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**Evolving diasporic identity construction within a complex socio-historical context: The case of the fourth generation Zainichi Koreans in Japan**

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**Evolving diasporic identity construction  
within a complicated socio-historical context**

*The case of the fourth generation Zainichi Koreans in Japan*

In partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Arts

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## Introduction

“The school made me proud to be Korean, but it is easier to be Japanese and actually I would rather be South Korean. I used to think I was unique, but it is complicated to talk about because the image of Koreans is sometimes negative (here)” (McBride 2008). This quote belongs to Jungwang Kwang, former student of a *chōsen-gakkō* or ethnic Korean school in Japan. The quote touches upon the complex situation of the marginalized group of ethnic Koreans that remained in Japan after the Second World War (WW2). It illustrates how the student has been struggling with his self-identification within a complicated Japanese context.

Late in the Meiji Era (1867-1912) Japan took on an aggressive world view. It presented itself in the Pacific as the savior of Asian culture amidst a reality where western powers were expanding their territory in Asia. Eventually, Japan annexed the Ryukyu islands and Hokkaido, then pointed its arrows to Korea (Buzo 2002, 32-41). Between 1876 and 1910, Japan slowly annexed Korea by forcing a series of treaties upon them. The dismantling of the Korean army in 1910 paved the way free for Japan to occupy the peninsula. What followed was an era of suffering and oppression for the Korean people. The Japanese colonizer pursued an increasingly rough anti-Korean policy in which Koreans were regarded inferior and Korean culture was suppressed.

Schools were shared under strict control by the colonial Government-General (GG) and curricula refocused on introducing young Koreans to the ‘new morals’ and revisions of Korean history and culture. All Korean newspapers were closed down in 1940 and from 1942, Korean language, geography and history were completely removed from school curricula. Students would be obliged to make daily pledges of devotion to the Japanese emperor (Atkins 2010, 42-44). Japanese assimilation policies were intended to train Koreans as submissive and obedient colonial subjects by erasing social and cultural factors from daily life, enforcing the Japanization process of Korean customs, names, language, and culture (Yang and Lee 2016, 10601). Refusing to obey the Japanese resulted in severe punishments, such as public beatings. Therefore, many Koreans gave in as there seemed to be no clue left in their resistance. In their hearts, however, many fostered nationalist consciousness (Gordon 2009, 240-241; Yoon 2012, 414-423).

From the early 1920s, Japan experienced severe labor shortages in its mines and heavy industries while the Korean colony faced high unemployment. Therefore, many thousands of Koreans were transported to Japan to fill up these shortages (Kim 2008, 875-876). Another migration wave was enforced upon the Japanese establishment of Manchukuo in 1932. Approximately half of the Koreans signed up voluntarily, seeking better (economic) opportunities (Yoon 2012, 414). In 1939, Japan was two years into the Second Sino-Japanese War and WW2 broke out in Europe. Preparing for the war, the government launched its National Mobilization Plan, resulting in many more thousands of Koreans to be conscripted into hard labor in Japan (Kim 2008, 875-876).

Between 1939 and 1945, 810.000 to 940.000 Koreans were brought to Japan. Among them were approximately 200.000 women between the ages of 17 and 20 who were forced into prostitution work at Japanese army brothels. A considerable number of Korean men were sent to the battlefields to fight in

the Japanese army (Yoon 2012, 414-423). All this forced labor and ‘voluntary’ economic migration, in many cases followed by their families, resulted in the number of Koreans in Japan to have raised to 2.3 million by the end of WW2 (Gordon 2009, 240-241). After WW2, most of them returned to ‘liberated Korea’ but not everyone possessed the financial means to return (Yoon 2012, 423). Others did not want to return because of the economic confusion that prevailed in Korea, following sudden liberation (Motani 2002, 227-228). Moreover, some Koreans had stayed in Japan for (over) twenty years and had already settled with their families (Kim 2008, 875-876). Around 600.000 Koreans stayed in Japan, becoming the backbone of the current ethnic Korean community in Japan (Yoon 2012, 423; Laurent & Robillard-Martel 2022, 44).

Japan, upon defeat, was occupied by the United States (US). In 1951, it became independent again through signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan had to give up Korea, resulting in Koreans to lose their Japanese nationality (Motani 2002, 228-229). Their situation became even more complicated by the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953). After WW2, the Soviet Union (SU) occupied the North and the US the South. Both countries fought a common enemy in WW2 but faced each other in a different context on the Korean peninsula. Without consulting the Korean people, they divided the peninsula alongside the infamous ‘38<sup>th</sup> parallel’ (Oberdorfer 1999, 4-11). Under the SU, the North developed into communist North Korea and the South was turned into the capitalist South Korea by the US (Tucker 2010, 4-11). Shortly after both superpowers pulled back their military personnel, North Korea invaded the South, resulting in the Korean War (1950-1953). Even though this war officially never ended, a truce was signed in 1953 agreeing on a status quo, leaving the peninsula divided (Merkel 2008, 293). The Korean War ensured that the long-term residents in Japan would stay there (Lie 2016, 249).

What followed was an overly complex situation for Koreans in Japan forced upon them by political (f)actors. Some were from the northern part, others were from the southern part, but many did not necessarily sympathize with either of the newly installed regimes and saw themselves as *chōsen-jin* or ‘just Korean’. All (offspring of) Koreans that came to Japan before or during WW2 either voluntarily or forcefully and stayed in Japan after the War are called *Zainichi chōsen-jin*, or *Zainichi* in short. The liberalization of overseas travel by the South Korean government in 1989 caused more migration to Japan. These migrants are called ‘newcomers’ and are not considered *Zainichi* as they grew up in an independent and industrialized South Korea. Therefore, they are left out of this thesis’ scope. ‘Korea’ in this thesis will refer to the whole peninsula, unless explicitly mentioned North- or South.

In this thesis, I am going to zoom in on this community of *Zainichi* Koreans in post-War Japan. The War left a legacy in Japan, because of which this group has been heavily marginalized. Their situation is extraordinarily complex, as they are stuck in between many factors and did in fact neither have a home country, nor a smooth relationship with their host country. Partly because of the discrimination *Zainichi* faced, they established their own communities and built their own schools. The first generation had first-hand experiences with the Japanese colonizers, yet their children and grandchildren developed a different relationship with their host society. With their complex history and within a complex context, the way they perceive themselves has been changing. Caught between three different countries, the younger generations seem to have developed different identities compared to preceding generations *Zainichi*. As I will point out in this thesis, current scholarship lacks research on the identity construction

of specifically the fourth generation Zainichi. Therefore, this thesis will explore the development of identity construction of Zainichi, focusing on the evolution of it throughout post-War generations, bringing the fourth generation's state of play into academia. The following research question will be leading: "How has the identity construction of Zainichi been evolving and how is the fourth generation's identity constructed?"

In the first chapter, the theoretical framework, the cadres in which this research takes place will be set by defining key concepts. Following, the academic field of Zainichi research will be explored in chapter 2: literature review. The discussion of extensive literature leads to the discovery of what lacks in current academia. The way how this thesis seeks to fill in this gap will be discussed in chapter 3: methodology. Considering multiple ways of approach, the best-fitting methodology will be applied. In the succeeding fourth chapter, the results will be discussed and brought into conversation with existing literature. This will in the last chapter, the conclusion, lead to answering the research question.

## 1. Theoretical framework

### 1.1 Identity and identity construction

Identity includes a broad range of aspects to define the self, most often in relation to the other. This includes, among others, religion and belief, heritage, and language. However, there is not necessarily a right or wrong definition for it and exactly that is what makes this term rather vague. The definition of identity used in this research is that of Stuart Hall, leading figure in the field of identity research and his work centers around cultural identity construction in diasporic communities. Hall moves away from the widely established belief that identity is an already accomplished fact, arguing that identity is "a production which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not without, representation" (Hall 1989, 22-223).

Hall has introduced two ways of looking at identity. The first defines identity in terms of one, dominant, shared culture that people with shared history and ancestry hold in common. This understanding of identity provides the 'us' with a stable, continued and unchanging frame of 'oneness'. Hall's second take does not only recognize the similarities between members of a group, but also acknowledges critical points of significant differences that define 'who we are' or 'how we have become' (Hall 1989, 222-227). Hall clearly states which way is most relevant in modern times: "Identities are about questions of using the resource of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being not 'who we are' or 'where we came from,' so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves. (..) Identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the 'positive' meaning of any term—and thus its 'identity'—can be constructed" (Hall 1996, 4).

Identity is one of the most commonly studied constructs in recent social sciences and was introduced around the 1950s when it mainly focused on the individual level until late into the 1970s. Erikson (1950) set the traditional definition stating that identity is a stable constellation of attributes, values, beliefs, and experiences within an individual, which can produce a definition of the self. He believes that every person has different experiences and encounters different crises and/or conflicts throughout his/her lifetime, which in combination shape one's identity. Throughout the 1980's and 1990's, the study of identity slowly shifted to the site of the collective (Cerulo 1997). Giddens (1991) states that stable identities no longer exist as the individual could hold more than one identity. Identity is often defined as the subjective concept of oneself as a person (Vignoles 2011).

Sedikides & Brewer (2001) distinguish three distinct levels at which identity can be defined. First, individual identity that refers to self-definition at the level of the individual self (goals, values, religious and spiritual beliefs, behavior standards, self-esteem, decision-making, self-evaluation, and individual life story). Second, relational identity that entails someone's role among other people, and how those roles are interpreted by those who possess them (e.g. parent-child, worker-coworker, customer-clerk). Their theory implicates that identity cannot be formed by only the individual but is always defined by one's relations to others. Lastly, collective identity confirms the latter but focuses on one's identity inside groups and social categories. Thus, based on the value the individual gives to these groups and categories and feelings/attitudes that result from identifying with them. This could go for any kind of group, for example groups based on ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender, families, or classes (Schwartz et al. 2011, 2-4). Upreti (2007) recognizes that identity construction is strongly subjected to the relationships one has (with family, peers, and members of their social sphere) and adds that identity is influenced by one's personality, family, culture, peers, and communication technologies.

As this thesis focuses on the development of identity construction of Korean diaspora in Japan, the notions of Japaneseness and Koreanness also offer helpful tools to analyze this development.

## 1.2 Japaneseness and Koreanness

'Japaneseness' is not a commonly used term and therefore not covered by leading dictionaries. However, this term is often used in scholarly research. Japaneseness can be seen as a traditional interpretation of identity for the Japanese, by the Japanese. The word was derived from the Japanese concept of *Nihonjiron*, explained as 'theories of Japanese people'. Less established online dictionaries such as definitions.net and the Wiktionary define Japaneseness as 'the quality of being Japanese'. This definition may bear some sense of the truth, but scholarly debate proves its complexity.

Discussion on Japaneseness emerged in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and was especially a hot topic during this- and the 18<sup>th</sup> century when political movements in Japan emphasized the uniqueness of Japanese culture, contrasting it with Chinese culture. This was extended to the contrasting of Japanese people and culture with that of western countries from the Meiji period (Kimura 2020, 256-257). Thus, Japaneseness as a concept was developed by the Japanese as method for othering foreigners in relation to the Japanese self. In more recent times, the work of John Lie (2001) is quite influential. He confirms that Japaneseness is defined by what Japanese consider themselves to be- and what not to be. According to



Lie, Japanese had historically placed themselves in an inferior position compared to European cultures yet presented themselves as superior in Asia and above domestic ethnic minorities as ‘the real Japanese’. Lie concludes that the discourse of Japaneseness presented Japan as homogeneous society in which ethnic/cultural diversity was excluded. Lie describes this as “a deductive and dogmatic assumption that seeks to reject the empirical reality of ethnic diversity” (Lie 2001, 50). Ishibashi (2001) therefore called Japaneseness a myth.

The above shows that Japaneseness is not a simple term to define. Yet, as this research focuses on the development of identity construction, it is essential to be able to ‘measure’ this notion of Japaneseness. For this, the framework of Japaneseness by Fukuoka (2000) will be used. Fukuoka states that for the Japanese, someone should have Japanese blood, Japanese nationality, and have ‘internalized Japanese culture’ in order to be called Japanese. According to Iino and Murata (2013), a real Japanese is considered to be born from Japanese parents and generally lack the experience of having lived in a foreign country.

I would like to add language ability to this framework, based on the works of Akiba (2000) and Motani (2002), who demonstrate that language stands in close relation to identity. Lastly, the use of names will be added to the framework of Japaneseness used in this thesis, as Aoki (2012) argues that names indicate people’s identity, reflecting both self-perception and perceived identity. Kim and Lee (2021), however from a quite different angle, also connect the use of name with identity.

Most of the above is also true for Koreanness. Interestingly, the same online dictionaries as used with Japaneseness, define Koreanness as ‘the quality or state of being Korean’. It thus adds ‘state of being Korean’ to the definition. Moon (2012) states Koreanness to be ‘fluid and not essentialized’. Just like Japaneseness, Koreanness has also been an interpretation of Koreans in relation to the other. Koreanness in existing literature has been almost exclusively assigned to South Koreans. In this thesis, this North-South distinction will not be made.

