Nietzsche's Revaluation of Schein

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Introduction

Dem Dichter und Weisen sind alle Dinge befreundet und geweiht, alle Erlebnisse nützlich, alle Tage heilig, alle Menschen göttlich. – Emerson[1]

This quote stands proudly on the title page of the first (1882) edition of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche's *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* (The Joyful Science)—a motto of sorts. The quote indeed reflects some of the central themes of the book, and it is on all accounts but one a sound translation of Emerson into German—all accounts *but one*. For the original reads:

> To the poet, to the philosopher, to the saint, all things are friendly and sacred, all events profitable, all days holy, all men divine.[2]

Notice: the poet, the philosopher, and—the saint. For some reason, Nietzsche leaves the latter out in his translation. One ought to ask: did he do so deliberately? The first thing we should make sure of is that Nietzsche was not misled by the German translation—for he did not read English—he read from. Fortunately, we live in times of extraordinary digital archiving, and we can find free, openly accessible scans of Nietzsche's copy of an 1858 translation of Emerson's essays, by one G. Fabricius. There, we find the quote indeed marked with pencil by Nietzsche. Fabricius' translation reads:

> Dem Poeten, dem Philosophen, wie dem Heiligen sind alle Dinge befreundet und geweiht, alle Ereignisse nützlich, alle Tage heilig, alle Menschen göttlich.[3]

From this, it becomes clear that it is Nietzsche who translates the saint away, leaving only the poet and the philosopher. In *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, Nietzsche will turn out to do, in a sense, conceptually what he has done here in his translation: he will diminish the Christian, moral interpretation of the world and, at the same time, affirm both the pursuit of knowledge, i.e. philosophy or 'science'—the latter understood in a very broad sense of the word—and the pursuit of beauty, i.e. art. As to whether Nietzsche's misquote was purposeful; one can only speculate. In any case, whether deliberate or not, both the leaving out of the saint and the presentation of the poet and the philosopher as kindred spirits reflect ideas and valuations that, as I will argue, are central to *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*.

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[1] Cited in: *Kritische Studienausgabe* (KSA) 3, 343

[2] Emerson, Ralph Waldo. (1841) 1950. 'History'. In *The Complete Essays and Other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. New York: The Modern Library.

[3] Emerson, Ralph Waldo. (1841) 1858. *Versuche*. Translated by G. Fabricius. Hannover: Meyer.
Scans accessed: https://haab-digital.klassik-stiftung.de/viewer/image/118058662X/2/LOG_0000/ on 02/06/2022.

In this thesis, I will chronicle a particular development in Nietzsche's thinking, one that occurs in the period from his earliest works up until *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*. In this period of around a dozen years, Nietzsche considers the value and meaning of art—which relates to beauty but also to lies, to appearance and semblance—and science—which is characterized by a passion for knowledge or, as Nietzsche later calls it, the will to truth. I will follow in particular the development of Nietzsche's usage of one particular term, namely: *Schein*, which I translate as 'semblance'. Semblance is a concept that keeps returning in highly relevant passages throughout Nietzsche's oeuvre. It remains significant to Nietzsche for similar reasons throughout many different works, but its meaning shifts almost constantly. What's more, 'semblance', as a concept, connects two intertwined themes of Nietzsche's early thought: a conception of reality as false or falsified; and the affirmation of life. In all cases, semblance stands for empirical reality insofar as it does not show us 'metaphysical reality', or the 'true nature' of things. In all the works from the period I discuss, Nietzsche holds that reality is in some sense or to some degree characterized by semblance. Furthermore, in all of his works, the affirmation of life is at stake; and semblance (and its affirmation) always turns out to have some role to play. Both in the first published work—*Die Geburt der Tragödie* (The Birth of Tragedy) and the last—again, *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*—Nietzsche argues that in order for life to be affirmed, it must be an 'aesthetic phenomenon'. What Nietzsche means by 'life as an aesthetic phenomenon' in the respective works, however, could not be more different.

The difference can concisely be summarized as follows: in early Nietzsche, semblance is only conceived of as the outer to an inner, a surface that hides a depth. From 1882 on, however, semblance is conceived as the *only* conceivable reality. If we follow Nietzsche's thought along the course of this concept, we come across his total and radical rejection of an 'inner', 'higher', 'deeper' 'truer' world—i.e. his rejection of all metaphysical thought. What we encounter is a jarring revaluation, a total *umwertung*—in Nietzsche's own language—of what the word *Schein* represents. While semblance remains, as stated, the concept by which Nietzsche articulates his conception of reality, substantively it takes three very different, very distinct forms. Until now, however, the development of the concept has garnered little to no attention in the secondary literature. While there have been some papers about certain aspects of (Nietzsche's usage of) the concept, there has been no engagement with the significant shifts in the meaning of the word. Perhaps this is because the development in thought that guides the development of the concept happens largely in the background; there is not one singular moment one can point to in which Nietzsche explicitly reverses the meaning of the concept—and yet it ends up reversed by the end of the period I discuss. The closest contestant to such a 'moment of reversal' would be aphorism 54 of *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*—which has, to be sure, received considerable attention in the literature—but in my interpretation of Nietzsche's early thought, this aphorism merely describes the outcome of a development that takes up all of the 1870s and at least four works. In this thesis, I therefore pay particular attention to the works between the *Geburt der Tragödie* and *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*.

This thesis is grounded on the belief that a thorough study of the development of Nietzsche's concept of semblance offers new insights into Nietzsche's thought on reality, art and life—arguably three of the most important themes in Nietzsche's entire oeuvre. In following this development, I will advance the following thesis:

> Nietzsche's usage of the term *Schein* indicates three stages of his thinking on the conception of reality: a metaphysics of art, an aesthetic idealism and an aesthetic perspectivism. The three stages furthermore represent three attempts at life-affirmation.

One source that was particularly important for my formulation of the problem I engage with here is the first and only paper—to my knowledge—that has thus far been written on the evolution of Nietzsche's usage of the term *Schein*. The paper in question is simply called *Schein in Nietzsche's Philosophy* (1991). The author, Robert Rethy, offers multiple indispensable insights into Nietzsche's usage of the term. First, Rethy distinguishes *Schein* from *Erscheinung*—a distinction that Nietzsche himself also repeatedly makes. Rethy translates *Erscheinung* as 'appearance' and *Schein* as 'semblance', and I follow him in this choice. While Rethy does draw some justified and insightful comparisons between *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, his account does not engage with the works written in between those two books. My contention is, again, that most of the development of the concept of semblance occurs in that decade between those two major works. My entire second chapter is theferore dedicated to a discussion of two works in particular: *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn* and *Über das Pathos der Wahrheit*. Rethy's paper does not problematize the revaluation of semblance that is at the basis of my project, and therefore, while I am indebted to his effort, I argue that it fails to capture what is truly is at stake in the evolution of the concept.

A more general debate in the secondary literature was inaugurated by Maudemarie Clark's book *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (1990). Clark interprets, as her title suggests, Nietzsche's thoughts on truth, and offers a developmental account of his epistemology. The long-lasting, still influential debate in the literature centres on a position she calls the 'Falsification Thesis'. Clark interprets Nietzsche as holding the position that all of our beliefs are false or falsified. The immediate problem with this position is, as Clark points out, that it is obviously self-contradictory. A larger, more general problem however is that if Nietzsche indeed holds this position—and Clark argues convincingly that he, at least for some period of time, does—he no longer has any ground to stand on when it comes to making truth claims, and yet he keeps making (seeming) truth claims and keeps championing the truth to some extent. Unfortunately, Clark, like much of the English-speaking authors in the secondary literature, does not distinguish *Erscheinung* from *Schein*. Again, this is a distinction that Nietzsche does make and as I will attempt to show, it is a distinction he makes with urgency and on clear philosophical grounds. The lack of this distinction in much of the secondary literature—including the literature centred around this Falsification Thesis debate—is most likely a direct result of the two main translations of Nietzsche (The Kaufmann and the Cambridge University Press editions) rendering both terms simply as 'appearance'. Clark, for this and related reasons, ends up reading Nietzsche's thoughts on truth and lies merely as a set of contradictions. The debate that follows Clark in problematizing falsification in my view fail to account for a number of crucial aspects of Nietzsche's thought.

Hence, my thesis offers an alternative way of reading Nietzsche, one that does not frame it in terms of a conflict between truth and falsification. My reading of Nietzsche embraces the very same paradoxes in Nietzsche's thought that the falsification debate problematizes.

The most important paradox at the centre of the falsification debate is as follows: if Nietzsche denies truth and the possibility of truth, then how can he still talk about truth or talk in temrs of true and false? What I will attempt to show in this thesis, however is that Nietzsche recognized that his celebration both of semblance, art and deception on the one hand and intellectual honesty and the pursuit of knowledge on the other led to tensions—but that he ultimately did not prefer a single side of this dichotomy. In fact, I will show that *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* is the first book in which Nietzsche purposefully refrains from trying to resolve the tension by placing either art and lie or science and truth on a higher pedestal. Nietzsche ends up celebrating a synthesis between art and science; lie and truth. The concept of a joyful science is precisely this synthesis. Ultimately, Nietzsche's conception of the life of the philosopher requires both a passion for knowledge and an acceptance of the general untruth and mendacity—the conditions of *Schein*—that life and the pursuit of knowledge rest on.

The debate that frames Nietzsche's thought in terms of a paradox of falsification has mostly resulted in various attempts to resolve a central tension in Nietzsche's thought that he himself was not by any means blind to; he felt this tension, experimented with it and ultimately joyfully kept it unresolved. For that reason, one of the first responses to Clark still stands out to me as the most insightful: R. Lanier Anderson's 1996 paper titled *Overcoming Charity: The Case of Maudemarie Clark's Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, in which Anderson argues that Clark's usage of the principle of charity ultimately leads her to attempt to save Nietzsche from himself in a way that only ends up detracting from what is original and valuable in Nietzsche's thought. Anderson writes:

> [Clark's] commitment to charity prevents her from adopting any solution to the falsification paradoxes which acknowledges Nietzsche's basic challenge to our *ordinary* conception of thinghood and its metaphysical implications. (1996, 340–41)

Anderson continues and makes his point more urgently, and in the process outlines a methodological and interpretive strategy that I too will adopt in this thesis, namely: to render Nietzsche's thoughts and positions in precisely as much paradox, tension and lack of resolution as they are present in Nietzsche's thought itself. Anderson argues:

> Nietzsche is a philosopher given to paradox, and to strikingly novel presentations of philosophical views. Interpretation of his work demands that we remain always open to the possibility of something new, something which jars our philosophical common sense. An interpretive strategy which takes agreement with *our* best philosophical understanding as a necessary condition on attributing views to the text is therefore undesirably risky. At the very least, such a strategy threatens to turn Nietzsche into a more conventional philosopher than he really was. At worst, the strong version of the principle of charity can cause us to miss just what is genuinely new and philosophically challenging in Nietzsche. (341)

By adopting this strategy, which aims to outline as clearly as possible the tensions in Nietzsche's thought and his experimental attempts to think them through, I believe my thesis will help rethink Nietzsche's new conception of truth and lies in a novel way: one that does not fall prey to the same problems that plauge the debate surrounding the falsification thesis.

I believe my thesis ends up accounting for three specific things more successfully than much of the secondary literature has been able to: first, the tension between truth and lie, science and art in early Nietzsche; second, the constant shifts that Nietzsche's thought undergoes regarding the concept of semblance; third, the rationale for his ultimate affirmation of the tension between art and science, truth and lie, through the concept of a joyful science.

