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'Copying' in Sōseki's *Bungakuron* as replication

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I. Introduction

Sōseki reviews *Arakure*

In 1916, Japanese author Natsume Sōseki 夏目漱石 reviewed the 1915 novel *Arakure* あらくれ by fellow writer Tokuda Shūsei 徳田秋声. According to Donald Keene, Tokuda is to be considered part of the naturalist (*shizenshugi* 自然主義) phase of Japanese literature,¹ which aims to realistically depict the protagonist's observations and psychological states.² That is to say, it seeks to directly represent real, individual human life in writing. By the same gesture, in the naturalist school of writers, no lofty, philosophical ideals are to be presented through literature by means of metaphor or lengthy exposition. Keeping this in mind we turn to Sōseki's aforementioned *Arakure* review:

In other words, the work of Mr. Tokuda describes 'reality as-is', and there is no philosophy behind it. Although taking 'reality as-is' to be philosophy is one thing, to compress the observations shown by our very eyes and call that philosophy is a point I cannot acknowledge. Even if we suppose there to be philosophy present, it is an extremely vague one. However, I am not claiming that whatever lacks philosophy is not a novel. And again, although perhaps Mr. Tokuda himself despises so-called 'philosophy' it remains a fact that a so-called 'idea' is missing in his writing.³

In his article "Naturalism in Japanese Literature", William Sibley claims Sōseki was not particularly enamoured with the naturalist school of writing.⁴ In *Dawn to the West*, Keene mentions that during his life Tokuda was

¹ Keene, *Dawn to the West. Japanese Literature in the Modern Era*, Fiction:271.

² Sibley, "Naturalism in Japanese Literature," 164. "The Japanese naturalists' preference for specific, demonstrable facts based on their personal observation to a general, hypothetical truth inferred from the whole range of their experience is capsulized in slogans adopted by Katai and Hōmei: "straightforward description" (*rokotsu naru byōsha* 露骨なる描写), "flat description" (*heiman* 平面 *byōsha*) and "one-dimensional description" (*ichigen* 一元 *byōsha*)."

³ Natsume, *Bessatsu Jō*, 468–69. Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this thesis are my own.

⁴ Sibley, "Naturalism in Japanese Literature," 159.

criticized by his contemporaries for “lacking any intellectual preoccupations”.⁵ As such, we could read the above paragraph as a somewhat theoretical rejection of reductive naturalism in literature. The point of quoting this review however is not to discuss Sōseki’s taste in literature or Tokuda’s qualities as a writer. Instead, I seek to observe Sōseki’s use of specific words. What stands out is the use of ‘philosophy’ and ‘idea’, which are written in katakana as *firosofi* フイロソフイー and *aidea* アイデア, respectively. For Sōseki, both words are taken to mean the same thing. He shifts from ‘philosophy’ to ‘idea’ in order to argue that despite Tokuda’s distaste for philosophical overtones in literature, the lack of an ‘idea’ has produced a ‘shallow’ work in the case of *Arakure*.

Leaving aside what the words ‘philosophy’ and ‘idea’ mean in Sōseki’s review, we turn to a question regarding the structure of his argument. Based on the quotation above, is an adherence to describing purely ‘reality as-is’ (*genjitsu sono mama* 現実其儘) to be considered philosophy or not? According to the very first sentence of this passage, it is not: Tokuda describes ‘reality as-is’, and there is no philosophy to be found behind that description (*sono ura ni firosofi ga nai* 其裏にフイロソフイーがない). The second sentence states the opposite: sure enough, we can perceive ‘reality as-is’ as a philosophy, but Sōseki simply cannot consider the compression of observations as philosophy (*mitomeru koto ga dekinu* 認める事が出来ぬ). The first and second sentence are at odds with one another. What are we to make of this?

As Sōseki notes, the ambiguous status of the term ‘reality as-is’ is inherent to the matter at hand: the naturalist ‘philosophy’ itself is an extremely vague thing (*kiwamete sanman de aru* 極めて散漫である). This is a very astute observation by Sōseki. Succinctly put, the problem that he finds in the naturalist writers is the following: is the rejection of philosophical musing in favour of reality itself a ‘philosophy’?

⁵ Keene, *Dawn to the West. Japanese Literature in the Modern Era*, Fiction:301n142.

The present thesis

The latter half of this thesis is devoted to Sōseki's largest non-literary work: the *Bungakuron* 文学論 (*Theory of Literature*) published in 1907. I propose that the suspicion of literary naturalism's ambiguity referred to in the *Arakure* review can, in a roundabout sense, also be found in the *Bungakuron*. In particular, in the fifth and final book of the *Bungakuron*, Sōseki describes the promulgation of 'ideas' through groups of people using the term *mogi* 模擬. I (mostly) translate *mogi* as 'copy' in this thesis. To state the central claim of this thesis in very broad terms: what is called 'philosophy' or 'idea' in the *Arakure* review, is called a 'focal point of consciousness' or 'F' in the *Bungakuron*, and is viewed by Sōseki as the way in which humans perceive or relate to the world around them. These modes of relation promulgate themselves through human societies, changing over time. The topic of this thesis is a semantic shift in the word *mogi* that enables Sōseki to see it thus.

The use of *mogi* and similar terms, most famously *mōsha* 模写, is emblematic for early Japanese literary theory. In particular, both Tsubouchi Shōyō's 坪内逍遥 1885 book-length essay *Shōsetsu shinzui* 小説神髓 and Futabatei Shimei's 二葉亭四迷 1886 shorter *Shōsetsu sōron* 小説総論 grapple with these terms.⁶ In the second chapter of this thesis, I will discuss both of these works with regards to their use of *mōsha* and *mogi*, which I call a 'representational sense of copying'.

In the third chapter, I discuss the fifth book of the *Bungakuron*. While the fifth book builds on the preceding parts of the *Bungakuron*, it is fairly self-sufficient. Part of the fifth book of the *Bungakuron* is concerned with the mechanism through which the 'focal points of consciousness' underlying literature spread in society and change over time. I will argue the central terms in Sōseki's proposed mechanism are *mogi* on the one hand and *mohō* 摸倣 on the other, which I translate as 'imitation'. I read both in the 'reproductive sense of copying', as opposed to the 'representational sense' mentioned above. Sōseki's use of *mogi* has barely been remarked upon in secondary literature. Matthew Young's 2012 master's thesis, "Evolution in literature" makes short

⁶ Suzuki, *Narrating the Self: Fictions of Japanese Modernity*, 21–23.

mention of it, but reduces the matter to whether *mogi* is used in an ‘intentional’ or ‘unintentional’ sense.⁷ As I will argue in my chapter on the *Bungakuron*, this is a completely secondary concern as far as interpreting Sōseki’s text is concerned. Given the lack of commentary on this term however, most of the chapter will be concerned with direct readings of several key passages from the *Bungakuron* itself.

The overarching motif of the second and third chapter, then, and the reason why seemingly unrelated essays by Shōyō and Futabatei are included in a thesis on the *Bungakuron*, is to explicate two meanings of the word ‘copy’ (*mogi*, *mōsha*, *mōhō*). What is at stake in the final book of the *Bungakuron* is what a copy is, and contrasting Sōseki’s use of the word to that in the essays by Futabatei and Shōyō will bring to the fore what is distinctive about the *Bungakuron*. In the preceding two paragraphs, I called these two uses of the word ‘copy’ representation and reproduction. Before proceeding to a discussion of Shōyō’s and Futabatei’s essays, I will explain the difference between these two terms.

Representation and reproduction

The distinction between representational and reproductive senses of copying as featured in this thesis is derived from Dutch philosopher Wouter Oudemans’ 2007 book *Echte filosofie*. There, a distinction is made between two senses of identity: how a thing is what it is. Those two senses are ‘basalt’ and ‘replicative’ identity.⁸ Notably, in this context Oudemans speaks of ‘identity’ and ‘ways of existence’ (*bestaanswijzen*). My use of ‘copying’ is however not a forced adaptation of his thought. As we shall presently see, the upshot of asking what a copy is, is to ask what identity is. ‘Identity’ denotes what something is, what it means for two things to be the same, different, related, derived from one another, etc. I also call identity ‘meaning’: the

⁷ Young, “Evolution in Literature: Natsume Sōseki’s Theory and Practice,” 48.

⁸ Oudemans, *Echte Filosofie*, 137. “Een basaltblok ontstaat, bestaat een tijd en vergaat. Zolang het bestaat verandert het weliswaar, maar het blijft basaltblok of een transformatie ervan. Zijn identiteit is die van de metafysische wereld: onveranderlijkheid, al is die maar tijdelijk. Wanneer iets bestaat uit zijn herhaling heeft identiteit op een andere manier van zich blijk gegeven.”

meaning of the word ‘banana’ is the identity of a banana, which includes but is not limited to the oblong, yellow fruit. A banana is more than just a piece of fruit. It is also a phallic symbol, associated with primate diets (regardless of the veracity of this association), and so on. When I say ‘identity’ or ‘meaning’, this is what I am talking about: how a thing appears to us in perception, thought and language.

One way of thinking about the relation between copying and identity is to look at the way the noun ‘copy’ works. A copy is always a copy ‘of’ something. Semantically, to speak of copies is to speak of something external to which the copy in some sense ‘defers’. Succinctly put, in what I call the representational mode of copying, a copy is a copy of an original, and in the reproductive mode, it is a copy of another copy. At first glance, this distinction may seem trivial. When making photocopies one can either copy an original document, like a textbook or whatnot, or when the original is not present, one can copy a previous copy. What of it?

