Consuming Coexistence: Jaffa's Urban Transformation and the Israeli State's Positive Execution of Power
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Research Master's Thesis

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Contents

1. Introduction

On the 19th of July 2018 the 20th Israeli Knesset passed a new piece of legislation called 'Basic Law: Israel – The Nation State of the Jewish People'. This law describes and defines a multitude of important features, symbols, and practices of the Israeli state. For example, it suggests that Hebrew is the state's language and that Arabic has a mere special status. The law furthermore states that the capital of Israel is a 'complete and united' Jerusalem and that 'the state views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value' the 'establishment and strengthening' of which it shall 'encourage and promote' (The State of Israel, 2018) . Yet, as is suggested by the name, the law's core purpose seems to be explicitly reaffirming the idea that the State of Israel is an exclusively Jewish state that is the realisation of self-government of a single Jewish people. Though this idea is not at all new, this is the first time that it has been anchored into the state's de-facto formal constitutional structure (Harel, 2021, p.262).

The very explicit way in which this law takes stance in a number of key political debates within Israeli state and society allows for a multitude of interesting questions. The most important one arguably being 'but how about the non-Jewish Palestinian citizens of Israel?'. Despite the self-identification as 'the Jewish State', this population group often described by Israeli authorities as 'Arab Israelis' makes up close to two million of the country's 9.2 million citizens (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2021).

When looking at this Basic Law it seems as if the Palestinian Israelis have collectively been degraded to a place outside the scope of the state's perceived citizenry. By itself this dynamic is not at all new and has been addressed in detail in studies that examine and debate the complicated relationship between the State of Israel and its Palestinian citizens. Though this topic has always been relevant, it seems that the introduction of the Basic Law in 2018 seems to have brought it to the forefront of scholarly debate on Israeli state and society.

This study attempts to address this complicated relationship from one specific angle. Namely, through that of the Israeli state and the way in which it attempts to negotiate this complicated between itself and a significant portion of its citizens. Yet, instead of focussing solely on a national framework and the different ways in which the type of citizenship granted to Palestinian Israelis falls short of that of Jewish citizens, this study attempts to add to existing research in two distinct ways. First, it attempts to deconstruct nationally homogenous images of Israel avoid issues of methodological nationalism by addressing this issue from a local rather than a national perspective. It does so by addressing how the state attempts to govern its

Palestinian Israeli citizens in Jaffa, the ancient and diverse port city now part of the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality. In practice, this entails that this study takes attempts to identify how this municipality governs the Palestinian Israelis who live in Jaffa. Hence why the core question that this study attempts to answer is: 'How does the State of Israel govern Palestinian Citizens in Jaffa'.

Second, when conducting this study, it became apparent that the best way of understanding the way in which local government attempts to govern the Palestinian Israeli residents of Jaffa is by employing a theoretical framework of Foucauldian governmentality. As I will explain in greater detail in the next section, this framework allows us to address the ways in which the local subsidiary of the state exercises power and shapes conduct through positive rather than negative means. That is, through establishing rationalities, expectations, and opportunities rather than through imposing limits and sanctioning those who dare to cross these limits as would be more appropriate when, for example, asking a similar question but limited in scope to the Occupied West Bank where many Palestinians live under Israeli military rule and occupation. In the end, using such framework of governmentality allows for a better understanding of the complicated relationship between the Israeli state and its Palestinian citizens who, though they get to enjoy some of the benefits that Israeli citizenship offers, seem to fall outside of the scope of the state's desired citizenry.

The core argument that I put forward is that the way in which the Palestinian citizens of Jaffa are governed by the local authorities is rooted in a local historical dichotomy between white, Hebrew, and Modern Tel Aviv and Black, Oriental, and backward Jaffa and how, in recent decades, a reconfiguration of this dichotomy is resulting in the transformation of Jaffa into a Disneyfied consumable space celebrated as a 'model of coexistence between Jews and Arabs'. The realisation of this transformation is dependent on the participation of the city's Palestinian citizens. Therefore, I contend that the Palestinian Israeli residents of Jaffa are made subject to a governmentality based on rationalities of neoliberalism and ethnocracy which is being exercised through technologies of self-investment, participation, and displacement. Even when taking place under the discursive veil of 'transforming Jaffa into a model city of coexistence' I argue that what we are witnessing in Jaffa is a continued Judaization of Palestinian (urban) space exercised by a state that governs in favour of fundamentally belongs solely to its Jewish citizens.

However, before I arrive at this conclusion, I first provide a more detailed description of what method I used to answer this study's research question and how the theoretical framework of governmentality has informed this method. In the third chapter I offer an extensive overview of the academic debates directly related to this research. Doing so means addressing three key debates. First, the scholarly debate over the ontology of the State of Israel and its self-identification as a 'Jewish and democratic' state. Second, the consequences of the state's strong ethno-national or ethnocratic nature on the citizenship status of Israel's Palestinian citizens, and third, how these politics translate into urban spaces coinhabited by Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. In the fourth chapter I give a brief historical overview necessary to understand the contemporary political context and argument that I put forward. Chapter five focusses on the existing dichotomy between Tel Aviv and Jaffa and gives a detailed outline of how Tel Aviv has been constructed as a Hebrew, modern, and white city reliant on the existence of Jaffa as an oriental, backward, and black 'other'. In the sixth chapter I examine how, starting in the late 1980s, this existing dichotomy is being reconfigured, eventually resulting in the transformation of Jaffa into what I describe as a Disneyfied and consumable city. In the final chapter I finally answer the research question and present a detailed description of how this transformation of the city results in a governmentality according to which the Tel Aviv-Jaffa municipality attempts to exercise power and thus govern Jaffa's Palestinian citizens.

2. Literature review

Even though it is the relevantly recent introduction of a piece of legislation that gave rise to this research, this study is part of a much larger field of study that critically assesses the nature of the Israeli state and the way it engages with its Palestinian citizens. An understanding of these debates will properly contextualise the argument I put forward in this thesis. Hence why in this section I shall provide a brief overview of the key debates within this field before explaining where in these debates this study is positioned.

Existing research within this field seems to centre around three interrelated issues. From broad to narrow these are: Existing research into this topic seems to centre around three interrelated issues. From broad to narrow these are: First, how to describe and define the Israeli democratic system. Especially in the light of the perceived conflict between Israel's explicitly Jewish nature and self-proclaimed commitment to democracy. Second, what the perceived tension between the state's exclusive Jewish nature and a sizeable Palestinian minority means for the type of citizenship granted to these people. And finally, how these inequalities play out in urban encounters between Jews and Palestinians in urban spaces that they coinhabit.

2.1 Defining Israeli democracy

A key debate on Israeli state and society focusses on how to define and describe the Israeli democratic system as it functions today.[1]

The debate centres mostly around the perceived incompatibility between the state of Israel's explicit, and often seen as exclusive, Jewish nature and its self-proclaimed commitment to democracy. In exploring this issue, existing research assesses to what extent the state's self-proclaimed democratic nature is justifiable. If it is, what type of democracy would Israel then be? And if not, what other non-democratic regime type should it be classified as? Answers to these questions can be placed on a scale ranging from 'Israel is a democracy comparable to most European states' to 'Severe issues within Israeli society mean that, instead of a democracy, Israel is best described as a different non-democratic regime type'.

2.1.1 Israel: the 'Jewish and democratic' state
The State of Israel's Jewish identity is easy to spot. Above all, when the state was declared in May 1948, it was positioned to be a 'Jewish State in Eretz Israel' (Provisional Government of Israel, 1948). At the same time, at least on paper, the Israeli state has always been positioned

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[1] It is perhaps relevant to not that this question refers to the government of the State of Israel within the 1948 borders. Thus, excluding East Jerusalem, the Golan heights, and the Occupied West Bank from analysis.

by its leaders as a state with a democratic political system. Though the 1948 declaration of independence does not make any explicit reference to democracy or the type of government of the new state, it was built on a number of pre-state institutions that, according to Rubin (2009, p.271-272), seemed to line themselves up to become democratic institutions after the establishment of a Jewish state. In addition, Israel's declaration of independence also appeals to the 'Arab inhabitants' to 'participate in the upbuilding of the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship and dues representation in all of its provisional and permanent institutions' (Provisional Government of Israel, 1948).

Moreover, starting with 'Basic Law: the Knesset' in 1958, a number of basic laws steadily introduced, often pre-existing, procedural features of a democratic state into a body of basic laws. After the adoption of 'Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty' and 'Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation' in 1992 and 1994 respectively, this body of law is argued to resemble a constitution despite the absence of a single constitution (Navot, 2007, p.48; Fox & Reynhold. 2008, p.209).

In addition, starting in the 1990s when 'Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation' was introduced, this body of law started explicitly referring to the State of Israel as a 'Jewish and Democratic state' (The State of Israel, 1994). The exact meaning of 'Jewish and democratic' and apparent incompatibility of the two, in light of a large number of non-Jewish citizens and perceived violations of core democratic values, has sparked a lot of criticism and is an academic debate (Masri 2017, p.4).

It should be clear then that, especially since the early 1990s, if one were to ask the State of Israel itself whether it identifies as a democracy, the answer is a profound yes. The State of Israel self-identifies as a 'Jewish and democratic' state. Nonetheless, it is precisely this identification as 'Jewish and democratic' that causes debate on how to categorize Israel's democracy or the perceived lack thereof.

2.1.2 Israel as a regular democracy

On one side of the debate, one can find strong defendants of the validly and feasibility of being both a Jewish and a democratic state. These scholars do not see why the state's explicit Jewish character should be in the way of being a functioning democracy.

For example, Gavison (1999, 2011 & 2016). She writes in response to critical scholars who, in her view, have positioned the terms 'Jewish' and 'democratic' as mutually exclusive and thus

at the heart of why Israel is best not considered a proper democracy. Contrary to these scholars, she does not see these two as zero-sum games.

Though she argues in favour of labelling the state as a democracy, Gavison (2016, p.742) acknowledges that Israeli society has two major divides that deserve to be addressed: First, the status of the Arab citizens of the state. And second, an internal Jewish debate over whether the contemporary State of Israel is built upon ancient religious foundations or whether it is the realisation of self-government of a modern community not defined solely by religion. Nonetheless, instead of concluding that these tensions are at the core of why Israel cannot be considered a member of the family of democracies she argues that it there is no causal relation between these fundamental issues and Israel's regime type. On the contrary, she even argues that it is precisely Israel's democratic nature and system that is tasked and equipped for overcoming these issues.

On a similar note, Yakobson and Rubinstein (2009, p.2) suggest that, even if there are reasons to doubt Israel's status as a liberal democracy, these are not the result of a contradiction between the state's definition as a Jewish state and democratic. On the contrary, they argue that it is precisely denying the legitimacy of the concept of the Jewish state that should be regarded as a violation of the principles of universal equality as they perceive such denial to be akin to denying the Jewish people the right to self-determination and national independence. They acknowledge that Israel is a Jewish state with a non-Jewish ethnic minority and close ties to an ethno-national diaspora living abroad. Yet, they argue that this is not much different from a number of European states that are generally, and rightfully, considered liberal democracies (p. 7). Therefore, they wonder why Israel should belong to any other family than that of liberal democracies.

2.1.3 A democracy with flaws

In a different understanding of Israeli democracy explicitly positioned as separate from other interpretations, Benjamin Neuberger (2016, p.726) argues that Israel is best seen as a 'Democracy with four flaws'. He argues that there can be no doubt over the idea that the State of Israel was founded on the ideological principles of democracy and continues to display this commitment through its elections, limitations on executive power, a strong and independent judiciary, freedom of press and expression, freedom of religion, and freedom of gathering (p. 715-725).

Yet, despite having the basic elements of a democracy, he also argues that Israeli democracy has four significant flaws: Its legal system (i.e., its lack of constitution and the existence of antidemocratic laws), the complex relation between religion and state, the difficult status of the Arab Israeli minority, and the occupation of the West Bank (Neuberger, 2016, p.726). He therefore concludes that, when taken together, this means that the Israeli democracy has to be categorised as a 'democracy with four flaws'.

2.1.4 A different type of democracy

A third group of scholars is more critical and recognises that the State of Israel's explicit Jewish character and consequential difficult relations with Palestinian citizens makes it tough to categorise Israel among other liberal democracies.

Yet, despite the issues they identify, these scholars do not argue that Israel is not a democracy at all. Instead, scholars such as Smooha (1997, 2002 & 2016), Peled (1992, 2005 & 2013), and Dieckhoff (2015) write that the unequal ownership of the state between Jewish and non-Jewish Israelis make that Israel is best described as a different type of democracy they refer to as 'ethnic democracy'

Smooha (1997, 2002 & 2016) writes that, despite presenting itself as a Western Liberal democracy, Israel is best seen as an ethnic democracy where the Jewish population has appropriated the state and uses it as a tool for advancing their own interests vis-à-vis those of its Arab population. Based on this reading of the State of Israel, its Jewish nature, and perceived ill treatment of its Palestinian minority, Israel is described by Smooha (2014, p.93) as 'the archetypal ethnic democracy' that is analytically distinct from liberal, multi-cultural, consociational, and Herrenvolk democracies (Smooha, 2003, p.477).

The Ethnic democracy comes with a number of features that make it unique from existing typologies of democracy. Crucially, it is built upon an ideology or movement of ethno-nationalism that appropriates a state for a single ethnic group in order for them to exercise their self-determination. In Israel, this it is the Jewish ethnic group that has appropriated the state. Moreover, within this state, there is there is a significant distinction between members and non-members of the ethno-national group. In Israel, the non-members of the ethno-national group are the non-Jewish (Palestinian) citizens. Though they are still legal citizens of the state, they are perceived and treated as less desirable and as a general threat to security (Smooha, 2002, 478). Nonetheless, despite these issues, the political system remains democratic as it continues

to meet the minimum procedural, though not substantial, components of a democracy. Because of this, the ethnic democracy is perceived to be of lesser status than other types of democracy.

Peled (1992, p.432) agrees with Smooha's interpretation of Israel as an ethnic democracy and writes that Israel has a political system that combines democratic institutions with the dominance of the Jewish ethnic group. According to his interpretation it is mainly the problematic citizenship status of Israel's Arab citizens that is at the core of why Israel should be seen as an ethnic democracy. He observes that whereas Israel's Jewish citizens get to enjoy a republican type of citizenship in which they have the ability to collectively shape the common good, Israel's Arab citizens only get to enjoy a liberal citizenship in which they enjoy civil and political rights but take no part in shaping the common good.

However, in an article published more recently, Peled & Navot (2005, p.3) complexify these initial observations and argue that the question of Israeli democracy should be viewed dynamically and historically. Based on an analysis of how the state treated its Arab citizens they claim that Israeli democracy has gone through a number of non-democratic and democratic phases throughout history. Though they maintain that the Israeli political system was best seen as an ethnic democracy from the late 1960s until the early 1990s (when Peled wrote his initial article), the Israeli government's amendments to Arab citizenship rights in the years following the second intifada leads them to argue that, even after a brief liberalisation in the 1990s, Israel is transitioning towards a non-democratic majoritarian state.

Dieckhoff (2026, p.694) points towards the importance of analysing Israeli democracy as an evolving practice instead of comparing its contemporary politics to an abstract model. Thus, based on his historical analysis, he concludes that even though there is a very strong ethnic component to Israeli politics, the state has at the same time been able to keep following to basic principles of democracy. Even with regards to minority rights. He therefore contends that Israel is best seen as an ethnic democracy in which political sovereignty belongs to all Israeli citizens, but the state belongs to all Jewish people. Much like Peled & Navot (2005), Dieckhoff (2015, p. 703) also maintains that this system has been relatively flexible with regards to its alikeness to democracy. The system moved closer towards a democracy in the early 1990s to only move away from it in the years following the second intifada.

2.1.5 Israel as a non-democracy

On the other end of the scale, one can find those who argue that, considering its strong Jewish character and preferential treatment of its Jewish citizens over other citizens, Israel's political

system no longer meets the minimum requirements of a democracy and should instead be classified as something else.