The reading that guides this thesis is presented as follows: the first chapter will expound Nietzsche's usage of the term *Schein* in terms of a metaphysics of art in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and the essay *Die Dionysische Weltanschauung* in the first chapter; the second chapter discusses the two essays *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn* and *Über das Pathos der Wahrheit* and argue that these, taken together, represent an aesthetic idealism; finally the third chapter argues through a reading of *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* that Nietzsche finally formulates an aesthetic perspectivism. Throughout these chapters, how these conceptions relate to the aesthetic affirmation of life will also be clarified.

The reader should be advised that some prior knowledge of Nietzsche—specifically, his aesthetics—will be helpful, but by no means be necessary. All of the interpretive moves I make will be spelled out and there will be present ample textual evidence for all of the positions and ideas ascribed to Nietzsche. From the first chapter on, the standard referencing style of Nietzsche scholarship will be used, with abbreviations of the German titles of the works. The specific abbreviations used are:

DW: *Die Dionyische Weltanschauung*
GT: *Die Geburt der Tragödie*
WL: *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn*
CV 1: *Über das Pathos der Wahrheit*
FW: *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*

One possible objection to this thesis could be that it ultimately ascribes to Nietzsche a set of positions or beliefs that are paradoxical or even contradictory, and the reading might therefore be seen as uncharitable. As I hope to have outlined above, however, I am more sympathetic to Anderson's general approach of keeping Nietzsche's thought in its original, paradoxical state. Much of the strength and depth of Nietzsche's thought comes precisely from the moments of ambiguity, paradox and tension. One could, however, argue that my reading does not make much progress in the way of 'solving' certain interpretive problems that the secondary literature attaches significance to. In fact, Nietzsche's thought is significant precisely because it experiments and does not lead to a resolution in which all internal inconsistencies and tensions are sublated. This thesis is not an attempt to fix or save anything in Nietzsche, but conversely have tried to put the problems his thought engages with—and the multitude of problems his various positions in turn generate—on full display. Every text that is discussed in this thesis breaks with much if not everything said in what preceded it. In my opinion, this should lead us to treat his work as thought in motion, thought that considers different options and outcomes, rather than a set of internal contradictions that have to be externally resolved. The result is a reading that, as I hope shall become clear, engages with the problem of semblance, rather than the semblance of problem.

I. *Schein in DW & GT: Metaphysics of Art*

i. *Die Dionysische Weltanschauung*

I start my discussion of *Die Geburt der Tragödie* (1872) not with GT itself, but rather with one of the essays Nietzsche wrote in preparation for this debut, namely: *Die Dionysische Weltanschauung* (DW). This work, written in the spring and summer of 1870, contains in condensed form some of the major lines of thinking that one ultimately finds in GT. Some passages are even brought over nearly identically into GT, though they appear on occasion in different contexts. Reading the essay in the context of the later work gives one the impression of reading a blueprint for what was to come. Silk and Stern, who discuss the essay in *Nietzsche on Tragedy*, their extensive commentary of GT (and early Nietzsche more generally) call it a "preliminary stud[y]": "indeed a letter[4] to Wagner later that year refers to '*The Dionysiac Philosophy*', in precisely such terms, as a *Vorstudium* [pre-study]." (Silk and Stern 2016, 54) One of the major differences, however, is that DW focuses solely on the two Greek gods of art, Apollo and Dionysus, and their respective characteristics. While there is already the beginning of a narrative about their ultimate synthesis in the form of Attic tragedy, it is presented without the ecstatic exaltation of GT. While GT, as I will show in the next section, puts the synthesis between the Apollonian and Dionysian at the end and makes it the conclusion of the entire argument of GT, in DW it is presented early in the essay, with a more neutral, historical tone.

Tragedy already becomes somewhat more pronounced as a theme in a newer version of the project that Nietzsche presents to Cosima Wagner as a Christmas present at the end of 1870, bearing the new title *Die Geburt des Tragischen Gedankens* (GTG)[5] But while the looming figure of Schopenhauer is already quite present, and tragedy slowly enters the scene, Wagner and German music are still completely missing. DW thus shows us the first conception of the metaphysics in the background of GT's argument, but still lacks ideas and lines of thinking that make GT into the characteristic work that it is. It confines itself to describing a duotheism and a connected dual origin of art according to the Greeks. Silk and Stern write, in a similar vein:

> This essay was a theoretical account of Apollo and Dionysus in their various guises: as deities within Greek religion; as expressions of opposing attitudes to, or philosophies of, life; and as artistic forces in Greece and elsewhere. Under the last heading, music and lyric poetry were characterized as Dionysiac, sculpture and epic as Apolline, and tragedy as a rare fusion of the two. (2016, 55)

What DW does show us, then, is a description of *Schein* that is already somewhat fleshed out, since it is such an important term in relation to Apollo and the Apollonian. DW shows us therefore Nietzsche's first thoughts on the topic of *Erscheinung* (appearance) and *Schein* (semblance). As in GT, these terms are introduced as aspects of Apollo, who is called

[4] KGB II, 1, 156 (10 Nov. 1870)
[5] For a detailed overview of the line of development from DW and GTG to GT, see: Schmidt, Jochen. *Kommentar Zu Nietzsches "Die Geburt Der Tragödie."* De Gruyter, 2012.

"the 'shining one'" [*der „Scheinende"*] (KSA 1, 554)—the God of light, beauty and semblance. In Ira J. Allen's translation of DW, special attention is paid to the shared etymology of terms like beauty, seeming, and shining. She translates a particularly telling passage as follows:

> Beholding [*das Schauen*], the beautiful or seemly [*das Schöne*], what shines or seems [*Schein*]: these bound the realm of Apollonian art; it is the transfigured world of the eye that creates artistically, behind closed eyelids, in the dream. (2013, 40)

Similarly, while any (reasonably presentable) English translation of the *Geburt* must leave the multitude of resonances of *Schein* underappreciated, Ronald Spiers, the translator of the Cambridge University Press edition of GT, does a good job of outlining Nietzsche's deliberate play with multiple meanings and cognates in the glossary appended to his translation:

> *Schein* and the associated verb *scheinen* […] can mean both 'to give off light' and 'to appear'. Thus Nietzsche links Apollo, the 'shining one', with the world of 'appearances' (*Erscheinungen*), 'semblance' (*Schein*) and beauty (*Schönnheit*, which like Schein, derives from Old German *skôni*, meaning 'bright', 'gleaming' and hence 'magnificent'). This network in turn is related to a set of words centred on *Bild* ('image'), namely *Abbild*, *Lichtbild*, *Traumbild*, *Urbild*, *Götterbild*, *Bildner*, *bilden* and *Bildung*. (2007, 154)

Through the figure of Apollo and the use of these linked words, the term *Schein* is already developed throughout DW. One gets the sense that in this stage the project was conceived of as a history of aesthetics—somewhat more palatable for the philological establishment, but no less heterodox in its interpretation of Greek culture. What's more, the aesthetic concept of the Apollonian and the figure of Apollo are grounded on a historical and psychological analysis of the Hellenes. Apollo is already in DW the symbol of an art of beautiful seeming [*schönen Schein*] and the result of the Greek will to cover up. Even the act of inventing a pantheon of Olympian Gods is explained as the result of an Apollonian will:

> Measure, under whose yoke the new pantheon laboured (opposite the fallen world of the Titans), was the measure of beauty [*Schönheit*]; the limit within which the Greek had to hold himself was that of beautiful seeming [*des schonen Scheins*]. The innermost purpose of a culture oriented toward seeming [*Schein*] and measure can only be the veiling of truth. (2013, 42)

The veiling of truth that is mentioned is left somewhat up in the air: some comments are made elsewhere in the essay, and the basic elements are there. Nietzsche ascribes a fundamental pessimism to the Greeks, which in its most condensed form entails: the best is not to be, second-best is to die quickly, a paraphrased version of the folk-wisdom told by the figure of Silenus[6]. The complete argument becomes clear, however, only in GT.

[6] This reference to the figure of Silenus is made explicit later in DW. In GT 3, Nietzsche introduces Silenus as a "companion [*Begleiter*] of Dionysos". (KSA 1, 35)

ii. *Die Geburt der Tragödie*

Mazzino Montinari did not lie when he called GT "Nietzsche's most difficult work" (KSA 1, 902), nor did Nietzsche himself when he, looking back a decade and a half later at his debut, called it "impossible" (13). The work is as rich and eclectic as it is ungraspable at times: it discusses topics of classical philosophy; offers an account of Greek history alongside a developmental chronicle of Greek aesthetics; it takes a stand against Socrates and the rationalistic optimism he represents; it evaluates the state of German music and advocates for the Wagnerian drama; it develops a variation of Schopenhauerian metaphysics and aesthetics and—one would almost forget it—the work does indeed extensively deal with the eponymous birth of the Attic tragedy. In this chapter, I will focus only on the term *Schein* and relevant aspects and topics of GT, such as the Schopenhauerian metaphysics that Nietzsche develops. For that reason, much of the context of GT will, unfortunately, be lost. GT intersects many different stories and themes, and one should not be under the impression that my summary here does any justice to it, for it discusses only a single term and its development throughout GT. Because of the narrow interests of this thesis, I will simply follow the order of the book and highlight the sections where semblance plays a role, either explicitly (as *Schein*) or implicitly. Then, I will unify the ideas gathered from the overview and outline what semblance means for the early Nietzsche, and what function it has in the context of GT. The book starts with two forewords, the first of which, the *Versuch einer Selbstkritik* (Attempt at a Self-critique) was added to the book in a second edition in 1886. It is a re-interpretation by the later Nietzsche, some 14 years after the book was initially published. I will discuss this foreword therefore after my discussion of the work proper. We will start with the short foreword addressed to Richard Wagner.

In the *Foreword to Richard Wagner*, Nietzsche directly addresses Wagner, whom he admired and looked up to a great deal, in an almost private tone. Wagner's seniority and accomplishments as a musician meant that their relationship was akin to one between a teacher and student. This fact is clear as day here in the foreword, where Nietzsche tells Wagner that "he [Nietzsche], in everything he thought up, communicated with you [Wagner] as with a present person and was only allowed to write down something appropriate to this presence." (23) He tells Wagner, furthermore, that the book is concerned with "a seriously German problem". (24) What Nietzsche is foreshadowing here is that he will end up burdening Wagner's modern music with the role of saving German culture. Thus, while in DW both Wagner and German music more generally were nowhere to be seen or suspected, in GT proper these topics are of the greatest importance. Nietzsche will describe the birth of tragedy out of a confluence of Apollonian and Dionysian forces, the death of tragedy from Socratic rationalism and prophesize the rebirth of tragedy through the highest modern German—that is, Wagnerian—music. Anticipating his contemporary readers' surprise and perhaps mockery, Nietzsche writes: "Perhaps, however, it will be offensive to those same people to see an aesthetic problem taken so seriously" (24) And his pre-emptive rebuttal is the now-infamous proclamation of his artistic metaphysics:

> To these serious people, let it serve as instruction that I am convinced of art as the highest task and the properly metaphysical [*eigentlich metaphysischen*] activity of this life (24)[7]

Art as metaphysical—let alone the "properly metaphysical activity of this life"?—this surely still puzzles us as much as it puzzled Nietzsche's contemporary readership, which consisted to a large extent of philologists[8]. What this metaphysics consists of will be slowly unfolded throughout the book—and to the extent that it relates to *Schein*, it will be unfolded throughout this chapter. The book starts on the topic of aesthetics—the "aesthetic science", even. Nietzsche introduces the Apollonian and Dionysian forms of art, named of course for the Olympian Gods Apollo and Dionysus. In the broadest of definitions, Apollonian art is the art of the image (*Bild*); of paintings and sculptures, whereas Dionysian art is the non-representational, image-less art of music. At the same time, the two describe two drives [*Triebe*] that are present in the art-making process. Furthermore, Apollo, his art and his drive are connected to the "[art-world] of dream [*Traum*]" (26). As one can tell, a lot is happening already in this opening. In the first aphorism, Nietzsche describes how these "artistic powers […] burst forth from nature itself, without the mediation of the human artist" (30), but from GT 2 onwards, he will describe their concrete appearances within Greek art and culture—again, we unfortunately have to leave most of this undeveloped, here.

