often depicted as a vast unified force rather than as individuals with diverse needs and opinions. Consequently, the key issue attributed to the securitization process is the securitizing actor's failure to see immigrants as individuals. Immigrants are basically being lumped together into a single group (Farny, 2016). Huysmans argues a large group of people who are together is more likely to be feared than a diverse range of individuals. Additionally, immigrants are depicted as having a negative impact due to influx numbers and cultural differences. It is a widely held belief that a sudden influx of immigrants could destabilize a country's labor market, potentially leading to civil unrest. Most fear, however, departs from the belief that immigrants change the established community and culture and the existing life patterns and habits according to Huysmans (2006). Securitization of immigration, then, contributes to the introduction of new policies and the need for more funding for the security issue. The necessity and urgency of the securitized issue are important factors in the implementation of new policies. Admittedly, in order to be solved, prioritized topics are in need of new and above all extraordinary solutions (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 208).

The belief that the "Dutch identity" was in jeopardy has become a popular refrain. The loss of "Dutch norms and values" was a major source of concern among citizens. The failure of the "multicultural society" and the "integration" of immigrants would put Dutch society as a whole in jeopardy and plenty politicians were rushing to stress that they were listening to voters' concerns (Siebers, 2017). One can expect that public opinion on immigrants was influenced in large part by the discursive construction of immigrants, and refugees in particular, as a security threat, such as by political leaders. Either way, it is important to understand that public sentiment in the Netherlands provided a favorable context for securitized discourse regarding immigrants.

The Netherlands is governed by a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary representative democracy with a bicameral system. The Second Chamber has the most legislative and regulatory authority (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2008, p. 31). Consequently, the focus in this chapter is on the Dutch political debate on immigration in the Second Chamber and public statements of members of this Chamber in the media. Which political actors have contributed in what ways to the securitization of immigration will be outlined below.

A significant number of parties have securitized immigration in the Dutch political debate. However, the ways in which parties or individuals securitized immigration differed greatly. In the Dutch political order of debate, a nationalist right-wing populist political party, Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV), served as the key norm entrepreneur⁴ of the securitization of immigration, structurally building the influx of immigrants as an existential threat to society, especially around 2015 (Damhuis, 2019). In parliamentary debates, Second Chamber members of the PVV repeatedly used negative rhetoric in which the immigration influx was, among other things, presented as a “flood” or “tsunami” and in which the policymakers at the time with their immigration policy were supposedly responsible for giving away Dutch identity, wealth, and freedom (Fritsma, 2015; Wilders, 2015). It is also stated that the Dutch borders should finally close and no asylum seekers should be allowed in anymore. “The need to do that is particularly great and I would of course point out the issue of safety!” (Fritsma, 2015). In the 2010 PVV election program it is also stated that many problems, or at least their intensity, originate from the “open borders policy” (PVV, 2010, p. 13). The PVV therefore proposed not just exceptional but above all extreme measures. For example, it was suggested that all foreigners must either work or leave; “no job = no place in the Netherlands” (PVV, 2010, p. 15). No distinction was made here between different types of immigrants. Additionally, undocumented residence in the Netherlands must be regarded as a criminal offence (PVV, 2010, p. 15), mainly because “terrorists hitch a ride in the refugee flow” (Fritsma, 2015). In order to put a stop to this major immigration problem, there must by definition be an immigration stop from Muslim countries, according to Geert Wilders (2010) in the Party Leaders’ Debate.

Other right-wing parties, such as the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, VVD) and Christian Democratic Appeal (*Christen-Democratisch Appèl*, CDA)—although less dramatically and explicitly than the PVV—gradually mirrored this rhetoric by framing immigration as an existential challenge. VVD party leader Mark Rutte stated in the 2010 Party Leader’s Debate as well that the borders should be closed for undesirable immigrants, so that “we can make a success of the situation here” (Rutte, 2010). He seemed to imply that, if this group of “unsuccessful” immigrants could cross the border, success would no longer be possible in the Netherlands. In the 2010 VVD election program it is stated that the unregulated influx of low-skilled immigrants caused major problems in neighborhoods, schools, labor market, and in the field of crime (VVD, 2010, p.

⁴ A norm entrepreneur is a person interested in changing norms (Sunstein, 1996).

36). The VVD stood for essential principles of our society, such as equality of men and women, heterosexuals and homosexuals, believers and non-believers, according to its own statements. Liberals battled hard for these, and the VVD would not compromise on them. When it came to immigrants, however, even those who were legally here and had a residence permit, a different standard appeared to be applied. Like the PVV, the VVD also supported criminalizing undocumented immigrant residence. Moreover, if someone with a migratory background committed a criminal offence, his residency permit could be revoked. Since immigration was considered to be a burden on society and state finances, especially when immigrants' socioeconomic characteristics equaled those of non-Western immigrants (VVD, 2010, pp. 34-36), such extraordinary measures appeared to be justified.