Knowledge of ancient Korea relies almost exclusively on Chinese documentation. These records produce diversified interpretations of the Korean people’s origins and civilization. The variety of these interpretations peaked during the colonial period in which Korean scholars sought to construct a unique and uncontaminated Korean national identity, tracing it back to the remote past (Xu 2016, 31-38). During the occupation, Japanese ethnographers and folklorists were curious about the Koreans. Supported by the GG, they researched Korean folklife. Much has been written on the Koreans by the Japanese, who defined Koreans by comparing them to the Japanese (Atkins 2010, 92-94) In 1913, the Japanese government published a document about ‘the identification of Koreans’, in which the identity was broken down into five categories: frame and appearance, language, manner, food and drink, culture, custom (Itagaki 2015, 53). Because of this, the ‘colonial anthropology’ from the 1920s and 1930s is generally referred to as the era in which Koreans discovered/constructed a national self (Atkins 2010, 92-94). Around the 1980s, leftist discourse centered Koreanness around the concept of *han*<sup>1</sup> (Lie 2016, 253).

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<sup>1</sup> *Han* is believed to be the basis of Korean spirit. It entails a mode extracted from the Korean people’s suffering under foreign aggression, mirroring the desperate situation of Koreans during the occupation in which people could do nothing but bear their emotions and deal with it (Park, et al. 2021, 79; Atkins 2007, 646-647)

Kim (2016) argues that in current context, Koreanness cannot anymore be defined by blood, ancestry, or biological notions of ethnicity. Yet, one has to look at residence, material circumstances and the language and culture acquired. She states that Koreanness should be defined as a “social, political, economic, and cultural identity that is no longer associated exclusively with a single ethnicity but should include subjects of multiple ethnicities” (Kim 2017, 157). Ahn (2013) also goes into the ‘blood metaphor’, stating it has been used as a mechanism to draw boundaries between ‘inclusion and exclusion’. She states that full bloods have historically been considered as ‘full Koreans’, while mixed bloods have been located outside the imagined boundary of the ethnic nation (Ahn 2013, 405-406). However, she reveals that the believed ability to transfer Koreanness through the blood made place for the belief that in principle one drop of Korean blood would be enough to be seen as Korean, as long as someone’s heart is publicly connected to Korea. I find Kim and Ahn’s arguments valid enough to exclude the ‘blood metaphor’ from the framework in this thesis. It seems to have been overtaken by time.

Prébin (2008) shines an interesting light on Koreanness by analyzing cultural programs financed by the South Korean government for adult Korean adoptees who remigrate to South Korea. These programs are founded by the idea that returnees possess genetic and physical predispositions to become ‘real Koreans’. The program covers various aspects of Korean culture, such as traditional music, sports, and cooking. This can be linked to ‘performing culture’ as Fukuoka (2000) had included in his framework of Japaneseness. Furthermore, there is also attention for the Korean language, linked to another part of that framework.

Lee (2009), in her research on identity construction of Korean diaspora in the US also mentioned food as an element of identity. What the diasporic community eats (either Korean or American food), is also considered to be a measure of Koreanness.

Summarizing the above, the following variables will be used in this thesis to ‘measure’ the notions of Japaneseness and Koreanness:

- Nationality/ethnicity
- Extent to which one has internalized Japanese- and/or Korean culture
- Present or absent experience of having lived outside of Japan
- Japanese and/or Korean language proficiency
- Usages of names
- Type of food that is being regularly eaten

Needless to say, this kind of analysis enforces an unavoidable degree of generalization. Therefore, it is necessary to place the notions of Japaneseness and Koreanness within the broader context of generational analysis.

### 1.3 Generations and generational analysis

While ‘generation’ is a frequently used word in daily language, it is a complex term in academia. The study of generations goes back to halfway through the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology defines generations as ‘forms of age-groups consisting of those members of a society who were born at

approximately the same time'. This definition is, however, not complete. Likely, there will never be a universal definition as generational analysis is conducted in various fields of research. Becoming clear from reviewing literature is that generation is often used simultaneously with the term 'cohort' that according to the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology is 'used to identify any group of people with a time-specific common experience'. Examples of these experiences could be a group of people retiring or graduating at the same time, but in the case of the Zainichi community it could also be the group that experienced war or peace.

Annalistic research in the US was conducted on generational changes from the earliest period of time (1584~) by Strauss and Howe (1991), yet the earliest record of generational analysis belongs to German sociologist Mannheim. In 1927, he drafted an essay that was republished in English in 1952 and is considered by many as the most systematic, complete, and influential work on generation of his 'generation'. The field of generational analysis up to the present day has been largely shaped by the both the fact that his ideas were applied and taken over by many as well as by the critique and extension that derived from it (Popescu 2019). Mannheim advocates that generational analysis provides a basis for understanding how social change is possible while cultural traditions and identity are preserved.

Mannheim considers social generations to be cohorts of people born in the same date range and who share similar cultural experiences. He identified five processes that establish social change: the emergence of new participants in the cultural process, the disappearance of former participants, the fact that members of a generation can participate for only a limited time, the fact that cultural heritage is passed on from one generation to the next and the idea that generational transitions are continuous. According to Mannheim, the thriving factor behind this change is the transformation of the individual's consciousness. He recognizes that the younger members of society learn values and history from their parents and thus core ideals are often transmitted. Yet, as they become aware of the world around them, experience this society differently. Mannheim calls this 'fresh contact'. He argues that especially the formative experiences during one's youth shape a generation (Mannheim 1952, 193, 291-293, 302-305).

Thus, generations according to Mannheim are formed through both a common location in historical time (shared events, experiences) and the awareness members of a generation have of that historical location. Young, 'new' members of society experience and process their surroundings individually while growing up instead of just through their parents' eyes and adapt value systems that were passed onto them to the realities they find themselves in. These 'collective mentalities that mirror a dominant view of the world' and the defining values that are collectively formed by a generation will likely influence their individual behavior throughout their lives (Mannheim 1952, 304-305).

Ryder (1965) complements Mannheim's theory by stating that the succession of birth cohorts is a process of lending flexibility that provide new perspectives to address actual and social problems. He states that cohorts should be placed within other variables, such as education, race, class, and geographical location. Jansen (1975) sees the generation as a form of coexistence. Members share collective perspectives, but also have perspectives unique to them. She distinguished two methods of identifying a generation in the social structure. First, a particular time dimension. Thus, members of a generation live at the same time. This does, however, not mean that everyone living at the same time

forms one generation. Second, the historical context. She says that people can never separate themselves from the particular circumstances they are living in. They will always be in connection, so there is no choice than to live with it. In order to survive, one gets confronted and needs to solve certain problems. The solutions to those depend on one's interpretation of the problem. There is a gap between chosen solutions and solutions that are transmitted from former generations. Perspectives of people in the same cohort are directed to the same circumstances and therefore a generation according to Jansen consists of same-age people that interpret their shared circumstances by attaching similar meanings to them, seeing the world in a similar way (Jansen 1975, 93-94).

Wyatt (1993) attempts to produce a complete cultural definition of generation. He lists that a generation is constituted by 1- a traumatic event (e.g. civil war or natural catastrophe'), 2- a variety of political and/or cultural key figures who give articulation to the traumatic events, 3- dramatic shifts in demography, 4- external circumstances that put a generation into either a cycle of success or failure, 5- the creation of sacred space that sustains a collective memory of utopia. Eyerman and Turner (1998) add to this that a generational cohort "survives by maintaining a collective memory of its origins, historic struggles, primary historical and political events, leading characters, and ideologists" (Eyerman and Turner 1998, 97).

Pilcher (1994) and Biggs (2007) point out that the above discussed works focused too much on one definition of generation, and stress that generations can be seen in multiple ways. Apart from same-age people who experience the same notable events in a certain period of time, they also point at generation in the kinship sense and how the concept of generation can be applied to locate certain birth cohorts within their social context, like 'baby boomers'. Kinship relations identify different generations in comparison with their relatives. Thus, linear classifications based on the line of descent from an ancestor (e.g. grandfather, father, son). Biggs points out that the social meaning of a generation is largely influenced by socially structured opportunities such as lifestyles, values, the meaning of existence and shared ideological points of reference.

Jaeger (1985) identifies two schools of thought regarding the formation of generations: the 'pulse-rate hypothesis' and the 'imprint-hypothesis'. The first one states that the entire population within a society can be divided into series of cohorts, which all develop a unique 'peer personality' because all came of age within the same time period. The 'imprint hypothesis' can be traced back to Mannheim's theory, stating that generations are constructed by specific events that cause young people to see the world in a different way than their ancestors. Woodman & Wyn (2015) add to this that it is important to look at how young people experience their generation and how that changes based on their geographical location. Grenier (2007) stresses that in generational analysis, it is not important where exactly birth cohorts' borders are drawn, but rather how individuals and societies interpret those borders. She does, however, recognize that categorizing generations according to age cohorts is an important scholarly means to analyze generations.

Strauss & Howe in 1991 published a widely recognized book that analyzed US society from 1584 onwards, developing the influential Strauss-Howe theory. They discovered patterns which they used to predict the continuation of generational development in the US until 2069. They stick to the traditional order of one's life as going through the stages of childhood, young adulthood, midlife, and old age. They

see each of these stages as a period of 20 years, identifying a cycle that would repeat itself within the course of a lifetime (80 years). The first period is called 'the high', then 'the awakening, followed by 'the unravelling' and lastly 'crisis'. Within these periods, they distinguish the 'prophet generation', the 'nomad generation', the 'hero generation' and the 'artist generation'. They describe these different generations as having distinct features to them what other generations have not, that were assigned to them by external factors relevant to the period they live in and situations they have to deal with. Thus, they emphasize the importance of external factors in the process of shaping a generation. The theory states that every cycle ends with a period of crisis and destruction in which social chaos, individualism and distrust toward institutions prevail. This is then followed by a new period where the generation that was born during the destruction sees the importance of collectivism again and rebuilds society and its institutions in order to prevent chaos from appearing again. Strauss and Howe call the current cycle the 'millennial saeculum' and identify the 'baby boom' generation (1943-1960), 'generation X' (1961-1981), the 'millennial generation' (1982-2004) and the current 'homeland generation' (2005~).

The main critique on the Strauss-Howe theory is that it overgeneralizes age cohorts and that it is too much focused on the US. For this research, it is therefore more interesting to look at how generations are distinguished in Korea and especially Japan. Although to a lesser extent than in the US, there also seems to be research activity in the field of age cohorts and generational identification in South Korea. Park & Park (2018) draw on earlier done research on age cohorts in South Korea and compare four generations in the US with that of South Korea. They distinguished the following South Korean equivalents of the Strauss-Howe theory: traditionalists (1925-1949), boomers (1950-1959), Generation 386 (1960-1969), Generation X/*Shinsedae* (1970-1979) and Generation Y/millennials (1980-1994).

I have been unable to find academic work on what comes after Generation Y. However, within current public discourse on generational development in South Korea the terms 'Hell Joseon' and *sampo sedae* or 'three giving up generation' are often heard. The first term refers to the narrative that some of the youngest generation of South Koreans call their country a 'living hell', where people born in wealthy families tend to have a 'normal' life, while those who were not struggle with (often) irregular jobs, long working hours, low wages, less security and are overall less happy (Borowiec 2015; Filfield 2016). Moreover, the pressure is also caused by high competition the Koreans have found themselves in from an early age and by parents that have set (ambitious) standards for their children. Many feel that within this context, there is not much reason to keep living that life and rather start living elsewhere. *Sampo sedae* refers to the generation's characteristics to give up on three traditional values: marriage, dating and childbirth. There are variations of the term that extend this to also giving up on employment, home ownership, interpersonal relationships, hope, health, and physical appearance. In the most extreme variation, *wanpo sedae*, even life is given up, referring to South Korea's high suicide rate (Williams 2020).

As for Japan, I have been unable to find an academic generational breakdown of society. However, there is much to find in both English and Japanese sources online. Therefore, I applied a comparative funnel approach, taking over only the information the sources agree on in order to attach sufficient reliability to it (Wong 2016; Nippon.com 2022; Henry 2022; Takaoka 2016).

- Taisho Generation (born between 1912-1926). Experienced the First World War.

- Showa Single Digit Generation (1926-1934). There is not much overlapping information on this generation within the mentioned sources.
- Burnt Generation (1935-1946). Grew up during times where Japan was preparing for war. Struggles related to security and uncertainty before, during and after WW2.
- Babyboom Generation/*Dankainosedai* (1947-1950). Growing up during the post-War recovery, people worked hard and experienced recession and the collapse of the bubble economy. Also referred to as 'corporate warriors' because they worked extremely hard.
- Danso generation/*Shinjinrui* (1951-1960). This generation spent a large chunk of its formative years during a period of rapid economic growth and did not experience the direct aftermath of the War.
- Shinrui generation (1961-1970), spent young adulthood at the peak of Japan's economic bubble. They spent most money on themselves, adopted media consumption and subcultures emerged. In return, people were willing to work long hours. Low unemployment rate.
- Ice Age generation (1971-1981). Electronic products, convenience stores and fast-food became widely available. During early adulthood, the bubble economy collapsed (early 1990s). As a result, this generation struggled in finding full-time jobs. People started to realize that they should become individuals rather than parts of a company.
- 80s/Pressure Generation (1982-1986). Fierce competition on the labor market put this generation under pressure to become the best. This generation produced many skilled workers.
- Yutori generation (1987-1996/2004). Less ambitious, more practical, realistic, and adaptable. *Yutori* translates as 'relaxed' or 'free from pressure'. People start putting more importance on work-life balance and family/friends.
- Generation Z (1996-2010). This generation is compatible with multimedia, more aware of social issues but less politically interested. They are characterized by seeking equality and rationality. This generation is also referred to as the Satori generation, which is regarded as the equivalent of the Korean *sanpo sedae*. The generation is less interested in money, career, romantic relationships, and hobbies. The economic trends contain a varied palette of career options.