What is of the essence for us is the description Nietzsche already gives in GT 1 of the natural manifestation of the Apollonian in art as the "beautiful semblance [*schöne Schein*] of dream-worlds" (26) But for all of our enjoyment of beautifully seeming images, even "in the highest life of this dream-reality, we still have the shimmering [*durchschimmernde*] sensation of its semblance [*Schein*]". (26) This makes some intuitive sense: one enjoys paintings and sculptures even though it is quite obvious that what one is looking at only *seems* like the thing it represents—presupposed that we are dealing with figurative art and not music or modern, abstract art. But Nietzsche continues: "The philosophical man even has the presentiment that underneath this reality in which we live and exist there lies hidden a second, quite different one, that therefore it [this reality] too is an illusion". (26) Here for the first time we find that *Schein* is used simultaneously as an aesthetic and metaphysical term: our daily lives and our experiences in "this reality"— our empirical reality—are akin to an imagistic artwork, in the sense that something lies hidden behind it, something that "this reality" only represents. As Nietzsche continues:

> Schopenhauer describes the very gift that causes one, at times, to experience people and all things as mere phantoms or dream-images, as the mark of philosophical talent. Just as the philosopher relates to the reality of existence, so the artistically excitable human being relates to the reality of dreams. (26–27)

While it is not exactly clear how the two things relate, Nietzsche is clearly in the process of bridging aesthetics and metaphysics. *Schein* indicates, in both imagistic art and the philosopher's sense of reality, a particular kind of dualism between appearance and essence.

[7] This translation and all following translations from German that refer to the KSA are my own.
[8] For an extensive and documented history of the reception of GT, see chapter 5 of: Silk, M. S., and J. P. Stern. *Nietzsche on Tragedy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Apollo, the god of *Schein* and the shining god, somehow also describes something about the irreal nature of our empirical reality. We look further to GT 4 to discover the essence that is implied here, on the metaphysical level. GT 4 starts with a discussion of the thematic of dreams in relation to Homer and his art. Homer is deemed a quintessentially Apollonian artist, who therefore must affirm the dream-like nature of reality; which Nietzsche dramatizes by imagining him as calling out to himself: "it is a dream, I want to dream on" (38). The Apollonian aspect of art and life even shows us that our preference for waking life and relative lack of appreciation for our dreaming life ought to be questioned:

> Though it is certain that of the two halves of life, the waking and the dreaming half, the former seems to us to be incomparably preferred, more important, more valuable, more worthy of life, indeed the only one lived: yet, as paradoxical as it may seem, I would like to assert for that mysterious ground of our being [*Grund unseres Wesens*], of which we are the appearance [*Erscheinung*], precisely the opposite valuation of the dream. (38)

With the introduction of the "mysterious ground of our being" and its opposition to an "appearance" here, metaphysics truly enters the scene. Nietzsche sketches out, for now in an undefined and somewhat mysterious form, a dualism of essence and appearance. While Nietzsche's dualism is original in some significant ways, it is transparently indebted to Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal and to Schopenhauer's distinction—itself a variation on or radicalization of Kantian metaphysics—between Will [*Wille*] and Representation [*Vorstellung*]. Indeed Nietzsche was greatly inspired by these two forebears early in his life. In *Nietzsche on Tragedy*, Silk and Stern comment that of "modern philosophers he [Nietzsche] had studied Kant and Schopenhauer with 'particular interest.'" (2016, 63). They also chronicle his conversion to Schopenhauer around 1866, which was initially the result of the "*aesthetic* quality" (23) of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*.

Throughout the late 1860s and into the early 1870s, however, Nietzsche's metaphysics slowly but radically evolved from a more or less straightforwardly Schopenhauerian one into one that was—as Nietzsche only later fully realized—fully in conflict with the fundamental assumptions and valuations behind Schopenhauer's very thought. In fact, by 1871 (i.e. before the publication of GT) he already thought of his own metaphysics as—properly his own. He wrote, in a letter to Erwin Rohde: "You will have noticed the study of Schopenhauer everywhere, also in stylistics: but a peculiar metaphysics of art [*Metaphysik der Kunst*], which constitutes the background, is more or less my property" (KGB II, 1, 216) According to Friedhelm Decher, this "peculiar metaphysics of art" developed in fact as a response to the fundamental pessimism and life-denial that grounds Schopenhauer's thinking. Decher writes:

> [T]he *Birth of Tragedy* raises the question of a justification of the world, based on his conception of the primordial ground [*Urgrund*] of the world as a primordial one [*Ur-Eine*]. (1985, 120)

While this conception of the world seems, on the surface, consistent with that of Schopenhauer, there is one most fundamental difference: the question of justification. For, as Decher aptly describes, the singular ground and final consequence of Schopenhauer's thought is "the postulate of the negation of the will", which "aims at a free self-dissolution of the will." (121)

Indeed: while Nietzsche most certainly shares Schopenhauer's pessimism regarding the fundamental nature of life and the world, the consequence for him is, quite on the contrary, that we must find a justification for life, so that it will be worthy of affirmation yet. Decher rightly points out that such a justification "can only be an 'aesthetic' one". As textual proof for this point, he quotes, from GT 5: "only as an aesthetic phenomenon [are] existence and the world *eternally justified*". (121)[9] Returning to GT 4, Nietzsche further outlines his metaphysics, separating *Schein* from something like an essence. He starts by referring to the artistic drives—the Apollonian and Dionysian—in their natural, unmediated form, and continues describing their relationship to both *Schein* and inner *Wesen*.

> For the more I become aware in nature of those all-powerful artistic drives [*Kunsttriebe*] and in them a fervent longing for semblance [*Schein*], for being saved [*Erlöst*][10] through semblance, the more I feel myself pushed to the metaphysical assumption that the Truly Existing [*Wahrhaft Seiende*] and Primordial One [*Ur-Eine*], as the eternally suffering and contradictory, at the same time needs the delightful vision, the pleasurable semblance, for its constant salvation. (KSA 1, 38)

The "Truly Existing and Primordial One", which internally suffers and contradicts itself is thus saved, redeemed through *Schein*. But what kind of *Schein* does Nietzsche intend, here? It seems that in this metaphysical schema, the artistic meaning of *Schein* does not fit.

> This semblance, which we consist of, and in which we are completely caught up, we are compelled to perceive as the Truly Non-existing [*Wahrhaft-Nichtseiende*], i.e. as a perpetual becoming in time, space and causality, in other words, as empirical reality. (38–9)

Our empirical reality is thus a semblant kind of reality, just like the "philosophical talent" mentioned in GT 1 already foresaw. In some sense, what we experience is not true. Does this mean that empirical reality—lived reality—is merely a *representation* of the Truly Existing and Primordial one? This surely seems to be the case, for Nietzsche writes:

> If, therefore, we disregard our own 'reality' for a moment, if we grasp our empirical existence, like that of the world in general, as a representation [*Vorstellung*] generated at every moment of the Primordial One [*Ur-Eine*], then we must now regard the dream as the *semblance of semblance* [*Schein des Scheins*], consequently as an even higher satisfaction of the Primordial Desire [*Urbegierde*] for semblance. (39)

Apollonian art is thus the art that represents most our metaphysical situation: the image is somehow beautiful—life is somehow affirmed, redeemed—because the kernel of reality, the true reality is transfigured. As an example of art in which the semblance of semblance is affirmed, Nietzsche discusses Raphael's *Transfiguration*, about which he writes:

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[9] For a more detailed discussion of to what extent Nietzsche's 'aesthetic metaphysics' is original and how much of it is owed to Schopenhauer's metaphysics, see: Decher, Friedhelm. "Nietzsches Metaphysik in der 'Geburt der Tragödie' im Verhältnis zur Philosophie Schopenhauers." *Nietzsche-Studien* 14 (1985): 110–25.

[10] I have chosen to translate *Erlösen* here as 'salvation' but the reader should be aware that in German, it can mean either redemption or salvation (especially in the Christian context) or to set free or release.

> Here, in the highest symbolism of art, we have before our eyes that Apollonian world of beauty and its underground [*Untergrund*], the terrible wisdom of Silenus, and we understand, through intuition, their mutual necessity. Apollo, however, appears to us again as the deification of the principium individuationis, in which alone the eternally achieved goal of the Primordial One, its redemption through semblance, takes place. (39)

Again, the terrible reality described by the wisdom of Silenus (again: for man, the best would be not to be, the second-best is to die quickly) is used as a metaphor for what Nietzsche just now called the suffering and contradictory nature of the Primordial One. The *principium individuationis* which Nietzsche refers to here is a concept he takes from Schopenhauer; it describes how empirical reality presents itself to us as a collection of distinct objects or appearances. In Nietzsche's conception of the Apollonian, it seems to mean that which originally divides up and diffuses the Primordial One.

Moving forward through the book quite a bit to GT 16, Nietzsche explains the Apollonian salvation through art. For this is one of the key things that separate Apollo from Dionysus (who is discussed in the interim between GT 4 and 16) is their strategy of affirming life. In short, Apollonian art, like GT 4 already stated, aims for salvation through semblance and the transfiguration of suffering, whereas Dionysian art aims to affirm suffering *as* suffering:

> Apollo stands before me as the transfiguring genius of the principium individuationis, through whom alone the salvation in semblance [*Erlösung im Scheine*] can truly be attained: while under the mystical shout of exultation of Dionysus the spell of individuation is shattered and the path to the mothers of being [*Müttern des Seins*], to the innermost core of things, lies open. (103)

Apollo and Dionysus respectively represent the affirmation of life by, respectively, an escape into the beautiful semblance of images; and the overcoming confrontation with life as suffering. Nietzsche goes on to commend Schopenhauer for recognizing the difference between music and imagistic art, which Nietzsche connects to their different roles in representing either the appearance or the will itself:

> This immense contrast that opens up between plastic art as the Apollonian, and music as the Dionysian art, has become apparent to only a single one of the great thinkers to the extent that (…) he conceded to music a different character and origin from all the other arts, because it is not, like all the latter, the image of the appearance [*Abbild der Erscheinung*], but directly the image of the will itself [*Abbild des Willens selbst*], and thus to everything *physical in the world the metaphysical*, to all appearance [*Erscheinung*] the thing in itself [*Ding an sich*]. (103–4)

What Nietzsche makes clear here is that the Apollonian and Dionysian drives and the forms of art they bring forth represent two distinct strategies for dealing with suffering in life. As Silk and Stern rightfully point out, Nietzsche distinguishes between "Socratic love of knowledge; [the Apolline impulse towards] the beauty of art; and [Dionysiac] metaphysical [faith] in the essential indestructibility of life." (2016, 99) These three strategies all seek to affirm or justify life in their own way:

> Everything we call culture consists of these stimulants: depending on the proportional mixture, we have a primarily *Socratic* or *artistic* or *tragic* culture: or, if one will allow historical examples, we have either an Alexandrian or a Hellenic or a Buddhist culture. (KSA 1, 116)

Indeed, Greek or Hellenic culture will turn out to be primarily Dionysian. Apollo might have come first in the chronology of GT—taking centre stage in GT 4 and onwards before Dionysus got a full introduction—but in Hellenic culture, it came second. Nietzsche describes how these two strategies and artistic impulses come together, reciprocating and reinforcing one another, in the form of Attic tragedy. This synthesis between Apollo and Dionysus comes, as I already stated in my discussion of DW, at the high point and final aphorism of the book, aphorism 25. Here, Nietzsche finally and most clearly defines the relationship between Apollo and Dionysus:

> Here [in music and tragedy] the Dionysian, measured against the Apollonian, shows itself to be the eternal and original artistic force [*Kunstgewalt*] that calls the whole world of appearance into existence: in the midst of which a new transfiguring semblance [*Verklärungsschein*] becomes necessary in order to hold the lived world of individuation in life. (154–5)

The Apollonian originates out of the Dionysian, much like the world of *Schein* originates out of the world of *Sein* or *Wesen*—the world of the "Truly Existing and Primordial One". What function does Apollo have, however, conceived as such a secondary force?

