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A Capability Approach to Peace: A Philosophical Defense of Galtung's Theory of Peace through Nussbaum's Partial Theory of Justice

Baars, Hannah

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A Capability Approach to Peace: A Philosophical Defense of Galtung's Theory of Peace through Nussbaum's Partial Theory of Justice



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Supervisor: Thomas Fossen

Name: Hannah Baars

Student number: 2243938

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“Peace is not absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice.”

- Spinoza

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Introduction.

For years, the level of intrastate conflicts around the world has been rising, and thus obtaining peace has been a crucial endeavor of international politics. There, however, exists no consensus on what exactly ‘peace’ is (Faila, 2021). Defining peace has been a never-ending endeavor of not only sociology and political science, but also history, psychology, law, criminology, public policy and of course, philosophy. The same counts for the discipline of peace and conflict research that arose in the 1950s (Gleditsch, Nordkvelle, & Strand, 2014, p. 147). This field exclusively dealt with negative accounts of peace, by focusing only on the absence of widespread violent conflict or war. This changed when sociologist Johan Galtung, the founder of modern peace studies, redefined peace into a much broader concept (Davenport, Melander, Regan, 2018, p. 31). Galtung’s ideas about peace are still widely used, not only in the academic world but also by United Nations Peacebuilding (Gleditsch, Nordkvelle, & Strand, 2014, p. 150). His notion of peace, however, has received much criticism from the peace research field, with many finding it too all-encompassing, vague, and a moral ideal (Faila, 2021).

This thesis will therefore set out to defend Galtung’s notion of peace against its critics, and it will do so through Nussbaum’s capability theory of justice. This particular philosophical theory has been chosen, because there are certain parallels between the two theories, through which it has potential to strengthen Galtung's theory. The thesis is therefore guided by the question: *‘how can the capability approach be used to defend Galtung’s theory of peace?’*.

First, this thesis will outline Galtung’s general definition of violence, the distinction between personal and structural violence, and how these two are combined in his definition of peace. Thereafter, four critiques of Galtung’s theory will be posed. Then, Nussbaum’s capability approach to partial justice will be explained. This approach will thereafter be used to substantiate Galtung’s concept of violence further. Thenceforth, an extended account of Galtung’s theory on peace supplemented with the capability approach will be given, called ‘a capability approach to peace’. Based on this developed approach, the four critiques will be refuted. To conclude, this thesis will be briefly summarized, the implications of the capability approach to peace will be described, and recommendations for future writing will be made.

1. Peace and Structural Violence

In the very influential article ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’ (1969), Galtung set out to provide a new concept of peace (Gleditsch, Nordkvelle, & Strand, 2014, p. 149). Galtung continues with defining peace in terms of violence, but also revolutionized peace research by arguing that peace is the *negation* of his own developed concepts: structural violence and personal violence. This chapter will first discuss Galtung’s general definition of violence, continue with his distinction between personal violence and structural violence, and lastly, show how these two are combined in his definition of peace.

1.1. General Definition of Violence

Galtung starts his article by writing that he still regards peace as ‘the absence of violence’ (1969, p. 167). Galtung however continues with providing a new general definition of violence. Here, he aims to reject the narrow understanding of violence which was dominant in peace research at the time. This narrow concept of violence focuses on the deprivation of health alone, which must also be at the hands of an *actor* who *intends* the consequence. Galtung rejected this definition because then ‘highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace’ (1969, p. 168).

Instead, Galtung defines violence as: ‘when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations’. This can either be done by other people, but also what will later be elaborated upon: structure. Another definition he gives is: ‘the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is.’ (1969, p. 168). In other words, when the potential is higher than the actual, and it is also by definition avoidable, violence is present. For example: ‘If a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the medical resources in the world, then violence would be present according to our definition’ (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). In this case, death due to tuberculosis was not avoidable back then, but today it is. So, if people die of a disease for which effective treatment is available, it means that something prevented them from accessing proper medical care. The death would have been avoidable, what could have been is different from what is, and thus this is considered violence.

He continues by giving six distinctions between different forms of violence (Galtung, 1969, p. 169-172). First the distinction between physical and psychological violence. Narrow notions of violence tend to only focus on physical violence that is aimed at the body. But psychological violence that decreases mental capabilities, such as indoctrination, is also relevant. Second, the distinction between negative and positive approaches to influence, which is either forcing a person to act in a particular way or rewarding them when they act in the desired manner. Third, the distinction whether or not there is an object present that is actually being hurt. According to Galtung, the mere threat of psychological and / or physical violence to an object can also be characterized as violence, because it still puts constraints upon human action, through for example fear. Fourth, the distinction between intended and unintended violence: is there an actor that *intends* violence? Galtung argues that when ethical systems focus on intention only as a criterion for violence, they will not be able to capture his concept of structural violence (which will later be explained) in their definition. Fifth, there are two levels of violence: manifest and latent. Manifest violence is a direct observable form of violence, such as a person being hit. Latent violence is when a situation is so unstable that the actual realization level between the potential and actual decreases, it is 'a situation of unstable equilibrium' (Galtung, 1969, p. 172). This is for example during a violent regime change.