Arguably the biggest propagator of a non-democratic interpretation of Israel's political system is Yiftachel (1999 & 2006). As an alternative to democracy, he proposes the 'ethnocracy' as a model of government that is neither democratic nor authoritarian and arises in states characterised by the presence of a settler society, high levels of ethno-nationalism, and an ethnic logic of capital. He writes that the State of Israel is not the state of all of its citizens and argues that the Jewish ethnic group has appropriated the state and has made it function solely in accordance with their own interests. Ultimately, this means that the state favours the Jewish 'Ethnos' over the entirety of the Israeli 'Demos'. In doing so, making ethnicity instead of citizenship the main criteria for distribution of power and resources (Yiftachel, 2003, p.689).

Yiftachel (2006, p.84) believes that the ultimate goal of the ethnocratic Israeli state is to appropriate as much space for the Jewish population as possible. Described as 'Judaization', this process comes at the price of 'de-Arabisation' of that same space. Practically, this means that, throughout its history, Israel has continued to expel as many original Arab citizens of the land and replace them with a Jewish settler society. Combined with having unclear borders to both its citizenry and the land that it governs, and strong ethnic segregation, the continuous facilitation and promotion of these processes of Judaization and de-Arabisation make that Yiftachel (p.105) argues that the State of Israel fails to comply with a fundamental pillar of democracy. Namely, having a 'demos' that consists of an inclusive body of citizens within clearly defined physical national borders. What this means is that, aside from pointing at the strong ethnic nationalism and perceived discrimination of Palestinian citizens of the state, Yiftachel also uses Israel's complex political and legislative with the global Jewish diaspora as reason why the political system does not meet the minimum requirements of any type of democracy.

Even though the concept was constructed on an analysis of the State of Israel, ethnocracy is not limited to this state alone. It has also been used to describe ethnic relations in, for example, Sri Lanka (Balasundaram, 2016), Beirut (kastrissianakis, 2016), and the Baltic states (Melvin, 2000).

2.1.6 Different types at once
An alternative interpretation that avoids labelling the entirety of the Israeli political system as democratic or undemocratic comes from Sheterenshis (2019, p. 612). He argues that Israel's

political system is best described as a 'multicracy': a form of political organisation in which a power pie within a state is shared between multiple forms of government such as democracy, autocracy, and theocracy all acting together in policy making.

In doing so he also explicitly argues against Yiftachel's theory of Israel as an ethnocracy by stating that, though part of the Israeli state apparatus indeed functions in accordance with logics of ethnocracy, important areas of Israel's constitution, politics, and methods of government are only partially explained by these logics. This includes the main body of the Israeli legislature and executive, and large parts of the state's judicial system (Sheterenshis,2019, p.616).

In conclusion, even though the State of Israel was founded on democratic values and continues to self-identify as 'Jewish and democratic', the degree to which political reality actually lets itself be described as a (liberal) democracy continues to be up for debate. Whilst some scholars are strong defendants of the idea that Israel's strong Jewish nature and commitment to democracy are non-mutually exclusive, others suggest that the state's stronger affiliation with its Jewish citizens and resulting power imbalances make that Israel's political system is best perceived as a lesser democratic or non-democratic alternative to liberal democracy.

2.2 Palestinian Israelis' citizenship

By itself, existing literature that attempts to categorise Israel's political system is not yet immediately relevant for answering the research question of this study. It becomes relevant when we ask what the type of government means for the citizenship status of Palestinian citizens of Israel. This debate centres around questioning whether, in practice, the Palestinians who have been granted Israeli citizenship actually get to enjoy the same rights and the receive the same government treatment as Jewish citizens of Israel. Particularly relevant are the scholars who provide interpretations positions as alternatives to 'full' or 'equal' citizenship.

Some studies are built upon the perceived absence of a 'regular' democratic system, the perceived to be problematic self-identification of 'Jewish and democratic', and their respective alternative interpretations of democracy (or lack thereof). Other studies are positioned more independently and critically and also provide different interpretations of the Palestinian Israelis' citizenship status.

Whilst some scholars suggest forms of citizenship that are 'different', and often lesser, than that of Jewish citizens of Israel, others are more critical and result to terminologies of 'statelessness' in their analysis. Yet, all of these studies argue against the idea that one can speak of a situation of complete equality between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of the state.

In doing so they show that, even within the realm of citizenship, it is possible to create different typologies of citizenship that explain the relative inequality between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis.

2.2.1 Palestinian citizens of Israel

Before addressing these typologies however, it is important to note that, between 1948 and the present, the rights granted to Israel's Palestinian citizens have not been constant. Whilst Israeli Zionist victory in the 1948 war, or the 'Nakba', forced many Palestinians into becoming refugees, some Palestinians did not leave Israel and, often after being stripped of their properties and land, became legal citizens of the newly established State of Israel (Leibler & Breslau, 2005, p.880). However, despite the state's self-declared commitment to 'ensure complete social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex', Palestinian Israelis spent the first eighteen years after 1948 living under a system of direct military rule that severely limited them in their basic freedoms and rights otherwise associated with citizenship (Pappe, 2011, p.48-49). Taking this into consideration, it is relevant that the studies mentioned in this brief overview all address the contemporary, and not historical, citizenship status of Palestinian Israelis.

2.2.2 An issue of democracy

Scholars such as Yiftachel (2006), and Peled (1992) wrote critical commentary on the degree of democracy within Israel's political system and provided alternative interpretations of this system. In doing so, they base (part of) their argument on the perceived lack of complete citizenship rights granted to Palestinian citizens of Israel and provide alternative 'categories' of citizenship as means of describing this lesser status.

Part of his larger theory of ethnocracy, Yiftachel (2006, p.142) also provides a more elaborate description of practical implications of such government has for Palestinian citizens. Based on analyses of Israel's political geography he argues that the state has managed to decouple citizenship from geography and, in doing so, has created an unequal citizenship between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. This is most clearly visible when looking at the complex system of land leasing and ownership and the unequal access to land that this system entails. He writes that, because a lot of power over the distribution of public lands is in the hands of explicitly Jewish organisations that bar non-Jewish Israelis from buying or leasing these lands, Arab Israelis are effectively barred from buying or leasing land in approximately 80% of Israel's territory.

In his initial argument for using ethnic democracy as a way to best describe Israel's political regime type, Peled (1992, p.435) states that Israel's political culture is best understood as a combination of republicanism and ethnonationalism described as 'ethnorepublicanism'. What this means is that republican interpretations of citizenship, i.e., citizenship as contributing to the virtuous practice of contributing to the common good as, are most dominant. However, because being Jewish is a necessary condition for taking part in determining, protecting, and creating the common good, only Jewish Israelis get to be republican citizens. Thus, instead of being part of a republican citizenry, Peled (p.435) claims that Arab Israelis only get to enjoy a liberal citizenship where Palestinian Israelis, as *individuals*, receive a number of rights and privileges in return for complying to a set of rule and practices. However, following the second intifada and the Israeli political response to these events, he argues that, although Palestinian Israelis still possess a form of meaningful, albeit second-class, citizenship that distinguishes them from the non-citizen Palestinians on the Occupied West Bank, the political space available for them to enhance their citizenship has been reduced (Peled, 2005, p.103; Peled & Navot, 2005, p.23).

Furthermore, aside from the authors who use these typologies to suggest a different interpretation of Israeli democracy and its political system, a number of other scholars have also developed alternative categorisations independent of the question of how to categorise Israeli democracy. Rooted in the idea that there is a fundamental inequality between different groups of citizens, these critical studies all argue that the citizenship granted Palestinian Israelis lacks meaning and substance when compared to that of the state's Jewish citizens.

2.2.3 Unprivileged citizenship

In the introductory chapter to their volume on the nature and foundational underpinnings of Palestinian Israelis' citizenship of the State of Israel, Rouhana (2017, p.3) introduces the terms 'privileged citizenship' and 'unprivileged citizenship' for Jewish and Palestinian Israelis respectively. The core of their argument is that the existence of these two categories is the result of a settler-colonial structure in which Palestinian citizens are an underprivileged minority constantly made subject to the settler-colonial state's discriminatory policies. In doing so they thus argue that the existence of such unprivileged citizenship is not merely the result of discriminatory policies but can be attributed to the core nature of the Israeli state as a settler colony.

2.2.4 Hollow citizenship

Jamal (2007) writes in response to a number of attempts by Palestinian Israelis to appeal against the perceived structure of dominance against them. These appeals, such as the 2006 'Future Vision of the Arab Palestinian in Israel' were aimed at enhancing the position of Palestinian Israelis in Israeli politics and, according to Jamal (p.472-473) were to the increased efforts by the Israeli state to establish a form of 'hollow citizenship' in which Arab Israelis' citizenship of the state of Israel is emptied of substantive cultural, economic and political meaning as, based on their mere existence as non-Jews in a non-Jewish state, these people already challenge the state's basic vision.

Practically, this means that the political, cultural, and economic policies of the State of Israel have created a Jewish hegemony that goes way beyond the symbolic and into the legal level. The result is the eviction of the Palestinian minority from effective democratic participation and effectively addressing its inferior status vis-à-vis Jewish Israelis. In other words, the political, cultural, and economic policies are such that Palestinian citizens are barred from using the options assumed to be available to all citizens to challenge the Jewish hegemony in these three realms. Therefore, resulting in their citizenship being 'hollowed out' (Jamal, p.472).

In a follow-up study, Jamal (2017) again points to the existence of a hollow citizenship. This time relying on a theoretical framework of governmentality based on which he analyses how the Israeli state acts through non-repressive exercises of power practices and procedures aimed at penetrating and controlling the Palestinian Israeli community. He concludes that the Israeli state utilises three complementary mechanisms of governmentality: the politics of expectations, the manufacturing of consent, and the hollowing out of citizenship as a means of exercising sovereign power of its minority communities. In doing so, he believes that the hollowing out of citizenship from substantive meaning and converting it into an efficient mechanism of control is a peak of anti-democratic practice (Jamal, 2017, p.183-184).

2.2.5 Stateless citizenship

Molavi (2013) also uses governmentality and the non-repressive exercise of power as a theoretical with which to come to a renewed interpretation of Palestinian Israelis' citizenship. Though this analysis focusses on *how* a deficient citizenship is produced and maintained instead of *what* citizenship rights people lack, Molavi (p.213) concludes that because of colonial contradictions in Israeli society, democracy, and its citizenship regime, genuine inclusion of Palestinian Israelis has become an impossibility. This is mostly because the

institutions and processes through which non-Jewish Israelis could be included are deliberately designed to be accessible only to Jewish Israelis and actively exclude all others.

The result is a contradictory logic of 'inclusive exclusion'. According to this logic, Palestinian Israelis are included as citizens of what is essentially a judicio-political reality so exclusionary towards them that genuine membership will never be possible. In other words, it is precisely their inclusion as citizens of the State of Israel that makes that they are simultaneously being excluded. On the whole this renders them stateless citizens of the State of Israel (Molavi, 2013, p.214).

2.2.6 Half-statelessness

Following the introduction of 'Basic Law: Israel the Nation State of the Jewish People' in July 2018, Jamal (2020), Jamal and Kensicki (2020), and Jamal and Gani (2020) introduced a renewed interpretation of Palestinian Israelis' citizenship status. In this series of articles, they introduce the concept of 'half-stateless' as the new reality of Palestinian Israeli citizenship after the introduction of the aforementioned basic law. In doing so, also arguing against Jamal's earlier concept of 'Hollow citizenship'.

Conceptually, the argument relies heavily on Hannah Arendt's interpretation of citizenship and human rights who, In the first and second chapters of her book 'The Human Condition' (1958/1998), describes human life as the 'Vita Activa'. A human life based on three activities: labour, work, and action. She argues that all three are essentially social acts that cannot take place to its full potential in isolation from other humans (Arendt, 1958/1998, p.22). She thus argues that to reach full human existence, which includes participation in politics, means living a social life in which the individual has the right to act in the public sphere and, together with others, decide on how to shape their mutual life (Jamal & Gani, 2020, p.3).

Furthermore, Arendt writes that having the opportunity to live such a social life is tied to being a legal citizen of a state. Based on her own experience as a stateless individual in 1940s Europe (Gündoğdu, 2014, p.108), Arendt argues that the right to speak and act in the public sphere, i.e., the essential component of full human existence, will not be given to the individual based merely on their humanness. Instead, it is only granted to people who are citizens of the state and leaves those without citizenship also without rights (Arendt, 1948/1973, p.298; Kesby, 2012, p.1).

She perceives citizenship two consist of two dimensions. First, a legal dimension: a state providing citizens with the negative right to be defended against harm. Second, an ethical

dimension: granting citizens the positive freedom to develop the abilities and power required for action and speech in the public sphere, i.e., political participation. It is only through these freedoms that citizens can participate in shaping their mutual lives (Ingram, 2008, p.411-414; Jamal & Gani, 2020, p.4).

Jamal and Gani (2020, p.5-7) argue that there are four ethical aspects of citizenship that transform the legal dimension into something meaningful in Arendtian terms. These are: recognition of a person's identity as a basic condition, a sense of worldliness recognising the individual as part of the world and therewith their right to shape the world around them, the ability to express speak their own language and express their own identity in the public sphere, and lastly, the recognition of pluralism and the right of the individual to take part in legitimate and effective political action.

As, especially since the introduction of the most recent basic law, Palestinian Israelis are not recognised as a legitimate national group and are asked to be non-Jewish citizens in an exclusively Jewish state, they are argued to have lost their worldliness. Furthermore, losing Arabic as an official language and the limited options for Palestinian Israelis to participate in national politics means that Jamal and Gani claim that that Palestinian Israelis no longer have the ability to contribute to effective political action.

Crucially, though they keep their access to the legal dimension of citizenship, access to the ethical aspects of citizenship, i.e., participating in collectively shaping the world around them, are argued to be severely limited. What this means is that the realm of citizenship is being invaded by elements of statelessness. In effect making Palestinian Israelis 'half-stateless' and, in the words of Jamal and Kensicki (2020, p.772), dehumanising them by shrinking the existential dimensions of their being.

Even though these scholars use different terms and concepts, there are a number of underlying assumptions on citizenship and human rights that they all share. and binds all of these studies is their particular interpretation of citizenship and the state's obligations towards their citizens. First and foremost, all of these studies seem to follow an Arendtian interpretation of citizenship in which the state is the sole distributor of human rights. In extension, they criticise the State of Israel for failing to take the responsibility to distribute these rights to its Palestinian citizens.

Second, these studies also implicitly assume that it is their legal status as citizens of the State of Israel that demands the Israeli state to treat Palestinian citizens differently than it treats Palestinian non-citizens of the Occupied West Bank. Nowhere does this become clearer than

in the analyses of Yiftachel (2006) and Peled (2005) who argue that it is the Israeli police's indiscriminate violent treatment of Palestinian citizens and non-citizens during the October 2000 protests that has reduced the human rights of Palestinian Israelis to such an extent that the state can no longer defend that these people are citizens equal to Jewish Israelis. The assumption that Palestinian citizens deserve a more superior treatment from Israeli authorities than Palestinian non-citizens of the Occupied West Bank shows great resemblance to Hindess' (1998 & 2000) writings on the distinction between citizens and non-citizens and the perceived legitimacy of discriminating against non-citizens.

2.3 Urban encounters between Jews and Palestinians

The scope of this study is limited to Jaffa. An ancient city situated just south of Tel Aviv and a part of the larger Tel Aviv municipality. Even though it is sometimes described as a 'Palestinian city', contemporary Jaffa is not at all the home to an exclusively Palestinian population and is instead one of the rare cities in Israel coinhabited by Jewish and Palestinian citizens. Hence why third relevant topic of debate are the urban encounters between Palestinian Israelis and Jewish Israelis in these so called 'mixed cities' and the degree to which these spaces are examples of coexistence.

1.3.1 Israel's 'mixed cities'

Many towns and cities in Israel are home to either an almost exclusively Jewish or Palestinian population. Above all, even the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics explicitly distinguishes between 'Jewish' and 'non-Jewish' localities and a 'Jewish' and 'Arab' population when presenting their urban and demographic data. However, not all urban spaces are exclusively inhabited by a single population group. Some cities are home to both Jewish and Arab citizens and are described as so called 'mixed cities'.

Yacobi (2009, p.1) describes three types of mixed cities in Israel. First, cities inhabited by Jews and Arabs prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. Second, cities that were considered Palestinian before 1948. Jaffa is one of these cities. And finally, towns that were created after 1948 and have since then accommodated large groups of Arab migrants.