> If we could imagine a becoming human of dissonance—and what else is man?—then this dissonance, in order to be able to live, would need a glorious illusion that would cover its own being with a veil of beauty [*Schönheitsschleier*]. This is the true artistic intention [*Kunstabsicht*] of Apollo: in whose name we summarize all those countless illusions of beautiful semblance that make existence worth living at every moment and urge us to experience the next moment. (155)

As before, Apollo turns out to represent the artistic untruths that justify and affirm life—indeed make "existence worth living". What is new in this final statement, however, is the knowledge that this should be thought of as a supplement to the Dionysian knowledge of life as suffering—life as, at least initially, *unbearable* and not worth living:

> Of that foundation of all existence, of the Dionysian underground of the world, only as much may enter the consciousness of the human individual as can be overcome by that Apollonian transfiguring power [*Verklärungskraft*]. (155)

The unity of the Apollonian and Dionysian makes the affirmation of life possible through, as unlikely as it seems, *both* beautiful seeming and confrontation with life's innermost nature: Apollo cures what Dionysus shows. We find, at the end, that this peculiar treatise about the Greeks has always been, at a more intimate level, about ourselves. Hellenism, while thematically rich to Nietzsche the philologist, was most importantly the vehicle for a deep consideration of life and its potential to be beautiful—to be affirmed. The book ends with the image of a wandering traveller, perhaps a dream-traveller, who visits the 'ancient Hellene':

> [W]ould he [the traveller] not, with this continual influx of beauty, have to exclaim to Apollo, raising his hand: 'Blessed Hellenes! How great must Dionysus be among you if the Delic god [Apollo] deems such magic necessary to cure your dithyrambic madness!'—To such a person, however, an aged Athenian, looking up at him with the sublime eye of Aeschylus, might reply: 'But say this too, you strange foreigner: how much did this people have to suffer in order to become so beautiful! But now follow me to the tragedy and sacrifice with me in the temple of both deities!'

To conclude my own chapter on Nietzsche's first published philosophical endeavour, I will discuss a few comments made by Nietzsche himself in the foreword to GT added in the second edition of 1886. Commenting on the absence of moral meaning in the book, Nietzsche writes:

> Indeed, the whole book knows only an artist's sense and meaning behind everything that happens—a 'God', if you like, but certainly only a completely unobjectionable and immoral artist-God. (17)

Nietzsche sees the *Metaphysik der Kunst* (here: *Artisten-Metaphysik*) of GT as a kind of divine aesthetic meaning:

> The world, in every moment the *achieved* salvation by God, as the eternally changing, eternally new vision of the most suffering, the most contradictory, the most contradictory, who only knows how to redeem himself in *semblance*: this whole artist-metaphysics [*Artisten-Metaphysik*] may be called arbitrary, pointless, fantastical—the essential thing about it is that it already betrays a spirit that will one day defend itself at every risk against the *moral* interpretation and significance of existence. (17)

This is for me the takeaway from GT, too: an impossible book though it may be—convoluted, confusing, confused—it expresses already a great deal of what is original, pressing and relevant about Nietzsche's thought: his experimentation with taking an aesthetic—rather than moral—viewpoint in regards to life, the human being and the world. Indeed, this fantastic and fantastical debut manages to express "with Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulas" (19) already—though perhaps in germinal form—properly Nietzschean valuations. These valuations are already, although silently, opposite to the Christian way of thinking—which is the *moral* way of thinking for Nietzsche, for:

> Behind such a way of thinking and valuing, which must be hostile to art [*kunstfeindlich*] as long as it is somehow genuine, I have always felt the hostility to life [*das Lebensfeindliche*], the furious, vengeful aversion against life itself: for all life rests on semblance [*Schein*], art, deception, optics, the necessity of perspective and of error. (18)

What this Nietzsche—again, the Nietzsche of 1886—means by life resting on semblance and art cannot be explained with reference to the aesthetic metaphysics of GT, however. The semblance that life rests on is not a semblance that coats and veils an essence—like, for instance, the *Ur-Eine* of GT. Instead, *Schein* means to this later Nietzsche something inherently anti-metaphysical and anti-dualistic. How and why this development occurs will become clear through our discussion of FW in Chapter 3. But first, we must look at some intermediary works, which will help us draw more intricately the development of Nietzsche's conception of *Schein*.

II. *Schein in WL & CV 1: Aesthetic Idealism*

i. *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im Außermoralischen Sinn*

In 1873, just a year after GT, Nietzsche writes an essay entitled *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn* (On Truth and Lie in the Extramoral Sense), but he ultimately decides not to publish it. The work would in fact remain unpublished until 1896, long after his mental collapse. The fact that it was written so shortly after GT was published is puzzling, to say the least—two works could hardly be more dissimilar. As I will show in this chapter, certain themes of Nietzsche's thought are picked up again and further developed, but the two works speak in two wholly different registers. The obvious dramatization of history that made GT both difficult and exciting contrast with the analytical tone and discursive style of WL. Interestingly, WL reads like something much closer to Nietzsche's later style—though it is not yet aphoristic. For our purposes, WL is an important work when it comes to Nietzsche's thinking on the nature of knowledge, art and the nature of reality—and, of course, on the notion of *Schein* and its close neighbours like illusion [*Illusion*] and deception [*Täuschung*]. The word *Schein* however gets mentioned only twice, the word *Erscheinung* once, but the essay on the whole centres around the ideas of truth and lie, which brings it in close thematic proximity to Nietzsche's thought on semblance and reality. I will start my discussion here by discussing the last and most significant occurrence of the word *Schein*, in the very last aphorism of the text.

> There are ages in which rational man and intuitive man stand side by side, the one in fear of intuition, the other with scorn of abstraction; the latter is as unreasonable as the former is inartistic. Both desire to rule over life: the former by knowing how to meet the most important needs through precaution, cleverness, regularity, the latter by being an 'overjoyful hero'[11] who does not see those needs and only takes life, which is disguised as semblance and as beauty [*zum Schein und zur Schönheit verstellt*], as real. (KSA 1, 889)

Nietzsche will ultimately separate—much like he did Apollo and Dionysus in GT—two characters in this text: the rational man and the intuitive man. The intuitive man, who celebrates beauty and takes the world simply as *Schein*, will turn out to be better equipped for life-affirmation. Like in GT, beauty and life-affirmation are conceptualized together. To make sense of this, however, we must understand this affirmation of *Schein* and *Schönheit* in the context of the greater argument of WL. Let us go back, then, to the start of the essay, and work our way towards the now-familiar endpoint.

The text is divided into two numbered chapters, the first of which starts with a fable which describes cognition, or, to be more accurate to the German, 'the knowing' [*das Erkennen*], which Nietzsche argues looks miserable, shadowy, purposeless and arbitrary when seen from the larger perspective of nature. There were, as Nietzsche dramatically puts it,

[11] Original: *„überfroher Held"*. This phrase might be taken from Wagner's final *Nibelungen* drama, *Götterdämmerung* (Act 3, Scene 2). While Wagner only finished *Götterdämmerung* in 1874, I would speculate that Nietzsche, a close friend of the composer, read an early version of the libretto, since *überfroher Held* is something of an idiosyncratic turn of phrase and since it is here put in quotation mark.

"eternities in which it was not" and "when it is over again, nothing will have happened." (875) For all of our usual hubris about our cognition, our knowing, Nietzsche holds that it is purposeless and small. While we 'knowers' might think that we are the centre of what happens on earth—perhaps even in the cosmos—Nietzsche argues that, if we could talk to a mosquito, we "would hear that it too swims through the air with this pathos and feels in itself the flying centre of this world." (875) Humans are not special, nor is their 'knowing'. But the philosopher, who as the lover of knowledge is "the proudest man", "believes that he sees the eyes of the universe telescopically directed on his actions and thoughts from all sides." (875–6) More pressing than the unimportance of our intellect, however, is the fact that it is nothing like we think it to be. Nietzsche will argue throughout this first chapter that our intellect originally served as a kind of mechanism for survival in that it helped us deceive, most prominently by pretence:

> In man this art of pretence reaches its peak: Here deception, flattery, lying and deception, talking behind one's back, representation, living in borrowed splendour, masquerading, the veiling convention, the stage play before others and before oneself, in short, the continual fluttering around the one flame of vanity is so much the rule and the law that almost nothing is more incomprehensible than how an honest and pure drive for truth could arise among men. (876)

What's more, we are deeply drenched in illusions and dream-images; we let ourselves be fooled every night in our dreams; we know barely anything about ourselves, about our physiology or innermost motivations—and so, Nietzsche asks: "Where on earth did the drive for truth come from in this constellation!" (877) Naturally, Nietzsche provides an answer: while pretence was useful enough as a form of defence in the time before man formed societies (again, a clear reference to the state of nature arguments employed most famously by Hobbes et al.), it became a dangerous thing once peace was made between people. As society is formed, people together establish "what from now on is to be 'truth'". (877) This truth is no more and no less than a "uniformly valid and binding designation of things"—an arbitrary set of names for things and states of being. Truth, then, is using the right conventions for the right things and states of being, whereas lying means using those conventions to make something "unreal appear as real". (877) Truth is no high ideal that earlier generations have laboured to achieve; rather, men of ages past simply wanted to avoid being damaged or disadvantaged by others' deception. Similarly, man only "desires the pleasant, life-sustaining consequences of truth; he is indifferent to pure knowledge without consequences and even hostile to truths that may be harmful and destructive." (878)

This arbitrariness of language leads Nietzsche to consider: "Is language the adequate expression of all realities?" (878) Nietzsche's short answer is no, language is not the adequate expression of reality. The long answer starts as follows:

> What is a word? The representation of a nerve stimulus in sounds. But to infer from the nerve stimulus a cause outside of us is already the result of a wrong and unjustified application of the principle of sufficient reason. (878)