Left-wing parties, such as the Socialist Party (*Socialistische Partij*, SP) and GreenLeft (*GroenLinks*, GL), have maintained quite stable humanitarian discourses (Gesthuizen, 2016; GL, 2010, p. 38; Klaver, 2015; SP, 2010, pp. 13-14). These parties have therefore made little or no contribution to the securitization of immigration. Initially, this also applied to the left-wing Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid*, PvdA), but a shift did take place here at the height of the immigration influx in 2015. While there were strong echoes of humanitarian rhetoric in political debates by Second Chamber members of PvdA, Diederik Samson started to express concerns on the high numbers of immigrants around 2015. He recommended turning the ferry to take immigrants back to Turkey in an interview in *Volkskrant*, making the assumption that Turkey was a safe country for immigrants (although this was not the case at the time). As a result, he advocated for a policy which was not (then) compliant with international law. Additionally, he claimed that his recommendation was the “only way” to handle the immigrant influx (Peepkorn, 2016; Trouw, 2016). To put it another way: the welfare state would become unreachable if his recommendation would not be adopted. While PvdA members did not portray immigrants as a direct security issue or a threat to the “Dutch identity” as PVV members for example did, Samson *did* justify exceptional measures to restrict the influx of immigrants while portraying them as a potential danger for welfare and stability.

The media, at their turn, have focused a lot of attention on immigration and integration issues in the Netherlands as well. According to Dekker's research (2016), different frames predominated in the media around different immigration issues, resulting in different forms of policy reform as a result of the media's impact on the policy agenda. In other words: immigration policy is not driven arbitrarily to be stricter or more generous (Dekker, 2016). However, media attention to certain issues and their use of images have the ability to affect public opinion and, thus, policy. That is because images, in particular those in which

immigrants are explicitly shown as possible intruders behind a gate or fence, point to two fundamental forms of security depiction: dehumanization and demonization. Visual cues resembling immigrant representations like the aforementioned “intruders behind a gate” are used in such images. They have the ability to amplify pre-existing fears and worries (Brader et al., 2008; Esses et al., 2013).

The “immigration crisis” of 2015 resulted in an increase in the number of people seeking asylum from war in the Middle East, particularly Syria. However, the Dutch government and the mainstream media did not utilize the term “crisis” to describe the conflicts that drove people to flee, nor the crises that these same individuals encountered on their treacherous journey to safer areas. Rather, the term “crisis” appeared to apply to what was occurring in Europe, and particularly the Netherlands, at the time. Images of unknown faces “overflowing” the continent dominated in the media and emphasized the enormity of this “European crisis”. The emphasis was on overcrowded vessels in the Mediterranean, people breaking through barriers in Eastern Europe, Greek camps full of people who were obstructed on their route into Europe, and maps depicting the “invasion” of immigrants migrating to Europe with large arrows (Bueno Lacy & Van Houtum, 2019; Wissink, 2020, pp. 17-18). Surprisingly, in light of the “immigration crisis”, bureaucrats were directed to comply to newly implemented limits, which were rapidly limiting the number of applications that could be processed per day. As a result, persons waiting in line to register an asylum plea were kept waiting for weeks. The public was led to believe that the number of individuals entering was too great to handle, and that the country had indeed been “overrun” by immigrants (Wissink, 2020, p. 18). Yet, this “European crisis”, as portrayed in the press and promoted by many politicians, was caused by the arrival of people who made up less than 0.25 percent of Europe’s population according to Bhambra (2017, p. 397). Regardless of whether the figures depicted an invasion or not, what was most intriguing about it was the range of extraordinary measures it allowed for (Wissink, 2020, p. 18).

The presence of this negative image of immigrants, and undocumented immigrants in particular, fueled by the Dutch media, the Dutch politicians and public discourse, is part of the securitization of immigration. Immigration is considered to be such a threat that extraordinary measures are needed to counter it (Buzan et al., 1998; Middleton, 2016). What policy and extraordinary measures in the Netherlands were the actual result of this securitization of immigration follows in the next section.

Dutch immigration policy: important actors and their tasks

Immigrant “illegality” has gained unparalleled notoriety as a “problem” in policy debates and as the target of border policing strategies for countries all over the world (De Genova, 2002, p. 419). Detention and deportation of “illegal” immigrants in liberal democratic states have become contentious and divisive political issues in recent years (Kalir & Wissink, 2016, p. 34). When an immigrant is considered “illegal”, he or she is expected and encouraged to leave the country voluntarily, but if this is not done, he or she is detained and forcibly deported. Although it is widely recognized that detention should only be used as a last resort, it has increasingly been used as a first response and deterrent in several European countries. As a consequence, there has been a lot of excessive detention (Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, 2010).

Human spatial configurations and their emotional co-location with both belonging and the exclusion of the “other” are important aspects in risk communication and policy in the context of immigration (Howarth & Ibrahim, 2018, p. 1469). The state’s monopoly over legitimate tools of coercion is exemplified by immigration control (Weber, 1979). States define and enforce regulations on who can reside within their territory by restricting the movement of “non-citizens” across national boundaries, and they “defend the national welfare” against persons who may constitute a threat (Ellerman, 2006, p. 293).