The most important distinction he makes, between personal or direct violence and structural or indirect violence, will be discussed in the following two separate subsections.

1.1.1. Personal or Direct Violence

By introducing the distinction between personal and structural violence, Galtung poses the question: is there a subject that acts or not?

When violence can be traced back to specific persons, meaning there is a clear relation between a subject that harms an object, this is defined by Galtung as *personal or direct violence* (1969, p. 171). Galtung divides personal violence of how the object (the human being) can be harmed, in two ways. First is the denial of input, which is the denial of energy sources, such as water and food. Secondly, the denial of output, which is movement. Output can either be *somatic*, recorded by the outside as movement or *mental*, which cannot directly be perceived from the outside (1969, p. 175). Though Galtung provides no examples for somatic and mental personal violence, it can be inferred that somatic could for example, be the case of imprisonment and mental for example the case of brainwashing. Galtung notes

though that the line between physical and psychological violence is thin, since physical constraints have mental implications and vice versa.

1.1.2. Structural or Indirect Violence

The other definition of violence Galtung develops is called *structural* or *indirect violence*.

To start, personal violence per definition needs an object that acts, but when there is no clear subject-object relation in violence, Galtung defines it as structural violence. Meaning that violence is enthralled in structure. Take the following example Galtung gives: when one husband abuses his wife, this is a form of personal violence. But when one million husbands prevent their wives from having a job, there is no concrete actor actively attacking another person. This is a form of violence because although there is no clear actor, people are influenced by either social, political, economic, or cultural forces so that they cannot attain their potential physically, mentally, or both (Lee, 2019, p. 125). The cause is part of the structure of society through existing institutions and organizations, in the previous case that of gender discrimination.

Second, structural violence is silent according to Galtung: it does not automatically show and is essentially static. In a society, personal violence is therefore registered more often whilst structural violence may be ‘as natural as the air around us’ (Galtung, 1969, p. 173). In other words, structural violence is often viewed as something that has a certain stability in society, whereas personal violence can exhibit fluctuation over time. People often overlook it and accept it as just the way a society functions (Lee, 2019, p. 128).

Lastly, structural violence expresses itself as an unequal division of power and unequal chances in life (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). He writes: ‘the general formula behind structural violence is inequality, above all in the power to decide the distribution of resources (1969, p. 171). It manifests itself in infant mortality, slow starvation, discrimination, disease, and other augmented disparities of health, economics, gender, and race. It is about limitations in society that constrain people from meeting their basic needs and achieving the quality of life that would otherwise have been possible. These limitations can be political, economic, religious, cultural, or legal (Lee, 2019, p. 123). One of the most pressing ways structural violence shows is through healthcare disparities, because this often leads to morbidity and mortality in people (Lee, 2019, p. 131). For example: preventable diseases such as diarrhea kill approximately two million children annually, just because they are too poor to afford treatment.

1.2. Defining Peace

Galtung, by thoroughly examining violence, aimed to establish an extended concept of peace (1969, p. 183).

Though Galtung has divided peace into the negation of both structural and personal violence, they are not truly separate entities. Peace, he writes, is the absence of both personal and structural violence. But, Galtung has added another dimension to his definition of peace. He writes ‘we shall sometimes refer to structural violence as social injustice’ and ‘the absence of violence is what we shall refer to as justice’ (1969, p. 183). He has thus equated the absence of structural violence with justice. Peace now entails the absence of personal violence as well as justice. This section sets forth how Galtung perceives the interaction between the two notions, which he views as interdependent on each other.

It is possible, according to Galtung, to empirically observe structural and personal violence as independent. That is, he states, because personal violence can persist regardless of changes in structural contexts, violent persons for example will always exist. Vice versa, there are structures of violence that function the same regardless of changes in persons functioning in the system (Galtung, 1969, p. 177). An example is the Apartheid regime in South Africa, a system of institutionalized racial discrimination that functioned the same for years. But despite being independently observable, Galtung writes that there does exist a relationship between the two forms of violence. Because ‘One can argue that all cases of structural violence (...) can be traced back to personal violence in their pre-history’ (Galtung, 1969, p. 178). He does not explain this further, but presumably he means that structure breeds personal behavior. For example, gender-based structural violence often leads to personal violence: ‘In Bangladesh, men propagate violence on women mainly because they have witnessed violence in their families of origin, and because social systems and structures condone such violence. Similar studies have shown that women with little education in Egypt are far more likely to tolerate violence from their husbands, especially if they are dependent on them for sustenance.’ (Lee, 2019, p. 132). This shows that the distinction between personal and structural violence is often unclear. After all, violent structures are consistently upheld by action from, among other things, individuals, and individual actions in turn come about based on expectations and norms contained in society (Galtung, 1969, p. 177).