The Zainichi population's generations have been distinguished primarily through their vertical familial succession/kinship ties (Kang 2006; Chapman 2007; Kim 2008; Chatani 2021). The generation that came to Japan is called the first generation, their children the second, etcetera. In current literature, four generations are distinguished. Considering that especially young people came to Japan and the vast majority arrived just before- and during the War (Kim 2008, 875-876; Yoon 2012, 414-423), it is likely that most members of the fourth generation are between the ages of 10 and 30. Problematically, however, it that Koreans started coming to Japan as early as in the 1920's (Kim 2008, 875-876; Yoon 2012, 414-423). Thus, the generations cannot perfectly be shared under isolated age cohorts, as the dates of coming to Japan have a range of approximately 25 years. It therefore exists that there are for instance Zainichi in their forties belonging to the fourth generation, as well as Zainichi in their twenties that are third generation Zainichi.

## 2. Literature review

### 2.1 Zainichi institutions and ethnic education

When the War ended, the first generation Zainichi regarded themselves as *kaiho jinmin* or liberated people who would go back to Korea as soon as circumstances would allow and therefore believed that their children should be educated in ethnic schools or *chōsen gakkō*. There, they could regain their pride in being Korean and become talented individuals able to serve the Korean nation (Motani 2002). By 1948, the number of these schools had exceeded 600, offering space for 58.000 students (Bell 2019, 32; Nomoto 2009, 55).

As Ryang (2000) points out, education is one of the most powerful state vehicles for training children ideologically as national subjects. The Japanese Ministry of Education in 1948 stated that all students in Japan must receive the same public education and ordered the closure of *chōsen gakkō* (Okano 2013, 121). Many Koreans protested in major cities, violently cracked down by the police. One Zainichi student was killed, few thousands were injured, and even more were arrested (Akiba 2000, 603; Jo 2015, 178; Nomoto 2009, 55). When Japan became independent from the US in 1951, the government refused to be financially responsible for Korean students. Enrolling in public schools was hard and many Zainichi were bullied (Akiba 2000; Tai 2007, 8). Because of this, North Korea stepped in (Park-Kim 2020, 70).

In 1955, Kim Il-sung established the Chongryon and made it responsible for the reestablishment of *chōsen gakkō* and the protection of Zainichi rights, among others (Shipper 2010). Because of this, even though the vast majority of Zainichi originated from the southern half of the peninsula (Itagaki 2015, 52), nearly 90% supported the Chongryon in 1955 (Wickstrum 2016, 51). This was mainly because South Korea largely neglected Zainichi community, the communist system attracted Zainichi living in poverty and because the North Korean economy was far ahead of that of the South until the 1960s (Wickstrum 2016; Itagaki 2015, 52) As de facto embassy of North Korea to Japan, Chongryon dominated Zainichi discourse at least until the 1970s. The number of *chōsen gakkō*, with North Korean funds, exceeded 160 by the 1970s (Chatani 2021, 591). It educated students as North Korean nationals, with own textbooks and ideological classes (Ha 2018, 194). The schools were meant to be 'liberated spaces' away from discrimination that prevailed in Japanese public schools, taking over the role that usually belonged to the ethnic Korean slums, which were disappearing in the 1960s (Chatani 2021). Discrimination in Japanese society resulted in low self-esteem and self-hatred among Zainichi students. In 1975 only 27,4% was proud of their heritage whereas 46,9% would have rather been born as Japanese (Akiba 2000, 603).

Mindan, the South Korea-affiliated equivalent of Chongryon was established in 1948 and also built some *chōsen gakkō*. These aimed at preserving Korean ethnicity and heritage, but followed the Japanese education curriculum, enabling graduates to enroll in Japanese universities (Wickstrum 2016, 52-53; Akiba 2000, 604-605). Whereas Chongryon aimed at maintaining the Korean language and culture by rejecting Japanese society and fostering 'long distance nationalism' (Wickstrum 2016, 52; Shipper 2010, 57), Mindan encouraged assimilation into Japanese society (Bell 2019, 32-33; Chatani 2021, 591).

As the Korean War ideologically divided Zainichi community, Zainichi identity was strongly connected to which institution one belonged. In the 1980s, Mindan members exceeded Chongryon members as Koreans started integrating better in Japanese society, South Korea democratized and human rights violations in the North became increasingly known to the public (Wickstrum 2016, 52-53). However, as both organizations were dominated by first generation Zainichi, also Mindan numbers started to drop (Shipper 2010, 71).

As time passed and second and third generations Zainichi arose, not only Zainichi institutions- but also *chōsen gakkō* faced declining enrollments for multiple reasons. First, birth rates among Zainichi were low and attitudes towards ethnic education changed. Japan was increasingly seen as permanent homeland and therefore parents saw Japanese education as important for their children’s survival in Japanese society (Akiba 2000, 604-605). Demand shifted from ideological education to ethnic education that teaches children to see both Koreas as origins of their ethnic heritage while preparing them to become members of Japanese society (Okano 2004, 126; Chatani 2021, 605). Secondly, institutional exclusion of *chōsen gakkō* continued (Jo 2015) and North Korea scaled back subsidies, relocating the financial burden to the parents who often could not afford it (Park-Kim 2020, 73-74). Third, extreme academic competition for enrolling in university under the standardized examination system did not leave much time for Korean classes (Akiba 2000, 601). Largely failing to meet these shifted demands, by 2018 Chongryon operated 70- and Mindan only seven *chōsen gakkō* (Flores 2018, 10).

The declining numbers have brought major changes to the Chongryon, as it adopted survival strategies not to lose all members. In 1993, this led to reforms of their school curriculum, offering students a broader understanding of the world (Shipper 2010, 71; Ha 2018, 201; Akiba 2000, 604). Motani (2002), Nomoto (2009) and Jo (2015) argue that contemporary ethnic education is an effective way to create bicultural and bilingual Zainichi that both find pride in their ethnic heritage while also fitting well into Japanese society.

## 2.2 Institutional discrimination and socio-economic changes

Institutional discrimination by the Japanese government has continued in more recent times as political tensions between Japan and both Koreas worsened (Ha 2018; Jo 2015; Itagaki 2015). In 2010, the Japanese government implemented its Free High School Education Policy but excluded *chōsen gakkō*. It sought to use Japanese education as means to promote Japaneseness (Kimura 2020, 258). In 2013, the government announced its intention to completely stop all funding to *chōsen gakkō* and by 2018, 14 prefectures had done so (Park-Kim 2020, 72-73; Itagaki 2015, 60-62).

Institutional discrimination regarding Zainichi was not limited to education only. Japanese law had been interpreted in a way that Zainichi were prohibited from being hired by local governments, public corporations, and educational institutions (Akiba 2000, 601-605). In the private sector too, many employers would not hire Koreans (Kim 2008, 876-877). In 1986, 40% of the Zainichi had experienced discrimination looking for a job (Okano 2004, 125). Moreover, Zainichi were excluded from social welfare systems such as health insurance and unemployment benefits (Motani 2002, 228; Wickstrum 2016, 45). Furthermore, families of the 22.182 Koreans that died while forcefully serving in the Japanese army were



excluded from provisions the Japanese government did pay to families of fallen soldiers from other former colonies. After the War, this all forced many Zainichi into low-status, low-paying 'dirty' jobs, often illegally (Wickstrum 2016, 44-46). Widespread feelings of prejudice and hostility towards Zainichi caused their socio-economic position to be exceptionally low in the 1950s (Kim 2011).

The exclusion of Zainichi from regular jobs and food rationing, on the contrary, turned many into entrepreneurs. As means of survival, Zainichi used offal and turned it into a dish that was sold to malnourished people on the black market (Laurent 2020; Cwiertka 2007). This laid the foundations for Yakiniku; a popular kind of restaurant which by 1999 was for 66% in Zainichi hands (Toshio 1999, 31). Also, when the Japanese government in 1954 legally banned gambling, many Japanese left the business, but Zainichi smartly found loopholes in the law and took over (Manzenreiter 1998). In 2010, 80-90% of the Pachinko game parlors, Japan's largest chain, were in Zainichi hands and its total revenue in 2006 exceeded that of Japan's domestic automotive industry (Magaña 2010). The rapid growth of Japanese economy during the 1960s-70s provided Zainichi with opportunities to improve their socio-economic position (Kim 2011). From the 1980s, globalization increased the demand for 'Korea experts', getting Zainichi into large companies (Kim 2008, 877-880). From 1991, Zainichi were also allowed to become teachers in public schools (Chapman 2006, 76). Zainichi also obtained the rights to access public housing and pension programs, and to become government employees (Visočnik 2019, 218-219). Employment discrimination decreased and Zainichi improved their educational level (Kim 2011, 238-240).

## 2.3 Japanese-Korean relations and hate speech

While institutional discrimination decreased, hate speech and public racism by far-right nationalist groups increased severely in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The 'anti-Korean Wave' (Cho & Kobayashi 2019) was founded by the changing dynamics of Japan's relationship with both Koreas. Already since the 1980s, the rise of Japanese neo-nationalist historiography had resulted in governmental denial of committed war atrocities. This included extremely sensitive topics for (Zainichi) Koreans, including sexual slavery and forced labor (Laurent & Robillard-Martel 2022, 49). This also showed in government-approved history textbooks at Japanese schools that depicted Japan as the victimized (Suh et al. 2013; Guex 2015). Moreover, visits of Japanese prime-ministers to the Yasukuni shrine, enshrining Japanese who died in battle including class-A war criminals, caused multiple diplomatic crises between Japan and South Korea between 2001 and 2013 (Koga 2016). Since 2010, territorial disputes intensified, sparking nationalist sentiments on both sides (Cho et al. 2009; Akimoto 2020).

Tensions between Japan and North Korea escalated even further. North Korea's nuclear testing from the 1980s threatened Japan's national security. From 2017, test missiles regularly landed near Japan (Matthews 2020). In 2003, a former North Korean scientist testified that 90% of the missiles' components were smuggled from Japan with cooperation of the Chongryon (Shipper 2010, 66). Moreover, North Korea recognized in 2002 that it had abducted at least 12 Japanese civilians to teach Japanese to intelligence agents between 1977 and 1982 (Shipper 2010; Ha 2018; Lie 2009). Furthermore, a senior Chongryon official confessed to running a North Korean spy network in Japan (Shipper 2010, 66). These scandals were largely reported in Japanese media, sparking public sentiment against Koreans to

turn radical, fueled by the Japanese government linking *chōsen gakkō* directly with organized crime (Itagaki 2015, 61).

Throughout the 2000s, Chongryon members have been targeted by reactionary Japanese and its offices have been shot multiple times (Shipper 2010, 689-690). Verbal and physical assaults against *chōsen gakkō* students on their way to school multiplied (Ha 2018, 191-192). With the emergence of the internet, many online platforms were created fostering hate speech towards Koreans (Laurent & Robillard-Martel 2020, 403). Starting as an online platform, the ultranationalist group Zaitokukai, founded in 2006, has been very influential. It openly celebrates Japan's imperial past and emphasizes Japanese superiority over Koreans (Laurent & Robillard-Martel 2022, 43; Matthews 2020, 54-64; Ito 2014, 437).

Zaitokukai's emergence fitted in the global trend of 'North Korea-phobia' (Itagaki 2015). Anti-Korean sentiment in Japan increased for various reasons. First, Japan's economy stagnated while South Korean economy grew. Second, fears existed that the Korean Wave (see 2.4) was taking over the popularity of Japanese goods. Third, emerging far-right groups were a byproduct of the Liberal Democratic Party's growing influence, promoting Korea-phobia. Fourth, the co-hosted FIFA World Cup by Japan and South Korea in 2002 sparked societal resistance against cooperation with 'the enemy'. Fifth, Koreans were historically associated with communism and Yakuza. Sixth, even smaller crimes involving Koreans were largely reported in the media (Martín 2011, 130-132; Ahn & Yoon 2020, 180; Yoon & Asahina 2021, 365-372; Itagaki 2015, 50; Ito 2014, 436).

Since 2008, Zaitokukai has organized many actions, ranging from verbal assaults to physical attacks. They also targeted major television broadcasters that broadcasted Korean dramas. They regularly gathered in Koreatowns and at *chōsen gakkō* gates, waving imperial flags and shouting hate speech. Even children were accused of being spies and cockroaches and were demanded to go 'back to Korea'. Their hate speech also includes things such as 'beat all Koreans to death' or 'make all women prostitutes' (Park-Kim 2020, 74-75; Itagaki 2015, 49; Shipper 2010, 57; Ahn & Yoon 2020, 182; Ito 2014, 434-438). Police often did not take Zainichi-claims seriously (Park-Kim 2020, 74). Kumpis (2015) revealed that over 80% of Zainichi-related articles between 2000 and 2014 contained negative news.

