The reconfiguration of Colombia's non-state armed groups after the FARC demobilisation in 2017: Understanding Arauca's Oligopoly of Violence and its consequences for human security

Milani, Olivia A.C.

The reconfiguration of Colombia's non-state armed groups after the FARC demobilisation in 2017:

Understanding Arauca's Oligopoly of Violence and its consequences for human security

Foto: Razón Pública (2022)

Student name: Olivia A.C. Milani

Type of thesis: Master Thesis

Programme: International Relations GPE

Supervisor: Dr. Håvar A.S. Solheim

Place and date: The Hague, 24th June 2022

Wordcount: 17503

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

ACCU	Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
BACRIM	Criminal bands (Spanish acronym)
BVA	Bloque Vencedores de Arauca
CINEP	Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular
CNAI	Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris
COALICO	Coalición contra la Vinculación de Niños, Niñas y Jóvenes al Conflicto Armado en Colombia
DSP	Democratic Security policy
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación
ERPAC	Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antisubversivo de Colombia
F10-MV	Frente 10 – Martín Villa
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo
FBL	Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberación
FDL	Frente Domingo Laín
FIP	Fundación Ideas para la Paz
FSFs	FARC successor fronts
GAOr	Residual organized armed groups (Spanish acronym)
GAOs	Organized armed groups (Spanish acronym)
GDOs	Organized criminal groups (Spanish acronym)
INDEPAZ	Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz
M-19	Movimiento 19 de abril

MAQL	Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame
MAS	Muerte a Secuestradores
NCA	National Constituent Assembly
NSAGs	Non-state armed groups
OoV	Oligopolies of Violence
PMSCs	Private military and security companies
PRT	Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores
PSOs	Paramilitary successor organisations
UP	Unión Patriótica

Introduction

This thesis aims to analyse the reconfiguration of the constellations of Colombia´s non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and the consequences it has on the human security of local communities in the border region with Venezuela after the demobilisation of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (FARC) in 2017. Besides the well-known druglord Pablo Escobar and his Medellín cartel, it was one of the most important Colombian NSAGs. It was the oldest and largest guerrilla group worldwide, engaging in an armed conflict with the state for more than 50 years (NPR 2016). This internal armed conflict contributed to the enduring presence of violence in the country's history, which killed 220.000 people and led to the second-highest number of internally displaced people, surpassed only by war-torn Syria (Idler 2019, 10). Historically, the Colombian state has particularly neglected its rural and border areas making it possible for NSAGs to employ violence and replace the state as a governance actor (Bulla and Guarín 2015). In addition, the presence of illicit economies, such as drug trafficking and illegal mining, led to the emergence of organised crime groups and has been providing the resources for NSAGs to sustain their struggle, prolonging the conflict and violence over such a long time (Rettberg, Leiteritz, and Nasi 2014).

Nevertheless, the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos succeeded in negotiating peace with the FARC in 2016, and the subsequent disarmament and demobilisation process of the groups' combatants was successfully finished in August 2017 (Yagoub 2017). The years immediately after these processes, a reduction in violence took place nationwide, but it exacerbated especially in areas previously dominated by the FARC (Cabezas Palacios, Rondón Molina, and González Perafán 2020). The lack of state presence remains a problem and together with the demobilisation of the FARC led to power vacuums that were not filled by the state. This induced a new phase in the country's history of armed conflicts; the reconfiguration of the constellation and relations between NSAGs, such as the Gulf Clan[1], the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) and newly emerged FARC successor fronts (FSFs), took place in territories the FARC had left behind. These remaining NSAGs are trying to establish territorial and social control over these areas, their populations and licit and illicit economies. The state is attacking the groups' structures but is not able to consolidate its presence and hold the

[1] They became one of the most powerful groups with the widest presence that also expands to urban centres. Besides being known as the Gulf Clan (*Clan del Golfo*), the group is also called *Los Urabeños, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, or Clan Úsuga.*

monopoly of violence, perpetuating the conditions that have allowed the emergence and permanence of violence (Garzón Vergara 2016).

The border zone with Venezuela is an extreme case of what Anette Idler (2019) calls complex security landscapes. This is the result of three factors which are weak state governance, high incentives for illicit economic activities and propensity for impunity. Furthermore, socio-economic problems remain prevalent. Local populations lack access to basic public services and the recent migration crisis in Venezuela creates additional pressures. The security dynamics are extremely complex due to the presence of a myriad of NSAGs that operate in the border region, also across Venezuelan territory and are in constant interaction (Idler 2019). Their presence and resulting constellations between those groups vary considerably along the 2.219 km long border. The FARC had not established a significant presence in all border departments. According to Andrés Cajiao,[2] its presence along the border had been most significant in the departments Vichada, Norte de Santander and Arauca. Each one of them presents its reconfiguration of actors with its consequences for local communities. Due to the scope of this thesis the department Arauca which borders the Venezuelan department Apure was selected as the case study of the investigation.

To analyse the reconfiguration of NSAGs in Arauca, the concept of Oligopolies of Violence (OoV) by Dr Andreas Mehler (2003; 2004) will be used to analyse the situation since the FARC demobilization in 2017 until now. Mehler (2003; 2004) developed the concept to capture the possible dynamics that occur when various security providers or violence actors are present in a territory. Depending on the relation between the NSAGs themselves and the public state forces that form part of it, OoV produce different levels of violence, which affect the human security of local communities. Consequently, this thesis explores two closely related research questions:

1. **How did Arauca's Oligopoly of Violence between the present non-state armed groups and the state military reconfigure since the FARC demobilization in 2017?**
2. **What consequences for human security have resulted from the Oligopoly of Violence in Arauca since 2017?**

[2] Interviewed together with Paula Andrea Tobo Caviedes, online via Zoom 7th of April 2022, investigator at the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP)

The methodological approach of this thesis is actor-oriented. This means that considerate attention is paid to individuals or social actors. Naturally, their actions are affected by external or institutional factors, however, they still possess agency and play a central role in altering social relations. Social actors are not just passively receiving intervention but they are actively participating, processing information and interacting strategically with external institutions and personnel (Long 1990). Mehler's concept of Oligopolies of Violence fits well into this approach. Through the concept, the central social actors of interest are NSAGs and the state's public forces which both act as security providers but also employ violence to establish social and territorial control.

Different data collection strategies were employed. First, secondary literature and book chapters on the three main theoretical concepts were reviewed on their own and combined into the thesis' theoretical framework guiding the research and analysis. Fieldwork in the border region could not conducted for this research project as conflict-affected areas pose considerable security obstacles for the researcher. Consequently, qualitative data was collected in six semi-structured interviews online, mostly in Spanish. The remoteness of the border region made it difficult to contact locals in Arauca. That is why the interviewees selected belong to organisations based in Bogotá and Medellín. They are all experts in the analysis of the dynamics of the armed conflict, organised crime and their consequences for the local communities in Colombia. More details can be found in Appendix 1. The information acquired in the interviews is mostly used in the analysis and is supplemented with reports and documents from the organisations above as well as other documents from think tanks, newspapers and the government agency *Defensoría del Pueblo*.

Besides this introduction, this thesis consists of three main chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 presents the theoretical concepts and debates around non-state armed actors, Oligopolies of Violence and human security. Chapter 2 provides a historical contextualization on the national level from 1948-to 2021, divided into three periods and structured around the three analytical concepts. Lastly, chapter 3 consists of the empirical analysis of the OoV configurations present in Arauca, its NSAGs and the resulting consequences for human security.

1. Chapter: Non-State Armed Groups, Oligopolies of Violence, and Human Security

The first chapter will outline theoretical concepts and related debates relevant to the analysis of security dynamics in the Venezuelan-Colombian border region since 2017. Central to those dynamics are non-state armed groups, which will be conceptualised in the first section. Secondly, the presence of various of these groups, as is the case in Colombia, disrupts the state's monopoly of violence. Therefore, the concept of oligopolies of violence will be introduced in order to analyse the reconfigurations of these groups and their use of violence after the demobilisation of the FARC in 2017. Moreover, the concept of human security is presented and its relevant elements are conceptualised. Lastly, the three concepts are converged into the theoretical framework for this thesis project.

1.1. Non-State Armed Groups

Since the end of the Cold War and the eruption of various internal conflicts, a debate has emerged on the changing nature of warfare (e.g. Kaldor's 'New Wars' (2012); Koonings' 'New Violence' (2001)), which, among other factors, specifically highlights the role of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) (Krause and Milliken 2009). In the context of Latin America, Koonings (2001) looks at the continuation of social and political violence in the context of democratization in Latin America committed by a number of different armed actors. Therefore, he identifies five categories of armed actors which hinder the consolidation of stable democracies in Latin America due to the violence they exert:

i) Military and public security forces such as the police
ii) Paramilitary and vigilante groups that exert extra-legal violence, often in symbiosis with official state forces
iii) Old and new forms of guerrilla forces opposing the state and paramilitary forces
iv) Social or political movements that have radicalised using force to back up their social and economic claims
v) Large-and small-scale organised crime linked to the international drug trade and other illicit economies

It is important to note that the forces within the first category are not part of NSAGs. In Latin America, they are, however, often as well responsible for the erosion of democracy and

violence (Koonings 2001). Authors such as Miroiu (2020), argue that in general, theory should move beyond state centrism, as in essence all armed actors, including state forces, fulfil the same functions, namely establishment, defence or contestation of a prevailing social order. In most of the literature, however, the distinction between public state forces and NSAGs has been emphasised and Weberian premises are followed, to which the monopoly of the legitimate use of force is central – something that NSAGs directly challenge. In addition to the five categories identified above, mercenaries such as private military and security companies (PMSCs), warlords, gangs, terrorists and marauders and soldier-rebels are also considered (Schneckener 2006, 26-27; Reno 1998). Other important trends that can be observed in the evolution of NSAGs, are processes of transnationalisation and the development of rather loose network structures internally moving away from very hierarchical forms of organisation (Schneckener 2009, 14). The latter is also encouraged by the establishment of cross-border ties and networks related to transnational organised crime activities. Transnational organised crime can be defined as "the passing of illegal goods and/or services over national borders and/or rendering criminal support to criminal activities or related persons in more than one country" (Allum and Gilmour 2021, 8). Many NSAGs make part of regional and global transnational networks engaging in organized crime activities such as drug- and human trafficking to generate the revenue necessary for their activities and rely on small arms trafficking to acquire weapons to equip themselves (Levitsky 2003). Borderlands are of specific importance here, as their transnationality and distance to political and economic centres of a country translates into impunity and weak state governance in those areas – both ideal conditions for organised crime to flourish (Annette Idler 2018). NSAGs engage in 'glocal' operations; they are simultaneously entrenched in local power structures but also have international mobility.

The different group types vary in their motivations (political vs economic motives) and forms of violence and actions they employ, but generally share four characteristics (Schneckener 2009):

i) The willingness and capability to use violence for pursuing their objectives

ii) The separation from formal state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police or special forces.

iii) A certain degree of autonomy, resulting from characteristic ii), which does not mean however that there is no support or involvement by state actors at all, be it informally or officially.

iv) An organisational structure or relationship over a specific period of time

As a result of their diverse motivations, their relationship with civil society and employed strategies of action, two opposing perspectives on the role of NSAGs emerged. On the one hand, they are perceived as a problematic actor which does not only engage in conflict violently but also hinder the return to peace and stability (Schneckener 2009, 7).

Within this perspective, NSGAs are usually associated with limited or fragile statehood and the debate around state failure and weak states (Koonings and Kruijt 2013; Vinci 2009, 11). A state might fail or is weak for example in the provision of basic public welfare services and security. The inability to provide the latter is often a consequence of the loss of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a state's territory, one of the central features for statehood identified by Max Weber (2008, 156). Consequently, "as the state weakens, armed groups can become relatively more powerful than the state either as a whole or in certain areas" (Vinci 2009, 12). This leads to the takeover of control of territory and its people living on it by NSAGs. However, that is not the only way in which they exert authority. In parts of Africa and Asia, due to factors like low population density, harsh geographies or forms of living (e.g., nomadic tribes), territorial control is not a precondition to hold authority over people. For members, it is rather a process of recruitment and initiation, which can be based on patronage or force. In this context, NSAGs are often referred to as governance actors, relating to the second perspective on NSAGs, outlined below.

For Latin America, Koonings and Kruijt (2013) distinguish post-authoritarian violence as 'new violence' from the violence before aimed at defending or challenging state power. 'New violence' enacted by NSAGs, is rather "socially and politically organised to wield coercion by evading or undermining the legitimate violence monopoly of formally democratic states" (Koonings and Krujt 2013, 8). This kind of state failure results in governance voids and often includes a symbiosis or at least a relation between official state forces and the second type of NSAGs, paramilitary or vigilante groups serving local elites' interests. The consequences are felt in society as a whole as violence fuels fear and distrust among civilians. Especially the human security of the vulnerable sections of society is affected, which will be discussed in detail in section 1.3.

In post-conflict settings,[3] NSAGs often continue to undermine peace and heavily hinder peacebuilding processes, not seldomly resulting in increased violence. They can act as so-called spoilers to peace. Originally, the concept has been put forward by Stedman (1997, 5) who defined spoilers as "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it in the context of peace processes". They can be part of the negotiations or remain outside of them and employ various non-violent and violent strategies. In addition, it can also be distinguished between direct and indirect spoiling activity, implying that some spoilers intentionally challenge peace processes while others engage in violent activities to achieve non-political goals, which foster political consequences as their by-product (Maher and Thomson 2018, 2144).

On the other hand, the second perspective rather focuses on the questions of whether and under which conditions there can be a potential for those groups to fulfil the role as a governance actor. A vast literature developed on this topic, often as a critique to state-centre perspectives, counter-terrorist discourses and the overgeneralising use of state failure (Podder 2013). Different concepts emerged as an answer to the failed state paradigm and the notion of ungoverned spaces, for example, hybrid governance (Villa, Braga, and Ferreira 2021), rebel governance (Duyvesteyn et al. 2016; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015), NSAGs as governance or security providers/actors (Berti 2018; Bryden and Caparini 2006; Mandel 2013), alternatively governed spaces (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010) and wartime social order (Arjona 2016). Some groups provide basic services such as protection, water and food supply, resources and jobs, to their members and the population living in their territory (Schneckener 2009). They take over functions of the state in areas where state presence is weak and are rather perceived as possibly legitimate stabilisers in peace- and state-building processes. Not all NSAGs are equally negative for society, some do have political objectives and socio-political legitimacy among sections of society (Podder 2013). Moreover, especially in urban settings, it does not seem to be state failure but rather state abandonment as in many contexts only parts of the population are affected by security threats posed by NSAGs – it seems to be a deliberate choice to withdraw the state (Davis 2006; Koonings and Kruijt 2007).

[3] The term is usually applied to situations where an armed conflict has been settled with a peace treaty, military victory or external intervention. However, this does not mean that violence and insecurity stop prevailing but rather develop new dynamics (Kurtenbach and Wulf 2012).

It is of importance, to be aware that the groups very often engage in different activities and also potentially fit into both roles assigned above, as well as they can belong to different categories of motivations and strategic actions, not only because groups often transform over time, but also because their behaviour relating to some issues might have spoiling effects, while in others they are interested in cooperation and compliance to agreements (Schneckener 2009, 8).

1.2. Failed States, Horizontal Orders and Oligopolies of Violence

As already mentioned above, scholars have been developing approaches relating to the failed state concept (Rotberg 2003), which do not only analyse the breakdown or diffusion of state governance but instead also look at how alternative orders emerge .[4]

Focusing on the African region, the author Trutz von Trotha (2005) speaks of a "horizontalization of the state order". He puts forward that the vertical state order, at which's core, lies the states' monopoly of violence, transforms into a horizontal order where various institutions or actors compete for the rule over territory and develop new forms of regional or local forms of rule – also denominated as para-states.

The development of these decentral or horizontal state orders have been labelled as 'Oligopolies of Violence' (OoV) by the author Andreas Mehler. His approach follows von Trotha in the sense that he also starts with the observation that many West African states do not hold the monopoly of violence. The state is a rather weak guarantor of physical security for the population in its territory and various alternative providers exist, which at the same time are also violent actors. Based on this, he hypothesises that (empirically) illegitimate monopolies of violence and OoV coexist (Mehler 2003). His approach is more actor-centred and analyses the behaviour and dynamics of these alternative executors of violence, or simply NSAGs, but also the role of state forces if relevant. In that context, NSAGs also can act as

[4] Within the topic of state failure, which is also very much criticised (Hameiri 2007; Nay 2013) and often specifically focuses on the African context, different concepts like 'collapsed states' (Allen 1999; Zartman 1995; Mair 1999), 'state inversion' (Forrest 1998), 'para-states' (von Trotha 2000), 'fragmented authority' (Hoyweghen and Smis 2002), and 'dysfunctional state' (Biereenu-Nnabugwu and Nwanegbo 2012) developed, all relating to the problems of fragile statehood faced on the continent.
In the Latin American context, the concept of the anomic state has been developed by Peter Waldmann (2002). It can be summarised in four main points: 1) The Latin American state is not able to provide an order to which its citizens are subject to but is rather a source of disorder. 2) This happens due to its inability to translate written law and order into practice fully. Consequently, other groups and actors compete for the voids left and citizens do not know which rules are to be followed; the official or unofficial ones. 3) State officials or personnel themselves are a source of insecurity and fear for citizens as they use their position for their own benefit. 4) A state that is not able to provide the basic need of public order and security for its citizens, loses from their perspective its legitimacy.

governing entities over a territory. Consequently, the concept can belong to both perspectives on NSAGs mentioned before, depending on the specific case. It has been applied by himself and other authors mostly in the African context in countries such as Sudan, and other West and Sub-Saharan African countries (Mehler 2003; 2004; Mehler, Lambach, and Smith-Höhn 2010; Omeje 2010; Ekpon 2012).