According to Gijsberts (2005), since the early 1990s already, a considerable part of the Dutch population has harbored hostile attitudes toward newcomers and immigrants. Pim Fortuyn (who was assassinated on May 6, 2002) and his political party named Pim Fortuyn List (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, LPF), which gained a high number of seats in the 2002 parliamentary elections, expressed this unhappiness. Following that, succeeding Ministers for Immigration and Integration, Hilbrand Nawijn (LPF) and Rita Verdonk (VVD), restricted the immigrant policy (Jennissen et al., 2011, p. 224). In the period 2010-2015 the continuing securitization of immigration in the Netherlands resulted in an even more restrictive immigration policy. During Rutte I (2010-2012) and Rutte II (2012-2017)⁵, the Netherlands had an immigration policy that made a distinction between the aforementioned “wanted” and “unwanted” immigrants. The starting point of that policy was aimed at limiting and pushing back the arrival of immigrants with little perspective. The return and deportation policy would be tightened, and illegal residence had, indeed, been made a criminal offence. Immigrants were only welcome as long as they had the correct papers and could potentially contribute to society in the foreseeable future. If a person did not (or no longer) have papers that could justify residence or settlement

⁵ The Dutch name for the governing cabinets in these consecutive periods.

in the Netherlands, he or she had to leave the territory as soon as possible (VVD & CDA, 2010, pp. 21-27; VVD & PvdA, 2012, pp. 29-31).

Within this policy, certain objectives have been set. In the annual report of either the Ministry of Justice (*Ministerie van Justitie*, MinJus)⁶ or the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (*Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties*, BZK) on the immigration chain of 2010, these objectives are subdivided into 6 sections. The first section is *access*: the access procedure's goal was to monitor the Dutch Schengen external border in order to prevent illegal immigration and crime by conducting personal inspections on foreign nationals (MinJus, 2010, p. 14). The second section was *admission*: the goal of the admissions procedure was to make a decision on foreign nationals' applications for a residence permit within the time constraints established. This controlled admission of foreign nationals to the Netherlands should be done in a socially responsible way that "balance[d] the interests of foreign nationals and Dutch nationals" (MinJus, 2010, p. 20). The third section is *supervision and enforcement*: the main goal of this procedure was to reduce crime and criminal activity among foreign nationals. This was done in tandem with the use of criminal legislation. Asylum seekers and foreign nationals who were no longer allowed to remain here were monitored, among other things, to ensure that they were available for the current asylum and return proceedings. Priority was given to the expulsion of criminals and "undesirable aliens", with the goal of preventing re-entry to the greatest extent possible (MinJus, 2010, p. 42). The fourth section is *return*: the national return policy aimed to oppose and prevent unauthorized foreign nationals from residing in the Netherlands. The primary idea of Dutch return policy was that foreign people who were no longer legally residing in the Netherlands had the option of returning to their home country or leaving for another country with assured access. This was the responsibility of the foreign national himself. If he did not cooperate, he would be forcibly deported back to his home country or deported to another nation where he would have guaranteed access (MinJus, 2010, p. 50). The fifth section is *reception*: the goal of the reception process was to receive asylum seekers who were awaiting a decision on their residency permit application. The Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (*Centraal Orgaan opvang asielzoekers*, COA) provided shelter and services to asylum seekers throughout the asylum process. The environment, societal wishes, and EU legislation were all taken into consideration while receiving asylum applicants. As a result, asylum seekers were received in a "sober but humane" way (MinJus, 2010, p. 62). The sixth and final section is *detention*:

⁶ Later called the Ministry of Security and Justice and currently known as the Ministry of Justice and Security.

surprisingly, there was no mention of a specific goal or target of detention. Immigration detention was defined as “the placement in a detention center of a foreign national who has been refused entrance or is not authorized to stay in the Netherlands (any longer) until departure or expulsion is possible”. The foreign national’s custody assured that he or she was ready to depart. The use of immigration detention was only permissible if achieving the same goal with less extreme measures was not possible, which is known as the *ultimum remedium* principle (MinJus, 2010, p. 67). In the period 2010-2015, these sections and objectives have been reformulated and subdivided differently (See, for instance, MinJus, 2011; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016).

It is important to indicate some actors that played a crucial role in the implementation of the Dutch immigration policy with its aforementioned objectives. A selection of these actors that are relevant to this research are outlined in this section. The descriptions of these actors and their objectives come from the official report of the immigration chain of the Ministry of Security and Justice (2016, pp. 4-5). Firstly, there is the Immigration- and Naturalization Service (*Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst*, IND). The IND was in charge of implementing the admission policy. This implies that the IND evaluated all applications from foreign people seeking to remain in the Netherlands or become Dutch citizens. Secondly, the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers was the organization in charge of receiving and guiding foreign nationals. The COA, which was commissioned by the State Secretary for Security and Justice, provided (temporary) shelter to persons in difficult situations and assisted them in planning for their future, whether in the Netherlands or elsewhere. Thirdly, the Repatriation and Departure Service (*Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek*, DT&V) was in charge of enforcing the return policy and preventing illegal entry into the Netherlands. In other words, the DT&V was in charge of the voluntary and/or forcible departure of foreign people who were not permitted to remain in the Netherlands or who had been denied entry. Fourthly, the Custodial Institutions Agency (*Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen*, DJI) ensured the enforcement of sanctions and custodial measures, such as the imprisonment of foreign persons who must leave the Netherlands, on behalf of the Minister of Security and Justice. Fifthly, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (*Koninklijke Marechaussee*, KMar) was a police organization with military status that monitored the security of the state, in the Netherlands and far beyond. As a border authority, the KMar was responsible for guarding the Dutch borders and acted as a border police. Relevant themes the KMar dealt with are border control, forced return, mobile security surveillance and tackling identity fraud. Finally, the Aliens Police, Identification and Human Trafficking (*Vreemdelingenpolitie, Identificatie en Mensenhandel*, AVIM) was in charge of enforcing,

supervising, and identifying aliens. In addition, the AVIM units were active in the investigation of human trafficking and migratory crime.