Assaults have had substantial influence on Zainichi. For adults, it felt like history was repeating (Itagaki 2015, 49). Some children victimized by attacks reported PTSD-symptoms and others asked their parents why it is bad to be Korean (Park-Kim 2020, 74). Gilmour et al. (2019) figured that between 2012 and 2016, suicide rates among Zainichi were extremely high compared to that of Japanese nationals and Koreans in South Korea. Though not causally substantiated, they link this to hate speech and the struggles over obtaining Japanese citizenship, causing stress and illness. Ahn & Park (2019) however, revealed that third and fourth generation Zainichi in the preceding decade have increasingly dissociated themselves from hate speech.

Another development is the formation of groups countering Zaitokukai actions in which ethnic Japanese have joined forces with Zainichi (Ito 2014, 442; Park-Kim 2020, 77-80; Laurent & Robillard-Martel, 43). These groups have also been addressing Zainichi human rights issues to various UN agencies and committees, resulting in the UN demanding Japan to include *chōsen gakkō* into its free high school

program and to firmly act against hate speech and racism (Park-Kim 2020, 81-82). Under this pressure, the government passed an anti-hate speech bill in 2016 (Ahn & Yoon 2020, 182). Demonstrations decreased, but did not disappear (Park-Kim 2020, 75).

## 2.4 The Korean Wave

The Korean Wave or *Hallyu* renewed appreciation of Koreanness around the globe through businesses and popular culture (Shim 2006). In Japan, the Korean Wave dramatically increased the demand of Korean food and culture (Cwiertka 2007; Demelius 2019). Ethnic slums were transformed into vibrant Koreatowns. Zainichi started organizing Korean cultural workshops and Korean products were booming (Demelius 2021, 104-105).

Ahn & Joon (2020) identified three different Korean Waves and revealed that in the beginning, mostly middle-aged Japanese women came to watch Korean dramas. The second wave (late 2000s – early 2010s) shifted the focus from drama to music and the audience from middle-aged women to people in their 20s/30s. The third wave from halfway through the 2010s centered around K-pop, cosmetics, and fashion, attracting mostly teenagers. They also showed that young Japanese fans of Korean culture disengaged from the growing anti-Korean sentiment in Japan. Interesting, because Shipper (2010) pointed out that those engaging in hate speech are mostly middle-aged men.

The Korean Wave made Zainichi more visible (Tai 2004, 372; Demelius 2021, 107). It not only improved the image of Korea in Japan, but also caused the Japanese to be more interested in Zainichi and their history (Iwabuchi 2008). As Korean products became part of Japanese daily life, the way Japanese related to Koreans shifted from uneasiness to appreciation, resulting in increasing confidence among young Zainichi (Lie 2016, 253). Through this, some Japanese and Zainichi started fostering a shared sense of community (Demelius 2021).

## 2.5 Legal statuses

When Korea became independent from Japan in 1951, Koreans lost Japanese nationality yet received a special residence status. As Japan in 1965 recognized South Korea as the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula, Zainichi lost this status and faced the moral dilemma of either obtaining Japanese or South Korean citizenship or becoming stateless. Those who did not obtain a nationality, for example because they felt as if choosing would betray their ethnic heritage, were not granted permanent residency until 1982 (Motani 2002, 228; Kim 2008, 876).

Currently, there are three legal statuses of Zainichi: Japanese nationality, South Korean nationality and *chōsen-seki*. While factually untrue, the latter in public discourse is often regarded as ‘North Korean’ (Matthews 2020, 6; Hee 2020, 452). By the end of 2019, more than 450.000 Zainichi had South Korean nationality and almost 30.000 had *chōsen-seki*. There are much more Zainichi in Japan, but many have naturalized. The Japanese government does not keep (public) records on naturalized Zainichi, making it impossible to quantify them (Wickstrum 2016, 49). Naturalization procedures used to be

complex but were simplified for Zainichi by the Japanese government in the 1980s (Kim 2006, 65). Tai (2004) and Wickstrum (2016) refer to this as another government incentive for assimilation.

Naturalization has been on the rise from the 1990s, as Zainichi are increasingly separating ethnicity from nationality, believing that they can still keep their Korean identity after naturalization (Tai 2004, 356; Bell 2019, 32-33). Between 1994 and 2004, annually 10.000 Zainichi obtained Japanese citizenship (Ahn & Park 2019, 682). By 2005, 90% of Zainichi married Japanese citizens, meaning that only 10% of Zainichi marriages would result in Zainichi status (Shipper 2010, 70). Within families, often different nationalities appear (Hee 2020, 458-459). Another reason Zainichi have increasingly been choosing to obtain either Japanese- or South Korean citizenship is because *chōsen-seki* does not allow overseas travel (Hee 2020, 458-460). Jo (2015) describes the emerging positive discourse regarding naturalization as ‘the discourse of abandoning Zainichi’. Laurent & Robillard-Martel (2022) add to this that future generations of Zainichi will all have Japanese nationality. According to Oh (2012), the acceptance of Japanese citizenship is an act of exposing oneself to a new diasporic fate, entering the mainstream Japanese society.

## 2.6 Generational differences

### 2.6.1 *The first generation*

The first generation Zainichi came to Japan during the occupational period and were directly subjected to Japanese aggression, enduring severe assimilation policies. Living in poor conditions and often in segregated slums, they would resume Korean practices such as making kimchi, ancestor worshipping and Korean dancing. Shamans healed the sick (Visočnik 2019, 225; Chatani 2021, 594-595). Being isolated from Japanese mainstream society, these slums were regarded a cultural extension of the homeland (Shipper 2010, 57). Poverty disabled most to attend school. Those who could go, encountered discrimination by teachers and classmates (Okano 2004, 127-128). They were regarded as ‘third country people’ that destroyed public order and morality. Many were illiterate and knew only few words Japanese. Also, many had relatives injured or killed during WW2 (Kang 2006, 268). 1945 Marked the end of WW2. This ‘year zero’ for Zainichi, as Lie (2008) calls it, filled their hearts with hope of finally returning to the homeland. The division of the Korean peninsula in 1948 and the Korean War, however, resulted in utter disappointment and realization that they had to, once again, endure ethnic discrimination (Kang 2006, 271). During the late 1950s/early 1960s, Chongryon organized a large-scale repatriation campaign. Until 1984, more than 93.000 Zainichi were relocated to North Korea together with 6.000 Japanese spouses. The majority, however, stayed in Japan (Shipper 2010, 62; Wickstrum 2016, 52; Bell 2016, 18; Oh 2012, 653; Kang 2006, 271).

Struggling to survive, bearing deep sorrows, having close family connections, a native Korean command and great familiarity to Korean culture characterized the first generation Zainichi. They had strong personalities, mirroring endured hardships that hardened their worldview (Chatani 2021, 590). This generation for long felt like being displaced in a foreign land and saw Japan as temporary living space, planning to return to the ‘imagined homeland’ (Chatani 2021, 595; Shipper 2021, 58; Tai 2004, 364). Of the 650.000 Koreans that registered themselves in 1946, 80% planned to go home. They

redefined themselves as a diasporic community instead of an ethnic minority, staying away from the mass (Chapman 2004, 32). They maintained strong ideological ties to the imagined homeland (Ahn & Park 2019, 682-683; Oh 2012, 654). First generation Zainichi embraced Koreanness by rejecting Japaneseness (Chatani 2021, 7).

### *2.6.2 The second generation*

Their children, the second generation Zainichi, were often only fluent in Japanese because of assimilation policies (Lie 2016, 248). They were told by their parents to hide their ethnic background in order to avoid discrimination. Protecting their children, many parents would not tell their young children about their ancestry (Kimura 2020, 263). Many adopted Japanese names, trying to pass as Japanese (Aoki 2012, 382-386). In the mid-1980s, 90% of Zainichi passed as Japanese in their daily lives (Tai 2004, 364). This surviving strategy stimulated assimilation. In the late 1980s, Zainichi had become culturally assimilated to the extent that people wondered whether they had disappeared (Lie 2001, 348). In 1986, 91,3% of Zainichi used their Japanese names in public (Aoki 2012, 384). In 1993, 90% of Zainichi had Japanese names in addition to their Korean birth names, of which 80% used the Japanese name in daily life (Okano 2004, 124).

For the second generation, 'the homeland' was a vague term. They had not lived in Korea and Japan felt as their native place. Many grew up in ethnic slums where they witnessed their parents' hardships and involvement in illegal business (Kang 2006). They had learned to survive and excel in Japanese education and did not completely reject Japan (Chatani 2021, 590-598). The long-distance nationalist sentiment that belonged to the first generation, made place for a sentiment of diasporic nationalism among the second generation, without the longing of return, seeing Japan as country of permanent residence (Shipper 2010, 57-58). By the late 1970s, nearly 80% of Zainichi did not know much about the 'imagined homeland' (Chapman 2004, 31).

### *2.6.3 The third generation*

As the first and second generations saw their existence as colonial legacy, the third generation focused more on what it meant to be Korean in Japan (Htun 2012, 14). From the 1970s, the share of second and third generations within Zainichi community grew and resulted in changing political discourses and cultural consciousness (Kang 2006). The third generation regarded Korean language as a foreign language and Japanese as their native tongue. They adopted various aspects of Japanese life which, to the critique of the first generation, resulted in the 'departure from the homeland' discourse and assumed abandonment of Korean identity in order to fit into the Japanese mainstream (Chapman 2004, 32-33). Demelius (2021) refers to this trend as 'weakened homeland-oriented ethnonationalism'. This generation rejected the stigma of being an ethnic minority and their ideology centered around being 'people without a country', increasingly separating themselves from Zainichi institutions (Shipper 2010, 57-58; Bell 2019, 32-33).

From the late 1970s and 1980s, a new Zainichi ideology was created that is referred to as 'the third way': living in Japan as home without being fully Korean or Japanese, but by being Zainichi (Chapman 2004, 44). They saw Korea as ancestral home but felt most comfortable in Japan (Koo 2019, 192). This was a breakthrough for those who had been caught between the pressure of either

naturalization or 'returning to the homeland' (Tai 2004, 363; Hester 2002). By 1980, Zainichi were linguistically and culturally indistinguishable from ethnic Japanese (Kim 2011, 235). By 1993, the Japan-born share of Zainichi Koreans reached 90% and they further came to see ethnicity as separate from nationality (Chapman 31-34). Visočnik (2019) points out that since the 1980s, younger Zainichi had a much more positive view of what she calls 'hybridity'. She defines this by the feeling of not having two homelands, orientating on a path that does not lead to either naturalization or belonging to one of the Koreas but would rather lead to contribution to the host society.

This third way offered space for Zainichi to experiment with new possibilities of locating their identity, challenging stereotypes (Chapman 2014, 35-36). This space is referred to by Aoki (2012) as 'in between space' where Zainichi construct a transcultural identity, helping them to redefine their selves as Zainichi Koreans instead of having their identity defined by dominant groups. Diasporic consciousness was given another meaning (Kwon 2020). The meaning of Zainichi shifted from affiliation to either of the Koreas to a field of contested identity regardless of nationality. Ahn & Park (2019) describe this identity location as 'something in between Japanese and Korean' (Ahn & Park 219, 697).

Younger Zainichi, while regarding themselves as members of Japanese society (Hester 2002), started to express themselves more and gatherings emerged in which Zainichi of all generations with diverse political backgrounds would come together to discuss their situation in a supportive and discrimination-free environment. Trying to reconnect to their roots, this especially benefitted young Zainichi to cultivate ethnic awareness. Laurent & Robillard-Martel (2022) call these activities 'hidden acts of resistance'. The Korean Wave further encouraged Koreans to increasingly 'come out' as it brought many Zainichi celebrities into the Japanese mainstream (Cho and Kobayashi 2019). Since the 2000s, those celebrities have increasingly been open and proud Zainichi (Lie 2009, 168-169). TV-commercials featuring Zainichi also contributed to the partial disappearance of 'racial passing' (Oh and Han 2021).

Kweon (2018) and Htun (2016) point out that third generation Zainichi that travelled or moved to South Korea felt like 'foreigners with legal nationality'. Though the majority has been educated in Japanese schools and few speak fluent Korean, the third generation still sees the Korean language, popular culture, and culinary traditions as important parts of their heritage (Laurent & Robillard-Martel 2022, 47). Many experienced less bullying and attacks and made Japanese friends, changing their relationship with schools (Okano 2004, 127-128). While they still struggle with their names because of potential discrimination, 65% of Zainichi revealed their ethnic identity to their Japanese peers in 1994 (Okano 2004, 131). From the early 2010s, a movement emerged in Japan encouraging Zainichi to use their ethnic Korean names in public, resulting in more Zainichi students to do so at school (Aoki 2012).

#### *2.6.4 Theories on Zainichi identity*

Fukuoka (2000) distinguished five types of identity among Zainichi:

- Pluralists: want to remove ethnic discrimination to create a place of peaceful co-existence; living together while representing mutual differences. Affiliation to both North and South Korea.
- Nationalists: see themselves as overseas nationals and do not wish to assimilate into Japanese society, illustrated by the refusal of Japanese names and nationality. Often North-Korea supporters.
- Individualists: main concern is achieving personal success and rarely feel devotion to either Korea or

Japan. Many travel or study abroad.