The term OoV implies that the market logic from economics is transferred to the context of security and politics, proposing that markets of violence or security markets exist in contexts of state failure and/or weak institutional statehood with no monopoly of violence (Elwert 2003; Mehler 2003; Branović and Chojnacki 2011). An oligopoly can be described as a state of limited competition where a small number of producers share a market. OoV encompass a fluctuating number of NSAGs of different qualities that can be cooperating or competing for the provision of security and exercise of violence (Mehler 2003, 11). More generally, that means that the different actors are striving to be the governing authority in regions where state presence is weak.

Oligopolies can be homogeneous, meaning that there are few providers of an identical product, or heterogeneous; there are few providers of differential products. In total three different types of oligopolies have been identified. Originally, Mehler proposed two – the functional and the territorial oligopoly, which are not mutually exclusive. Omeje (2010) supplemented them with a third type – dysfunctional oligopolies. In functional oligopolies, NSAGs satisfy various protection needs, such as the protection of different social groups or markets and trading routes and from distinct threats. Consequently, this type of oligopoly is always heterogeneous. In territorial oligopolies, NSAGs aim for the control of certain territories within a state. They can be homogeneous and heterogeneous. Sometimes a dominant group is able to hold a fragile monopoly of violence in those specific territories. The situation is still fluid, however, as it lacks official recognition and therefore can be subject to change, justifying to speak of a territorial oligopoly of violence (Mehler 2003, 11).

These two types of oligopolies can be characterised further based on the relationship between different present NSAGs (Mehler (2003, 11; 2004, 540). They can be based on arrangement, where territory and/or functions are divided between groups. Generally, oligopolies based on arrangements tend to produce less violent situations (Mehler 2004, 540). Often OoV have a

dominant security leader which is exercising power in central areas of a territory or country.[5] In many instances this is a weak or weakened state that is not holding the monopoly of violence over its entire territory. The remaining marginal territories fall under the control of NSAGs or are even intentionally outsourced to control them indirectly. Lastly, there are also oligopolies marked by continuous competition or open rivalry between NSAGs. This implies less security as violence is used in a less restricted manner against the population and also against the adversary. This is substantiated by Branović and Chojnacki (2011, 559) who elaborate on the logic of security markets and the behaviour of NSAGs. One assumption is that to gain ownership over goods and services, violence is necessary because those are not exchanged voluntarily. Competition between NSAGs tends to turn violent when there is no regulating central authority because security dilemmas and informational asymmetries arise. Those only increase with a greater number of potential competitors.

Lastly, there are also dysfunctional oligopolies that account for NSAGs that function in a very dysfunctional way which can be extremely violent (Omeje 2010). This type of oligopoly is a very ambivalent entity, often consisting of a dominant market leader (the state) and various violent NSAGs. While they might offer some security services, have a large support base and can be considered legitimate actors, they are at the same time responsible for systemic human rights violations. Moreover, dysfunctional oligopolies tend to subsume some features of territorial and functional OoV.

The concept cannot only be applied from "above" to understand dynamics between violence actors in conflict areas but also from "below" to analyse the perception of the population towards NSAGs, who are the victims of violence or receivers of protection (Mehler 2004, 542). Here the focus lies especially on the question of legitimacy. In territories where the state does not hold the monopoly of violence anymore and is unable to establish physical security, OoV can be perceived as legitimate by the population if actors can provide the latter. This changes as soon as violence is employed against the population and with the end to pursue economic and political interests.

As reasons for the emergence of OoV, Mehler (2003) puts forward two seemingly opposing, but still intertwined reasons prevalent within the literature. On the one hand, an oligopoly of violence can emerge as a response to state despotism. The state itself has become a source of

[5] The concept can be applied on different levels of analysis. One can analyse the presence of OoV on a national, regional or local level (Lambach 2007).

insecurity and violence against which one has to protect oneself (von Trotha 2000; Waldmann 2002). This applies both in the African and Latin American context. On the other hand, the state's capacity to uphold the monopoly of violence is not sufficient and NSAGs are disputing for it, hence leading to OoV. Here the state seems to be weak as opposed to a strong state in the sense of how it exerts repressive violence. However, despotism is not to be confused with a strong state – on the contrary, the continuous exercise of violence, instead only the threat of its use, is rather a sign of state weakness (Mehler 2003, 13).

1.3. Human Security, Personal Security and Non-State Armed Groups

The notion of human security is centuries old and can be dated back to the writing of Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Rousseau, who regarded the state as the prime guarantor of human security, ultimately being the justification to have it in the first place (Lautensach and Lautensach 2020). The traditional and prevailing definition of security until the end of the Cold War has been very nation-state centred. The state was the subject and object of security policy at the same time. Due to the persistence of conflict after the Cold War, with changing dynamics and actor constellations as mentioned in section 1.1., governments started to recognize that the security of the state as a whole is dependent on the security in its regions and communities – ultimately consisting of families and individuals. At the time, that had been an unconventional perspective but the necessity of that paradigm shift evidenced itself by not only internal armed conflicts between NSAGs but also states failing to deliver security to their populations and in many cases being itself a source of violence and insecurity.

The occurring paradigm shift was backed by the United Nations (UN) and gained recognition after human security had been the subject of the UN's Human Development report in 1994 (UNDP 1994). Here the UN identified four essential characteristics of human security: 1) it is a universal concern applying to everybody everywhere; 2) its different components are interdependent; 3) it is easier to ensure through early prevention than intervention at a later stage; 4) it is people-centred (UNDP 1994, 23). The two major components by which the UN defined human security have been freedom from fear and freedom from want, used by Franklin D. Roosevelt in his Four Freedoms speech in 1941. The former relates to the absence of a threat to someone's physical security and the latter is concerned with economic and social security. With that broad definition of security, many factors constitute a threat to it and therefore seven categories that constitute human security have been identified: 1) economic security; 2) food

security; 3) health security; 4) environmental security; 5) personal security; 6) community security and 7) political security.

Precisely the broadness of the concept also has been the main reason for criticism towards it. The concern is that by being so all-encompassing, it would lead to securitisation of all human problems, which is of little help in tackling challenges practically, because the heterogeneity prevents the formulation of coherent models to inform effective policy making (Lautensach and Lautensach 2020; Englehart 2016; Paris 2001). Therefore, human security has remained a conceptual category used by scholars and analysts (Goldstein 2015, 139). It is not to be confused with the concept *seguridad cuidadana* (citizen security) that has been put forward especially in the Latin American context. It also fits into the new paradigm and holds a broader understanding of security focused on the individual. In the context of rising violent crime and homicide rates in the late 1990s-early 2000s, Latin American states and cities became the most violent worldwide outside of war zones. Citizen security "became a discourse for conceptualising the vulnerability to which ordinary people were exposed by criminal threat, and for coordinating efforts to counter it" (Goldstein 2015, 141). Opposed to human security, citizen security has been widely applied in policy making all over the continent. Instead of solely repressive and punitive criminal justice policies, also called *mano dura* policies, various measures have been implemented targeted to achieve the prevention and reduction of violence, the promotion of public security and access to justice, and the reinforcement of rights and also obligations of states and citizens alike. One concrete policy has been community policing, often forming part of police reforms enacted in various countries (Muggah 2017, 294). Central to this approach is the strengthening of the relationship between the police and the communities it is serving via the co-production of crime control and building of police legitimacy (Malone and Dammert 2021, 420).

For this research project the effects of reconfigurations of NSAGs on the use of violence against local populations are at the centre. That is why when talking about human security, the focus lies solely on category five – personal security. The most important aspect of human security is the security from physical violence. Connecting NSAGs and human security, Englehart (2016) identifies that the most pervasive threat the former pose, is the threat to human security of local populations, more specifically to personal security. The definition of personal security makes the threats and harms directly attributable to actors and easier to observe than structural violence. Furthermore, the relevance of personal security, specifically in post-conflict situations, is identified by Benedek (2010, 4) who states the following: "During and

immediately after conflicts the freedom from fear, the protection of the human person against violence and therefore its personal security, is in the foreground." In line with that, the definition of violence used by von Trotha (1995) is seen as the most adequate for the purpose of this research. He defines violence as a threefold power of action that either results in 1) the intentional physical harm of others or imminently threatens such harm; 2) material damage or 3) reduction in social participation (von Trotha 1995, 131). Specified further, that means the threat of or actual physical harm in any form, the destruction of private property or entire villages and also forced displacement.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined the guiding theoretical concepts for this thesis. First, a categorization of NSAGs and concerning debates about their role in weak states and governance were provided. Secondly, Mehler's concept of OoV and its different types were explained. Lastly, human security was conceptualised and it was specified further which dimension of it will be of interest during the analysis. All the three concepts make part of the paradigm shift which occurred in the study of war, conflict and security. Traditionally, conflict and war between countries and their implications for state or national security have received most of attention. With the end of the Cold War, internal conflicts, NSAGs and their effects on individuals rather than states have become central objects of study. Furthermore, they are related to each other as OoV involve NSAGs and have, depending on their constellation, different consequences for human security. Additionally, Mehler's concept poses a viable actor-centred approach to analysing dynamics between NSAGs on different levels of analysis – nationally, regionally or locally. In this thesis, the level of analysis selected is the Colombian department Arauca which borders the Venezuelan department Apure.

2. Chapter: The development of Oligopolies of Violence in recent Colombia history (1948-2021)

This second chapter provides the historical contextualization and the necessary background, starting in the late 1940s, to understand the configuration of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and the implications of their behaviour in the armed conflict for the populations' human security in Colombia today. This long period is divided into three sections: 1.) 1948-1990; 2.) 1990-2002; 3.) 2002-2021. Colombia encompasses a huge territory and this chapter will provide a national overview illustrating some trends and how the relationship between the NSAGs and the state transformed over time, leading to different oligopoly of violence configurations and transformations of NSAGs, particularly after negotiated peace accords leading to their demobilisation. These dynamics have been very complex and diverse in their constellations and respective outcomes in different regions of the country. Generally, the NSAGs present in Colombia mutually contest their presence, leading to competition and violent conflict between them or periodically engage in alliances, while in other areas the state is their principal threat and opponent. Nevertheless, any kind of confrontation between them always has effects on the human security of the Colombian population.

2.1. The emergence of Colombia's the internal armed conflict and the role of narcotrafficking (1948-1990)

Since the beginning of the 20th century, Colombian society has been characterised by deep political divisions between liberals and conservatives and the exclusion of other opposition forces. This has led to various violent civil wars throughout the country.[6] In 1948, the leftist liberal candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated in Bogotá, leading to a riot in the city, called the *bogotazo* (Watson 2000). It marked the beginning of a countrywide civil war, known as *la Violencia*, during which about 300.000 people died in partisan violence.[7] The conservative government especially blamed the communist party for the escalation, leading to massacres of suspected allies by the military and police with a focus on the countryside. As a result, peasant

[6] Various explanations can be found for the causes of political violence in Colombia. Different primary reasons have been identified, such as poverty, unjust government oppression, inequality (Ruiz 2001; Bergquist 2001; Pearce 1990). McDougall's (2009) institutional approach identifies the states' infrastructural weakness as the primary cause and economic interpretations emphasise the role of greed and the profits derived from narcotrafficking (Collier and Hoeffler 2000).

[7] The period of *la Violencia* and its implications for Colombian society is a period in Colombian history, which has been researched a lot. For a literature review of some contributions see the work of Rojas and Tubb (2013).

self-defence groups emerged (Gehring and Gontermann 2012). In 1953, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla came to power via a military coup to end *la Violencia*, granting amnesty to all involved parties, but at the same time installing his military dictatorship. The traditional liberal and conservative elites ousted him in 1957 though and created the *Frente Nacional*, a power-sharing agreement lasting until 1974, which alternated presidency and legislative power every four years between the two parties (Editorial 2018).

During this time the political exclusion of other opposition groups continued, preventing a necessary land reform and other measures to counter the immense social inequality in the country. As a consequence, in different parts of the country, various left-wing guerrilla groups developed, generally aiming for land reform, a reduction in social inequality and ideally the takeover of the state. The peasant self-defense groups which originated during *la Violencia*, laid the basis for what would become Colombia's largest Marxist guerrilla group; *Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (FARC) founded in 1964 (Gehring and Gontermann 2012). The second biggest group is the *Ejército Nacional de Liberación* (ELN) emerging in 1965. However, their background is different as they were founded by students, who were invited to Cuba in 1964 to export the revolution and priests following liberation theory (Medina Uribe 2016). Another group was the *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (EPL), influenced by Maoist ideology. Additionally in 1970, the *Movimiento 19 de Abril* (M-19) emerged due to electoral fraud during the presidential elections held on the 19th of April in the same year. Various other, but significantly smaller groups existed as well, e.g. *Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores* (PRT) and the *Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame* (MAQL), the latter being indigenous (Tate 2001).These different rebel groups belong to Koonings' third category, old and new forms of guerrilla forces which stand in opposition to the state, identified in section 1.1 within Colombia's internal armed conflict.

Belonging to the second category of Koonings, right-wing paramilitary groups are another type of NSAGs present in Colombia and are an actor in the country's internal armed conflict. They developed as part of the counterinsurgency strategy against the different guerrilla groups. Consequently, their origins can also be traced back to the 1960s when the state legalised the creation and state sponsorship of civil defence forces (Hristov 2014, 42; Tate 2001, 164).[8] Their counterinsurgent objectives coincide with those of the official armed forces, who worked

[8] Also to be considered is the role of the United States (U.S.) and its military advisors, who recommended the organisation of "indigenous irregulars" as part of the counterinsurgency strategy (Tate 2001, 164). From 1962 until 1965 Special Warfare Mobile Training Teams worked together with the Colombian armed forces under the counterinsurgency plan *Plan Lazo*, implementing the recommendation.

closely together with paramilitaries (Aviles 2006). However, paramilitaries did not only target guerrilla groups but also parts of civil society they considered an internal enemy based on their progressive political activism or alleged support to guerrilla groups (Hristov 2014, 93). They operated in a very violent way torturing, killing, mutilating and raping people in order to establish social control over territory or to force the abandonment of land. Only in 1989, they were officially outlawed after a government statistic from 1987 showed that paramilitaries were more deadly to the civilian population than guerrillas (Aviles 2006, 392).

Lastly, Koonings' fifth category, organised crime groups linked to international narcotrafficking, are present in Colombia as well. International drug trafficking networks were fostered in the early 70s with a marihuana boom in the Colombian Caribbean, replacing the Mexican marihuana supply to the U.S. which had been eradicated by fumigations (Britto 2010). Once traffickers realised the huge potential for profits to be made with cocaine, they invested in facilitating its production and developed powder cocaine and crack in order to supply both rich and poor communities (Pardo 2000). In the 1980s, various drug cartels arose, specialising in different niches of the drug economy – the two most famous examples are the Medellín cartel led by Pablo Escobar and the Cali Cartel led by Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela.

The relationship between the state and organised crime is a highly complex one. It not only varies over time and space but there is also an entrenchment of politics and crime on the regional, national and transnational level (Idler 2019).[9] Very often politicians move between both the upper- and the underworld. Illustrative here are again the two most famous drug cartels. The Cali cartel opted for coexistence or even alliance with the state's security apparatus and political elites. Violence was kept to a minimum as it wanted to maintain a low profile to maximise its profits (Duncan, Sosa, and Fortou 2022). Moreover, the state has been fiercely fighting the War on Drugs since the 1970s with considerable U.S. involvement and support (Britto 2010). Taking down Pablo Escobar and his Medellín cartel was the top priority for a long time. The cartel engaged in heavy confrontational and terroristic acts as Escobar also had political aspirations (Duncan, Sosa, and Fortou 2022). He was very much able to realise those; in 1982 he was elected into congress, where he did not stay long because Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, then Justice Minister, denounced him of being a drug trafficker. In the underworld, Escobar maintained a very powerful position for a long time, as he involved gangs from Medellín's

[9] Anette Idler identifies four types of relationships between the political and criminal realm in Colombia (collusion, pacific coexistence, strategic alliances and preponderance relations).

slums in his criminal enterprise. Via the distribution of profits and his charisma, he won their loyalty and armed support (Duncan, Sosa, and Fortou 2022).

The emergence of these cartels and the huge profits made with narcotrafficking considerably altered the dynamics of Colombia's internal armed conflict between the guerrillas, the state and the paramilitaries (Duncan, Sosa, and Fortou 2022) but also led to territorial, social, political and economic transformations (Salas Salazar 2014). The relationship between guerrillas, paramilitaries and drug cartels has been a very dynamic one. In the early 1980s, guerrilla groups had provisional alliances with cocaine producers to protect their cocaine refineries (Zaitch 2002). This alliance did not last very long and broke down in 1982 when the guerrillas started to target "big capital" by kidnapping and extorting landowners and drug entrepreneurs in order to finance their territorial and military expansions and restructuring (Verdad Abierta 2008; McDougall 2009). More specifically, the FARC managed to expand over the national territory, augmenting its presence to almost all departments and triplicating its number of members between 1982 and 1986. The ELN, whose numbers had been reduced dramatically from 150 to 70 men by the Colombian military with Operation Anorí in 1973, managed to reorganise and increase its number of members to 1000 by 1986. Consequently, landowners as well as *narcos* turned to paramilitaries for protection and supported them financially, leading to the establishment of the paramilitary group *Muerte a Secuestradores* (MAS), pointed to by Richani (2013). All of this inevitably led to competition for control of territory and a rise in confrontations, indicating the presence of OoV that are functional (the paramilitaries as providers of security to landowners and *narcos*) and also marked by rivalry.

