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Development Within the Chaosmos: a Deleuzian Approach to Pedagogy

Winkelhorst, Sharron

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DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE CHAOSMOS

A Deleuzian Approach to Pedagogy

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INTRODUCTION

With this thesis, I aim to critique the notion of development based on a philosophy of Being. I will argue that development, and learning, can only occur within Becoming. This critique is inspired by Nietzsche and Deleuze's project of overthrowing Platonism. Because, as I will illustrate using Deleuze's texts: *Plato and the Simulacrum*, *The Logic of Sense*, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, and *Proust and Signs*, transcendental principles show us how reason is conditioned, not how it is generated. To explain the process of genesis (of reason) we have to understand the principles that make order out of the chaos of life.

My main hypothesis is that development is a process of the embodiment of differences, as a process of becoming. And learning is the process of encountering and internalising differences through involuntary memory and pure thought. Conditioning, on the contrary, is a process that reduces development and thought to functions in service of a final state, an Ideal, and therefore obstructs development.

The process of development is a process of individuation where essences of becoming, grounded on an eternal return of difference, become internalised and increase someone's power to resonate with the World. The production of a subject, however, is problematic because it is the result of conditioning, the internalisation of general identities (the symbolic order) in reaction to overpowering negative tensions. Development has its spiritual equivalent in learning and pure thought. Conditioning stops thought, it allows access to a desired feeling against the condition that someone accepts a certain state, or fact, without question. Because of this, conditioning always produces the unfortunate side-effect of anxiety, since the assumed truths lack any grounding in univocity.

The structure of this thesis

First I will outline our project inspired by Deleuze and Nietzsche of overthrowing Platonism and the philosophy of Being. I will argue to replace a metaphysics of Being with a metaphysics of Becoming grounded on difference because the concept of chaos can explain order and flux, whereas the idea of a (Platonic)order leaves us trapped in the need for a mythical transcendental realm. Following this, I will argue that Being is in a problematic tension with Becoming and that this metaphysical conflict explains the problem of conditioning related to pedagogy. I will conclude that a philosophy of Being renders us unable

to select for essences of becoming. This causes an inability to make meaningful relations with the environment and the embodiment of difference, which is what constitutes development.

In the first chapter, the second part, I will problematize subjectivity and rationality by explaining that the production of simulacra precedes and grounds rational thinking, not the other way around. I will also argue that any preference for a rational dialectic is grounded on a problematic projection of a lacking subject, which is the internalised idea of identity to neutralize negative stimuli. This will illustrate that a pedagogy based on a philosophy of Being is dependent on the internalisation of a symbolic order that is merely generated as a coping mechanism against anxiety. Before we start imagining a pedagogy that is suited to produce sense, within a living, difference-producing world, we first have to acknowledge that development is stunted by negative experiences. Because overwhelming negative feelings cause us to produce idealistic fictions to counter the tension.

Outlining the difference between a philosophy of Being based on Ideas, selected through rationality, and a philosophy of Becoming based on difference, selected through desire, I will conclude that development and learning can only be understood if we assume the existence of two primary notions. These are the productive principles of the will to power and the limiting principle of the eternal return. These two principles alone can explain the conditions of emergence (of life) and the process of individuation that results from their dynamic. In the third chapter, I will outline the dynamic between forces, as the will to power, and how they produce consciousness. It will become clear that consciousness is reactive and that true thinking, and learning, occurs unconsciously. The distinction between conscious and unconscious, or active and reactive allows us to understand the difference between genesis and conditioning. Given the principle of the will to power, I will explain that we generate sense through our affects as we resonate with our environment. The will to power is a principle of affective resonance that generates newness by actualizing virtually present difference. This is what we call development.

In the fourth chapter, I will focus on the principle of the eternal return. I will explain that the eternal return offers us a notion of virtual possibility, which we can understand as the actual World. The World, as the eternal return of difference, raises the status of nature, in its complete immensity and splendour, within our philosophizing; and illustrates that we can only make sense to each other when we produce sense in line with the differential essences that nature produces. It is possible to have a sense of univocity – a single sense of saying-, ergo, not to be trapped in subjective relativism, but only if our process of individuation emerges in resonance with the production of difference, the dynamic of the cosmos at large. Individuation

comes as a process of resonance, and the internalisation of emerging differences.

Subjectification, in contrast, is argued to be the problematic product of alienation due to an eschatological projection onto the chaosmos. I will illustrate that the eternal return of difference allows life to be grounded back on the activity of material life by referring to the pagan cosmological idea of eternal recurrence. I will compare this to the Christian notions of creation and infinity (God), which leads philosophers, like Heidegger, to downplay the generative role of desire and chaos, and consequentially to come up with a new transcendental philosophy of subjectivity. Finally, I will compare Heidegger's take on recurrence of the same to Deleuze's eternal return of difference. In light of this comparison, I argue that only a cyclical cosmological approach to the eternal return, as the eternal return of difference, leaves room for genesis, and is in that sense concordant with our notion of development.

Finally, in the last chapter, I will conclude what we have learned from the simulacra, will to power, and the eternal return in a final analysis of learning. I will introduce one last differentiation, that is the difference offered by Deleuze between worldly signs, signs of love, sensuous signs, and signs of art. These signs illustrate the difference between conscious, reactive conditioning as the activity of voluntary memory and voluntary thought, and unconscious learning as the activity of involuntary memory and pure thought. In line with the previous chapters, I will argue that learning is done unconsciously. The final analysis will clarify that we learn in apprenticeship to sensuous signs and signs of art, which are respectively signs of nature and culture. I will argue that learning is the tracing of differentiation within a sense of vocation that unfolds itself through apprenticeship to signs. When we develop we learn to resonate with the unfolding of the virtual, both unconsciously, through sensuous signs, and consciously through signs of art. I will illustrate that a focus on common sense and a search for truth, however, threatens our ability to produce a sense grounded on univocity. My conclusion will be that only sense grounded on univocity, sensuality, can be shared within a community, can co-constitute becoming as development.

CHAPTER ONE: OVERTHROWING PLATONISM

This chapter outlines an attempt at liberation from the conditioned, which follows Deleuze and Nietzsche's critique of Platonic metaphysics of Being. In *Plato and the Simulacrum* (1983), Deleuze emphasizes the importance of Nietzsche's project of overthrowing Platonism. Throughout his work, Deleuze finds ways to do justice to Nietzsche's project, while also maintaining Plato's metaphysical motivation to select. Deleuze, in contrast to many of his philosophical contemporaries, does not abandon metaphysics. As we will see in this chapter, he builds on the concepts of difference, desire, and the will to power to form a critique against any form of representationalism, as first introduced by Plato and his method of selection motivated by transcendental Ideas. Deleuze's conclusion: we cannot critique the world of Ideas and appearances if we take refuge in abstractions simply more cunning; we have to start at forming a critique of our motivations from a place that remains immanent. This project echoes Immanuel Kant's reversal of Platonic Idealism, as his critique of pure reason, examining 'how can the given be given to a subject?' Only Kant, according to Nietzsche, did not push through to its ultimate conclusion, that is, a true critique whereby thoughts are no longer adaptations to 'real' things and Ideas, but a critique that examines the very genesis of reason itself. Kant's Copernican revolution within metaphysics remained lacking because his grounding of knowledge on a rational subject was still conditioned by a static metalogic (our faculties of reason), and therefore unable to explain the conception of novelty, also the production of difference. Similar to Plato, Kant's 'non-metaphysics' is based on an oppositional hierarchy with transcendental categories. Hence, Deleuze's complaint: "Transcendental philosophy discovers conditions that are still external to the conditioned. Transcendental principles are principles of conditioning and not of internal genesis. We require a genesis of reason itself, and also a genesis of the understanding and its categories: what are the forces of reason and of the understanding?" (Deleuze 2006a, 85) The above is the context of this thesis's intuition, namely that only a critique that attacks conditioning from within itself can open up a genuine philosophy of Becoming.

This thesis leads with the question: what is development, or what is education? This is a question motivated by the same critique as Nietzsche and Deleuze, namely, what is the difference between developed and conditioned? If there is such a thing as development and learning, it will belong in the domain of difference, of newness, unless development means a person is merely manipulated to fit a predefined mould. We argue that the difference between

a Platonic Being, and a Deleuzian Becoming echoes the difference between conditioned and developed. This chapter will therefore entail arguments build on Deleuze's paper *Plato and the Simulacrum*. These arguments lead us to conceptualise chaos, and outline the principle of becoming as the production of difference. An ontology of difference creates a need for an alternative to rationality and the subject. We will argue that Deleuze's concept of the simulacrum is able to ground the alternative to subjectivity as a process of individuation. To ensure we fully understand the concept of the simulacrum we will use Świątkowski's (2015) close reading of Deleuze's *the Logic of Sense* to elaborate on its psychoanalytical grounding. In summarization: what follows is an outline of the distinction between a philosophy of difference and philosophy of Being, through which it becomes clear (in the later chapters) that development constitutes becoming grounded on difference.

PART ONE: VIRTUAL CHAOS

We can easily feel sympathy for the Platonic attempt to solve the problem of measure, and its ethical consequence, namely, the inability to know what to select, and consequentially how to be. To offer a (simplified) example: if two people are in disagreement and a decision needs to be made between them, that process could be decided, in a 'Nietzschean', sophist, sense, by the dominating 'creative' power of one of the contestants. A sense that, when it motivates people, leads us to think that victory is relative to one's individual 'creative' power and unrelated to any pre-conceived 'truth'. The opponent should be 'submitted'. Such a process would be decided, not based on one being 'right', but simply because one is either more cunning, or stronger; which is, one way or the other, through violence. It might even be beneficial if you are simply 'stupid' but most forceful. Socrates' 'humility' within Plato's method of selection, for what is 'right', on the other hand, displays that what should win is not what can be enforced, but what is as an essential 'truth' superimposed on beings. A conversation, according to Socrates, should be structured through a dialectic to select Ideas.

Our Deleuzian answer to Plato's and Nietzsche's propositions would be that there are in fact 'essences' that structure reality and that we can select them to order our reality in relationship to them. Hence, we can avoid relativism and the problem of violence inherent to absolute individualism. But, as will become clear, the existence of essences, makes more sense within a framework of becoming. These essences are not Ideas, but problems constructing a virtual field of tension, that we can only perceive through its solutions, which are actualised structures, also differences, or individuations.

Development as the actualisation of the virtual

Traditionally, it may be remarked that "development," or "entwincklung," is a process of 'unfolding' properties that are already within phenomena, meaning properties that are pre-existing of current expressions as essences. Development perceived this way would be contrary to genesis, and if that is the case there would be no reason to differentiate between development and conditioning. Development in such a view would equal the actualisation of potential within proper conditions. In what follows, an argument will be constructed stating that development should be interpreted as the embodiment of difference, a process that relies on genesis. It will be proven that what is incarnated within development is not pre-determined, but that the newly embodied is, however, actualised from pre-existent virtual structures that overflow reality as created time, as 'the new'. Virtuality will be an important concept grounding development. It denotes, in response to Plato, a domain of Ideas as problems, which are not distinct from their incarnation, and in that sense simultaneously 'pre-existent,' as well as novel.

Genesis takes place not between one actual term, however small, and another actual term in time, but between the virtual and its actualisation – in other words, it goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases of solution, from the differential element and their ideal connections to actual terms and diverse relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time.

(Deleuze 2004, 183)

We can trace Deleuze's thoughts on the virtual back to, amongst others, Albert Lautman who proposed a mathematical grounding to Platonism, so that structure (Oneness/Univocity) could be reconciled with genesis (difference). This would lead to a proposition of an ontological One-All, a duality of nature: the One and the Dyad (plurality). Without diving too much into the mathematical properties and details (For this, see Bova and Livingston 2017). The summarization is that any concept of a 'One-All' answers to an ontological need for an account of a virtual structure that can also function as an account of its real, concrete genesis (65). Meaning, the need for a principle that can both explain structure and production, origin and becoming. In other words, there is a search for a 'dialectic', a way to select formal relationships, that explains concrete relations. This search, specifically in

Deleuze, echoes Plato's task to illustrate, and perhaps solve, the tension between the flux of sensory experience and the fixity of ideas. Between temporal becoming and infinite Being. The notion of the virtual is proposed by Deleuze because it offers a solution given its bidirectional structure. This structure encompasses that change and becoming occur, fundamentally, and that those are not the consequence of intelligible, static moulds producing copies.

Deleuze hints at a more fundamental duality than the Platonic intelligible versus the sensible, or Idea and matter, namely "that which receives the action of the Idea" versus "that which eludes this action". According to him, we have to acknowledge that there is always an 'overleaping' of boundaries or a 'subversion' of identities. A continuous change that "exceeds the resources of a given consistent theory" (78). This conception changes the direction of ontology: "[It] no longer takes the form of a progressive completion of a One-All or a filling in the gaps of a total account of all the beings that is in itself capable of both completeness and consistency." (79) It breaks with the absolutist tendencies of thinkers like Aristotle and Hegel, that is sparked from Plato's dialectic.