Language, Nietzsche argues, is a product of human representations. We cannot justifiably infer that our words have any relationship to some cause outside of us. This will turn out to be an implicit critique of Kantian idealism. Nietzsche continues by commenting that, since there are many different languages, words are "never about the truth, never about an adequate expression". The arbitrary nature of words suggests that words never relate to the "thing in itself" [*„Ding an Sich"*], which "would be the pure truth without consequences" (879). Instead, language reflects the relations between things and people, and it is created through a process of metaphorization. The initial experience we have of a thing—which Nietzsche here calls a "nerve stimulus"—is "first translated into an image", then "reproduced in a sound". Language thus does not relate in any way to the way things are "in themselves" [*an sich*] but rather relates to the way things are to us. Language reflects our subjective experiences—not any kind of essential truth. Fittingly, Nietzsche explains this process of metaphorization through metaphor. The relationship between our language and the truth, he says, is like that of a deaf man who sees "sound-figures in the sand" drawn by a vibrating string[12] and consequently claims to know what sound means. The point here is that language is fundamentally 'deaf' to the things in themselves; it has no means to reach it, because things in themselves are fundamentally inaccessible to man, and because language is an arbitrary human creation:

> We believe we know something of the things themselves when we speak of trees, colours, snow and flowers, and yet we possess nothing but metaphors of things, metaphors that do not correspond at all to the original entities. Like the sound as a sand figure, the enigmatic X of the thing in itself takes the form first of a nerve stimulus, then as an image, finally as a sound. (879)

The most important aspect of this argument is Nietzsche's ambiguous relationship to the Kantian distinction between the thing in itself and the way things appear to us. Kant distinguishes the thing in itself from the appearance [*Erscheinung*] but Nietzsche distinguishes it from the nerve stimulus that is then further metaphorized. While it is not yet explicit here, Nietzsche will soon introduce the term *Anschauungsmetapher* (perception-metaphor) to indicate that even our initial experience of a thing is already metaphorized. Thus, Nietzsche states, the truth is no more than a "mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations". (880) What starts as a metaphor turns, after repeated use and solidifying convention, into truth. With a now-famous turn of phrase, Nietzsche concludes: "Truths are illusions of which people have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors that have become worn out and devoid of sensual power [*sinnlich kraftlos*]." And yet, Nietzsche immediately adds, we have a drive for truth [*Trieb zur Wahrheit*]. Somehow, we forget the entire process by which illusions come to be mistaken for truths:

Now, of course, man forgets that this is how it is with him; thus he lies in the earlier described manner, unconsciously and following a hundred years of habituation—and it is precisely through this *unconsciousness* [of the process by which illusions become truth], through the forgetting of the initial mendaciy that he comes to the feeling of truth. (881)

[12] Nietzsche calls these 'Chladnian sound-figures' in reference to physicist Ernst Chladni who did experiments with the vibration of strings.

All of this leads, in the case of reasonable man, to a worshipping of abstractions and concepts—truths of the coldest nature. But Nietzsche emphasises that even for the coldest-seeming of abstractions, concepts, scientific theories and philosophical systems still have their origin in metaphors—in an artistic transfer:

> [E]ven the concept […] remains only as the residuum of a metaphor, and […] the illusion of the artistic transfer [*die Illusion der künstlerischen Übertragung*] of a nervous stimulus into images is, if not the mother then at least the grandmother of every concept. (882)

Nietzsche goes on to say that every society builds a "mathematically divided conceptual heaven [*Begriffshimmel*]". (882) All systems of truths and all enquiries into truth—all science, all philosophy—are built by man out of concepts [*Begriffe*]—in this sense, man is more spider than bee, for he builds what he builds out of a self-produced, internally produced substance—the concept. To illustrate how such systems of truth are built, Nietzsche employs the image of the palpably naïve character called the 'researcher' [*Forscher*]. The researcher is perhaps misguided in thinking that he is looking for—and finds—things that are "true in themselves" [*wahr an sich*] but really only knows the world inasmuch as it is already made human. While looking for the truth, all he finds are metaphors—but like Columbus mistaking America for India, he stubbornly believes and insists that what he's found really is some kind of truth in itself:

> Only by forgetting that primitive metaphor-world, only by the hardening and stiffening of a mass of images that originally flowed forth in heated fluidity from the primordial faculty [*Urvermögen*] of human imagination, only by the invincible belief that this sun, this window, this table is a truth in itself [*Wahrheit an sich*], in short, only by the fact that man forgets himself to be a subject, and indeed an artistically creative subject, does he [the researcher] live with some peace, certainty and consistency. (883)

The man of reason, the character-if-not-caricature of the researcher in fact finds peace only insofar as he believes himself to be the measure of all things—but he does not realize that by doing so, all things become anthropomorphic. He feels himself the centre of the world, and thus it "already takes effort for him to admit to himself how the insect or the bird perceives a completely different world than man" (884). While he would like to have some basis to say that the human perspective is superior, Nietzsche is quick to add that 'the question of which of the two world-perceptions [*Weltperceptionen*] is more correct is a completely pointless one, since this would already have to be measured with the "*correct perception*" [*richtige Perception*] (884), i.e. with a measure we have no access to. Nietzsche adds, that, in general, 'correct perception' seems to him "a contradictory absurdity: for between two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, no expression, but at most an *aesthetic* relationship [*Verhalten*]". (884)

This aesthetic relationship is not in any way a reflection of the way things are in themselves. Again, all we know, all we have access to and all that we can build our systems of knowledge upon, are things already metaphorized in experience, then further metaphorized into the spheres of image (in thought) and sound (in language). This leads Nietzsche to the following statement:

> The word appearance [*Erscheinung*] contains many seductions, which is why I avoid it as much as possible: for it is not true that the essence of things [*das Wesen der Dinge*] appears in the empirical world. (884)

Even though Nietzsche himself does not really comment further or elaborate, it is important to further reflect on what is said here. This statement is significant, at least in terms of my project for three reasons: first, just in the context of WL, it captures very concisely the kind of aesthetic "idealism" (a world he will shortly use for the first time to describe his own thinking) he builds up throughout the first chapter; second, it indicates a break with the aesthetic metaphysics of GT, a metaphysics of appearance and essence (*Schein* as opposed to the *Ur-Eine*]) in which the essence does appear, to some extent, in the empirical world; third, it foreshadows the definitive rejection of the thing in itself or the essence of things in *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*.

Nietzsche ends this first chapter by describing how we might be convinced of the certainty of truth by the laws of nature—the fact that science is so internally consistent as to be infallible leads us to "a deep distrust of all such idealism" (885). While he only here introduces the term idealism, I have described how a kind of aesthetic idealism has been developed throughout the first chapter of WL: the idea that we do not have access to any truth but only to our perceptions and the illusions we build out of them through artistic transfer and metaphorization. He further explains that we only feel such strong confidence in our laws of nature because we always experience the world in the same way: from the human perspective

> [I]f we each had a different sense-perception [*Sinnesempfindung*], if only we could perceive either as a bird, or as a worm, or as a plant, or if one of us saw the same stimulus as red, another as blue, or a third even heard it as a sound, then no one would speak of such a regularity of nature, but would only understand it as a highly subjective entity. (885)

What we celebrate as the consistency of our science is merely a misunderstanding: what is actually consistent is our human perspective. With that, we move on to the second chapter of WL, which is much shorter than the first. In its line of thinking, it mostly follows the first chapter; Nietzsche starts by stating that while the "construction of concepts was originally the work of language", in later times it was that of science. No surprises here. But Nietzsche soon adds to this the following image, which sets apart chapter 2:

> [T]he researcher builds his hut close to the tower of science in order to be able to help build it and to find protection under the existing bulwark. And protection he needs: for there are terrible powers that continually intrude upon him, and that hold up to the scientific truth quite different "truths" with the most diverse coats of arms. (886)

Soon enough, it becomes clear what those terrible powers are. For as much as reasonable man attempts to find peace and quiet in his strict conceptual systems, the human "drive to form metaphors"—which is such a "fundamental drive of man" that one cannot think the human without it—is "in truth not defeated" and only "hardly subdued" by these conceptual efforts. The drive to form metaphors finds a way out—into "myth and art in general" (887). The reasonable man of the first chapter was only half the story:

> [M]an himself has an irresistible propensity to be deceived and is and is almost enchanted with happiness when the rhapsode tells him epic fables as if they were true, or when the actor in the play acts the king [*König*] even more royally [*königlicher*] than reality shows him to be. (888)

To put it more clearly, Nietzsche separates two kinds of men: "rational man [*der vernünftige Mensch*] and intuitive man [*der intuitive Mensch*]" (889). And whereas reasonable man clings—as if his life depended on it—to the structure of concepts, intuitive man, who is a 'freed intellect' doesn't need this structure; and so he plays with it and tears it down. Intuitive man seems to mean, simply, the artist—one who continues to create new metaphors and celebrates life as a rich experience of beautiful seeming—which brings us to the final paragraph once more. Let us once more look at the passage cited at the beginning of this chapter:

> There are ages in which rational man and intuitive man stand side by side, the one in fear of intuition, the other with scorn of abstraction; the latter is as unreasonable as the former is inartistic. Both desire to rule over life: the former by knowing how to meet the most important needs through precaution, cleverness, regularity, the latter by being an 'overjoyful hero' who does not see those needs and only takes life, which is disguised as semblance and as beauty [*zum Schein und zur Schönheit verstellt*], as real. (889)

Intuitive man, the artist type, only takes life as real—life, "which is disguised as semblance and as beauty". With this very late introduction of an alternative, artistic type, we have, much like in GT, a distinction between ways to deal with life. In GT, we had the Apollonian celebration of Schein and the Dionysian confrontation with suffering life, as well as the rational, Socratic strategy. Here, that rational strategy is presented most thoroughly as the life of rational man; the outcome of a historical development of truth out of illusion. Intuitive, artistic man, who truly affirms the fundamental drive to create metaphors is, in the end, presented as more joyful, more daring, and more life-affirming. Rational man only manages to keep unhappiness at bay, whereas intuitive man experiences both joy and sadness more intensely. While Nietzsche's preference surely seems to go to intuitive man at this point, it is still not yet completely clear what type Nietzsche prefers. In the text we will consider next, the value Nietzsche gives to these two strategies is stated much less ambiguously.

ii. *Über das Pathos der Wahrheit*

In *Über das Pathos der Wahrheit* (On the Pathos of Truth), which Nietzsche wrote in 1872—before WL—we find the same fable that WL started with, only here, it is longer. For that reason, we might suspect that it helped prepare WL. The relatively short essay discusses, among other topics, both the truth and the human drive to truth and art and the human drive to art. About the former, he writes: "The truth! Infatuated delusion of a god! What do humans care about the truth!" (759) which is shortly followed by the fable of cognition. Here, it is presented as a fable told by "a callous demon" who speaks:

> 'In some remote corner of the universe, flickeringly poured out in countless solar systems, there was once a star on which clever animals invented cognition. It was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of world history, but still only a minute. After a few breaths of nature, the star froze, and the clever animals had to die. (KSA 1, 759–60)

So far, the fable matches up with the one told at the beginning of WL, but here, it continues:

> It was also about time: for although they boasted that they had already recognised a great deal, they had at last, to great weariness, come to the conclusion that they had understood everything wrongly. They died and cursed the truth as they died. That was the way of those desperate animals who had invented cognition.' (760)

This essay seems, at first, much more pessimistic about truth and cognition. But, like in WL, Nietzsche points out that man is more than just a rational being:

> This would be man's lot if he were only a knowing animal; truth would drive him to despair and annihilation [*vernichtung*], truth would be eternally condemned to untruth. But only faith in the attainable truth, in the confidently approaching illusion, befits man.