Figure 1: The Extended Concepts of Violence and Peace (Galtung, 1969, p. 183)

Galtung therefore claims that one cannot have peace through only one side of the coin. Gross social injustice, Galtung states, is often maintained by gross personal violence. On the other hand, when the focus is only upon obtaining social justice, this may lead to the justification of personal violence if this necessitates obtaining social justice (1969, p. 184). It can be assumed that he means for example cases of (political) revolution. Social justice is not an adornment to a peaceful society for Galtung, nor is the absence of personal violence an adornment to social justice. Galtung therefore proposes that both goals are significant and interdependent, and as such it is difficult to get rid of just one: you must get rid of both.

Galtung, however, does not provide ample solutions on how to obtain such a peace. He only writes: 'social justice being a positively defined condition found in the egalitarian distribution of power and resources' (Galtung, 1969, p. 173). He does not further specify any principles of redistribution or other measures to construct peace but concludes that more research and practice is needed to combine and obtain both forms of peace.

Chapter 2. Critique of Galtung

This chapter will discuss 'Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung' (1977), by economist and philosopher Kenneth Boulding, who posed several famous critiques on Galtung's theory on peace, and his criticism will be supplemented by some other authors. Boulding formulates multiple critiques against Galtung's definitions of peace and violence.

First, is the critique of the concept of structural violence being too large. Galtung's definition does allow for structural violence to contain much. He has stretched the concept of structural violence to include all things that constrain the realization of people's chances in life, as the 'the difference between the potential and the actual'. But this is often considered to be too all-encompassing, too general and too diffuse by scholars (Page, 2022). By making it a too large definition, Boulding writes that Galtung's version of peace 'is not in any sense the opposite of negative peace. In fact it may have very little to do with peace' (1977, p. 78). Moreover, Boulding calls structural violence and peace 'metaphors' instead of real concepts. He argues that Galtung uses the word violence as a symbol for 'poverty, deprivation, ill health and low expectations of life' in order to illustrate that what causes these processes is 'like a thug beating up a victim or a conqueror stealing the land of people (...) and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors' (Boulding, 1977, p. 83). Violence according to Boulding is something else entirely. There are structures that produce violence, and there are structures

that produce poverty and other injustices. They can be related, but ‘not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures’ (1977, p. 84). Boulding does, however, not further elaborate on what than violence might be exactly.

Second, the critique of the theory being a moral ideal. Boulding accuses the definition of being ‘a state of affairs which gets high marks on Galtung’s scale of goodness’ (1977, p. 78). Therefore, Boulding finds Galtung overly normative: he seems to view certain things in the world as ‘bad’ (which are all the consequences of structural violence) and wants them to change through his normative evaluations. Moreover, he wonders, if Galtung’s potential is the best that humans can do, what exactly does this certain level of attainment entail? Though Galtung never specifies this, he does seem to evoke questions about what makes human life valuable, what makes ‘a good life’ (Vorobej, 2008, p. 85). Then the elimination of structural violence becomes a moral ideal, according to Boulding, which he finds is something that does not belong in peace and conflict research (1977, p. 85).

Third, if one accepts Galtung’s general definition of violence, how does one measure the difference between potential and the actual to determine whether violence occurs? Galtung himself provides no suggestion on what this would look like. But suppose the life expectancy of Japanese women and the income of a woman living in Iceland are taken as the highest potential for women to obtain. In that case, violence acts on almost all women worldwide. Moreover, since peace and conflict studies are part of the social sciences, many scholars have attacked Galtung’s theory for not being scientific enough. This critique stems from the ongoing discussion about what role values should play in sciences, and whether science should always aim to be objective and refrain from making normative claims. Davenport, Melander and Regan remark how social justice is extremely hard to define as well as to operationalize, and it is therefore an unuseful definition of peace in the field of peace studies (2018, p. 19). Davenport et al. even go as far as stating that Galtung has made it impossible for peace to be empirically observable, because he lists so many different factors that contribute to peace that there are too many variables at play (2018, p. 19).