This example however still operates largely within the domain of representation. After all, even in the case of photocopy of a previous copy, one will still call it a copy of whatever original underlies the chain of copies. Under representation, the identity of the copy is reliant on that of the original. Under replication, by contrast, the relation of copy to original is significantly more complicated. When copies are by definition made of copies—when, in other words, everything is a copy of something else—the original is not absent, but it is not foundational to the meaning of the copy either. Rather, it is retroactively ‘discovered’ in the history of copies it led up to.

The archetypical example of something existing as replication is that of life as considered under Darwinism. For example, genes exist as copies of one another.⁹ However, given that we are not biologists, I will explain the status of origins under replication using a less far-fetched example: the modern kana system. As is well known, the hiragana and katakana used in modern Japanese are derived from Chinese script, i.e. kanji. In order to adapt kanji to the

⁹ Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, 25. “One gene may be regarded as a unit that survives through a large number of individual bodies.”

Japanese language, they have historically been used not only semantically, as they (mostly) are today, but also phonetically, e.g. in a system called *man'yōgana* 万葉仮名, named after the *Man'yōshū* 万葉集, a poetry anthology dating to the eighth century, comprising poems written during and before the Nara period.¹⁰ Modern kana shapes can often be derived visually from the kanji corresponding to their pronunciation, as seen in Figure 1.

Kana Development Chart											
Hiragana					Katakana						
平仮名					片仮名						
あ 安	い 以	う 宇	え 衣	お 於	ア 阿	イ 伊	ウ 宇	エ 江	オ 於		
か 加	き 機	く 久	け 計	こ 己	カ 加	キ 機	ク 久	ケ 介	コ 己		
さ 左	し 之	す 寸	せ 世	そ 曾	サ 散	シ 之	ス 須	セ 世	ソ 曾		
た 太	ち 知	つ 川	て 天	と 止	タ 多	チ 千	ツ 川	テ 天	ト 止		
な 奈	に 仁	ぬ 奴	ね 祢	の 乃	ナ 奈	ニ 仁	ヌ 奴	ネ 祢	ノ 乃		
は 波	ひ 比	ふ 不	へ 部	ほ 保	ハ 八	ヒ 比	フ 不	ヘ 部	ホ 保		
ま 末	み 美	む 武	め 女	も 毛	マ 末	ミ 三	ム 牟	メ 女	モ 毛		
や 也	い 以	ゆ 由	江 江	よ 与	ヤ 也	イ 以	ユ 由	エ 衣	ヨ 與		
ら 良	り 利	る 留	れ 礼	ろ 呂	ラ 良	リ 利	ル 流	レ 礼	ロ 呂		
わ 和	わ 爲		ゑ 惠	を 遠	ワ 和	ヰ 井	于 宇	エ 惠	ヲ 乎		
		ん 无					ン 尔				

Figure 1. Schematic overview of the graphic derivation of modern kana. Hiragana are shown on the left with 'intermediate' hentaigana. Katakana are shown on the right with the relevant part marked in lighter blue. Downloaded from <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:FlowRoot3824.png> on June 9, 2022. Image by user 'Rockerfrick' and modified by 'HarJIT'.

The development depicted in Figure 1 is however a significant simplification. Even under *man'yōgana*, which is only one of several different schemes for phonetic reading of kanji, multiple kanji can have the same phonetic reading. In *Man'yōshū* poem 1/41 we find an example of different kanji having the same reading when used phonetically:

鈿著 手節乃埼二 今日毛可母 大宮人之 玉藻莉良武

Through *kundoku* 訓読 it is read as follows:

¹⁰ Seeley, *A History of Writing in Japan*, 49.

*Kushirotsuku tafushi no saki ni kefu mo kamo ohomiyahito no tamamo
karuramu*

鉤着く答志の崎に今日もかも大宮人の玉藻刈るらむ¹¹

And in English:

At the beautiful, ebullient cape of Tōshi, will the courtiers once again
be out today, cutting seaweed?¹²

Note the *kefu mo kamo* 今日毛可母 phrase in the middle of the poem, which I translated as ‘today once again’. In this line 今日 is read semantically as *kefu* (modern *kyō*) and 毛可母 is read phonetically as *mo kamo*. That 毛 can be read as *mo* is not surprising, given the visual similarity to the corresponding hiragana も. Indeed, its derivation through *hentaigana* 変体仮名 is given in Figure 1.

However, in this sentence, 母 is also read as *mo*. While uncommon, this reading is still used today, e.g. in *unmo* 雲母. Here, we have two completely different and unrelated ways of writing the phonetic *mo* under *man'yōgana*. And this is not an isolated incident either: the option to use multiple different kanji for a single sound is extremely prevalent within *man'yōgana*. A 2003 article on *man'yōgana* by Tomasz Majtczak lists some 1,020 kanji and their phonetic readings, which puts the average number of kanji per kana at just over twenty.¹³

With the above in mind, we can start to see how origins work under the replicative mode of copying. Ultimately, the systems of writing known to us as kanji and kana have survived through time as copies of their individual acts of

¹¹ Original text and *kundoku* reading are taken from an online source: “Man’yōshū Dai 1 Kan 41 Banka 万葉集 第1卷 41 番歌.”

¹² Translation mine, with the aid of the reading notes in the aforementioned online source and Pierson, *The Manyōsū*, 1:152–53. To my knowledge, Tōshi refers to a region to the southeast of Nara.

¹³ Majtczak, “Man’yōgana 万葉仮名.” As Majtczak himself notes, many of these readings are quite rare, and nowhere close to all 1,020 readings will be encountered within a single text.

reading and writing. Inevitably, variation sets in.¹⁴ Not only does the way in which one writes a single character vary over a single lifetime—mostly insignificantly—but systems of writing must be transmitted through direct instruction as well. This is what I mean when I say that kana, and all characters and modes of writing really, exist as a series of copies. Regardless of whether or not we agree on the exact derivation posited in Figure 1, we can see that each kana has a respective ‘origin kanji’. 毛 led to も, and 母 did not. Neither did 聞, 問, 文, 目 or about ten other kanji. 毛 is the origin of the series of acts of reading and writing that lead to も, and the historical alternatives are not, even if some of them do have *hentaigana* read as *mo*.

However, my point is the following: it is only from our current day vantage point that we can see 毛 as an origin of も. This is not just because in the Nara period multiple kanji were usable for the phonetic *mo*. Rather, the kanji read as *mo* could neither be actual nor abortive precursors to も, as the entire hiragana and katakana system did not exist yet. It is only after countless repetitions, that at some point retroactively ceased to be repetitions and instead became the transformation of *man'yōgana* into *hentaigana* and the eventual orthographical reforms of the nineteenth and twentieth century—only after all that, does a copy-origin relation come into view between 毛 and も. As an origin of も, 毛 does not inform the meaning of the kana in the same way origins do under the representational mode of copying. If anything, the ‘initial Nara period’ meaning of 毛 is retroactively modified to now ‘also’ be an origin of a kana spun into existence centuries later. To put it differently yet

¹⁴ Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, 16. “But now we must mention an important property of any copying process: it is not perfect. Mistakes will happen. ... All scribes, however careful, are bound to make a few errors, and some are not above a little wilful ‘improvement’. If they all copied from a single master original, meaning would not be greatly perverted. But let copies be made from other copies, which in their turn were made from other copies, and errors will start to become cumulative and serious. ... I suppose the scholars of the Septuagint could at least be said to have started something big when they mistranslated the Hebrew word for ‘young woman’ into the Greek word for ‘virgin’, coming up with the prophecy: ‘Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son ...’”

again, in the reproductive mode of copying, origins are part of the meaning inherent to a series of copies, not the source of that meaning.¹⁵

The previous sentence bears repeating: under reproduction, meaning (or identity) is inherent to a series of copies. It is not something provided by an external source.¹⁶ The upshot to this statement is enormous. It means that identity is not static and cannot be made so.¹⁷ In the above example, what the word ‘kana’ means and for that matter what a kana is, changed from a mode of reading kanji, to a cursive writing style reserved for phonetic readings of kanji, to a self-sufficient system of phonetic symbols.¹⁸ What a kana is, is itself mutable in time. This applies to anything that exists under the reproductive mode of copying—that exists as replication.¹⁹

Method of this thesis

How did representation and reproduction relate to the present thesis again? I will argue over the course of the second and third chapter of this thesis that the representational mode of copying can be found in the *Shōsetsu shinzui* and

¹⁵ Oudemans, *Echte Filosofie*, 157. “Eigenaardig binnen de vermenigvuldiging is dat latere varianten invloed hebben op de betekenis van eerdere. De toekomst beslist telkens opnieuw over wat een replicator nu is.”

¹⁶ Oudemans, 144. “Wat is de *wonderbare* vermenigvuldiging? Dat er een *verband* is tussen de vermenigvuldigers, dat de mogelijkheid geeft om ze hetzelfde te noemen, terwijl er geen *idea* is om ze te verenigen. Dit verband is een *behoud*, dat speelt tussen de verschillende instanties die samen hetzelfde heten.”

¹⁷ Oudemans, 158. “Er zijn miljarden varianten en er is maar één de voorouder van latere succesverhalen – maar één mitochondrische Eva. Wat de voorouder is weet je niet van tevoren, maar pas achteraf. Dus je weet nooit wat de betekenis van A is en waarom. Variatie is niet alleen maar: gebeurtenis x volgt op gebeurtenis y, maar is een constante verandering van wat x en y *zijn qua betekenis*.”