In sum, in the first section of this chapter it has become clear in what ways immigration has been securitized in the Netherlands, which actors played a role in this and how the Dutch context offered opportunity for this. It is also explained which immigration policy resulted from this between 2010-2015 as well as which actors had to work on certain objectives. The following chapter focuses on detention particularly, including immigrant experiences and the practical repercussions of detention for them.

Chapter 4: Immigrants in detention and its implications

“(…) the deportable person is only as real as the political imaginary in which it is mobilized. When we contribute to this imaginary in our daily lives, let us be reminded that deportation bureaucracy testifies to our collective and dual potential of becoming a deportation bureaucrat or a deportable person ourselves.” – Lieke Wissink, 2020, p. 153

Anderson et al. (2011, p. 549) claims that the ability of states to lawfully deport “non-citizens” present on their territory is often viewed as a power derived from the state’s “right to control immigration”: just as governments have the right to prevent foreigners from entering their territory, they also claim the right to expel foreigners who have entered or remain on their territory. “The sovereign power to deport is an extension of the sovereign right to exclude” (Anderson et al., 2011, p. 549). Making someone deportable is a technique of establishing that they are not a citizen—someone whose membership and presence is not conditional. Deportation may also be used to label someone as ineligible for citizenship, because they do not meet the country’s norms (Anderson et al., 2011, p. 555). When deportation is used by nation-states to distinguish between “belonging” and “non-belonging” persons existing on their territory—an ordering for which a legal framework is put in place to justify these acts—the selection of those who will be deported takes place in bureaucratic activities assembled in the deportation unit (Wissink, 2020, p. 16).

In the realm of immigration politics, investments in measures to prevent the presence of migratory persons are favored over those arranging their stay. Consider the EU’s distribution of budgets earmarked for “immigration management”. Rather than investing in their integration, money is primarily spent on measures that prevent people from either coming in or staying (Wissink, 2020, pp. 18-19). The hardening of border procedures and the securitization of immigration have both been shown to increase the number of immigrants in detention centers. This is an unfair reality, according to Bello (2020, p. 9), because undocumented travel cannot be regarded a criminal in and of itself (See also, Bello, 2017; Lazaridis & Wadia, 2015). Detaining those who have traveled without documentation is a manner in which the securitization of immigration turns immigrants into criminals, self-fulfilling and reinforcing the security threat that it predicts (Bello, 2020, p. 10). The phenomenon of securitizing immigration, then, confirms its own hypothesis: if immigration is expertly presented as a threat, then the arrival of immigrants, whether in rising numbers or not, will always be a crisis to be

managed (Bello, 2020, p. 9; Maguire, 2015). When immigrants are treated as criminals, incarcerated in immigration detention centers, or deported, it is apparent that negative opinions about them grow. As bias grows, so does the level of securitization (Bello, 2020, p. 9; Bello 2017).

Detention and deportation have been used as “immigration management” tactics in the Netherlands since the late 1990s (Kalir & Wissink, 2016, p. 38). In 2010-2015 the Dutch government put in place a comprehensive deportation infrastructure that included 44 limited-free-movement-location centers, four detention centers, a special deportation unit (DT&V), and a significant police force allocation (Alien Police, KMar) (Kalir & Wissink, 2016, p. 38). The immigration policy began with the premise that a foreign national who was not permitted to remain in the Netherlands (any longer) was responsible for leaving the country. If the foreign national did not attempt to leave on his or her own, forced departure could be an alternative option. If there were reasonable grounds to assume that a foreign individual would elude government surveillance during a forced departure (deportation) procedure, immigration detention was used. Then it was a matter of administrative liberty deprivation. The policy would be applied at detention centers that were designated as such. In detention centers, the general Penitentiary Principles Act (*Penitentiaire Beginselenwet*) applied (ACVZ, 2013, p. 17). This law was written for criminal law and also (in particular) applied to criminal detainees (Amnesty International, 2010, p. 15). The goal of immigration detention was to get non-lawfully present people out of the country. Immigration detention, unlike criminal imprisonment, did not have the goal of increasing suffering (punishment). During detention, the foreign national’s rights and freedoms were not allowed to be restricted any further than was necessary for the goal of the measure, which was deportation (ACVZ, 2013, p. 17). Whether this happened in practice in 2010-2015 is examined in this chapter. Other concrete implications of detention for immigrants are discussed as well.