Deleuze hypothesizes an ontology of difference instead, stating that genesis is irreducible to anything else but itself, it is difference-in-itself. Difference, then, is the unbounded infinite substance of the chaosmos. This means difference, ontologically, is not negative or contradictory (as is the case with Hegel), but primary and productive. While negation is oppositional and dependent on the thing it reacts to, difference is autonomous and active. For both to exist means to be productive of difference. Difference (-in-itself) is chaos, and thus escapes our understanding as it is prior to it. This means difference can only be sensed, not known, as an empirical phenomenon. It is 'transcendental' in the sense that we are only conscious of its subordinated expression the moment we analyse it. Difference-in-itself can only be sensed and discovered as the productive ground of normative orderings, structures of power or any other social-spatial production. This ultimately means it is pre-social, pre-human, pre-Being, pre- any categorization. Difference is chaos individuated, it is produced, and it interacts with other produced differences. It should be clear, that if indeed difference is the ground of being, and we adjust our perspective to reality based on this concept, this has strong consequences for what it means to learn and develop. If being is the movement of continuous becoming, the words we use are, as representations of past conceptions, in tension with the real that is becoming.

The next sections focus on the argument that the synthesis of oneness as the consequence of Logos, as in Plato's *Timeaus*, is an unjustified projection. I will argue there

cannot be a 'harmony' between thoughts and Ideas, at least not through rationality or representational knowledge, because the concept of Idea is founded on a mythical, transcendental double of the actual. The concept of chaos can explain both genesis, through the principle of Will, as affective resonance, as well as explain the norm of consistency and completeness, which is order. Hence, it will be clear that chaos grounds development. It is the positing of a transcendental order, that creates, not solves, the ethical problems resulting from an overwhelming tension between fiction (Being) and reality (becoming). The relationship of chaos, the infinite multiplicity, with Logos, supposed as unity, is a duality that stands in problematic tension with our phenomenological experience. Through our understanding of this problem, we can build the argument that Ideas condition development in an unfavourable way.

Chaos and individuation

The experience of development can best be understood as a process of individuation. More precisely, individuation should be seen as active subjectivity; a being embodied that reflects the activity of the cosmos. What does this mean? It means that the body is an expression of pure positivity, Will (to power), which forms complexes as resonance. Based on this, desire is the expression of will through individuation, through the subjective pole of becoming. This means desire and resonance do not 'spring from' a subject, but that subjectivity is a pole of an actualized structure of the virtual. In other words, subjectivity is not some 'conscious' well both containing and reflecting emotions or cognitive structures; it is a movement of synchronicity and resonance. Will, or desire, hence, is not the expression of a 'lack', because it creates relations, it does not depend on them. In part II on the simulacrum we will elaborate on this. The resonance of pure productivity, which is will, becomes desire because it contains a structure organized through individuation. Which brings us to the question, what is individuation?

The question of individuation, I argue, can best be understood as we reframe the Platonic tension between two principles, the dyad/chaos, and order/laws, mentioned earlier. Chaos being that which is unbounded potential; unbounded denoting that chaos cannot exclude anything and is without a delimiting force acting upon it. I argue that any structure (individuation) we observe can primarily be explained from the assumption of chaos, as being unbounded in an absolute infinite way, plus the anthropic principle (the given of human life). This is a reversal of any dialectic that posits order as the ground of existence; plus it is a

challenge to idea of order being grounded by unity. An alternative to Plato's ideas, which are supposedly gathered under unity, is that the 'One' is simply that what is without limit, an infinite multiplicity, as difference, that under different conditions is solved in different ways. Another word for the unbounded would be 'chaos'. In this thesis, we are imagining chaos as infinite and eternal productivity, which grounds actualisation as individuation. Within this scheme, phenomena develop constantly, which in turn develop and express certain structures that point back to a general problematic, namely the structure of multiplicity constantly demanding new shapes, and concepts, to channel its solutions. Chaos creates structure (order) that is in tension with other differences, and as a consequence of that relation produces the new. Hence, 'problem', here, is an 'idea' prior to solution and structure. This problem, however, does not equal a transcendental ideal, but something that is incarnated in becoming, and is because of that essentially paradoxical. In that sense, the problem is also actual. Deleuze calls this aspect of the actual the 'virtual', and everything 'together' the 'chaosmos'

One of the reasons, I suspect, that many thinkers have trouble founding Being on chaos, as unlimited difference, is because there is simply a conceptual 'mistake' in thought that pushed a prejudice towards thinking in terms of Being, instead of becoming. In chapter three we will formulate the eschatological bias producing the metaphysical misassumption, in the second part of this chapter, on the simulacrum, we will describe the conditions of its internalisation. In any case, one of the reasons is that it is impossible to analyse chaos to find identity; or that we can't find anything 'beyond' or 'within' chaos that could be understood as fundamental, or a thing. So far, we have only hinted at a traditional inclination towards rationality that depends on identity, on the discernment of 'Being'. This is, partly, understandable if we take the 'simple', ontic, perception that there are 'things', such as human beings, which stand in an orderly relation to other things, and therefore in tension to the concept of chaos.

Desire versus rationality

To grasp the significance of this fundamental duality, Being versus chaos, and its dialectical consequences, we need to make a comparison between desire and rationality. Desire is one of the key concepts helpful to us, as it was used by Deleuze to critique any hierarchical thinking of Being grounded on rationalism. Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, and their followers, asked what the being of Being is, or what the 'essence' of Being is: 'tis hé ousia' (Plato, *Parmenides* 129a; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II 1028). They had a similar answer: there

exists a duality of the One and the many, which corresponds to something like Ideas and appearances, form, and matter. These are concepts creating a split between the experienced (as plurality) and the real (as unity). The latter is rated as most significant, creating a hierarchical, vertical, oppositional onto-theo-logy. In this view, Being is generally assumed to have the following characteristics: it is infinite (as opposed to finite), it is necessary (as opposed to coincidental), it is consistent (as opposed to changing), and it is intelligible (as opposed to sensible). This general notion implies that a metaphysical inquiry can be done by a neutral rational subject who can distinguish order. Nietzsche, siding with Heraclitus as an enemy of such Parmenidean ontology, problematized this perspective because he saw it as the ground, and result, of hubris and nihilism. The reason was that it came from people assuming supremacy within their subjective being, within the soul as consciousness. In the next chapter, I will explain that consciousness, for Nietzsche, comes second, not first. He also argued that any concept of ‘the real’ (Ideas), makes the ‘real-real’ a reaction to fiction because abstractions are made up. We agree with Nietzsche’s line of thinking that criticizes a static transcendental for standing in opposition to our sensual reality in flux. We can agree that there are ‘things’ outside of our periphery that we can form relations with, things that have power and are hence ‘conditioning’. But, contrary to Plato, we will argue that the assumption that these forms are static lacks any ground.

Plato understood desire not only as the opposite of rationality but also as a bodily weight that forms a danger to the soul (the seat of rationality). The whole Socratic ‘task’ is to escape bodily perceptions, obscured by desires, to gain access to the “Ideas”, unspoiled. In other words, the philosopher’s task is to learn how to ‘die’, in the sense of escaping bodily life (*Phaedo*). Desire is characterised by Socrates as a lack, moving the body ‘without measure’ in every direction except the right one, which would be towards wisdom, towards the Good (*Phaedo*). The only response to this unfortunate condition, for philosophers within this tradition, is the rational task of *selection* for Being: “the motive for the theory of Ideas is to be sought in the direction of a will to select, to sort out. It is a matter of drawing differences, of distinguishing between the “thing” itself and its images, the original and the copy, the model and the simulacrum” (Deleuze and Krauss 1983, 45). The simulacrum being the unfounded simulation of desire, for Plato a subjective subversion of the real, of Being. Unfortunately, Plato’s dialectical selection, as portrayed here, only functions if Ideas are real, meaning static and eternal. The problem is that Ideas, such as ‘justness’, which is meant to inform us of the merit of our direction, are mythical. Hence, with Plato, and any other philosophy of Being, we

land in circular reasoning demanding a mythical doubling in the form of a transcendental realm, to ground our dialectic reasoning.

Law and order

There is no reason to insist on the supremacy of fixity over change. In agreement with Deleuze, we argue that this ontological grounding on an external transcendental plane persists because of an illusion: “thought is covered over by an image made up of postulates which distort both its operation and its genesis. These postulates culminate in the position of an identical thinking subject, which functions as a principle of identity for concepts in general” (Deleuze 1994, 265). Ergo, the Idea of a fixed subject is projected onto experience to justify Being. The problem is that there is no such static object that can, or has to, ground anything.

We need to elaborate on the problem of structure. To answer what ‘causes’ order we first have to establish that meaning is produced through differentiation, because there can’t be meaning unless we have discreet elements composing a structure. Only a complex of structures can be analysed. In the same manner, must any image be differentiated so that it can be perceived as an image, it must be composed of ‘pixels’. Also, an absolute undifferentiated static unity encompassing all cannot be observed. For an analogy, if there is a constant tone vibrating through everything, we would not be able to hear it because it does not contain, or cause any differentiation. Chaos, the unbounded, is, contrary to what Plato argues, in this sense pure oneness; because it has no delimiting force that produces identities. In its ‘oneness’ it does not hold any (analytical) meaning, and cannot be contemplated. Hence, structure comes as a limitation. ‘Being’ is limiting. It is in this sense that we agree with Plato that ‘Being’ causes the order we can contemplate, but we call this ‘Being’ difference, or becoming, and this becoming is embodied. If we were to add the properties ‘fixity’, ‘eternal’, or ‘consistent’ to it, that would go against any sensual observation.

Another way to illustrate the problem is that there is a perceptual limit, namely that we cannot perceive things past a certain boundary. For example, beyond quantum qualities, beyond the existence of the fundamental elements of quantum nature. When, for example, we take an electron, we can only perceive its action, namely that it acts as a positivity. It can be anything within itself, meaning beyond what we can perceive it could be many things. In the same vein aren’t things affected by an absolute unbounded field. Only a spectrum of things causes differentiation in effect to other things. With an electron, there is a range of things that can affect it in being an electron. Anything could, fractally, be affected by anything and cause

it to differentiate, but there is a causal/topological position that limits that probability. However, does that also mean that these boundaries, within causal effect and perception itself, are definite proof of distinct Beings? Namely, that reality solely consists of, and can be explained by, for example, quantum particles? It does not.

If we understand the will as an unbounded force, as productive of difference, it would be able to will structure and bind itself without the existence of a transcendental law, but through repetition alone. This is Deleuze's answer to how order relates to chaos, namely that 'we' create universals, laws, as the repetition of action. This amounts to a reconciliation of chaos with itself; a 'fold' of pure potential intuiting itself, that through this intuition models something that is in flux. A movement containing folds that synchronise through resonance. Perceptually this is traced as a causal chain of processes. An analogy would be a flock of birds which is both movement and form. The perception of causation would, however, be the form of consciousness, as ego identity, that projects itself on resonance. In the next section, on simulacra, it is explained how the subjective bias of identity is produced.

Given that we only ever experience the intersection of chaos folding onto itself, which we perceive as the intersection between order and chaos (because we use linear thinking), we can already deduce that the will only perceive the embodiment of its difference, the effect of its power through affect. This expression should be understood as merely one side of that what is infinitely unbounded. Within the limited, the border itself is not limited. Meaning, that 'limit' cannot be limited because it is itself the limiting. Another way of understanding a limit, without proposing it as law, is simply saying that there is no limit, there is only absence. It is where a 'thing' ends, the boundary of perception. When arguing that a thing does not exist, we could be saying that it 'is not here'. It is the undifferentiated, the infinite multiplicity, the unbounded beyond perception. Therefore, absence, 'nothing', is everything. Nothing is everything that is not undifferentiated, and absolutely everything also. Given that no law delimits absolutely everything. If that were the case, we reintroduce a new, identical, set of the problem of the transcendental vs the unbounded. In other words, the introduction of an absolute law creates a new everything that includes that law that leaves the problem of it not being able to ground itself. An alternative to an absolute law that orders itself 'vertically', is a law that is the effect of resonance as every point ever established. This would be difference that relates to itself 'horizontally' within the actual world we perceive. So, every 'thing' has its centre, and the periphery of its world also has everything. But at this limit, at the periphery, these are known to us as probabilities, which is the virtual as possible relations.

PART TWO: THE SIMULACRUM

Representation is inescapable given our use of language for communication, but we need to understand its place within the metaphysical order. For Plato, representation itself is not problematic. That “phantasmatic simulacra” could be mistaken for faithful representations, however, is (Deleuze and Krauss 1983, 48). And by this perceived danger “Plato divides the domain of the *image-idols* in two: on the one had the *iconic copies* (likeness), on the other the *phantasmatic simulacra* (semblances)” (original emphasis, 47-48). The simulacrum is a ‘thing’ without the internal relations and proportions of an Idea; it is not internally and spiritually modeled on an Idea. The consequence is for the way it lays claim to an object, through “an aggression, and insinuation, a subversion, “against the father” and without passing through the Idea” (48). This is a crucial point Deleuze affirms, rather than criticises. According to him, in contrast to Plato, to ‘avoid the equivalent’ is to be a master, an adept, because its opposite: to look for a level of resemblance that is ‘true’, is to suppress that part which is productive. There are no Ideas; there are problems as the product of interactions of desires, and the only structuring principle is the will to power. Desire as principle and difference as being (becoming) are the only things explaining the possibility of experience. Existence, hence, is difference, and difference is productive. This implies the simulacrum is the only ‘true claimant’ because it can deal with intensities produced in difference, even though it can never fully ‘grasp it’ in a representation. In what follows is an outline of the production of the simulacrum and how it relates to the conditioning of the problematic subject. Based on this process we can argue for liberation from transcendental structures because they lack univocity, and obstruct development.