¹⁸ By self-sufficient, I mean that knowledge of kanji is not needed to understand kana. Indeed, new learners of Japanese will invariably start by learning the kana and then move on to kanji, which is categorically impossible under *man’yōgana* and impractical under *hentaigana*.

¹⁹ Oudemans, *Echte Filosofie*, 139. “In de epoche van de metafysica was een ding een zelfstandige drager van eigenschappen. Dat is de grammatica van subject en eigenschappen die zich herhaalt in de grammatica zelf – die van subject en predikaat. In de bestaanswijze van de vermenigvuldiging ligt dit anders. Het veelvuldige vermenigvuldigt zichzelf. Er is geen onderliggend subjectum dat de eenheid van het ding vormt. Alleen binnen de vermenigvuldiging komt de eenheid ervan op. Maar die is veranderlijk en gebroken.”

Shōsetsu sōron, whereas the reproductive mode is found in the *Bungakuron*. Note that this must be distinguished sharply from the notion that the authors of these respective texts have opinions on how ‘copying’ is to be understood, which I would then compare or judge for their quality of argumentation, etc. Rather, I simply hold that *mōsha* and *mōgi* mean one thing in the *Shinzui* and *Sōron* and *mōgi* and *mōhō* mean another in the *Bungakuron*. *Mōgi* is the common thread between these texts, but *mōsha* and *mōhō* are treated as full synonyms.

How do I intend to show what *mōsha*, *mōgi* and *mōhō* mean? By examining passages in which these words appear, which I will use to both explain the argument of their respective texts and to map the terms which with they are connected.²⁰ For the representational mode of copying, we will find plenty of reference to ‘reality’ or ‘life as it is’, which must then be ‘approached’, ‘reflected’, ‘imitated’, and so on. By contrast, the reproductive mode of copying finds *mōgi* and *mōhō* surrounded by ‘practicality’, ‘competition’, ‘variation’ and survival. This is the vocabulary of Darwinism.²¹

II. Shōyō and Futabatei

In this chapter I discuss two seminal essays of early Japanese literary theory: Tsubouchi Shōyō’s 1885 *Shōsetsu shinzui* and Futabatei Shimei’s 1886 *Shōsetsu sōron*.²² Of the two the *Shinzui* is by far the longer. Furthermore, the *Shinzui* is a staple of Japanese literary history, to the degree that it is already mentioned in the pioneering 1899 *A History of Japanese Literature* by William Aston, where Shōyō is considered a “principal promoter of the new

²⁰ Heidegger, *Der Satz Vom Grund*, 166–67.

²¹ Oudemans, *Echte Filosofie*, 136. “De betekenis van het darwinisme is in eerste instantie: inzicht in het leven als vermenigvuldiging en de plaats van selectie daarbinnen. Maar deze betekenis reikt verder en ligt ergens anders. Een heel ander voorval greep plaats, waaraan Darwin beantwoordde, namelijk een omwenteling in de zin van *identiteit*.”

²² For both texts I will be using volume 1 of the *Gendai nihon bungaku zenshū* (or GNBZ), which includes both works. It is listed in the bibliography under ‘Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, *Tsubouchi Shōyō, Futabatei Shimei Shū*.’

movement” in literature, a mere fourteen years after the *Shinzui*’s publication.²³

The *Sōron*, by contrast, is mostly treated as a derivative or lesser version of the *Shinzui*. For example, in *Dawn to the West*, Donald Keene’s massive two-volume overview of Japan’s literature past 1868, there is a single chapter devoted to Shōyō and Futabatei. Shōyō’s *Shinzui* features prominently in said chapter, whereas Futabatei’s *Sōron* is only mentioned in passing. The inverse holds true for their literary output.²⁴ While both Shōyō and Futabatei were novelists, it has become something of a commonplace to say Shōyō laid the plans for the modern Japanese novel in the *Shinzui*, while Futabatei was the first to successfully write one in the 1887 novel *Ukigumo* 浮雲.²⁵

In the introduction, I contrasted two types of copying. According to Dennis Washburn, the use of *mogi* and *mosha* in the *Shinzui* and *Sōron* “suggests mimesis, not reproduction”.²⁶ I understand ‘mimesis’ to mean the same as my use of the word ‘representation’. In this chapter, I argue Washburn’s claim holds true for both the *Shinzui* and the *Sōron* based on a reading of both texts. We start with the *Sōron*, which only contains use of the word *mosha* and not *mogi*. Due to its brevity, it is however more condensed in its representational use of *mosha*. In the *Shinzui*, we will find *mosha* and *mogi* to be synonyms, both being used representationally.

Futabatei Shimei’s *Shōsetsu sōron*

At the start of his writing career, shortly after graduating university, Futabatei Shimei came into contact with Tsubouchi Shōyō and published a short essay titled *Shōsetsu sōron* 小説総論 (“Elements of the novel”) in 1886. In a sense, the *Sōron* can be seen an attempt to emulate Shōyō’s *Shinzui*, which had been

²³ Aston, *A History of Japanese Literature*, 386. Regarding the status of the *Shinzui* and *Sōron* as radically new starting points of modern Japanese literature, see e.g. Keene, *Dawn to the West: Japanese Literature of the Modern Era*, 97, Washburn, *The Dilemma of the Modern*, 80, Mostow et al., *The Columbia Companion to East Asian Literature*, 62.

²⁴ Keene, *Dawn to the West. Japanese Literature in the Modern Era*, Fiction:96–118.

²⁵ Ueda, “Bungakuron and ‘Literature’ in the Making,” 27.

²⁶ Washburn, *The Dilemma of the Modern*, 103.

published the previous year and garnered Shōyō some amount of fame.²⁷ Like Shōyō, Futabatei sought to define what a novel is, but compared to the *Shinzui*, Futabatei does not mention *mogi*. *Mosha* does not appear until the second to last paragraph of the essay. From that point onward, it dominates the text, appearing in virtually every sentence.

However, this does not mean that what I have called in the introduction a ‘representational mode of copying’ is absent for the majority of the *Sōron*. In the first few paragraphs, Futabatei is occupied with setting up a distinction between what he calls ‘form’ (*kata* 形, glossed *fōmu* フホーム) and ‘idea’ (*i* 意, glossed *aidea* アイデア). In a previous essay on the *Sōron*, I argued this distinction is to be understood as the Platonic difference between a thing as it is presented to the senses (form) and its imperceptible, unchanging identity (idea). In a sense, this too can be seen as representational copying: the form takes its identity from its derivation from the idea. However, Futabatei does not use *mosha* to refer to this relationship, so my application of this sense of copying is speculative at best.

After explaining the form-idea dichotomy, Futabatei moves to the question of how these metaphysical ideas, which are not given through perception, can nonetheless be known by man and transmitted to others through literature. His answer to this question is ‘inspiration’ (*kandō* 感動, glossed *insupire-shon* インスピレーション). The point of *mosha* literature, according to Futabatei, is to effect this kind of ‘inspiration’. To wit, this means the novel is to present a copy (*mosha*) of sensible ‘forms’ in such an arrangement that it ‘inspires’ the reader to reach the ‘idea’ that the author is seeking to relate. This arrangement of forms is a plot (*kyakushoku no moyō* 脚色の模様).²⁸ In other words, there is a hierarchical relationship going from idea, to form, to text, which an author of literature is to trace in reverse order. This idea is represented schematically in Figure 2.

²⁷ Mostow et al., *The Columbia Companion to East Asian Literature*, 63–64.

²⁸ Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, *Tsubouchi Shōyō, Futabatei Shimei Shū*, 379.




Figure 2. Relation of text, form and idea as it is recommended the author follow in the Shōsetsu sōron.

At first glance, only the relation of text to form is described by the word *mosha*. However, we will soon see that while Futabatei technically has a different name for the form-idea relation, i.e. ‘plot’, it is fundamentally an instantiation of *mosha* all the same.

In the final paragraph of the essay, Futabatei speaks of the difficulties in writing *mosha* novels:

Given that all this is named with a single word, *mosha*, how could it be anything but a simple matter? Take, for example the calligraphy of Xizhi. Even if one is of a mind to copy it, the actual brushwork is difficult. And if some two-bit artist were to trace a painting of Kanaoka, to transmit its divinity is difficult.²⁹ The same applies to composing a novel. To duplicate the forms of this transient world is not even a simple matter, not to mention its ideas. Duplicating only this transient world’s forms while not duplicating its ideas makes for an unskilled work. Duplicating its forms and ideas wholesale makes for a skilled work. Duplicating its forms and ideas wholesale and true to life makes for a masterpiece. To judge on the presence, existence and skilful development of an idea—which is to say whether it has been thought through logically and is symbolic for reality—to judge a novel’s value thusly is precisely the task of a critic.³⁰

²⁹ Futabatei is referring to two artists: Wang Xizhi 王羲之, a Chinese calligrapher who lived from 303 to 361 AD during the Jin dynasty, and Kose no Kanaoka 巨勢金岡, a Japanese painter from the early Heian period.

³⁰ Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, *Tsubouchi Shōyō, Futabatei Shimei Shū*, 379. “夫れ一口に摸写と曰うと雖も豈容易の事ならんや。羲之ぎしの書をデモ書家が真似しとて其筆意を取らんは難く、金岡の画を三文画師が引写にしたればとて其神を伝はんは難し。小説を編むも同じ事也。浮世の形を写すさえ容易なことではなきものを況まし

Let us analyse Futabatei's use of the word *mosha*. What kind of language is used in the passage above? Futabatei speaks of:

- imitation, *mane* 真似,
- tracing, *hikiutsushi* 引写,
- duplication, *utsushi* 写し,
- perfection, *zenbi* 全備,
- true to life, *ikitaru gotoki mono* 活たる如きもの and
- symbolic for reality, *genjitsu ni shirushi* 現実に徴し.