Although the term 'mixed city' seems to mean nothing more than simply 'a city of mixed composition between Jews and Arabs/Palestinians', Karlinsky (2021, p.1104) points towards the genealogy of the concept and argues that the term 'mixed city' is not at all a value-free bureaucratic concept. Instead, it should be seen as a concept used exclusively in Israel and originating from the dictionary of Zionist ethno-nationalism and settler-colonialism. First

coined by Yishuv leadership in Mandatory Palestine in the 1920s, Karlinsky argues that the 'mixed city' was an inherently negative concept used to describe spaces situated somewhere in between the 'pure Zionist' spaces inhabited solely by Jews and 'foreign' spaces inhabited by Palestinians. It is precisely because of this association with politics of settler-colonialism that I refrain from using the term 'mixed city' to describe Jaffa and other Israeli cities that are home to both a significant Jewish and Palestinian population and instead describe it as 'diverse'.

Nonetheless, aside from this critique of the conceptual origins of the 'mixed city', various scholars have conducted research on these cities and how Jewish and non-Jewish Israelis live together in these urban spaces that they coinhabit. As mentioned, the larger question that these studies, either implicitly or explicitly, address is: 'Are these cities spaces of a coexistence rooted in equality between different ethnic groups?'. Their outcomes can be categorised in two camps. First, those who are extremely critical of the degree of coexistence and instead argue that these cities are precisely the epicentre of a conflict in which the Jewish Israelis appropriate as much Palestinian space, including urban space, as possible. The second camp is represented by Monterescu (2015) who criticises these studies and proposes an alternative interpretation of what it means to 'coexist'. Yet, despite its disagreement with the more critical studies, all academic research seems to stand in sharp contrast to the discourse of the Israeli state and, relevant for this research, the city government of Tel Aviv-Yafo, where the perceived coexistence between Jews and Arabs seems to take on the form of some sort of post-conflict discourse where these two groups are argued to have put their extreme animosities aside and have chosen to live together in a culturally rich and perceivably neutral space.

1.3.2 Critical interpretations of 'coexistence'

First of all, a quantitative study by Falah (1996, p.823) based partly on census data of Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, Lod, and Ramle, concluded that, though different ethnic groups live within the same administrative municipality, the cities themselves all continue to show high degrees of segregation and hypersegretation. Suggesting that, though appear to live together in the same city, Jewish and Palestinian Israelis actually live highly segregated lives without genuine integration.

Furthermore, and aside from the lack of 'real coexistence' from a demographics point of view, Yiftachel and Yacobi (2003) and Yacobi (2009) have conducted analysis based on the city of Lod and, in doing so, build up the concept of ethnocracy to introduce new urban-specific subtypes of this theory.

First, Yiftachel and Yacobi (2003) argue that the Israeli mixed city is not at all mixed but is instead characterised by a strong ethnic segregation between a dominant Jewish majority and a subordinate Palestinian minority. This power imbalance and continuation of politics of Judaization and de-Arabisation lead them to argue for interpreting these exceptional and involuntary urban spaces as 'urban ethnocracies' where a dominant Jewish ethnic group has appropriated the city apparatus with the overall objective of enhancing this groups domination and expansion. In Israel, this means that, similar to the national government apparatus, the city government of the mixed city is also perceived to be appropriated by the Jewish ethnic group in order to create an exclusively Jewish space free of native Palestinians (p.673).

Within the context of the Israeli ethnocratic state, the urban ethnocracies emerge as key sites of contestation and Judaization of what used to be Palestinian spaces. The process is met with significant resistance leading to prolonged conflict and instability. It is precisely this interpretation of the mixed Arab-Jewish city as a site of contestation and conflict that is at the root of why this research focusses on how the State of Israel governs its Palestinian citizens in Jaffa.

Second, Yacobi (2009, p.14), again based on a study of Lod, argues that contemporary developments in the Israeli mixed city are the direct result of the Israeli ethno-national project, including its logics of Judaization and de-Arabization. The outcome is a double trap of ethnocracy where, aside from being discriminated against in the allocation of resources on a national level, Palestinian citizens are also discriminated against on the urban level as they live in a city that declares itself to be 'mixed' but in reality, has excluded the Palestinian inhabitants, their planning needs, and their identity.

Adding to the canon of ethnocracy, Yacobi introduces the 'ethnocracity' as a distinct category of an ethnocratic regime that emerges in an urban setting. Though he does not elaborate in this part of his analysis much further, Yacobi states that the 'ethnocracity' is not merely the semantic conjunction of 'ethnocracy' and 'city', and thus conceptually similar to urban enthocracy, but is instead a product of Foucauldian governmentality. What this means is that processes of Judaization and de-Arabization top-down exercises of power performed by the state but are also reproduced through the actions of the people that inhabit the city.

1.3.3 A different form of coexistence
A study that addresses coexistence in Jaffa particular is that conducted by Monterescu (2015). The argument he introduces is a direct critique to both Yiftachel's (1999 & 2006) theory of

ethnocracy and the liberal discourses of achieved coexistence seen in mostly in Israeli politics and public debate.

He criticises existing theories for their 'dual society paradigm' akin to methodological nationalism that reduces Palestinians and Israelis to two essentialised and separate spaces each with their own distinct national trajectory. In urban spaces this would result in spaces conceptualised as disjointed and homogenous ethnic territorialities, actors reduced to ethnonational roles which are the result of the overstated power of the state and nationalist ideologies, and the city itself being essentialised as metonymic cultural representation of the nation (Monterescu, 2015, p.37).

Instead, he sides with relational theorists who reject analyses where distinct and pre-given units such as the individual, class, state, or nation are used as the starting point of an analysis and proposes a tripartite model consisting of 'spatial heteronomy', 'stranger relations', and 'cultural indeterminacy' (Monterescu, 2010, p.279; 2015p. 38-39). What this means is that he wishes to decouple space and identity and proposes an interpretation of the 'mixed city' as an urban order resulting out of unsettled tensions between the logic of capital accumulation, the evolution of modern governance, and the drive for ethnic and national control. This requires understanding of the mixed city in terms of cultural indeterminacy. In other words, a continuous and unresolved campaign over the ethnic and cultural identity of the city's urban space. Such interpretation refutes the understanding of the mixed city as belonging exclusively to a single national or ethnic group.

Thus, instead of writing about how the Jewish ethnic group, with the help of the state, is appropriating Jaffa for its own benefit and at the cost of the city's Palestinian population, the interpretation by Monterescu imagines an ongoing and unresolved conflict over the identity of the city between different non-essentialised groups. Whilst this is no outright acceptance of a liberal interpretation of peaceful coexistence, it does assume a form of, albeit conflictious, form of living together in a mixed Israeli-Palestinian city.

1.4 Positioning this study

This thesis will by no means introduce new paradigms in addition to the abovementioned academic debates. Yet, the results of this study do contribute to a number of the existing ways of thinking about the Israeli state, Palestinians' citizenship to this state, and the feasibility of genuine coexistence between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis in Jaffa.

Broadly speaking, the results of this study contribute to the larger branch of works which argue that the State of Israel is best perceived as an 'ethnocracy' which strives to Judaize and de-Arabize what was previously Palestinian space. As I will show in the upcoming chapters, in the end, the transformation of Jaffa that I describe comes down to the appropriation of the city by a local government which, despite its aim to transform Jaffa into a 'model of coexistence', contributes to a process in which Israeli government control over a previously Palestinian city is expanded, Jewish settlement is facilitated, and the Palestinian residents of the city are displaced. Such process is facilitated by the practical Jewish ownership of the Israeli state and the consequential lesser citizenship status granted to Palestinian Israelis. Crucially, this study shows that, though they get to enjoy some of the privileges of being an Israeli citizen, Palestinian Israelis mostly lack access to the process in which the common good is debated and decided. This shows that the type of coexistence that is presented in Jaffa is by no means a form of genuine and equal coexistence.

Whilst this study sides with a number of studies, it does add to this field in a number of ways. First of all, it attempts to de-essentialise and deconstruct nationally homogeneous interpretations of Israel as a whole and instead narrows the scope of research to a single city and the history and politics of Tel Aviv and Jaffa. Doing so results a better understanding of how we can continue to speak of ethnocracy and Judaization in a city characterised by a relatively independent local government (Fenster, 2005, p.358) and form of cultural pluralism with which it strongly differentiates itself from Jerusalem's more nationalist and conservative discourses (p.354-355). In addition, focussing on the local instead of the national is also an attempt to avoid issues of methodological nationalism and seek explanations in a local historical and political context instead.

Second, this study concludes with arguing that the State of Israel, and thus the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality, attempt to govern the Palestinian residents of Jaffa through the creation of a governmentality. In doing so, the findings of this study add to a growing body of scholarship which addresses the way in which the Israeli state attempts to exercise power onto Palestinian people through positive rather than negative means. In practice, this means that this study explores how through the creation of expectations and options and the shaping of perceivably voluntary conduct rather than through establishing boundaries and sanctions. Such approach to power and government has great potential to a better understanding of the complicated relationship between the State of Israel and Palestinian Israelis who, though they remain Palestinian subjects onto whom the state attempts to exercise control, are also legal citizens

who possess some of the privileges associated with being a citizen of a self-described democratic state.

However, before delving deeper into these issues, it is wise to shed light on the research method through which this study reaches its conclusions.

3.   Methodology and method

This study attempts to describe how the State of Israel attempts to govern its Palestinian citizens in Jaffa. Though such question leaves undecided whether this exercise is successful, the contents of the existing research into this topic I described in the literature review suggests that one can indeed speak of the Israeli state as a 'Jewish owned' state which attempts to exercise power onto a group of Palestinian citizens with whom it has a complicated relationship characterised by a structural imbalance of power. This then allows the state the opportunity to subject these citizens to a

Whilst the existence of an asymmetrical relationship of power is visible in a number of ways, this analysis assumes that one of the clearest ways in which such structures of power can be made visible and are reproduced is through discourse. Hence why the research method employed in this study is a 'critical discourse analysis' of documentation originating from the local government in Tel Aviv and Jaffa. in practice, this meant that I critically read and analysed written materials originating from the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality and associated institutions. Luckily, as a result of the relative openness of information within the Tel Aviv-Yafo, these documents were available online through the municipality's own digital database, with many documents available in Modern Hebrew and English.

In selecting and analysing these sources, particular attention was paid to a number of topics and institutions:

First, sources related to urban planning, architecture, and urban renewal in Jaffa/Southern Tel Aviv. This includes, but is not limited to, zoning laws, architectural and building guidelines, and minutes from municipal meetings in which these topics were discussed.

Second, as it represents an important component in the argument of this research, particular attention was paid to documents related to the Tel-Aviv White City project. This includes the materials aimed at visitors and investors created by local government itself, but also research reports produced by third parties.

Fourth, as an institution designed especially to 'Improve the quality of life in Jaffa' (2007 ,אמיר, p.127) part of the Tel Aviv-Yafo city government, particular attention was paid to sources related to 'Hamishlama LeYafo' (המִשְׁלמה ליפו). Sources analysed included but were not limited to policy documents, minutes, budgets, leaflets of different projects, and social media output. Though only a small component of the local government, this particular institution is perceived

to play a fundamental part in the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality's transformation of Jaffa and execution of power onto its Palestinian citizens.

4.   A short history

The argument I attempt to build in this thesis is reliant on how contemporary actors interpret a certain history of Jaffa and, in particular, the creation of Tel Aviv. Hence why there is value in briefly sketching the historical trajectory of both of these cities. I do so by first looking into the history of Jaffa and then going into the creation of Tel Aviv. This very short description is by no means an exhaustive overview of the history of these two cities. It is nonetheless necessary context for understanding the arguments that I make in the next chapters.

4.1 Jaffa before Zionism

Though it is now considered a neighborhood of the larger Tel Aviv-Yafo metropole, it is important to note that the city of Jaffa existed and thrived as a center of commerce and travel well before the first Zionist settlers came to Palestine, started building Tel-Aviv, and eventually established the State of Israel. In fact, Jaffa's history dates as far back as the 1479 B.C.E. Since then, the city gradually developed into a key commercial center and access point into and out of the wider region. It was only when the brother of Salah Ad-din reconquered the city from the crusaders in 1196 that it got completely destroyed and lost its importance (Levine, 2005, p.49).

However, a second episode of development started when the city was rebuilt at the beginning of the Mamluk period and eventually ended up falling under Ottoman rule. Aside from a brief invasion by Napoleon's forces, Jaffa remained under Ottoman rule until their eventual defeat and the birth of the Palestinian mandate. It was however especially during the late Ottoman period in the 19th century that Jaffa thrived both economically and culturally. Levine (2007, p.173-174) describes the Jaffa of that time as free from either an Ottoman state or European colonial hegemony over politics, culture, and economy. The result was a brief 'cosmopolitan Levantine modernity' or 'third space' free of the harmful effects of colonialism, nationalism, and capitalism. Instead, it was fostered by the hybridity and newness seen by Levine as defining modernity as it ought to be.

Jaffa's late-Ottoman richness was made visible especially though rich architecture and grand urban planning. Think for example of the clock towers, wide boulevards, and high standard European style housing built at the time. All in all, Jaffa's impressive economic, cultural, and political development during the late-Ottoman era made that the city was the second largest city in Palestine after Jerusalem (Levine, 2005, p.72) and considered by many as the so called 'Jewel of Palestine' (Levine, 2007, p.174). Interestingly, this was also the time at which the

first Zionist settlers arrived in the port city and made Palestine their new home (Ben-Bassat, 2020, p.490).

The point here is not to provide a detailed historical overview of Jaffa's history before the arrival of Zionist settlers and establishment the State of Israel. The point that I am making is that, contrary to Tel-Aviv, Jaffa has a history that dates back centuries and has seen its own periods of political, cultural, and economic growth and richness. In other words, and despite what is perhaps part of the common founding story of the city, Tel-Aviv was not just 'constructed on baren sand dunes' in an otherwise empty land. It was constructed alongside an existing city with a rich history and its own 'modernness' and modernity.

4.2 Settlers building Tel Aviv

The history of Tel Aviv is very recent compared to that of Jaffa. Above all, the city only started life in the late 19th century and took until 1934 until it was officially declared a city (Azaryahu, 2007, p.7). Although the State of Israel was still not declared until 1948, increasingly large numbers of Zionist settlers made their way to Ottoman, and later Mandate Palestine. Whereas they initially chose to reside in Jaffa, these settlers later constructed a new city they named 'Tel Aviv'. As I will show later in this chapter, it is precisely the history of constructing Tel Aviv and the discourses of 'newness' associated with it that determine Tel-Aviv's relation with Jaffa.

By the first decade of the 20th century, the number of Zionist inspired immigrants had risen to such a large number that the existing Jewish neighborhoods had started to suffer from overcrowding and a deteriorating standard of living. In 1906, an association of Zionist merchants from Jaffa decided to attempt to solve this issues and accommodate the arrival of more settlers by buying 120 dunams (30 acres) of land northeast of Jaffa and build a new Jewish suburb (Helman, p.2). The suburb was named 'Tel Aviv' after the Hebrew title of Theodor Herzl's *Altneuland* as 'mound of spring'. Throughout the late Ottoman years, an ever increasing number of immigrants meant that this settlement slowly grew into a city. Though the first world war meant a brief stagnation of growth and the temporary evacuation of Jaffa and Tel-Aviv, the city's expansion continued immediately after the end of the war and the creation of the Palestinian mandate. By 1921, the local settler's wishes were granted and Tel Aviv was declared an independent township governed by its own municipality instead of that of Jaffa (Goren, 2016, p.473).

The urban design and architecture of the Tel-Aviv township was a direct response to the overcrowding and low quality of housing in Jaffa. In practice, this meant that the first

neighborhoods of Tel Aviv were built in a style inspired by the British 'Garden City' movement. Residential areas were of relatively low density and high quality dwellings surrounded by large areas of green space (Helman, 2010, p,1). This modernist trend was further enhanced when, in 1925, Scottish botanist, sociologist, educator, artist, and town planner Sir Patrick Geddes was tasked with writing Tel-Aviv's first 'master plan' for urban housing. In this utopian vision of Tel-Aviv, Geddes provides an extremely detailed description of a modernist city he prefers to see as the integration of Tel Aviv and Jaffa. He refers to this conglomerate as 'Greater Jaffa' (Geddes, 1925, p.19). His plan includes ideas to the smallest details such as the plan for a suburban railway, a maximum building height, and number of schools to be built. Yet, according to Welter (2009, p.100-101), at its core, Geddes' master plan comes down to a modern city characterised by a hierarchical grid of streets, small-scale domestic dwellings surrounded by lots of open green space, and a single concentration of cultural institutions in the city's center. Luckily for Geddes, there was a continuous need for Tel Aviv to keep expanding and house even more Zionist immigrants. Therefore, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, most of the city's new development was constructed along the lines of his plans. Interestingly, according to Mualam (2017, p.69), though one can no longer speak of a direct implementation of the Geddes plan, his ideas continue to inspire Tel Aviv's contemporary urban planning.