Another factor that contributed to the dispute for local territorial control, was the decentralisation process instigated by the state in local politics, administration and public spending. First reforms were implemented in 1985 and the decentralisation process deepened further with the new constitution in 1991. It was part of the state modernisation process aiming at the enhancement of political participation, efficiency and the autonomy of departments regarding their development processes (Velásquez C. 2021). The municipality became central to this process and various competencies were transferred to it, particularly in the provision of public services (Mantilla Valbuena 2012). Naturally, this implied a transfer of resources to the municipalities in order to realise that provision. Guerrilla and paramilitary groups, however, quickly noticed that they can use those resources to their own benefit, which motivated the establishment of local territorial control of municipalities and their populations. Consequently, the intensity of the conflict rose dramatically and also electoral processes were severely

disrupted by NSAGs. In order to strengthen territorial control, both NSAGs protected favoured candidates and threatened or killed non-favoured candidates and voters. Generally, economic motivations guided territorial expansion (Sánchez and Chacón 2005).[10]

During Julio César Turbay's (1978-1982) very repressive government that had serious effects on the human security of the civilian population, the first popular social movements appeared demanding peace (García-Durán 2004). Those were given a channel for participation in the peace negotiations started by the administration of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986). He initiated peace talks with a number of guerrilla groups, recognizing them as political actors (Chernick 1996). First, he proposed an amnesty law which was approved in 1982 and ultimately paved the way for a ceasefire between the state, parts of the FARC, the M-19 and the EPL. Another result was the foundation of the political party *Unión Patriótica* (UP), which mostly consisted of ex-FARC members. However, most of them were assassinated by the end of the decade, confirming for the FARC guerrilleros and their leadership who refused to demobilise that this decision was justified. Also, the EPL, the M-19 and the Colombian military acted as spoilers further on (Nasi 2006; Torres Del Río 2015). They did not seriously commit to the ceasefires. The EPL used it to widen its presence in the whole country and recruit more members. The M-19 conducted the Palace of Justice siege during which almost half of the Supreme Court judges were killed as well as important leaders of the M-19. During that time no demobilisation was achieved, also the FARC continued to coexist with the UP, but committed nominally to the truce (Nasi 2006; Torres Del Río 2015).

The following administration of Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) continued negotiations with the groups after reducing the terms to disarmament and reintegration into civilian life and taking reforms off the negotiation agenda (Chernick 1988). He proved to be somewhat successful; the EPL demobilised partially, and the M-19 demobilised fully, transforming into a political party in 1990 under his administration (Gehring and Gontermann 2012; Torres Del Río 2015). At the same time, by removing reforms from the negotiations, Barco took away an important incentive for the FARC and ELN to negotiate. This, combined with an increase in the combat between armed forces and the guerrillas, led to a deepening of the political conflict and an

[10] This is confirmed by data comparing the characteristics of municipalities under the control of NSAGs. During the early years of the conflict, the decisive factors for NSAGs presence, especially for the guerrillas, seemed to be poverty and inequality. Since the 1980s however, they expanded to municipalities with an abundance of resources such as illicit crops, gold, coal, oil, bananas, cattle and coffee (Sánchez and Chacón 2005, 4).

upsurge in violence. Only in 1988, did 1650 deaths related to political violence occur (Chernick 1988).

2.2. The consequences of spoiled peace negotiations and the consolidation of Colombia's guerrillas and paramilitaries (1990-2002)

The years from 1990 until 2002 continue to be marked by ambiguity. On the one hand, Gaviria's administration (1990-1994) managed to negotiate some additional guerrillas' demobilisation, set up an inclusive National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and a new constitution, but on the other hand violence during this period peaked (Kline 2009), as the expansion process of the two remaining guerrillas and paramilitaries continues making them extremely powerful. Decentralising reforms, of which NSAGs took advantage off, and considerable spoiling activities by different actors during peace negotiations also contributed to a rise in violence.

The negotiations with the remaining guerrilla groups that had started under Barco continued to be successful also under Gaviria's administration. Many rebel groups had endured high political and military costs, laying the ground for the willingness to commit to a negotiated solution (Nasi 2006). Additionally, the formation of a NCA had been successfully on its way. The M-19 was elected into the NCA with 19 members and Gaviria presented participating in it as a way to introduce structural transformations. He promised to include leaders of the remaining rebel groups that would demobilise, the opportunity to participate in the NCA (Nasi 2006). Ultimately, this led to the demobilisation of the EPL, PRT and MAQL and some other small militias in Medellín (Torres Del Río 2015; Kline 1999). Negotiations with the FARC and ELN, however, failed due to maintained aggression from both the public forces and the guerrilla groups (Kline 1999).

From 1992 onwards the Colombian government pursued an integral war against the FARC and ELN – from then on denominated as narcoguerrillas. Negotiations with the Samper government (1994-1998) were rejected due to the allegations that Samper had received drug money from the Cali cartel in order to finance his campaign (Nasi 2006; Torres Del Río 2015). Nevertheless, with President Pastrana another attempt to negotiate peace began in January 1999. From the start, those negotiations were a difficult endeavour and many parties acted as spoilers. First of all, both the FARC and ELN demanded a demilitarised area of five municipalities, which was guaranteed by the government to both. This triggered fierce opposition among the armed

forces, which ultimately was justified as the FARC used the area to strengthen themselves militarily, financially and strategically. Furthermore, attacks on each other continued and negotiations were suspended unilaterally at various times (Nasi 2006; Hylton 2006).

Another factor that gave reason for the FARC to question the commitment to peace of Pastrana's government, has been Plan Colombia. What originally started as an initiative to raise funds for peacebuilding, turned into a U.S.-led anti-drug policy of counterinsurgent and militarised nature, which heavily supported Colombian armed forces. Instead of targeting paramilitaries and remaining urban drug trafficking organisations as well, the plan mainly targeted FARC strongholds in southern Colombia (Nasi 2006; Hylton 2006).

The paramilitaries played a very important role as well in spoiling these negotiations, especially the ELN became their primary target, probably because one of the Castaño brothers had declared to defeat the ELN militarily in 1998. The national umbrella organisation of the paramilitaries, *Autodefenses Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) which had been founded by the Castaño brothers, was responsible for two unilateral suspensions from talks by the FARC.[11]

Moreover, important developments had been taking place during the Samper administration in the early 1990s: the territorial expansion of guerrillas and paramilitaries mutually reinforced each other. The two remaining guerrillas strengthened their numbers and territorial expansion, especially in the countryside (McDougall 2009; Hylton 2006).[12] This territorial expansion always took place in competition with the paramilitaries, influencing the strategies employed by both guerrillas. In the case of the ELN, their vulnerability to paramilitary attacks due to internal conflicts and the absence of a coherent national strategy made them turn to the FARC for an alliance to face the attacks, trying to prevent the loss of territory in Bolívar (Insight Crime 2021). The forces of the FARC came closer to urban centres and also urbanites would find their human security threatened. That showed how powerful the guerrilla had become and was one of the main reasons that Pastrana would initiate negotiations again; more and more voices were demanding a peaceful solution (Long 2015).

[11] First, they enacted a series of killings during the first days of negotiations and later on kidnapped six politicians to prevent the approval of a law that would allow a prisoner exchange between the government and the FARC. Efforts to derail the negotiations with the ELN were even greater and prevented any significant engagement in peace talks, even if the ELN was more credibly interested in bargaining as the group was considerably weaker than the FARC (Nasi 2006).

[12] See McDougall (2009) and Insight Crime (2021) for more detailed data on the expansion of both guerrillas during that time.

The competition with other NSAGs also influences the alternative ways of governance which the FARC had established in territories. After their arrival, the groups established certain institutions; regulations for illegal economic activities and the monopolisation of violence (Hough 2011; Richani 2013). They also engage in resource extraction from those populations, for example via a taxation system of the income of the local population. The revenues acquired were used to finance their activities and army, but also for the provision of public services, such as the construction of roads, schools and hospitals and the provision of security. Over time, it has been noted that guerrilla violence against civilians rose – their rule became more coercive. Authors like Hough (2011), Metelits (2009) and Gutiérrez Sanín (2008) link this to the rivalry faced due to other NSAGs.[13] It threatens the monopoly over resources and violence established before, pressuring the rebels to use more coercive means of extraction and violence. For the local populations that meant higher threats to their human security and a shift in the perception of the FARC from a protector to a racketeer (Hough 2011). Looking at the example of the department Caquetá examined by Hough (2011), certain FARC-territories, where the FARC were providing protection and other services to the population, could be characterised as heterogeneous, territorial and functional oligopolies, where they hold a fragile monopoly of violence. This changed with increasing paramilitarization leading to a territorial oligopoly marked by rivalry and consequently more violence.

The transformation of the paramilitaries during the 1990s are related to the developments mentioned before. Until 1994 they acted locally on demand by the narcobourgeoisie and landowners, who needed protection for their investments and property from guerrilla attacks (Richani 2013, 118). Additionally, in 1994, their illegalization was reversed, which led to the new programme CONVIVIR for the establishment of private defence groups until 1997. Once again, the military de facto relied on paramilitaries for counterinsurgent attacks (McDougall 2009). This illustrates how the state used one NSAG to fight another one, which indicates that nationwide the state probably has not been the dominant security leader at that time and that arrangements and competition in the oligopoly of violence existed.

[13] A strategy is to destabilise guerrilla areas in order to break down the ties between them and the local peasant population. At some point, they will decide that it might be better to turn to another actor, either another NSAG or the official army. A cruel way to impose rule is terror via human rights violations, more specifically, massacres. The paramilitaries are the main group using them as a tool to eliminate the guerrilla interference; a report from 1999 shows that 40% of massacres and 78,69% of human rights violations were caused by paramilitaries, in contrast to 16% and 17% by guerrillas respectively (Richani 2013).

During the same year of their first national summit in December 1994, the different paramilitary groups started to organise themselves more coherently on a national level, always financed by narcotraffickers and the landed oligarchy. Ultimately in 1997, this led to their unification under the federation *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) mentioned before, undertaken by the Castaño brothers who had founded the *Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá* (ACCU).[14] It becomes evident that both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries acted as providers of security to different populations. Once competition between them increased due to their expansion and strengthening, so did violence. Territorial OoV based on competition were present during this period, with the predicted consequence of more violence threatening peoples' human security. Simultaneously, the OoV were also homogeneous, as the guerrillas and paramilitaries were providers of one product – security.

Regarding organised crime and narcotrafficking, the state continued to wage the war on drugs with the support of the U.S, following the "kingpin strategy" (Rosen 2015). According to this strategy, cartels are not able to function without their leaders. Therefore, their capture lies at the centre. During the first half of the 1990s, the Colombian government was able to dismantle the Medellín and the Cali cartel with that strategy. Nevertheless, not without allegations of cooperation with the cartels; it is said that President Samper (1994-1998) had received drug money from the Cali cartel in order to finance his election campaign (Knoester 1998). The collapse of the cartels has not led to an end of the narcobusiness however. Instead, the cartels fragmented into smaller organisations that started fighting to fill in the power vacuum in the illegal business that had resulted. This indicates the presence of an Oligopoly of Violence marked by competition between them. Consequently, President Pastrana strived for Plan Colombia, as mentioned before. Even with almost one billion dollars invested by the U.S. government into fighting drug trafficking and organised crime, Colombia became the largest coca cultivator by 2000, and the violence related continued.

[14] Like the guerrillas, the AUC grew considerably during the 1990s – while they only had 1200 members in 1993, that number rose to approximately 4.000-5.000 in 1998 and to 8.000 in 2000 (Richani 2013; McDougall 2009). The factors benefiting their growth and the rise of the Castaño brothers were a political void among the right-wing armed groups, resulting from the demise of the Medellín and Cali cartel and the death of Rodríguez Gacha, who was, besides Escobar, an important leader of the former and the paramilitaries. Additionally, the control of important parts of narcotrafficking businesses and routes provided the funds to finance the AUC's growth and very professional military equipment in order to engage in counterinsurgency (Richani 2013).

2.3. Military state-building and peace with the AUC and FARC under Uribe and Santos (2002-2021)

In 2002, following Pastrana, Álvaro Uribe Vélez was elected in a context of rampant violence. Each indicator of violence had increased during Pastrana's administration compared to the Samper years, deteriorating the situation of human security. Pastrana's peace negotiations and the concessions he gave were unsuccessful and instead helped the FARC to consolidate and expand their fronts. With his slogan '*mano firme, corazón grande*' (firm hand, large heart), Uribe presented himself as the candidate who would face the guerrillas militarily and thereby re-establish law and order in the country and negotiations would only be started with NSAGs that agreed to cease-fires. This resonated with the Colombian people and marked a completely new phase of intensification in the country's conflict (Kline 2009; Rodríguez 2014).

Uribe's administrations were very much focused on state-building to make the country safer and establish full territorial control (Kline 2009; Hinojosa 2018; Rodríguez 2014; Pachón 2009). He aimed to do so by strengthening the military and making the government more efficient, visible and accessible to citizens. His democratic security policy (DSP) is of special importance here and formed the backbone of his programme. Guided by the assertion that in order to regain security, authority needs to be put over liberty, the Colombian military became the main subject of his policies. A total restructuring of the military took place, leading to its expansion, modernization and renewed support by the Colombian population. Numbers of the military and also police forces rose by 40%, while they received better training and equipment at the same time (Ríos Sierra 2020). All this took place in close alliance with U.S. administrations and was financed partially with funds from Plan Colombia and justified with the proclaimed war on terror. The FARC, ELN and AUC were all on the U.S. State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Also, Uribe denominated the guerrillas, especially the FARC, as terrorist organizations. For him there was no armed conflict based on political aspirations. His all-out war on the guerrillas was put into practice with Plan Patriota, which was Colombia's most ambitious military operation plan and aimed to regain control of territory in the hands of the guerrillas and defeat the latter militarily (Kline 2009; Hylton 2006). Over Uribe's administrations both groups were significantly weakened; the number of FARC fighters was reduced from 17,000 in 2001 to 8000 in 2008 (Hinojosa 2018). The number of ELN combatants declined from 5000 to around 2,000 fighters in the same period of time.

It can be observed that the military confrontation against the FARC and ELN resulted in the peripheralization of both actors' presence, meaning that both groups intensified their presence at the border regions with Ecuador and Venezuela, which are characterised by institutional weakness of the state and illicit crop cultivation, and relocated their weakened fronts from more central regions (Salas Salazar 2014; Ríos Sierra 2020). Consequently, a reduction in violence and guerrilla actions took place in those regions where the presence of the guerrillas was reduced. However, levels of guerrilla presence and violence in north-eastern and southwestern regions rose between 2008 and 2012, as a result of the concentration in these peripheral areas. This indicates that the national OoV arrangements have changed. The strengthening of the Colombian military led to a considerable weakening of the guerrillas and pushed them to marginal territories, indicating the formation of a territorial OoV with the state as the dominant security leader on a national level, while the guerrillas hold marginal territories under their control.

Another factor which led to the intensification of the conflict during the first years of Uribe's administration was the consolidation of the AUC, which had started in 1997 (Ríos Sierra 2020). As mentioned before, the number of members of the paramilitary organisation grew significantly and it became the hegemonic NSAG in the Caribbean region of Colombia. During 1998 and 2004 the AUC was also the main responsible actor for the majority of acts of forced displacement and massacres. The AUC found itself on a peak of their power by 2003, both financially and militarily, and preferred to bargain their demobilisation from that position of strength (Hinojosa 2018; Hylton 2006). Additionally, they viewed Uribe as a favourable negotiation partner, aligned with their interests. They saw the possibility to stay powerful in times of peace and Uribe concentrated all efforts against the guerrillas, which had been the reason for the paramilitaries to emerge in the first place. By July 2005, the National Congress approved the Law of Peace and Justice, facilitating the demobilisation of roughly 35,000 AUC members of 37 subgroups. The immediate result was a significant reduction of violence indicators in 2006 in the country (Kline 2009; Hinojosa 2018).

Besides the dramatic reduction of levels of violence during Uribe's administrations as a result of his DSP and the AUC demobilisation, his government has also been heavily criticised (Pachón 2009). As mentioned before, paramilitary groups had a legal foundation and were formed with a specific counterinsurgent motive. This ideological orientation has been maintained over years and it cannot be denied that this NSAG had been a convenient ally in the war against the guerrillas for the Colombian government (Ríos Sierra and Cairo 2020;

Hristov 2014). The growth of the AUC between 1997-2003 has been tolerated by the military and police and local businesses as well as by politicians who cooperated with the paramilitaries. Illustrative of those connections is the scandal of parapolitics in 2007, which revealed that 35% of the National Congress had maintained connections to the AUC (Kline 2015; Hristov 2014). That also was the case during Uribe's first administration. The legal CONVIVIR groups and the AUC had been very powerful in the Northern Caribbean territory and expelled the guerrilla from this region. Interviews with paramilitary leaders dismantle the informal connections of Uribe's government with this NSAG (Ríos Sierra and Cairo 2020).

Also, in terms of the violence employed by state agents and the resulting effects on the human security of civilians, Uribe's administrations leave a dark legacy behind. The Colombian state has always made use of extensive illicit violence, however the numbers of massacres, abductions and executions by state agents peaked in 2007 (Hinojosa 2018). Another scandal, still investigated today, is the phenomenon of 'false positives', which involves extrajudicial killings of civilians, who were then presented as guerrilleros killed in combat, by members of the Colombian armed forces (Kline 2009).[15] While this phenomenon had been happening in the country before, the incentive structure during Uribe's terms intensified it dramatically.