The dynamic genesis of sense

To illustrate the workings and importance of the simulacrum we will make a segway to the Logic of Sense, in which Deleuze aims to demonstrate that our desire is not primarily organised by external structures. He argues that ‘sense’ occurs as a product of the primary drives (which are expressions of desires) in interaction (as a body) with its environment. Sense is constructed through this dynamic, but moreover, it is the product of the dynamic. Meaning, it is a positive difference that allows for a separation from the bodily drives by producing ‘spiritual’ objects as the child develops. In other words, there is a dynamic genesis of sense “during which thought separates itself from the body” (Świątkowski 2015, 29). This

means sense does not belong to the same (topological) dimension as the body. Sense is a property of the 'surface', which we will come to understand as thought, whereas the body belongs to the 'depths'. The use of the word 'surface' denotes that sense 'traces' the movement of bodies in the 'depths' underneath. We can understand sense as the 'organising' of desire through topological dimensions. Which is a process we can recognize as we think and structure things 'top-down', from concept to the negotiation between our drives, our 'constitution'. What does this hold? The 'ego' relates to its surroundings starting from a 'position'; it is oriented towards experience systematically. These positions are various internalised 'objects' that are used to mediate, 'channel', and flow from desire.

What is the simulacrum?

The simulacra have to be understood from the perspective of our first experiences. From the perspective of a newborn child developing a psyche as it physically interacts with its surroundings. From this position, a person experiences first contact with bodies, pleasant excitations, states of tension, stress and anxiety, the frustration of bodily need, fear of annihilation, separation anxiety, uncontrollable overpowering objects, and so on. In other words, a world of unorganised impressions that, according to Deleuze, following Melanie Klein, leaves the newborn in a state of permanent insecurity (36). The first psychic representations are those that accompany the good 'partial objects' that cause pleasure, and the bad 'partial objects' that cause tension and fear (as a result of the absence of pleasurable excitations, or an overabundance of negative ones). The objects are called 'partial' because Klein, and Deleuze, argue a child only comes into contact with part of a breast, or simply only part of any body or object. But most of all, these objects are partial because from the moment of birth the child is ruptured from an experience of 'wholeness', the womb, that it is unable to recover because the child's environment lacks the univocity that allows it to relate to it. Meaning, that the child is unable to synchronize with the environment, and as a consequence, it develops its psyche through this discord.

Simulacra are the product of any person's productive ability to produce psychic content, an internal differentiation that reacts to tension. The concept of a simulacrum illustrates that we do not have to start thinking from the primacy of the Idea to its opposition in the copy. Rather, the simulacra is a sign emerging out of a field with tensions, and encompasses always both 'the defective', the discord, and 'divine perfection', the latter being the lacking object of desire projected as a whole good being. As the psychic representations of

the child's initial experiences, Deleuze argues the simulacra show that everyone is capable of developing one's perspective free from the 'external order'. It denotes an immanent world "devoid of transcendence," that does not judge itself, yet, from the external order of signifiers (44). Because a small child would not yet be aware of this order, it does not 'know' what 'mother', 'father', 'brother', or 'bottle' mean in the scheme of things. Infants and small children showcase that psychic experiences only arise from the different degrees of intensity and various excitations they experience. The simulacrum simulates and produces effects; it expresses a 'force'. This implies individual experience is primary to shared meaning, but does react and is therefore in accordance with the shared levels of intensity. The next levels of psychic development are secondary to the development of simulacra, as certain events allow for shared meaning through the mechanism of simulation of the same, the projection of identity through the use of language, the internalisation of the symbolic order.

Projection and introjection

Any child's cognitive activity is largely centred around projection and introjection because it suffers a great deal. Most children are left to suspend negative tension through continuous introjections (consummation) of good partial objects to alleviate suffering. Conditioning, instead of development, starts with the urge to resist the impact of continuous overwhelming stimuli. Increased perceptual and cognitive abilities allow for the recognition of 'desired feelings' through projections and introjections; they create a referential 'image' grounding an intensity baseline. There is a need for a whole/complete good object, but reality does not reflect this need, so the child produces this object in itself as an ideal version of things, starting with the mother. Development slowly allows the distinction between good and bad objects and this promotes the need to undo the damage of aggressive and sadistic attacks that came about earlier as a result of the death drive. The workings of the psychic mechanism of reparation are easy to imagine when we take the many ways in which parents punish while expressing symbolic cues to children, judgements, so children can pinpoint their own 'damaging behaviour' and make up for it. Conversely, people respond to aggression with rejection and punishment and this allows for cognitive association and conditioning in reference to the intensity baseline. This development, however, does not secure a 'balance', given the love provided by the good object is conditional. The construction of the good object necessarily convicts the child as a subject that is 'lacking', with passions that are 'guilty', considering that it needs to adjust and develop in accordance to the external symbolic order.

The child is taught that only a continuous struggle against the internal bad objects can secure the love of the good object and protect the ego against anxiety (61). The child is made to accept that not getting what it wants is not bad; it is necessary.

Conditioning through the symbolic order

Why is it necessary to psychoanalyse the conditions of new-born and small children? Because it explains that the circumstances of children necessitate them to internalise the symbolic order as offered by their environment. This is how the child is first conditioned to take its inner world with a grain of salt and focus on an external logic, despite its own desires. Psychoanalysis explains that children are always in danger of depression, given that the environment does not follow any logic that resonates with the child's intrinsic 'drives'. There is no ground for interpretation, except for an external symbolic order that is unreachable. Schizophrenic and depressive states result from constantly being confronted by one's lack, or incapacity and inability to produce a complete object. Deleuze illustrates that children develop through topological positions that can be characterized as paranoid schizophrenic, depressive, and sexual perverse because they deal with simulated objects that are constructed as the body and the senses develop, to create an intensity baseline, to deal with tension from negative experiences.

The increase of control over the body and its triggers enables the strengthening of the ego. Only when conditioning by the symbolic order is 'completed', or neutralised, meaning when thought becomes disconnected from the destructive and sexual drives that are triggered when they are fighting negative excitations, bad partial objects, can a child learn. Any activity that is concerned solely with constituting balance between the drives is merely changing conditions by rearranging mental constellations. Deleuze emphasizes that most people 'get stuck' with schizoid, depressive, and perverse tendencies, even past childhood, as they are continuously trying to simulate 'whole good objects' to counter negative bodily excitations, anxiety. This attempt to make a 'good whole object' fully present, for example, by trying to get someone you love to care for you, unfortunately always comes with the association of the repressed negative experiences that it tries to make up for. The experiences where your parents abandoned you in times of need. The investment in simulacra simulated out of a feeling of lack requires high levels of neuroticism to avoid the danger of those bad feelings coming to the surface. Ideally, a child does not have to deal with such 'trauma', but given the demand of the symbolic order most of us find ourselves in, children need to have a process

that establishes a safer environment for the environment and themselves. Unfortunately, the description of a possible preventive or restorative process falls outside of the scope of this thesis. But we do hope that specifically illuminating the difference between development and conditioning, could inspire those that are active in the field of developmental psychology to come up with interventions that reflect that difference.

Phantasms and events

To get back to our point, Deleuze argues that at least one process is necessary to establish a relationship with the environment that allows for development. Namely, the separation of the ego from the bodily drives. This allows for an internal phantasmatic life to develop so that ‘events’ and ‘phantasms’ can emerge. Events and phantasms are the expressions of effects of physical causes without representing actual qualities of objects or occurrences. The phantasm is not an imagination or fantasy but represents an ‘event’ connected to the actualities, though separate from it; it is the ‘noematic attribute’ of an object or occurrence (184). For example, in the case of death, according to Deleuze, there is physical death and death as an event. The first is the disintegration of the body and the usual effect of grief on the ones left behind. The second, “can be expressed by the verb [to] ‘die’”. The effects of this kind of death are unpredictable. The event of death realises itself in the environment of the body in diverse ways that cannot be determined in advance. Death persists as a problem” (185). What Świątkowski and Deleuze mean to say is, that the occurrence of death is a challenge taken up by people in different ways; it is through the force of confrontation that one constructs phantasms, which are “primary with respect to both the psychological experience and the concepts of logic” (185). This is similar to how a child, confronted by a sudden outburst of a parent, develops a phantasm to solve that tension: “an actually experienced, persistent state of fear could generate a phantasm of a threatening figure” (183).

Phantasms are grounded on events and endogenous and exogenous causes, including hereditary physical constitution such as oestrogen levels or disease, actions and passions introjected, and last but not least, the disciplinary influence of the laws of the symbolic order. The phantasm allows for relative freedom from the actualised objects and occurrences because it is “separate from the body.. not a direct representation of the activity of the subject.. not directly expressing its actual passions ... [and] not a visual expression of a subjective will” (179-180). It is the noematic attribute that allows for a relationship toward the actual passions of the subject by representing “the result of the passions and actions of a

subject” (180). What this implies can be made clear with an example: when a person imagines he is a horse, ‘becoming-horse’ is a phantasm that allows one to “sympathise with the problems encountered by the horse in its life;” it allows one to feel proud and independent but also to suffer from its ‘horse-like’ sensitivity of the senses (206). In other words, such as imagining becoming a horse, we can imagine different ways to relate to the environment through the affects that emerge in the event of the phantasm, towards new possibilities for action. The phantasm is thus the result of passions and actions in relation to an event and is, therefore, a response and a transformation of the event, plus an event itself. Events and phantasms are both the same and different, in a similar sense that every object is both ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’, which is actual in being a phantasm. Also, for the part that an image is constructed of an event, the phantasm, it is never fully consciously grounded:

It escapes precise determination and is always only partially actualised. It represents something that can never be made entirely present. [A phantasm] .. represents an event that is itself referring to a multiplicity of psychological, social, economic and political factors that concern... [someone’s] life. It brings them together but it does not allow for their full explication. The phantasm merely allows for a continual interaction between those factors, for a continually changing response. (186)

In other words, phantasms are the internal differentiations that remain, partially, unconscious. When encountering an event, these unconscious processes allow for relative freedom from external determinations. They produce ‘more’ life.

The metaphysical surface

The dimension on which phantasms emerge is the metaphysical surface, which is the surface separate from the physical, as the part that is ‘spiritual’; it transcends any definition of objects and subjects, inside and outside, and is, in fact, their possibility for emergence. It “brings ‘its’ internal and external sides into contact in order to unfold them onto a single side,” which is another way of saying that “the virtual emerges together with its actualisation” (187). More simply put: what we find on our ‘inside’, that is, our passions, history, and ‘ego’, meets with the ‘outside’, of phantasms and events, and both form a problematic field plus solution simultaneously. Moreover, the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are interchangeable or ambiguously entangled with one another, considering the primacy of the metaphysical. The

new arises through the previous solutions within the actual. The key is that the metaphysical field enables the ego to escape hard determination because within the virtual there is always more that can be made present. This is what allows the ego to form new relationships with its environment and to transcend the physical, in the production of phantasms, within events (187). These virtual ‘problems’ are systems not yet fully developed that produce ‘metaphysical room’ for creation; they impose a ‘crack’ on the limits of the physical surface.

Subjectivity, then, is the product of events. According to Deleuze, the ‘ego’ is merely that field wherein a person is passive or active in relation to those events. This echoes Nietzsche’s distinction between the active and reactive, which we will further discuss in the next chapter. Beyond the active and passive is the metaphysical surface and one can only ‘be aware’ of the ‘content’ of this surface through the construction of phantasms, which can move along with its productive dynamic. Similar to Nietzsche’s active man, the construction of the metaphysical surface is not done through reflection, rather it is a way of sensing and relating to the environment through affects: “The movement that is visible in the phantasm implies an opening towards liberated a-cosmic, impersonal and pre-individual singularities”(206). This idea of the metaphysical surface allows us to think of a subject released from actualised structures and reactive control. In other words, the metaphysical surface illustrates the difference between conditioning and development. Development is the newness that arises through the previous solutions within the actual. It is what is made present from the virtual, free from the determination of the drives. This does not mean it does not have endogenous causes, it only means that it moves through the endogenous causes to make new qualities present. This links us to learning, which is the spiritual dimension of development, namely the production of the ‘subject’ as a process of individuation, as it emerges with events. Only through the encounter with an event can a person learn, otherwise it is only shuffling around historical content, purely determined by physical conditions. With conditioning, a person remains stuck with the problem. When we address learning in our final chapter we will make this clear.

Finally, the projected complete object, the product of a coping mechanism, is what we have to understand as Being. And difference, with the simulacra as its subjective pole, is the ground of being, as becoming.

CHAPTER TWO: THE WILL TO POWER AS AFFECTIVE RESONANCE

The overthrow of Platonism is done by undermining the primary position of ideas and the principle of rationality. Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, introduced the ordering principle of the will to power, that allows us to explain, and substitute, any metaphysical understanding of Being in light of Becoming. In this chapter we will outline what the will to power constitutes, we do this by illustrating the difference between active forces that are dominant, and reactive forces that are adaptive. The imagine we aim to portray is of a cosmos constituted by a dynamic of forces that creates differences and qualities through the generative selection of the will to power.