Aside from the general layout of the city, it is the particular architectural style of the buildings constructed during Tel Aviv's expansion which is particularly relevant. That is because, especially during the 1920s and 1930s, many buildings in Tel Aviv were constructed in a modernist style that closely resembles that of Le Corbusier and the Bauhaus school (Hatuka & Kalus, 2006, p.27-29). Slightly adapted to better suit the Mediterranean climate, this includes relatively low rise buildings constructed with flat columns, flat roofs, and curved lines (Flahive, 2018, p.114). Most importantly, and as I will elaborate upon later in this chapter, this period of urban expansion and the internationalist and modernist buildings style part of that expansion are not merely a description of Tel Aviv's history and urban aesthetics. Instead, they form a foundational element of the way in which Tel Aviv's self-conceived identity vis-à-vis the larger world, including Jaffa, was constructed and maintained. In extension to that, it also plays a significant role in how the Israeli authorities have approached the city of Jaffa and its Palestinian inhabitants.

All the while, Jaffa also grew significantly during the mandate years. Whereas the city had a population of around 32.500 in 1920, its population had grown to over 100.000 by 1940. Most

of these new inhabitants were internal migrants who moved from Palestine's villages into the city. However, contrary to Tel Aviv, Jaffa did not grow according to a grand modernist master plan drawn up by a foreign urban planner. Instead, Jaffa's quick urban expansion resulted in overcrowding, high poverty, and a low standard of housing. Particularly in the city's peripheral neighborhoods to the north and south (Radai, 2011, p.24).

The two cities had embarked on two vastly different development trajectories and each served as a home to a different national community. Tel Aviv was the new and modern home of the growing Jewish Zionist community and Jaffa was the old and deteriorating home to a still sizeable Palestinian community. However, this did not mean that the two communities lived in complete isolation from one another. Throughout the 1920s and much of the 1930s, the two cities seemed to function as a single urban entity with ample interactions between its citizens. An example are the large groups Palestinian residents of Jaffa who frequented Tel Aviv in order to spend their leisure time in the city's parks, cafés, and restaurants and enjoy themselves on the city's seafront (Goren, 2020, p.904).

Nonetheless, as the 1930s progressed, relations between the two communities deteriorated and eventually resulted in an atmosphere of hostility and violence which peaked with the 1936 to 1939 Arab Revolt. What had started as a general strike with large impact on vital infrastructures such as the Jaffa port ended in three years of violent uprising against the British authorities and the Jewish communities in, among other places, Tel Aviv. Aside from resulting in the destruction an demolition of significant parts of old Jaffa and a large number of refugees (Goren, 2019, p.1015), this period of unrest significantly widened the rift between the two cities and their respective communities (Goren, 2020, p.900).

4.3 The 1940s and a new balance of power

It was during the 1940s that the physical and social landscape of Tel Aviv and Jaffa changed dramatically. Crucially, it was the decade in which the balance of power shifted towards the Jewish community which, after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, changed from being a minority of Zionist settlers into the dominant social group and political force responsible for the displacement of much of Jaffa's Palestinian community and the destruction of the neighborhoods that these people once inhabited.

Yet, it is important to note that before these events took place, the Jewish community in Tel Aviv and the Palestinian mandate in general had rapidly expanded throughout the late 1930s and the 1940s. Rather gruesomely, many of the new arrival were fleeing from the genocide on

Jewish people taking place in Europe at that time. Nevertheless, tensions rose to a new high in 1948 when the British authorities announced the end of their stay in Palestine and war broke out between the Zionist settlers and native Palestinian community. As is widely known, this war ended in a victory for the Zionist camp and resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel. Though widely celebrated among the Jewish community as the long awaited establishment of an independent Jewish state, the events of 1948 remain embedded in Palestinian collective memory as a national catastrophe, or 'Nakba', which lead to the destruction of Palestinian society and displacement of the Palestinian people.

Jaffa was not spared from the catastrophes of the Nakba. In the years prior to 1948, the city was by far the largest Palestinian majority city in the Palestinian mandate and served as an industrial and commercial hub within the region (Radai, 2016, p.125). This changed drastically when the vast majority of the city's Palestinian population fled from the city in the months leading up to the establishment of the State of Israel. Concretely, the Palestinian peoples' departure from Jaffa began when the first hostilities started taking place on the municipal borders between Tel Aviv and Jaffa in November 1947 (Radai, 2011, p.26). The continuous attacks and raids on the city meant that, by April 1948, more than 30.000 of the city's 70.000 Palestinian residents had left (Golan, 2009, p.1027). This number increased even further when, on April 25th 1948, Zionist paramilitary group Irgun decided to attempt to take Jaffa and bring it into Zionist hands. The result was a week of intense urban warfare that ended in a victory for the Zionist paramilitary forces (Golan, 2012, p.1007). The city's authorities surrendered on May 13th, one day before the declaration of the State of Israel. It is estimated that by that day, Jaffa's Palestinian population had been reduced from 70.000 to a mere 3000 people (Radai, 2011, p.36). In effect, this transformed Jaffa into a near-empty city left to be taken over by the Israeli state and settlers.

Thus, as the war came to an end, the new Israeli government had two goals for Jaffa. First, to prevent the return of Palestinian refugees. Second, to allow for Jewish settlers to settle in the houses left behind by the Palestinian refugees. Both goals succeeded. Very few Palestinian residents of Jaffa found their way back to the city and the roughly 3000 Palestinians living in Jaffa were relocated to the city's southern Ajami neighborhood Like the Palestinians in other parts of Israel, they were placed under direct military control (Klein, 2014, p.248). Furthermore, the houses left behind were made available for new, mostly Mizrahi, Jewish migrants arriving in the young state.

Eventually, control over Jaffa was handed over from the Israeli state authorities to the Tel Aviv municipality. Though it is written that the municipal government of Tel Aviv was not eager to responsibility over a heavily damaged and impoverished city inhabited mostly by poor migrants, refugees, and Palestinians, Jaffa was eventually annexed into the Tel Aviv municipality in April 1950. In doing so transforming the municipality's name into the one it has kept to this day: Tel Aviv-Yafo. Using the Hebrew 'Yafo' instead of the Arab 'Jaffa'

To what extent the new Israeli authorities were consciously forcing as many Palestinians out of the city as possible remains a topic of debate that I will not explore further. What remains most important in the context of this study is that, by the early 1950s, Jaffa had been emptied of most of its Palestinian citizens, large parts of the city had been reduced to mere heaps of rubble, and what was left came under the administrative control of the State of Israel and the newly created Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality. In other words, what once was a rich and vibrant city inhabited mostly by Palestinians who, even under the British rule over the Palestinian mandate, had their own local government, had been reduced to an impoverished and peripheral neighborhood subject to the rule of the new Tel Aviv government and the State of Israel. This balance of power continues to exist to this day and, as I will explore later in this paper, continues to shape the way in which Israeli authorities approach Jaffa and its Palestinian citizens.

5.   A dichotomous discourse of difference

There is however more to this story than a descriptive history. Also part of the historical relationship between Tel Aviv and Jaffa is a particular discursive relationship that essentialises the two cities' core identities. Though rooted in history, different configurations of this dichotomy continue to be reproduced by the Israeli an Tel Aviv government and policy makers to this day.

Fundamentally, this discursive relationship is rooted in a reading of Tel Aviv's history that perceives the city to be built as a complete 'tabula rasa' void of a pre-Zionist history. The resulting discourse sees Tel Aviv's core identity as 'Modern, 'Hebrew', and 'White'. However, contrary to the fundamental independence part of Tel Aviv's founding story, I argue that this self-perception is deeply reliant on the existence of Jaffa as an essential 'other' vis-à-vis whom Tel Aviv's identity has been constructed. This has established what I describe as a constructed and reproduced 'dichotomous discourse of difference' where, as the complete opposite of Tel Aviv, Jaffa is perceived to be 'Backward', 'Oriental', and 'Black'.

5.1 Tel Aviv's identity as 'Hebrew', 'Modern', and 'White'

It is important to note that this discourse on Tel Aviv's core identity is essentially a social construct, or 'myth', rooted in a particular understanding of the city's history. Thus, though it is based on a certain history, the 'truthfulness' of that history is irrelevant. In fact, such a perceived history can even be inconsistent contradictory to itself. Yet, as is argued by Azaryahu (2007, p.5) it has been a relatively constant 'myth' that has seen different interpretations and manifestations throughout the history of the city.

At its very basics, this interpretation of the city's history that still present in the city's contemporary historiography is built upon the idea that the original founders built a city on completely empty land that had never before had a human purpose and was thus a real 'tabula rasa' built on 'nothingness' with no history and only a bright future. This interpretation of Tel Aviv's history has allowed for the development of a certain discourse about the city's identity as fundamentally independent and new from anything that existed before. Azaryahu (2007, p.5) refers to this identity using the term 'mythical city'. That is, an ideational construct that is constituted and shared in public discourse and cultural signification as these are the spaces where the identity of the city is produced, challenged, and reproduced. I argue that this 'myth' ascribes at least three aspects of identity to Tel Aviv as a city.

First, It allows Tel Aviv to be seen as the first ever 'Hebrew city'. Put simply, this means that it allows Tel Aviv to be considered the first ever city that, from its very beginnings, was built by Jewish settlers inspired by Zionism and its aim to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Nitzan-Shiftan, 2007, p.101). Hence why, referring to the national language of the Zionist endeavor, Tel Aviv is seen as the first real 'Hebrew City' in Palestine the creation of which presents fundamental moment in the national revival of the Jewish people in Palestine (Azaryahu, 2007, p.35).

Furthermore, the idea that Tel Aviv was constructed completely from the ground up was, and continues to be, seen as a conjunctural break with the past and the beginning of a radically different chapter of history. Starting from a perceived 'nothingness', Tel Aviv provided the opportunity to construct a 'new' and 'modern' city with modernist urban planning and housing fit for a new almost utopian like life in the Jewish homeland. These ideals are best seen in the aforementioned typically modernist Geddes plan that was used as the 'master plan' along the lines of which the city's urban space and architecture was to be constructed when Tel Aviv was still part of the Palestinian mandate.

Third, this myth suggests Tel Aviv to be a space that is essentially 'white'. The meaning of 'white' in this context twofold. On the one hand, it is also a 'white' in the sense of being 'clean' or 'cleansed'. That is, being clean of a pre-Zionist history, a pre-Zionist oriental population and being cleansed of the lesser 'dirtier' way of living associated with life outside Tel Aviv. Essentially, I see this as an expression of the myth that Tel Aviv has a founding story completely independent of Palestine or Palestinian people and has managed to create a Zionist way of being in a city that is essentially 'modern', 'clean', and 'safe'. On the other hand, 'white' also refers to the color of many of the residential buildings constructed in Tel Aviv during its growth in the 1930s. Yet, based on the assumption that the city's aesthetics are an expression of politics, I argue that the physical 'whiteness' of these buildings is an expression of the city's perceived identity as 'white'.

5.2 Tel Aviv White City

Perhaps the greatest example of how this 'tabula rasa' history and 'white' core identity of Tel Aviv continue to be reproduced and marketed by, among others, the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality is the so called 'Tel Aviv White City'.

In contemporary usage, the 'Tel Aviv White City' refers to a collection of modernist, and thus physically white' buildings in central Tel Aviv. Nonetheless, first references to Tel Aviv as

'The White City' supposedly originate from literature on the city written around the time of the first world war. In this literature, Tel Aviv was referred to as a characteristically new and modern city that has risen from the white and empty sand dunes just north of Jaffa. Interestingly, this description originates from well before the introduction of the aforementioned Geddes plan and the modernist or Bauhaus housing painted in white built the 1930s and 1940s (Sonder, 2016, p.93). This shows that it is the architecture that is an expression of the discourse of modernism and 'whiteness' rather than the other way around where Tel Aviv's modernist identity and naming as 'White City' supposedly originates from the buildings' architecture and colour.

In the first decades after the creation of the State of Israel the modernist architecture of Tel Aviv received little attention. In fact, many of the buildings had even fallen into a state of disrepair. A crucial change came in 1984 when Michael Levin curated an art exhibition on Tel Aviv's 'White City' in celebration of the city's 75th anniversary. In this exhibition on the international style architecture in Israel, Levin described a collection of 4000 modernist, or Bauhaus, buildings in central Tel Aviv as the 'Tel Aviv White City'. This moment is often referred to as the rediscovery and subsequent canonisation of Tel Aviv's collection of modernist architecture. Gradually picking up speed as the years went on, this process culminated in 2003 when the "White city of Tel Aviv the Modern Movement" was designated as a UNESCO world heritage site (Sonder, 2016, p.96). Since then, the 'Tel Aviv White City', that is, the collection of modernist architecture in central Tel Aviv, has been a core component of Tel Aviv's city heritage and functions as a core asset of what the city has to offer to foreign visitors (Tel Aviv Global & Tourism, 2019, p.16) and has subsequently been made part of what Tel Aviv has to offer to its visitors

For example, following the acceptance of the White City Canon onto the UNESCO list of world heritage, the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality and German federal government have co-founded the 'White City Center' located in the Max Liebling Haus on Idelson street in Tel Aviv (Federal Institure for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development within the German federal Office for Building and Regional Planning, 2015). Located in a listed building itself, the white city center serves as a hub whose mission is to 'promote architecture, conservation, and urban development, focusing on modern architecture' and includes a permanent exhibition introducing the white city to visitors, guided tours, a so-called research lab, and a Garden city style Garden (The White City Center, 2021). In short, this center serves as a permanent home for presenting, preserving, and constructing the idea of the modern white city.

Crucially, the Tel Aviv White City canon refers to much more than just a collection of buildings. It is also an interpretation, representation, and re-affirmation of the city's perceived identity and history. Interestingly, this is recognized by the authors of the 2003 application to the UNESCO world heritage list. In their application they argue that "The Zionist dream, of building a new and better world for a new egalitarian society, was materialized in the first Hebrew City in a spontaneous way, not dictated by any authorities." (Municipality of Tel Aviv-Yafo, 2002, p.8).

By presenting a collection of fundamentally modernist architecture argued to be built on empty lands by Jewish Zionist settlers inspired by their dream of building a fundamentally new way of living translated into aesthetics, both the city's 'tabula rasa' founding story and core identity as 'Hebrew', 'Modern' and 'White' (in the literal and figurative meaning of the word) are re-affirmed, re-produced, and given a tangible story and physical expression visible to citizens and visitors through the 'Tel Aviv White city' and the spaces and materials it has created.

5.3 The essential 'other'

The founding story upon which this self-identification is based suggests a 'clean' history where Tel Aviv and the Zionist project were constructed on a perceived emptiness or 'tabula rasa' without a history and without an existing entity in relation to which the city was constructed. Above all, this is what allowed the city to grow as a modernist utopia. I disagree with the idea that Tel Aviv was created on emptiness and instead argue that Tel Aviv's self-image is fundamentally reliant on the existence of an essential 'other' vis-à-vis whom the city's history and identity is constructed. Going back to the city's early beginnings as a mere suburb, the most important 'other' for Tel Aviv has always been Jaffa. In other words, there has historically been a dichotomous discourse of difference in which 'white' Tel Aviv is perceived and constructed to be the exact opposite of 'black' Jaffa.