- Naturalizing types: want to become Japanese, hoping to avoid discrimination and see no use in making a point of Japan's history.
- Ethnic solidarity types: mainly concerned about mutual assistance among Zainichi. They encourage the use of Korean names and want to improve cultural awareness. They see allies in anyone helping in their fight against racism and often feel attached to both South Korea as the motherland and Japan as country of residence.

Oh (2012) has, more recently, identified three stages of the, as he calls it, 'diasporic identity crisis' of Zainichi: 'diaspora', 'post-diaspora' and 'transnational diaspora'. He links the first stage to the period in which Koreans were expatriated to Japan, the second stage to the period of repatriation and/or decisions to stay in Japan and the third stage to a transnational diaspora that actively explores migration destinations beyond Japan and the Koreas. The latter is, according to Oh, in order to solve their identity crisis. Ethnic identity according to this model was shaped by historical events, for example the need to be liberated from the occupiers for the first generation. Much of the characteristics of the first- and second stages are similar to what has been discussed hereabove regarding the first and second generation. However, the 'transnational diaspora' stage is characterized by the exploration of western culture, for example by travelling to- or studying in foreign countries. Oh did not directly link this to the third generation.

### *2.6.5 The fourth generation and research gap*

Though some of the more recent discussed works talk about 'younger Zainichi', there is not much written about what comes after the third generation. Oh (2012) states that Korean diaspora is still in the making and Tai (2004) explains that in the 1990s' social climate, an alternative way of life for Zainichi emerged: the 'Korean-Japanese'. According to her, hybrid identity increasingly transcends ethnicity and nationality. Laurent and Robillard-Martel (2020) classified this 1990s-onward development as the 'fourth choice', describing it as advocating for naturalization with the possibility of preserving Korean ethnicity. Hester (2002) also touched upon this, defining the 'fourth choice' as "the full civic-political membership in Japanese polity through the acquisition of Japanese nationality, while maintaining pride in Korean heritage, including the display of it through the use of ethnic names" (Hester 2002, 16). Visočnik (2019) talks about the probability of the emergence of a new Zainichi cultural identity, speculating that the ethnic boundaries between Koreans and Japanese might shift more in the future. Lie (2009) talks about a 'post-Zainichi generation' yet does not directly link this to any of the generations. Cho & Kobayashi (2019) also use this term and added that 'younger Zainichi' increasingly regard issues of nationality and naturalization as personal choice. Htun (2012) adds that the 'younger generations' Zainichi see naturalization as a pragmatic step towards having a future in Japan.

This is where a scholarly gap exists. Robust literature has been written on the identity construction of the first three generations Zainichi, yet the fourth remains underexplored. This while, as pointed out earlier, the majority of this generation is in their young adulthood and thus already went through their formative years. Building on current literature, this thesis attempts to fill in this gap, bringing the fourth generation's state of play into academia.

## 3. Methodology

### 3.1 Methodological considerations

Schwartz et al. (2011) investigated whether identity should be researched through qualitative or quantitative methods, concluding that there is not necessarily a ‘best’ methodology for understanding individuals’ personal and subjective experiences of their identities. They argue that the ‘best’ methodology depends on the theoretical questions being asked and the kind of answers one wants to generate (Schwartz, et al. 2011, 11-12). Therefore, I have carefully considered what methodology to apply and will discuss my considerations below.

I first considered doing an analysis of several discourses relevant to Zainichi community that emerged during the fourth generation’s formative years, for example in the way Kumpis (2015) did. While this could potentially contribute to the academic discussion, this method would solely lead to speculation, making it complicated to causally link the impact of these discourses to the identity construction. Moreover, it would make comparative analysis unreliable as most research on earlier generations based on direct interactions between researcher and community (e.g. interviews and surveys). Furthermore, it is impossible to divide the different generations in isolated age cohorts because of the different periods in which the first generation came to Japan (see 2.5). Therefore, the formative years of the fourth generation vary significantly, making it hard to identify a valid timeframe.

The second considered method concerned in-depth interviews with fourth generation Zainichi as this methodology has been used in much academic literature dealing with Zainichi identity (Oh 2012; Aoki 2012; Ahn & Yoon 2020; Chatani 2021; Demelius 2021; Laurent & Robillard-Martel 2022). Lacking the necessary contacts, I decided to write several Zainichi organizations in Japan, asking for their cooperation. This has proven to be challenging for two reasons. First, the organizations were hesitant about consulting their network and some asked to see all questions in advance, contesting the freedom of conducting structured or semi-structured interviews. Second, the interviews would have to be conducted through (video)calls. Even though online interviewing has in the last decade become an increasingly often used method (especially during the Covid-19 pandemic), current academic debate on it has very diverging opinions on this method’s validity (O’Connor & Madge 2017).

Finally, a survey was chosen as main methodology. The above discussed methods have considerable disadvantages which are no easy ones to deal with. In fact, survey results have been an important reference for many works on Zainichi identity (Fukuoka 2000; Akiba 2000; Iwabuchi 2008; Ahn & Park 2019). The chosen methodology may be considered as a risky one as it, too, comes with many limitations. However, I found that many of them could be minimized through both thoughtful application of this method and using advanced survey software. Following, I will explain in detail how I attempted to minimize these limitations. Complementary to the survey, I analyzed primary sources publicly available on the internet in the Japanese language that touch upon the fourth generation’s identity. This in order to either confirm or contrast the generated survey results, ensuring stronger credibility and bringing nuance.



## 3.2 Survey construction and limitations

The survey questions were based on the variables identified in the theoretical framework section to ‘measure’ identity, especially the notions of Japaneseness and Koreanness. Additionally, inspiration came from the discussed academic works on the topic. For example, the variables that were used in order to describe the identity construction of earlier generations, allowing for generational analysis by comparing and contrasting. The survey was conducted in Japanese, the first language of the fourth generation Zainichi, and is included in appendix A. An English translation is added as appendix B. The survey was distributed for a period of nine days, between 22 and 30 June 2022. It consists of 28 questions. Since the respondent group may have diverse (political) backgrounds and some questions may be regarded sensitive, utmost care was directed to the formulation and terminology of the questions.

Before the survey period, in order to deal with the network limitation, several Zainichi organizations in Japan were approached. I targeted organizations which were likely to have fourth generation Zainichi in their network. In selecting the organizations, I took geographical location into account with the purpose of not limiting the respondents to one certain city/prefecture. In order to ensure objectivity and eliminate potential biases, organizations that openly stated political preference/affiliation and/or could be linked to North- or South Korean political institutions in any way were avoided. Organizations were approached through email, yet also through social media platforms Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. A total of 19 institutions/platforms were contacted, from which ten active contacts emerged. These are briefly described in appendix C.

The survey was distributed through software by Qualtrics, widely renown and offering a variety of options to ensure good response quality. Every respondent’s IP-address was recorded and therefore respondents could not take the survey twice. On almost every question, I put a ‘requirement’, requiring respondents to answer a question in order to proceed to the next question. This is not the case for Q1 (respondent’s name), Q26 (affiliation to either Mindan or Chongryon) and Q28 (free space for comments). This because the survey offered the opportunity to be taken anonymously and the participant may not wish to share his/her political affiliation. Q1 was intentionally asked anyway, because one of the survey’s aims is to research the usage of names among fourth generation Zainichi. Because one cannot go back in the survey, the answer of Q1 will be non-changeable when later in the survey one is asked what name (Korean, Japanese) one uses in what contexts. This ‘double check’ adds reliability to the given answers regarding names. Q12 and Q13 were included in the survey but not in the results/discussion because I later regarded these questions insufficiently relevant.

Another limitation is that a survey is similar to a fully structured interview, in the sense that only prepared questions can be asked and therefore the risk exists that useful information does not reach the researcher. Moreover, multiple choice answers leave no space for free answers and may force a respondent to choose an answer that does not completely fits his/her situation. To minimize this limitation, I have included many free spaces for comments. This complicates analysis of results yet adds to the answers’ reliability. The open questions had spaces to freely write answers and the multiple choice questions had the option ‘Other, please explain’. Furthermore, the last question offered the

respondent to write anything on their mind. This does not completely avoid, but certainly minimalizes this limitation. The respondents widely used the free sections.

No display logic, skip logic, choice randomization or other intelligence was applied to the survey, keeping it simple and avoiding any suggestiveness.

The survey was distributed through both a URL and a QR-code, accompanied by a short introductory message in which I briefly introduced myself (name, age, position, research goal) and explicitly stated that the survey is anonymously, that I do not have any political intentions or interests and that the results would be used for academic purposes only. The cooperating organizations also clearly stated to their network that participation in the survey is voluntarily. This because of privacy and consensual considerations. When discussing specific responses in the results section, no names will be mentioned.

The cooperating organizations made sure that they only distributed this survey to fourth generation Zainichi Koreans in Japan. To further avoid the risk that other generations would fill out the survey, I inserted Q2 (age) where only ages 0-40 could be selected. This still allowed fourth generation participants outside of the mainstream age cohort to take the survey, yet functioned as a warning to those of earlier generations in case they were accidentally directed to the survey.

As discussed in 2.5, it is impossible to quantify the fourth generation Zainichi population. Therefore, it is hard to quantify a desired focus group, complicating the declaration of accountability to what extend the respondent group would be representative for the entire population. Even though the extend of representativeness cannot be substantiated, it is logical to assume that the respondent group and therefore also the results are not representative for the entire population fourth generation Zainichi. However, a considerable number of responses could be generated, allowing the results to offer interesting insights into the identity construction of the fourth generation and therefore, especially with the complementary online sources, allow for comparison with earlier generations. In other words, not too much value should be attached to the exact numbers, but certain trends/perceptions can be identified, revealing the bigger picture.

## **4.0 Results and Discussion**

### **4.1 Online analysis**

On the internet, even in Japanese, not much is written on the combination of fourth generation Zainichi and identity. However, some sources touched upon it.

NEUT Magazine is an online magazine in Japan, especially read by young Japanese, seeking to discuss issues considered taboo by established mass media. Their 2017-article on the identity of young Zainichi features an interview with Eri Fukuda, a 27-years old fourth generation Zainichi. She said to usually tell people about her heritage and regards it as something unique to be proud of. However, she also shares a story of when she was in elementary school and told a friend she was Korean. That friend

told her parents, who responded by demanding her not to play with Eri anymore. She experiences that diversity is much more accepted by her generation (cohort). Eri was happy with the Korean Wave and thinks there is no substantial difference between a Korean living in Japan who cherishes Korean culture and a Japanese cherishing Korean culture in Japan. She mentions some Japanese children love South Korea so much that they are even more Korean than she is. She thinks having good knowledge of history is important. Eri says to have become strongly aware of her identity while studying in the US. There, she figured she did not know much about Korea, and therefore decided to study in South Korea too, attempting to discover her roots. Lastly, Eri thinks that Zainichi are neither Japanese nor Korean, but 'independent entities'. She thinks that her generation can become the bridge between Japan and Korea, making life in Japan for Zainichi better and turning Japan into a diversity-accepting country.

A 2018-article by the established Asahi Shimbun featured Yuka Kim, a 22-year old Zainichi. While attending university, she volunteered at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in 2018. She was asked about what nationality meant to her as a fourth generation Zainichi. While her real name is Yuka, she often calls herself by her Japanese alias Kaneko. She has South Korean nationality, but she and her parents only speak Japanese. At her Japanese school, she was taught about Korean history and felt uncomfortable. Also, she realized how little she knew about Korea and therefore went to university in South-Korea. Being in South Korea made her feel like a Japanese, while in Japan she felt like a South Korean (Asahi Shimbun 2018).

In 2022, the established Mainichi Shimbun published an article featuring Kim Yon-hi, a 29-years old professional rugby player and fourth generation Zainichi. He plays for a club in Osaka and decided to join the South Korean national team. He said he was quite nervous because he had been wondering what reactions he would get. He explained that in Japan, they (Zainichi) are often seen as Koreans, but as Japanese in Korea. His anxiety disappeared soon as he experienced acceptance on both sides. In the article, he sounded proud to represent both Japan and South Korea (Mainichi Shimbun 2022).

Lastly, an article by Mindan Shimbun covers fourth generation Zainichi. It should be noted that the Mindan Shimbun, as its name suggests, is a newspaper by Mindan. It is created by Zainichi and intended for (Mindan-affiliated) Zainichi. The article talks about the 'millennial generation' and interviewed 13 fourth generation Zainichi that participated in a Mindan-organized summer school program. They were asked seven questions regarding their childhood, friendship, affiliation to Mindan, dreams, ethnic awareness, their nationality, and that of their parents. The article states that millennials are becoming more diverse. Some answers they gave, for example about their nationality and schools, may be colored as Mindan is a political organization and will therefore not be used in this analysis. What can be learned from this article are the more general notions of it. First, it illustrates that the fourth generation has different nationalities, even within their families. Second, their ages at the moment they became aware that they are Zainichi vary. Some were told about it by their parents from an early age, others discovered it at their (public) school when they were wondering why some terms they used at home were not used at school. Except for one, all interviewees have come to know about their heritage between the start and end of elementary school. Third, the vast majority highlights that participating in cultural events and performing Korean traditions have positively contributed to their identity awareness

as a Zainichi. Moreover, many of the interviewees stated to have become more aware of their identity when connecting with fellow Zainichi (Mindan 2020).