Lastly, is the critique of Galtung’s possible solution to structural violence. Boulding writes that Galtung assumes that the unequal division of power and unequal chances in life are the results of the existing hierarchical structures (1977, p. 79). And though Galtung’s ‘maximalist agenda’ aims to emphasize the negative consequences of unequally distributed power (and resources), Boulding reprimands Galtung for not providing a framework for possible solutions to structural violence (Boulding, 1977, p. 79). Boulding then continues by reading between the lines of Galtung’s work and writes that ‘one almost suspects that Galtung

would prefer a society in which everybody is equally destitute than one in which some were destitute, and some were rich' (1977, 79). Emphasizing how Galtung often mentions 'uneven distribution of power and resources as structural processes' in his article, Boulding concludes that Galtung (though Galtung never explicitly states this in his article) views the redistribution of power and resources as part of resolving structural violence. Though Galtung never works this out any further, he does state: 'whereas the absence of structural violence is what we have referred to as social justice, which is a positively defined condition (egalitarian distribution of power and resources). Boulding criticizes this emphasis on redistribution rather than on production, which he himself finds to be the way towards more equality (1977, p. 81).

Chapter 3. Capabilities Approach

This chapter will first discuss Nussbaum's capability approach to partial justice. The capabilities approach will then be used in the next chapter to substantiate Galtung's concept of violence and peace further.

3.1. Nussbaum's' Capability Theory of Justice

In her book 'Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach' (2011), Nussbaum starts with the guiding questions: 'what are people actually able to do or be? What real opportunities are available to them? The answer is found in her 'capability-based theory of justice', which is 'concerned with entrenched social injustice and inequality, especially capability failures resulting from discrimination or marginalization. It ascribes an urgent task to government and public' (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 30). Nussbaum's version of the capabilities approach is, according to her, a way to assess the quality of life as well as a theory about social justice through looking at 'what are people actually able to do or be?'. Her capability theory is grounded in two moral claims: first, achieving well-being is the primary moral goal in life, and second, well-being is found in obtaining all capabilities (Robeyns, & Morten Fibieger Byskov, 2021).

Capabilities are the potentials people have for being and doing certain things (if they choose so), such as be literate, be well-nourished and be politically active. Nussbaum distinguishes between three kinds of capabilities: basic, internal, and combined (1999, p. 237). Basic capabilities are the 'innate equipment of individuals that is necessary for

developing the more advanced capabilities’, such as speech and bodily-health, which need to be nurtured in order to develop other capabilities later. Internal capabilities are ‘states of the person itself that are (...) sufficient conditions for the exercise of the requisite functions’(Nussbaum, 1999, p. 237). Combined capabilities are the internal capabilities plus the social, political, and economic conditions in which these can actually be practiced. People may have had education and thus developed the internal capability for free speech and political participation. Still, if they live in a repressive dictatorship, they do not have the combined capability to exercise upon them (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 33). Conversely, it is possible for a society to have extended political rights to all citizens, but if the government has not provided sufficient education, citizens lack the internal capability to function well in a political environment, such as the ability to think critically about the government or speak publicly. That is what is compelling about this approach: it focuses on the actual opportunities available to a person. It is possible to have certain liberties on paper, but if they cannot be exercised upon, they have little meaning. One needs to be in a position and have the resources to have the opportunity to choose and act upon those rights (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 231).

Nussbaum eventually develops a list of combined capabilities, that looks as following ((though she writes that the list may be altered (2011, p. 39)):

- I. Life: being able to live a life of normal length
- II. Bodily Health: being in good health
- III. Bodily Integrity: being able to move freely and not be subject to assault and violence
- IV. Sense, Imagination and Thought: do the things that ‘make a person truly human’, such as use all the senses, have freedom of thought and expression, have pleasure etc.
- V. Emotions: being able to experience all emotions, which is also connected to human association
- VI. Practical Reason: being able to form a conception of the ‘good’
- VII. Affiliation:
 - a. Engage in social interaction
 - b. ‘Being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails protections against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity or national origin
- VIII. Other species: having concern for animals and nature
- IX. Play: enjoy recreational activities
- X. Control over one’s environment:
 - a. Political: being able to effectively participate in the political processes that govern one’s life
 - b. Material: hold property, and equality on the labor market

When people have realized their capabilities, they are called functionings: ‘a functioning is an active realization of one or more capabilities (...) functioning are beings and doings that are the outgrowths or realizations of capabilities’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 36). Functionings are states of being or actions, such as sleeping and working, that can be achieved through the space of opportunity that capabilities provide for them. A capability is therefore the opportunity to choose a specific function: the concept of choice is central. Nussbaum therefore also sometimes refers to capabilities as a kind of freedom: ‘they are not just abilities residing inside a person but also the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and the political, social, and economic environment’ (2011, p. 32). A person starving and a person fasting have the same function of being hungry, but the person starving did not have the freedom to choose this. The other way around, a person might have the freedom to go and vote but chooses not to, and therefore not have the functioning of voting.