What this means is that Tel Aviv was created and continued to be understood as a city that embodies precisely all that which Jaffa is perceived to be lacking. Namely, a familiar European sense of modernity and an opportunity to establish a Zionist majority and hegemony. Practically, this means that whereas Tel Aviv was seen all that which is associated with European modernity, Jaffa is regarded as a mere relic of a backward and oriental past Tel Aviv has managed to leave behind. Or, in the words of Rotbard (2015, p.66):

"Much more than a physical location boxed in by calcified geographical frontiers, the Black City is a condition. And it is a condition which exists only in relation to the White City. Without

it, the Black City is invisible; it is everything hidden by the long, dark shadow of the White City, everything Tel Aviv does not see and everything it does not want to see – it is the pictures left behind in the dark room never to make it into the museum display, the stories and events slashed from the history books, the street names deleted from the map and the houses ripped from their foundations. In this sense, the Black City can be found wherever the White City is not. It has been necessarily conceived as its direct opposite, as Tel Aviv and the White City's absolute Other. It is the black background without which Tel Aviv cannot continue to appear white."

Most importantly, this dichotomous interpretation of the two cities core identities leading to Jaffa being designated as 'Black', 'Backward', and 'Oriental' has significant tangible consequences. These consequences were most explicitly visible in the early decades after the Nakba and the creation of the State of Israel. Yet, they remained to have an influence on the decades that followed. First, in terms of what people the city is perceived to be intended for. Whereas Tel Aviv is seen as the home for modern people, Jaffa is seen as the home of the, for lack of a better term, backward and oriental people. Practically, this means that Tel Aviv is constructed to suit the style of living of a mostly modern, Ashkenazim Jewish middle class. Jaffa on the other hand, is seen as an urban space that better suits a population of mostly lower-class Mizrachi Jews and Palestinians.

The clearest example of how this was initially brought into practice is through the allocation of housing in the years after the Nakba. As most of the original residents had fled the city, the new Israeli government created the so-called Absentees' property law in order to transfer the ownership of empty properties to the state (Forman, 2004, 813). When these houses were once again inhabited, it was not the Ashkenazim middle class, but a lower class of Jewish migrants from the Middle East and Balkans that made Jaffa their new home (Monterescu, 2015, p.138).

Furthermore, it also means a fundamental lack of interest in and overall neglect of the needs of Jaffa's urban population. From 1948 until the late 1980s in particular Jaffa was neglected and disinvested from by the Tel Aviv municipality. The result was an even further social and economic decline and what was previously relatively middle-class Jaffa had increasingly started to deteriorate and become inhabited solely by a lower class of Tel Aviv's 'Others' (Monterescu 2015, p.138) who lived in an environment characterised by socioeconomic difficulties such as poor-quality housing, high crime rates, and poor school performance by Jaffa's Palestinian children (Leibovitz, 2007, p.249).

Though this happened in the entire city, the socioeconomic decline was most rampant in the two neighbourhoods that, coincidentally, were and continue to be home to the largest portion of Jaffa's Palestinian population. Namely, 'Ajami and Jabaliyye in southern Jaffa and the Eastern neighbourhoods on the other side of Jerusalem boulevard. Following the departure of the wealthier Palestinian population and most of the Mizrachi migrants who arrived in the city in the 1950s to newer neighbourhoods in surrounding towns such as Bat Yam and Holon (p.42), these parts of the city now often described as 'slums' were inhabited by lower class rural Palestinian migrants. What was left for them came to be described as the most depressed disadvantaged community in the entire country (LeVine, 2015, p.218). For most of the time, this socioeconomic decline was the direct result of government policies of neglect and divestment. Above all, these types of problems were considered a normal part of the of the city's perceived black and oriental nature described by Klein (2014, p.247) as 'lazy, wild, polluted, and noisy' and more characteristic of a 'desert caravanserai than an urban centre'.

Lastly, thinking of Jaffa in terms of the 'black Other' to Tel Aviv also entailed in an altogether lack of value attributed to the city's history, architecture, and culture. Simply put, the story of Jaffa's rich history, the urban space and architecture produced by this history, and the stories of the people who lived in it were simply regarded as invaluable. Especially when compared to the founding story of Zionism and the modernist urban space and architecture it produced.

This became immediately visible when the city was conquered in 1948. The Israeli victors of the war did not see any value in preserving the history of the city and decided to erase most of it and, especially in northern Jaffa, construct their own white city on top of Jaffa's rubble (Rotbard, 2015, p.65). For the areas of the city that were not 'replaced' by Tel Aviv, it often meant that existing streets were demolished and replaced by streets without the original Arabic names and named in Hebrew or mere numbers instead. In addition to the erasure of the existing urban fabric, it also meant the erasure of Jaffa's written history by destroying the contents of Jaffa's, albeit already heavily damaged, municipal archive located in the old town hall (Rotbard, 2015, p.104). This meant that as the records of the city's institutions, citizens, politics, and government, and thus its entire discursive history, were all deleted, the only locally available stories that remained were those part of the narrative of Zionist settlement in Tel Aviv.

In addition, very little effort was also put in the preservation of the surviving parts of Jaffa. Many of the neighbourhoods that survived the war and were not demolished in the years after,

were made subject to so called 'freezing policies' that included an effective ban on renovating properties and a deliberate neglect of the urban infrastructure connecting them. Officially, these policies were part of a larger strategy aimed at first clearing Jaffa's so called 'slums' before constructing a new and modern city on the land left behind. These policies literally named 'Eviction and Construction' (בינוי פינוי) by the Tel Aviv authorities put the task of clearing Jaffa's existing neighbourhoods and constructing new ones into the hands of a group of private companies (Sa'id-Ibraheem, 2020, p.6). Whilst these companies were very successful in demolishing old buildings, they were less successful in replacing them with adequate new ones and thus failed to achieve the initial goal of demolishing the old and constructing the new (Monterscu, 2015, p.139-141). Nonetheless, these policies remained in place until the late 1980s (Sa'id-Ibraheem, 2020, p.6) when, as I will show in the next chapter, Tel Aviv's attitude to Jaffa's urban space and architecture slowly started to change and resulted in new urban policies that changed the initial dichotomy between Tel Aviv and Jaffa.

6.   Rethinking the dichotomy: the re-valorization and transformation of Jaffa

Though the existing dichotomy between the two cities I have just described continues to exist to this day I argue that, starting in the late 1980s, logics of capitalism and neoliberalism have caused this initial dichotomy to be reconfigured. Under the previous configuration, Jaffa's perceived 'blackness' meant that it was allowed to be a city inhabited by Tel Aviv's 'others' living in conditions of poverty, dirtiness, crime, and a general lack of opportunity. However, in the current configuration, the altogether re-valorisation of Jaffa means that genuine efforts have been made to rid the city of its dirtiness and crime whilst maintaining Jaffa's perceived authentic and oriental character. The end result is a 'cleansed' version of an oriental city meant to be 'consumed' by an audience consisting mostly of tourists and Jewish Israelis.

6.1 Re-configurating the dichotomy

The dichotomous discourse of difference I described in the previous chapter is a historical dichotomy which has had its most significant tangible consequences in the immediate decades after the establishment of the State of Israel. Starting in the late 1980s however, the dichotomy seems to have been re-configurated.

Within the existing dichotomous way of thinking, Jaffa was seen by many 'black', 'backward', and 'oriental' other to Tel Aviv. In practice, this meant that Jaffa was perceived to be, and made into, a city characterised by large scale urban degradation, poverty, and crime. Yet, in this new configuration, renewed popular conceptions of Jaffa and a change in government policies in the city mean that some of the elements of the dichotomy have been eradicated whilst others have been consciously enhanced. In other words, conscious efforts have been made to eradicate Jaffa of the elements of blackness and backwardness such as crime, poverty, filth, and urban degradation whilst at the same time enhance its perceived nature as an oriental city that is fundamentally different from Tel Aviv. To put it another way, the city is being transformed from a deteriorated, filthy, crime ridden, and oriental 'other' to Tel Aviv into an attractive looking, clean, safe, yet still oriental part of larger Tel Aviv-Yafo which has become an attractive place to visit and live in for Jewish Israelis from Tel Aviv and beyond.

This reconfiguration is fundamentally dependant on a single driving factor. Namely, the gradual re-valorisation of Jaffa's apparent 'Authenticity' reflected in the city's rich history and oriental architecture and aesthetics. On the one hand, this means that Israeli buyers, investors, and government, rediscovered the value of the real-estate they previously regarded as worthless and suitable only to a lesser population of the city's 'others'. On the other hand, as I will explore

later, it also means a regained interest in what is perceived and positioned as the city's rich, mostly Arab, cultural history and heritage.

Such change did not come about abruptly. Instead, I believe it to be a gradual process for which the seeds were planted in the late 1980s when a different way of thinking about Jaffa's real-estate in combination with the introduction of neoliberal logics and policy instruments in the housing market and city planning slowly set off a process of urban redevelopment and gentrification in Jaffa.

6.2 Gentrification and the revalorisation of Jaffa's real estate

As I wrote before, from 1948 until the late 1980s, the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality neglected large parts of Jaffa as part of conscious 'freezing policies' aimed at letting the existing buildings and urban fabric deteriorate and demolish it before constructing something wholly new and modern on the empty space left behind. In many cases this also meant the displacement of the buildings' existing residents (Sa'di-Ibraheem, 2020, p.341). In any case, these policies of deliberately destroying and neglecting the existing urban fabric with the plan to later replace it with something completely new are perhaps the greatest show of how little value was attached to the aesthetics, architecture, and heritage of 'black Jaffa'.

This changed in the late 1980s. First of all, this was the result of the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality changing its urban renewal policies for Jaffa and moving from a policy based on a logic of 'eviction and construction' to a logic that I describe as one of 'renovation and preservation'. More concretely, this new policy was realised through the establishment of the so called 'Jaffa Planning Team' by the city engineer in 1985. This 'planning team' operated according to a firm neoliberal logic and thus believed that the private sector should be invited to take over state-owned properties and services in order to realise what they described as 'Jaffa's physical and socioeconomic rehabilitation' (Monterescu, 2009, p.410). This meant that state owned housing was privatised, public services were outsourced to private companies, and the municipality attempted to attract outside investors willing to contribute to the improvement of the city (Monterescu, 2015, p.141).

This change in municipality's policies on Jaffa did however come at a financial cost. Though changes such as selling public land and outsourcing municipal services would have arguably resulted in at least a short-term cost reduction, it was argued that an important long-term financial ingredient for Jaffa's urban renewal was an altogether increase of tax revenue collected from the city's residents. Hence why the Jaffa Planning Team put great effort in

changing the city's socioeconomic composition and making it more attractive to an altogether 'wealthier' population that would increase the net tax revenue of the city (Monterescu, 2009, p.410).

Interestingly, both the inventors of this new policy logic and scholars such as Monterescu (2015) write about this change as primarily motivated by the perceived failure of the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality to reach their goal of renewing the city by constructing new and 'modern' housing and infrastructure on the empty space left behind after the demolition of Jaffa's existing neighbourhoods. In their interpretation, it seems that the new strategy was merely aimed at achieving the same goal through different means. Whilst I do not contend that, at least on surface level, this renewed policy logic was a response to the failure of the previous, I argue that this process was also motivated by a fundamentally different way of thinking and attaching value to the existing 'non-modern' aesthetics and assets of Jaffa.

Hence why I argue that the second ingredient of Jaffa's transformation was what I describe as the 'revalorisation' of the city's perceived authentic heritage and aesthetics. What this means is that whereas Jaffa's real estate was previously seen as 'undesirable', 'worthless' and thus rightfully subject to demolition, it had now been attributed value and came to be seen as 'desirable' and 'worth saving'. Hence why, albeit gradually, Jaffa's real estate became of interest to Jewish Israelis (Meishar, 2018, p.67-68). In extension, this revalorisation also applied to the view many Israelis had of the city as a whole Whereas it was previously seen as 'poor', 'backward', and 'oriental', and thus not worth visiting let alone living in, Jaffa was re-imagined rediscovered as 'quant', 'fashionable', 'authentic', and thus a desirable place to live in.

Levine (2001, p.252) describes this process of re-valorisation of Jaffa's urban as part of a wider postmodern trend in which people have grown tired of modernism's clean break with the past and consumer-driven urban space and architecture. Instead, they have started to search for the perceived authenticity, character, and uniqueness that older parts of cities have to offer. A more critical reading suggests that despite being seen as turning away from a visually consumerist lived environment, this trend is actually part of a process where architecture and other forms of art have been increasingly commodified and made to fit consumers' changing tastes. Thus, suggesting that the increased interest in Jaffa was not just motivated by an 'authentic' or 'genuine' rediscovery of what Jaffa had to offer but also by an evolvement of logics of capitalism and neoliberalism. In other words, this makes the idea that Jewish Israelis were

increasingly seeking to consume what they thought Jaffa could offer them the third ingredient for the perceived core identity of the city had started to change.

Thus, starting in the late 1980s Jaffa's previously very modest urban renewal started to pick up speed and increasingly change the urban fabric of the city. At first, the gentrifiers consisted mostly of young and highly educated middle class Jewish residents of Tel Aviv looking for a house in a city with more character and history than Tel Aviv could offer them. Later on, many of those buying Jaffa's real estate were international real estate entrepreneurs and wealthier residents buying houses part of larger projects in which a collection of buildings or even entire streets were bought and transformed into luxury communities closed off to outside visitors (Monterescu, 2009, p.206). By the 1990s, real estate prices had risen to such an extent that housing prices of millions of dollars were no exception in what was still one of Israel's poorest neighbourhoods. Uncoincidentally, it was mostly Jewish Israelis who could afford these houses. As a result, the demographics of Jaffa changed in such a way that what was previously a mostly Palestinian city had become a so called 'mixed city' with a majority Jewish population inhabiting most of the more desirable neighbourhoods (Monterescu, 2015, p.411).

It was also during this time that the original mostly Palestinian population started feeling the negative effect of Jaffa's urban renewal and gentrification. In particular, the inability of the mostly lower socioeconomic status Palestinians to afford living in Jaffa's more attractive western (seacoast) and northern neighbourhoods became cause for dissatisfaction and popular protest through newly established movements such a, 'Harabitta'. Rooted in the Christian-Palestinian community, Harabitta has been responsible for a large number of campaigns against the state-led gentrification of Jaffa and the negative consequences, including the Judaization of the city, that are part of this process (Leibovitz, 2007, p. 251). However, because the movement has repeatedly opposed explicit cooperation with municipal institutions and instead favours a more resistance-based approach, it is often considered too radical by the local authorities and has therefore relegated to the margins of local institutional arena in favour of more collaborative organisations (Rossi & Vanolo, 2012, p.171).

Yet, despite the decades of discontent over Jaffa's urban renewal and the negative consequences this has for the city's Palestinian community, the state-led gentrification continues to this day. It is no surprise then that, when Palestinian Israelis took to the streets in May 2021, the ever-increasing difficulties for people of this community to find affordable

housing in the city and their consequential displacement from Jaffa were an important component of peoples' discontent with the Israeli state (Peleg, 2021).

Though not of immediate relevance, it is interesting to note that the second intifada of the early 2000s did not put this process to a complete stop. Instead, the hostilities of those years only put a temporary halt to the increasing popularity of Jaffa among Jewish Israelis. Though the city was avoided by Jewish Israelis and referred to by some journalists as 'little Tehran' and the home of Islamist and Nationalist extremism (Monterescu, 2015, p.142), gentrification, its negative side effects, and the discontent over these side effects gradually picked up speed again as the years progressed.

However, this story is not just limited to urban renewal and gentrification resulting in increased housing prices and the subsequential displacement of Jaffa's Palestinian citizens. As the decades went on, the revalorisation of Jaffa had done much more to the city than make it a more desirable space now co-inhabited by Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. It was also paired with a redefinition of the city's core purpose and the way it is governed by the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality.

6.3 A space 'to be consumed'

In the end, these developments have created a different city and different way in which Israelis and the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality engage with Jaffa. thus, I argue that the end result of the revalorisation, development, renewal, and gentrification that has taken place in the last decades is best described as a city that is 'to be consumed'. At its very basics, this means a change in the primary purpose of the city. In the past, Jaffa existed as a home for Palestinian Israelis and other population groups regarded as Tel Aviv's 'others'. Therefore, as I have described in the first section of chapter six, it was avoided by most Jewish Israelis and systematically neglected by the local authorities. Yet, after a significant transformation, Jaffa has become a city in which people are offered the opportunity to consume a manufactured and orientalised image of Jaffa's history and identity.