## 4.2 Survey

As the survey respondent group is not representative for the entire population fourth generation Zainichi, not too much value should be attached to the exact percentages of the results. Instead, the focus should be on the bigger picture. This study offers good insights into the development of identity construction throughout Zainichi generations and especially how the fourth- differs from the third generation, allowing for generational analysis.

112 Responses were recorded. After filtering out the incomplete responses and those that were red-flagged by Qualtrics because of validity concerns, 71 full and valid responses remained, making up the results. The results are graphically displayed in appendix D, with exception of the open questions and the comments respondents shared after selecting 'other' in the multiple choice questions. This because these records are too robust and may be traceable to certain respondents. In anonymized form, they will be provided by the researcher upon request.

The youngest participant was 18- and the oldest 40 years old. The average age was 22,1 and 65% were between the ages of 19 and 21. The responses were submitted from 15 different prefectures, of which Tokyo (30%), Osaka (27%) and Kyoto (14%) represented the largest part. 13% Of the respondents have Japanese nationality, 61% hold South Korean passports and 27% have *chōsen-seki*.

47 Respondents have given their first names of which 38% were Japanese names and 62% were Korean names. 13% Said to usually introduce themselves by a Japanese name, whereas 83% introduce themselves by a Korean name or only have a Korean name. As discussed, in 1986, 91% of Zainichi used Japanese names in public, decreasing to 80% by 1993. This trend has continued, or in fact, this study shows that these numbers have reversed within the course of one generation. Another interesting finding is that most Korean names are written in Japanese characters, indicating the fourth generation's biculturality. The movement that emerged in the early 2010s, as Aoki touched upon, encouraged Zainichi to use Korean names. The survey also shows that the use of names strongly depends on the situation's context. Japanese names are still often used on official documentation for example, which may indicate that the Japanese government still has not accepted Korean names to the fullest extent.

The Korean Wave has done good for the confidence of fourth generation Zainichi. In 1975 only 27,4% of Zainichi were proud of their heritage while 46,9% would have rather been born as ethnic Japanese. This study reveals that three quarters of the respondents feel proud of their ethnic heritage. 18% Does not necessarily feel proud or not proud, and some respondents mention not to think about it. Only a single respondent stated he/she would rather have been born a Japanese. Moreover, in the mid-1980s, 90% of Zainichi would pass as Japanese, hiding who they actually are. In 1994, 65% of Zainichi revealed their ethnic identity to their Japanese peers. This study shows that three quarters of the fourth generation respondents either would talk about their background when being asked or would share it with their close friends. Only a single respondent stated to make effort hiding his/her ethnicity. The

online analysis also shows that the fourth generation sees their ethnicity as something unique to be proud of.

More than half of the respondents identify themselves as *chōsen-jin* and a quarter as South Korean. Remarkably, 19% chose for 'other'. How they clarified this was interesting. It ranged from 'Zainichi Korean' to 'an individual' and from 'someone with roots in three countries' to 'a unified Korean'. The specificity of their answers indicate that it is something they have been thinking about. Being around ethnic Japanese let most respondents (66%) feel the same way as them, while simultaneously they would still feel *chōsen-jin* instead of a Japanese. This indicates that the fourth generation has found a way to live as Japanese, while maintaining pride in- and consciousness of their ethnic background. One respondent, 27 years old, explained that in Japan it is not necessarily a matter of how one perceives his/herself, but it is society that decides how one is seen: "my feeling among Japanese depends on the consciousness of the people around me". Interestingly, while 54% the respondents identify themselves as *chōsen-jin*, only 27% holds *chōsen-seki*. This indicates the increased separation of nationality and ethnicity, a trend that was already observed within the third generation but has extended to the fourth generation.

Laurent and Robillard-Martel predicted that *chōsen-seki* holders would decrease as Zainichi are increasingly naturalizing, causing Zainichi to become invisible. This does not become apparent from this study. The fact that the vast majority either has South Korean or Japanese nationality may also be out of practical reasons as the study also reveals an increasing mobility among fourth generation Zainichi. The facts that *chōsen-seki* does not permit overseas travel and ethnicity and nationality are increasingly seen as separate things, could also explain why increasing numbers of Zainichi choose for obtaining either Japanese- or South Korean nationality.

Japan has been the only country of residence for almost all respondents (92%). Those who also lived abroad, mostly studied at foreign universities. The mentioned countries are South Korea, China, US, UK, Cambodia, France, Canada, and the Philippines. The periods range from half a year to five years, with an average of 2 years. Increasing mobility potential is observed in the fact that nearly quarter of the respondents stated to wish to migrate to a third destination in the future, indicating the emergence of a trend in which Zainichi are looking at countries other than Japan and the Koreas to plan their futures. The survey and online analysis show that many Zainichi develop more ethnic consciousness when either (re)connecting to their roots or moving abroad. Moving to a third destination would offer neutral space to discover the own identity. The fourth generation has therefore moved closer Oh's 'transnational diaspora' phase of identity crisis. This also indicates that the third generation's ideology of being 'people without a country', extends to the fourth generation.

What Oh meant with 'people without a country', however, is that the third generation increasingly moved away from Zainichi institutions and became less politically involved. This does not become apparent from this study. Interestingly, while 66% of the respondents stated to feel connected to neither Korea, almost three quarters stated to be affiliated with either Mindan or Chongryon. However, this could as well be explained by the way the question was asked. Looking back, affiliation with either of these institutions could have also been interpreted by the indirect affiliation through enrollment in *chōsen-gakkō*. This question should have been more specified. Another explanation may

be that Mindan and Chongryon, as they have lowered their tones, are increasingly seen as 'just' institutions defending Zainichi interests, and thus placed outside of the political arena.

It should not be neglected, regardless of increased mobility, that the vast majority (74%) still sees Japan as their permanent homeland. Chapman has identified this trend in earlier generations as the 'departure from the homeland'. I would argue that the meaning of 'the homeland' shifted from Korea to Japan and therefore one can now speak of the 'arrival in the homeland'. While 90% of the third generation Zainichi in 1993 were Japan-born and both linguistically and culturally indistinguishable from ethnic Japanese, the fourth generation is completely Japan-born. Moreover, 70% of the respondents are most proficient in Japanese and 30% are bilingual. Whereas the third generation adapted various aspects of Japanese life, the fourth generation seems to have adopted Japanese lifestyle to the full extent.

Therefore, Laurent and Robillard-Martel argued that the visibility of Zainichi decreases as naturalization is on the rise. However, I would argue the opposite. In order to express themselves, the third generation started to gather with fellow Zainichi, helping to cultivate ethnic awareness. Laurent and Robillard-Martel called this 'hidden acts of resistance'. This study shows that almost three quarters of the fourth generation respondents often or sometimes participate in activities related to Korean culture. This is a major change, indicating the fourth generation is expressing themselves more and tries to reconnect more with their roots than the preceding generation. I therefore think that 'hidden acts of resistance' is no longer a suitable way to address this. For the fourth generation, it has just become a part of their lives. Jo referred to the increasingly positive discourse towards naturalizations as 'the discourse of abandoning Zainichi'. However, I would argue that naturalization might mean assimilation, but assimilation does not necessarily include the abandonment of one's heritage. I therefore agree more with Oh and Htun that naturalization means exposing oneself to a new diasporic fate, entering Japanese mainstream society.

Whereas the first two generations Zainichi regarded their existence a colonial legacy, the third generation has focused more on what it meant to be Korean in Japan. This applies even more for the fourth generation. Visočnik revealed the third generation Zainichi having a more positive view towards hybridity, orientating on a path that does not lead to naturalization nor belonging to either of the Koreas. She stated that this 'new path' would rather lead to something where Zainichi could contribute to their host society. Looking at the desired occupations among the fourth generation respondents, it is notable that many of them wish to do something in the future in which they can help others. Thus, contributing to society, making this new path seem suitable for the fourth generation too. Furthermore, the fact that the respondents' enjoyed education is quite diverse, especially as 35% attended both *chōsen-gakkō* and public schools, indicates biculturality. This biculturality is also shown in the kitchen. 80% Of the respondents eat a mixture of Japanese- and Korean style food on a daily basis, whereas 18% stated to mainly eat either Japanese or Korean style food. Furthermore, a quarter is bilingual and the fact that almost all respondents (89%) speak Japanese at home while some words like 'mother' or 'school' are replaced by Korean words also shows the fourth generation's biculturality.

According to 76% of the respondents, Japanese society still does not accept having Korean heritage. Some mentioned they think people in Japan would accept it if they knew more about Zainichi. 59% Has experienced difficulties living in Japan as a Zainichi whereas 35% has not. When answering 'yes'

or 'other', respondents were asked to clarify their answers. 39 Respondents have done so, and it is remarkable to see the same topics coming back. Those with *chōsen-seki* mentioned the inability to travel abroad and getting a loan at the bank to buy a house as difficulty. Someone mentioned that when signing any contract, often a Japanese national is required as guarantor. The misreading and/or misunderstanding of Korean names written in Japanese is also a struggle to some. The exclusion of *chōsen gakkō* from the Japanese free high school system and the exclusion of Zainichi to receive free childcare has forced parents into financial struggle, according to some. Those that graduated *chōsen gakkō*, could often not enter the university they wanted and were told that Zainichi were not accepted. Those that could get into university, said they spent a lot of time taking care of additional documents they were required to submit as Zainichi. Also, few respondents mentioned that their struggling centered around their self-identification. All of the above indicates that Japanese society seems not ready yet for complete integration of Zainichi.

In general, many respondents shared the feeling that they are not commonly accepted and have a tough time continuously having to explain their selves to others. This because many Japanese are not aware of the specific situation and history of Zainichi. One respondent stated to have been asked whether he/she is an international student, whereas someone else mentioned that he/she is sometimes mistaken as an ethnic Japanese. Others said to be sometimes treated in discriminatory ways even though having a Japanese name and speaking fluent Japanese. One respondent (24) commented "because I went to school on the countryside, I was looked down on because I had parents who are non-Japanese. I ended up spending a lonely childhood which I felt was a vexation". Another respondent said "because I have three (ways of using) names, I always feel uncomfortable about how to use them properly. Also, the teacher in my cram school said he hated Koreans. I was not bullied, but he made fun of Koreans during class. I was feeling extremely unpleasant".

30% Of the respondents experienced bullying due to their ethnic background, whereas 62% has not. The five that responded 'other', said they were not bullied, but experienced microaggressions or 'unconscious discrimination'. An example is "(...) I was told by a Japanese that I am on the right track because I naturalized". Stories of those that experienced bullying are quite shocking. Many of them have been verbally-, but a significant amount also physically attacked. Many of these cases occurred when commuting to school in Korean uniforms. Some were spit on, others were chased or told bad language. Some were told to 'go back to their country' or to even die. "When I was in elementary school, I was treated as a foreigner and outsider of the group and told bad language. I have once been thrown stones at and beaten with wooden sticks". Another respondent shared a story of his/her sister who was involved in a traffic incident caused by a Japanese taxi. At the same time, a *chōsen gakkō* bus was on the spot. The taxi tried to blame it on that bus, supported by Japanese bystanders.

Exclusion from social groups, at school or in the neighborhood, were frequently mentioned as consequence after revealing one's ethnic background. Sometimes even loosing friendships because of it. One respondent noticed "I think people want to hide the fact that they attended a *chōsen gakkō* more than they would hide being Korean".

28% Of the respondents stated to have felt unsafe in Japan because of their background, whereas 68% responded negative. More than half of those who answered 'yes' or 'other' mentioned

hate speech as the main contributor to their sense of unsafety. Many of them explicitly mentioned this usually gets worse whenever there is something about North Korea on the news. Several talked about incidents in which they were attacked, spit on or scolded, after which their sense of safety decreased. Someone mentioned "I always think it would not be surprising if someone did something bad to me". Someone else stated "I would feel danger when hate speech gets too radical". A 32-years old respondent shared the following story: "I was learning Korean in a Zainichi-building. On the Japanese emperor's birthday, the windows of the building were broken, written on and things were thrown in".

While fourth generation Zainichi are actively trying to make sense of their identity location, the above shows they encounter more external difficulty than the third generation. Increasing tensions between Japan and the Koreas created momentum for the emergence of far-right groups like Zaitokukai. In the past two decades, institutional discrimination decreased, but public hate speech increased dramatically. As both this study and the discussed literature pointed out, strikingly almost all shocking experiences of hate speech and (physical) attacks occurred during elementary school age. I have been unable to find an explanation for this, other than the logical assumption that they form an easy, defenseless target.