Again, like in WL, man is not just rational, but also intuitive. Man lives "by being continually deceived" (760). It is only the "fatal new desire of the philosopher" to step outside of this continually deceptive consciousness; for the philosopher:

> desires once to peer through a crack out of the room of consciousness and down: perhaps then he will suspect how man rests on the greedy, the insatiable, the disgusting, the merciless, the murderous, in the indifference of his ignorance and hanging, as it were, on the back of a tiger in dreams. (760)

While much could be said about the metaphor of man "hanging on the back of a tiger in dreams", what is most pressing here is what Nietzsche immediately goes on to say: he distinguishes two responses to this dreaming man: "'Let him hang,' shouts *art*. 'Wake him up' shouts the philosopher, in the pathos of truth". (760) Compare this to the end of WL: two approaches to life are distinguished: one that simply affirms life as *Schein*, as a dream which man must simply go on dreaming, and another that wants to wake man from his slumber to show him the truth. But, in this second case, another delusion becomes clear:

> But he himself [the philosopher], while he thinks he is shaking [awake] the sleeping man, sinks into an even deeper magical slumber—perhaps he then dreams of the 'ideas' or of immortality. Art is more powerful than knowledge, for *it* wants life, and the latter achieves as its ultimate goal only—annihilation [*Vernichtung*].—

This last sentence is quite enigmatic in the context of this essay; it is even quite enigmatic in the context of all we have discussed so far. The fact that art is a form of affirmation is no surprise—this was the case in both GT and WL. But nowhere else does Nietzsche state as strongly that the desire for or pursuit of knowledge, the eponymous "pathos of truth", ultimately leads to annihilation.

All of this has prepared us for an examination of at the total affirmation of *Schein* in *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* (The Joyful Science), which will develop out of some of the ideas presented here already in enigmatic, juvenile form. Art, beauty and semblance will still be connected; science, philosophy, and rationality will still be connected to the truth and its potential for annihilation. Just like in these early texts, Nietzsche will struggle to clearly choose one path: that is, either beauty or truth—but what is at stake remains the same: life and its affirmation.

III. *Schein in FW: Aesthetic Perspectivism*

i. *Gaya Scienza: Art and Science*

Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft was written in 1882, and it remained throughout the rest of Nietzsche's life one of his favourite and even the most personal of his books. In his auto-biography *Ecce Homo*, he groups it together with *Morgenröthe* (1881) (KSA 6, 332). Giorgio Colli calls the book, in his afterword to the KSA 3 edition, "central" in Nietzsche's oeuvre, not just in the obvious sense of chronology but in a thematic and substantive sense. One thematic issue that is treated at length is the distinction between *Schein* and *Erscheinung*—needless to say one that is of crucial import to this thesis. Colli notes that FW is exceptionally measured: in other works (such as the late *Götzendämmerung*) "rages with great insistence against the metaphysicians' concept of 'appearance' [*„Erscheinung"*]" while also still considering our reality in some sense falsified, but here, more specifically in aphorism 54, "one finds this stark antinomy tempered in a higher, contemplative, clearer, animosity-free view." (KSA 3, 660) Colli connects this—much like I will in this chapter—to the antinomy between art and science:

> *The Gay Science* is also 'central' in terms of the juxtaposition of art and science. Nietzsche's incessant passion for this theme reflects the inner struggle between his antithetical vocations —and every work so far has revealed a respective outcome of this struggle [*Kampf*][13]. Now, in contrast, the very title points to a new solution: the inner struggle […] does not lead to the elimination of one of the two adversaries […] but to lead them to coexistence in a transfigured realm. (660)

I agree with Colli that FW for the first time does not cash out the tension between art and science into either option, but rather keeps them *in* tension and affirms them and that very tension that characterizes them. A joyful science, Colli leads us to believe, is precisely the product of such a double 'yes'. This too is quite plausible; Nietzsche would later, in the second 1887 edition, add the subtitle *La Gaya Scienza* to the work, and would draw more attention still to this phrase in his self-commentary in EH. *Fröhliche Wissenschaft* or Joyful Science is already a translation of this phrase, but with this translation, it tends to lose its original meaning: for *gaya scienza* or *gai saber* referred, in the Middle Ages, to a troubadour—a travelling poet and singer. In EH, Nietzsche refers to FW interchangeably with its subtitle, and specifies that he means with this concept "a unity of *singer*, *knight* and *free spirit*" (KSA 6, 333–4). Indeed, Nietzsche takes on all three of these roles in FW. In this chapter, I will explore two aspects of the gaiety of the *gaia scienza*: first, the joyful affirmation of *Schein* as our empirical reality, and second, the science beyond seriousness that Nietzsche proposes.

The first section will follow the line we have followed, in part, from GT and through WL. In GT, we ultimately found the *Metaphysik der Kunst* in a dualism of Apollo and Dionysus—the godly representatives of a metaphysical distinction between *Schein* and *Wesen*.

[13] The "respective outcome" in the works Colli refers to has up until this point always been one in which one of the two parties overcomes the other, much like the word *Kampf*—which is closer in connotation to 'war' than to 'friendly misunderstanding'—would suggest.

If we are allowed to call this quasi-Schopenhauerian, then WL was most definitely quasi-Kantian. The train of thought concerning reality in WL was, as I have called it, an aesthetic idealism: Nietzsche entertained the idea of reality only insofar as it does *not* appear to us in its essence. I will explore how and why in FW, the next and final step will be a rejection even of this negatively thought "reality".

In the second section, I will draw the other line that ran parallel to the first in Nietzsche's early thought and describe how it, too, finds a kind of conclusion in FW: the affirmation of life through either science or art. I will attempt to make sense of a move which spans a decade, which takes us from the justifiability of existence as an aesthetic phenomenon in GT, through the assertion that art, unlike the drive for truth, wills life in the *Pathos der Wahrheit* finally to FW, where art is "still bearable" as an aesthetic phenomenon—art, we will see, is what keeps the knower, the lover of knowledge, the philosopher, a safe distance away from annihilation. If there was any doubt about the interconnectedness of these two lines of thinking, Nietzsche himself explicitly calls art the "good will to semblance [*Schein*]". While FW is, in many aspects, a work that sets apart the early 1880s Nietzsche from the earlier Nietzsche, the intertwining of the themes of reality and art—and the central usage of the term *Schein* in the discussion of both—make FW a very clear extension, and arguably a conclusion, of the thought of the early Nietzsche.

ii. *Semblance and Perspectivism*

As stated, FW develops a kind of aesthetic perspectivism. In this section, I will first outline the 'perspectivism' part of this position and then relate it to the earlier works discussed so far, to show the development of Nietzsche's thought on *Schein*. The position is outlined in two groups of aphorisms, the first around the end of the first book and the beginning of the second book, most notably in FW 54 and FW 57; the second in the fifth book, which was only added in 1887. I will start with the first group.

In aphorism 54 of *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche proclaims most clearly his affirmation of *Schein*. The aphorism is titled *The Consciousness of Semblance*, and it develops for the first time in unambiguous terms a conception of reality that is *Schein* through and through and without reference to something 'real' outside of this *Schein*. The aphorism starts with Nietzsche exclaiming that he has found for himself that past valuations live on in his viewpoint in life:

> How wonderful and new, and at the same time how ghastly and ironic I feel, with my knowledge of the whole of existence! I have *discovered* for myself that the old humanity and animality, indeed the entire primeval time and past of all sentient being, continues to poetise, continues to love, continues to hate, continues to conclude within me,—I have suddenly awakened in the midst of this dream [*Traum*], but only to the consciousness that I am dreaming and that I *must* continue to dream in order not to perish: as the night-walker must continue to dream in order not to fall down. (KSA 3, 416–7)

Recall the passage in GT in which Nietzsche had Homer—as an Apollonian artist—exclaim that he wished to keep dreaming after he had realised that he was dreaming. The metaphor of a dream and the consciousness of the dream—what we might call a 'lucid' dream—is one that Nietzsche is quite fond of throughout his oeuvre. Here, substantially, the point is that no man is neutral in his perceptions and in the valuations that one immediately carries with oneself in all perception. To speak on the point of lucidity, one's being conscious or becoming aware of this perspectival 'colouring' of our experience does not suddenly open up a 'neutral' or 'colourless' point of view. One must go on dreaming. Nietzsche continues:

> What is 'semblance' [*Schein*] for me now! Truly not the opposite of any essence [*Wesen*],—what do I know to say of any essence except just the predicates of its semblance! Truly not a dead mask that one could put on an unknown X and also take off! Semblance is for me the active [*Wirkend*][14] and living itself (417)

This is the core of the passage; it is both the reason it is often quoted and perhaps the most important passage for this project. For it is only here that Nietzsche outright rejects the dualism that *Schein* has thus far always implied, both in his own thought—especially in the *Birth*, and in philosophy in general. This is in one sense a break with all of Nietzsche's prior thoughts on *Schein* and, what is very much connected, his prior thoughts on the nature of reality:

[14]: While *Wirkend* means active, *Wirklich* means real and *Wirklichkeit* means reality. The working is thus the real in German. I believe Nietzsche is applying this linguistical nuance here to imply that Schein *is* 'reality', not *opposed to* reality (in the sense of Being or essence, both translations of *Wesen*)

for both in GT's quasi-Schopenhauerian metaphysics and in WL's quasi-Kantian idealism, *Schein* always meant the other of some *Wesen*. Recall that in GT, *Schein* was empirical reality, presented by Apollo—set against the backdrop of a truer, more essential Dionysian *Ur-Eine*; recall too that in WL *Schein* was the metaphorized reality that could only be affirmed by intuitive or artistic man. Granted, in WL *Schein* was the other of a *Ding an Sich* about which nothing at all could be said, a *Ding an Sich* which only *would be* the pure truth without consequences—that is, if it could be anything at all for us. One could go so far as to say that any reader could have seen this move—which affirms phenomenal or empirical experience without any reference to an 'outer', an 'essence', a 'real'—coming nine years out, since WL only holds on to the most minimal and minimized conception of the *Ding an Sich*. Doing away with it altogether takes only a small shift in thinking—although, to be fair, a step with grave consequences. Let us continue reading the aphorism:

> [the active and living itself] goes so far in its self-mockery as to make me feel that here is semblance and will-o'-the-wisp and ghost-dance and nothing more,—that among all these dreamers [*Träumenden*] I, the 'knower,' also dance my dance, that the knower is a means and that the sublime consistency and interconnectedness of all knowledge perhaps is and will be the highest means of sustaining the universality of reverie [*Träumerei*] and the universal comprehensibility of all these dreamers among each other and thus *sustaining the duration of the dream*.

The initial consequence here in the same aphorism is that there is "nothing more" than *Schein*, nothing more than the dream, and the knower who is aware of this—the philosopher, and obviously Nietzsche himself—cannot and should not take a position outside of the dream, condemning *Schein* and its predicates from above or beyond. There is no position outside of the dream, in fact, it might be an unfortunate side effect of Nietzsche's preferred metaphor that we can think in terms of an 'awake' state at all—for the point is clear: there is only dreaming, there is at most—in the special case of the philosopher—a lucid dreaming.

If it is already clear here, near the end of book 1, that FW inaugurates a period of Nietzsche's thought which is defined by a 'perspectivism-without-idealism', or a recursive perspectivism—in any case, a perspectivism based on *Schein*, Nietzsche starts book 2 by making equally clear one more thing: his rejection of idealism does not imply a way out into realism. In FW 57, the first aphorism of book 2, Nietzsche addresses "the realists", whom he sarcastically calls "sober people", people who "feel armed against passion and fantasy and would like to make a pride and an ornament out of [their] emptiness" (421) Nietzsche accuses these realists of hubris, of knowing the 'real' nature of things, of knowing 'reality', but he contends:

> There that mountain! There that cloud! What is 'real' about it? Subtract the phantasm and the whole human attribute from it, you sober ones! Yes, if you could! If you could forget your origins, your past, your pre-school,—your entire humanity and animality! There is no 'reality' for us—and not for you either, sober people (421–2)

It is telling that Nietzsche once again mentions the past and "humanity and animality". The choice of these particular words readily reminds us of the "old humanity and animality" which lives, judges and values through our perspectival experiences of life according to FW 54.