Semantically, all of these terms operate according to what I have defined as the representational mode of copying. Each refers to an external item which is used as an original, and their meaning exists as a derivative thereof. Imitations (*mane*) need things worth imitating and a tracing (*hikiutsushi*) requires an original drawing. Perfection (*zenbi*) can only be attained if there is an ideal to be met and a description can only be true to life (*ikitaru gotoki*) if there is an 'actual' life to be true to.

There is more to be gleaned from these two passages. In Figure 2, I portrayed the relation between text, 'form' and 'idea' as consisting of two separate movements: *mosha* between text and 'form', and 'plot' between 'form' and 'idea'. Here, we find both form and idea are subject to *mosha*: for an at least passable work, both must be perfectly duplicated into text (*utsushite ikei wo zenbi suru* 写して意形を全備する). This means that the representational mode of copying encompasses both terms, and plot is but a mode in which forms *mosha* ideas,

In summary, while not always explicitly mentioned, representational copying, most strikingly represented by the term *mosha*, is structural to Futabatei's text.

てや其の意をや。浮世の形のみを写して其意を写さざるものは下手の作なり。写して意形を全備するものは上手の作なり。意形を全備して活たる如きものは名人の作なり。蓋し意の有無と其発達の功拙とを察し、之を論理に考え之を事実に徴し、以て小説の直段を定むるは是れ批評家の当に力むべき所たり。” For the sake of convenience I use modern orthography for these citations, which at times contradicts the *Gendai nihon bungaku zenshū* edition, e.g. *mosha* 模写 in my quotation vs. 模寫 in the *GNBZ*.

Washburn's thesis that *mosha* is to be read as 'mimesis, not reproduction', which I understand representationally, seems correct. We move on to Shōyō's *Shōsetsu shinzui* to observe the same in his use of *mosha* and *mogi*.

Tsubouchi Shōyō's *Shōsetsu shinzui*

Tsubouchi Shōyō's attempts to understand realism in literature in the 1885 book-length essay *Essence of the Novel* (*Shōsetsu shinzui*) revolve around the term *mosha*. In the following section, I will focus on the use of *mosha* and *mogi* in the second, third and fourth chapters of the first book of the *Shinzui*. They are titled "Transformation of the Novel", "Subject of the Novel" and "Types of Novel", respectively (*Shōsetsu no henshen* 小説の変遷, *Shōsetsu no shugan* 小説の主眼 and *Shōsetsu no shurui* 小説の種類).

The *Shinzui* is commonly taken as a starting point for histories of modern Japanese literature, and multiple scholars have commented on the novelty of Shōyō's approach. In *The Development of Realism in the Fiction of Tsubouchi Shōyō*, Marleigh Ryan takes Shōyō to be the father of literary criticism in Japan.³¹ Although Shōyō, according to Ryan, did not meet his own critical standards in his novels, he was still the first in Meiji Japan to articulate that literature should aim to explicate psychological aspects of human life.³² Ryan is referring here to Shōyō's treatment of *ninjō* 人情, which Keene translates as 'human emotions' and is taken to be the principal aim of the novel in the *Shinzui*.³³

This interpretation stems from an oft-quoted line from the third chapter of the *Shinzui*: "the topic of the novel is human emotion (*ninjō* 人情), followed by the state of society and modes of behaviour (*setai fūzoku* 世態風俗)."³⁴ It is debatable whether 'human emotion' and the unwieldy 'state of society and modes of behaviour' are fitting translations for *ninjō* and *setai fūzoku*. In the 1982 book *The Reform of Fiction in Meiji Japan*, Peter Kornicki opposes the

³¹ Ryan, *The Development of Realism in the Fiction of Tsubouchi Shōyō*, 17.

³² Ryan, 20–21.

³³ Keene, *Dawn to the West. Japanese Literature in the Modern Era*, Fiction:103.

³⁴ Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, *Tsubouchi Shōyō, Futabatei Shimei Shū*, 91. "小説の主眼は人情なり、世態風俗これに次ぐ。" As with Futabatei, modern orthography is used for the sake of convenience.

view that *ninjō* refers to psychological aspects of mankind and *mosha* to ‘realism’.

Kornicki claims “there has been a tendency to interpret [Shōyō’s terms] in twentieth-century senses.”³⁵ According to Kornicki, Shōyō’s use of *ninjō* is however more in line with that of late Edo period *gesaku* authors such as Tamenaga Shunsui 為永春水 (1790-1844). Accordingly, Kornicki argues *ninjō* should be read in the *Shinzui* as referring to ‘passions’, which are to be understood as “emotions in their external manifestations rather than ... nuances of character or mental processes”.³⁶ For our present purposes however, the exact meaning of *ninjō* (and by extension *setai* as well) is inconsequential, for we are interested in Shōyō’s use of *mosha* and *mogi*.

Kornicki harbors similar suspicions towards ‘modern’ readings of *mosha* as he does towards those of *ninjō*. According to Kornicki, *mosha* “was new to the language of literary criticism”³⁷, but he claims the term was not particularly influential in shaping literary discourse immediately following publication of the *Shinzui*. Furthermore, Kornicki states the *Shinzui* was only sparingly cited between 1885 and 1890. He warns not to read *mosha* as “modern realism or naturalism”, referring to several sources which claim the *shinzui* enjoys its ‘foundational’ status mainly because it was considered as such by the naturalist school, who were the first to write a history of Meiji literature.³⁸

Be that as it may, Kornicki does not propose an alternative reading for *mosha* in the same way he does for *ninjō*. Rather, he considers Shōyō’s ‘realism’ to be in line with modes of description already available in the Edo period. It was, according to Kornicki, in “codifying and justifying a rationale for the novel” where the achievements of the *Shinzui* are to be sought.³⁹ In other words: Shōyō found the ‘correct’ set of names (*ninjō*, *setai*, *mosha*) for

³⁵ Kornicki, *The Reform of Fiction in Meiji Japan*, 26.

³⁶ Kornicki, 28.

³⁷ Kornicki, 34.

³⁸ Kornicki, 34–36.

³⁹ Kornicki, 34.

describing modern literature, although those words may speak to us differently than they did to Shōyō.

In the following paragraphs I will therefore argue that *mosha* and *mogi* are both to be read as ‘representational copy’ on the basis of the use of the term in several passages in the *Shinzui*. This means that I will provide translations of these passages with *mosha* and *mogi* left untranslated. From there, I analyse what words and types of language Shōyō uses surrounding *mosha* or *mogi*. We will find two commonalities to the citations I discuss. First, Shōyō speaks in terms of ‘construction’ and ‘fiction’ on the one hand and ‘reality’ on the other. It is the latter category, of reality, which Shōyō argues is the matter *mosha* novels are made of. Second, in order to attain this mode of ‘writing realistically’ the would-be author of literature is advised restraint at multiple occasions. For Shōyō, writing involves the possibility of creating fabrications of all sorts, only some of which are true to life. We will find it is knowledge of reality that allows the writer to discern what is and is not realistic.

Shōyō first speaks of *mosha* in the third chapter of the *Shinzui*:

Therefore, the writer of a novel should focus entirely on psychology. As soon as the characters he constructs emerge for the first time in his story, he should regard them as real-life humans, and when describing their feelings, he should absolutely not be constructing those with his own ideas of good and evil in mind. Rather, he should simply observe and *mosha* things as they are through his knowledge thereof.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, *Tsubouchi Shōyō, Futabatei Shimei Shū*, 92. “されば小説の作者たる者は専ら其意を心理に注ぎて、我が仮作たる人物なりとも、一度篇中にいでたる以上は、之れを活世界の人と見做して、其感情を写しいだすに、敢ておのれの意匠をもて善悪邪正の情感を作り設くることをばなさず、只傍観してありのままに摸写する心得にてあるべきなり。” For the sake of convenience I have translated 心理 as ‘psychology’ and rendered both 感情 and 情感 ‘feelings’. As mentioned in the main text, Peter Kornicki objects to the ‘psychology’ translation. Personally, I think there is significant merit to Kornicki’s argument, but the entire question of how to translate the *ninjō* cluster of words is irrelevant to the point at hand.

This fragment is structured as follows: the author of a *shōsetsu* is to avoid one course of action (*aete ... nasazu* 敢て...なさず) and instead restrict himself to another (*tada ... arubeki* 只...あるべき). The mode of writing which Shōyō discourages is characterized as a type of ‘construction’ where the author’s own sentiments come into play (*onore no ishō wo mote ... tsukurimoukuru* おのれの意匠をもて...作り設くる).

Mosha is in this paragraph defined in contradistinction to the aforementioned construction. One synonym is given: ‘description’ (*utsushi idasu* 写しいだす). This ‘description’ is explained in empiricist terms. The *mosha* author should ‘regard’ (*minasu* 見做す) his constructed characters as though they were ‘real-life humans’ (*katsusekai no hito* 活世界の人) and ‘observe’ (*bōkan* 傍観) ‘the way things are’ (*ari no mama* ありのまま).

Although Shōyō only remarks on this as an aside, for him ‘the way things are’ is not immediately accessible either. One can only observe and *mosha* the way things are by means of ‘knowledge’ thereof (*kokoroe nite* 心得にて). This mention of ‘knowledge’ is not expanded upon in the third chapter. According to Washburn, Shōyō assigns epistemic qualities to the novel in the fourth chapter.⁴¹ While neither Washburn nor Shōyō explicates the underlying mechanism, I hypothesize it works as follows. The author is expected to gain knowledge of how things work in reality, of psychological mechanisms, social dynamics—basically, of the things Shōyō claims are copied in literature. This allows the author to distinguish pure fabrication from proper *mosha* of ‘reality as-is’ and apply the restriction that Shōyō advocates for.