Undocumented immigrants: guilty until proven innocent

In a report of further hearing from the IND some interesting findings were done (See appendix 3). Further hearing is intended to clarify why the person in question left the country of origin. Partly on the basis of the further hearing, a decision is made on the asylum application. The asylum application can be rejected if the questions are not answered completely and truthfully. The type of questions that present in this report are striking. A Serbian woman was interrogated. She indicated in the first interview that she was completely drugged during her flight from Serbia. This did not prevent the IND from asking detailed questions about things such as travel

time and train companies. The woman in question talked about abuse, drugging and rape. She also repeatedly talked about her sister's death and how upset and traumatized she was by all these events. She stated that returning to Serbia was impossible for her and that if she would be deported, she would be forced to commit suicide. The report shows that the IND employee asked very detailed questions and was actively looking for inconsistencies. Questions about the torture, its frequency, the types of injuries, the people involved and the place in which it occurred are all discussed in the report. The human element seems utterly overlooked. Research from Huisman and Kootstra (2019) revealed that this type of questioning is a general trend within the IND.

In another research, conducted by Werkman (2014), it is also shown that questions are asked that are extremely difficult to answer. For example, religious refugees must be able to prove that they were actually followers of the religion that was persecuted in their country of origin. This was done, for example, by asking questions about nuance differences between Protestantism and Catholicism for instance. It seems that hardly any account was taken of issues such as illiteracy or trauma. If the IND employees subsequently deemed this person's story to be implausible, there was a real chance that the asylum application of the person in question would be rejected.

The method IND employees applied, was designed to uncover even the tiniest flaws in asylum stories in order to reject asylum applications as fast as possible. It seemed to be forgotten that contradictions during hearings could also be caused by cultural differences; in the Netherlands, it was customary to mention every precise detail during an IND hearing, although in other cultures, spelling things out for people was considered impolite (Huisman & Kootstra, 2019). According to Severijns (2019) an IND official did a good job if he noticed that something was not right or consistent. A refusal was, in short, preferable. The basis on which something was deemed implausible was, however, really subjective. It appeared to be, then, that the undocumented immigrant detainee was largely dependent on the subjective judgment of an IND employee.

In the Netherlands various motives for fleeing were considered legitimate, such as religious oppression, homophobia, conflict and violence. However, it seemed that undocumented immigrants, who were criminalized, could not benefit from the basic principle of criminal law "innocent until proven guilty" (Bemelmans, 2017). In fact, most immigrants were in advance perceived as bogus asylum seekers and fortune seekers. The manner of interrogation, but more importantly the detention of immigrants, seemed therefore very similar to an opposite principle: guilty until proven innocent.

Representation and treatment of detained immigrants

According to Wissink (2020, pp. 16-17), when it comes to internal detention and deportation statistics, it is important to remember that those refer to the *number of detentions* and deportations, not the *number of people* detained or deported. The same person can be detained and deported several times throughout a calendar year. In other words, the detention and deportation bureaucracy's annual statistics "do not reflect persons, but paperwork". This applied for the Netherlands as well. One could wonder, then, in what ways the Dutch immigration policy was about individuals.

Deportable persons were typically referred to as "foreigners" or "illegal foreigners" in Dutch formal jargon, as well as in the aforementioned official reports and statistics. However, research shows that the preferred term among DT&V employees was "clients" and many of them used the informal term "illegals" in casual conversations. Employees from DT&V payed regular visits to their "clients", usually once every three weeks. These sessions took place in detention centers, DT&V offices, or sites with limited freedom of movement, where primarily "to-be-deported families with children" were held. During these sessions, the DT&V employees offered their "clients" updates on their deportation process and/or got new information from their "clients" regarding tasks that they were required to accomplish, such as getting a *laisser-passer*⁷ document from their embassy (Kalir & Wissink, 2020, pp. 38-39). In its management of "illegal" immigrants, the DT&V built up a reputation for being "tough" and uncompromising in the Dutch deportation field, as well as in Dutch society at large (Kalir & Wissink, 2016, p. 39).

Research has shown that immigration detainees who did not commit a crime were often treated worse than convicted detainees in terms of conditions and protections (Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, 2010). Special detention facilities intended to accommodate the expanding alien population resembled traditional detention facilities. Many of the essential assumptions that justified constraining people's liberty were violated or ignored in such settings. Different standards applied to foreign citizens. States did not only define a national character based on exclusion in jails and detention centers, but they also highlighted the limits of the liberal political ideal of inclusion (Bosworth & Franko Aas, 2013, p. x).

According to a report by Justitia et Pax (2010, pp. 24-25; see also, Justitia et Pax, 2012, pp. 11-15), one of the most serious issues faced by imprisoned immigrants was uncertainty over the length of their stay in detention. This issue was also apparent in the letter from immigrants

⁷ A travel document issued by a country's embassy that allows a national to return to that country for a limited period of time (DT&V, 2021).

in detention center Noord-Holland (appendix 1). In addition, although a maximum of 18 months of detention applied, immigrants could be arrested and detained again (Justitia et Pax, 2010, p. 25). All procedures, including the counting of detention months, were then restarted from the beginning. As a result, the actual length of incarceration could be far greater than the maximum of 18 months. Once it had been established that a person was not deportable, it was unlikely that they could be deported during a second or third detention. The detainment following a previous impossible deportation therefore served as a form of punishment in practice, according to Justitia et Pax's report (2010, pp. 25-26). This is very remarkable. Again, it shows that extraordinary measures with regard to the immigrant were legitimate. Article 68 of the Dutch Penal Code is based on the *ne bis in idem*-principle, which means that someone may not be prosecuted twice for the same offence (Albers & De Groot, 2020, p. 40). This means that a criminal who has been acquitted of, for example, murder can no longer end up in prison for that murder, even if indisputable evidence is later put on the table showing that the criminal in question committed the murder. If a criminalized undocumented immigrant, however, was detained, apparently different standards and rules applied. Undocumented "illegal" immigrants could end up in a detention center again and again, even if it was completely clear that deportation would be impossible in the future.