It will become clear that consciousness relates to the reactive side of forces in becoming. And that reactive forces are in servitude to active forces. This enables an understanding of the difference between the conditioned as consciousness, and the developed as a process of generating differences unconsciously, through affective resonance, by sensing the qualities that emerge. This does not mean that consciousness is 'bad' it merely illustrates there is a hierarchy between spontaneous forces with more generative power than others. The ability to resonate, to be affected, and produce newness as a reaction to active forces, is a relational capacity that allows people to 'act' reaction, and to be creative in the process. To be able to unfold virtual dimensions and constitute beings. The principle of the will to power and affective resonance illustrates an alternative to a static ontology of developmental states, by introducing the concept of the virtual. This chapter will allow us to elaborate on the argument that development is not mediated through pre-existent forms, but constituted by problematic fields.

The best place to start to illustrate the will to power is through illuminating the difference between the conscious and unconscious. We do this as a compliment to the difference we have already laid out in the previous chapter, namely between simulacra and Ideas. The simulacra is a product of desire in interaction with its environment. This image is not created in resemblance to external or transcendental structures, but by an internalized difference, or internal imbalance, as the consequence of tension. So far, we have been able to illustrate a becoming that does correspond to external dynamics, only not through imprints, but as a the product of desire in resonance with force dynamics. We can trace this idea back to Nietzsche and the principle of the will to power, which is equivalent to what we experience as desire, given that we are individuated. The principle of the will to power allows us to be very

specific about what it means to constitute becoming, and for us to argue that the metaphysical underpinning of learning and development is an unconscious process.

The ‘problem’ of consciousness

For Nietzsche, to understand consciousness is to understand whatever arises in our consciousness is merely a symptom of the transformation of forces which are nothing like consciousness itself. Consciousness is the border region affected by “the external world,” made up of things that are ‘superior’ to any awareness of it (Deleuze 2006a, 36). Consciousness, hence, is the process of evaluation and interpretation, because it is the actual effect of being incorporated and subordinated into something through reflection. What does this mean? “Consciousness usually only appears when a whole wants to subordinate itself to a superior whole ... Consciousness is born in relation to a being of which we could be a function” (Deleuze 2006a, 36; Nietzsche 1935 II, 227). Taken together, consciousness is the expression of a reaction, an ‘adaptation’ of our mental phenomena through a will, to fit in a dynamic larger than us. If a consciousness found itself ‘superior’, that is, stronger, than its exteriority, it would have lost itself within activity, and would therefore be unmotivated to react to its surroundings through conscious measure. In this sense, consciousness relates to value because it is through the evaluation of what is happening, as an overwhelming force is sensed, that concepts are being produced and appointed to the occurrence.

According to Deleuze, in reaction to Nietzsche, we always experience ourselves being active and/or reactive within a bigger whole, and consciousness is on the side of reaction out of servitude to this whole. This brings us to what is ‘outside’ the experience of consciousness: “nothing but quantities of force in mutual ‘relations of tension’,” where “every force is related to others it either obeys or commands” (Deleuze 2006a, 37; Nietzsche 1968, 635). Our consciousness, plus our ‘being alive’-ness are the product of tensions and relations between different quantities of forces, some dominant, some dominated. What is underneath our perception of life, or thought, is movement as the result of this. Furthermore, “This difference between forces qualified according to their quantity as active or reactive will be called hierarchy” (Deleuze 2006a, 38). Hierarchy, in terms of strength, qualifies the relationships; and relationships produce strength. Our own strength essentially escapes our mind and is as such hard to define. Only what impinges on us with a certain ‘violence’ evokes a conscious reaction: “one overlooks the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions, although “adaptation” follows

only after this; the dominant role of the highest functionaries within the organism itself ... is denied” (Deleuze 2006a, 38; Nietzsche 1967b II, 12). Hence, first, there is a force that through its spontaneity creates a type of form. If a person, or organism, is overcome by the strength of this emerging force, it internalizes the difference that is produced through conscious measure. That person is in reaction to the active force. Moreover, even though the quality, active or reactive, of forces, can differ, force, however, does not cease to be a force: “individual power is by no means surrendered [in reactivity]. In the same way, there is in commanding an admission that the absolute power of the opponent has not been vanquished, incorporated, disintegrated. “Obedience” and “Commanding” are forms of struggle” (Deleuze 2006a, 37; Nietzsche 1968, 642).

The above means that thinking is always done from a place of reactivity. This explains why, according to Nietzsche, any true empiricism can only be thought through *sensing* what is created in the relations of forces, and not through the categories which are a result of the subjugation of the mind. In other words, true understanding is necessarily unconscious. Consciousness is ‘conditioned’ by stronger forces. Whereas the unconscious develops understanding, as it moves along with the emerging differences. So far, a framework has been constructed posing the whole of life as force. This means that although a person can become reactive, becoming itself does not refer to a ‘lack’. The idea of lack comes from a causal explanation where force is split into two and consequently seems separated from its manifestation as if every manifestation is not itself a display of force. Manifestation is turned into an effect, which refers back to force as if it were a distinct and separate cause (115). Nietzsche illustrates this is similar to saying “light shines” as if shining and light are separate things (Nietzsche 1935 I, 100; Deleuze 2006a, 115). It is this type of thinking that leads to a distinct, blameworthy, subject; force is thought to be separate from a subject (light ‘chooses’ to shine). On that account, any effects observed are caused by an agency that has a choice whether to exercise force. This fiction allows reactive forces, ‘agents of the symbolic order’, to think of themselves as ‘superior’ (in control), or opposed to force, and allows force to be made ‘evil’ when it is not in the benefit of the transcendental order (Deleuze 2006a, 115). Force becomes moralised.

Again, “forces are inseparable from the differential element from which their quality derives. But reactive forces give an inverted image of this element: the difference between forces seen from the side of reaction becomes the opposition of reactive forces to active forces” (117). Within a philosophy of Being this inverted image, the fiction, is projected onto active forces and makes them blameworthy. The consequence is that within pedagogy

educational practices become limited to practices that want to secure the representation of the symbolic order within children's conscious activity so that it conditions their behaviour.

What does it mean to be active? "reaching out for power" (Nietzsche 1968, 657). The characteristics of active power are: "appropriating, possessing, subjugating, dominating" (Deleuze 2006a, 39). This means we need to be aware of the place of consciousness within the hierarchy of forces, as secondary. In our chapter on learning, we will explain that we can only truly 'learn' something if our thought is 'involuntary', meaning, the product of unconscious processes. Thought is a qualitative outcome of quantitative tensions. When one force encounters another, those forces, which are always different in quantity, correspond to a specific quality, being either active or reactive. This means quality is presupposed in the relationship between different quantities and is therefore secondary; yet quality is always absolutely there, albeit arbitrarily (41). In other words, the tension, the quantitative relation between forces, creates qualitative objects. We always have to understand that we, as beings in becoming, and our thoughts, are qualitative output resulting from the subjugation of forces over other forces. Given that these forces are always in tension with each other, there is movement; meaning, there is becoming.

Nietzsche distinguishes between the conscious and unconscious in a similar manner to Freud, although less systematic. Freud's separation of the conscious and unconscious allows us to understand the difference between 'feeling' and 'acting' reactive forces. Freud's 'topical hypothesis' explains two systems interacting with each other: one system containing lasting traces of excitations, as mnemonic traces, and a separate system without 'memory traces', but able to access them. The latter receives the perceptible excitations without those perceptions leaving traces on them. The second system is the conscious and the first is the unconscious. Memories are unconscious and consciousness "is born at the point where the mnemonic trace stops,"

We must therefore see the formation of the conscious system as the result of a process of evolution: at the boundary between the outside and the inside, between the internal world and the external world, we could say that 'a skin has been formed which has been made so supple by the excitations it constantly receives, that it has acquired properties making it uniquely suited to receive new excitations', retaining only a direct and changeable image of objects completely distinct from the lasting or even changeless trace in the unconscious system. (Deleuze 2006a, 105)

This 'skin' is a system able to grow in capacity to be affected and resonate with its environment, and specifically 'resonate' because its activity is not the effect of 'caused states of being' but is what we can perceive of a becoming, of productivity. According to Nietzsche, and Deleuze, consciousness allows for reaction to be acted, through its ability to resonate. This means there is certain productive interactivity of being influenced by perceptions while also 'adding' something complementary; a type of 'dance' of reaction. This ability to resonate is the will to power. Being influenced could be misunderstood as being passive (Deleuze 2006a, 58). Nothing is less true. The power to be affected does not correspond to one thing being 'imprinted' onto another thing without its own properties. One force can 'resonate' (sensing and valuing) with another, and in doing so produce qualities in becoming. This 'being able to be affected' determines our power, our force. Deleuze builds on the motif of affective resonance (becoming), already found in Nietzsche and Spinoza. Both argue the more ways a body can be affected, the more force it has (58).

What is resonance?

What does it mean to resonate? It is when the frequency of one force matches the frequency of another. A person can be in resonance with another person, a part with a whole, a system with its surroundings, a system with another system, and so on. When two frequencies are matching, only a minimal amount of energy is needed to incite a high amount of vibrational energy within a system. In other words, the activation of a high-energy vibrational system needs a very low energy trigger as long as it is matching in frequency. What this means for a person, or any living being, is that it has mechanisms, latent processes, that can be activated given the right circumstances. To be moved, to be energized, a person needs to be in alignment, in resonance with their environment. And for a mechanism to be activated, it needs a trigger that matches its constitution. As you can imagine, this has consequences for development, because certain developments can only occur if the body is being brought in contact with certain signs. Which we will elaborate on in the last chapter.

The relationship of resonance works both ways; once the system is induced into vibration by an external force, in turn, that external source also becomes amplified into producing more energy by the system. To give an illustrative example, you can see this with mechanical objects, how a washing machine causes nearby objects to vibrate at the same frequency. The same goes for microstructures such as quantum physics or molecular bonds (Bogue 2009, 304). It is also hypothesized vibration and resonance structure the development

of organic life, perception, and consciousness, through a field of ‘musical forms’ (Ruyer, Posteraro, Roffe 2019). Building on Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, we have removed ourselves far from any ontology or metaphysics grounded on subjects, objects, and a simple, causal or mechanical structure. Within a framework of becoming, we can find connections to hypotheses formulated in quantum field physics, namely that chaos is the ground for production. This link helps us imagine a chaosmos in which structures are implicated through a series of differentiation (Plotnitsky 2006). This ‘formation’ of things, that cannot depend on linear causality or atomistic determinism, falls in line with the principle of affective resonance. To slow down the phenomenological chaos of the world, however, we limit ourselves with an introduction of the dynamic form of affective resonance to explain individuation or development as the product of coupled systems.

Affective resonance

Mühlhoff (2014) characterizes resonance as follows:

It is a co-dependent interplay of the two coupled systems, it is something that is dynamically established in the coupling as a bidirectional and non-additive joint process. ‘Non-additive’ means that the vibration in resonance is not a linear sum of separate vibrational contributions of the two coupled systems. It is not a superposition of independent processes in A and B, but it is one process integrating both systems as one new coupled system. (1008-1009)

That systems are coupled through resonance can be perceived from an external position, as we can see that two pendulum clocks have synchronised their swing. But it is also possible to perceive resonance from an immanent perspective, as a human being in relation to others and/or an environment. This is the experience of affective resonance, being moved in being joined with another force. We name it affective, because the movement, or being ‘caused’ to move, happens within a subconscious interplay that only arises to our consciousness through our emotions, or to a large degree more subtle through our affects (feelings). A small amount of energy can trigger a large system, but for a lot of systems to be excited, they have to be coupled within a very specific setting to avoid interference. For example, two pendulums cannot resonate when they are set up in a windstorm. This is simple enough, but the same goes for more complex systems, such as humans; two people would have trouble resonating

within an activity, such as dancing if other people are distracting them. What else, the product of the single objects or systems in joint movement cannot be reduced to the addition of both their energies. Resonance creates new qualities, unfolds new dimensions, and constitutes beings. This means resonance is not an aggregate of quantities, it is a problematic field producing answers by adding something new. We experience this as a lightness, an energy that allows things to unfold. How are we to understand this concretely? When two people dance, if the conditions are right and they become in ‘flow’, they will produce a variety in dance movements that exceed their individual ‘banks’ of skill and techniques, their individual potential; but it will also exceed what could be calculated as a product of both their capacity. This means, their joint movement produces something entirely new, even if this newness is only perceived as a subtle difference.

Phenomenologically, it seems adequate to see the resonative affective engagement in its entirety as something qualitatively new and self-contained, and in its concrete form as highly sensitive and specific to the relation. (...) Joint movement is not accountable as a composition of individualized voluntary action, aiming at a certain preconceived target state. Phenomenologically, the joint movement is much rather an unfolding of forces that are inherent to the relational and situational configuration. The experience of being-in-resonance is constituted by an immediate experience of these forces, taking hold of oneself within the joint dynamic. (Mühlhoff, 2014, 1011)

In resonance difference is constituted as the product of a problematic field, that is real and in that sense actual. This problematic actuality is the virtual.