This insistence on constraint is echoed later on in the third chapter:

If the character is a morally good person, for example a *jitsugotoshi*,⁴² the author must do his utmost to only *mosha* those feelings that the *jitsugotoshi* would feel from time to time. And if the character were of

⁴¹ Washburn, *The Dilemma of the Modern*, 89–90. See e.g. Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, *Tsubouchi Shōyō, Futabatei Shimei Shū*, 96.

⁴² According to Shōriya Aragorō’s “Kabuki Glossary”, a *jitsugotoshi* 実事師 is a specific *kabuki* role, described as a “wise, righteous and clever man”.

an evil stock, the author should reflect only feelings of a heart enveloped in wickedness.⁴³

Here, a restraint is repeated twice: the author should only (*nomi* のみ) *mosha* feelings appropriate to the character in question. For Shōyō, to write in a way that can be called *mosha* involves constraining writing in order to produce a text that seems as though it describes a real, living human being. And again, in chapter four, “Types of Novel”, Shōyō’s emphasis on restriction is repeated:

The *mosha* novel is something completely different in quality from the so-called ‘didactic novel’. It has no goal outside of describing the state of society, and when fictionalizing characters or constructing a plot, it adheres to the subject of the novel stated before: to solely make characters and strictly bring to life settings which are devoid of fictionality. It is something that tries to make its writing approach reality.⁴⁴

In effect, this definition is a repetition of the one found in the third chapter. ‘Description’ (*utsushi’idasu*) is again given as a synonym for *mosha*. The author is to ‘make his constructions approach reality’ (*shin ni semarashimu* 真に逼らしむ), which is to say they should be ‘devoid of fictionality’ (*kakū* 架空).

⁴³ Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, *Tsubouchi Shōyō, Futabatei Shimei Shū*, 93. “もし人物が善人にて、所謂実事師といふ者ならむか、作者は力めて実事師が其折々に感じつべき感情をのみ摸写しいだし、もし人物が悪質なりせば、邪曲し心に抱きつべき感情をのみ写すべきなり。” I have translated *utsusu* 写す as ‘to reflect’. It may be argued that in doing so I am taking something of an advance on my thesis that *mosha* is to be translated as ‘representation’, given that the 写 kanji in 写す is of course part of *mosha* 模写. However, these fragments become increasingly illegible the more Japanese I leave untranslated, and my point is to emphasize the restrictive character of *mosha* anyway.

⁴⁴ Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, 96. “摸写小説は所謂勸懲とは全く性質を異にしたる物にて、其主意は偏へに世態をば写しいだすに外ならざるなりされば人物を仮作するにも、又其脚色を設くるにも、前に述べたる主眼を体して、只管架空の人物として、架空界裡に活動せしめて、真に逼らしめむと力むる者なり。” I have translated *kakū* 架空 as ‘devoid of fictionality’ based on the frequent use of *kasaku* 仮作 as ‘fiction’ in chapters two and three.

Turning to the use of *mogi*, we find that the phrase ‘approaching reality’ (*shin ni semaru*) is used in the context of that word as well, both in the second and third chapter. In chapter two, Shōyō speaks of realism in theatre. According to Shōyō, changes in societal mores can cause behaviour depicted in theatre to seem outlandish to later generations. In other words, what were once realistic characters, may at some point in time no longer be so. To prevent a theatrical piece from depreciating quickly, strict imitation is not advised:

Instead of approaching reality, which is a quality of theatre, it went beyond reality. To put it differently, it did not *mogi* a thing as it itself is in reality as its guideline. Rather, it took as its main purpose the imitation of a fabrication based on a thing as it is in reality. For example, whether it be a tryst or a battlefield we *mogi*, if it does not resemble the thing as it is in reality, we may call it a clumsy work. Yet if it does not differ from the thing as it is in reality at all, it is equally uninteresting.⁴⁵

Here, ‘reality’ (*shin* 真) is invoked frequently, initially as something to ‘approach’ (*shin ni semaru*). Next, we find it as ‘the way a thing is in reality’ (*shinbutsu* 真物), which is the target of *mogi* or ‘imitation’ (*gi su* 擬す). When *mogi* is performed with regards to a ‘thing as it is in reality’, the *mogi* can either ‘resemble’ (*niru* 似る) or ‘differ’ (*kotonaru* 異なる). In summary: *mogi* denotes the relation between a copy and an original of stable and independent identity. In Shōyō’s view, strict imitation may not make for riveting theatrics—so he does not advocate it—but it is the way in which *mogi* is conceived that we are interested in here.

In chapter three as well, Shōyō speaks of the end point of *mogi* as ‘being made to approach reality’ (*shin ni semarashimu*):

⁴⁵ Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, 88. “夫れ演劇の性質たる真に逼るべきものにあらず、寧ろ真に越えつべきものなり。語を換へて之れをいへば、真物それみづからを摸擬することを其主脳とはなすにあらず、真物並びに或物を擬するを主眼となすものなり。例へば、一条の情事を演じ、一場の鬪戦を摸擬するにも、真物に似ざるはもとより拙しといへども、真物に異ならざるもまた興なし。”

As I have also stated previously, fundamentally the novel belongs to the arts. Yet there are considerable differences between it and poetry and drama. For example, poetry does not necessarily take *mogi* for its main purpose, whereas the novel will always build its entire foundation out of *mogi*. It will *mogi* human emotion and it will *mogi* the state of society. Indeed, the novel is devoted entirely to making its *mogi* approach reality as much as possible.⁴⁶

Like *mosha*, *mogi* is applied to the copying of ‘human emotion and the state of society’ (*ninjō wo mogi shi setai wo mogi shi* 人情を摸擬し世態を摸擬し). As stated in the introduction to this section, these are two main subjects of the novel for Shōyō. I therefore take *mogi* and *mosha* to be full synonyms in the *Shinzui*.

Like Futabatei, Shōyō expresses a straightforward schema of literature copying an external reality. In order to prevent his fabrications from running wild, the author is to gain knowledge of life and the world around him so that his characters can be ‘true to life’, ‘approach reality’, ‘resemble the way a thing is in reality’ and ‘reflect the way things are’. Although Shōyō is not preoccupied with metaphysical trappings in the same way Futabatei is, they consistently speak the language of what I call the representational mode of copying.

Underlying both the *Shinzui* and the *Sōron* is the idea of a readily accessible reality which can be objectively known and transmitted by an author of literature. While this external reality is unchanging for Futabatei (idea) yet social standards are fluctuating in time for Shōyō (*setai*) they share the basic assumption that there is an immutable mode of access to the world ‘out there’. This access is named by the words *mogi* and *mosha* in the two essays discussed in this chapter. In the following chapter, I will discuss the *Bungakuron*, where we will find that man’s access to the external world in

⁴⁶ Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, 93. “前にも已に述べたりし如く、もと小説は美術にして詩歌、伝奇と異なる所尠からず。例へば、詩歌は必ずしも摸擬を主眼となさざれども、小説は常に摸擬を以て其全体の根柢となし、人情を摸擬し世態を摸擬し、ひたすら摸擬する所のものをば真に逼らしめむと力むるものたり。”

perception and thought is subject to change over time, based on Sōseki's use of the words *mogi* and *mohō*.

III. *Bungakuron*

Before devoting his life to literature, Natsume Sōseki was a school teacher in English, went to England on a government stipend and taught at Tokyo Imperial University. At university, Sōseki lectured on the 'content of literature' (*bungakuteki naiyō* 文学的内容) between 1903 and 1905.⁴⁷ After leaving the university to become a literary critic for the *Asahi* newspaper, Sōseki compiled these lectures into the *Bungakuron* text as it is available today. According to the preface, the text aims ask what literature is and to determine its psychological and social necessity:

I believed it a measure akin to washing blood with blood to read works of literature so that I may come to know what literature is. I swore to pursue to its very end what psychological necessity there is to literature, as it is born into this world, develops and degenerates. I swore to pursue to its very end what social necessity there is to literature, as it exists, rises and declines.⁴⁸

Outside of Japan, interest in this work has been virtually non-existent, and inside Japan it is discussed only among scholars of Japan's literary history.⁴⁹ In Keene's *Dawn to the West* the *Bungakuron* is only mentioned in passing.⁵⁰ Miyoshi Masao's *Accomplices of Silence* devotes just under four pages to Sōseki's non-literary works.⁵¹ The only twentieth-century Western work to

⁴⁷ Although I translate *naiyō* as 'content', Thomas Lamarre argues 'substance' is a more fitting translation. This is because *bungakuteki naiyō* is here opposed to *bungakuteki keishiki* 文学的形式 or 'literary form', which is the subject of Sōseki's lectures preceding those bundled in the *Bungakuron*. (Lamarre, "Expanded Empiricism: Natsume Sōseki with William James," 49.)

⁴⁸ Natsume, *Bungakuron*, 9. "文学書を読んで文学の如何なるものなるかを知らんとするは血を以て血洗ふが如き手段たるを信じたればなり。余は心理的に文学は如何なる必要あつて、此世に生れ、発達し、頽廢するかを極めんと誓へり。余は社会的に文学は如何なる必要あつて、存在し、隆興し、衰滅するかを究めんと誓へり。"

⁴⁹ Matsui, *Natsume Sōseki as a Critic of English Literature*, 142–43.