Nussbaum also uses the notion of human dignity as an addition to her approach. Claassen (2015) describes Nussbaum’s notion of human dignity as being threefold (p. 243-244). First, humans have dignity because of their potentiality to develop certain capabilities for multiple forms of activity and striving. Second, the ascription of dignity makes sure that all persons are deserving of equal respect. Third, respect for dignity leads to the necessity of the protection of people’s development of these capabilities. On this basis, we can also judge that ‘that some living conditions deliver to people a life that is worthy of the human dignity that they possess, and others do not’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 38).

The capabilities approach thus focuses on preserving these essential ‘freedoms’ of which a breach would lead to a life not worthy of human dignity. She argues in ‘a very general and intuitive way’ that all ten capabilities are essential parts of establishing a life in accordance with human dignity. Social justice, according to Nussbaum, is therefore found in ‘the protecting of the ten basic entitlements and placing them above an ample (specified) threshold of capability, as there is an essential requirement of life with human dignity’ (2011, p. 85). If we want to establish whether a society is just, we look at whether the capabilities have been secured. Nussbaum’s theory of social justice is comprehensive in the sense that it holds for all human beings on earth (because all have human dignity), but it is also a partial and minimal account of justice because of her focus on capabilities as a threshold, she does not specify what more justice requires once those thresholds are met (Robeyns & Morten Fibieger Byskov, 2021).

Chapter 4. A Capability Approach to Peace

This chapter will first provide an extended account of Galtung's theory on peace, supplemented with the capability approach. To set up this approach, Galtung's definition of violence will be enhanced with the capabilities. Thereafter, the paper describes a capability approach to peace.

4.1. Framing Galtung's Definition as Capabilities.

As previously seen, the general definition of violence that Galtung gave was the difference between the actual somatic and mental realizations and the potential realizations (1969, p. 170). Personal or structural violence can interfere in this process so that the actual realizations fall below the potential realizations. Galtung, however, leaves open what exactly it is that people are not able to actualize when their realizations fall below their potential.

This next section will specify Galtung's deficiency by arguing that what is not actualized are, indeed, capabilities. First, the 'potential and actual' will be framed in terms of capabilities. Second, it will be shown that when people are kept from realizing their capabilities, this is a case of violence under Galtung's definition.

4.1.1. Capabilities as the Potential

There are two reasons why Galtung's potential can be further defined in terms of capabilities: First, both Nussbaum and Galtung focus on people's 'potentialities': about what potential a human life has, if no constraints are placed upon it. Nussbaum ascribes human dignity to humans because of their potentiality to develop certain capabilities (Claassen, 2015, p. 244). Though Galtung's definition about the difference between the actual and potential realizations is not very specific, he does, like Nussbaum, seem to assume that every person is endowed with some capacity for certain physical and psychological achievements. Galtung exemplifies this through the case of literacy, and when the level hereof is lower than what it could have been (1969, p. 168). Here, he assumes that people have the capacity for reading but did not have the opportunity to develop this potential. This is what the difference between the potential and actual is: the potential is what a person can be capable of, *if* there has been an opportunity and choice to do so. The actual is what occurs when constraints are placed upon

people's potential: constraints on achieving a quality of life that otherwise would have been possible.

Second, both Galtung's definition of violence and the capability approach focus on a discrepancy between *what could have been* and *what is*. In the opening anecdote in her book, Nussbaum describes the life of an Indian woman, stating for example how small she is due to poor nutrition in her childhood as a consequence of not only of poverty, but also of gender discrimination (2011, p. 13). Parents are often hesitant to spend resources on daughters who are costly due to their dowry and lack of employment opportunities. Similarly, the mortality of daughters is notoriously high as compared to sons in India. Moreover, in some regions there exists a striking gender imbalance with there being abnormally more men than women, due to the high abortion rate of female fetuses (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 17). These are all instances where what could have been, is different from what is: normally the demographic distribution between males and females is equal. Moreover, in high-income countries boys are even at a greater risk of infant and childhood mortality than girls (Aghai et al, 2020). Galtung gives similar examples of violence such as 'if the life expectancy in a society is twice as high in the upper as in the lower classes' (1969, p. 168-169). Moreover, compare the following sentences: 'what are people *actually* able to do or be? What real opportunities are available to them?' (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 33) and 'the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, what *could have been* and what *is*. (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). Both Galtung's concept of violence and the capabilities approach are similar in the sense that they both focus upon a gap or discrepancy between *what is* and *what can be*.