Hate speech has been impacting young Zainichi severely (see 2.3). However, while the shared stories of bullying and feelings of unsafety are quite extreme, it should be emphasized that the vast majority of the respondents never felt unsafe- (68%) nor experienced bullying (62). Those that have felt unsafe, almost all stated hate speech to be the main contributor. However, the fact that young Zainichi have increasingly disassociated themselves from hate speech, can explain the 68%. Moreover, the third Korean Wave mainly attracted ethnic Japanese members of the same age cohort as the fourth generation Zainichi, who increasingly disengage from the growing anti-Korean sentiment. Furthermore, hate speech has almost exclusively been practiced by middle-aged Japanese men. Thus, ethnic Japanese members of the same age cohort as fourth generation Zainichi are becoming more tolerant towards Zainichi. This in combination with the developments that Japanese started to counter anti-Korean hate speech, the Japanese government recently passed an anti-hate speech bill under UN-pressure and admitted *chōsen-gakkō* under its free high school system, may offer bright future perspective for the fourth generation Zainichi's near future.

On the question if there was anything else the respondent wanted to share, 31 respondents did so. The topics vary a lot. Some stated that Zainichi are often considered anti-Japanese, but that this is not the case. Others said something along the lines of a 21 years-old respondent saying "(...) if there are good people, there will also be bad people. It is wrong to judge someone just by their country, but I feel like this is spreading throughout current society (...)". A 19-years old respondent shared that "I am a Zainichi who lives in Japan, but I only attended ethnic schooling for six years at elementary school. What I learned in those years and my ethnic consciousness is something that cannot be taken away from me. I feel that it brought me confidence to be Korean. Even now, I do not feel embarrassed to say that I am a Korean. I am living like a Japanese in Japanese society, but I am continuously proud of being Korean". Characteristic for the changing relationship with the host country is the following notice: "in the end, Zainichi North- and South Koreans are being financed by donations and funds of the two Koreas. If we do not coexist more with Japanese society, I think one day there will be no Mindan and Chongryon



anymore”. Another respondent said “it is important to take pride in your roots (...). There is no need to care about opinions of people around you”.

## Conclusion

Mannheim stated that generational analysis provides a basis for understanding how social change is possible while traditions and identity are preserved. This has proven to be slightly different in the case of Zainichi, as even traditions have been subjected to change and identity seems to be fluid. This is where Hall’s interpretation of identity comes in, stating that identity is a continuously changing process on both the personal and public level and not something that is dominantly shared and never changes. Identity is constructed when looking at the ‘other’, to reveal what one is not, explaining what one is. Fresh contacts, as Mannheim said, define a new generation, mainly during the formative years. Values and history were passed on from preceding generations. Yet ‘newcomers’ to the cultural process experience society in different ways and develop meaning based on their individual experiences within the social context of their time, creating a gap between the solutions that a new generation chooses and the solutions that were passed onto them.

As for Zainichi generations, this gap can be identified as the ‘in between space’ wherein the meaning of Zainichi has been renegotiated from belonging to either of the current Koreas, to belonging to Japan, to a location of contested identity. In this thesis, I have researched the evolution of Zainichi identity construction and applied generational analysis to explore how the fourth generation’s identity is constructed. Zainichi identity has evolved enormously throughout the past generations and therefore proves identity to be constantly changing. The fourth generation as ‘fresh contact’ in the cultural process can be defined in comparison and contrast with its preceding generation.

Prior to this thesis, Lie has talked about the post-Zainichi generation and Visočnik speculated about the probable emergence of a new Zainichi cultural identity, predicting that ethnic boundaries between Koreans and Japanese may shift more in the future. Laurent and Robillard-Martel as well as Hester have touched upon what they called ‘the fourth choice’ as a presumed identity location succeeding the ‘third way’. They refer to this as an identity location in which naturalization is advocated with the possibility of preserving Korean ethnicity. Given that hybrid identity increasingly transcends ethnicity and nationality and considering that fourth generation Zainichi have become full members of Japanese society while maintaining pride in their Korean heritage, this fourth choice contains a certain sense of accuracy. However, I would rather refer to it as the ‘fourth way’, doing justice to what the fourth generation has achieved in terms of its identity construction.

The fourth generation Zainichi is Japan-born, speaks Japanese as their native language, speaks Japanese at home, attends either ethnic or public schools, mostly sees Japan as their country of permanent residence, are full members of society and naturalization is on the rise. This indicates an increased degree of assimilation into mainstream Japanese society. On the other hand, most identify as *chōsen-jin* and especially feel so when among ethnic Japanese. Most of them use Korean names written in Japanese characters, eat both Korean and Japanese style food, are proud of their ethnic background,

increasingly bilingual, often participate in Korean culture-related activities and increasingly reconnect to their roots, revealing the increased ethnic consciousness and openness among these fourth generation Zainichi. The Korean Wave has disconnected young Japanese from growing anti-Korean sentiment and younger Zainichi have increasingly placed themselves outside of the hate speech.

While the fourth generation actively explores its identity location, Japanese society has shown not to be completely ready yet to play its part in Zainichi integration. Institutional discrimination, although to a lesser extent, prevails and hate speech has dramatically increased during the last two decades. This and the Korean Wave are the two major events within the fourth generation's formative years.

Fukuoka distinguished five types of identity. I would argue that the fourth generation's identity is located somewhere in between 'individualists', 'pluralists' and 'ethnic solidarity types'. The first because this generation is floating away from the notion of belonging to either Japan or Korea, and they increasingly study/travel abroad. The second because they seek to remove discrimination to create a place of peaceful co-existence respecting mutual differences. The latter because they are increasingly disconnected from traditional tensions between Koreans and Japanese and instead improve their cultural awareness while seeing allies in anyone who respects their existence. Another interesting insight this study revealed is the fact that the fourth generation has moved closer to what Oh explained as the 'transnational diaspora'. A new trend has been identified in which Zainichi are increasingly exploring third destinations to discover who they are. As Oh pointed out, diaspora is still in the making. Therefore, building on Fukuoka's framework, I would like to add a sixth type of identity: the 'explorers'. They see Japan as their homeland and advocate for naturalization while fostering pride in their heritage, seeing ethnicity and nationality as separate things. This type feels most affiliated with Japan, while interest for mainly South Korea exists and third destinations are regarded as neutral space to explore one's identity.

When considering the fourth generation's location between the notions of Japaneseness and Koreanness (see 1.2), it becomes apparent that the alternative way of living as 'Korean-Japanese' as Tai touched upon, seems to have become reality. If Koreanness was on the left- and Japaneseness on the right side of a scale, the fourth generation may be more centered than the third. However, as ethnicity and nationality are being regarded as two separate concepts and the 'in between space' is used to construct a distinct identity away from dominant views, it may not be fair to continue defining Zainichi alongside the lines of the dominant Korean and Japanese cultures. I would therefore advocate to use the term 'Zainichiness' to refer to the unique identity of the fourth generation.

In this thesis, I have investigated the evolution of identity construction throughout Zainichi generations and put emphasis on the many external contributing factors. This study brought the fourth generation Zainichi's identity construction into academia. Many trends that emerged in the third generation, have been extended to the fourth generation, while new trends have also emerged. Future research should find out how the fifth generation's identity will be constructed, having fourth generation Zainichi as parents.

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# Appendices

## Appendix A. Distributed survey

Below follows the original survey that was distributed among the participants.

### 在日朝鮮人の4世のアンケート

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Q1 お名前は何ですか? 「下の名前で十分です」 教えたくない場合は、スキップしてください

---

Q2 いくつですか? 下のボークを動かしてください

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

---

いくつですか? ()



Q3 どの都道府県に住んでいますか?

▼ 愛知県 (1) ... 山梨県 (47)

Q4 あなたの国籍は何ですか？

- 日本国籍 (1)
- 韓国籍 (2)
- 朝鮮籍 (3)

Q5 今まで、日本だけに住みましたか？

- そうです (1)
  - いや、ここにもこのぐらい住みました： (2)
- 

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Q6 どういう学校に通いましたか？（小、中、高、大）（今学校通ってる場合、今までの教育について教えてください）

- すべては日本の学校だった (1)
  - すべては朝鮮学校だった (2)
  - 日本の学校にも、朝鮮学校にも通った (3)
  - その他、（説明してください）(4) \_\_\_\_\_
-

Q7 自分のアイデンティティのことをどう説明しますか？

- 特に日本人として (1)
- 特に韓国人として (2)
- 特に朝鮮民主主義人民共和国人として (3)
- 特に朝鮮人として (4)
- その他、(説明してください) (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q8 どちらの言語の方が能力を持っていますか

- 日本語 (1)
- 朝鮮語 (2)
- どちらも一緒 (3)
- その他 (4) \_\_\_\_\_

-----  
Q9 家で、何語で会話をしますか？

- 日本語 (1)
  - 朝鮮語 (2)
  - その他、(3) \_\_\_\_\_
-

Q10 普段は日本の名前やコリアンの名前で自己紹介しますか？

- 日本の名前で (1)
- コリアンの名前で (2)
- 日本の名前しかない (3)
- コリアンの名前しかない (4)
- その他 (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q11 日本の名前も、コリアンの名前もある方、その二つはどのような風に使っていますか？ (複数の回答を選べる)

- 一つの名前しかない (1)
- ほとんど日本の名前を使用してる (2)
- ほとんど、コリアンの名前を使用してる (3)
- 公式文書では、日本の名前を使用してる (4)
- 公式文書では、コリアンの名前を使用してる (5)
- 在日コミュニティの人といると、コリアンの名前を使用してる (6)
- 家族とは、日本の名前を使用してる (7)
- 家族とは、コリアンの名前を使用してる (8)
- 友達といると、日本の名前を使用してる (9)
- 友達といると、コリアンの名前を使用してる (10)

学校や仕事では、日本の名前を使用してる (11)

学校や仕事でコリアンの名前を使用してる (12)

その他、(説明してください) (13) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Q12 日本の国歌 「君が代」を歌えますか？

歌える (1)

歌えない (2)

その他、(3) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Q13 アリラン/아리랑 を歌えますか？

歌える (1)

歌えない (2)

その他、(3) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Q14 普段、毎日の食事はどのような感じですか？

- 主に日本食っぽい (1)
  - 主にコリアン食っぽい (2)
  - 両方も同じぐらい食べる (3)
  - その他、(4) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q15 あなたの朝鮮の遺産のことをどう思いますか？

- 誇りに思う (1)
  - 誇りに思わないけど、あってもいいかな (2)
  - なかった方が良かったかも (3)
  - その他、(4) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q16 民族的背景のためにいじめられたことはありますか？

- はい (説明してください) (1) \_\_\_\_\_
  - いいえ (2)
  - その他 (説明してください) (3) \_\_\_\_\_
-



Q17 民族的背景のために人生で今まで困難を経験したことがありますか

- はい、(説明してください) (1) \_\_\_\_\_
- いいえ (2)
- その他 (説明してください) (3) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q18 日本で、民族的背景のために危険を感じたことはありますか？

- はい、「説明してください」 (1) \_\_\_\_\_
- いいえ (2)
- その他、(説明してください) (3) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q19 あなたは定期的に朝鮮語や朝鮮文化に関連する活動に参加していますか？ (語学教室、料理教室、グループディスカッション、など)

- 良く参加する (1)
- たまに参加する (2)
- あまり参加しない (3)
- 全然参加しない (4)
- 参加したことがない (5)
-

Q20 日本人民族の周りにいると、自分はどのような風に感じますか？

- 私も同じような感じで、日本人民族と変わらない (1)
- 私は違う風感じて、朝鮮人に感じる (2)
- 同じように感じるけど、やっぱり私は朝鮮人 (3)
- その他、(説明してください) (4) \_\_\_\_\_

Q21 普段、学校や仕事とかで、民族的背景について友達に話しますか？

- すぐ教える (1)
- すぐには教えないけど、仲がいい人なら教える (2)
- 聞かれないと教えないけど、聞かれたら教える (3)
- あまり誰にも教えない (4)
- 隠すために最善を尽くす (5)
- その他、(説明してください) (6) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Q22 将来はどこに住みたいと思いますか？

- 日本 (1)
- 韓国 (2)
- 朝鮮民主主義人民共和国人として (3)
- 他の国 (4)

Q23 将来、どういう仕事をしたいと思いますか？

\_\_\_\_\_

Q24 昔、朝鮮は一つの国だったのに、今は韓国と朝鮮民主主義人民共和国として に分かれています。あなたは今の韓国や朝鮮民主主義人民共和国として に繋がっていると感じますか？

- 別に一つにじゃなくて、両方ともに繋いでると感じてる (1)
- 一つだけに繋いでると感じてる (2)
- 両方に繋いでる感じがしない (3)
- その他 (説明してください) (4) \_\_\_\_\_

Q25 民団/민단 や 朝鮮総連/총련 について聞いたことがありますか？

- 両方よく知ってる (1)
- 一つは知ってる、もう一つは知らない (2)
- どっちも知らない (3)
- その他 (説明してください) (4) \_\_\_\_\_

Q26 民団/민단 や 朝鮮総連/총련 と繋がっていますか？ (教えたくない場合はスキップしてください)

- 繋がっている (1)
  - 繋がっていない (2)
  - その他 (3) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q27 今の日本社会では、朝鮮民族的遺産を持つことが一般的に受け入れられていると思いますか？

- そう思う (1)
  - そう思わない (2)
  - その他、(説明してください) (3) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q28 最後の質問ですが、僕に教えたことがありますか？

\_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix B. Survey (English translation)

Below follows the translated version of the survey

### Survey of 4<sup>th</sup> generation Zainichi

---

Q1 What is your name? (only first name is enough). If you would not like to answer, please skip this question

---

Q2 How old are you ? Please move the balk below

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

---

How old are you?