These two aphorisms taken together, then, show Nietzsche rejecting both realism and idealism with the same logic. I have dubbed the resulting 'third' option *perspectivism*—qualified as a kind of recursive perspectivism that does not refer to an extra-perspectival realtiy—but Nietzsche does not use this term himself, that is, until the fifth book of FW, which was only added in the second edition of 1887.

In FW 344, Nietzsche questions, in a way that is very reminiscent of WL, the origin and meaning of our desire for truth. Nietzsche claims that we immediately assume that "truth is necessary" and even that we tend to think that "nothing is more necessary than truth". (575) But what is this "unconditional will to truth", asks Nietzsche: "is it the will *not to be deceived*? Is it the will *not to deceive*?" (575) He goes on to argue that the latter is the case and that, consequently, the unconditional will to truth is a moral phenomenon:

> For one has only to ask oneself thoroughly: 'Why do you not want to deceive?' especially if it has the semblance [*Anschein*]—and it does have the semblance!—as if life were based on semblance [*Anschein*], I mean on error, deceit, pretence, blinding, self-blinding [*Irrthum, Betrug, Verstellung, Blendung, Selbstverblendung*] (576)

This passage and especially the last sentence should remind us of a very similar passage in the late preface to GT (GT Versuch 5) that I already quoted in chapter 1.2:

> [A]ll life rests on semblance [*Schein*], art, deception, optics, the necessity of perspective and of error. (KSA 1, 18)

Of course, in the first edition text of GT, life rests on semblance only insofar as that semblance hides a deeper *Ur-Eine*, but in the second foreword (which, again, was added in 1886), Nietzsche surely had in mind his later conception of a *Schein* without reference to a deeper reality. The similarity between these two quotes is a result of the later Nietzsche (1886–7), who, looking back at these two works, added material—in the case of GT, a reflective preface; in the case of FW, a productive final chapter—in order to introduce some retrospective sense of univocity and cohesion to his oeuvre. Nonetheless, what is telling is that Nietzsche chose this specific idea that 'life rests on semblance' to tie his work together.

I would argue that we should grant Nietzsche this sense of cohesion. If I have done an adequate job of outlining the evolution of Nietzsche's thought on *Schein*, it should be clear to the reader that, indeed, the idea that life rests on semblance is one of the only things that remains constant throughout Nietzsche's first productive decade. To put it as clear as possible, we can distinguish three distinct forms in which the idea appears throughout Nietzsche's thought: first, life rests on *Schein* in the sense that our empirical experience is an already-transfigured form of the inner essence of the *Ur-Eine*; second, life rests on *Schein* inasmuch as our experience is already metaphorized through the *Anschauungsmetapher*—and only gets further from the 'truth in itself' or 'thing in itself' by consecutive steps of metaphorization (into image, into sound, into language, finally stiffening into 'truth'); ultimately, in the final form, life rests on *Schein* because *Schein* is experience—there is nothing outside it, no (conceivable) perspective outside of the perspectival.

In the foreword to FW, which is already included in the first 1882 edition, Nietzsche offers something of an explanation or at least a motivation for this final move, this rejection of thinking *Schein* in terms of an opposite *Wesen* or *Sein* or *Ding an Sich*. He writes that "we knowers"—presumably fellow philosophers or his readership—no longer have a "will for truth, for 'truth at any price'". (KSA 3, 352) We 'knowers' "no longer believe that truth remains truth when one pulls off its veil; we have lived too much to believe this." (352) It sounds, then, like Nietzsche has become disillusioned with all attempts at finding a truth 'beyond' *Schein*. Perhaps he suffers from something like a philosophical burn-out after attempting on his own terms to think this kind of truth—first in a manner following the example of Schopenhauer, then that of Kant. He ends the foreword with another ode to the Greeks, this time solely for their celebration of semblance—their appreciation for surfaces and, what means the same, their lack of a will to truth, a will to depths. I print the full quote uninterrupted because it is one full thought that deserves to be left unmarred:

> Oh those Greeks! They knew how to *live*: it is necessary to remain bravely by the surface, the fold, the skin, to worship semblance, to believe in forms, in sounds, in words, in the whole Olympus of semblance! These Greeks were superficial—*out of depth*! And is this not what we come back to, we daredevils of the spirit, who have climbed the highest and most dangerous peak of present thought and looked around from there, who have looked down from there? Are we not just in this—Greeks? Worshippers of forms, sounds, words? Precisely for this reason—artists? (352)

If it was not yet clear from aphorisms 54 and 57, Nietzsche's new perspectivism is not merely thought as negative—that is, as the 'remaining option' after the declaration of the impossibility of both idealism and realism: the foreword makes it clear as day that his new outlook on life and reality is motivated by a positive appraisal as much as it is by a 'negative' elimination of options. And, as always when Nietzsche celebrates the Greeks, what he sees in them as worthy of celebration is their unwavering affirmation of life. The Greeks knew how to celebrate life because they knew how to celebrate and affirm semblance, because, once again, life rests on semblance.

This finally leads us to 374, one of the last aphorisms of the book. In this aphorism, one of the last of the book, Nietzsche most clearly calls his new vision of the world perspectivism. The aphorism is titled *Our new 'infinite'*. The aphorism presents a relatively concise and unambiguous claim as to the "perspectival character of existence". Nietzsche argues that we cannot know "[h]ow far the perspectival character of existence extends, or even whether it has any other character". He follows this up by entertaining—seemingly rhetorically—the question "whether existence without interpretation, without 'sense' does not become 'nonsense', whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially an *interpretive* [*auslegendes*] existence". (626) While we may expect Nietzsche to answer that, indeed, there is nothing but an 'interpretive existence', Nietzsche merely answers with agnosticism:

> [T]his can, as is only fair, not even be determined by the most diligent and painstakingly conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect: for in this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself under its perspective forms and seeing itself *only* in them. (626)

For man, there is no getting around the perspectival, but by that very logic we cannot know if there is anything like a non-perspectival world or truth 'out there'. "We cannot see around our corner" (626)—that is, the corner of our perspective, our consciousness, our viewpoint in life. What still counts, then, for man is that *our* human existence—life—only makes sense insofar as we consider it an inherently sense-giving and interpretive life. Does this not echo WL's assertion that neither the mosquito, the bird, the insect nor man has the "correct perception" (KSA 1, 884)? Perceptions or perspectives are in no sense to be called 'correct'—correctness is just not a valid predicate of experience. For that reason 'truth' became untenable in WL; for that reason, we find ourselves in a new 'infinite', here:

> The world has rather once more become 'infinite' to us: insofar as we cannot reject the possibility that it *contains infinite interpretations*. (KSA 3, 627)

This 'infinite perspectivism' articulated in the second edition of FW comes as a direct result of Nietzsche's affirmation of *Schein*, which is already laid out early in the first edition. The perceptive reader has already noticed however that I have not simply titled this last chapter 'perspectivism' or even 'infinite perspectivism' but rather 'aesthetic perspectivism'. In the next section, it will become clear why Nietzsche's perspectivism in FW is thoroughly aesthetic. The affirmation of *Schein* as the basis on which life rests is, in the very same breath, also an affirmation of life as resting on *Schein*. The topics of semblance, beauty and affirmation are interwoven once more—just like they were in the *Geburt*, in *Wahrheit und Lüge* and in the *Pathos der Wahrheit*.

iii. *Aesthetic Affirmation*

In the previous section, we found that Nietzsche's affirmation of *Schein* in FW amounts to a conception of life as perspectival, life as "based on semblance […], deceit, pretence, blinding, self-blinding". (FW 344; KSA 3, 576) In this subchapter, I will show that this affirmation of *Schein* also entails a strategy for life-affirmation. To start with, let us look once more at FW 344, which I quoted above. For in the larger context of the aphorism, the statement that life is based on semblance is, as I already noted, part of an argument against the will to truth. To recap shortly, Nietzsche argued earlier in the aphorism that the unconditional will to truth is ultimately grounded in the moral conviction not to deceive. One can perhaps already sense how this could be problematic for Nietzsche, for whom life rests to a certain degree on 'deception' or at least on untruth. So he writes, after his interjection that it really does seem like life is "based on semblance", that the "'will to truth' […] could be a concealed will to death." (576) How could this be? Let us read on, first:

> There is no doubt, the truthful [man] [*der Wahrhaftige*], in that audacious and ultimate sense which faith in science presupposes, *affirms with that* [will to truth] *another world* than that of life, nature and history; and insofar as he affirms this 'other world', how? must he not at the same time deny its counterpart, this world, *our* world? But one will have understood what I am getting at, namely that it is still a *metaphysical faith* on which our faith in science rests. (577)

It is thus because the will to truth only affirms another world—the 'true' world—that the man of (faith in) science conceals a will to death. The will to truth leads to a negation of 'our world', that is, the empirical world of *Schein*. The faith that lies at the basis of science is, Nietzsche goes on to argue, faith in the divinity of truth: "that Christian faith, which was also Plato's faith, that God is the truth, that truth is divine [*göttlich*]…" (577) Fortunately, not all science is life-negating in this way—for otherwise how could we have something like a joyful science? In FW 107, which is titled *Our ultimate gratitude towards art*, Nietzsche argues that it is our "approval of the arts", which he calls a "kind of cult of untruth" (464) that saves us from the life-negating character that the truthful man, with his faith in science, tends to fall victim to. "If we had not approved of the arts" in this way, "the insight into the general untruth and mendacity that science now gives us" that is, our newfound consciousness of life's resting on *Schein*, "the insight into delusion and error as a condition of cognitive and sentient being [*erkennenden und empfindenden Daseins*]—would not at all be endurable [*gar nicht auszuhalten*]. (464) Because we have art—and have *approved* art—we can endure the knowledge that there is no ultimate truth to get to, no correct perception to use once more the metaphor from WL. In fact, without art we would be completely lost—we 'knowers', that is—we with our scientific instinct to gain ever more and more knowledge of things. Only because of art do we still enjoy our science after discovering—through that very science[15]!—the impossibility of achieving a conclusive kind of truth:

[15] Science as a translation of *Wissenschaft*, i.e. not just science in the sense of, for example, the natural sciences, but the entirety of the pursuit of knowledge, including philosophy, too.

> If we had not affirmed art […] [*h*]*onesty* [*Die Redlichkeit*] would lead to disgust and suicide. Now, however, our honesty has a counter-power [*Gegenmacht*] that helps us to avoid such consequences: art, as the *good* will to semblance [*guten Willen zum Scheine*]. (KSA 3, 464)

Art is "the *good* will to semblance"—and thus enables us still to affirm life after we have found it to be semblance through and through. This brings us finally to the core thought of the aphorism: the *aesthetic* affirmation of life:

> As an aesthetic phenomenon, existence is still *bearable* [*erträglich*] for us, and through art we are given eye and hand and above all the good conscience to *be able* to make such a phenomenon out of ourselves. (464)

All of this follows from what preceded: art is a necessary counter-power to science, for science tends to lead to a negation of this world through its will to truth. But, let us consider for a second: can any science, even one reinforced or balanced out by a *good* will to semblance, be said not to be characterized by a will to truth? If one does not will truth, then why would one pursue knowledge in the first place?