It is therefore useful to explain Galtung's not specified definition of 'the potential and the actual' in terms of capabilities. The concept of the potential will be all ten previously mentioned capabilities, because all humans are endowed with the potential to develop these. The actual is what occurs when people are able or not able to exercise upon their capabilities.

4.1.2. Violence and Capabilities

By substantiating the potential and the actual as capabilities, the following section argues that when capabilities are breached, this is violence under Galtung's definition. Namely, violence is what occurs when the actual is lower than the potential: when capabilities cannot in actuality be exercised upon. The relationship between violence and capabilities will be illustrated through multiple examples in the following section.

Take capability number one, life. A life can be ended prematurely either through a murder which is a form of physical personal violence. However, take the following example: the maternal mortality rate of black women in the US lies four times higher than that of white women. This is a case of structural violence because there is no clear actor, instead, the cause lies with discriminatory structures in society. In both cases, violence leads to the capability of life falling below its own potential: leading a human life of normal length. There are many more examples: Galtung mentions indoctrination as an example of personal violence which breaches capability six, practical reason and critical reflection. Alternatively, Galtung writes about low education rates in his fourth distinction of violence, which breaches capability four of 'being informed and cultivated by an adequate education (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 235).

Breaches to capabilities do not occur in isolation of personal or structural violence but are often an interplay of both. This illustrates that the distinction between both forms of violence is often not clear, which Galtung already stated in formulating his approach to peace. Structural violence appears to be more related to combined capabilities since it looks at the external forces that prevent people from realizing their potential, and attributes this to structures. Number 10, being able to control one's environment either politically or materially, is more reliant on the social, political, and economic environment a person functions in. This can for example depend on the type of government a country has. Contrastingly, when somebody is brainwashed (which we saw earlier is a case of both mental and personal violence), a person is also not capable of actual control over his political environment. So, both personal and structural violence can breach the same capability. Another example that shows the interplay is 'when the excess to transportation is unequally distributed, thus keeping large segments of the population at the same place with mobility a monopoly of the selected few' (1969, p. 169). This is a case of violence where there is no clear actor intending to do harm, but still unequal constraints are placed upon people. This, however, also translates itself to a form of personal violence, because Galtung previously defined the denial of output as 'limits on movement' as a case of personal violence. So, there is also an interplay between both forms of violence: both breach the third capability of bodily integrity, because a person does not possess the capability to move freely from place to place.

4.2. A Capability Approach to Peace

By supplementing Galtung's general definition of violence with the capability approach, an extended variant of Galtung's theory can be given, which will be called 'a capability approach to peace'.

Galtung's potential is considered as the ten capabilities, and thus a new definition of violence is established: violence occurs when people are prevented from exercising upon their capabilities. Peace, according to Galtung, is the absence of both personal and structural violence. Fortunately, guaranteeing all capabilities for all citizens will consequently eliminate both forms of violence. This is first and foremost the case because both forms of violence can, as seen, act upon all and upon the same capabilities. Moreover, by framing Galtung's potential as capabilities, it is even more evident that the distinction between personal and structural violence is opaque. As seen, breaches to capabilities are often an interplay between both forms of violence. Therefore, cases of personal violence will hopefully decrease when structural violence is eliminated, because structure often breeds personal behavior, and vice versa forms of structural violence might decrease when this is no longer upheld by personal actions. Guaranteeing capabilities will provide a solution to this. For example, if gender discrimination (which is a case of structural violence) is tackled through guaranteeing capability 7b which entails 'protections against discrimination on the base of race, sex (...) or national origin', cases of personal violence in the form of genital mutilation on specific women (a breach of the third capability of bodily in) will hopefully decrease (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 235).

Since the absence of both structural and personal violence is therefore found in obtaining all capabilities for all citizens, and peace is the absence of structural and personal violence, a new definition of peace is also created. A capability approach to peace has the following definition of peace: peace is the presence of all capabilities for all citizens.

Furthermore, this capability approach to Galtung's theory is not only a theory about peace, but ultimately also one about justice. In her theory of partial justice, Nussbaum has not defined social justice in the same manner as Galtung. According to her, social justice is 'the protecting of the ten basic entitlements and placing them above an ample specified threshold of capability, as they are an essential requirement of life with human dignity' (2011, p. 85). If we want to establish whether a society is just, we look at whether the capabilities have been secured. Auspiciously, peace for Galtung is also a demand of justice: justice is what arises when structural violence is absent in society. As shown before, guaranteeing all capabilities

for all citizens will eliminate this form of violence. So ultimately if we understand Galtung's theory under a capability approach, Galtung and Nussbaum will have a similar concept of justice: when the objective of guaranteeing all capabilities for all citizens is achieved, it will create a society that is not only peaceful, but also just.