Q3 In what prefecture do you live?

▼ 愛知県 (1) ... 山梨県 (47)

Q4 What is your nationality ?

- Japanese nationality (1)
- South Korean nationality (2)
- Chōsen-seki (3)

Q5 Have you always been living in Japan?

- Yes (1)
- No, I have also lived at this place for this period: (2)
- 

Q6 What kind of schools have you attended (primary school, middle school, high school, university) *If you are currently attending school, please answer the question in line with your enjoyed education until now*

- All were Japanese schools (1)
- All were *chōsen gakkō* (2)
- I have both been to Japanese schools and *chōsen gakkō* (3)
- Other (please explain) (4) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q7 How would you describe your own identity ?

- Especially Japanese (1)
- Especially South Korean (2)
- Especially North Korean (3)
- Especially *chōsen-jin* (4)
- Other (please explain) (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q8 What language are you most proficient in?

- Japanese (1)
  - Korean (2)
  - Both same level (3)
  - Other (4) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q9 What language do you speak at home ?

- Japanese (1)
  - Korean (2)
  - Other (3) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q10 Do you usually introduce yourself by a Japanese or a Korean name?

- By a Japanese name (1)
- By a Korean name (2)
- I only have a Japanese name (3)
- I only have a Korean name (4)
- Other (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q11 In case you have both a Japanese and Korean name, in what ways do you use them? (*you can choose multiple answers*)

- I only have one name (1)
  - I mostly use my Japanese name (2)
  - I mostly use my Korean name (3)
  - With official documents, I use my Japanese name (4)
  - With official documents, I use my Korean name (5)
  - When I am among fellow Zainichi, I use my Korean name (6)
  - With my family, I use my Japanese name (7)
  - With my family, I use my Korean name (8)
  - With my friends, I use my Japanese name (9)
  - With my friends, I use my Korean name (10)
  - At school or work, I use my Japanese name (11)
  - At school or work, I use my Korean name (12)
  - Other (please explain) (13) \_\_\_\_\_
-



Q12 Can you sing Kimi Gayo, the Japanese national anthem?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Other (3) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Q13 Can you sing Arirang?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Other, (3) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Q14 What kind of daily meals do you usually have?

Especially Japanese style (1)

Especially Korean style (2)

Both Japanese- and Korean style with a similar frequency (3)

Other, (4) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Q15 How do you feel about your ethnic background?

- I am proud of it (1)
  - I am not proud of it, but I think it is okay to have it (2)
  - I would rather not have it (3)
  - Other, (4) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q16 Have you ever been bullied because of your ethnic background?

- Yes (please explain) (1) \_\_\_\_\_
  - No (2)
  - Other (please explain) (3) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q17 Have you ever experienced difficulties in life due to your ethnic background?

- Yes (please explain) (1) \_\_\_\_\_
  - No (2)
  - Other (please explain) (3) \_\_\_\_\_
-

Q18 In Japan, have you ever felt unsafe because of your ethnic background?

Yes (please explain) (1) \_\_\_\_\_

No (2)

Other (please explain) (3) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Q19 Do you regularly participate in activities related to Korean language and culture? (Language class, cooking class, group discussion, etc.)

I often participate (1)

I sometimes participate (2)

I almost never participate (3)

I do not participate (4)

I have never participated (5)

---

Q20 When you are among ethnic Japanese people, how do you feel about yourself?

I feel the same way as them, not different from ethnic Japanese (1)

I feel different, I feel like a *chōsen-jin* (2)

I feel indifferent from them, but at the end I feel that I am *chōsen-jin* (3)

Other (please explain) (4) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Q21 Do you usually talk to your friends at school or work about your ethnic background?

- I would talk about it soon (1)
  - I would not talk about it soon, only to those I am close with (2)
  - If nobody asks, I would not tell them, but if someone asks, I will tell them (3)
  - I would talk about it with almost nobody (4)
  - I would make an effort to hide it (5)
  - Other (please explain) (6) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q22 Where would you like to live in the future?

- Japan (1)
  - South Korea (2)
  - North Korea (3)
  - Another country (4)
- 

Q23 What job would you like to have in the future?

\_\_\_\_\_

---

Q24 the past, Korea used to be one country, but it is now divided into North- and South Korea. Do you feel connected to either one of these current Koreas?

- I do not necessarily feel connected to one-, but to both of them (1)
  - I only feel connected to one of them (2)
  - I do not feel connected to any of them (3)
  - Other (please explain) (4) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q25 Have you ever heard of Mindan and/or Chongryon?

- I know both very well (1)
  - I know about one, but not about the other (2)
  - I do not know either of them (3)
  - Other (please explain) ) (4) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Q26 Are you affiliated with Mindan or Chongryon? (in case you would prefer not to answer, please skip this question)

- I am affiliated (1)
  - I am not affiliated (2)
  - Other (3) \_\_\_\_\_
-

Q27 Do you think it is generally accepted in today's Japanese society to have Korean heritage?

I think so (1)

I do not think so (2)

Other (please explain) (3) \_\_\_\_\_

---

Q28 This will be the last question. Is there anything else you would like to share with me?

\_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix C. Survey distribution

The survey was distributed with the help of multiple Zainichi organizations in Japan, most of whom were contacted by e-mail. Others were contacted through social media. These organizations will be mentioned below with a brief description. Only active contacts will be mentioned, as they are the ones that really distributed the survey within their network. Names and contact details of particular persons will not be mentioned because of privacy considerations.

### Organizations in which the contact has been through email:

#### 1. 無償化連絡会東京 - Free Liaison Meeting Tokyo

This relatively small organization is a liaison group that stands against the exclusion of Korean schools from the Japanese Free Education System. It organizes meetings, lectures and crowdfunding events around Tokyo and field trips. It consists of volunteers and does not have an open political affiliation with one of the Koreas.

Official website:

<https://mushoka2020.blogspot.com/>

#### 2. 在日本朝鮮人人権協会 – Human Rights Association for Korean Residents in Japan

This organization was found in 1994 by Zainichi of many different occupational fields (lawyers, tax accountants, etc.) in order to contribute to the protection of Zainichi rights in Japanese society and to contribute to the improvement of their lives. It tries to combine the powers of lawyers, accountants, activists, company workers, researchers, human rights experts, etc. in order to achieve its goals. It organizes human rights lobbies (to the Japanese government and UN), offers free counselling to Zainichi residents, conducts research, and publishes books and newsletters. No public political ties have been found; it just states to protect the human rights of all Zainichi.

Official website:

<http://k-jinken.net/>

#### 3. ウトロ平和祈念館代表 – Utoro peace memorial hall

This organization is in charge of the museum and newly opened memorial hall in Utoro, Kyoto. It aims to commemorate the history of Japan and the Korean peninsula as well as the history of the Zainichi Korean population in Japan. Utoro is a distinct place, because many Koreans were conscripted to build a military airport there during the WW2. After the War, they continued living there. This organization is professional and has no political ties.

Official website:

<https://www.utoro.jp/en/>

#### 4. 南北 코리아 と日本のともだち展 - Friends of North-South Korea and Japan Exhibition

This organization tries to form a bridge between both Koreas, Japan, and China. It lets children exchange paintings in order to let them learn about each other's culture to stimulate intercultural understanding in a reality where it is difficult to meet in person (for example because of the travel limitations from- and to North Korea. The organization does not have a public political preference and states to be there to 'lower the walls' between the mentioned countries. It stated to have exhibited the children's work in Tokyo, Seoul, and Pyongyang.

Official website:

<http://tomodachi10.net/T/>

#### 5. 在日本朝鮮留学生同盟東京地方本部 – Korea International Student Alliance in Japan , Tokyo regional HQ.

This organization is a community of third- and fourth generation Zainichi students that attend Japanese universities and vocational schools. It supports Zainichi students in practical matters and also organizes activities in Japan with students from North- and South Korea, together with students from other countries. This organization offered their support in the survey distribution after a request from the 無償化連絡会東京 - Free liaison meeting Tokyo , described above. No public political preference has been discovered.

In the absence of a website, their official Twitter channel:

<https://twitter.com/rhttokyo>

#### 6. 在日コリアン青年連合 (KEY) - Zainichi Korean Youth Union (KEY)

This organization is an NGO run by Korean youth in Japan. It is an organization that seeks to create a place in which all Zainichi, regardless of their nationality or registration status, can come together to connect with youngsters from a similar ethnic background. The organization seeks to empower these young members of Japanese society. It organizes activities and offers support. It is a professional organization and states to have no political interests.

Official website:

<https://www.key-j.net/>

#### 7. 同志社大学 Korea 文化研究会 – Doshisha University Korea Cultural Study Group

This is a sub-organization of Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan. It consists of Zainichi and organizes



study sessions and exchange meetings on a regular basis. It explicitly mentions to welcome all members regardless of nationality or residence status.

In absence of an official website:

[https://twitter.com/dongji\\_korea](https://twitter.com/dongji_korea)

## **Organizations in which the contact has been through social media:**

### **8. 朝鮮文化研究会 – Korean Culture Study Group**

This is a platform rather than an organization, which organizes study sessions with students in Japan that have roots on the Korean peninsula. It aims to create a safe place where they can gather and discuss their lives. Universities connected to this platform include Ritsumeikan University and Kyoto University of Foreign Studies. It states to be there for all Zainichi.

Official Instagram account:

[https://www.instagram.com/rits\\_chobunken/](https://www.instagram.com/rits_chobunken/)

### **9. 日韓青年会議- Korea-Japan Youth Conference**

This international non-profit organization was established by Zainichi students and is still being run by Zainichi students. Their goal is to form a bridge between Japan and the Koreas. They believe that de media and politics in both Koreas and Japan cause negative stigmas about the other, making it necessary for Koreans and Japanese to interact with each other freely. It organizes guest lectures, Japan-Korea dialogue exchange programs and a camp. Though this organization does not express any political affiliation, it should be noted that one of its four sponsors as stated on the website is the Japan-Korea Cultural Exchange Fund, which is affiliated with South Korea.

Official website:

<https://www.kjyc.org/home>

**Other:**

10. A call for filling out the survey was also placed in the following Facebook group (2,2 thousand members):

ウリハッキョを守る在日朝鮮青年学生達の会 – Association of Korean Youth Students in Japan to Protect *Urihakkyo*

This group is a platform that advocates for a Japanese society in which all students have equal right to education, especially focused on the Zainichi population.


Link:

<https://www.facebook.com/groups/690440174299751/>


## Appendix D: Survey results

Below are the results of the survey's multiple-choice questions, displayed graphically.


### Q2 - Age



### Q3- Prefecture of residence




Q4 - Nationality/residential status




Q5 - Has always been living in Japan



Q6 - Attended schools




### Q7- Description of own identity




- Especially Japanese
- Especially South Korean
- Especially North Korean
- Especially chosen-jin
- Other

### Q8 - Most skillful language




- Japanese
- Korean
- Both same level
- Other

### Q9 - Language spoken at home



- Japanese
- Korean
- Other

### Q10 - Name used when introducing oneself




● Japanese name   
 ● Korean name   
 ● Only has a Japanese name   
 ● Only has a Korean name   
 ● Other

### Q11 - Usage of Japanese- and/or Korean names


Field	Choice Count
Only has one name	26
Mostly uses Japanese name	4
Mostly uses Korean name	27
Uses Japanese name with official documents,	13
Uses Korean name with official documents,	8
Uses Korean name among fellow Zainichi	14
Uses Japanese name with family	5
Uses Korean name with family	12
Uses Japanese name with friends	2
Uses Korean name with friends	13
Uses Japanese name at school/work	6
Uses Korean name at school/work	16
Other	4

### Q12 - Able to sing Kimi Gayo




● Yes ● No ● Other

### Q13 - Able to sing Arirang




● Yes ● No ● Other

### Q14 - Daily meal types




● Especially Japanese style ● Especially Korean style ● Both Japanese- and Korean style at a similar frequency ● Other

Q15 - Feelings regarding ethnic background




● Proud of it ● Not proud of it, but it is okay to have it ● Would rather not have it ● Other

Q16 - Experienced bullying due to ethnic background



● Yes ● No ● Other


Q17 - Experiences difficulties in life due to ethnic background



● Yes ● No ● Other




### Q18 - Has felt unsafe in Japan due to ethnic background




● Yes ● No ● Other

### Q19 - Participation in activities related to the Korean language and culture




● Participates often ● Participates sometimes ● Participates almost never ● Participates never  
● Has never participated

### Q20 - Feeling about oneself when being among ethnic Japanese




● Feeling the same way, not different from ethnic Japanese ● Feeling different, like a chosen-jin  
● Feeling the same way as them, but at the end feel like chosen-jin ● Other


### Q21 - Revealing ethnic background at school and/or work



### Q22 - Intended place to live in the future



### Q24 - Feeling connected to either of the current Koreas



### Q25 - Has heard about Mindan and Chongryon



### Q26 - Affiliation with Mindan or Chongryon



### Q27 - Thinks having Korean heritage is currently accepted in Japan