Moreover, vulnerable people, such as the disabled, victims of human trafficking, pregnant women and even children could be detained. Sometimes, families were separated from each other (Justitia et Pax, 2010, pp. 26-28). Also, in contrast to stays in other Ministry of Justice institutions, the stay in immigration detention centers, according to the study Justitia et Pax (2010, p. 34), did not focus in any constructive way on the future. As a result of this approach, immigrants were unable to spend their time in custody on something that would benefit them in the future, such as working to earn money (Justitia et Pax, 2010, p. 34). Another key limitation for foreigners that Justitia et Pax (2010, p. 35) emphasized, and that was non-existent in conventional prison institutions, was the practical impossibility for immigrants to be present (even under supervision) at critical family moments (even if the family lived in the Netherlands). Think, for example, of the birth of a child or the funeral of a relative. This was only permissible in extremely rare circumstances. In the cases where it was allowed, the visit was done with a so-called "stick in the pants", which is a splint around the person's knee that prohibited the immigrant from fleeing (Justitia et Pax, 2010, p. 35). This demonstrates, again, that the immigrant was being criminalized; after all, it was a common procedure in regular prisons.

Implications of detention for immigrants in the Netherlands

Refused asylum seekers are not wanted legally or politically—they do not have the “right” to stay, society is told—but they refuse to leave willingly, and they resist deportation. Despite the fact that a large number of people are deported each year, deporting them without damaging its humanitarian image and human rights obligations is sometimes impossible for states (Johansen, 2013, p. 258). Nonetheless, the aim is to get rid of them, to use tactics to compel them to go back to where they “belong”. In this regard, the treatment of denied asylum seekers shows a wider and more complicated range of social exclusion and expulsion tactics aimed at the world’s “unruly” people, creating a distinct area of politics that Johansen (2013, p. 258) calls “the funnel of expulsion”. Immigrants in detention centers are politically abandoned and forced to fight for themselves, resulting in widespread despair and deprivation. The overarching purpose is to “force the unenforceable”; these individuals are imprisoned in such an excruciating condition that they “choose” to leave. They are considered as enemies and as such they are abandoned politically, which is similar to Agamben’s concept of *homo sacer* (Agamben, 1998; Johansen, 2013, pp. 258-259). This seemed to be the case in the Netherlands as well.

For many years, immigration detention has been the subject of political and media concern. Aside from the financial consequences of exclusionary dynamics, there were significant human consequences as well (Wissink, 2020, p. 20; see also, Spijkerboer, 2007; Spijkerboer, 2013). Immigrant detention and deportation were deemed vital parts of border security by government policy. The tactics were considered the state’s right and duty. However, things were not so straightforward for opponents of detention. It was often argued that detention could cause long-term psychological trauma, was often used arbitrarily, and was costly and ineffective (Bosworth, 2013, p. 153; see also, Fazel et al., 2011). A concrete implication of immigration detention is the vulnerability of people who are facing deportation. Scholars have looked at the ramifications of what De Genova (2002) referred to as “the condition of deportability”, known as the ramifications of living in a country wherein deportation is always possible for “non-citizens”. It has been suggested that because of this circumstance, people, especially those without legal immigrant status, are unable to demand even the most fundamental of rights for fear of attracting the attention of immigration authorities (Anderson et al, 2011, pp. 551-552; De Genova & Peutz, 2010; Gibney, 2011; Krause, 2008). Deportation is a clearer and more direct expression of citizenship definition, because “it entails the loss of any right to reside in the state”; it basically implies the total severance of the state-individual relationship, as well as the loss of all related privileges and rights. Deportation deprives an

individual of a status rather than simply preventing them from obtaining one, and that status is the right to remain in the country (Anderson et al., 2011, p. 556).

The Dutch implementation practice with regard to immigration detention, in particular, had been heavily criticized by advocates for human rights. In comparison to other countries, research showed, the Netherlands used the measure far too frequently and casually (ACVZ, 2013, p. 13). Logically, this had great repercussions for those detained human beings. For example, there were no legal or regulatory grounds for waiving custody or determining if someone was not suitable for detention. As a result, how the practitioner dealt with the space set out in legislation and regulations had a big impact on whether or not the *ultimate remedium* principle was followed (ACVZ, 2013, p. 9). The presence of two variables could be used to determine whether the Netherlands genuinely used immigration detention as a last resort, according to Justitia et Pax's report (2012). First and foremost, an individual assessment must be conducted prior to the imposition of alien detention. Second, alternatives to detention should be considered before detention is used as a measure, such as a duty to report (Justitia et Pax, 2012, p. 12). According to a report by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and *VluchtelingenWerk Nederland*, asylum seekers were detained without an individual assessment of their detention's necessity. Furthermore, if an asylum seeker was denied entry to the Netherlands, the disposal that he was granted did not provide a precise rationale, but simply fundamental considerations as to why detention was necessary (UNCHR & VluchtelingenWerk Nederland, 2011).