Chapter 5. A Rebuttal to the Objections

Having thus extended Galtung's theory as a capability approach to peace, several of the aforementioned objections can be rejected.

First is the critique of there being no measure to establish the difference between the potential and the actual, needed to determine whether violence occurs. By using capabilities as the new definition for the potential, it is now possible to determine whether violence occurs, and Galtung's deficiency of not providing a way to measure violence is solved. Namely, violence occurs when a person is not able to exercise upon one or more of the ten capabilities. Capability theory aims to be useful in practice and deal with real-life issues (Robeyns & Morten Fibieger Byskov, 2021). One need only go over the list and for example ask: 'Is he or she able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault (...) for choice in matters of reproduction?' (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 235). If not, then violence occurs. Moreover, people are already endeavoring to make the capabilities empirically observable and measurable (Comim, Qizilbash, & Alkire, 2010). If a measurement of the capabilities is one day created, then ultimately peace and justice (since these are related under this specific approach) will also be measurable. In practice then, United Nations peacebuilding could for example use the list of capabilities as the final criterion to determine when a peace mission is over: only when all capabilities for all citizens are guaranteed, peace is established, and the mission can cease.

Related to this is the critique that defining violence as all things that constrain the realization of people's chances in life is a too large definition. By taking the capabilities as a threshold for peace, thinking about peace is much more concrete than when the emphasis was on 'all forms in which the actual falls below the potential'. Now, peace will finally have an end: which is ensuring all citizens obtain all ten capabilities. Moreover, the distinction Boulding mentioned between 'the structures that produce violence and the structures that produce poverty and other injustices' no longer exists. As seen, guaranteeing capabilities will both eliminate violence and establish justice. Ultimately, it ensures that Galtung's definition is no longer a 'metaphor' as Boulding called it, it is a concrete plan of action.

Third, is the critique of Galtung's theory being a moral ideal about what makes human life valuable. Nussbaum (2011) writes the following about this:

'There is another, different reason for a theory of justice to take a stand on content. This reason derives from a commitment to political liberalism. If we are convinced that the political principles of a decent society ought to be respectful of a wide range of different comprehensive doctrines and should seek to become the object of an overlapping consensus among them, then we will not want to propose principles that use the idea of capability as a comprehensive theory of the value or quality of life. Theorizing about the overall quality of life should be left to each comprehensive doctrine, using whatever terms and concepts it uses. What it is reasonable to ask citizens to affirm is the political importance of a relatively short and circumscribed list of fundamental entitlements-in the form of the capabilities list-that could be attached to the rest of their comprehensive doctrine in each case. ' (p. 29).

Nussbaum justifies her list of capabilities on the basis that they promote human dignity (Robeyns, & Morten Fibieger Byskov, 2021). Accordingly, a 'good life', one where a person has human dignity, is found in having the possibility to exercise all ten capabilities. Nussbaum's theory does therefore present some idea about what makes human life valuable, and the same consequently counts for the capability approach to peace.

This is, however, a minimal account. Nussbaum's theory is not comprehensive but partial, because it leaves freedom for individuals to pursue a range of different lives in accordance with their own comprehensive doctrines, and thus endorse their idea about 'the good life' (Claassen, 2018, p. 32). Her list of capabilities, she argues in Rawlsian terms, is the object of an overlapping consensus that leaves room for different moral and religious doctrines (Claassen, 2018, p. 19). Galtung himself similarly states that the term peace will be used for social goals that 'many would at least verbally agree to' (1969, p. 167). There is no 'morally right' way to use capabilities, it passes no judgment on how people exercise them. They can either be used positively, such as to be educated or to ride a bike. But it also gives people the freedom to have the ability to rape and to pollute. People decide for themselves what makes human life valuable. Though it cannot be denied that there is some morality in this theory, it is questionable whether it is ever avoidable to make moral claims when theorizing about peace, because it is ultimately a judgment of what society 'ought' to be like.

This minimal account that leaves room for plurality might therefore still be the best approach if one is worried about morality.

Last, is the critique of Galtung's possible solution to structural violence. Boulding reprimands Galtung for not specifying a specific solution to structural violence, as well as blaming him for the implied emphasis Galtung places on egalitarian redistribution of power and resources. Boulding is right in the sense that Galtung mentions equality a lot throughout the article, especially in its relation to justice (and structural violence). Galtung never elaborates upon a distinct conception of inequality, but he mentions some specific characteristics, such as: 'it shows up as an unequal division of power and consequently as unequal chances in life' (p. 171; 175) and 'Resources are unevenly distributed (...) above all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed' (p. 171). So, it is understandable why Boulding assumes Galtung wants redistribution of resources.