A simplistic misunderstanding of actuality as objective materiality would perceive such a claim as an impossibility. But we have argued against a reductionist ontology in chapter one and suggested an ontology of difference instead. This leads us to interpret the world as a chaosmos, a problematic field constitutive of individuations, solutions, which all have a singular essence. We can find the notion of the virtual first in Bergson, who arrived at it, because evolutionary individuation of current organic species could not be preconceived based on, and thus not reduced to, a potentiality within its predecessors (Bergson 1907). This means evolution cannot be derived from a static ontology of developmental states where potential comes to actuality, or that creation is mediated through pre-existed forms. Production is constituted through actuality, but actuality simply means ontologically real. Only the real has constitutive power. Deleuze build on Bergson’s notion of the virtual and

explained it as an ontological register of differential elements. The virtual differs from the possible, because within a notion of possibility, something that is non-existent, but modelled on preconceived logic, jumps into existence from an abstract realm out of nothing. This type of actualization would be governed by the law of models and Ideas and excludes the movement of differentiation. The actualization of the virtual, however, is due to the constitutive unfolding of dynamic forces in actuality. It is purely positive, not magical, abstract, or limiting and therefore encompasses the element of chance, such as can be observed in contemporary (quantum) physics. This also means the virtual does not ‘operate’ as a function directed at preconceived target states, it does not contain essence, it produces essence. The notions ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’ could be confusing if they are interpreted through opposition. It is simplest to understand the actual as ‘the phenomena that we can perceive and measure at any given moment, but the virtual is as much present given that it is embodied in what we perceive. The notion of the virtual, however, ensures we do not reduce phenomena to a state such as a static ontic frame, a snapshot, but appoints the living dynamic of differentiation as the ground of becoming. Chance, chaos, produces us as finite beings in becoming, through the infinite structures within virtuality.

The principle of the will to power

So what is the will to power? Our analysis thus far sketches a dynamic of forces, in affective resonance with each other, generating qualities out of tension, that subjugate weaker forces under the hierarchy of active creation. All of this is the process of becoming, which can be summed up as the product of a single principle. Affective resonance is nothing other than a mode of the principle of the will to power. The will to power, according to Nietzsche, is the only principle not too general, and, therefore, able to account for becoming. For a principle to be true to its nature it needs to express what it governs or regulates faithfully. So, in a ‘system’ of non-systemization, a principle of “superior empiricism,” as the chaosmos of the eternal return (see next chapter), needs to be plastic. It is “no wider than it conditions... changes itself with the conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it determines” (Deleuze 2006a, 46). This means the will to power is not separate or ‘superior’ to the forces it determines. It is inseparable from quantity, quality, and direction; it is “plastic and changing” but simultaneously distinct from these forces (47). The will to power is “both a complement of force and something internal to it,” which means we cannot say ‘force wills’, given it is the will to power that wills. We also cannot ask, ‘who wills power?’ since being by

itself is the will to power (46). There is no force or subject of will to power. What there are, are relationships between forces quantitatively different from one another, producing the qualitative difference between action and reaction, dominating and dominated. Will to power is “the genealogical element of force, both differential and genetic.” Or, “the element from which we derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation;” it is “the principle of the synthesis of forces” (46), namely, their difference and reproduction. The will to power is the principle of the synthesis that is the eternal return, which is a different name for the chaosmos (see next chapter). This is why it is a ‘will’; it captures relationships between forces and in doing so produces and reproduces synthesis (i.e., difference). “Force is what can, will to power is what wills” (47).

The latter statement should be elaborated: force can be understood as something that ‘can’ because it expresses the idea of the ‘victorious’ (47). This means force is something that relates to other forces, and can either dominate or be dominated, but it is not victorious in the process of domination if there is nothing internal to it that determines it as such. In other words, something needs to be added to force for it to be made sense of as victorious. This complement to force is the will to power that allows for a “double point of view” reflecting on which way the genesis of their quantity and respective quality through their relationships comes to be (47). The forces are in a reciprocal relationship constitutive of their becoming, and will to power is the differential and genetic element of this relationship between forces: “it is added to force as the internal principle of the determination of its quality in a relation ($x + dx$) and as the internal principle of the quantitative determination of this relation itself (dy/dx)” (47). This expresses the will to power as that through which a force dominates, and simultaneously also that through which another force obeys. To summarise, the will to power is the genealogical element within force.

One of the reasons we have elaborated on the will to power, active and reactive force, is to be prepared to understand the problem of nihilism. The reason that Plato needed to be overthrown is that a selection for Ideas, instead of the affirmation of difference, turns us against life. Rational consciousness becomes solidified and aimed at structures outside of life, structures that don’t exist. When reactive forces dominate the dynamic of becoming, will is, in other words, aimed at nothingness. This is why Nietzsche calls the victory of reactive forces nihilism. This is distinct from the will to power because, instead of wanting to affirm its difference, the will to nothingness denies difference. ‘Nil’ in nihilism means zero value, which is the value given to life, namely nothing if it is subjugated to transcendent representations. If we take everything as life, meaning, everything as force, the valuation of

anything being nothing would be fiction. This is why Nietzsche says any separation of force from what it can do must be conducted through an abstraction, falsification, and/or mystification. Since reactive forces, in principle, divide active forces, and turn them against themselves and other forces, they can, essentially, never turn active. This is also reflected in thought and learning. This will be the main discussion in our final chapter, where it will be clear that a type of 'dynamic of decomposition' could disable productive thinking. Which is the search for truth.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ETERNAL RETURN OF THE WORLD

Given the affiliation between reactive forces and consciousness, which in their ultimate manifestation become a will to nothingness, it cannot be said reactive forces become active when taken to their limit. In order to become active, force must make ‘what it can do’ an object of affirmation (Deleuze 2006a, 63). Deleuze explains we cannot ‘know’ what it is like to become active; we can only understand it as a product of selection. This should be understood as a logical consequence of the fact that activity is productive and ‘newness’ cannot be anticipated due to its difference. What we can ‘know’, is that activity bears the symptoms of ‘lightness’ and ‘joy’. The tool for selection is the eternal return, which gives thought a practical rule and a speculative synthesis: “whatever you will, will it in such a manner that you also will its eternal return” (Nietzsche 1935 IV, 229, 231; Nietzsche 1968, 1053, 1056; Deleuze 2006a, 63; Deleuze 2004, 8). This is a test that has repetition (i.e., return) itself as its only law. Its simplicity is its elegance. This selective thought is the only way to unite the eternal, chaos, and the singular, order, allowing for immediacy, instead of mediation: “There is a within-the-law and a beyond-the-law united in the eternal return” (Deleuze 2004, 8). Nietzsche introduces the law of the eternal return as the (sole) law of nature. It is not a ‘refrain’ of a cycle of mimesis but “the logos of the solitary and the singular, the logos of the “private thinker”” (7), that is, the thought of the autonomous thinker. In other words, there is only one ‘law’, which is the eternal return of difference, which is the law of the chaosmos, of the eternal, which, if we select for it, allows us for an immediate connection to it.

The idea of the return, of repetition, is the ground for an unconscious that is ‘superior’ to consciousness, which has falsely assumed the main stage. What is extracted through consciousness, that contemplates ‘the new’, is just habit extracting generalities through the use of memory, in a pseudo repetition (8). It is conditioning. Nietzsche’s repetition allows for a ‘thought of the future’, “where thought becomes a positive power while the unconscious becomes a positive and superior unconscious ... everything is summed up in power... the immediate expression of the will to power... in other words, separate out the superior form by virtue of the selective power operating of thought in the eternal return by virtue of the singularity of repetition in the eternal return itself” (9). The question hiding in the eternal return is, ‘What allows for movement?’, ‘What type of metaphysics actually accounts for ‘activity’?’, or, ‘What does it mean to ‘produce’ movement?’ According to Deleuze, it is

desire (will to power) that creates the eternal return, not as a return of “the Same in general” but a repetition that selects, destroys, as well as creates (12).

Many hypotheses have broadly interpreted the eternal return as either a cosmological theory or as a practical thought experiment designed to select and constrain our thought in the face of eternity. What is its importance for our thesis? We will argue that a comparison between an eschatological understanding of creation, an infinite reality, and a pagan cyclical understanding of an eternal world showcases the different motivations and individuating processes that we can understand as development and conditioning. The eternal return offers a ground of immediacy that explains why learning is unconscious, and potentially empowering; whereas other frameworks obstruct development. The different ways in which Heidegger (see Heidegger 1991), Löwith (see Löwith 1941; 1942; 1944; 1945; 1995; 1997), Fink (see Fink 1990, 2016), and Deleuze approach the concept of the eternal return, following Nietzsche, illustrate in which way our neglect or search into the matter interacts with pedagogy.

One reason Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return of the same hasn’t made the general canon of plausible ontological groundings, besides its elusiveness, is because Heidegger convincingly argued that it potentially traps us in a death spiral of nihilistic devaluation (Olney 2020, 180). He believed, however, that a reinterpretation of the eternal return offers us a fundamental metaphysical position that can correct fragmentation and disorder. A way to contain the flux of life is by welding being and becoming together. Many were not convinced, however. Deleuze believes Heidegger’s approach to the matter, although fruitful, ultimately leaves us still imprisoned in a cage of sameness, thus frustrating becoming; because it leaves out the idea of the future. It is Löwith’s cosmological interpretation that raises questions on the status of nature in the whole scheme, insinuating Heidegger’s approach is too anthropomorphic and guided by reactive, implicit, beliefs in Christian redemptive progress. Löwith’s and Fink’s criticism of Heidegger’s unexamined eschatological bounds on the eternal leads Deleuze to come up with a reinterpretation that opens up the room for becoming.

In this chapter, we will argue that it is not sameness that we need in order to be able to communicate and share meaning. What we do need to have any meaningful conversation, at all, is univocity; which is the ground for connection. In the previous chapters, we have outlined the principle of chaos and will to power as resonance. The reason why resonance can allow for meaningful concepts to emerge and be communicated is that the will to power is embedded in the chaosmos that grounds it. A pedagogy based on becoming can only make sense if sense can be grounded in something bigger which structures it in hierarchical dimensions, that help us select for meaning. Thinkers like Heidegger tried to save Being from

its downfall. This chapter aims to put the final nail in the coffin of Being. In what follows, we will outline a more detailed account of the chaosmos using the idea of the eternal return. First, we explain Heidegger's approach to recurrence and follow it with Lowith's, Fink's, and Deleuze's alternatives to illustrate that there can be no doubt, that the univocal ground we need is the chaosmos.

Heidegger's recurrence

Throughout Heidegger's work, we encounter many examples of how everyone is enmeshed in the structures they aim to question. There is no such thing as a neutral subject able to neutrally perceive and contemplate objects in front of them. Everyone is trapped within their own perspective. Questioning that perspective, and questioning the mode and terms used for that activity, allows us to come closer to more essential modes of being and becoming. We can never access what things are essentially, but we need to keep questioning to come closer to Being. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche was also falsely contained by the assumptions of his philosophy. The problem lies in the tension between will to power and the eternal return. The combination of these two principles was meant to ground life back onto the activity of material life; to prevent it from merely reacting to abstract ideas. Heidegger argues, however, that the tension between will to power as a concept illustrating endless flux and becoming, and the eternal return as an endlessly turning back upon itself in a closed cycle, creates, once again, a dimension of highly abstract ideas: the Being of becoming and becoming of Being (182) In other words, Nietzsche metaphysics fails to ground active life in life as will and materiality itself.

Nietzsche meant to reinstate the concept of value in light of the loss of the Platonic Ideal and truth. Meaning, to describe an active life without the need for transcendental metaphysics. Heidegger reacted to Nietzsche's destruction of the concept of truth and the Idea, by finding an alternative to the truth as a capacity to generate stability of meaning, or a "fixing into place of a particular perspective" (183). Instead of a new metaphysics grounding this approach to truth, Heidegger employs the concept of art as the creative act that can make these stable positions available from which anyone can navigate through life, without strapping them down to immobile abstract dimensions. Art allows for an open relationship to life, open to becoming. Heidegger follows Nietzsche in this, as he recognizes the importance of the will to power given that it is the only principle producing and valuing life, the only principle grounding, structuring, and affirming creativity. However, the production of a

Nietzschean value, free from any abstract frame of reference, does not explain, according to Heidegger, why there are beings at all (184). If we leave the search as sufficient with Nietzsche, everything, according to Heidegger, is left as an illusion, meaning we are closer to nihilism now than we were before Nietzsche. If it were not for Nietzsche himself, saying that nihilism is a historically necessary endpoint of western thought, we wouldn't feel inclined to take up on Heidegger's warning to investigate whether Nietzsche himself is not weighted down by this trajectory, causing him to stop questioning before his findings could serve to 'save us'.

In line with Nietzsche and Heidegger, we argue the search for 'truth' is of nonvalue since it merely 'stops' life. In the next chapter, this will be further discussed in light of learning. Life is a movement of perpetual flux, it is being in becoming. What is the condition of life that makes it live? As in, what makes it vital, producing beings, at all? Ideas or truth as static objects cannot imbue life with vitality. They only exist in the abstract. That what makes life vital must be something that intensifies it, that affirms it, instead of reacts to it, and to the extent that it captures it, slows it down. But, for Heidegger, the concept of the will to power is not sufficient to understand the conditions for why there are beings. Because, when we reduce life to merely flux, there is no point of perspective from where to constitute being and value except for a 'looking back' on what has happened. Life would be an imagination. Only relativism and historicism can constitute a reality grounded on a pure becoming. So, if truth cannot go together with the will to power? Then what gives life a sense of stability without inhibiting its creative activity? Perhaps the answer is eternity or the thought of the eternal return.