Such transformation is the result of the desire to make the city and its valuable assets attractive for domestic and foreign tourists as well as Israeli Jewish people wishing to relocate to Jaffa. Therefore, especially in recent years, the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality has invested a lot of resources in the development of Jaffa as a key site in their larger tourism development and marketing strategy. In fact, in a 2019 document in which the municipality's tourism department

outlines the long-term strategy for the development of the tourism strategy for Tel Aviv at large, tourism in Tel Aviv in 2030 is described as:

"A leading urban destination that rests on three pillars: Old-Jaffa – the ancient part of the city, Tel Aviv – the new city, which is known for its vitality and creative energy and also draws businesspeople from around the world; and primarily – the spectacular beach with its extraordinary qualities."

(Tel Aviv Global & Tourism, 2019, p.10)

Furthermore, in the 2017 'strategic plan for Tel Aviv, one of the goals part of the larger aim of developing Jaffa as a 'model of coexistence' (a premise I will further address later) was defined as "Safeguarding Yafo's key assets – authenticity, history and Old Jaffa – and its continued development as a tourism hub that involves the local population" (Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality, 2017, p.117)

All in all, this does not only show how important Jaffa has become for Tel Aviv's strategy for competing on the global tourism market but also shows a glimpse of the narrative these visitors get to consume. Namely, a narrative that positions Jaffa as an 'ancient', and authentically 'oriental', and 'Arab' space where people get to admire and enjoy the relics of a premodern time and society. Such experience is vastly different than that which they are being sold in 'white' and 'modern' Tel Aviv. In other words, this time, Jaffa is seen as the city that can offer all that Tel Aviv cannot. Namely, something that is authentically ancient or oriental. Whereas, as I showed in the previous chapter, this oriental 'blackness' was previously seen a dark stain not worth saving and thus subject to neglect and removal, it is now considered valuable and thus marketized and made available for consumption. Using the words of Öncü (2011, p.70) and their analysis of Turkey's predominantly Kurdish East, what visitors are offered is a certain 'consumable difference' between themselves and Jaffa's Arab and oriental nature. In doing so changing the latter into a marketable and consumable commodity.

It is important to note that such 'ethnic tourism' where Jewish Israeli and foreign tourists consume Arab or Palestinian cultural difference inside Israel's borders and in a space repurposed for leisure and tourism is not new or unique to Jaffa. For example, according to Stein (2008, p.46) rural Palestinian villages and towns in the galilee such as Sakhnin, 'Arrabeh, and Dayr Hannah were reconfigured as Jewish-Israeli leisure destinations in the mid-1990s. This was made possible by the Oslo peace process and the consequential reimagination of

Palestinian Israelis from being a solely a security threat into fellow citizens with whom Jewish Israelis were expected to coexist.

However, though there is undoubtably a realistic degree of difference between the histories and perceived identities of Tel Aviv and Jaffa, what makes this case more interesting is that this consumption of difference takes place in a city that is not home to an exclusively Palestinian population previously left untouched by the State of Israel and Israelis but is a very familiar city with a diverse Jewish and Arab population. As I wrote before, the history of this city has been marked by a history of displacement and erasure of Palestinian people and the urban space they inhabited. Hence why I believe that the 'authentic heritage' is not a genuine 'discovery' of localities that were previously left untouched and unvisited. Instead, I argue the city that is made available for visitors should be seen as a manufactured consumable difference.

In addition to being 'consumable', I furthermore argue that, as part of its transformation, Jaffa has also been 'Disneyfied'. Based on the interpretation of this concept put forward by Bryman (2004, p.2-6) such 'Disneyfied Jaffa' has two clearly distinguishable components. First, a manufactured image of authenticity and identity that speaks to popular imaginations of Jaffa as oriental and thus enhancing the pre-existing dichotomous conception of the city as a 'black' other to Tel Aviv. Second, an attempt to sanitize and civilise this black city in such a way that it becomes attractive for Jewish Israeli and foreign visitors to visit and roam around in. In other words, cleaning the city of the physical and discursive dirt that has previously made it unappealing and with that attempting to erase parts of the existing dichotomy such as the associations with crime, poverty, prostitution, and perception that the city is home solely to Tel Aviv's unwanted 'others'. This production of Disneyfied consumable space is made visible in two areas. First, the city's urban architecture and aesthetics. And second, the creation of a consumable cultural difference.

6.3.1 Transforming aesthetics

After decades of private investment in real estate and municipal policies aimed at urban redevelopment, Jaffa seems to have been consciously restored and reconstructed with the aim of offering an aesthetic that very clearly speaks to popular imaginations of authentic oriental architecture and urban space whilst at the same time making sure that the urban space and buildings themselves remain aesthetically pleasing, clean, and safe and thus attractive to visitors. In other words, constructing what is seen as an authentic oriental façade for what is

essentially a manufactured and cleaned aesthetic only loosely based on what could be found in Jaffa before the mass destruction of the city in 1948 and the decades that followed.

On the level of individual buildings this has been realised through the creation of a novel architectural language according to which the city should be restored, reconstructed, and constructed anew. In their article on Jaffa's increasingly prevalent gated communities catering to wealthy Jewish Israelis, Monterescu (2009, p.421) encounters what is described by the Jaffa planning authorities and commercial developers of real estate as the 'Jaffa style of architecture'. Seen by its creators as a very positive development, they describe this novel architectural language as characteristically romantic and rooted in the local oriental history of Jaffa.

Yet, a more critical view at municipal legislation and that prescribes the architectural language to which new construction and renovation projects in large parts of Jaffa have to comply to paints a more nuanced picture of the 'Jaffa style'. Most importantly, although the it is sold as a preserved or recreated version of the original and authentic structures that cand historically be found in the city, and thus as a simple continuation of what is considered 'typical' to Jaffa, I believe it to be an architectural language that that both enhances the romantic oriental elements of existing and new structures whilst at the same time deleting the elements of chaos and disorder previously associated with 'Black Jaffa'. What this results in is a highly stylised and romanticised but at the same time also 'cleansed' version of the city's original aesthetic.

This is best shown by looking at the highly detailed guidelines for renovating and constructing buildings that apply to most of Jaffa's historical neighbourhoods. These guidelines written by the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality and its local planning and engineer divisions provide detailed descriptions of what the desired aesthetic of renovated and newly constructed buildings. Simply put, I believe that these guidelines prescribe a type of construction that resembles a 'cleansed' or 'modernised' version of oriental and authentic architecture. Generally speaking, the desired building style consists of simple and clean geometric shapes with as little clutter as possible. Doing so means prohibiting the construction of extra extensions, balconies, and pergolas, and asks of people to hide air-conditioning units, solar powered water boilers, and solar panels from plain view as much as possible. Aside from the shape of buildings, these guidelines also prohibit the usage of otherwise very common construction materials such as concrete and metal roofing. Instead, buildings should be constructed with local materials such as limestone, kurkar stone, and

wood (Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality ,2018).

Local legislation prescribes a detailed and highly manufactured aesthetic for redevelopments and new developments in Jaffa. Existing architectural languages are replaced by simple shapes, clean lines, and few additions. The result is a cleansed oriental aesthetic sometimes referred to as 'Jaffa style' (Levine, 2007, p.190; Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2018)

This process of creating artificial oriental space is not just limited to individual buildings themselves. It also extends into the creation of a uniform aesthetic and experience throughout entire areas and neighbourhoods of the city. The best examples of this case are the old port and old city centre of Jaffa. It is important to note that, contrary to what is currently marketed as (Tel Aviv Global & Tourism, 2019, p.10), the contemporary old city of Jaffa is not at all an ancient and authentic part of the city. Following the Zionist victory and establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, this part of Jaffa was deliberately demolished and practically erased (Alfasi & Fabian, 2009, p.141). What was left was described as 'the big zone', referring to a relative emptiness in what was otherwise a dense urban area (Rotbard, 2015, p.60). It was as early as the late 1950s and early 1960s that a small number of Israelis contested the erasure of this part of the city and argued that it should be reconstructed as an artists' colony which, though not at all the same as pre-1948 Jaffa, resembles the oriental city the ruins of which was built upon (Alfasi & Fabian, 2009, p.140-141). In 1961 the government responded by establishing the 'Old Jaffa Development Corporation' and labelling part of Jaffa's old city as an architectural reservation subject to detailed zoning regulations (Rotbard, 2015, p.63).

Though they have obviously evolved over time, these contemporary versions of these detailed regulations give great insight into how the entirety of public space in the old city is manufactured with the aim of creating a unified and perceivably authentic aesthetic in which

visitors are invited to roam freely. This includes strict guidelines which prescribe that buildings must have uses that are adapted to the 'special character of Jaffa'. This means that whereas artists' workshops, art galleries and shops, museums, antique shops, restaurants, and what is described as 'oriental markets' (בזר מזרחי) are considered part of the desired uses of the city all other uses need special permission of a designated committee. Even the streets themselves are decorated with elements such as benches, streetlights, sewer openings, and in the case of the old port, even historical artefacts generally associated with trade such as disused weights and Ladders (Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2002). In effect, this creates a unified space with a concentration of establishments and artefacts all in a unified aesthetic. Together, they construct a cohesive space manufactured to be attractive for tourists and other visitors.

Interestingly, in a 2013 proposal to increase the number of hotels and thus increase the capacity for hosting tourists within the old city, those from within the municipality responsible for managing the development of the urban space in this part of the city argued against the proposal reasoning that increasing the number of hotels would lead to an undesirable lack of proper separation between different services as exists in 'Kasbah like' spaces typical to the middle east (Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2013). Though only a very small example, this shows the continuous tension between attempting to create an authentically oriental space and making sure that the city is kept 'clean' and free of the chaos previously associated with Jaffa's oriental or black nature.

The point here is not to expose the existence of detailed regulations on (part of) the city's aesthetic. Such legislation setting strict guidelines for construction and renovation aesthetics and desired uses for certain historical areas of a city are in no way unique to Jaffa. What I am trying to illustrate is that, through these guidelines and regulations, the local government attempts manufacture a cleansed and uniform aesthetic which resembles common conceptions of what an authentic oriental and Arab city looks like. Though constructed on a discourse that contemporary old Jaffa the result of the State of Israel's careful preservation and restoration of Jaffa, one has to remember that large parts of the city are in fact newly constructed on top of the rubble of the pre-1948 Jaffa deliberately destroyed by the same state authorities.

6.3.2 Selling 'culture and tradition'
Aside from an aesthetic, such consumable Disneyfied experience also entails selling visitors a certain authentic culture perceived to be unique to Jaffa. In other words, as is the case with aesthetics and architecture, Jaffa is increasingly being transformed into a space where visitors

are invited to consume what is positioned to be 'authentic Arab culture'. In doing so transforming not only the city's aesthetic but also the cultural difference between Jews and Palestinians into Disneyfied and consumable commodities.

Whilst there are certainly elements of cultural difference between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Israelis, the cultural difference made available for consumption in Jaffa seems to be highly manufactured and altered in at least two ways. First, it rests on an orientalised depiction of an 'authentic Arab' culture. Based on the ideas of Edward Said's Orientalism (1979), this entails that what is marketed is a culture that is static, backward, exoticized, romanticised, essentialised, and fundamentally 'other' to that of the Jewish Israelis and other visitors from outside the Middle East. A striking example of how such depictions of Arab, or in this case Muslim, culture are marketed and consumed could be witnessed during the 2021 celebrations of Ramadan in Jaffa. Though many Muslim residents of the city probably organise their own celebrations, one of the parties joining in on the celebrations was the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality and their 'Hamishlama LeYafo', a component of the municipality's executive I will come back to in more detail later.

Together they organised a series of events marketed as 'Ramadan evenings in Jaffa' (לילות רמדאן ביפו). These events took place throughout the Ramadan period and included small scale cooking workshops where people unfamiliar with the local cuisine were taught how to make authentic Ramadan foods, a multi-day food tasting event where people got to consume an Iftar meal accompanied by traditional poetry, music, and dance, and the placement of a large fanous lantern in one of Jaffa's parks (Hamishlama LeYafo, 2021). Unfortunately, the largest event of the series, a 'Ramadan procession' that included music, actors, special effects, and a truck decorated in gold spreading confetti through the city was cancelled because of the escalation of violence between Hamas and the IDF in May of 2021.

Poster by the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality's 'HaMishlama LeYafo' promoting the 'Ramadan evenings' held in the city during the month of Ramadan in 2021 (Hamishlama Leyafo, 2021)

The main argument is not that I denounce any type of celebration of cultural diversity. Instead, what I am trying to illustrate is that what took place here was an attempt by the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality and their

Mishlama Leyafo to create a series of events that allowed Jewish Israelis to come to Jaffa and get a taste of a culture and cultural traditions that were previously alien to them. In other words, a series of government organised events that allowed Jewish Israeli people to consume the cultural difference between themselves and the Muslim Arab population of Jaffa.

Furthermore, though they included many elements considered to be part of contemporary celebrations of Ramadan, these events were built on what seems to be a simplified, essentialised, and practically orientalised representation of Arab Muslim culture and its cultural celebrations. What this means is that the language, practices, and images sold the public reproduce the discourse that this cultural celebration a relic of an ancient and slightly exotic tradition no longer part of the modern world. Examples include the usage of actors dressed head to toe in oriental dress serving tea from a large golden teapot, balloon figures of Walt Disney's Aladdin, men wearing fez and keffiyeh performing traditional dance, and as is shown in the image, a life-sized lantern containing an illuminated sphere lighting up the lantern in different colours (Hamishlama LeYafo, 2021). Fundamentally, what

Balloon animals of easily recognisable oriental figures during Ramadan celebrations organised by the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality (Hamishlama LeYafo, 2021)

these celebrations are not an invitation to Jewish Israelis to experience celebrating Ramadan together with the Muslim residents of Jaffa in a manner that is common to these people themselves. Instead, they are celebrations of cultural difference that position Ramadan and the culture of Islam as exotic and foreign entities which Jewish Israelis can visit and consume.

As is the case with the aesthetics of the city, the consumable cultural difference is also 'cleansed' or 'sanitised'. In this instance that means cleansing it of the histories, stories, and people perceived to be undesirable by the local government and Jewish Israeli people. In practice, this means that Jaffa and its local culture have been cleaned of its Palestinian identity and associations with the Palestinian national struggle. This is made most explicit by the observation that not a single piece of documentation about this community originating from the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality made mention of 'Palestinian' culture, history, or people and instead persists on describing these as 'Arab' as is common in Israeli discourse.

furthermore, these developments also result in a sanitising of Jaffa's history and the State of Israel's part in that story. It does so by focussing solely on Jaffa as a well-preserved ancient city home to an authentic and historic culture whilst avoiding telling the stories of the Nakba, military rule of Palestinians forced to live in ghettos, the destruction and neglect of the city, and the ongoing displacement of the city's Palestinian population. Crucially, this transforms the State of Israel from the perpetrator of the physical and discursive erasure of the city and its residents, into a philanthropist that has carefully preserved and restored an ancient and authentic city and culture.

6.4 A discursive veil of 'coexistence'

What makes this transformation of the city all the more interesting is that it is not taking place with the explicit mention of transforming the city into a Disneyfied consumable entity. Instead, Jaffa's transformation is accompanied by a discourse which positions this transformation as the flourishing of 'coexistence' between Jewish and Arab Israelis. Within this discourse, Jaffa is to become a leading example of what such city of coexistence should look like. Thus, in the words of the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality and their long-term strategy vision, Jaffa is ought to be developed as 'a municipal attraction and a model for coexistence' (Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality, 2017, p.116). Hence why the abovementioned cultural celebrations are positioned as one of the many festivities that such a diverse and mixed city has to offer to residents and visitors.

By itself, creating a model of coexistence appears to be a relatively positive development. Above all, if one considers the entirety of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a conflict between two ethnic groups who simply 'cannot get along' and therefore live in hostility and isolation, this transformation of Jaffa into a model of coexistence seems like the right way forward.

However, it is also not free of criticism. As I have shown in this chapter, it entails a fundamental transformation of the city into a Disneyfied, and thus cleansed and romanticised, consumable entity with manufactured oriental aesthetics and widespread consumption of cultural difference. In addition, as I will demonstrate in the final chapter of this thesis, the efficacy of this transformation also entails an attempt to exercise power on the Palestinian residents of the city by making them subject to a governmentality. In the end, the final outcome is that an increasingly number of Jewish Israelis get to celebrate their perceived progressiveness and reside in what has been sold to them as a model of coexistence. Yet, and rather paradoxically, doing so comes at the cost of the Palestinian population's presence in the city as these people

increasingly struggle with the rising cost of housing in this increasingly gentrified model of coexistence.