⁵⁰ Keene, *Dawn to the West. Japanese Literature in the Modern Era*, Fiction:311–12.

⁵¹ Miyoshi, *Accomplices of Silence. The Modern Japanese Novel*, 58–61.

cover Sōseki's theoretical efforts substantially and in-depth is the 1975 study *Natsume Sōseki as a Critic of English Literature* by Matsui Sakuko. The only notable exception to the general indifference towards the *Bungakuron* among Western scholars has been a recent and very short-lived burst of interest around 2008, which I will discuss at the end of this chapter.

There are several reasons for the lack of academic interest in the *Bungakuron*. For one, it was published at a point in time when there was no real need for it to exist.⁵² Unlike the *Bungakuron*, literary theory written in the first decades of the Meiji period served a very real purpose: to establish in Japanese the vocabulary and syntax needed to write modern literature.⁵³ In the standard view of the development of Meiji literature this process had already come to an end in 1905.⁵⁴ By that point, the modern novel was ready to be written in Japanese.

Furthermore, the *Bungakuron* is quite resistant to interpretation. While its preface is highly personal and describes Sōseki's anguished stay in England, the tone of the main text tends towards the dry and scientific. In the earlier chapters in particular, multiple references are made to works from the newly minted scientific field of psychology, such as Conwy Lloyd Morgan's *Introduction to comparative psychology* (1894) and Edward Scripture's *The New Psychology* (1897).⁵⁵ The main text features an obscure investigation into the 'content of literature'. This 'content' takes the form of two aspects or elements of the 'focal point' (*shōten* 焦点) of the 'mental waveform' (*shinteki*

⁵² Karatani, *Nihon kindai bungaku no kigen*, 5. “漱石の序文は『文学論』が当時の読者にとって奇妙なものにうつらざるをえないことを意識している。…それは突然に咲いた花であり、したがって、種を残すこともなかったのである。”

⁵³ Ryan, *The Development of Realism in the Fiction of Tsubouchi Shōyō*, 22. “Where were the words for intimate conversations to come from? Where were they to find the language of the interior monologue, early recognized as a crucial technique for motivational literature? ... Tsubouchi struggled with this problem, as did others in the late eighties, until eventually a solution was reached, a solution that involved inventing a new language for expressing ideas never before articulated, and perhaps never before thought.”

⁵⁴ Shirane, “Issues in Canon Formation,” 6.

⁵⁵ Natsume, *Bungakuron*, 30.

hakei 心的波形) that is ‘consciousness’ (*ishiki* 意識).⁵⁶ Together, these two ‘focal point aspects’ are referred to in a cryptic formula ‘(F+f)’ that frequently pops up in the earlier parts of the *Bungakuron*. A recurring problem in literature on the *Bungakuron* is what to make of this jumble of foci, aspects and waveforms.

In the first half of this chapter, we will read the fifth book of the *Bungakuron* with regards to its use of *mogi* and its synonym *mohō*, which I argue are to be read in a ‘reproductive sense’. We then interpret the first and second chapters and their terminology, arriving at a reading of ‘focal point F’ as the way in which something appears to us, i.e. its identity. After discussing the *Bungakuron* text proper, we will then look at secondary literature about the *Bungakuron* published in English. I will argue that all of the texts under discussion try and fail to deal with the aforementioned ‘focal points’, ‘waveforms’ and ‘(F+f)’ head on. As these terms are on their own mostly incomprehensible, the secondary literature fails to gain access to the *Bungakuron*, which invariably leads interpreters to drawing on some outside source as a frame of reference in order to make sense of the *Bungakuron* itself.

Bungakuron, book 5

Book 5 of the *Bungakuron* is titled “Collective F” (*Shūgōteki F* 集合的 F). As the title suggests, this book is concerned with ‘F’, which Sōseki calls the “literary material drawn from our consciousness”.⁵⁷ In particular, Sōseki looks to “discuss differences in F”.⁵⁸ The *Bungakuron* poses considerable difficulties in interpretation due to the central position assigned to a number of terms revolving around this ‘F’. Our first order of business is therefore to map these terms in their relation to ‘F’. In the opening paragraphs of book 5, before starting the first chapter, Sōseki restates a definition from earlier in the *Bungakuron*: F is a ‘focal point of consciousness’ (*ishiki no shōten* 意識の焦点).⁵⁹ As of yet this is not much of an explanation: currently we do not know

⁵⁶ Natsume, 32–33.

⁵⁷ BGR 418: “吾人は吾人の意識中より文学的材料となり得べきものゝ性質を限りて”

⁵⁸ BGR 418 “吾人は此編に於て F の差違を述べんと欲す。”

⁵⁹ Natsume, *Bungakuron*, 419.

what ‘consciousness’ means in the *Bungakuron*, nor in what way it relates to ‘focal points’.

I believe that significant headway can be made in interpreting the key terms of the *Bungakuron* by looking at Sōseki’s use of *mogi* and *mohō* in book five. It is first mentioned in its first chapter, when distinguishing three types of ‘focal points of consciousness’:

Within a single generation, there are three main types of collective consciousness. These are: *mogi* consciousness, talented consciousness and genial consciousness. And when I speak of ‘consciousness’ at this junction, it should of course mean the focal point of consciousness (i.e. F).⁶⁰

At first glance that Sōseki distinguishes three types of ‘collective consciousness’: *mogi*, talented (*sainō* 才能) and genial (*tensai* 天才). Most of chapter one is devoted to discussing the difference between these three categories. As Sōseki explains later in chapter one, the difference between *mogi* and ‘talented consciousness’ is purely a matter of speed at which they arrive at a given focal point.⁶¹ In fact, there are no hard distinctions between different types whatsoever, and to speak of multiple types is purely for heuristic reasons.⁶² As such, the difference between *mogi* and ‘talent’ will not help us in understanding Sōseki’s use of *mogi*. We will touch on Sōseki’s description of ‘genial consciousness’ at the end of this section.

Returning to *mogi*, Sōseki provides a synonym in the related term ‘imitation’ (*mohō* 模倣) early in chapter one:

What I call *mogi* consciousness is that which is easily directed by external sources. And ‘directed’ means: while moving from A to B, it naturally matches its pace to others’ as well as its course of action. In

⁶⁰ Natsume, 420. “一代に於る集合意識を大別して三とす。模擬的意識、才能的意識、天才意識是なり。こゝに意識と云ふは意識の焦点（即ち F）なる事は言ふを待たず。”

⁶¹ Natsume, 426–28.

⁶² Natsume, 435.

short, it is a consciousness that occurs when imitating (*mohō*) others, in taste, in ideology and in experience. Imitation is like a glue, necessary for the structure of society. Were imitation to be lacking in society, like a heavenly body unguided by gravity, it would scatter into more and more pieces, soon to collapse as a whole.⁶³

Here, Sōseki connects *mogi* to the related term ‘imitation’ (*mohō*), which is listed as a synonym for *mogi* in the index to the *Sōseki zenshū* 漱石全集 edition of the *Bungakuron*.⁶⁴ While I have translated *mohō* as ‘imitation’ in the paragraph above, if we truly take *mohō* to be a synonym for *mogi*, the question of what mode of copying is used by Sōseki applies to both *mogi* and *mohō*. For the remainder of the discussion, I will therefore treat the two terms as interchangeable. Like we did with the *Shinzui* and *Sōron* in the second chapter of this thesis, we glean the meaning of *mogi* and *mohō* from the words surrounding them. *Mohō* applies to other humans (*hoka wo mohō shite* 他を模倣して) and concerns modes of human relation to the world, such as taste (*shikō* 嗜好), ideology (*shugi* 主義) and experience (*keiken* 経験).

Furthermore, *mohō* is claimed to be ‘necessary for the existence of society’ (*shakai wo kōsei suru ni ... hitsuyō naru* 社会を構成するに...必要なる). In the preface to the *Bungakuron*, Sōseki frames the question of what literature is as asking for the social and psychological necessity of the emergence, development and decline of literature.⁶⁵ The reference to ‘heavenly bodies governed by gravity’ seems to imply a mechanical necessity, but later paragraphs clarify it to be pragmatic in nature instead:

⁶³ Natsume, 420. “摸擬的意識とはわが焦点の容易に他に支配せらるゝを云ふ。支配せらるゝとは甲を去つて乙に移るに当つて、自然に他と歩武を齊うし、去就を同じうするの謂に外ならず。要するに嗜好に於て、主義に於て、経験に於て、他を模倣して起るものとす。模倣は社会を構成するに膠油の如く必要なるものなり。もし社会に模倣の一性質を欠かんか、引力の大律に支配せられざる天体の如く、四分し五裂して糝然として須臾に瓦解す。”

⁶⁴ Natsume, I26.

⁶⁵ Natsume, 9. “余は心理的に文学は如何なる必要あつて、此世に生れ発達し、頽廃するかを極めんと誓へり。余は社会的に文学は如何なる必要あつて、存在し、隆興し、衰滅するかを究めんと誓へり”

Therefore, imitation (*mohō*) is necessary. The fact that we live in adult society without continuously courting disaster, is evidence that we adapt our thoughts, conduct and words to this society. ... Therefore we come into this world bearing nature's imperative to imitate (*mohō*) others. And the existence of society more than sufficiently proves to what degree imitation (*mohōsei* 模倣性) operates between individuals.⁶⁶

In summary, we find that *mogi* and *mohō* are ways in which a human being adapts to those around him by copying their ways of relating to the world. He is under the command of nature to do so, which is to say natural selection demands that one adapts (*tekigō* 適合) to the thoughts (*shisō* 思想), conduct (*kōi* 行為) and speech (*kotoba* 言葉) of others. Do note: while not explicit in this paragraph, adaptation presupposes variation. Furthermore, while in Shōyō nature (*shizen* 自然) is an object of copying,⁶⁷ here we find that nature necessitates and therefore encompasses the act of copying instead.