Furthermore, there is no concrete evidence that detention centers discouraged immigration, but there is plenty of evidence that they caused significant damage. Some opponents of detention contended that detention should be scrapped entirely, while others advocated for a time limit on how long anyone could be detained *in total* (Bosworth, 2013, p. 153; Phelps, 2009). For detained immigrants in the Netherlands it certainly applies that they have been damaged. Because of the Dutch immigration policies, immigrants were constantly worried about if/when they would be deported, what would happen to their families in custody or, if they would be deported, what their future would be. In immigration detention, the uncertainty, as well as the previously mentioned lack of development chances and meaningful daytime activities, often resulted in hopelessness, frustration, and anger among detained immigrants, according to the report by Justitia et Pax (2012, p. 15). Also, according to Justitia et Pax's research, immigration detention in the Netherlands had more limits on freedom, rights,

and facilities than criminal custody did. Article 59⁸ detainees were subjected to an austere regime known as the “regime of limited community”. This meant that detainees spent an average of 17 to 21 hours a day in a cell. The cell opened during the other hours, and the detainees had access to the corridor or recreation room. Detainees were also allowed to air for one hour a day, receive visitors for two hours a week, exercise 1-2 hours a week, and receive spiritual treatment for one hour a week when they were not in cell (Justitia et Pax, 2012, pp. 14-15). According to another report of Justitia et Pax (2010), the regime in detention centers for those imprisoned on the basis of Article 6⁹ was less strict. The “regime of general community” applied here. This meant an increase in the number of hours that could be spent outside the cell and the number of visits that could be made (Justitia et Pax, 2010, p. 10). Although the detention of undocumented immigrants was supposedly not aimed at punishing these people, and although the intention was that these persons should not undergo any more measures that deprived them of their freedom than was necessary for the ultimate goal of deportation, in practice this proved far from being the case. Additionally, although regulations stated that custody of foreign nationals would be lifted if there was no reason to detain them (any longer), the ACVZ pointed out that this did not always happen immediately (ACVZ, 2013, p. 10).

In sum, the Dutch immigration policy tried to tackle the “immigration problem” by using detention and deportation techniques. Within the IND and DT&V, every effort seemed to be made to make deportation possible. The human aspect was often in the background here. Logically, criminalizing undocumented refugees to this extent also had a major impact on the way these people are viewed and treated. In many cases this led to stress, anger and frustration, and it also led to a certain degree of political abandonment for immigrants in detention centers.

⁸ Article 59 refers to a detention provision designed to keep illegal aliens who are required to leave the Netherlands from delaying deportation (DT&V, 2021).

⁹ Article 6 states that aliens who are refused entry at the border may be held in alien custody (DT&V, 2021).

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The securitization theory as introduced by the CoS focuses mainly on speech acts. This dissertation shows how the social context is also of great importance for successful securitization. In the Netherlands there has been a negative attitude towards the ‘alien’ since the 1990s. There has been a process of securitization of immigration on a global scale around this time. The terrorist attacks of 2001 gave an additional impetus to the securitization of immigration. Immigrants were no longer merely a threat to the identity of the host country or to the labor market; they were also increasingly seen as potential terrorists.

In terms of the political and social climate in the Netherlands, it is worth noting that the tone of anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner rhetoric has hardened since 2000. In the Netherlands this hardened discourse was mainly stimulated by right-wing politicians. The media also played a major role in this securitization process. Immigrants were portrayed as one large group of people who, as it were, flooded the country. The media and political debate focused on the Netherlands, and Europe generally, when it came to the immigration crisis. It certainly was not about the crises that forced people to flee their homelands; the Netherlands and Europe were hit by a crisis: a flood of immigrants. The fear that prevailed in society (the self) for the immigrant (the other) had been politicized and securitized. The repetition of fear rhetoric and the spread of risk based on instability scenarios were used by the Dutch politicians to influence and control society’s attitude towards immigration. Here it is crucial to understand that immigration securitization meant that immigration was *framed* as a security issue and not that immigration *was* an existential security issue per se. In any case, the framing of the existential threat meant that this “danger” had to be put to an end by extraordinary measures. The aim was to maintain the so-called “Dutch identity”.

To begin with, the ideals and behaviors cited as examples, such as gender equality or equality between heterosexual and homosexual people, are not inherently “Dutch”. These are universal ideals embedded in human rights declarations around the world. A common argument that was prevalent was that immigrants posed a threat to this “Dutch” way of life, and that the only way to maintain this “Dutch” identity was to exclude the non-Dutch people: in particular the “undesirable” and “unwanted” immigrants. The Dutch approach was aimed at removing certain individuals from the country, while mobilizing a “Dutch” way of life, which was considered to be endangered. However, if there was indeed a crisis in the Netherlands, it was more of a moral crisis stemming from the incapacity to behave in accordance with what are ostensibly “Dutch” principles (these would include a dedication to human rights at the very

least). What actually undermined these “Dutch” principles were not these undesirable immigrants then, but the development of forms of exclusionary nationalism that were hostile to those “Dutch” humanitarian objectives.