Lastly, the Law of Peace and Justice and the demobilisation process of the AUC has also been heavily criticised, for example, there was no mandatory confession included, the penalties were to weak and no reparations for victims nor a strategy to dismantle the economic and political facets of paramilitarism was included (Kline 2009). As a consequence, already during and quickly after the negotiation process, new groups developed, consisting of demobilised, non-demobilised and new recruited members. They were denominated *bandas criminales* (criminal bands) or shortly BACRIM, by the government of Uribe. This is in line with the de-politized interpretation of the conflict in the country during Uribe's terms. For his government the threat is a terroristic one and the main terrorist organisation the FARC. In 2007, as answer to the emergence of the BACRIM, his administration promulgated a consolidation of the DSP, which basically was a continuation of the former DSP. The FARC remained the main group to be combatted and even if the BACRIM were recognized, their importance was minimised. It was

[15] The authors Omar Eduardo Rojas Bolaños Fabián Leonardo Benavides Silva (2017) Bolanos and of the book *Ejecuciones Extrajudiciales en Colombia 2002-2010: Obedencia Ciega en Campos de Batalla Ficticios* posit that the false positives are the result of a systematic practice by the military together with paramilitaries, demobilised, informants and other individuals. Soldiers were rewarded with payments and days of rest for reported successes, which were measured in dead guerrilla body counts. The phenomenon happened in almost every department, showing the magnitude of the scandal. For more information see (Arango González 2019; Quintero Mendoza 2016; Vestri 2015)

only in his last year of presidency, in 2010, that the post-demobilization groups were directly addressed with decree 2374/2010 (García Ruiz, Silva Aparicio and Magallanes Montoya 2018).

Uribe's successor, Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018), first maintained Uribe's strategy of military pressure against NSAGs, also when confronting the BACRIM. However, he recognized that there is a political dimension to Colombia's armed conflict, acknowledging political motivations by the FARC and ELN. This resulted in a broader perception of the security problems faced and did not only determine the FARC as the most important NSAG to be combatted, but also the potential for violence and power of other NSAGs was recognized. Ultimately in 2016, his government puts forward a new classification of the BACRIM with decree 15/2016, categorising them into organised armed groups (Spanish acronym GAOs) or organised criminal groups (Spanish acronym GDOs) as mentioned by García Perrilla and Herrera (2017).[16]

In 2007, thirty-four different BACRIM were identified (Rico 2013). That number has been reduced due to the persecution by the state, but also because of disputes between themselves, resulting in the presence of five major groups in 2016; the Gulf Clan, *los Rastrojos, Águilas Negras, los Puntilleros* and *los Pelusos.* The last group are dissidents of the EPL that demobilised in the 1990s (INDEPAZ 2017). Some of the smaller structures are *los Constru, los Pachenca, la Oficina, la Empresa, la Cordillera Nueva Orden* and *Renacer AUC*. One example of conflicts between them, was the violent period of confrontation between *los Rastrojos* and the Gulf Clan between 2006-2009, resulting in 2300 deaths (Rico 2013). The former, already internally divided, was considerably weakened and territory partially absorbed by the latter. The territorial control exercised by these groups relies on the use or the threat to use violence. Naturally this affects the human security of the local populations who are sometimes subject to torture or murder and consequently live in constant fear (Bargent and Charles 2017).

Furthermore, these groups also maintain transnational relations for example with Mexican cartels such as the Sinaloa cartel or *los Zetas*, as they control the majority of routes to the U.S. (Aranzazu 2016). Sometimes those alliances include support when the Colombian groups

[16] While the latter are mainly fought against by the *Policía Nacional*, the former are persecuted by the military as they are considered more powerful. The distinction of both types did not necessarily lead to significantly different strategies employed against them. The operations and actions against those groups have led to the capture of many leaders and middlemen and the seizure of drugs and weapons, but they did not dismantle the support structures and the networks between them (Jiménez 2012).

confront each other, e.g., the Sinaloa cartel supported *los Rastrojos* economically and logistically during their confrontation with the Gulf Clan (Rico 2013). Profits are not only derived from narcotrafficking but also illegal mining and livestock (Bargent and Charles 2017).

The presence of so many post-AUC-demobilisation groups has sparked considerable debate around the question whether they mark a continuation of paramilitarism in the country. There are authors such as Hristov (2015) and Echeverri and Restrepo (2007) who are convinced that the demobilisation was nothing else than a legalisation of paramilitary structures by deliberately guaranteeing impunity to many of the demobilised. Intermediate positions emphasise that there is both continuation and differences in the way those groups operate. Many of the new structures remain controlling the same territories as the AUC before, benefit from the same illicit economies and some of their members or leaders are former AUC commandants (Barrera 2020). However, there has been a certain deinstitutionalisation and de-elitisation of paramilitarism and the counterinsurgent motives are mostly absent. The main preoccupation is to ensure stability for their illicit and licit activities. This can be observed in the usage of mechanisms like diversification, specialisation and subcontracting, cooperation or pacts of non-aggression with other NSAGs, including guerrillas. Furthermore, in the national discourse, the debate has been dominated by how to fight those groups and not about the controversy of why they are not persecuted as has been the case with the predecessors (Barrera 2020). Nevertheless, the role of the state and public forces remains ambivalent as there is complicity of state officials and members of the public forces on different levels and practices such as violent lobbying and bribery remain prevalent (Barrera 2020; González Posso 2017). For the rest of the thesis the term paramilitary successor organisations (PSOs) will be used to refer to these groups.[17]

The dynamics described above mark another change in the characterisation of the OoV on the country level. Before, the relationship between paramilitaries and the state has been one of closely intertwined cooperation, tolerance and reliance of the latter on the former in order to fight the guerrilla. Now more recently, the state has been opposing some of the PSOs in a way that was not seen before and internal disputes between leaders and middle man inhibit the establishment of a national umbrella organisation. However, PSOs adapt constantly in their

[17] For a more detailed comparison of the former paramilitary groups and the PSOs and their differences, see Barrera (2020, 182-199). Additionally, the INDEPAZ has produced reports on the paramilitary complex, its different dimensions and transformations, denominating the post-AUC-demobilisation groups as *narcoparamilitares*, due to their strong connection to narcotrafficking and mentioned similarities with the former paramilitaries (González Posso 2017; Espitia Cueca et al. 2018).

practices and there are still forms of cooperation or co-optation with state officials. Therefore, depending on the subregional context, both forms of territorial OoV, either based on competition or arrangements between NSAGs present can be found.

As mentioned before Santos, while maintaining the heavy military pressure early in his presidency introduced by Uribe, he diverted from his predecessor in his perception of the conflict. He acknowledged the underlying political motives of the FARC and began secret conversations with the leadership in Havana in early 2012 (Hinojosa 2018; Rodríguez 2014). The guerrilla had been weakened considerably and realised that it would not achieve its ultimate goal of military victory over the state (Herbolzheimer 2016). The start of official peace negotiations soon followed and led to an agreement in August 2016, which would be signed and ratified on December 1 by the National Congress. The peace accords include agreements for six main points: rural development and agrarian reform, political participation of oppositional forces, conflict termination, a solution for the problem of illicit drugs, transitional justice and victims and lastly the verification and implementation of the accords (n.a. 2022). By the end of 2017, the process of demobilisation and disarmament was concluded; more than 13.000 FARC members handed in their weapons and started the process of reintegration, first in camps at specific locations for security purposes (INDEPAZ 2021; Casey and Daniels 2017). Additionally, the political party *Fuerza Revolucionaria Alternativa del Común* (now *Comunes*) was founded and granted seats in congress, marking the transformation of the guerrilla group into an officially recognized opposition force (Reuters 2021).

After this peace process approximately 20-30 new subsequent structures developed, of which some denominate themselves as the follow up to the demobilised FARC (Aguilera Peña 2020). Those groups are generally called FARC-dissidents and are classified by the Colombian government as Residual Organized Armed Groups (Spanish acronym GAOr). This categorization is not ideal as, according to INDEPAZ, 900 of the estimated 2500 members are rearmed, 300 did not disarm (these are by definition dissidents) and 1300 are new recruits (Espitia Cueca et al. 2018). To maintain consistency those groups are denominated FARC successor fronts (FSFs) throughout the thesis. There are two larger networks of FSFs. The first one to emerge was the network centred around Gentil Duarte in the *Comando Conjunto Oriental*, who dissented from the peace process in 2016. In 2019, the second one, the *Segunda Marquetalia*, was formed later by former FARC-members that saw the peace agreement as broken by the Colombian state. It is important to note, however, that not all the FSFs belong to one of these and also if they do, they still act in an independent way locally (Restrepo 2022).

The high number of different fronts makes the phenomenon very complex. Their motivations vary as well; some seem to be more political and informed by a leftist ideology, while others are purely criminal organisations (Espitia Cueca et al. 2018). This shows how once again the recent demobilisation process transformed the OoV configurations in marginal territories due to the emergence of FSFs that maintain different relations with other NSAGs present. INDEPAZ (González Perafán, Cabezas Palacios, and Zimmermann 2021) describes how in Putumayo they are competing with some, but cooperate with other NSAGs.

In terms of human security, the situation in Colombia has improved overall, for example a reduction in homicides has been taking place since 2003 (Escobedo et al. 2016). With the start of the peace negotiations, the effects on human security nationally expanded also on other indicators of violence, such as victims of the armed conflict, dead combatants and violent actions[18]. Especially in the last year of negotiations when the FARC and the government parties signed a bilateral agreement for the de-escalation of conflict, they fell to the lowest numbers registered for 52 years (CERAC 2016). Five years after the signing of the peace accords, evaluations show, however, that the situation of human security in the country is the worst since the peace accords in 2016. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the number of internally displaced persons, injured or killed as a result of violence has reached its highest level in five years (ICRC 2022). One particular group that is targeted are human rights defenders and social leaders; 1270 of them have been assassinated between the 24th of November 2016 and the 23rd of November 2021 (INDEPAZ 2021). Moreover, the same geographic hotspots of violence during the armed conflict with the FARC are still the ones most affected. The levels of homicide rose in areas with a high density of coca crops and reintegrating ex-guerrilleros (Ríos Sierra 2020). With the election of Iván Duque in 2019, the implementation of the accords is going rather slow due to the lack of political and financial commitment (Otálvaro and Klinger 2020). The structural and institutional causes at the root of the violence are not being resolved and the state was not able to establish its presence and fill the power vacuum left in the areas where the FARC had become the governance entity. Instead, different armed groups and criminal structures are now competing over the territory in order to control illicit economies, which leads to the rise in numbers of violence indicators (Ríos Sierra 2020).

[18] The interviewees Hilda B. Molano Casas from COALICO, Leonardo González from INDEPAZ, María del Carmen (Carmenza) Muñoz Sáenz from CINEP reported this in our conversations.

Conclusion

All in all, the probably most striking feature of the Colombian landscape of NSAGs, is its complexity. The emergence of state-opposing, Marxist guerrilla groups triggered the formation of first legal paramilitary groups to fight them, as the state did not have the capacity to face them on its own. Even though if outlawed later on, the state continued to use the powerful paramilitaries against the FARC and ELN. Furthermore, the emergence of drug trafficking networks and the resulting profits altered the dynamics of the conflict considerably, as they provided the means to finance expansion and armed struggle of the different NSAGs. This in turn set the incentive for NSAGs to establish territorial control of areas and communities, causing competition between the different actors – with detrimental consequences for the human security of the civilian population. The new constitution of 1991 and the decentralisation following also incentivised both guerrillas and paramilitaries in establishing local control over the more independent municipalities and their resources.

The armed conflict entered a new phase with the election of Uribe, whose main goal was to strengthen the state's military capacity. Additionally, his administration negotiated the AUC's demobilisation. The heavy military confrontation of the guerrilla groups weakened the FARC considerably leading to a peace agreement with them under Santos. However, both the process by Uribe and Santos left behind new, more fragmented structures, the PSOs and FSFs, additionally to the ELN. They continue to threaten the human security of local populations, especially in certain marginal hotspots where they make up the governing entity and are in active rivalry with other NSAGs or the state.

Consequently, OoV can be observed during the different periods. Throughout all of them the principal triangle of state, paramilitaries and guerrillas is present, further complicated by the presence of different organised crime groups with transnational characteristics. Due to Uribe's emphasis on military capacity, the Colombian state was able to establish itself nationally as the dominant security leader. Even so, marginal regions where state presence is still weak continue to exist. In these, NSAGs continue to exert control and more recently new configurations have been formed due to the vacuum left by the FARC demobilisation and the emergence of FSFs, adding yet again new NSAG-structures. This reconfiguration often has been marked by competition or persecution by the state resulting in detrimental consequences for human security.

3. Chapter: The case of Arauca – Caught between militarization and non-state armed group rivalries

Chapter 3 will analyse the specific reconfiguration of the NSAGs after the FARC demobilisation in one of the regional hotspots today – the department Arauca at the Venezuelan border. Section 1 will provide some information about the department and its Oligopoly of Violence configuration before 2017. The next sections will analyse the reconfiguration of it after 2017, which includes the relationship between the NSAGs (section 3.2.) but also with the Colombian and Venezuelan military (section 3.3.). Finally, the impact of that reconfiguration on the human security of local populations will be assessed in section 3.4.

3.1. Zooming in: Background information and the Oligopoly of Violence before 2017

The department Arauca is located in the extreme north of Colombia's Orinoquía region also called *Llanos Orientales* (see Map 1). The department is subdivided into seven municipalities Saravena, Fortul, Tame, Arauquita, Puerto Rondón, Arauca and Cravo Norte (see Map 2). The Arauca River marks the border with the Venezuelan department Apure for the municipalities Saravena, Arauquita and Arauca.

Map 1: Map of Colombia and Venezuela with department names (Wikimedia Commons 2015b)

Map 2: Municipalities of Arauca (Wikimedia Commons 2015a)

The oil industry is of special economic importance for the department, and its presence has played a crucial role in the armed conflict. The oil field Caño Limón, located in Arauca and Arauquita, was discovered in 1983 and attracted national, international and public as well as private investments. The oil extracted there is transported via the longest Colombian pipeline Caño Limón – Coveñas until the port Coveñas in the department Sucre (FIP 2014). Map 3 provides an overview of the pipelines in the region. The Bicentenario pipeline also passes through the Arauca.



Map 3: Colombia´s oil pipelines (Portafolio 2017)

Historically, the department has been highly affected by the armed conflict, also reflected in the fact that four municipalities are classified as such in the peace accords and as a result receive support in the form of Territorially Focused Development Plans, which are part of the peace agreement with the FARC (El Espectador 2021b). There are various factors that make Arauca an attractive territory for NSAGs. Its location at the Venezuelan border provides NSAGs with the possibility to use Venezuelan territory as a rear-guard area and to "tax" drug and arms trafficking across the border, besides other forms of contraband (VIU 2021). Even more important is the presence of the petroleum industry because NSAGs constantly extort the companies and carry out attacks on infrastructure and kidnap company members. These practices have been a crucial source of finance for NSAGs, especially the ELN and to a lesser extent the FARC.[19] The systematisation of extortion of oil companies and the resulting deviation of the profits from that sector have been contributing to the prolongation of the armed conflict, ever since its discovery.[20]

Especially since Uribe's administration, the state`s response to these problems has been an extreme militarization of the department in order to protect the oil infrastructure and the extracting companies. Approximately 9.600 troops are stationed, with an average of 34,2 military members for 1000 inhabitants which surpasses the national average by 300% (Editor Medellín 2022). Militarization does not benefit the population and border villages are often left without any protection. Despite the richness in oil and the profits derived from it, the population living in Arauca is still neglected by the state and lacks access to basic services in health, education and infrastructure (Aponte González and González González 2021; Idler 2019). There are also abuses happening that are committed by the public forces against the populations, due to the fact that most of the soldiers perceive the people of Arauca merely as a bunch of allies to the ELN (VerdadAbierta 2022). The consequences for the population are constant stigmatization, mass detentions and incidences of sexual and gender-based violence (FIP 2014).

The first NSAG that arrived in Arauca was the ELN. They needed to reorganise after being heavily debilitated by the state military operation Anorí against them in 1973. They established their presence also established in Cesar and Norte de Santander. The *Frente Domingo Laín*

[19] For a historical overview of attacks of the ELN on the oil infrastructure and the motivations behind them see the report "El ELN y la Industria Petrolera: Ataques a la Infraestructura en Arauca" (FIP 2015).
[20] Not only the NSAGs use it to their benefit, also local politicians divert funds, levels of corruption are very high and people working in the department's administration are often not sufficiently qualified to do so. That is why resources do not arrive where they are needed, e.g. in education, infrastructure and culture (FIP 2014; 2015).

(FDL) has been the principal structure in Arauca.[21] It belongs to the most powerful subdivision of the ELN, the *Frente de Guerra Oriental* (FIP 2014). During the 1980s and 1990s, the ELN achieved a significant expansion and consolidation made possible by the profits derived from practices against the oil sector. The group was able to establish its presence in all municipalities of Arauca and basically established itself as the main governance actor, controlling the public, social, political and economic order (Celi 2022; Aponte González and González González 2021). Since the 1980s their presence also extended into the Venezuelan department Apure. With a restructuring in the past ten years, they established themselves as the hegemonic governance actor among the local communities and they managed to expand their presence beyond Apure (León et al. 2012; Aponte González and González González 2021; VIU 2018a).