How so? Eternity is a concept of time that connects the past and future in a loop of recurrence. It is time perceived as circular, in contrast to linear, with everything endlessly returning. For Nietzsche, it is eternity meant as an abyss that provokes thoughts "so heavy they can scarcely be born at all" (184). In light of awareness of eternity a person is able to open himself up to the future by decision, it generates the authority to create. This perspective allows Nietzsche the experience of fully embracing life, to accepting one's immanent perspective. Meaning, that it affirms everything that brought him to that place, including all tragedy so that a new point of self-authority can exist. Will can only exist in affirmation of its position within the eternal return of all things. Hence, there is a paradox given that there is a subject that is free to will its determination, and it is this affirmation of its destination that allows him freedom. How is that possible? For Nietzsche, the only subject that can overcome himself and claim this perspective of authority is one that is not chained to a realm of Ideas. It

has to be someone that can generate a creative act from himself. In other words, Heidegger claims, in line with Nietzsche's obscure image of the eternal return, that only someone who can constitute himself with a sense of 'self-same', is able to create. Only when able to bear the full weight of the eternal return comes the possibility of a 'self-sustaining capacity to Be' (186). We mentioned in chapter one that it is exactly this sense of subjectivity that was problematic.

In light of the eternal return, something exists in contrast to a lot of things that could have existed but don't. In other words: "eternal return means eternal return of the self-same, the perspective of pure decision, which is capable of knowing itself. Nothing else can be truly said to exist at all" (ibid). This is why the eternal marks the possibility of overcoming relativity. Because we can decide, in light of eternity, to have a balance between fixity and creativity by repeating everything that affirms active life and purging the rest from forces that threaten it. Given that this can only be done from a perspective of immanence, from a thought upon the threshold between past and future, it is a form of believing. The act of believing allows for a "securing of permanence" by fixating its perspective through art (ibid). Truth, in contrast, can only affirm life as endless chaos and flux. One thus projects their subjectivity onto becoming with the act of belief. Hence, Nietzsche stripped away everything from metaphysics and in doing that solidified the human perspective, constituted a metaphysics of extreme individualism, or radicalized transcendentalism.

Deleuze's eternal return

The closing circle of the recurrence of the self-same by Heidegger led Deleuze to formulate his own interpretation of Nietzschean metaphysics. For Deleuze, the eternal return offers a paradox of being and becoming that is solved in the idea of difference. Difference is, as we mentioned before, a repetition 'in itself' that encompasses everything, that cannot be captured in a representation that generalizes it. The problem, according to Deleuze, and of interest to us, is that for Nietzsche and Heidegger there is still the authority of common sense. Which is the subjective, human, element that projects itself on everything. With Nietzsche, this is his ultimate humanism, and with Heidegger the idea of Dasein. Every meaning that is produced on the basis of this subjective fixation, according to Deleuze, is nothing more than an 'infinite representation'; it is still reductionist. Both Heidegger and Nietzsche, although occupied with the idea of an abyss, or nothingness, don't follow through to fully accept it in their mediations. Both insist, more or less implicitly, on a stable ground of univocity of Being,

leading to opposition between Being and being and, consequently, every search to be a search for Being within beings.

As we mentioned before, for Deleuze it is not Being that returns, but the eternal return itself, the cycles of differences interacting with, and implicating each other, that produces beings. A cycle that produces singularities that repeat as differences. Deleuze, hence, does the opposite of Nietzsche and Heidegger, in the sense that he grounds being on chaos, instead of the stability of sameness. It is in Heidegger's method of 'unveiling' that asking the question of what is behind something presupposes that there is and that we might be doing nothing other than, projecting an ontology of 'pure beginning', an origin of essence, onto chaos. The latter being the 'real' origin. Deleuze favours the simulacra against essences or constitutes the simulacra as the essence to allow for an understanding of 'the virtual', against the world of Ideas. If the only thing that keeps returning in the eternal return is the rupture, divergence, difference, we still have to answer how can there be reason that projects stability onto chaos? The Virtual differs from any other conception of a realm of Ideas or field of potential, in the sense that it holds problems instead of Ideas. The potential that it holds offers more than a collection of static moulds that can be actualized into being, it is a dynamic of forces implicating each other into producing experience.

According to Deleuze, we cannot understand life other than it grounding itself. In the sense that life is vitality, is becoming, and as such, it is only beginning. Except, this beginning is not a static point but implicated within the cosmological eternal. It is differences producing each other through implication which means that anything that appears is never identical to its predecessor, despite its resemblance. The same goes with subjectivity, self-sameness, never being identity, it is always the product of forces of differences implicating each other. Again, everything is simulacra.

Why would we favour such an interpretation over Heideggers?

To some, the recurrence of the past offers stability within a never-ending flux, to others history is merely a 'burden' as it is dominating us into preconceived structures, at the mercy of whoever claims the highest authority. According to Deleuze, we should understand the eternal return as a circle with difference at its centre and sameness at its periphery, continuously torturing us with its boundaries (191). For Heidegger, memory, self-sameness, consoles, not tortures, us as support in our path to unveiling Being, as we are becoming. It is a path of prudence. To abandon Heidegger's perspective of faith and stability for freedom and change is a fit-for-slogan commonsensical approach. But of course, we aim to understand beyond the superficial 'moral' of liberation why we need chaos at the heart of our

philosophizing. The summary of an answer is that the return of memory leaves no room for creation, whereas creation does not exclude memory. The repetition of difference does not foreclose the future, but foregrounding memory does. Deleuze's heart of chaos allows us to include everything, but to be fair to Heidegger, to assume the periphery of sameness, encircling the interplay of differences, is unavoidably torture, might be because we have not been able to construct a sense of culture that is pedagogical, that can affirm our sense of futurity without negating the past. Given that reality is ordered through repetition, traditions, and rituals that offer pedagogical boundaries to protect the process of development from overwhelming tensions should be affirmed. Only traditions that have themselves as a goal, that aren't pedagogical but dogmatic, should be mistrusted. Just as how a monthly dance encourages people to dance, or weekly art lessons the production of art. This sameness, or memory, has will at its heart, which means it has productive difference at its heart. The point is not to abandon ritualistic veneration, it is to understand that when we repeat a hymn, for example, that repetition is not exactly 'the same' as its first instance. The ritual is not to copy a singular instance one on one, for the same reasons that a movie is not remade to be exactly the same as the first. Or a song covered. There is an essence repeated, a problem, but this essence is difference as it answers to an actual demand.

It would be a mistake to disregard the importance of culture. Culture is the training and selection of people, done by means of violence and pleasure. Violence, in the sense of having to strain yourselves to assert your position within the hierarchy, to be a proud member of a group. Pleasure, because cultural traditions allow people to gather in the celebration of life. The creation of culture can be an 'active' standpoint if it serves to keep reaction 'in check' by giving consciousness life-affirming content, art, and through participation a way to create one's own content. Culture reinforces consciousness with a consistency that it does not have in itself, namely memory. This is a memory different from reactive thought because these memories are not constructed to invest in the past, but they are images, stories, that enable one to invest in an expectation, the future: "It is not a memory of the sensibility, but of the will. It is not a memory of traces but of words" (Deleuze 2006a, 125). This is the meaning of culture 'in principle'; though, given the triumph of reactive forces, culture has not been able to do what culture can do, to select (and raise) strong active individuals that promote creativity.

The return of the World

The crucial element of the eternal return is the production of difference. It is within this difference without a concept that we find the most positive value. This difference, however, does not mean a loss of univocity. The eternal breaks with the linear line of infinity, historicity, and with that the idea of progress, but returns to us 'the World'. It is nature, reality, in its all overcoming immensity and splendour. The eternal return offers a cosmological framework that gives a sense of 'the world' in all its modes. A framework that offers the univocity needed in order that any fruitful engagement with the world is possible, at all.

The image of 'the world' has changed significantly over time. With Kant, we switched from a world of infinitude, created by God, to finitude, constituted by the world in space and time. For him, the conception of a finite world is connected to the understanding of a knowing subject that is both autonomous, as it is determined by its perceptions, meaning it has two equal homogenous faculties. The philosophical notion of a world as infinite, as it is generally conceived in the 17th century, considers sensuality secondary to understanding, or derived from rational constructs. We have to understand this construct as connected to Christian theology claiming that existence was created out of nothing, and is therefore completely dependent on the rational mind of God. Knowing, therefore, is an approximation toward the mind of God, through our own rational faculty. Unfortunately, given that we are finite beings, our cognition is also finite, and our sensations are derivations of the divine rational construct, derived from Ideas. Which is problematic.

In a philosophy of finitude, the faculties of sensing and understanding become separated and autonomous. This means that man cannot simply understand the world through intuition but has to work with his senses to discern objects and analyse these objects in relation to his subjectivity to discern what is true and what is not. In other words, man cannot passively intuit the world any longer. Moreover, with Kant, man formed the transcendental condition for the constitution of the empirical world, and with that carries the responsibility to discern laws. Man takes over God's place, and grows with infinite arrogance. The world is left as a purely passive being, first derived from God, then from God-man. The concept of the eternal allows a way back for the world as a primary, constitutive being. The eternal renders the choice between finitude and infinitude unnecessary, while also explaining the possibility of the existence of both.

After secularization, we perceive the world as a spiritless, mechanical, physical extension. Löwith claims that the clearest conception of 'the world' before any secular tendency was with Heraclitus in fragment 30 of Diel's collection of the *Fragments of the*

Presocratics: “the world (κόσμος), the same for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and is and will be: fire everliving, kindled in measures and in measures going out” (An, 2019, 36). According to An, following Löwith, the Heraclitean original intuition reveals three fundamental characteristics of the World:

First, World is not “one” in the numerical sense of the word, because it does not coexist on the same level with the finite individual beings, that says, only the intraworldly beings have the numerically determined existences. In other words, it is neither an enormous worldthing nor an aggregation of numerous intraworldly things, but the universal condition which makes all the intraworldly beings to be what they are. It is precisely in this sense that the World can be called *One*; second, World is neither the creation of God nor the constitution of Man, it is, on the contrary, the priori condition of both God and Man. Neither is God world-transcending nor is Man the center of the world, because both of them are intraworldly beings; third, World is not subject to the passing time and advancing history on the human level, its nature is of the *aeternitas* which have nothing to do with the *sempiternitas*. (An, 2019, 36)

In other words, we can consider the World to be what is eternal, which is what we consider as ‘natural’, or everything we consider to be from nature. We have made ‘nature’, or the World, secondary as a consequence of creationism and rationalism. Furthermore, the subversion of the World has even made its man’s enemy in favour of other spiritual or rational realms. The world is not an aggregation of things nor resembles, any, subjective reason, rational construct nor, according to Eugen Fink, “Dasein’s constitutive determination or moment”. The world is, in other words, not constituted of individuation, as individuation emerges from the World:

the world is the total field of the actual. There is only one actuality, however many dimensions it may have. The one total actuality is not first assembled from many individual actual beings, however, but rather actuality *tout court* gathers together every individual-actual thing in advance. The world(-order) therefore is an infinite-dimensional totality which precedes ontologically all the parts that are the individual beings and serves as the latter’s condition of possibility. (An, 2019, 37)

Cosmological movement, the eternal return, is the process of individuation, of belonging to the World. This means it is not simply the accumulation of created beings, but a dynamic

creative process to which individuals belong. A cosmological philosophy ultimately aims to restore this sense of belonging to the World which is creative, dynamic and alive. This can be done by restoring the Heraclitean intuition through the concept of the Eternal Return.

The problem of eschatology

Löwith argued that modern thinking is unable to reintroduce this sense of belonging to the World, as nature, as long as it still carries the poison of Christian eschatology. It was his aim, particularly, to deconstruct with a radical skepticism the direction of western thought. Arguing that the meaning we give history is viewed through a lens of hope of being saved. There is a false sense of ‘development’, as progress is projected on history and our position in it. This projection comes from our engagement with phenomena from the sense of being situated within history instead of eternity, and within an infinite universe instead of a limiting cosmos. According to Löwith, the problems of the modern age are characterized by implicit logic that assumes the idea of a start, middle, and ending, that corresponds to the Christian idea of creation, fall, and salvation. This construct of creation and salvation influences our engagement with the past, present, and future. It is this same construct that limits our relationship to our environment within the confounds of measuring and quantifying it.