As seen in the previous paragraph, where taste, ideology and experience were imitated, here we find adaptation to target modes of relation to the world. And this adaptation is a condition of possibility for society to exist. Humans imitate one another, lest they court disaster (*fusoku no hen wo ... maneku* 不測の変を...招く). The references to 'nature' and 'pragmatic necessity' are to be understood in a fully Darwinian sense, which is made explicit when Sōseki speaks of this necessity as the 'great principle of the struggle for existence':

The foundation for the uniform provision of this type of quality [of imitation] is the great principle of the struggle for existence. For those who are dealt a substandard hand with regards to this point, will stray

⁶⁶ Natsume, 422. “模倣は斯の如く必要なり。大人の社会に生存して不測の変を常時に招かざるは、其思想、行為、言葉の其社会に適合するを示すものなり。...従つて吾人は他を模倣すべく自然の命を受けて此世に出現す。社会の存在は此模倣性の個人と個人の間如何なる程度に運行しつゝあるかを証明して余りありとす。”

⁶⁷ Tsubouchi, Shōyō and Futabatei, *Tsubouchi Shōyō, Futabatei Shimei Shū*, 93. “恰も他人のやうに思ひて、自然の趣きをのみ写すべきなり。”

from the path of adaptation to society and be met with failure in common interactions with others.⁶⁸

Here, we find *mohō* itself to also be subject to reproduction. After all, it admits variation, meaning that some can be dealt a ‘substandard hand’ (*suijun ika no tempu wo ukuru* 水準以下の天賦を受くる). That this is not encountered in practice and we instead meet with a relatively ‘uniform provision’ (*ichiyō ni ... yū suru* 一様に...有する) is entirely due to the struggle for existence. And this struggle for existence, which is nothing more than a selection among variants on the basis of their costs and benefits in replication, is called ‘foundation for’ (*motodzuku* 基づく) by Sōseki. Note that for Sōseki, a pragmatic reason, i.e. a ratio of costs and benefits, can be called a ‘foundation’. This is emblematic for Darwinian thought, where every foundation or reason for something being the way it is, is ultimately of this ‘pragmatic’ sort, and by extension it is typical of the reproductive mode of copying as well.⁶⁹

Next, we turn to the meaning of ‘focal points of consciousness’ or ‘F’. In the second chapter of the fifth book, Sōseki discusses the mechanisms under which one F succeeds another, or why a specific F arises instead of a different one. Here, when one focal point succeeds another, the first in time is called F and the second is called F’.

As F transitions into F’, a competition must normally occur between numerous ㊦. ㊦ is not the meaning of that which that exists in the

⁶⁸ Natsume, *Bungakuron*, 421. “案ずるに吾人が一様に此種の性質を有するは生存競争の大理法に基づくもの、もし此点に於て水準以下の天賦を受くるときは社会に適合する所以のみちに迷ふて、尋常の他人事に失脚し去るの運命に遭遇す。”

⁶⁹ Oudemans, *Echte Filosofie*, 10. “Filosofen zochten naar de eenheid, de *adaequatio* van denken en weten enerzijds en de wereld anderzijds. Zij verlangden daarvoor bestendigheid van dingen en het menselijk bestaan, vaste fundamenteen en doorzichtigheid. Sinds de tweede mechanische revolutie is deze metafysische, basalten bestaanswijze langzaam vernietigd door die van de vermenigvuldiging. Daarbinnen is de *ratio* van iets niet het fundament ervan, maar het product van een economische calculatie. Kosten en baten worden tegen elkaar afgewogen. Hoe je als mens leeft is getekend door vermenigvuldiging en haar economische ratio – net als de manier waarop je communiceert en nadenkt. Hetzelfde geldt voor de dingen die je tegemoet treden.”

focal point. It names that which exists at the boundaries of consciousness, or in its periphery.⁷⁰

Rounding out my application of what I have thus far called the reproductive sense of copying, we find that F is stated to have the same characteristics: it is mutable in time through variation and selection, i.e. ‘competition, between numerous ㊦’ (*ikuta no ㊦ no kyōsō* 幾多の㊦の競争). Furthermore, this competition between variants, like in the case of the ability of imitation, is decided on pragmatic grounds, based on costs and benefits, i.e. in a Darwinian sense. It is for that reason that while transformation from one F to another is necessary, there is no guarantee for ‘advancement or improvement’ within nature,⁷¹ but merely a succession of struggles for existence.

Lastly, in the quotation above we are given a significant definition of F: ‘a place where meaning is held’. I have stated previously that I hold ‘meaning’ and ‘identity’ to be effectively synonymous. I therefore claim that Sōseki’s theory ultimately revolves around how things appear to us as they are, changing over time and transmitted from one member of society to another, where some arrive at a way of viewing the world earlier than others. The mention of ‘consciousness’ I take to mean that that identity is something that requires human involvement, unlike Futabatei’s brand of Platonism.

Although less explicitly aimed towards ‘focal points’ and ‘F’, the same interpretation is put forward in Karatani Kōjin’s 柄谷行人 *Origins of Modern Japanese Literature* (*Nihon kindai bungaku no kigen* 日本近代文学の起源, hereafter *Origins*).⁷² Furthermore, multiple examples of extremely panoramic

⁷⁰ Natsume, *Bungakuron*, 440. “上の命題はFのF’に推移する場合には普通幾多の㊦の競争を経ざるべからずと変ずるを得。㊦とは焦点に存在するものゝ意味を有せず、識末もしくは識域下にあるものをかね称す。”

⁷¹ Natsume, 453.

⁷² Karatani, *Nihon kindai bungaku no kigen*, 11. “漱石が拒絶したのは、西欧の自己同一性^{アイデンティティ}であった。彼の考えでは、そこには「とりかえ」可能な、組みかえ可能な構造がある。たまたま選びとられた一つの構造が「普遍的なもの」とみなされたとき、歴史は必然的で線的なものにならざるをえない。漱石は西洋文学に対して日本文学を立て、その差違や相対性を主張しているのではない。彼にとっては、日本の文学の自己同一性もまた疑わしい。それは別のものになりえた可能性をもっている。”

‘F’ are given in the *Bungakuron*. By ‘panoramic’ I mean that the example given has a single name, but concerns a large grouping of things that all appear in a singular light, rather than any particular item. Among others, Sōseki mentions boredom experienced during a lecture,⁷³ the Russo-Japanese war and the industrial boom resulting from said war,⁷⁴ as well as Darwin’s theory of evolution.⁷⁵ In all of these cases, there is no single thing that can be pointed to that makes something boring, a war, or evolving. Rather, it is in the light of their identity that they appear as such, and that disparate phenomena can be grouped together in the first place.

In the 2010 work *Sōseki ron* 漱石論 Komori Yōichi remarks that in the very first definition of ‘F’, two contradictory terms are united:

Generally, the content of literature takes the form of (F+f). F means the impression as focal point, that is, as idea⁷⁶

As Komori astutely points out, ‘impression’ (*inshō* 印象) and ‘idea’ (*kannen* 観念) are united by the conjunction ‘that is’ (*mata wa* 又は). ‘Impression’ however refers generally to that which enters the mind from external reality, whereas ‘idea’ on the other hand refers to things inherent to the mental domain. According to Komori, F thereby denotes the connection between the realms of experience and sign.⁷⁷ And as explained in the introduction, this is what I understand by the words ‘identity’ and ‘meaning’: the way a thing is given to us in perception (Komori’s ‘experience’), thought and language (Komori’s ‘sign’).

Notably, the English translation of the fifth book of the *Bungakuron* by Keith Vincent takes a different interpretation. In the first chapter of the book, when speaking of imitator and imitated, Sōseki writes:

⁷³ Natsume, *Bungakuron*, 425.

⁷⁴ Natsume, 426.

⁷⁵ Natsume, 431, 451.

⁷⁶ Natsume, 27. “凡そ文学的内容の形式は (F + f) なることを要す。F は焦点的印象又は観念を意味し”

⁷⁷ Komori, *Sōseki Ron*, 315–16.

Mogisha wo shite mogi seshimen ga tame ni wa, kore ni sono mokuteki taru beki F wo kyōkyū sezaruru bekarazu.

模擬者をして模擬せしめんが為めには、之に其目的たるべき F を供給せざる可からず。⁷⁸

I translate this as:

In order to incite an imitator (*mogisha*) to imitate, he must be provided an F that is to be his target therein.

Vincent has rendered it thus:

In order for the imitator to want to imitate something, he must be provided with an object “F” that is worthy of imitation.⁷⁹

Sōseki simply states the imitator must be “provided an F” (*F wo kyōkyū*). When we turn to Vincent’s translation however, we find the imitator must be “provided with an *object* “F”” (emphasis mine). In my interpretation F is not an object: it is a ‘focal point of consciousness’ or more concretely, the way in which an object appears to us, i.e. its meaning or identity. Vincent does not provide an argumentation for why ‘object’ is inserted. In the next section, we will find that a common theme to secondary literature on the *Bungakuron* is the interpretation of ‘focal points of consciousness’ or ‘F’.