The FARC expanded their presence to Arauca shortly after the ELN and took the municipality Fortul in 1980, establishing the Frente 10, which by the end of the decade would be divided, leading to the emergence of the Frente 45. During 1990, the FARC would become more mobile and expand its presence all over the department and across the border. Notably, Venezuela also had its own guerrilla, the *Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberación* (FBL). For a long time, the three guerrilla groups coexisted and cooperated sometimes (Idler 2019). Even if both groups were hegemonic in certain municipalities, the ELN especially in Fortul and Saravena, and the FARC in Puerto Rondón and Cravo Norte, in most of the municipalities both guerrillas were coexisting (Aponte González and González González 2021). However in 1998, with the expansion of coca crop cultivation and drug trafficking, the FARC managed to consolidate itself and started to challenge the predominant ELN in order to capture extortion profits as well (FIP 2014).

During the 1990s, the paramilitaries tried to establish their presence in Arauca, but the guerrillas successfully prevented that, due to the considerate support of their social bases. Later in 2000, the AUC arrived in Arauca with the *Bloque Vencedores de Arauca* (BVA). The BVA confronted both the FARC and ELN leading to an intensification of the conflict, especially in Saravena and Arauquita, which hindered the expansion process of the FARC and led to a higher presence of the ELN in Venezuela. However, the paramilitaries were never able to establish a hegemonic presence in the department and only controlled parts of the Southern municipalities of Tame, Cravo Norte and Puerto Rondón. Finally, with the AUC demobilisation process under Uribe, the BVA demobilised in December 2005 (FIP 2014). With the demobilisation, a

[21] Other present structures of the ELN in Arauca have been the Frente Efraín Pabón, Columna Adonay Ardilla and the compañías Simátoca and Capitán Pomares (OPDHDIH 2002).

reconfiguration of actors took place and some paramilitary successor organisations (PSOs), such as the Águilas Negras, the *Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antisubversivo de Colombia* (ERPAC) and ex-BVA combatants, would concentrate their presence in Tame, Saravena and Arauca. However, due to the historic hegemony of the guerrillas, PSOs' presence ended in 2013 (FIP 2014).

The disappearance of the BVA also led to a sharpening of the confrontations between the FARC and ELN, which had started in 1998. From March 2006 until November 2010, the two guerrillas engaged in brutal confrontations between them, both in Arauca and Apure, further complicated by the participation of the Venezuelan FBL. The FBL in its early days has closely worked together with the ELN. Today it identifies the ELN rather as competition (VIU 2018a). The period was perceived as the most violent by inhabitants of Arauca and produced more displacement in the department than the brutal paramilitary incursion between 2001 and 2003. The war ended in 2010 with a non-aggression pact, called "No more confrontation between revolutionaries". The Araucan territory, as well as parts of Apure, were divided between the two Colombian guerrillas. Over time those divisions would become less strict and in 2014 the FARC and ELN even formulated a manual of rules for the local populations together and started to cooperate again against state forces (Idler 2019; VerdadAbierta 2011).[22] Nevertheless, Map 4 provides an indication of the hegemonic territorial presence of each group in 2013 – green areas imply ELN presence, brown areas FARC presence.

[22] The author Anette Idler (2019, 130-143), as well as VerdadAbierta (2011), produced detailed analyses of the dynamics of the confrontation between the Colombian guerrillas and their consequences for human security and the negotiations for an end of the war.



Map 4: Presence of guerrilla groups in Arauca in 2013 (FIP 2014)

All in all, the department Arauca mirrors the complexity of Colombia's landscape of NSAGs and the armed conflict. Every type of group has been present at some point. In Arauca there has always been a territorial oligopoly present with its further characterizations differing. The relationship between the military and both guerrillas always has been one of rivalry. Between the guerrilla groups ELN and FARC, the OoV was based on an arrangement first. Both groups coexisted and had their municipalities where the presence of one group would be stronger. Except for a short disruption in 1998, that relationship was maintained to counter the arrival of the paramilitaries via the BVA and a stronger state presence with Plan Colombia in 2000 (Aponte González and González González 2021). With the demobilisation of the BVA in 2005, the conflict between the two guerrillas resumed, transforming their relationship into one of open rivalry, making the conditions of human security of the populations even worse than they had been before.

During the FARC's demobilisation process, peace negotiations with the ELN, which had been announced before, finally started in 2017. Both developments lead to substantial decreases in violence indicators. With the end of the negotiations,[23] the expansion of the ELN and the emergence of the FARC successor front (FSF) *Frente 10 – Martín Villa* (F10-MV), pressures against the populations rose again.

[23] The reason for the end of the peace negotiations with the ELN was that the group exerted a bomb attack on a police academy in Barranquilla, which killed seven police officers (Acosta 2018).

3.2. The reconfiguration of the Oligopoly of Violence after the FARC demobilisation

Since the demobilisation of the FARC, there have been especially two NSAGs that consolidated their presence in Arauca and Apure: the FDL, belonging to the ELN, and the F10-MV. As mentioned before, the FDL has had a long-established presence in both Arauca and Apure the department for various decades. It has established itself as a governance actor, regulating the communities' behaviour (Celi 2022). Consequently, during the last months of 2017 and the beginning of 2018, the ELN took over the zones that before the demobilisation of the FARC have been under FARC control. At the same time, the group also consolidated its presence and influence further in Venezuela, beyond Apure, using it as a rear-guard zone (Cajiao 2018).

At some point between three and six different FSFs have been present. The F10-MV is the most important one and emerged from one of the actual FARC fronts, the *Frente 10*. In December 2016, fifteen members of that FARC front left the reintegration camp located in Arauquita due to their disagreement with the peace agreement and founded the F10-MV. In the beginning, they mainly operated on Venezuelan ground in La Victoria, but by May 2018 the group was active in almost all of Arauca's seven municipalities, except Cravo Norte (Cabezas Palacios, Rondón Molina, and González Perafán 2020; Álvarez Vanegas, Pardo Calderón, and Cajiao Vélez 2018; Cajiao 2018; Defensoría del Pueblo 2018c).

Furthermore, the relationship between the two types of NSAGs changed significantly over time. Once the F10-MV had established itself as the main FSF in Arauca it maintained a non-aggression pact with the ELN and they even cooperated with each other in illicit activities across the border (VIU 2018b; Cajiao 2022; Cabezas Palacios, Rondón Molina, and González Perafán 2020). Directly after the demobilisation of the FARC only sporadic clashes would take place between the FSFs and the ELN (Posada 2022). Over time, according to VerdadAbierta (2022), the ELN had been asked to exert governance by the population in Arauca as the F10-MV had behaved quite violently towards the civilian population. The selective homicides of F10-MV members had been the first reaffirmations of power and governance authority. In addition, the F10-MV belongs to the larger network of FSFs and its *Comando Conjunto Oriental* that follow the leader Gentil Duarte (Restrepo 2022), which puts them into a position of rivalry against the members of FSFs belonging to Iván Márquez's *Segunda Marquetalia*. In September 2021, the latter tried to expel the F10-MV from Apure, but the F10-MV was able

to push it back and killed three of the *Segunda Marquetalia's* main leaders in December of the same year. The ELN had remained outside of these confrontations at first, as it had cooperated with both FSF networks (Posada 2022; Posada and Garcia 2021; VIU 2018b; InsightCrime 2021). Map 5 provides an indication of the presence of the different NSAGs in Apure.[24]



Map 5: NSAGs presence in Apure (VIU 2021)

This relation changed roughly at the end of 2021, confirming the predictions of the *Defensoría del Pueblo* (2018c; 2021), which has been warning that the agreement between the F10-MV and ELN is very fragile and foresaw strong confrontations between the two groups. Ultimately, this is exactly what has been happening. During the first weeks of 2022, selective homicides of F10-MV members were committed by the FDL, followed by open disputes with serious humanitarian consequences for the Araucan communities. There are various explanations put forward of why the fragile coexistence turned into heavy confrontations. The Colombian government reduces it to a conflict for the control of routes for narcotrafficking (VerdadAbierta 2022).

[24] See Chapter 2 "Apure's Proxy War" of a recent investigation by InSight Crime's Venezuela Investigative Unit (VIU 2021) on the development of the rivalry between the F10-MV and the *Segunda Marquetalia* in Apure.

While this might partially explain the situation, much more is at stake for the NSAGs. First and foremost, the competition for territorial and social control of the border department is important for all kinds of illicit activities such as contraband across the river into Venezuela and extortion from which both groups want to benefit (Celi 2022; VerdadAbierta 2022). Moreover, with the strengthening of the F10-MV, the discrepancies between the two groups became more and more pronounced (Cajiao 2022). The two NSAGs have different opinions on coca crop cultivation in Arauca. Notably, Arauca has been free from coca crops approximately since 2018 (UNODC 2021; Gobernación de Arauca 2018). Voluntarily local populations eradicated all illicit crops, a process the FDL supported due to its historic disapproval of coca leaf cultivation (Cajiao 2018). The government's coca crop substitution programme also assisted during that process (FIP 2019). The F10-MV, however, wants to introduce cultivation again (Restrepo 2022).

Another reason could be that the F10-MV feels confident to confront the ELN after the successful attacks against the *Segunda Marquetalia* – rumours exist that the FSF has killed various ELN members (Collazos 2022; Posada 2022).[25] Having in mind the cooperation between the *Segunda Marquetalia* and ELN, this seems reasonable. Ultimately it probably was an interplay of all these factors that led to the confrontations contributing to a new wave of violence in Arauca and Apure with deteriorating consequences for the human security of the civilian population (see section 3.4.).

With the emergence and consolidation of the FSFs and the disappearance of the FARC, the oligopoly of violence configuration in Arauca and Apure changed. It remains a territorial oligopoly as all NSAGs and also the state, strive for the exertion of territorial and social control. Right after the FARC demobilisation, the NSAGs avoided conflict with each other and opted for coexistence. With increasing consolidation, violence is used in a selective way and sporadically to show their claim for power and governance. Once, however, the F10-MV became stronger they decided to become a direct rival of the ELN. The goal is to gain control over territories, border crossings and populations in order to benefit from the profits that can be derived via extortion and contraband. Also, other differences play into this conflict, further complicated by the FSFs from the *Segunda Marquetalia* which also try to gain influence along the profitable border. Nevertheless, according to VerdadAbierta (2022) and the interviewees

[25] Also the fact that according to PARES (Restrepo 2022) the F10-MV has been supported in those confrontations by the FSF Frente 28, based in the neighbouring department Casanare, corroborates this.

Leonardo González[26], Juan Diego Posada[27] and Andrés Cajiao[28] the ELN is the most powerful NSAG in Arauca and Apure.

3.3. Non-state armed groups and the Colombian and Venezuelan military

Another important armed actor in OoV is the state military. As mentioned before Arauca has been heavily militarised ever since the discovery of oil in the department. The public forces have been the principal opponent of the former FARC, ELN and now the FSFs. Military and police units are, for example, targets of aggressive actions with explosives, ambushes and sporadic hostilities by the ELN (Jimenez and Cabezas Palacios 2020). To address the new configurations and continued attacks of NSAGs on the public forces and on each other, Duque's administration focused on a military response. In the end of 2017, three new battalions were created to operate in the rural zones of Saravena, Fortul and Tame (VerdadAbierta 2018). In 2019, Arauca was pronounced a Strategic Zone of Integral Integration, installing two new military bases and an additional police station (Redacción Trochando 2020). The consolidation of the military in these zones means also that they will penetrate the civilian institutions, militarising civilian life further (Editor Medellín 2022). In 2022 with the recent surge in confrontations, Duque's defence minister decided to deploy 600 additional soldiers and to increase the compensations for high-level NSAG members in Arauca (Semana 2022).

The public forces are of course not only stationed in the department to show their presence, but also to conduct operations against the NSAG or are attacked by the latter. According to the interviewed investigator Andrés Cajiao, the attacks on the Colombian armed forces have become less due to two factors. Firstly, the NSAGs are recently more focused on the conflict between themselves. Secondly, the military capacity of the state is definitely higher and they cannot win in open combat against it. That is why they, when attacking public forces, rather have relied on using snipers, ambush attacks and bomb attacks on military infrastructure. These actions require less military power. However, the presence of public forces concentrates at the petrol infrastructure and in urban areas, leaving rural areas and their people without any protection NSAG (HRW 2020). Additionally, when the NSAGs escape to Apure, where the

[26] Interviewed online via Zoom 28th of April 2022, Coordinator of the observatory of human rights at INDEPAZ
[27] Interviewed online via Zoom 3rd of May 2022, now editor and former investigator at InSight Crime
[28] Interviewed together with Paula Andrea Tobo Caviedes online via Zoom 7th of April 2022, investigator at the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP)

ELN even receives support of the Venezuelan government, Colombian forces are unable to persecute them (VerdadAbierta 2022).

In April 2022, Colombian troops attacked the F10-MV, killing five of its members (Loaiza 2022). At the same time, there are allegations, coming from the communities, that have been affected by attacks from the F10-MV and the *Frente 28 – Antonio Medina*, that these two FSFs receive some kind of support from the Colombian armed forces. Both belong to Gentil Duarte's *Comando Conjunto Oriental*. The interviewee Henry Cuervo Castillo[29], made a similar statement:

> "What you see in the language they use, in their press releases, in their actions; they are organisations with limited political formation. They do not have a coherent proposal or vision for the country. For a supposedly revolutionary organisation, these guys have a strange position – a position that makes one believe that they are actually infiltrated by the intelligence organisms of the military forces."[30]

Illustrative of these descriptions is an attack on the 20th of January in 2022 in Saravena. A car bomb exploded in front of the headquarters of various social organizations, heavily affecting the infrastructure of the building and four persons. First, the F10-MV was made responsible, later with a video message the *Frente 28 – Antonio Medina* took responsibility, stating that board presidents and social leaders must be killed (Redacción Trochando 2022). However, other newspapers indicated the F10-MV as the perpetrator (Redacción El Tiempo 2022). One should also not forget that the *Frente 28 – Antonio Medina* and the F10-MV belong to the same network of Gentil Duarte. Moreover, the F10-MV has threatened various organisations, among the ones attacked in Saravena, that they will be punished for collaborating with the ELN (amerika21 2022). This justification for the attacks has also often been used by the Colombian military when attacking or detaining civilians, as explained by Cuervo Castillo.[31]

Due to the long-established presence on Venezuelan ground in Apure and the usage of the zone as a very important rear-guard area for Colombian NSAGs, recent developments including the Venezuelan military are of considerable importance as well. In the past the Venezuelan government, especially under Chavez, held a connection with the former FARC and viewed

[29] Interviewed online via Zoom 12th of May 2022, Co-founder of CNAI and coordinator of the observatory of the armed conflict and post-conflict
[30] Quote from the interview with Henry Cuervo Castillo, translation mine.
[31] Interviewed online via Zoom 12th of May 2022, Co-founder of CNAI and coordinator of the observatory of the armed conflict and post-conflict

them as ideological allies (VIU 2018a). Also, the ELN has been tolerated by Nicolas Maduro and his government until today and has benefitted from this significantly. Their bases in Apure are their ultimate sanctuary from where they can plan and prepare their consolidation. Arguably, this stronghold in Venezuela is an important reason why the ELN is not engaging in peace negotiations with the Colombian government.

Furthermore, Venezuelan public forces seem to have instructions to support the rebels logistically. With the Bolivarian National Guard, the group engages in criminal cooperation in smuggling and contraband (VIU 2018a). Here the network structure known as the *Cartel de los Soles* is crucial. It consists of trafficking cells that are embedded in military and police forces that used to be directed by politicians. Since 2013, it has become more fragmented and a more self-regulated system.[32] Nevertheless, it does rely on the ELN as the guerrilla controls key routes across the border (InsightCrime 2022).

Similarly, as for the ELN, the FARC had also made use of Apure as one of their principal bases in the border region. The F10-MV used to maintain these pre-established connections and cooperation with the network and Venezuelan public forces as well. However, their relationship of cooperation has been deteriorating since September 2020 and turned into heavy confrontations after Maduro declared that the F10-MV had abused Venezuela's hospitality (VIU 2021). Consequently, the Venezuelan forces are trying to expel the FSF and have been attacking it in various operations between January 2021 and May 2021, with little success however. At some point the NSAG managed to capture Venezuelan soldiers that were released after the military withdrew from la Victoria (VIU 2021; El Espectador 2021a). The relationship looks different for the FSFs belonging to the *Segunda Marquetalia*. Their leader Iván Márquez has maintained high-level connections reaching Caracas, which leads to the assumption that the Venezuelan military is helping the *Segunda Marquetalia* in their conflict with the network of Gentil Duarte, represented by the F10-MV in Arauca and Apure (VIU 2021).

These recent developments have shown that the relationship between the two states' public forces and the NSAGs have changed within the oligopoly of violence. The former alliance between the F10-MV and the Venezuelan military broke down, while they might have become infiltrated or connected to the Colombian military. The Venezuelan government is committed to reinstall the power balance that existed before with the FARC by supporting the *Segunda*

[32] The *Cartel de los Soles* plays an important role for Maduro's regime, as it is used to reward loyal militaries with their placement in regions with opportunities for enrichment via illicit economies (InsightCrime 2022).

Marquetalia. It wants to re-establish its position as the dominant security leader in Apure. This has proven to be difficult. All these developments certainly benefited the ELN. They continue to receive support from the Venezuelan government, while their rival, the F10-MV, needs to defend against it. In Arauca, the Colombian state maintains the position of the dominant security leader, at least in areas of economic importance and urban centres. Here neither the ELN nor the F10-MV are able to defeat the state militaries. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the ELN is not the main governance actor, exerting considerable control of the territory and social life of the communities, especially in rural areas.