Hence why I argue that this discourse of coexistence functions as a discursive veil over the negative effects that this transformation of the city entails. In the end, genuine and equal coexistence is more a story sold by the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality and reproduced by the Jewish Israelis who gentrify the city than it is an accurate reflection of the transformation of Jaffa which I argue to be taking place.

To conclude, this chapter has shown that, in recent decades, the existing dichotomy between Tel Aviv and Jaffa has been reconfigured but not erased. The days where Jaffa was a dark hole riddled with crime, dirt, drugs, prostitution, and gambling have gone. Nonetheless, the city's perceived identity as the authentic and oriental other to modern and Hebrew Tel Aviv remain as Jaffa has been transformed into a what I describe as a Disneyfied consumable city draped in a discursive veil of being an example of coexistence between Jewish and Arab Israelis. In the next chapter I will show that, instead of resulting in the creation of genuine and equal coexistence, this transformation of Jaffa is accompanied by the local government's attempt to exercise power onto the Palestinian residents of the city through positive rather than negative means. The end goal of such 'governmentality' is a continued Judaization and de-Arabization of Jaffa, the 'model of coexistence'.

7. The positive execution of power

Up until now I have made very little mention of the Palestinian Israelis living in Jaffa. Instead I have focused solely on the way that Jaffa has been perceived and transformed by the Israeli people and Israeli state respectively. In this final chapter, I will finally address the initial research question of this thesis and describe what this urban transformation entails for the Palestinian Israelis who inhabit Jaffa.

Crucially, I believe the transformation of the city to be dependent on the active management of its residents and their part in the transformation. Hence why I argue that the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality is attempting to make the Palestinian citizens of Jaffa subject to a governmentality. That is, an exercise of power through positive means where, instead of introducing restrictions and limits, the power is executed through the creation of rationalities, expectations, and opportunities. This governmentality is rooted in rationalities of neoliberalism and Judaization and has three technologies. Namely, self-investment, participation, and displacement.

However, before I further explore this governmentality, I first want to elaborate on the municipal organ that plays a fundamental role in managing the contemporary transformation of the city and the management of the Palestinian people which is part of that process. Namely: 'Hamishlama Leyafo'

7.1 Hamishlama LeYafo and the management of the Palestinian people

Those familiar with the Hebrew language will note that 'hamishlama' (המישלמה) is not a word one can find in the dictionary. Instead, it is a made-up name consisting of the words 'שלם' (whole) and 'ממשל' (government) (אמיר, 2007, p. 127). The Mishlama is a unique and independent unit under the direct authority of the municipality's director general and thus not part of any of the municipality's existing departments. Despite its independent status, the Mishlama has a very broad set of responsibilities defined as 'working for the rehabilitation and development of Jaffa in all areas of life'. It does so through four channels of action. Namely: Welfare and education, renovation and restoration of infrastructure, development of culture, tourism, and business, and finally the finding of solutions to the city's affordable housing crisis (Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2021).

The unit first saw light in the late 1990s when Ron Huldai, a former member of the Israeli Labour party now running his own 'the Israelis' party, was elected mayor of Tel Aviv (Hoffman, 2020; Marom & Yacobi, 2013, p.68). In line with the earlier mentioned re-

development of the city, the Mishlama's initial task focussed mostly on managing the redevelopment of the city's public space and infrastructure and address social issues prevalent mostly among the city's Palestinian community. These issues included the lack of affordable and high-quality housing, a high number of young adults who do not finish their education, and high unemployment rates (Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2021).

In practice, the unit functions as the executive branch of the municipality in Jaffa and thus focusses especially on the specific challenges concerning the local Palestinian population faced by the municipality (Marom & Yacobi, 2013, p.68). It mainly does so by acting as a liaison between the different municipal organisations and coordinating the services they provide to the city. In other words, the Mishlama is a unique governmental entity that is equipped with the necessary tools and expertise to 'manage' Jaffa and its Palestinian residents and therewith facilitate the workings of the regular municipal departments (Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2021).

The Mishlama's 'brand' featuring the unit's name in Hebrew and Arabic next to Jaffa's well known clock tower (Hamishlama LeYafo,202)

The Mishlama's unique status is even further exemplified by its own branding strategy and logo showing the unit's name in Hebrew and Arabic alongside Jaffa's well recognisable clock tower. Though the creation of a brand and a logo is seemingly irrelevant, it also shows the extent to which commercial logics of branding have made its way to a specific component of the city's executive branch.

Aside from coordinating the city's urban and infrastructure redevelopment and dealing with its widespread social issues, it seems that in recent years the Mishlama has increasingly been tasked with managing Jaffa's transformation into a unique multicultural space that is attractive to citizens and visitors alike. In other words, the Mishlama LeYafo has been made the most important actor in leading Jaffa's transformation into the 'model of coexistence' the Tel Aviv-Yafo city government actively tries to position Jaffa as. In practice, this often entails an increased focus on providing visitors the opportunity to celebrate the perceived cultural traditions of different groups of non-Jewish 'others' that live in Jaffa. Being the biggest of these communities, particular attention is paid to Jaffa's Arab (Palestinian) community and how they and Jewish residents of the city should coexist.

This explains why the Mishlama is heavily involved in contributing to the commodification and marketisation of the cultural difference between Jewish and Palestinian (Arab) Israelis, and

in promoting the idea that Jaffa is a progressive model of coexistence. In the previous chapter I showed what this translated into during month of Ramadan. Though striking by itself, similar events also take place for other (religious) holidays such as Christmas and Easter. For example, at the time of writing, another large series of events titled 'lighting up Jaffa' is set to take place around a number of Christian, Jewish, and Islamic holidays in December. To put it in the words in which the series of events is announced to the (English speaking) public:

"Come and enjoy the beauty and excitement of Jaffa like never before. During "Lighting Up Jaffa" the city celebrates its unique traditions, beauty, and mixed culture by lighting up the city streets and hosting a number of exciting events inspired by Christmas, Hanukkah, and the birth of the Prophet Mohammad. The activities are designed to captivate and engage visitors of all ages. Once there you can check out the traditional lighting of the city's Christmas tree, many artisan booths, live performances, interactive photo displays that are perfect for selfies, special holiday foods, and much more!"

(Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2021)

In addition to a metres high Chanukah placed in one of the city's public parks, Jaffa's residents are invited to enhance the visitors' experience by ordering a small kit containing a mini light with which they can decorate their own homes from the municipality. In the end, the goal is to light up the entire city (Hamishlama Leyafo, 2021).

7.2 A governmentality

As mentioned before, I am more critical of the transformation of the city into the model of coexistence of which these festivities are part and argue that it reduces of Jaffa into a Disneyfied consumable space. Aside from acting as the executive branch of the local government and thus managing this transformation of the city, I argue that the Mishlama Leyafo also functions as a key actor in the municipality's attempt to establish a governmentality through which power is exercised on Jaffa's Palestinian residents.

But what do I mean with 'a governmentality'? Crucially, this theory coined by French philosopher Michel Foucault's assumes that that modern society is characterised by discursive relations of power. Foucault (1978, p.93-94) argues that instead of being held by a singular sovereign or institution and exercised over a passive population, power is present everywhere, is exercised from an infinite number of points, and has the potential to be reproduced by ordinary citizens.

Governmentality is a concept Foucault never fully developed and published in one of his books. Instead, what we know about the concept originates mostly from a series of lectures he held at the Collège de France in Paris in the late 1970s (Madsen, 2014, p. 814). Nonetheless, based on recordings and written transcripts of these lectures, scholars such as Dean (1999) and Lemke (2002) have been able to translate his ideas into a relatively coherent theory of governmentality.

At the very basics, 'governmentality', or 'government' refers to an exercise of power through what is often described as the 'conduct of conduct', i.e., the capacity to shape the perceivably autonomous and voluntary behaviour of the individual to a certain desired end (Lemke, 2002, p.50). Thus, instead of exercising power through negative means, by introducing limits, governmentality, or the 'act of government', refers to exercises of power through shaping peoples' positive conduct (Dean, 2010, pp. 17-18). This entails shaping peoples' desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs in such a way that they follow a specific form of reasoning (Lemke, 2002, p.53). This exercise is perceived to be a relatively calculated and rational activity undertaken by a multitude of agencies and authorities (Dean, 2010, pp. 17-18). In this research, the actors exercising government vis-à-vis the Palestinian Israelis in Jaffa are the agencies and authorities tied to the Israeli state and ideology of Zionism.

The system of thought on which the governmentality is based is referred to as the 'rationality' of government. Often, including in the works by Michel Foucault himself, the rationality identified is a rationality of neoliberalism and the way its shapes peoples' desires, values, and everyday activities (Lemke, 2001, p.192). In other words: a neoliberal governmentality strongly influences what individuals perceive as desired, normal, even 'rational' values and behaviours.

Governmentality is about shaping peoples' positive conduct in favour a certain rationality. This means that the rationality of government results in a number of autonomous actions individuals can undertake when acting upon this governmentality. Foucault called these actions 'technologies of power' and argued that these technologies determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to a certain end or domination (Nilson, 1998, p.107). In other words, to 'think' in terms of a certain rationality ideally translates into 'acting' in terms of that rationality.

I invite you to think of it as follows: The Palestinians who reside in Jaffa are citizens of the State of Israel and thus enjoy a certain number of legal rights and degree of protection from arbitrary rule. This limits the possibilities for exercising power over these people solely through

imposing limits and sanctions that are not imposed on all other citizens of the state. Thus, a different way of exercising power over a single population group and shaping their behaviour into a desired direction is through establishing options, opportunities, and expectations that, at least at face value, seem rational and common sense. In addition, not only does this mean an exercise of power within the limits of the law, but also one that, if successful, is reproduced by the citizens themselves and thus requires very little maintenance by the state.

Such governmentality is not completely arbitrary. It is best seen as a means to a certain end based on a logic or rationality that makes the desired actions of subjects seem natural or common sense. In the case of the governmentality that is being established for the Palestinian residents of Jaffa, I argue that one can speak of a rationality of neoliberalism and Ethnocracy. What this means is that the execution of power that I identify in Jaffa is rooted in two overlapping logics and ultimately serves two ends. On one level, it is rooted in logics of neoliberalism which presuppose that the ideal solutions to the widespread (social) issues in the city can be found through the involvement of private capital logics of the free market. The end goal is to is to create a type of citizen who acts as an entrepreneur of the self (Lemke, 2001, p.199). Such individual is expected to carry the responsibility of their wellbeing by themselves instead of relying on the state to do it for them. On another level, this governmentality is rooted in the practical logic of a Jewish ethnocratic state where, in accordance with the writings by Yiftachel (2006), policy is formulated by, and serves the interests of only the country's Jewish population. This thus means that there is little to no opportunity for other Israelis to contribute to the formulation of government policy. In effect they will always remain 'external' to the state as policy is constructed for them but not by them. The end goal that these policies attempt to reach is an increased Judaization and de-Arabization of Jaffa.

Regardless of the specific line of reasoning behind it, what is crucial about any rationality of government is how it allows one to perceive those who do not wish to comply and reproduce. As is suggested by the term itself, the existence of a rationality of government entails the existence of a number of behaviours deemed to be 'rational' or 'common sense' and thus relatively unquestionable and unchallengeable. Insofar as an individual has the opportunity to do so, not complying to the prescribed conduct is thus perceived as 'irrational', undesirable, and counterproductive. Hence why the desired conduct in the upcoming section does not at all

appear to be harmful or extraordinary. It is precisely that which is normal, rational and expected. To that extent, the power of establishing a rationality of government rests as much in the creation of a common sense conduct people are expected to adhere to as it does in the labelling and excluding those who do not comply as 'irrational' and 'undesirable'

I argue that the desired conduct part of this governmentality can be categorised into three broad categories. Described as 'technologies of governmentality', the three categories of actions are: self-investment, participation, and displacement. In the following section I briefly explore the meaning of these technologies and how they are part of the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality's policies vis-à-vis Jaffa and the Palestinian residents of the city.

The system of governmentality I identify consists of three different 'technologies' or categories of conduct. Self-investment, Participation, and Displacement

7.2.1 Self-investment

In this case, the technology of self-investment should be understood as providing Jaffa's Palestinian Israeli population the option to invest time, energy, and resources into enhancing their individual value on the labour market. The rationality behind this seems to be that the relatively low employment rate among Jaffa's Palestinian Israelis is the result of a lack of transferable skills and consequential poor fit to the labour market. Enhancing individuals' employability through learning would then be a solution to the Palestinian Israelis' low employment rate and other socioeconomic issues (Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2017, p.117). Therefore, local government is investing a lot of resources and time into offering Palestinian residents of Jaffa with classes and programmes that will enhance their employability and, in some cases, even employ them.

The 'Work in my City' programme is targeted specifically at Jaffa's Palestinian Israeli youth and provides them the opportunity to receive training before they start working for the municipality (Hamishlama LeYafo, 2021).

A very interesting example of one of these initiatives taken up by the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality and their Mishlama Leyafo is the so called 'working in my city' (לעבוד בעיר שלי), programme organised in early 2021. Marketed in Arabic as 'working in my country ' (العمل في بلدي), this project is aimed specifically at Palestinian Israelis from Jaffa who are between 18 and 20 years old and have just completed their secondary school education. After being admitted into the programme, people choose one of six tracks that prepares them for a specific form of employment ranging from lifeguard or fitness instructor to IT developer and teaching

assistant. After completing anywhere between 115 hours and 11 months (depending on the chosen track) of special training participants are hired by the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality for a period of two years (Hamishlama Leyafo, 2021). Especially the fact that Palestinian Israeli youths are educated to work within the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality seems to be a break with existing logics of Zionism and labour in the Jewish state where a core aim has historically been to reserve spaces of employment for Jewish and not Palestinian workers (Preminger, 2018, p.5).

What stands out is that, because this programme targets Palestinian Israeli youth between 18 and 20 years old specifically, this programme is also positioned as an alternative to entering military service with the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) after they graduate secondary school (time out, 2021). This is arguably a much-welcomed alternative as few Palestinian Israelis tend to enter military service. Above all, contrary to their Jewish Israeli peers, they are not subject to compulsory military service and often have a complicated relationship with the Israeli military (Kanaaneh, 2003, p.6). If one lo

Another clear example is the so called 'made in Jaffa' project organised by non-profit organisation 'presentense', Citibank, the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality, and the Mishlama Leyafo. The aim of this project is to expose the people of Jaffa to the benefits of entrepreneurship and establish a local entrepreneurial community. It does so through organising workshops in the local youth centre, managing events in Jaffa's high schools, and providing guidance to beginning entrepreneurs who take part in the project (Made in Jaffa, 2021). Though only a small example, this project and the wide support it receives from the municipality again shows how solutions to Jaffa's high unemployment are sought in the realm of developing skills and promoting entrepreneurship.

By itself, decreasing the unemployment among Jaffa's Palestinian community through investing in their employability seems like a very rational strategy. However, it also contains elements one can be more critical of. Specifically, I see this technology of self-investment is not just as providing people with the opportunity to invest in their own employability, but also as the creation of the expectation or discourse that suggests that the status of 'being employable' is the result of one's own actions and thus a matter of individual responsibility. In other words, whether one does or does not have a job is reduced to the outcome of their own willingness to take the responsibility to become employable and seek employment. This has thus created what Michel Foucault describes as 'entrepreneurs of the self'

In extension, though it might seem counterintuitive, by embracing investing in one's own employability as the solution to the high unemployment among Jaffa's Arab population, 'employment' is reconfigured from being a collective and societal issue where responsibility is held by the individual, society, and government into being an issue of solely the individual, their sense of responsibility, and willingness to find employment. In simple terms, 'being unemployed' is no longer the outcome of a number of factors such as individual decisions, societal expectations and stigmas, and government policy. Instead, within this way of thinking, 'being unemployed' is solely the fault of the individual and no longer a result of societal stigmas of Palestinian workers, labour market discrimination, and government policies that disadvantage the Palestinian Israeli community.

7.2.2 Participation

The second technology concerns the participation of Palestinian Israelis' participation in the government led transformation of the city. This technology of participation is expressed in three different ways. First, the transformation of the city's aesthetics and public space. Second, the creation and reproduction of a consumable cultural difference and third, participation in the reproduction of the discourse of coexistence which acts as a discursive veil over the ongoing transformation of Jaffa into a Disneyfied consumable space.