In any case, the Dutch context offered room for successful securitization of immigration. What implications, then, has the securitization of immigration in the Netherlands had for immigrants in detention centers, 2010-2015? As a result of the securitization of immigrants, the government criminalized undocumented immigrants. The purpose of this was to attract “wanted” immigrants only, and to keep out “unwanted” immigrants. This policy led to the implementation of several agencies with the aim of deporting the unwanted immigrants “voluntarily” as quickly and easily as possible. The return and deportation policy tightened and various actors, such as the KMar, the IND and the DT&V, each played their own role in this. In concrete terms, this meant a great deal of detention, even though detention was only to be used as a last resort. Logically, detention had a major impact on these people. Although immigration detention was not allowed to function as a punishment with more restrictions that deprived people of their freedom than was necessary for deportation, research shows that immigration detention used even more freedom depriving measures than regular prisons did. This particularly affected immigrants detained under Article 59.

Taking away someone’s liberty is reserved for those who have committed significant crimes for a reason. The foreigners in custody have not really done anything criminal and therefore detaining them seems unjust. It is extremely ambiguous to consider the search for a better life outside one’s own country a crime. Whether someone has valid residency papers or not is insufficient cause for indefinite detention. Above all, the conditions in immigration detention were substantially harsher than in conventional prisons. This immigration detention policy was therefore causing much damage to detained immigrants. It has led to trauma, misunderstanding, frustration and anger. Hopefully, this thesis will contribute to a revision of the Dutch immigration policy, since it has not improved much to this day (See, for instance, VVD et al., 2017).

Finally, there is no doubt that this research, its theoretical framework and empirical evidence, could be further developed and improved in a follow-up research. This could be done by focusing on other aspects of the securitization theory that have been underexposed here, such as the de-securitisation process, or by examining other case studies, for example. The focus could be given to politicians and the media, and how they could contribute to the de-securitisation of immigration in the Netherlands. Such research could provide more insights in the ways politicians and the media can influence how society perceives certain issues.

Additionally, research into possibilities for de-securitisation of immigration is, as this thesis has shown, extremely relevant and useful.

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
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Appendices



Appendix 1: Letter from detainees in detention center Noord-Holland

nier zijn we met zijn allen cellenr gesteld. daar om laten we u onz handtekeningen hierover ontvangen, om onze vrijheid terug te winnen -

Naam	Vox Letters	Gebourts Datum	Afdeling	Cellnummer	Detentienummer / Hand tekening
		09-09-1971	I	28	
		02-03-1986	I	09	
		21-07-1983	I	30	
		19-01-1990	I	26	
		13-01-1990	I	08	
		17-03-1991	I	08	
		02-07-1986	I	09	
		13-08-1985	I	13	
		10-01-1992	I	17	
		04-02-81	I	11	
		02-09-1999	I	24	
		20-10-1989	I	20	
		23-12-1980	I	25	
		30-10-1983	I	32	
		31-01-1990	I	16	
		5A2-1998	I	25	
		3-10-1983	I	25	
		20-10-1988	I	18	
		28-06-1993	I	14	
		01-12-2011	I	14	
		01-11-1983	I	4	
		14-10-1976	I	22	
		10-04-1990	I	01	
		04-12-1985	I	01	
		1-10-1979	I	26	
		11-12-1989	I	18	
		06-05-1980	I	20	
		12-02-1986	I	30	
		02-01-1979	I	23	
		26-12-1985	I	2	
		02-02-1972	I	32	
		15-01-1984	I	16	
		13-10-1982	I	23	
		6-3-54	I	27	
		31-12-1987	I	29	

Wij willen van te voren weten hoe lang we hier moeten
 Blijven

002/002

DCR TRF 0880785044 01/09 2011 15:14 FAX

Appendix 2: Signature list attached to the letter. For privacy reasons the names, detention numbers and signatures have been made invisible.

3. Dec. 2011 20:32

IND AC Schiphol



Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en
Koninkrijksrelaties

Postadres Postbus 75718 1118 ZT Schiphol

0900-1234561 (EUR 0,10
p.m.)
(werkdagen van 9.00 tot
17.00)

Kenmerk Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (IND): [redacted]

V-nummer: [redacted]

Rapport van Nader Gehoor

Achternaam bij geboorte : [redacted]
Voornamen : [redacted]
Geboortedatum : oktober 1986
Geboorteplaats / Land : [redacted] Duitsland
Nationaliteit : Burger van Servië
Geslacht : Vrouw
Bevolkingsgroep : Roma
Religie : Katholiek
Verblijfplaats in land van herkomst : Onbekend
Datum vertrek land van herkomst : Onbekend, 2-3 maanden geleden
Datum Inreis in Nederland : Onbekend, 2-3 maanden geleden
Datum aanmelding in Nederland : 14 november 2011
Datum en plaats aanvraag : 14 november 2011, Rotterdam
Datum en plaats inbewaringstelling : 9 november 2011, Tilburg
Datum en plaats nader gehoor : 27 november 2011 / Aanmeldcentrum
Schiphol
Rapporteur : [redacted]
Naam tolk / Taal : [redacted] / Duits
Registertolk : Ja
Hulpverlening : [redacted] (van VVN)

Appendix 3: Report of further hearing of the IND, 27 November 2011, page 1 out of 21. For privacy reasons the names and surnames have been made invisible, nor the entire report is attached.