In light of eternity, a common sense account would be enough to ground an epistemology. If it were true that people could access an attitude that is fully attuned to eternity. This is because the eternal return of the same ensures that everything always comes back. So, in line with Heidegger, one would only have to be immanently part of the interplay of forces enfolding into beings that return eternally, to be able to register and express those phenomena commonsensically. It is in that sense that if we are in resonance with the eternal cosmos, and start the construction of our sense based on that, such an expression would be very limited if it is the case that only the same returns. Ultimately, this means that we cannot ground our epistemology on anything infinite (godly) or finite (human) without excluding what actually makes us human, namely being embedded in the overpowering physical immensity and neutrality of eternal nature and the cosmos. Or as Löwith would say: being part of a *Mitwelt*, a primordial togetherness. (Potter, 2012, 30)

Modern thought, however, has grounded itself on the idea of an ultimate goal, or eschaton that we inherited from religion, and this creates a metaphysical divide between ourselves and our *mitwelt*. Despite the secularisation of our times, this construct is still implicitly present in our relationship with the world causing disunity between ourselves, as

humans, and nature. How so? Even though the world has transformed itself into a contingent natural world, bound to the laws of physics, we are still looking for a logic to give sense to our history, and to instil hope for the future. Furthermore, this attitude is grounded on more fundamental predispositions, namely, an idea of a man that rationally grounds life after the loss of objective principles grounded in God. Which paradoxically is a rationality that can only be grounded on a willing, but totally free spirit. In other words, modern thought is grounded on an impossible nihilism that both assumes a free willing subject and a positivistic, deterministic mechanical universe.

This paradox is the consequence of a philosophical inheritance of religion and physical metaphysics, as Christianity and idealist philosophy. Man cannot be re-embedded into nature as a ‘free being’ if the construct of eschatology remains intact. Within modernity, there is an underlying cause of thought, namely “the expectation that history is traveling towards an absolute end, a final event that contains some purpose” (Potter, 2012, 34). The secular idea of ‘progress’, meaning the perfection of culture through reason, is conditioned by the religious pattern of beginning (creation), interim (a life lacking), and end (salvation).

Any eschatological predisposition subordinates events to a logic that assumes the motion of progress, without questioning the idea of progress itself. Furthermore, the eschatological perspective requires the measurement of progress which can only be done through the effects that have been selected from history to prove it, meaning it leaves progress bound by the limits of the past, and as such determined by representation.

However, we still know that the ancient pagans had a circular view of time, and we argue that their perspective offers a metaphysical grounding better suited for current ontological needs. The cosmological view of the ancients assumes the world has always existed, and that material life, or humans, are merely a part of an eternal seasonal cycle that corresponds with archetypes such as celestial revolution (36). This position was abandoned with a need to be saved from a meaningless life of suffering. Abandoned with the construct of a promise of providence, first in the afterlife, later as a secularized idea of realized progress.

The world as Chaosmos

Following Löwith’s and Fink’s concern, as we mentioned earlier, Deleuze destabilizes the ‘individual’s’ arrogance by conceiving of the world as ‘chaosmos’. Deleuze tries to neutralize subjective projection by emphasizing the impersonal and pre-individual play of forces that precede the production of the subject. In other words, he puts his weight on the

side of chaos to open up our understanding of the singularities that make up any series of repetitions. An ontology of nature, of its power, should enable the understanding of the World without creating the problem of the subject. And this understanding should be able to be shared by everyone. In other words, if we were to construct an ontology this activity assumes a univocity of being.

Instead of explaining the possibility of understanding God, in the medieval scholastic sense, the ‘new’ univocity explains how we can know the world, and through that also understand the infinite and finite, Gods and humans. Within an ontology of the eternal return of difference, the infinite and finite are modes of the eternal. Hence, in a cosmology where the eternal envelopes the finite and infinite, infinitude shares the same nature with finitude, and it is precisely this reason that Spinoza could claim humans can approximate the divine, nature, through understanding. The same reason he was considered a heretic. The combination of the Heraclitean formula “One-All” with Spinoza’s theory of attributes allows Deleuze to construct the univocal being:

Attributes are univocal or common forms, predicated, in the same form, of creatures and creator, products and producer, formally constituting the essence of one, formally containing the essence of the others. In this regard, Nature-Being-Attributes, although conceived by Spinoza as strictly univocal, is definitely not a genus subsuming substance as infinite being and mode as finite being under itself as secondary concepts; it is, in fact, the reality constitutive both of the substance and the modes. On the one hand, the attributes are quantitatively infinite and as genetic elements constitute the substance as absolutely infinite Multiplicity. On the other hand, each attribute as an infinite quality is an actually infinite series which implicates within itself the modal essences as intensities or intensive parts which, although distinguished from one another, are indivisible (An, 2019, 40)

This formula announces the possibility of a real univocal being containing both infinitude and finitude as substance and modes of the attributes and is, therefore, a being that is accessible as it fully corresponds to reality. The infinite and finite are two different intensities, quantities, of the same being, just as dark red and light red are both red with different intensities. This being is the attributes, forces that implicate each other into infinite essences, multiplicity, in eternal movement, chaosmos. We, as finite beings, are individuated from the infinite intensive parts of the eternal. In that sense, we contain both an individual essence, a singularity, and are

generated by pre-individual impersonal forces. We, our subjective experiences, are within this cosmology directly related to the eternal being, and not accidentally 'caused' by 'external' matter. These essences that constitute our being are not abstractions, like the Aristotelian genus, that determine us from nothing but are ontological conditions actually present. In other words, it is within and through the attributes, that are not there potentially, like an Idea, but in actuality, that individuation occurs. This also means that the expression of infinite substance and its creative power, is a mode of the attributes, just as our finite being is. Within the dynamic of eternal multiplicity creative infinite and finite expression is a power that is constituted through it. In that sense, there is us, living beings, the universe, and the cosmos as actuality that constitute each other in being actual. Within the eternal cosmos, the infinite substance implicates itself as an infinite series of difference and repetition, and within the infinite finite individuation as singular essences are implicated. The world is univocal, in the sense that through the individual the absolute infinite power is expressed, and through the infinite power the principle of individuation, the attributes, is expressed. All that is actual expresses the inner nature of the infinity of modes of the eternal attributes.

CHAPTER FOUR: LEARNING AS APPRENTICESHIP TO SIGNS

Education concerns itself with teaching people. This means that there are things that can be taught to people, however, Deleuze makes an interesting argument that we can only learn unconsciously through sensual signs. This means the same as we have been arguing this whole thesis, namely that there is only development and learning when there is becoming, which is a movement that emerges in resonance with the creative movement of differentiation within the world, the chaosmos. We can only learn from sensuous signs because those are the only ones that aren't reactive, the only signs grounded in life. Deleuze makes a distinction between sensuous signs, worldly signs, signs of love, and signs of art, which will serve to illustrate to us what constitutes thinking and learning and what constitutes conditioning in contrast. Worldly signs and signs of love are not constituted on active force but are constituted to stop movement so force can fit a preconceived desired state, it forces people to become reactive. This does not mean that an apprentice who perceives these, or any, signs is not learning. Given that force always remains force and difference is always constituted, unconsciously there is always development and learning, despite that the conscious mind becomes trapped in reactive constructs when it searches for meaning in common sense. Worldly signs are not 'worldly' in the sense of being emitted from the World, the chaosmos as we discussed earlier. Deleuze gave them the name 'worldly' because they refer to conventions and common sense. Conventions, through their nature, have their grounding in an agreement between people, between subjects, hence are not grounded in sensuality and do not actually learn us something about the World. In this chapter we offer our final analysis to understand what 'learning' is, we will come to this point through an understanding of differences in thinking first. We will be able to understand thinking as the product of tension between different experiences of time. Which is the tension between a sense of future in the feelings of vocation and the meaning of the time that we have lost in our idle searches. To learn and to think is to regain and constitute time.

Time and thinking

The element of time informs us about the question of learning. Because we spend time in search of answers, invest ourselves, and either lose or regain time, depending on whether some things start to make sense, or not. According to Deleuze, learning happens as we become apprenticed to signs; when we regain lost time as we realise we have learned

something new, while we were subconsciously constructing sense in relationship to those signs, all along.

[L]earning is essentially concerned with signs. Signs are the object of a temporal apprenticeship, not of an abstract knowledge. To learn is first of all to consider a substance, an object, a being as if it emitted signs to be deciphered. . . . Vocation is always predestination with regard to signs. Everything that teaches us something emits signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of signs. (Deleuze 2008, 4)

The use of the notion ‘vocation’ reminds us of Meno’s paradox: you won’t search for answers to a question unknown to you, therefore, the search itself signals that a part of you knows and remembers through perceptual triggers. Socrates solved the paradox for himself by assuming all knowledge is within the memory of the Ideas, within the soul. Gaining access is done through reminiscence. Deleuze’s approach recognizes there is a similar experience of reminiscence at the ‘end’ of a search, at that moment we have ‘won’, or ‘regained’ the time spent in the search. In agreement with Deleuze’s analysis of thought, which we will elaborate on below, we abandon Socrates’ notion of reminiscence, because a) it presumes the primacy of the world of Ideas over active life, and b) because Socrates’ notion of reminiscence, or anamneses, does not entail ‘learning’ or ‘thinking’, but is limited to an ontology of return of the same. We will argue, however, that it is the experience of reminiscence that drives thought and learning because it gives us a sense of vocation. Through reminiscence “we discover what we could not know at the start: that we were already apprenticed to signs when we supposed we were wasting our time” (Dejanovic, 2014, 41). Reminiscence illustrates that we are always unconsciously learning.

Signs and the subject

Learning unites the seemingly incompatible: the production of difference and the production of the subject, the self-same. This subject, however, needs to be understood as produced through difference, through pre-individual forces; as individuated. So, firstly, what is learning? It is the tracing of differentiation within a sense of vocation that unfolds itself through apprenticeship. Learning is the subconscious activity that produces sense to allow a person to resonate with the unfolding of the virtual in actuality, consciously. First, one encounters signs, these are the things emitted from phenomena that stimulate us to search for

meaning or value. It is a vocation that ‘triggers’ that relationship and shapes the affective resonance and sense produced from it. Signs have different textures and change given that the apprentice learns and difference is constantly produced. Then, an apprentice projects what is relatable or subconsciously produced as sense onto the sign as a meaning. This a subjective pole of the sign, and within conventional discourse, leads the apprentice to interpret signs with a sense of objectivity. By conventional discourse we mean the common sense that people operate with. We are, in the likely but worst-case scenario, enmeshed in ‘worldly signs’ (common sense). Common sense dictates that there is a destination to our search, namely truth. And truth is understood as an objective, predetermined destination. Truth, common sense, knowledge, or any other form of representational content, promotes the idea that we can calculate what someone does not know yet, and still has to accomplish; what the degree of progress is; and based on these calculations, how we can steer and secure certain (cognitive) practices. Such common sense knows ahead of time what it will encounter and what ‘has’ to be learned. This, in its ultimate form, results in disciplinary education and pedagogy, to keep someone on the road and steer them away from ‘evil’ temptations, so to speak.

Here is the problem, if not already obvious, a worldly sign “anticipates action as it does thought, annuls thought as it does action, and declares itself adequate to its meaning, it is empty or hollow” (42). The reason common sense is an empty form is that it is constructed on the basis of convention. What does this mean? The motivation for its construction is to understand the workings of a social milieu: “what sort of codes admit, exclude, and distribute people in that milieu”, and how do these changes transform “the value of signs emitted by people occupying that milieu.” (ibid.) A different angle to understand this is from a developmental perspective; from the perspective of a newborn developing its psyche as it physically interacts with its surroundings. When the surroundings leave the child in a permanent state of insecurity, because its desires are not being met, it will put all its energy into deciphering the social cues that can allow it to manipulate its parents to cooperate with its needs. Especially, because it is encouraged to internalize conventional (the parent’s) knowledge and custom, the symbolic order. Common sense is produced to enable access to a desired feeling without having to actually think, it is a reactive tool to counter a lack, a social hack. Because worldly signs are produced on the basis of lack, and only have representational value, there remains an anxious urge to search for deeper truths with every encounter.

Every object encountered, affected by its subjective pole, the projection of lack, creates a dynamic of alienation, because worldly signs “lack the mark of necessity and always give the impression that they ‘might have been’ different and differently expressed” (Deleuze

2008, 61). In other words, worldly sings lack univocity, because they give away the sense that they are constituted on an arbitrary whim of someone else's desires. They are not grounded by our own immanent experiences, by something that feels real, but are abstract and lead the mind to an infinite regress to justify its value. This feeling can discourage someone completely because it makes a person aware that there is an infinite possibility for associating memories. "Voluntary memory is limitless, as it is arbitrary, no matter how elaborate and clever the linkages made." (Dejanovic, 2014, 43) Common sense can only be 'internalised' in bad faith. Meaning, on the basis of a promise of something beyond what is actually (not) being felt. The lesson that should be learned from this is not to flee, even further, into subjectivism or relativism, but to understand that a strong emphasis on objective common sense, and the search for truth, forces us into the realm of subjective projection of lack. In other words, it ultimately leads to a discourse grounded on representation, motivated by lack. Learning cannot be done through common sense. Because we argue that learning does not equal the exchange of thought or downloading, or imparting of information. All of what is exchanged as such remains abstract, representational, and leaves those that internalize it in a state of anxiety. This also means that knowledge cannot simply be 'given', even by extremely smart men, to lacking children. Also, learning cannot be done through the means of voluntary thought. What does this mean?