In the previous chapter I described how Jaffa has undergone an aesthetic transformation over the past decades. Put simply, this transformation entails making Jaffa into a space with an enhanced yet cleansed oriental aesthetic. In the end, the goal is to establish a perceivably authentic oriental space made suitable for visitors to safely wander around in.

Participation in this transformation is fairly simple. For individual property owners it means altering the aesthetics of their house or store in such a way that it matches to the desired aesthetic. However, this is not only mandated through the legislation I described in the previous chapter, but also facilitated by a number of initiatives such as the creation of grants meant for the renovations of buildings' street facing façades. Though, at the time of writing, funding is available for houses in the entirety of the city Yet, as the size of the grant is doubled for homeowners in Jaffa's less gentrified south-eastern neighbourhoods (Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2021) inhabited mostly by Palestinian Israelis and other groups of 'others' (Schipper, 2015, p.526) it seems that these funds are mostly aimed at houses in this part of the city. A different but smaller example is the initiative by the Mishlama LeYafo to offer residents

of Jaffa free tree with which they can add green space to their private or shared garden and contribute to altering the aesthetic of the city (Hamishlama LeYafo, 2021).

On the level of the urban space in the city, participation mostly entails contributing to making Jaffa into a space that is safe and clean enough for visitors to roam around in. Aside from creating this environment themselves, the municipality also invites citizens to contribute to this process. This is done through, for example, organising a so called 'neighbourhood queen' competition where citizens of Jaffa are invited to report as many issues in the city as possible to the '106+ app', a mobile application where residents can share issues with public space to the municipality (Hamishlama Leyafo, 2021). Interestingly, the prize for whoever wins consists of an unspecified 'upgrade' of the public space this individual lives in. Other examples include simple things such as the 'Jaffa clean up' event in which residents of the city together cleaned the hilltop park in old Jaffa under the supervision of the Mishlama (Hamishlama Leyafo, 2021) or free dog training courses organised in order to reduce the number of incidents with aggressive dogs in the city's streets and parks and therewith improve public safety and the ease with which one can roam around the city (Hamishlama, Leyafo, 2021). Together these initiatives all seem rather harmless, mundane, or even a little bit boring. However, they how, through relatively harmless, rational, and common-sense behaviours, Palestinian residents of Jafa are invited to participate in the aesthetic transformation of their city into a space that is desirable and safe for visitors to roam around in.

This technology of participation becomes especially interesting when looking at the level of culture and creation of consumable difference. As I wrote before, visitors to the city are being offered a consumable cultural difference that relies on an orientalised and cleansed image of an 'authentic' Arab culture. However, selling this culture is dependent on the participation of these 'authentic people'. Hence why participation in the celebration and consumption of cultural difference is a second expression of the

Performative actor in perceived authentic dress serving drinks to visitors during a municipal event (Hamishlama LeYafo, 2021).

technology of 'participation'. Practically speaking this is done through taking part in the different celebrations of cultural difference. For local store owners this can be done by for example setting up a food stall from which they sell authentic Arab foods. For individuals it could also mean taking part in these events as a performative actor playing the role of an

authentic Arab individual. A practice that seems to be common during celebrations such as that which took place on during the 2021 Ramadan (Hamishlama Leyafo, 2021).

Third, participation also entails participation in the reproduction of a discourse that positions Jaffa as a city that is, or is ought to become, a model for coexistence between Jews and Arabs. A discourse which, as I wrote before, seems to function as a veil over the development of Jaffa into a Disneyfied consumable space and is thus cleansed of any form of 'Palestinianness'.

A moment in time in which the invitation to reproduce this discourse became very clear was during the escalation of violence in May 2021 when it seemed that, all of a sudden, the temporary lack of peaceful coexistence urged many, including the mayor of the city and the people behind the Mishlama Leyafo, to restate their belief that Jaffa was still an example of peaceful coexistence. Aside from releasing a video statement in which the mayor of Tel Aviv addressed the population of Jaffa and, in response to the riots that had been taking places, stated that 'this is not our way' (Hamishlama LeYafo, 2021), and a lot more statements and images shared by the municipality itself, the most interesting way in which this message was restated was through the creation of flags and banners that spread a message against violence and upheaval and restated peoples' commitment to coexist. Though introduced as a citizens' initiative many different actors from withing

'A poster financed by the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality reading 'Jews and Arabs refuse to be enemies' displayed one a private building in Jaffa in the wake of the May 2021 escalation of violence (Hamishlama LeYafo, 2021)

the municipality endorsed this message, financed the printing of a large number of banners, and invited people to fill in an online form to receive their own display it in a visible place. Subsequently, pictures and short stories of different Jewish and Palestinian residents of the city who had put up a banner and thus publicly displayed their commitment to making/keeping Jaffa a model of coexistence were shared online. These images showed brightly coloured banners in different sizes reading 'Jews and Arabs refuse to be enemies' written in both Arabic and Hebrew.

In this context, a public restatement to one's commitment to coexistence was positioned directly against the ongoing protest and riots in the city. This leads one to believe that at least to some extent, the banners were also used as a way through which people could distance themselves from the ongoing violence and signal to their neighbours that 'they are not part' of

these developments. This creates an interesting dilemma. Namely, what to think of the people who were offered the opportunity to display a banner but refused to do so? Did they not support the idea of coexistence between Jews and Arabs? And if not, what else do they support?

This is precisely where the power of the governmentality lies. It is not just about creating opportunities for people to perform the conduct that is desired of them. It is also about creating a situation in which not subscribing to a particular discourse and not conforming to the conduct that it desired of people is made to be a choice that is irrational and counterproductive. In other words, it allows one to position the people who do not subscribe to this discourse of coexistence and, as I have attempted to sketch in the previous chapter, the fundamental transformation of the city that is behind it, as irrational and thus naturally excluded from the conversations in which the common good is determined.

7.2.3 Displacement

The third and final technology of governmentality is what I call 'displacement'. Contrary to the previous two this technology does not exist because it is a type of conduct which is actively spoken about by the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality or the Mishlama Leyafo but instead because it is a type of conduct that, at least in my view, is inadequately avoided. In other words, though local government does not directly ask people to leave Jaffa, a combination of factors many of which can be attributed to government policy mean that the 'door to moving out of the city' is always left open and available for those whom there is little alternative

The core driving factor behind the displacement of the Palestinian people of Jaffa seems to be the ongoing gentrification of the city and the increasing lack of affordable housing part of that process. Arguably because of the ethnic logic of capital which virtually traps Palestinian Israelis in a socioeconomic underclass (Yiftachel, 2006, p.15), it is mostly members of Jaffa's Palestinian community who struggle to find housing and see no other option to leave the city altogether. Hence why some scholars such as Monterescu (2015, p.135-138) and Shmaryahu-Yeshurum and Ben Porat (2021, p.2609) refer to these developments using the term 'ethno-gentrification'. That is, a process by which the seemingly neutral, and often state-led, development of gentrification has a strong ethnic component resulting in a single ethnic group gentrifying the city at the cost of excluding the other. In this case this means that it is Israeli Jews who gentrify Jaffa at the cost of the native Palestinian community who increasingly find themselves displaced outside of Jaffa and into other Israeli towns and cities.

This not to say that local authorities have not been taking steps to mitigate the impacts of this local housing crisis. On the contrary, finding solutions to the ongoing difficulties of Palestinian (Arab) residents of Jaffa to find adequate housing has made its way onto the municipality's long term policy agenda (Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2017, p.116). In practice this has translated into the municipality and private housing companies cooperating to build houses especially for the city's Palestinian residents and allocated to them via special lotteries in which, after proving that they meet the detailed criteria, Palestinian Israeli families can apply to 'win' the opportunity to rent an apartment in a social housing estate (Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 2021).

Though good in its intent, the fact that apartments are allocated to a specific ethnic community via a lottery where the literal 'prize' consists of access to affordable housing shows the severeness of the current housing crisis. In addition, though it is true that these people are offered housing by the municipality, it remains questionable whether these housing solutions are a solution to the problem or actually make it worse by contributing to the gentrification of poorer neighbourhoods (Schipper, 2015, p.531). To that extent, such affordable housing projects look as if they address the Palestinian citizens' needs on the outside but, in reality, have the potential to serve merely as another instrument of enhancing the gentrification and transformation of Jaffa at the cost of the Palestinian population in the city.

7.3 Looking back at the state

All in all, I have attempted to describe how the transformation of Jaffa into a Disneyfied, and consumable space is accompanied by an attempt by the state and local government to exercise power on the Palestinian citizens of the city through positive rather than negative means. In other words, I have attempted to sketch how the creation of opportunities and setting of expectations by the local government can also be seen as a means of reaching an end. In this case, the end is the transformation of Jaffa. Crucially however, even though this development is rooted in the local histories and politics of Tel Aviv and Jaffa, what we are also seeing on a larger scale is effectively an increase of the extent to which it controls Jaffa, attempts to exercise power over the population, and facilitates Jewish citizens to settle in the city. In other words, even though it happens as part of a process of urban development sold under a discursive veil of creating model of coexistence, what we are witnessing is a continued 'Judaization' and 'de-Arabization' of what was previously a Palestinian city few Jewish people stepped foot in.

Crucially, this development is facilitated by the structural imbalance of power between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis within the State of Israel. This imbalance of power is the result of the core nature of the Israeli state as a Jewish ethnocracy where the state is owned and staffed solely by Israel's Jewish population and acts in accordance with the interests of these people. Within this state the native Palestinian population has been reduced to a lesser citizenship status where, though they get to experience some of the benefits of being an Israeli citizen, they do not get to contribute to the creation of the greater good. In other words, though they live in the newly transformed model of coexistence between Arabs and Jews, they lack the opportunity to take part in the debate on what such city should actually look like. This explains why what appears to be a democratic government in one of Israel's most liberal cities is capable of establishing a system of governmentality which, through the active participation of Jaffa's Palestinian residents, aims to transform the city into a Disneyfied and consumable space constructed on the rubble pre-1948 Jaffa, cleansed of the artefacts and stories of the Nakba and any other associations with a collective Palestinian history and nationhood, transformed into a space where Jewish Israelis can consume cultural difference between themselves and Jaffa's Arab 'others', and lastly, increasingly Judaized and cleansed of its original Palestinian population. Most astonishingly, this is done under a deceiving discourse of creating a model city of 'coexistence'.

8. Conclusion

This thesis started by introducing Israel's most recent Basic law 'Israel, the Nation State of the Jewish people'. Based on the way in which this law very explicitly re-affirms existing understandings of the State of Israel as the realization of self-government of solely the state's Jewish citizens, I questioned what consequences this perceived self-identity has for the large number of Palestinians who, though not Jewish, are also legal citizens of Israel. In an attempt to disentangle and de-essentialize the entirety of Israel as a single unit of analysis and avoid resorting to methodological nationalism, the scope of this study is shifted from the national to the local. Hence why this study has focused solely on how the state governs Palestinian citizens in Jaffa, a city with a rich and independent history now part of the larger Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality and often described as one of Israel's 'mixed cities'. Hence why the research question that this study attempted to answer was: 'How does the State of Israel govern its Palestinian citizens in Jaffa?'

The choice of the phrase 'to govern' was conscious as during the process of conducting fieldwork it was found that the state's attempt to exercise power upon its Palestinian citizens in Jaffa is best approached via a theoretical framework of Foucauldian governmentality. This comprehensive philosophical framework rooted in Michel Foucault's notions of power and agency suggests that, instead of doing so through force and discipline, power can also be executed through the positive shaping of peoples' conduct. Practically, this is done through the establishment of rationalities, expectations, and opportunities and relies on the willingness of the governed subject to exercise the conduct that is expected of them and reproduce the governmentality.

Using a local scope also yields a an answer to the research question quintessentially rooted in local politics and history. Hence why, even though it is not the central object of analysis, a significant part of the answer to the research question can be found in the history and perceived identity of Tel Aviv. Currently considered the home of liberal and labor Zionism and the Israeli left and often described on the basis a 'tabula rasa' like founding story of a totally new and Hebrew city built on empty sand dunes, Tel Aviv's perceived identity is best described as Hebrew, modern, and white. Despite the tabula rasa founding story, this identity is not at all created in isolation. It seems to be strongly rooted in the urge to build and maintain a city that embodies all that Jaffa, perceived to be oriental, backward, and black, was not. In other words, Tel Aviv was constructed with Jaffa as its dichotomous 'other'. This explains why, by the time the Zionist settlers had taken over power and united Tel Aviv and Jaffa in a single municipality,

the city government believed Jaffa to be worthless and rightfully subject to neglect and demolition. The city was simply a relic of a past that had no place in the State of Israel and modern Tel Aviv.

Though the dichotomous relationship between Tel Aviv and Jaffa continues to exist, a process in which Jaffa's oriental urban space and architecture, and later culture, gradually started to be revalorized meant that it, by the late 1980s, the existing black and white dichotomy started to be reconfigured. Put simply, this reconfiguration meant that whereas the oriental nature of the city was enhanced, the city was to be rid of its other elements of blackness such as crime, filth, and urban degradation. The result was a genuine transformation of the city. What started with the gentrification of the city's most attractive neighborhoods, lead to the creation of a Disneyfied and consumable city where Israeli visitors can consume an enhanced and cleansed version of an Arab (and not Palestinian) oriental city and the cultural difference between themselves and the people who inhabit it.

Crucially, this transformation is also dependent on the management of the city's Palestinian population. In other words, it requires these people to be 'governed' towards this end. Instead of doing so through creating limitations and using force and discipline, the state attempts to exercise power upon these people through the establishment of a system of governmentality. Rooted in rationalities of neoliberalism and ethnocracy, this governmentality functions according three different technologies. First, a technology of self-investment where local government invites and encourages people to invest in their employability and become so called 'entrepreneurs of the self'. Second, a technology of participation where residents of Jaffa are encouraged to participate in the transformation of their city on the level of aesthetics, creating consumable cultural difference, and, importantly, the reproduction of the discursive veil of creating a model city of coexistence under which this transformation is taking place. Especially this last case serves as a good example of how the creation of a governmentality also allows one to categorize and dismiss those who do not wish to comply and contribute as people who refuse to coexist. The last technology is the that of displacement. Not necessarily because it is a type of conduct actively spoken about by the local government but more so because the transformation of Jaffa is forcing many Palestinian residents of the city to move out of the city and seek refuge elsewhere.

Though this argument is rooted in local history and politics, what is taking place in Jaffa can also be considered part of a large national development. Namely, a development where,

whether that be through the explicit use of force or more complicated executions of power, the state contributes to the Judaization of Palestinian land. This appropriation and the establishment of a governmentality is made possible by the core nature of the Israeli state as a Jewish state that acts in the interest of its Jewish citizens and denies its Palestinian citizens to contribute to the formation of the greater good.

It remains however very important to note that I consider this study only the first part in a larger examination of the relation between the Israeli state and the Palestinian Israeli residents of Jaffa. In this study I critically assessed the development or transformation of Jaffa and the way in which the state attempts to exercise power on the Palestinian residents of the city. In order to get a better picture of the situation, a second study should address how this transformation of the city and the execution of power by local government is experienced by the people themselves. It is only in that study where voice is handed back to the Palestinian Israeli people themselves and, in the words of Spivak (1988), the subaltern can speak.

This also points to the most significant limitation of this study. Though it has been successful at answering the research question it attempted to answer, this had to be done with a limited number of options for proper data collection and analysis. Most importantly, the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and its travel restrictions meant that it has remained impossible to travel to Israel to conduct local fieldwork in Jaffa and speak to the people whom, to a certain extent, this study is 'about'. Instead, this study has been completely reliant on the, albeit very detailed, documentation originating from the Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality and their digital databases. Hence why an upcoming study (preferably one exercised in a post-covid context) should make use of different research methods in order to get an idea of how the people themselves experience the developments described in this study.

Furthermore, as this study is very context specific, it would be inappropriate to assume that the same political processes take place in other diverse Israeli cities such as Haifa, Ramle, or Lod. Different studies that focus their attention on the particular histories and politics of those cities are needed in order to draw further conclusions. Regardless, by addressing the history and politics of Jaffa, this study has given further into the difficult relationship between the State of Israel and the Palestinian people. Even when these Palestinian people are Israeli citizens living in the 'model of coexistence'.

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