Secondary literature on the *Bungakuron*

The *Bungakuron* re-entered view in western scholarship thanks to the 1993 translation of *Origins of Modern Japanese Literature* (*Nihon kindai bungaku no kigen* 日本近代文学の起源, hereafter *Origins*) originally written by the Japanese philosopher Karatani Kōjin 柄谷行人.⁸⁰ The *Origins* is a collection of six sequential essays, published in book-form in Japan in 1980. Together with fellow philosopher Asada Akira 浅田彰, Karatani came to dominate the ‘postmodern’ style of literary criticism which was in vogue in Japan during the

⁷⁸ Natsume, *Bungakuron*, 423.

⁷⁹ Natsume, *Theory of Literature and Other Critical Writings*, 126.

⁸⁰ Karatani, *Nihon kindai bungaku no kigen*.

last two decades of the twentieth century.⁸¹ Karatani opens the first chapter of the *Origins* by citing the preface to the *Bungakuron*, a hitherto generally ignored work by Sōseki.

The fruits borne from this renewed *Bungakuron* interest have been a 2008 *Japan Forum* issue devoted to the work and a 2009 translation of major parts of the text into English.⁸² Joseph Murphy, contributing editor to this translation, has also published on the *Bungakuron* separately, chiefly in his 2004 book *Metaphorical Circuit*. In *Metaphorical Circuit*, Murphy compares the ‘impressionist’ descriptions in *The Tower of London* to Sōseki’s typing of consciousness as a wave moving from point to point.⁸³ Murphy’s overarching goal is to interpret Sōseki as “rejecting the methodologies of literary criticism” and instead choosing “to approach the matter using the methods of the sciences, specifically psychology and sociology”.⁸⁴ What this means in concrete terms is that Murphy takes several passages from the *Tower* to point out the impressionist style of perception described therein. Murphy then claims this type of perception fits both the ‘model of consciousness’ found in the *Bungakuron* as well as modern day psychology.⁸⁵

I have here neither the space nor the occasion to judge whether Murphy’s comparison of Sōseki’s *Bungakuron* to modern psychology is apt. More to the point, I think following Murphy helps us little in reading the *Bungakuron*. For example, Murphy also comments on Komori’s remark, mentioned above, that Sōseki fits both ‘impression’ (*inshō*) and ‘idea’ (*kannen*) into the singular expression ‘F’. According to Murphy, Komori’s reading is ultimately overstating the matter, because this equation of impression and idea is to be understood as a ‘Berkeleyan frame’.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Abel and Kono, “Translators’ Introduction,” xxi.

⁸² This translation is listed in the bibliography as Natsume, *Theory of Literature and Other Critical Writings*.

⁸³ Murphy, *Metaphorical Circuit*, 24 ff.

⁸⁴ Murphy, 34.

⁸⁵ Murphy, 41–45.

⁸⁶ Murphy, 47–48.

‘Berkeleyan’ here refers to the philosopher George Berkeley (1685-1753), who took the sensible objects of experience normally understood as existing in the external world to instead be ideas in the mind. Murphy provides no justification to the connection between Sōseki and Berkeley beyond stating “this is precisely Sōseki’s setup”.⁸⁷ My issue with this line of thought is not that I find Murphy’s argumentation lacking or that I want to safeguard Komori’s emphasis on connecting ‘impression’ and ‘idea’, even though the latter does serve my own interpretation nicely.

Rather, I find Murphy’s approach hermeneutically objectionable. Which is to say: Murphy relies entirely on external sources to read the *Bungakuron*, few to none of which are actually referenced in the *Bungakuron* text proper. Beyond just Berkeley, we find invocation of neurophysiologist William Calvin,⁸⁸ Walter Benjamin’s ‘angel of history’,⁸⁹ literary historian Terry Eagleton,⁹⁰ and many more authors. This is fine for the purposes of Murphy’s overarching goal in *Metaphorical Circuit*, which is to tangle up literature and science, but it helps us precious little in reading the *Bungakuron*. If the *Bungakuron* is as unique a work as it is claimed to be in the introduction to its English translation,⁹¹ it would stand to reason there is little to be gained by relying on external references to do the interpretative heavy lifting.

This issue of over-reliance on external sources to explain the *Bungakuron* is a running theme in secondary literature. In the 2008 *Japan Forum* article “Property and sociological knowledge”, Michael Bourdaghs quotes a passage on *mogi* consciousness in passing and immediately equates it to ideas from sociologists Max Weber and Émile Durkheim,⁹² the fact that “Sōseki did not read Mauss, Weber, Durkheim or Simmel”⁹³ notwithstanding. Reading

⁸⁷ Murphy, 48.

⁸⁸ Murphy, 41.

⁸⁹ Murphy, 45–46.

⁹⁰ Murphy, 39.

⁹¹ Bourdaghs, Murphy, and Ueda, “Introduction: Natsume Sōseki and the Ten-Year Project,” 35.

⁹² Bourdaghs, “Property and Sociological Knowledge: Natsume Sōseki and the Gift of Narrative,” 86–87.

⁹³ Bourdaghs, 86.

Thomas Lamarre’s “Expanded Empiricism”, we find Sōseki “confirming Foucault’s remark that ‘[t]he space of Western knowledge is now about to topple’”.⁹⁴ Viewed through the lens of Karatani’s reading of the *Bungakuron*, this comparison is certainly not without merit. But my point here is to show the bait-and-switch trick common to the articles under discussion: one goes in expecting *Bungakuron* and is instead presented with a set of familiar, European thinkers. What of the *Bungakuron*’s purported novelty?

The same movement can be found in the discussion of ‘Sōseki’s Darwinism’. Invariably, Sōseki’s link to Herbert Spencer and his ill-wrought doctrine of Social Darwinism is mentioned in secondary literature: by Bourdaghs,⁹⁵ Murphy,⁹⁶ Lamarre⁹⁷ and Young,⁹⁸ among others. Sōseki does indeed mention Spencer several times in the *Bungakuron*. Furthermore, according to Shimada Atsushi 島田厚, some work has been made of tracing Spencer’s influence on Sōseki’s early writings as well.⁹⁹ Indeed, Komori Yōichi has repeatedly claimed that Sōseki’s references to sociology should be understood within the frame of Spencer’s view of society encompassing ethics, religion, aesthetics and history.¹⁰⁰ But how does this help us in reading the *Bungakuron*? At best, not at all, and at worst, we assume to have understood Sōseki’s purported Darwinism as his knowledge of Spencer. As I hope to have shown with sufficient force in the previous section, the meaning of Darwinism in the *Bungakuron* is to be sought first and foremost in Sōseki’s replicative use of *mogi* and *mohō*.

IV. Conclusion

In the previous section, I have criticised several English commentaries for their approach to the text of the *Bungakuron*. That is to say: each of the

⁹⁴ Lamarre, “Expanded Empiricism: Natsume Sōseki with William James,” 51.

⁹⁵ Bourdaghs, “Property and Sociological Knowledge: Natsume Sōseki and the Gift of Narrative,” 83.

⁹⁶ Murphy, *Metaphorical Circuit*, 34–35.

⁹⁷ Lamarre, “Expanded Empiricism: Natsume Sōseki with William James,” 71–72.

⁹⁸ Young, “Evolution in Literature: Natsume Sōseki’s Theory and Practice,” 13–15.

⁹⁹ Shimada, “Sōseki No Shisō,” 24.

¹⁰⁰ Komori, *Sōseki Ron*, 314. However, Komori has a habit of publishing works on Sōseki for a general audience where this claim regarding Spencer is repeated, e.g. in the 1993 *Natsume Sōseki wo yomu* 夏目漱石をよむ and the 1995 *Sōseki wo yominaosu* 漱石を読みなおす.

articles under discussion relied heavily on external sources in order to interpret the *Bungakuron*. Given the impenetrability of the *Bungakuron*'s technical jargon, this tends to result in the *Bungakuron* text appearing as little more than a mirror for its 'theoretical framing', providing no insight into the *Bungakuron* itself.

Can the same not be said of my own approach? The central dichotomy leveraged in this thesis is that between 'representational' and 'reproductive modes of copying'. Explaining this distinction required multiple pages of examples and weighty exposition on 'identity' and 'meaning'. Besides, like the articles I criticize, I too borrowed this 'theoretical frame' from an external source, i.e. Wouter Oudemans' *Echte filosofie*. Has the pot been calling the kettle black?

In proposing two different translations for the semantic cluster of words around *mogi*—representation and reproduction—I have sought to gain access to the *Bungakuron*. Viewed from this angle, the entire point of this thesis was translation: whether it was possible to meet the *Bungakuron* on its own terms, through my terms.¹⁰¹ Decisive in this undertaking is neither the quantity nor quality of 'external' sources brought to bear, but the perspective afforded by the interpretative choices made. I believe something of the meaning of the *Bungakuron* can be seen through my reading: the key term 'focal point of consciousness F'.

¹⁰¹ Gadamer, *Wahrheit Und Methode. Grundzüge Einer Philosophischen Hermeneutik*, 1:387–88. "Der Übersetzer muß hier den zu verstehenden Sinn in den Zusammenhang hinübertragen, in dem der Partner des Gespräches lebt. Das heißt bekanntlich nicht, daß er den Sinn verfälschen darf, den der andere meint. Der Sinn soll vielmehr erhalten bleiben, aber da er in einer neuen Sprachwelt verstanden werden soll, muß er in ihr auf neue Weise zur Geltung kommen. Jede Übersetzung ist daher schon Auslegung, ja man kann sagen, sie ist immer die Vollendung der Auslegung, die der Übersetzer dem ihm vorgegebenen Wort hat angedeihen lassen.."

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