The problem of voluntary thought

Learning is building a world of sense where we can be more sensitive to signs. According to Deleuze a quest for truth always leaves us vulnerable to pain and disappointment. This goes for objective truth, but also for emotional truth. If conventional knowledge cannot please someone hungry for the search, the emptiness that becomes obvious could tempt an apprentice to look for it in other people, in signs of love. But similar to common sense, signs of love are the product of our past disappointments, only this time in the shape of a realisation that a person's worth is grounded on an accumulated need that is looking for absolution. A need that forces us to bet on a single person that arouses feelings of affection, in the hope they can make up for lost time. Every sign of love we receive or emit to the person we love has come forth from the many times we were excluded from love before. Signs of love are also signs grounded on lack, they are a sign needed to ease an old pain. This is not to say there is no 'real' love, free from an associative poison of regret and disappointment, it is only to say that whoever looks for signs of love, is bounded by anxiety.

Why do we mention the signs of love, did we not mean to explain the problem of voluntary thought? Well, it is exactly this search for love, the experience of ‘the vocation of a love relationship’ that drives a person anxious, and the mental suffering brought on by this anxiety serves well to explain voluntary thought: a continuous survey of memories to understand where the pain comes from. We think about our loved ones “to decipher the earliest moments of their transgressions. When is it that we should have known that they did not love us?” (45) Voluntary thought, prompting memory to put our discomfort at ease, is not equipped to truly discern what signs are of significance, at least not in time. Voluntary thought selects what it holds as truth, as a reaction to a situation overpowering and hurting them; any selection motivated by this anxiety is a projection of a lifelong need, on a single person.

When our sense is regained through the faculty of forgetting (we are generally not able to remain in the state of volition), our subconscious takes over, and our productive ability to sense unconsciously is, in retrospect to the event, able to distinguish there was a difference within the triggering repetition. Being made aware of our regression and the uncontrollable need to invoke memory, calls upon people to discern ideas that explain why we keep losing time to sorrow. They prompt us to formulate general ideas that can substitute sorrow in the order of time (Ibid). The search for signs of love, and the method of voluntary thought to synthesize the transpersonal meaning overarching all loved ones, does never recover time. It is circular, because it is grounded in a love lost, and on temporary reprieve in forgetfulness, in order to start the search again. It wastes time.

Unconscious learning through sensuous signs

So, what does it mean to truly learn? Initially, it is unconscious, meaning, it is through discerning sensuous signs: sensing “differentiations of qualities – for instance, the variation in the atmosphere of a room when a friend enters – that the apprentice unfolds by implicating past events” (46). Sensuous signs trigger involuntary memory; reminiscence, “by signalling a differentiation of a quality that becomes interpreted as two simultaneous impressions” (ibid). The reason a sensuous sign can trigger different impressions that are seemingly unrelated is that sensuous signs are strictly coupled to immediate experiences of “matter, things, or people, past and present” (ibid). What does this mean? The meaning of an event, of a signal being emitted to us by the sensuous sign, is grounded in univocity. In other words, there is an empirical, albeit transcendental meaning that is produced through encountering an actual differentiation in quality. It is the essence of the sign, its immediacy, that transports us to

different moments in time where we hear the same appeal of a vocation being made on us. “Leaning over to unbutton his boots, [the apprentice] feels something divine [or joyous]; but tears stream from his eyes, involuntary memory brings him the lacerating recollection of his dead grandmother” (Deleuze 2008, 14). One sensuous quality can connect two materially separate impressions to a common sense of vocation. This is done through a recollection of involuntary memory: the phenomena of unconscious learning. Reminiscences, however, can easily mislead us given that they are limited to only a sense of connection between two different events. Because of their vagueness, they could prompt a person to a search for truth, again.

There are different ways one could answer why we connect two seemingly different events through association. Plato argued that the different impressions are connected through a whole that transcends both, and this whole causes the reminiscence. This sign is not equal to the past or current event but solicits a memory that encompasses both through generality. This type of generalisation, however, implies the existence of a mythical past, but, moreover, denies there is a sense of novelty that arises in the event of reminiscence, a sense of something learned. And it is this analysis that calls for a judgement of taste and meaning; are we merely living to recollect what is already known in the world of Ideas? In other words, are we merely living to uncover the repetition of the (self-) same, to learn how to die? Or is the fact that we sense newness a sign of positive value, of the production and affirmation of living creation? Nietzsche allowed us to pursue the latter meaning and showed us how it is this meaning that allows for thinking, even though we are abandoning a thinking grounded on recollection.

Involuntary thought and signs of art

Involuntary memory allows us to bypass the series of memories and judgements connected to historical events, in order to understand what something actually is. It allows us to bypass the labour of voluntary thought. Deleuze argues that reminiscence shows us that the past is solicited from a sense of potential creation. The sign of the present, which calls upon the impression of the past, is linked through a relationship with what is virtually present as something that could come to unfold. Reminiscence, hence, opposite to Plato’s interpretation, is a sign of the future. Involuntary memory can only be evoked through sensuous signs when the signs are univocal. Also, we can only ‘know’ what we have already learned, unconsciously, until we encounter signs that allow us to produce thoughts, in line with what

we already sense. In order to allow univocity to speak, however, a mode of thinking is needed that traces involuntary memory. This would be pure thought, involuntary thought, which can only be evoked through non-representational, but selective signs: signs of art.

What is learned, unconsciously, can only be accessed through chance encounters, because it is through a relationship that is established and guided by sensuous signs and involuntary memory. A teacher cannot tell a child to look at a tree and ‘force’ it to see what the teacher has seen himself in that or any particular tree; this knowledge cannot be imparted. Not unless he wants to trap the child in a search for worldly signs. A teacher or caregiver could, however, increase the chances for encounters and subsequent learning, by making sure that the learning environment is univocal: sensuously rich, and without representational imposition. That being said, there is another layer needed, unless we want to argue there is no need for culture or communicable thought. Signs of art are immaterial, spiritual signs that find meaning, they “yield an ideal essence because they go one step further than sensuous signs, by forcing pure thought to intervene in the search” (Dejanovic 2014, 48). It is with signs of art that memory comes to serve the production of new expressions of life, instead of serving the search for the meaning of life in the repetition of memory itself. Through art, meaning a non-material sign that allows for an affirmative orientation towards ‘more life’, “involuntary memory has found its spiritual equivalent, pure thought, both producing and produced” (Deleuze 2008, 100). Signs of art could be aesthetics, an artistic creation, or anything that prompts involuntary thought to be produced (Dejanovic 2014, 48). They are events, prompting the production of phantasms. With the activity of pure thought, pure time is created, while simultaneously past time is recovered through its capture within thought. Pure thought constantly resides at the boundary of the past, regaining time by unfolding what is learned, while also creating new opportunities for learning, as it is aimed at the future. In other words, a new world is created that explains the world of the past; this is “the birth of time” (ibid).

Someone well-acquainted with signs of art is a master of learning, which means he knows how to encounter the world without reducing the search to a function in service of a final state. Learning does deal, however, with the meaning of ideal essences, which are immaterial ‘final qualities’. We have to understand this in the sense that essences are internalised differences that constitute a singular viewpoint from where someone can orient towards the past and future. They are singularities that prompt involuntary memory and, once internalised, pure thought. Signs of art do not only offer us an internal viewpoint from which we can see our own process of learning, sensibility to learning, they also offer us a point of

orientation that is shared by other people. It is through art that we connect a multiplicity of viewpoints, that we create culture; conversely, it is through culture that a person's individuation is co-constituted.

Learning is becoming constituted on difference

Learning means that the person who is learning is becoming different because of the interaction with signs. This difference is the interaction of the difference of intensity in the sign in relation to an internal difference. Sensuous signs are the events that cause the apprentice to produce simulacra and phantasms, as discussed in chapter one. This internal difference is the unconscious that moves along with a sensuous sign, and involuntary thought that is brought to movement by involuntary memory. The whole of this process is immediate, meaning it is the product of a relationship of the apprentice with the signs, directly, without any mediator. A teacher, or a book, might produce their own signs, and those signs might prepare the apprentice to be more susceptible to other signs. This does not mean, however, that a teacher can present 'downloadable' content, that can be internalised 'top-down', meaning through voluntary thought. The latter type of 'knowledge' is uprooted and floats in memory as a trigger for the search for truth. A teacher can show the apprentice a tree, or a poem, and it will be the poem and tree itself that cause an internal differentiation within the apprentice, and so will the teacher, in being a sign on their own.

Essences of becoming, hence, are not 'floating generalisations' outside of actuality, of materiality, they are difference embodied. They are the internalised perspective of a subject brought out of balance by an actual force embodied in another being. We conceive essences constantly because we are forced to by their active becoming, their difference. Difference forces the rearrangement of our becoming, produces our individuation, as we are always in the middle of the whole of becoming, emerging in relationship with our environment. Our inner constellation emerges with the becoming of the whole constellation of the cosmos. It is from this perspective that we also have to understand that time weaves the search for learning, the world is continuously born and reborn, a repetition of a singular essence, but different. Given this infinite repetition, the eternal return, thought is the product of materiality, of sensuous signs, in the sense that thought immaterially enfolds the virtual condition of the essences that present themselves as being at any given moment. Because the repetition is always one that is different, that difference stands in tension with the past that is overpowered, and a future that is implicated. The sensuous signs that are produced within the difference

bring our subjectivity, that is a product of the past, out of balance and onto a search for signs of art, meaning, for a way to materialize in thought what is there virtually. Actual thinking is individuation and is involuntary, because it is produced as a response to emerging qualities of the present, as it happens within the vocation of the future, to the virtual that is materializing as an internal difference. In this sense, thinking is creation, as the constitution of time. And it is in the same sense that development is becoming, the constitution of difference.

CONCLUSION

The forces of sense and development are the product of the will to power and the eternal return, producing difference, as time, within the interplay of their relation. This statement is intimately connected to development and learning because development is the embodiment of the differences produced within the interplay of forces. Learning is the spiritual dimension of that process, as the unfolding of the virtual through individuation. Throughout this thesis, we have illustrated that development contrasts conditioning in the same manner that a philosophy of Becoming contrasts a philosophy of Being. It has become clear that we cannot speak of development if we are not in the business of production, of creating differences. Therefore, a philosophy of becoming is the only philosophy able to construct concepts that enable a fruitful pedagogical relationship with the reality of chaos. To promote the internalisation of general notions grounded on Being, on the other hand, obstructs development. Thought and movement motivated by a search for truth demand a mythical doubling in the form of a transcendental realm, that leads a subject to an infinite regress within memories and convention. It leaves a person locked into the past, conditioned to feel what has been decided one should feel, by outside forces; trapped in reactivity.

To actually learn something, to think, is not grounded on voluntary thought or action. This seems surprising, but only when it is assumed that thought is a neutral instrument we can use to arrive at a pre-decided endpoint. In a World that consists of productive forces, however, one that is always in movement, truth, and identity are fictive projections. Our critique has shown that subjectivity, our consciousness, and rational thought, come second to pre-individual forces that constitute the process of individuation. This means that the forces that are actually in movement, constituting the World, are stronger and more active than the forces trying to capture them in conscious terms. Consciousness is not active when it is not emerging together with the creation of the World; when it is not in resonance. 'Consciousness' on its own, as an isolated identity, is a simulated topological position that can 'think' what it has internalised from stronger forces. Consciousness is not productive, unless it moves along with involuntary thought, through affective resonance, and within that play produces newness.

True sense, hence, is constructed through the unconscious. When it is connected to the sensual World, to the Chaosmos. We can only learn when a positive difference becomes internalised and constitutes a spiritual dimension free from the conditions of bodily drives. Free from negative tensions that cause us to project 'idealised' fictions onto reality, in order

that we can temporarily neutralize anxiety. Conditioning starts with the urge to resist the impact of continuous overwhelming stimuli and the need to manipulate the world to meet our desires. This means we can only counter conditioning and enable development when we allow a child to be affected without it being overwhelming. So it can grow in strength to affect and be affected thus increasing its power to resonate, without having to produce simulations to compensate for an overwhelming experience of lack.

Also, a true sense is not 'knowledge' that can be imparted by internalising the symbolic order, consciously; by 'downloading' it from one mind to another. True sense comes when an emerging quality expresses itself as an internal differentiation, due to the tension produced within a relationship of affective resonance. True sense is grounded on univocity, meaning, it is the product of relating to sensuous signs; to the eternal World, in its natural immensity. Any true 'knowledge' comes second to unconscious development, as one relates, privately, to spiritual signs. This is when one encounters what can be unfolded and one gains time in production, instead of losing time to the past. True knowledge is the product of pure thought and involuntary memory, it is grounded on the experience of reminiscence; which is not merely a memory of the past, but the sense of vocation that can tell us what is present virtually, meaning, what could be actualized in the future.

Only when we ground pedagogy on an understanding of desire, the will to power, in relation to the eternal return of difference, can we start thinking of an educational model that concerns itself with the process of individuation and learning, instead of education that merely conditions children to react to abstract ideas. This thesis has been limited to a concern for metaphysical principles and has not yet offered a different educational model. But we argue that we have made the first step in this direction, which is that we have made the World the ground for our thinking. And that we have gained awareness of thought as being a private, immanent process that can potentially express infinite relationships. So, our start is to imagine a pedagogical environment that offers great power to resonate, a naturally and culturally rich environment. Also, that a pedagogical relationship becomes strengthened by a form of communication that allows children to develop their own sense. So, a play of affects and questions, open to the qualities that might emerge, unfiltered by expectations and desired outcomes. In what praxis this might take shape is a topic for future analysis.

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