3.4. The consequences for human security of the interplay of the new Oligopoly of Violence and militarization

Historically, the population in Arauca and Apure has been suffering a lot under the consequences of the different developments in the armed conflict and reconfigurations of its OoV. Therefore, it is not surprising that the recent dynamics and clashes also have affected the communities' human security. How exactly those unfold and are affected by current events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Venezuelan migration crisis will be explained with some examples in this section. Due to the scope of the thesis, it is not elaborated on all types of consequences for human security in detail. Instead, particular dynamics that were highlighted by the interviewees, are discussed and explained more precisely.

> "It is necessary to understand that when a new actor arrives to impose new norms, there is always an exercise of more violence. In Arauca, with the process of expansion of the ELN to former FARC zones, there were certain pressures exerted against social leaders, which also included assassinations."[33]

This quote by Andrés Cajiao indicates what happened shortly after the demobilisation of the FARC in Arauca. With the consolidation of the ELN and F10-MV and their aim to establish social control, a rise in homicides can be observed in 2018 in Arauca, similar to levels between 2011 and 2013. The homicides often were of selective nature, targeting robbers, drug consumers, Venezuelan migrants and social leaders; in short, people who in the eyes of the ELN or the F10-MV did not comply with their social rules or norms (FIP 2019; HRW 2020). According to the interviewed investigator, social leaders are specifically targeted because "they

[33] Quote by Andrés Cajiao, translation above mine.

are a kind of intermediary, the person who stands in between the community and the armed actor, they are the interlocutor facing the armed actor."[34]

Additionally, other human security threats such as extortion and kidnapping, forced disappearance, accidents and incidents with antipersonnel mines, forced recruitment, gender-based sexual violence, forced displacement and confinement are effects on the civilian population and result from NSAGs rule and attacks directed against the public forces. All of this has been foreseen and registered by the *Defensoría del Pueblo* (2018a; 2018b; 2018c) in the aftermath of the demobilisation. A report by Human Rights Watch (HRW 2020) confirms this for both departments Arauca and Apure and documents incidents of forced labour as well.

Homicide rates in Arauca correlate with what has been indicated in the conducted interviews in general and the elaboration of killings of social leaders by Andrés Cajiao[35]; in 2015 with the cease-fire that was part of the peace negotiations 96 homicides were registered in Arauca. In 2018 and 2019, this number rose to 160 and 161, respectively (HRW 2020).

With the clashes between the F10-MV and the ELN that started in January 2022, the human security situation deteriorated further. Only in the first week of January, 27 people were killed in the confrontations and this triggered a wave of forced displacement (VerdadAbierta 2022). The number of killed people rose to 146 at the end of April (Colprensa 2022). End of March 2022, HRW (2022) reported 3860 internally displaced people in Arauca and more than 3300 people fleeing from Venezuela to Arauca and Vichada because of the clashes.[36]

The militarized response to the NSAGs by the Colombian state has two principal human security threats to communities that arise with increased militarization. On the one hand, there are the abuses committed by the public forces themselves, mentioned before in section 2.3 and 3.1., such as the *falsos positivos* scandal for example, and the persecution and shooting of civilians (HRW 2020).

On the other hand, the decision to locate military and police bases close to civilian institutions such as the town hall, schools and churches, turns into another human security threat. It leads to collateral damage inflicted on civilians in attacks between the public forces and the NSAGs. The communities themselves report that they feel that they are at higher risk with a rise in state

[34] Quote by Andrés Cajiao, translation above mine.
[35] Interviewed together with Paula Andrea Tobo Caviedes, online via Zoom 7th of April 2022, investigator at the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP)
[36] The clashes between the F10-MV and the Venezuelan military have similar consequences for the population of Apure. More than 2000 people have been displaced and killings and kidnappings happened as well. For more information see Fundaredes (2022).

military presence. According to the interviewee Hilda B. Molano Casas [37], this is not done to benefit or protect the local communities as proclaimed by the state, but puts them in great danger. The resulting close interaction of military or police personnel with children, for example, during recreation days or the presence of soldiers at schools, makes them an indirect target for NSAGs. The following statement by Molano Casas explains why that is the case:

> "Why should the armed actors believe that the public forces are only there to protect the population? Why should they not assume that they are collecting intelligence? Why should they not assume that the children are auxiliaries of the [NSAG]? The armed actor believes that the children might pass on valuable intelligence information about them onto the militaries. And, well, the idea is that we are at war, so [the NSAGs] attack to prevent this."[38]

She mentioned two incidents, one in Arauca, which illustrates this whole problem very precisely. Our interview took place in May and just two months before in March, a cylinder bomb attack by an NSAG had been carried out against the police station in Saravena, which is located close to the municipality's public school. Also, the school building was affected by the bombing, luckily no child died. As a consequence, the school needed to be closed because the security of the students and professors could not be guaranteed. This specific example is representative for many incidents where civilians were afflicted by NSAG attacks because they were close to state military infrastructure or troops – and the outcomes are not always so fortunate (Idler 2019; VerdadAbierta 2022).

Two important recent events that have had implications for the human security of local populations and have been intertwining with the armed conflict dynamics are the COVID-19 pandemic and the Venezuelan migration crisis. Both these events have put people in a very difficult humanitarian situation of which the NSAGs take advantage. Firstly, with the measures to contain the spread of COVID-19 also schools were closed. This had particularly negative consequences for child recruitment. Being out of school exposes children to the NSAGs. Many families do not have access to the internet to continue with online classes and the armed groups persuade children promising access to money, motorbikes and women (Charles 2022). According to Hilda Molano, COALICO registered the highest number of child recruitment since 2013 after the first five months of lockdown.

[37] Interviewed online via Zoom 2nd of May 2022, coordinator of the secretariat of COALICO
[38] Quote by Hilda B. Molano Casas, translation above mine.

Secondly, the interviewee María del Carmen (Carmenza) Muñoz Sáenz[39] explained that the NSAGs control *trochas* (unofficial border crossings) and charge for moving across the border. Additionally, they abduct or recruit migrants and subject them to forced labour, often in illicit economies. A report by Human Rights Watch (2020) confirms these abuses. Gender-based sexual violence against migrants also has been reported (Zulver and Idler 2020).

Thirdly, the ELN used the migration crisis and the insufficient assistance by the Colombian government to reassert their governance authority. In Arauca that takes a particular form, which was explained by the interviewee Hilda Molano[40]. The ELN would wait on the Colombian side of the border for the migrants, welcome them and offer humanitarian assistance with food, clothing and a place to rest. Apart from a message of solidarity, they acted in that way to persuade Venezuelans to join their organisation. This is a clear demonstration of their territorial control in Arauca and being close to the migrant population helps to gain their support. Nevertheless, it exposes the population to dangerous situations and it is questionable that the support to the guerrilla group is offered fully voluntarily, considering the abuses conducted against the civilians.

[39] Interviewed online via Zoom 27th April 2022, responsible for the project *Escuela de Paz y Convivencia Ciudadana* from CINEP

[40] Interviewed online via Zoom 2nd of May 2022, coordinator of the secretariat of COALICO

Conclusion

The analysis has shown that in Arauca the vertical state order has transformed into a horizontal order with various NSAGs and public forces competing for the territoral control over the department's territory. Arauca's territorial oligopoly of violence has seen considerable alterations since the demobilisation of FARC.

The ELN and the F10-MV quickly established their influence in former FARC territory following the demobilization of the latter. The non-aggression pact signed between the two NSAGs, broke down at the end of 2021 resulting in heavy clashes between the two groups. In response to the NSAG's reconfiguration, the government of President Duque militarized Arauca even further. Consequently, the oligopoly is marked by rivalry between these violent actors, even though observations made by representatives from social organizations and by the interviewee Henry Cuervo Castillo suggest that some factions of the FSFs might be infiltrated by parts of the state military.

For decades, all NSAGs have been using the Venezuelan state Apure as a rear-guard area, establishing themselves as transnational actors. With the encouragement of the presence of the Colombian NSAGs, a long-term relationship between the Colombian guerrillas and the Venezuelan public forces emerged. This relationship also transformed after the FARC demobilisation and differs for the different NSAGs. While the ELN and the *Segunda Marquetalia* receive support from the Venezuelan military, which is intertwined with the *Cartel de los Soles*, the F10-MV has been persecuted by the military since the deterioration of their relationship with the Venezuelan government in September 2020.

The impact of the reconfigured oligopoly of violence and the militarization of Arauca have detrimental consequences for the personal human security of local populations. The takeover of former FARC territory by the ELN resulted in homicides of social leaders and members of the population who did not comply with the clandestine social order established by the rebel group. Civilians became collateral damage of violent clashes between the ELN and the F10-MV. The confrontations also led to a spike in forced displacement and homicides. Extreme militarization by the state has also served to compound insecurity in the region as civilians have suffered at the hands of the public forces themselves. The close ubication of military and police stations to civilian institutions has made them an indirect target of NSAGs. Moreover, the Venezuelan migration crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic create additional pressures and have

left migrants and children very exposed to recruitment, forced labour and abductions by NSAGs.

The options for further research are endless. An analysis of the impact of reconfigurations in other regions of the country are likely to show very different OoV. From an actor-oriented approach, the role of local communities, and social leaders would be a fascinating focus for future research.

On the 19th of June 2022, the Colombian people elected the country's first left-wing President Gustavo Petro, who, himself is a former guerrilla member of the M-19, and the first Afro-Colombian female vice president Francia Marquez (NBC News 2022). This disrupts twenty years of right-wing conservative hegemony, or '*Uribismo*' (the political movement, that followed after Uribe's administration from 2002-2010). In a country of rising insecurity and where almost fifty per cent of the population live in poverty, the people of Colombia are demanding change (Janetsky 2022).

Petro's administration seems to represent this change. The President-elect has announced that he will resume peace negotiations with the ELN and will apply the necessary pressure on criminal NSAGs such as the Gulf Clan to surrender their arms. The ELN has responded positively to this call, and the FSF-network of Iván Márquez, the *Segunda Marquetalia*, has called for the initiation of negotiations, proclaiming the onset of "unstoppable change" (Martinez 2022). The killing of Gentil Duarte in May 2022 has sparked widespread uncertainty in terms of the structure and future of the network; will this lead to its fragmentation? (Dalby and Villalba 2022). In territories most affected by the conflict, the new government has plans to engage with local and regional social organisations to make decisions regarding recent reconfiguration of NSAGs and changing security dynamics (La Silla Llena 2022). This lies in stark contrast to the historically militarised response by the Colombian state. Petro's campaign reveals public will to change tactics; military presence alone is not enough to deconstruct the violent power structures which arise with OoV as is the case in Arauca. Firstly, the number of NSAGs must be reduced, preferably peacefully, and their rule replaced with institutional state presence for the communities.

In the week following his election, Petro initiated communications with Maduro; expressing plans to resume diplomatic and economic relations and to re-open the border to improve the human security of those living along the border lines (Torrado 2022). Depending on how successfully the relations between the countries can be re-established, there might be a way to

address the myriad of NSAGs present at the border in joint action. It remains to be seen how much of the promised change Petro's administration will be able to realise. Significant will be the reaction of the criminal NSAGs that are interested in the maintenance of the disorder to benefit from illicit economies as well. For Arauca the advances in the negotiation process with the ELN and the future development of Duarte's FSF-network will be decisive.

Bibliography:

Acosta, Luis Jaime. 2018. ‘Colombia Suspende Negociación de Paz Con Guerrilla Del ELN’. *Reuters*, 29 January 2018, sec. Latinoamérica. https://www.reuters.com/article/colombia-guerrilla-idLTAKBN1FI1N3-OUSLD.

Aguilera Peña, Mario. 2020. ‘Disidencias: ¿Rebeldes Obstinados, Exguerrilleros Narcotraficantes o Guerrillas Ambiguas?’ In *Violencias Que Persisten: EL Escenario Tras Los Acuerdos De Paz*, edited by Mario Aguilera Peña and Carlos Mario Perea Restrepo, 169–224. Editorial Universidad del Rosario.

Allen, Chris. 1999. ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence & State Collapse in Africa’. *Review of African Political Economy* 26 (81): 367–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056249908704399.

Allum, Felia, and Stan Gilmour. 2021. ‘Introduction’. In *The Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime*, 2nd ed. Routledge.

Álvarez Vanegas, Eduardo, Andrés Pardo Calderón, and Andrés Cajiao Vélez. 2018. ‘Trayectorias y Dinámicas Territoriales de Las Disidencias de Las FARC’. Serie Informes No.30. FIP.

amerika21. 2022. ‘Vorwahlzeit in Kolumbien: Welle von Attentaten, Morden und Sabotage gegen die Opposition’. *amerika21*. 5 February 2022. https://amerika21.de/2022/02/256681/gewalt-eskaliert-vorwahlzeit-2022-kolumb.

Aponte González, Andrés F., and Fernán E. González González. 2021. *?Por Qué Es Tan Difícil Negociar Con El ELN? Las Consecuencias de Un Federalismo Insurgente 1964-2020*. Colección Territorio, Poder y Conflicto. CINEP. https://www.cinep.org.co/publicaciones/es/producto/por-que-es-tan-dificil-negociar-con-el-eln-las-consecuencias-de-un-federalismo-insurgente-1964-2020/.

Arango González, Marcela Carolina. 2019. ‘Dignidad humana post mortem: reparación a las víctimas directas de las ejecuciones extrajudiciales en su modalidad de falsos positivos’, August. http://repository.javeriana.edu.co/handle/10554/45185.

Aranzazu, Liliana María Perico. 2016. ‘El Estado colombiano y las bandas criminales’. *Ciencia y Poder Aéreo* 11 (1). https://doi.org/10.18667/cienciaypoderaereo.496.

Arjona, Ana. 2016. ‘Institutions, Civilian Resistance, and Wartime Social Order: A Process-Driven Natural Experiment in the Colombian Civil War’. *Latin American Politics and Society* 58 (3): 99–122. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00320.x.

Arjona, Ana, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly. 2015. ‘Introduction’. In *Rebel Governance in Civil War*, edited by Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly, 1–20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316182468.001.

Aviles, William. 2006. ‘Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity Democracy’. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 38 (2): 379–408. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X06000757.

Bargent, James, and Mat Charles. 2017. ‘InSide Colombia’s BACRIM: Power’. *InSight Crime*, 12 September 2017. https://insightcrime.org/investigations/inside-colombia-s-bacrim-power/.

Barrera, Victor. 2020. ‘Paramilitares o No. Esa Es La Cuestión’. In *Violencias Que Persisten: EL Escenario Tras Los Acuerdos De Paz*, edited by Mario Aguilera Peña and Carlos Mario Perea Restrepo, 169–224. Editorial Universidad del Rosario.

Benedek, Wolfgang. 2010. ‘The Human Security Approach to Terrorism and Organized Crime in Post-Conflict Situations’. In *Transnational Terrorism, Organized Crime and Peace-Building: Human Security in the Western Balkans*, edited by Wolfgang Benedek, Christopher Daase, Vojin Dimitrijević, and Petrus van Duyne, 3–16. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281479_1.

Bergquist, Charles. 2001. ‘Waging War and Negotiating Peace: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective’. In *Violence in Colombia, 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace*, edited by Charles Berquist, Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781461646693/Violence-in-Colombia-1990-2000-Waging-War-and-Negotiating-Peace.

Berti, Benedetta. 2018. ‘Chapter 14: Violent and Criminal Non-State Actors’. In *The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood*, edited by Tanja A. Börzel, Thomas Risse, Tanja A. Borzel, and Anke Draude. Oxford University Press.

Bolaños, Omar Eduardo Rojas, and Fabián Leonardo Benavides Silva. 2017. *Ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Colombia 2002–2010: obediencia ciega en campos de batalla ficticios*. 1st ed. Universidad Santo Tomás.

Branović, Željko, and Sven Chojnacki. 2011. ‘The Logic of Security Markets: Security Governance in Failed States’. *Security Dialogue* 42 (6): 553–69. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611424423.

Britto, Lina M. 2010. ‘A Trafficker’s Paradise: The “War On Drugs” and the New Cold War in Colombia’. *Contemporánea: Historia y Problemas Del Siglo* 1 (1): 159–77.

Bryden, Alan, and Marina Caparini, eds. 2006. *Private Actors and Security Governance*. LIT & DCAF. https://www.dcaf.ch/private-actors-and-security-governance.

Bulla, Patricia, and Sergio Guarín. 2015. ‘Rural Security in Colombia: An Opportunity for State Consolidation’. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 4 (1): Art. 37. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.ga.

Cabezas Palacios, Juana Valentina, Jessica Daniela Rondón Molina, and Leonardo González Perafán. 2020. ‘Los Grupos PosFARC-EP: Un Escenario Complejo - Actualización 2018-2 y 2019’. INDEPAZ.

Cajiao, Andrés. 2018. ‘Las Garantías de Seguridad: Una Mirada Desde Lo Local - Arauca’. Serie Informes 31. FIP.

———. 2022. ‘Arauca Entre El Terror y La Disputa’. FIP - Ideas Para La Paz. 2022. http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/2116.

Casey, Nicholas, and Joe Parkin Daniels. 2017. '"Goodbye, Weapons!" FARC Disarmament in Colombia Signals New Era'. *The New York Times*, 27 June 2017, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/americas/colombia-farc-rebels-disarmament.html.

Celi, Silvia. 2022. 'Enfoque Internacional - ELN y disidentes de las FARC se disputan en Arauca por el control territorial'. RFI. 27 February 2022. https://www.rfi.fr/es/programas/enfoque-internacional/20220227-eln-y-disidentes-de-las-farc-se-disputan-en-arauca-por-el-control-territorial.

CERAC. 2016. 'Un año de desescalamiento: conflicto casi detenido, pero que se resiste a desaparecer'. CERAC - Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos. 2016. https://www.blog.cerac.org.co/un-ano-de-desescalamiento-conflicto-casi-detenido.