Equality in the form of redistribution of resources though, is not a necessary demand of justice in philosophy, since equality can exist without redistribution (Miller, 2021). The same counts for Nussbaum, who writes:

'All, that is, deserve equal respect from laws and institutions. If people are considered as citizens, the claims of all citizens are equal. Equality holds a primitive place in the theory at this point, although its role will be confirmed by its fit with the rest of the theory. From the assumption of equal dignity, it does not follow that all the centrally important capabilities are to be equalized. Treating people as equals may not entail equalizing the living conditions of all.' (2011, P. 35).

A capability approach to peace will therefore not focus on: 'an egalitarian distribution of power and resources' (Galtung, 1969, p. 173). Though Galtung himself focuses on resources, the capability approach shows that not only resources matter, but you also need to be able to act upon resources through capabilities. It is famously illustrated in Amartya Sen's 'Equality of What?' (1979) that having resources says nothing about what people are able to do or be with resources (p. 202-205). Sen compares two people with the same set of resources, but one of them is disabled and thus has limited capabilities. The disabled person cannot act upon resources in the same way as the able-bodied person because his life is more costly to correct for his disability. Leading to him having fewer resources to spend on pursuing other valued ends than the able-bodied person.

This does not mean that the capability account of peace does not involve equality. It does so, in two ways. First, the ascription of dignity makes sure that all persons are deserving of equal respect. Second, people are all equal in the sense that *all* citizens must be guaranteed their capabilities. Nussbaum's theory is a sufficiency account, meaning that justice requires people to have 'enough', which in this case are all capabilities. Nussbaum emphasizes that the capabilities are a threshold condition for social justice, and therefore everybody is equally deserving of these capabilities. But though it specifies a social minimum, she does not consider distributional matters if people for example go above this threshold. Justice is only held in all people reaching the threshold of the ten capabilities. In a sense equality, in the form of people having equal opportunities through the capabilities is therefore also part of justice, and ultimately also of peace.

Conclusion.

This thesis set out to defend Galtung's theory of peace, guided by the question: '*how can the capability approach be used to defend Galtung's theory of peace?*'. First, a comprehensive account of Galtung's theory was given. Then, the four main critiques of his theory were discussed. Next, Nussbaum's partial theory of justice was described, which was used to formulate an extended account of Galtung's theory, labeled 'a capability approach to peace'. In this approach, Galtung's concept of the potential was framed as Nussbaum's capabilities because both concepts focus on people's 'potential' and on a discrepancy between 'what could have been' and 'what is'. From this, a new definition of violence was established, namely: violence occurs when people are prevented from exercising upon their capabilities. Since Galtung defines peace as the absence of violence, a new definition of peace was also established: peace is found in obtaining all capabilities for all citizens. Through this new capability approach to peace, the four objections to the theory could be refuted.

Several other important implications of this approach emerged in the thesis. First, by regarding peace as the attainment of all capabilities for all citizens, this thesis constructs a more concrete plan of action to establish peace and justice in society, especially if the capabilities are ever made measurable. This is opposite to Galtung, who provided no specific solution to attain peace whatsoever. However, guaranteeing all capabilities for all citizens will be a complicated and difficult venture. As Galtung himself wrote: 'these principles of peace will be complex and difficult to obtain, but not impossible' (1969, p. 167). It is up to future

studies and policy makers to deliberate how such goals can (ever) be achieved. For example, deliberation might arise whether Nussbaum's exact list is a sufficient threshold for peace. Some may find it should include more capabilities, whilst others might view it as too exhaustive and argue that it should include less capabilities if peace is to be made attainable. Second, the capability approach to peace will be a minimal account that leaves room for individuals to their own comprehensive doctrines about 'the good life'. Third, the capability approach to peace will be a sufficiency account, because Nussbaum does not specify what more justice requires once this threshold is met. Still, equality is inherent to approach because it provides equal opportunities to all through guaranteeing all capabilities for all citizens. It is however possible to take a different stance on justice than this approach. Some may argue that peace for example does require a distributive rule above the threshold of capabilities or that an approach should take a stance on issues of responsibility. These are interesting topics to elaborate upon in future writing.

Lastly and most importantly, this thesis showed that when all capabilities for all citizens are guaranteed, a society will be created that is not only peaceful, but also just. Because though the capability approach is primarily a theory of justice, this thesis is the first writing to show that the capability approach might ultimately also say something about peace. Conversely, this thesis demonstrated that Galtung's theory might be more about justice than about violence: peace is about creating a just society where all capabilities are guaranteed. What this ultimately shows, is that peace and justice might be inherently related: peace may not be about violence, it might just be about justice.

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