It is important to consider here the original German word: *Wissenschaft* which is formed out of the word for 'knowledge' [*Wissen*] and the suffix *-schaft* which means—at least in this etymological context—something like 'creating or 'forming'. Knowledge-formation does not inherently entail a need for ultimate truth—even though modern science clearly has those ambitions, according to Nietzsche. What art offers is the relativizing reflective position that sees the folly of the seriousness with which science is practised:

> We [knowers] must temporarily rest from ourselves by looking at ourselves and looking down and, from an artistic distance, laughing *at* ourselves or crying *about* ourselves; we must discover the *hero* and equally the *fool* in our passion for knowledge [*Leidenschaft der Erkenntniss*], we must become happy with our foolishness now and then in order to be able to remain happy with our wisdom! (464–5)

So what it means for life to be "still *bearable*" as an "aesthetic phenomenon" is that, considered as an aesthetic phenomenon, we are saved from having to suffer from the life-negating seriousness that most, if not all modern science falls prey to. The reference to life as an "aesthetic phenomenon" quite clearly echoes GT 5, which states: "only as an aesthetic phenomenon [are] existence and the world *eternally justified*" (KSA 1, 121)—but this should not confuse the reader. Consider: in GT, the aesthetic phenomenon is only as such because it is made affirmable—*justifiable*—by Apollonian transfiguration; here in FW, life is *bearable* precisely because we affirm it just the way it is: *Schein* through and through.

The puzzling end of the essay on the *Pathos der Wahrheit* then finally becomes solvable. To remind the reader, the idea there was:

> Art is more powerful than knowledge, for *it* wants life, and the latter achieves as its ultimate goal only—annihilation [*Vernichtung*].— (KSA 1, 760)

Art wants life because it wants *Schein*, knowledge only achieves annihilation because it makes demands on life—that is, the demand of eternal, ultimate truth—that life cannot satisfy. Life as an 'aesthetic phenomenon'—read in the context of Nietzsche's newfound radical perspectivism, simply means that life is an experience in which there is nothing beyond the *Schein*. Just like in aesthetic experience, we only experience the beautiful semblance. An unfortunate result of this metaphor is that it tends to fall apart if we think it strictly in terms of figurative art (like a still-life), in which the *Schein* of the image really does refer to something outside itself—namely, reality. If we are to read the aesthetic phenomenon as 'life understood as *Schein*', it makes more sense to think in terms of modern (i.e. abstract) art or music, art forms that are pure *Schein* with no referent.

We have some reason to believe that Nietzsche thought of life as a *musical* aesthetic phenomenon: in FW 372, which advocates for a belief in the senses rather than in ideas—sensualism contra idealism—Nietzsche argues that those idealist philosophers 'of old' didn't dare to think life in terms of music:

> 'Wax in the ears' was almost a condition of philosophising in those days; a true philosopher no longer heard life, insofar as life is music, he *denied* the music of life—it is an old philosopher's superstition that all music is siren music. (623–4)

The idealism of the old days was wrong insofar as they plugged their ear to life's music: shouldn't we conclude that life is an aesthetic phenomenon precisely insofar as life is music? Life akin to the abstract art form par excellence: life as semblance without reality, perspective without figuration. The knower who knows life to be such an aesthetic phenomenon, i.e. knows life to rest on *Schein*, can still affirm life—and continue to be a knower. The knowledge he creates is relative, subjective, perspectival—but no less desirable, no less necessary. Joyful science, it ought to be clear, then, is the creation of knowledge by a knower who affirms life as resting on *Schein*. A life dedicated to truth—truth with a capital T, one could say, although this would be lost on any German thinker—leads to life-negation, suicide, annihilation; but a life of *fröhliche Wissenschaft*—a life grounded in both a strong drive for knowledge *and* a healthy dose of *guten Willen zum Scheine* is a life worth affirming. Aesthetic perspectivism entails aesthetic affirmation. To be joyous in pursuit of knowledge is to enjoy a life of *gaya scienza*, that is, to be a "unity of *singer*, *knight* and *free spirit*". (KSA 6, 333–4)

Conclusion

As I set out in the introduction, I have tried in this thesis to render Nietzsche's thought around the term *Schein* in all of its paradox and tension. While there is no resolution proper to the various tensions that surround this term—truth and lie, science and art—Nietzsche ends up in FW with a strategy that could still be called a 'solution' to the tension—a synthesis that keeps its two terms in tension. I have refrained from trying to solve inner contradictions between Nietzsche's different works but have rather attempted to show how Nietzsche's thought evolves through continuous experimentation with the two tensions named above. As I have tried to show, Nietzsche's thought evolves from a quasi-Schopenhauerian metaphysics of art to a quasi-Kantian aesthetic idealism and finally abandons all metaphysical and idealist tendencies in favour of an aesthetic perspectivism grounded in the affirmation of *Schein*. To draw some conclusions from this thesis, I will shortly summarize this three-stage development.

In *Die Dionysische Weltanschauung*, the figure of Apollo was already conceptualized and with it, *Schein* was introduced. In that work, however, *Schein* merely stood for 'something covered up'—the Apollonian will was the will to 'veil' the truth, but much of the specifics of this veiling remained in the dark. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, we encountered the metaphysics of art [*Metaphysik der Kunst*] that used semblance as the opposite of *Wesen* (essence) and thus belonged to a dualism between the outer empirical reality and the inner, suffering and contradictory reality. This metaphysics was, as I have shown, greatly indebted to Schopenhauer, but at the same time departed from Schopenhauer's thought on one fundamental issue: the affirmation of life. For Nietzsche, while he shared Schopenhauer's pessimism, this meant that life had to be transfigured and transformed in order to still be affirmable. His solution was that life could still be justified as an aesthetic phenomenon—what such a phenomenon would be, however, remained ambiguous. In any case, in GT Nietzsche already searched in art and the realm of aesthetics for a path to life-affirmation. Nietzsche's first book thus already displayed a key feature of his later thought: the attempt at an aesthetic perspective on and valuation of life—rather than a moral one.

In *Wahrheit und Lüge*, I outlined how Nietzsche set up an aesthetic idealism. Nietzsche argued through an exposition of the genesis of language that we are not able to trace our human experience back to some original and originary 'thing in itself'. All of our experiences are mediated, and life is characterised by an 'aesthetic relating' to the world. The human perspective is just one amongst many, such as the bird's or the mosquito's—and we lack a 'correct perception' [*richtige Perception*] with which to measure our perspectival experiences. Nietzsche rejected the idea that the essence of things [*das Wesen der Dinge*] appears to us—and consequently rejected the world *Erscheinung* (appearance). Nietzsche introduced the two characters of 'rational man' and 'intuitive man', the latter of which very much seemed to get the advantageous valuation—for the intuitive man, an artistic type, simply affirms life as it is: "disguised as semblance and as beauty [*zum Schein und zur Schönheit verstellt*]". (KSA 1, 889)

In the *Pathos der Wahrheit*, Nietzsche spoke on art rather than 'intuitive (artistic) man'—and opposes it to 'knowledge' rather than 'reasonable man'; and yet the distinction was nearly the same: the first stood for an affirmation of life—life as characterised by *Schein* and by deception; the latter for a will to the truth beyond *Schein*, a truth beyond the falsified nature of experience.

In *Die Frohliche Wissenschaft*, Nietzsche once more distinguished rationality and art, truth and lie, but here tried to unite them in an unlikely synthesis. I argued that Nietzsche did so by conceiving of a science or philosophy that doesn't fall prey to the life-negating will to truth—a joyful science. Nietzsche aimed to unite science and art in a manner that he ascribed also to the concept of *gai saber*, which he would in EH summarize with "a unity of *singer, knight* and *free spirit*" (KSA 6, 333–4). In one of the most important passages in Nietzsche's thought on semblance, FW 54, Nietzsche most unambiguously proclaimed that life rests on semblance and that we should think this not in terms of an opposite essence, or a truth that lies behind or beyond it. Nor should we, according to FW 57, fall into the trap of thinking that we see the true nature of things—that is, we shouldn't imagine our perspective as 'neutral' and 'valueless'. The same logic applies to both lines of thinking: namely that life and our experience are inherently, fundamentally perspectival—and that we cannot subtract this perspective in order to find some sort of 'reality' beyond perspective. In the 1887 additions to FW and in the 1886 foreword to GT, Nietzsche claims, respectively, that life is "based on semblance [*Anschein*]" (FW 344) and, what is the same, life "rests on semblance [*Schein*]" (GT Versuch 5). For this reason, he wrote in the foreword to FW, we should once again be like the Greeks, who knew how to affirm life precisely because they knew life to rest on semblance and affirmed this life of semblance. And as FW 107 made clear, it is art, conceived as "the good will to semblance [*guten Willen zum Scheine*]" (KSA 3, 464) that saves us from the tendency to life-negation and even annihilation that the discussion of rationality in *Wahrheit und Lüge* and the *Pathos der Wahrheit* already warned us about. With our appreciation for semblance and our acceptance of life as semblance, we knowers—i.e. we philosophers, we pursuers of knowledge—are equipped for joyful science. Life, especially the life of the knower, is affirmable through the unity of truth and lie, science and art.

Since this project only focused on *Schein* as a term in the particular confines of works up until FW, this is where my reading ended. But that is of course not to say that this is the end-point of Nietzsche's thought on semblance, art, science, knowledge, truth, lie and other related themes and terms. The topic of this thesis was, again, particularly the revaluation of *Schein* that happens in the delineated scope, but I would very much encourage future studies to pick up where this thesis ends. Hopefully, I will be able to expand on this project in the context of doctoral research; this would allow me the time and space to chronicle the development of *Schein* as a term throughout Nietzsche's entire oeuvre. One specific set of questions that I have had to leave undeveloped here regards the specific meaning of the concept of *fröhliche Wissenschaft* or joyous science, both in FW and beyond. While it is not directly related to Nietzsche's thinking on *Schein*, one would expect the idea of a joyous science to start from the kind of positions that I have outlined in this thesis—perspectivism and the synthesis between art and science. On this front, too, I highly recommend future inquiries.

Nonetheless, I believe this thesis has dealt with Nietzsche's thinking on semblance in an innovative and insightful way. By following the developments of Nietzsche's thought, light was shed onto the long-running tensions between both truth and lie on the one hand and science and art on the other. To my knowledge, this has also been the first inquiry that accounts for the different iterations that *Schein*, Nietzsche's concept of semblance, goes through on its way to the often-discussed aphorism 54 of FW. Moreover, both these long-running tensions and this development of the term have been contextualized in terms of perhaps the most significant problem in Nietzsche's oeuvre: life and its affirmation.

Allow me, in closing, to offer one more reflection: to the 1887 edition of FW, Nietzsche added a new motto, replacing the Emerson quote I reflected on in the opening of this thesis. That second quote is as follows:

Ich wohne in meinem eigenen Haus,
Hab Niemandem nie nichts nachgemacht
Und—lachte noch jeden Meister aus,
Der nicht sich selber ausgelacht.
Über meiner Hausthür.

I will not run the risk of embarrassing myself with an English translation in rhyme, but literally, the poem translates to: "I live in my own house, I've never imitated anyone and—I've laughed at every master who didn't laugh at himself." (KSA 3, 343) If the first motto tellingly omitted the priest—if deliberate, a clear negation of Christian morality—the second simply rests gladly in the idea that to live well means not to take life or oneself too serious, to be oneself, to laugh well and to be joyful.

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