Charles, Mathew H. 2022. 'La Participación de NNA en el Crimen Organizado y el Conflicto después del Acuerdo de Paz'. Working Paper Series #4. Documentos OCCO. Observatorio Colombiano de Crimen Organizado.

Chernick, Marc W. 1988. 'Negotiated Settlement to Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Colombian Peace Process'. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30 (4): 53–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/166057.

———. 1996. 'Introducción. Aprender del pasado: breve historia de los procesos de paz en Colombia (1982-1996)'. *Colombia Internacional*. https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint36.1996.02.

Clunan, Anne L., and Harold A. Trinkunas. 2010. *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Collazos, Mauricio. 2022. 'Muerte de comandante del ELN habría detonado ola violencia: secretario de Gobierno en Arauca'. *RCN Radio*, 3 January 2022. https://www.rcnradio.com/colombia/llanos/muerte-de-comandante-del-eln-en-venezuela-habria-detonado-ola-violencia-secretario.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2000. 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War'. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2355.

Colprensa. 2022. 'Crítica situación de violencia en Arauca, 146 personas han sido asesinadas este año'. *El País*, 21 April 2022. https://www.elpais.com.co/judicial/critica-situacion-de-violencia-en-arauca-146-personas-han-sido-asesinadas-este-ano.html.

Dalby, Chris, and Javier Villalba. 2022. 'The Fall of Gentil Duarte – What Does It Mean for Colombia?' *InSight Crime* (blog). 26 May 2022. https://insightcrime.org/news/fall-gentil-duarte-what-does-mean-colombia/.

Davis, Mike. 2006. *Planet of Slums*. London [etc.]: Verso.

Defensoría del Pueblo. 2018a. 'Alerta Temprana No. 006-18'. Sistemas de Alerta Temprana - Prevención y Protección. Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia. https://alertastempranas.defensoria.gov.co/?orden=&criterioBusqueda=006-18&anioBusqueda=.

———. 2018b. ‘Alerta Temprana No. 013-18’. Sistemas de Alerta Temprana - Prevención y Protección. Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia. https://alertastempranas.defensoria.gov.co/?orden=&criterioBusqueda=013-18&anioBusqueda=.

———. 2018c. ‘Alerta Temprana No. 081-18’. Sistemas de Alerta Temprana - Prevención y Protección. Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia. https://alertastempranas.defensoria.gov.co/?orden=&criterioBusqueda=081-18&anioBusqueda=2018.

———. 2021. ‘Alerta Temprana No. 006-21’. Sistemas de Alerta Temprana - Prevención y Protección. Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia. https://alertastempranas.defensoria.gov.co/?orden=&criterioBusqueda=006-21&anioBusqueda=.

Duncan, Gustavo, Santiago Sosa, and Jose Antonio Fortou. 2022. ‘Terrorism and Organized Crime in Colombia’. *The Nexus Between Organized Crime and Terrorism*, February. https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788979290/9781788979290.00026.xml.

Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, Georg Frerks, Boukje Kistemaker, Nora Stel, and Niels Terpstra. 2016. ‘Chapter 3: Reconsidering Rebel Governance’. In *African Frontiers: Insurgency, Governance and Peacebuilding in Postcolonial States*, edited by John Idriss Lahai and Tanya Lyons. Routledge.

Echeverri, Juan Diego Restrepo, and Vilma Liliana Franco Restrepo. 2007. ‘Dinámica reciente de reorganización paramilitar en Colombia’. *REVISTA CONTROVERSIA*, no. 189 (December): 64–95. https://doi.org/10.54118/controver.v0i189.151.

Editor Medellín. 2022. ‘Arauca en datos: ¿Militarización? ¿Narcotráfico? - Colombia Informa Conflicto y Paz’. *Colombia Informa* (blog). 18 February 2022. https://www.colombiainforma.info/arauca-en-datos-militarizacion-narcotrafico/.

Editorial. 2018. ‘El frente nacional’. *Colombia* (blog). 5 July 2018. http://semanahistoria.com/el-frente-nacional/.

Ekpon, Theophilus. 2012. ‘Oligopolies of Violence in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2128543. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2128543.

El Espectador. 2021a. ‘Análisis: la guerra en Apure entre las Farc y Venezuela’. *ELESPECTADOR.COM*, 31 March 2021, sec. Política. https://www.elespectador.com/politica/analisis-la-guerra-en-apure-entre-las-farc-y-venezuela-article/.

———. 2021b. ‘Las dos caras de los PDET en Urabá y Arauca’. *ELESPECTADOR.COM*, 22 November 2021, sec. Paz y Memoria. https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/paz-y-memoria/las-dos-caras-de-los-pdet-en-uraba-y-arauca/.

Elwert, Georg. 2003. ‘Intervention in Markets of Violence’. In *Potentials of Disorder: Explaining Conflict and Stability in the Caucasus and in the Former Yugoslavia*, 219–42. Manchester Univ PR.

https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/9781526137586/9781526137586.00017.xml.

Englehart, Neil A. 2016. 'Non-State Armed Groups as a Threat to Global Security: What Threat, Whose Security?' *Journal of Global Security Studies* 1 (2): 171–83. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogw003.

Escobedo, Rodolfo, Boris Ramírez, Maía Paula Lovera, and Camila Patiño. 2016. 'Las Dos Caras de La Reducción Del Homicidio En Colombia: Logros y Retos Para El Postconflicto'. FIP - Fundación Ideas para la Paz. http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1327.

Espitia Cueca, Carlos Eduardo, Juana Valentina Cabezas Palacios, Jessica Daniela Rondón Molina, Juan Carlos Jiménez Suárez, and Camilo González Posso. 2018. 'Conflictos armados focalizados – Indepaz'. INDEPAZ. https://indepaz.org.co/conflictos-armados-focalizados/.

FIP. 2014. 'Dinámicas Del Conflicto Armado En Arauca y Su Impacto Humanitario'. Boletín #73. Unidad de Análisis Siguiendo El Conflicto.

———. 2015. 'El ELN y La Industria Petrolera: Ataques a La Infraestructura En Arauca'. Área Dinámicas Del Conflicto y Negociaciones de Paz. FIP. https://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/55411b8a3ccab.pdf.

———. 2019. 'Arauca - Informe Preliminar Sobre El Estado de La Implementación Del Acuerdo de Paz'. Fundación Ideas Para La Paz.

Forrest, Joshua Bernard. 1998. 'State Inversion and a Nonstate Politics'. In *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, edited by Leonardo Alfonso Villalón and Phillip A. Huxtable. Boulder, Col. [etc.]: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Fundaredes. 2022. '#Boletín38 | NUEVA CORRELACIÓN DE FUERZAS DE GRUPOS ARMADOS IRREGULARES OBLIGAN AL DESPLAZAMIENTO DE POBLACIONES DE APURE'. https://www.fundaredes.org/2022/03/15/boletin38-nueva-correlacion-de-fuerzas-de-grupos-armados-irregulares-obligan-al-desplazamiento-de-poblaciones-de-apure/.

García Perrilla, Juan Carlos, and Ángela María Herrera. 2017. 'Clan Del Golfo: Una Amenaza Para Los Procesos Políticos En Colombia'. Preparation for the 9th Latin-American Congress of Political Science in Montevideo.

García Ruiz, María Andrea, Ángela María Silva Aparicio, and Marcela Julieth Magallanes Montoya. 2018. 'POLÍTICAS PARA COMBATIR A LOS GRUPOS ARMADOS POSDESMOVILIZACIÓN EN LOS GOBIERNOS DE ÁLVARO URIBE VÉLEZ Y JUAN MANUEL SANTOS'. *Análisis Político (Bogotá, Colombia)* 31 (92): 159–79. https://doi.org/10.15446/anpol.v31n92.71105.

García-Durán, Mauricio. 2004. 'Alternatives to War: Colombia's Peace Processes'. *GSDRC*, 2004. https://gsdrc.org/document-library/alternatives-to-war-colombias-peace-processes/.

Garzón Vergara, Juan Carlos. 2016. '¿Por Qué Bajan Los Homicidios? Hipótesis Sobre La Violencia En Colombia'. FIP - Ideas Para La Paz. 2016. http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1339.

Gehring, Dr. Hubert, and Sylvia Gontermann. 2012. 'Länderbericht: Informationen Zur Geschichte Und Zu Den Akteuren Des "Konflikts" in Kolumbien'. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.

Gobernación de Arauca. 2018. 'Para la Historia: El departamento de Arauca es declarado como territorio exitoso en sustitución de cultivos ilícitos'. 2018. https://arauca.gov.co/para-la-historia-el-departamento-de-arauca-es-declarado-como-territorio-exitoso-en-sustitucion-de-cultivos-ilicitos/.

Goldstein, Daniel M. 2015. 'Citizen Security and Human Security in Latin America'. In *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security*, edited by David R Mares and Arie M Kacowicz. Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315867908.

González Perafán, Leonardo, Juana Valentina Cabezas Palacios, and Paco Zimmermann. 2021. 'Los focos del conflicto en Colombia – Informe sobre presencia de grupos armados – Indepaz'. https://indepaz.org.co/los-focos-del-conflicto-en-colombia/.

González Posso, Camilo. 2017. 'EL COMPLEJO PARAMILITAR SE TRANSFORMA'. 2017. https://indepaz.org.co/el-complejo-paramilitar-se-transforma/.

Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. 2008. 'Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War'. *Politics & Society* 36 (1): 3–34. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329207312181.

Herbolzheimer, Kristian. 2016. 'Innovations in the Colombian Peace Process'. NOREF Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NOREF_CR_Report_Colombia%20Innovations_final.pdf.

Hinojosa, Victor J. 2018. 'Chapter 5: Negotiating Peace and Strengthening the State: Reducing Violence in Colombia'. In *Security in the Americas in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna Samir editor Kassab, 71–82. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.

Hough, Phillip A. 2011. 'Guerrilla Insurgency as Organized Crime: Explaining the So-Called "Political Involution" of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia'. *Politics & Society* 39 (3): 379–414. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329211415505.

Hoyweghen, Saskia >Van, and Stefaan Smis. 2002. 'The Crisis of the Nation-State in Central Africa: A Theoretical Introduction'. *Review of African Political Economy* 29 (93–94): 575–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240208704639.

Hristov, Jasmin. 2014. *Paramilitarism and Neoliberalism: Violent Systems of Capital Accumulation in Colombia and Beyond*. London, England: Pluto Press.

———. 2015. *Paramilitarism and Neoliberalism: Violent Systems of Capital Accumulation in Colombia and Beyond*. London: Pluto Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183p86g.

HRW, Human Right Watch. 2020. '"Los guerrilleros son la policía": Control social y graves abusos por parte de grupos armados en el departamento colombiano de Arauca y el estado venezolano de Apure'. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/es/report/2020/01/22/los-guerrilleros-son-la-policia/control-social-y-graves-abusos-por-parte-de.

———. 2022. 'Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups'. *Human Rights Watch* (blog). 28 March 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/28/colombia/venezuela-border-area-abuses-armed-groups.

Hylton, Forrest. 2006. *Evil Hour in Colombia*. London; New York: Verso.

ICRC. 2022. 'Colombia: vivir a la sombra de los conflictos armados'. Artículo. Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja. América/Colombia. 1 March 2022. https://www.icrc.org/es/document/balance-humanitario-colombia-2022-dih.

Idler, Anette. 2019. '16. Colombia: Organised Crime, Politics, and Convenience'. In *Handbook of Organised Crime and Politics*, edited by Felia Allum, Stan Gilmour, Felia Allum, and Stan Gilmour. Elgar Handbooks in Political Science. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786434579.

Idler, Annette. 2018. 'Preventing Conflict Upstream: Impunity and Illicit Governance across Colombia's Borders'. *Defence Studies* 18 (1): 58–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2017.1421859.

———. 2019. *Borderland Battles: Violence, Crime, and Governance at the Edges of Colombia's War*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

INDEPAZ. 2017. *Complejo Paramilitar*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xkbHpAppFms.

———. 2021. '5 AÑOS DEL ACUERDO DE PAZ: Balance En Cifras de La Violencia En Los Territorios'. INDEPAZ. https://indepaz.org.co/5-anos-del-acuerdo-de-paz-balance-en-cifras-de-la-violencia-en-los-territorios/.

Insight Crime. 2021. 'Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)'. *InSight Crime*, 21 October 2021. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-crimen-organizado-colombia/eln-colombia/.

InsightCrime. 2021. 'The Second Marquetalia's Uncertain Future'. *InSight Crime* (blog). 21 December 2021. https://insightcrime.org/news/second-marquetalia-uncertain-future/.

———. 2022. 'Cartel of the Suns'. *InSight Crime* (blog). 2022. https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/cartel-de-los-soles-profile/.

Janetsky, Megan. 2022. 'What Is Uribismo and Why Are Colombians Voting against It? - The New York Times'. *New York Times*, 19 June 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/19/world/americas/what-is-uribismo-and-why-are-colombians-voting-against-it.html%20janetsky%202022.

Jasmin Hristov. 2014. *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia*. 1st ed. Vol. 48. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

Jiménez, Juan Carlos. 2012. ‘Sobre las cifras oficiales’. INDEPAZ. http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Sobre-las-cifras-oficiales.pdf.

Jimenez, Juan Carlos, and Juana Valentina Cabezas Palacios. 2020. ‘Balance Sobre Las Dinámicas: Ejército de Liberación Nacional ELN En Colombia 2018-2019-2020-I’. INDEPAZ. https://indepaz.org.co/balance-sobre-las-dinamicas-del-ejercito-de-liberacion-nacional-eln-en-colombia-2018-2019-y-2020-i/.

Kline, Harvey F. 1999. *State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994*. Tuscaloosa, AL [etc: University of Alabama Press.

———. 2009. *Showing Teeth to the Dragons: State-Building by Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 2002-2006*. Tuscaloosa, AB: University of Alabama press.

———. 2015. *Fighting Monsters in the Abyss: The Second Administration of Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 2006–2010*. University of Alabama Press.

Knoester, Mark. 1998. ‘War in Colombia’. *Social Justice (San Francisco, Calif.)* 25 (2 (72)): 85–109.

Koonings, Kees. 2001. ‘Armed Actors, Violence and Democracy in Latin America in the 1990s: Introductory Notes’. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 20 (4): 401–8.

Koonings, Kees, and Dirk Kruijt. 2007. *Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America*. London [etc.]: Zed Books.

———. 2013. *Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America*. Ebook edition. London, England ; New York, New York: Zed Books.

Krause, Keith, and Jennifer Milliken. 2009. ‘Introduction: The Challenge of Non-State Armed Groups’. *Contemporary Security Policy* 30 (2): 202–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260903077296.

Kurtenbach, Sabine, and Herbert Wulf. 2012. ‘Violence and Security Concerns in Post-Conflict Situations’. Citeseer.

La Silla Llena. 2022. ‘Esto responde la campaña de Petro sobre su programa para la paz y la seguridad’. La Silla Vacía - Últimas noticias locales y nacionales. 17 June 2022. https://www.lasillavacia.com/historias/historias-silla-llena/esto-responde-la-campana-de-petro-sobre-su-programa-para-la-paz-y-la-seguridad/.

Lambach, Daniel. 2007. ‘Oligopolies of Violence in Post-Conflict Societies’. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1058701. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1058701.

Lautensach, Alexander, and Sabina Lautensach. 2020. *Human Security in World Affairs: Problems and Opportunities (2nd Edition)*. BCcampus & University of Northern British Columbia. https://opentextbc.ca/humansecurity/.

León, Sofía, Elizabeth Niño Ascanio, Edwin Camargo León, Wilfredo Cañizares Arévalo, and Carmen Rosa Guerra Ariza. 2012. *La Frontera Caliente Entre Colombia y Venezuela*. Edited by Ariel Fernando Ávila. Bogotá D.C.: Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris.

Levitsky, Melvyn. 2003. ‘Transnational Criminal Networks and International Security Essay’. *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce* 30 (2): 227–40.

Loaiza, Lara. 2022. ‘Colombia’s Most Wanted: Gentil Duarte’. *InSight Crime* (blog). 4 May 2022. https://insightcrime.org/news/colombias-most-wanted-gentil-duarte/.

Long, Norman. 1990. ‘From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case for an Actor-Oriented Sociology of Development’. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 3–24.

Long, Tom. 2015. ‘Peace in Colombia? Lessons from the Failed 1999-2002 Talks’. *Global Americans*, 16 December 2015. https://theglobalamericans.org/2015/12/peace-in-colombia-lessons-from-the-failed-1999-2002-talks/.

Maher, David, and Andrew Thomson. 2018. ‘A Precarious Peace? The Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia’. *Third World Quarterly* 39 (11): 2142–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1508992.

Mair, Stefan. 1999. *Staatszerfall Und Interventionismus: Determinanten Grenzüberschreitender Politischer Neuordnung in Afrika*. Ebenhausen: SWP.

Malone, Mary Fran T., and Lucia Dammert. 2021. ‘The Police and the Public: Policing Practices and Public Trust in Latin America’. *Policing and Society* 31 (4): 418–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2020.1744600.

Mandel, Robert. 2013. *Global Security Upheaval: Armed Non-State Groups Usurping State Stability Functions*. Stanford University Press. https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=22343.

Mantilla Valbuena, Silvia. 2012. ‘Economía y conflicto armado en Colombia: los efectos de la globalización en la transformación de la guerra’. *Latinoamérica. Revista de estudios Latinoamericanos*, no. 55 (December): 35–73.

Martinez, Marian. 2022. ‘Una facción de las disidencias de las FARC llaman a Petro a “dialogar para frenar la guerra”’. *El Ciudadano*, 23 June 2022. https://www.elciudadano.com/actualidad/una-faccion-de-las-disidencias-de-las-farc-llaman-a-petro-a-dialogar-para-frenar-la-guerra/06/22/.

McDougall, Alex. 2009. ‘State Power and Its Implications for Civil War Colombia’. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32 (4): 322–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100902743815.

Medina Uribe, Pablo. 2016. ‘Beyond the FARC: Colombia’s Other Illegal Armed Groups Explained’. *AS/COA*, 2016. https://www.as-coa.org/articles/beyond-farc-colombias-other-illegal-armed-groups-explained.

Mehler, Andreas. 2003. ‘Legitime Gewaltoligopole – Eine Antwort Auf Strukturelle Instabilität in Westafrika?’ *Fokus Afrika*, IAK-Diskussionsbeiträge, Hamburg Institut für Afrikakunde, .

———. 2004. ‘Oligopolies of Violence in Africa South of the Sahara’. *Nord-Süd Aktuell* 18 (3): 539–48.

Mehler, Andreas, Daniel Lambach, and Judy Smith-Höhn. 2010. 'Legitimate Oligopolies of Violence in Post-Conflict Societies with Particular Focus on Liberia and Sierra Leone'. *Forschung Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung* 23. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-260456.

Metelits, Claire. 2009. *Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior*. New York: NYU Press.

Miroiu, Andrei. 2020. *Political Theory of Armed Groups: Social Order and Armed Groups*. SpringerBriefs in Political Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51012-1.

Muggah, Robert. 2017. 'Chapter 13: The Rise of Citizen Security in Latin America and the Caribbean'. In *Alternative Pathways to Sustainable Development: Lessons from Latin America*, edited by Gilles Carbonnier, Humberto Campodónico, and Sergio Tezanos Vázquez. BRILL. https://doi.org/10.1163/j.ctt1w76w3t.

n.a. 2022. 'Explicación Puntos del Acuerdo'. La Paz con Legalidad es de Todos. 2022. http://portalparalapaz.gov.co/publicaciones/811/explicacion-puntos-del-acuerdo/.

Nasi, Carlo. 2006. 'Spoiler in Colombia: Actors and Strategies'. In *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution*, edited by Edward Newman and Oliver P. Richmond, xi–xi. Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

NBC News. 2022. 'Colombia Elects First Leftist President and First Afro Colombian Female Vice President'. *NBC News*, 20 June 2022. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/colombia-elects-first-leftist-president-first-afro-colombian-female-pr-rcna34336.

NPR. 2016. 'Colombia, Rebels Sign Treaty To End Latin America's Oldest Guerrilla War', 26 September 2016. https://www.npr.org/2016/09/26/495523350/colombia-rebels-sign-treaty-to-end-latin-americas-oldest-guerilla-war?t=1655642030804.

Omeje, Kenneth. 2010. 'Markets or Oligopolies of Violence? The Case of Sudan'. *African Security* 3 (3): 168–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2010.503856.

OPDHDIH. 2002. 'Panorama Actual de Arauca y Casanare'. Bogotá: Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional.

Otálvaro, Bairon, and Estefanía Klinger. 2020. 'FARC-CSIVI, Centro de Pensamiento y Diálogo Político. (2019). La implementación del Acuerdo de paz durante el gobierno de Iván Duque: Tendencia a la perfidia y simulación. Bogotá D.C.: Impresol, 106 pp.' *Ciencia Política* 15 (30): 313–18. https://doi.org/10.15446/cp.v15n30.92552.

Pachón, Mónica. 2009. 'Colombia 2008: Éxitos, Peligros y Desaciertos de La Política de Seguridad Democrática de La Administración Uribe'. *Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago)* 29 (2): 327–53. https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2009000200005.

Pardo, Rafael. 2000. 'Colombia's Two-Front War'. *Foreign Affairs* 79 (4): 64–73. https://doi.org/10.2307/20049809.

Paris, Roland. 2001. ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’ *International Security* 26 (2): 87–102. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753191141.

Pearce, Jenny. 1990. *Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth*. London : New York, NY: Latin America Bureau.

Podder, Sukanya. 2013. ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion’. *Contemporary Security Policy* 34 (1): 16–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2013.771029.

Portafolio. 2017. ‘Cenit y Ocensa habilitan nueva ruta petrolera’. Portafolio.co. 2017. https://www.portafolio.co/economia/habilitan-nueva-ruta-para-transportar-petroleo-desde-cano-limon-510931.

Posada, Juan Diego. 2022. ‘Ex-FARC Mafia vs. ELN: A Fight Too Far at Colombia-Venezuela Border?’ *InSight Crime* (blog). 11 January 2022. https://insightcrime.org/news/is-the-ex-farc-mafia-betting-all-its-chips-on-the-colombian-venezuelan-border/.

Posada, Juan Diego, and Sara Garcia. 2021. ‘Top Ex-FARC Commanders, El Paisa and Romaña, Confirmed Killed in Venezuela’. *InSight Crime* (blog). 9 December 2021. https://insightcrime.org/news/unconfirmed-reports-leading-ex-farc-commander-el-paisa-killed-in-venezuela/.

Quintero Mendoza, Juan Sebastián. 2016. *Las desapariciones forzadas y los “falsos positivos”: Del derecho internacional al derecho administrativo colombiano*. Editorial Universidad del Rosario.

Razón Pública. 2022. Picture NSAG Arauca. Photographs. Razón Pública. January 23, 2022. https://razonpublica.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Arauca-frontera-seguridad-Arauca-ELN-violencia-Andres-Cajiao-FIP.png.

Redacción El Tiempo. 2022. ‘Carro bomba en Saravena, Arauca, deja un muerto y cuatro heridos’. *El Tiempo*, 20 January 2022, sec. colombia. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/arauca-reportan-explosion-en-sede-de-fundacion-en-saravena-646063.

Redacción Trochando. 2020. ‘Zonas Futuro, intervención para militarizar los territorios’. *Trochando Sin Fronteras* (blog). 26 October 2020. https://trochandosinfronteras.info/zonas-futuro/.

———. 2022. ‘Ataque con explosivos contra ECAAAS E.S.P en Saravena, Arauca’. *Trochando Sin Fronteras* (blog). 10 January 2022. https://trochandosinfronteras.info/ataque-con-exposivos-contra-ecaaas/.

Restrepo, Diego Alejandro. 2022. ‘Plomo Es Lo Que Hay - Violencia y Seguridad En Tiempos de Duque’. Paz, Posconflicto y Derechos Humanos. Fundación Paz & Reconciliación PARES.

Rettberg, Angelika, Ralf Leiteritz, and Carlo Nasi. 2014. ‘Different Resources, Different Conflicts? A Framework for Understanding the Political Economy of Armed Conflict

and Criminality in Colombian Regions'. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2499580.

Reuters. 2021. 'Colombia's FARC Party Changes Name to Comunes'. *Reuters*, 24 January 2021, sec. Emerging Markets. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-farc-idUSKBN29T0SF.

Richani, Nazih. 2013. *Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia*. Second edition. SUNY Series in Global Politics 18192790X. Albany: SUNY Press State University of New York Press.

Rico, Daniel M. 2013. 'La Dimensión Internacional del Crimen Organizado en Colombia: Las Bacrim, sus Rutas y Refugios'. Woodrow Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/misc/Daniel%20Rico.pdf.

Ríos Sierra, Jerónimo. 2020. 'La(s) geografía(s) de la violencia guerrillera en Colombia 2012-2020'. Real Instituto Elcano. https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documento-de-trabajo/las-geografias-de-la-violencia-guerrillera-en-colombia-2012-2020/.

Ríos Sierra, Jerónimo, and Heriberto Cairo. 2020. 'Imagining the Outside Danger inside: The Critical Geopolitics of Security and the Armed Forces in Latin America (1960-2018)'. In *Handbook on the Changing Geographies of the State*, edited by Sami Moisio, Natalie Koch, Jonas Andrew E.G., Christopher Lizotte, and Juho Luukkonen, 291–301. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788978040/9781788978040.00040.xml.

Rodríguez, Gina Paola. 2014. 'Álvaro Uribe y Juan Manuel Santos: ¿una Misma Derecha?' *Nueva Sociedad | Democracia y Política En América Latina*, 1 November 2014, sec. Tema central. https://nuso.org/articulo/alvaro-uribe-y-juan-manuel-santos-una-misma-derecha/.

Rojas, Cristina, and Daniel Tubb. 2013. 'La Violencia in Colombia, through Stories of the Body'. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 32 (s1): 126–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12110.

Rosen, Jonathan D. 2015. 'The War on Drugs in Colombia: A History of Failure'. In *New Approaches to Drug Policies: A Time for Chance*, edited by Marten W. Brienen and Jonathan D. Rosen, 58–72. Palgrave Macmillan.

Rotberg, Robert I. 2003. *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. World Peace Foundation.

Ruiz, Bert. 2001. *The Colombian Civil War*. Illustrated Edition. Jefferson, N.C: McFarland.

Salas Salazar, Luis Gabriel. 2014. 'Lógicas Territoriales y Relaciones de Poder En El Espacio de Los Actores Armados: Un Aporte Desde La Geografía Política al Estudio de La Violencia y El Conflicto Armado En Colombia, 1990-2012'. *Cuadernos de Geografía (Bogotá)* 24 (1): 157–72. https://doi.org/10.15446/rcdg.v24n1.47777.

Sánchez, Fabio, and Mario Chacón. 2005. 'Conflict, State and Decentralisation: From Social Progress to an Armed Dispute for Local Control, 1974-2002'. London, UK: Crisis

States Programm Working Papers Eries No.1. http://www.crisisstates.com/Publications/publications.htm.

Schneckener, Ulrich. 2009. ‘Spoilers or Governance Actors?: Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood’. https://doi.org/10.17169/refubium-21606.

Semana. 2022. ‘Fuerzas Militares Anuncian Compromisos Para El Restablecimiento Del Orden Público En Arauca’. *Semana*, 3 January 2022. https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/fuerzas-militares-anuncian-compromisos-para-el-restablecimiento-del-orden-publico-en-arauca/202220/.

Stedman, Stephen John. 1997. ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’. *International Security* 22 (2): 5–53. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.5.

Tate, Winifred. 2001. ‘Paramilitaries in Colombia’. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 8 (1): 163–75.

Torrado, Santiago. 2022. ‘Gustavo Petro comunica al Gobierno venezolano su intención de reabrir la frontera’. *El País América Colombia*, 22 June 2022, sec. Elecciones presidenciales en Colombia. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/elecciones-presidenciales/2022-06-22/gustavo-petro-comunica-al-gobierno-venezolano-su-intencion-de-reabrir-la-frontera.html.

Torres Del Río, César Miguel. 2015. *Colombia siglo XX: Desde la guerra de los mil días hasta la elección de Álvaro Uribe. Segunda edición corregida y aumentada*. 2nd ed. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.

Trotha, Trutz von. 1995. ‘Ordnungsformen Der Gewalt Oder Aussichten Auf Das Ende Des Staatlichen Gewaltmonopols’. In *Politische Institutionen Im Wandel*, edited by Birgitta Nedelmann and Thomas Koepf, 129–99. Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie., Sonderheft 35. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

———. 2000. ‘Die Zukunft liegt in Afrika. Vom Zerfall des Staates, von der Vorherrschaft der konzentrischen Ordnung und vom Aufstieg der Parastaatlichkeit’. *Leviathan* 28 (2): 253–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11578-000-0017-z.

———. 2005. ‘Der Aufstieg Des Lokalen’. *Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 28/29: 32–38.

UNDP, United Nations Development Programme. 1994. ‘Human Development Report 1994’. New York, Oxford University Press. https://www.undp.org/publications/human-development-report-1994.

UNODC. 2021. ‘Colombia - Monitoreo de Territorios Afectados Por Cultivos Ilícitos 2020’. Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito.

Velásquez C., Fabio E. 2021. ‘Descentralización y Modernización Del Estado En Colombia: Balance de Una Experiencia’, no. No.55. http://nomadas.ucentral.edu.co/index.php/inicio/46-descentralizacion-procesos-y-tendencias-nomadas-3/717-descentralizacion-y-modernizacion-del-estado-en-colombia-balance-de-una-experiencia.

Verdad Abierta. 2008. ‘Conflicto armado 1981 - 1989’. *VerdadAbierta.com* (blog). 9 March 2008. https://verdadabierta.com/conflicto-armado-1981-1989/.

VerdadAbierta. 2011. ‘Un singular pacto de paz Eln-Farc’. *VerdadAbierta.com* (blog). 28 September 2011. https://verdadabierta.com/un-singular-pacto-de-paz-eln-farc/.

———. 2018. ‘Arauca, asediado por la inseguridad y la disidencia de las Farc’. *VerdadAbierta.com* (blog). 12 June 2018. https://verdadabierta.com/arauca-asediado-la-inseguridad-la-disidencia-las-farc/.

———. 2022. ‘Arauca, bajo un conflicto armado más allá de las drogas ilícitas’. *VerdadAbierta.com* (blog). 9 January 2022. https://verdadabierta.com/arauca-bajo-conflicto-armado-mas-alla-de-las-drogas-ilicitas/.

Vestri, Gabriele. 2015. ‘Colombia : ¿Convirtiendo La Desaparición Forzada y Los Falsos Positivos En Política de Estado? : El Actual (y No Tan Actual) Estado de La Cuestión’. *Colombia : ¿Convirtiendo La Desaparición Forzada y Los Falsos Positivos En Política de Estado? : El Actual (y No Tan Actual) Estado de La Cuestión*, 275–99. https://doi.org/10.14679/1009.

Villa, Rafael Duarte, Camila de Macedo Braga, and Marcos Alan S. V. Ferreira. 2021. ‘Violent Nonstate Actors and the Emergence of Hybrid Governance in South America’. *Latin American Research Review* 56 (1): 36–49. https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.756.

Vinci, Anthony. 2009. *Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents*. Routledge. https://nl1lib.org/book/827265/7d3fbe.

VIU, Venezuela Investigative Unit. 2018a. ‘Colombia and Venezuela: Criminal Siamese Twins’. *InSight Crime* (blog). 21 May 2018. https://insightcrime.org/investigations/colombia-venezuela-criminal-siamese-twins/.

———. 2018b. ‘Reunión entre ELN y disidencias de las FARC confirma que utilizan Venezuela como enclave criminal’. *InSight Crime* (blog). 10 December 2018. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/reunion-entre-eln-y-disidencias-de-las-farc-confirma-que-utilizan-venezuela-como-enclave-criminal/.

———. 2021. ‘The Battle for Apure: Chavismo and the Ex-FARC’. InsightCrime. https://insightcrime.org/investigations/battle-apure-chavismo-ex-farc/.

Waldmann, Peter. 2002. *Der anomische Staat Über Recht, öffentliche Sicherheit und Alltag in Lateinamerika*. Edited by Peter Waldmann. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-09590-3_1.

Watson, Cynthia A. 2000. ‘Civil-Military Relations in Colombia: A Workable Relationship or a Case for Fundamental Reform?’ *Third World Quarterly* 21 (3): 529–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/713701039.

Weber, Max. 2008. ‘Politics as a Vocation’. In *Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations*, edited by John Dreijmanis. Classics Series. Algora Publishing.

Wikimedia Commons. 2015a. *Mapa de Arauca, Colombia*. Own work. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mapa_de_Arauca_(pol%C3%ADtico).svg.

———. 2015b. *Map of Colombia and Venezuela*. Ecuador Colombia Venezuela map.svg. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Colombia_Venezuela_map.svg.

Yagoub, Mimi. 2017. '¿Qué sigue tras el desarme de las FARC en Colombia?' *InSight Crime* (blog). 16 August 2017. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/sigue-tras-desarme-farc-colombia/.

Zaitch, Damián. 2002. *Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands*. Studies of Organized Crime ; Vol. 1. 241274680. The Hague [etc.]: Kluwer Law International.

Zartman, I. William, ed. 1995. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Zulver, Julia, and Annette Idler. 2020. 'Gendering the Border Effect: The Double Impact of Colombian Insecurity and the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis'. *Third World Quarterly* 41 (7): 1122–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1744130.

Appendix 1: List of Interviewees

Name of the interviewee	**Affiliated organisation**	**Position within the organisation**	**Date and place**
Andrés Cajiao & Paula Andrea Tobo Caviedes	*Fundación Ideas para la Paz* (FIP)	Investigator for the team working on dynamics of the armed conflict and peace negotiations Research assistant for the team working on dynamics of the armed conflict and peace negotiations	07.04.2022, online via Zoom From the Hague, the Netherlands and Bogotá, Colombia
María del Carmen (Carmenza) Muñoz Sáenz	*Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular* (CINEP)	Responsable for the project *Escuela de Paz y Convivencia Ciudadana* (EPCC)	27.04.2022, online via Zoom From the Hague, the Netherlands and Bogotá, Colombia
Leonardo González	*Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz* (INDEPAZ)	Coordinator of the observatory of human rights	28.04.2022, online via Zoom From the Hague, the Netherlands and Bogotá, Colombia
Hilda B. Molano Casas	*Coalición contra la Vinculación de Niños, Niñas y Jóvenes al Conflicto Armado en Colombia* (COALICO)	Coordinator of the secretariat	02.05.2022, online From the Hague, the Netherlands and Bogotá, Colombia

Juan Diego Posada	InSight Crime	Spanish Editor, also accompanying investigators in the field	03.05.2022, online via Zoom From the Hague, the Netherlands and Medellín, Colombia
Henry Cuervo Castillo	*Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris* (CNAI)	Co-founder of CNAI and Coordinator of the observatory of the armed conflict and post-conflict	12.05.2022, online via Zoom From the Hague, the Netherlands and Bogotá, Colombia