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The Chinese Government's Response to Human Rights Accusations in Light of the Olympic Games

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**The Chinese Government's Response to Human Rights Accusations
in Light of the Olympic Games**

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1. Introduction

The 2008 Olympic Games of Beijing were an event that many Chinese considered a turning point for China's position in the world. Those Olympic Games were the opportunity for China to prove what it was capable of in terms of economics, culture, and governance after the 'century of humiliation' (1839 - 1949). This global sports event could show China's rapid development into the modern world over the years before. The Chinese hosts wanted to welcome the foreigners with open arms (Wardęga, 2014). Looking back on the Olympic Games, the Chinese host succeeded in showing the world what China had to offer. Their government successfully improved China's reputation in the international landscape (Cull, 2008). Not only did their image improve internationally, but the Chinese support for the government also improved (Brady, 2009). China showed the world what it had accomplished economically (Chen et al., 2012) and technologically (Wardęga, 2014). China already faced image problems before the event in 2008, for example, the SARS crisis, human rights violations in Tibet, and the Tiananmen protests. The Olympic Games were, therefore, "the ultimate distraction story," as Cull (2008) pointed out. However, foreign countries were not that easily distracted. Protests disrupted the Olympic Games, and especially the torch relay. Many foreign countries criticised China for its human rights violations and protested worldwide (Percival & Stewart, 2008). The disruptions mainly came on the one hand from pro-Tibet protesters and human rights activists and, on the other hand, pro-China people who wanted to support their government. These protests were a stain on the Olympic Games.

Fourteen years later, the Chinese government had the opportunity to host the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games. This time China faced reputation problems again. Once again, these reputation issues concerned human rights, such as violations in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong (Amnesty International Report 2020/21, 2021). A few months before the Olympic Games started, China was in the international news again because of tennis player Peng Shuai. Reportedly, she went missing after accusing the former Vice-premier of sexual harassment (Williams, 2021). Even though Peng Shuai resurfaced later and confirmed she was safe, this situation led to appeals to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to withhold from holding the Winter Olympics in Beijing (Kanter, 2021). Before the Olympics started in February 2022, some countries (U.S., U.K., Australia, and Canada) had already voiced their opinions about the Olympics in 2022 and China's issues (Kanno-Youngs, 2021; McGee & Westcott, 2021). In

their statements, officials of these countries mainly mentioned the human rights issues as a reason to boycott the Olympic games. Psaki, press secretary of the White House, noted that a complete boycott of the Games would be unfair to the athletes and their hard work (The White House, 2021). Australia's Prime Minister Scott Morrison said they would still send athletes to Beijing because he believes in separating sports and politics. The U.K. and Canada followed the U.S. by declaring a diplomatic boycott. Boris Johnson called an athletic boycott "sensible" (Ingle, 2021), and Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Joly also wanted to separate athletics from politics (Turnbull, 2021).

A boycott goes against the Olympic spirit, according to the IOC. The IOC released a statement in reaction to the boycott of the U.S. This statement affirmed that sports and politics should be separated. They also referred to the Olympic Truce, which states that the participating countries should uphold peace around and during the Olympic Games (IOC, 2021b). The truce is meant to promote peace and world unity. This spirit is represented by the five Olympic rings, which portray the unity of the continents and all athletes worldwide. Because of this spirit and the importance of political neutrality, countries that speak out about human rights issues call it a "diplomatic boycott" instead of only a "boycott." This former term means that participating countries send their athletes but no government officials.

This diplomatic boycott sent a signal to China. The Chinese government has responded to these human rights accusations in their media. This study wishes to address the following research question: What has been the response of the Chinese government to these human rights accusations issued by the boycotting countries in the context of the Beijing Winter Olympics of 2022?

To answer this question, I conduct a discourse analysis on two mouthpiece newspapers of the Chinese government. I explain this method further in my study. The boycotts that I refer to are announced because of the human rights issues in China (mainly the Xinjiang issues). Responses to these diplomatic boycotts thus show how the Chinese government responds to human rights accusations. For this reason, I also focus on how the Chinese government responds to these diplomatic boycotts. Some countries also announced boycotts due to the COVID-19 pandemic (AP NEWS, 2022), but these are not part of my research. Furthermore, I will use the terms diplomatic boycott and boycott interchangeably. I will mention this explicitly if I refer to an athletic/complete boycott. This research question will help discover what discourse the

Chinese government uses in responding to the human rights accusations concerning the Winter Olympics.

For the Olympics of 2008, multiple authors analysed the discourse of the Chinese government concerning the (protests of the) torch relays of the Olympic Games. They then looked at how these discourses shaped the Chinese nationalist discourse (Ma, 2018; Han, 2011). Researchers focused on soft power during the Olympic Games of 2008. They studied how the Chinese host used this event to carry out soft power strategies (Finlay & Xin, 2010; Wardęga, 2014; Kurlantzick, 2007; Grix & Lee, 2013) or promote nationalism (Billings et al., 2011; Han, 2011; Rider & Llewellyn, 2015; Ma, 2018; Wang, 2021). Inboden and Chen (2012) have also studied previous responses of China to human rights issues, as have other researchers (Yuan et al., 2017). As nationalism is an important element in this research, I will also consider Anderson's (1991) "imagined communities" and Herbst's (1990) take on external threats and nationalism.

The subject of the following chapter covers previous research concerning my topic, as already briefly elaborated on above. This literature review shows the relevant research for my case and what has already been done. Then I can incorporate my research into the existing knowledge. In chapter three, I explain the methods of discourse analysis and media framing, followed up by demonstrating my research methods. In the following data analysis chapter, I will show the reactions of the Chinese government to the human rights accusations and analyse these reactions. After showing the data I will discuss the data and analyse it in more detail. In my conclusion, I will summarise my findings and explain what these findings mean.

2. Literature review

In this chapter, I review the previous literature regarding my research. In order to answer the research question, we should first look at comparable research. First, I elaborate on research about the Olympic Games. I focus on discourse, soft power, and nationalism related to the sports event. Then, I will focus on China's history of responses to human rights. Since nationalism is an essential part of the research, I end the review by explaining nationalism in more detail and focusing on nationalism in China.

2.1 Olympic Games

Four pieces of research focused on discourse created by the official media regarding the Olympic Games of 2008. I elaborate on their conclusions and highlight the Chinese government's responses to the torch relay's turmoil. I will thereafter analyse how nations can use the Olympics to promote soft power and nationalism.

Discourse during the Olympic Games

Two researchers conducted a similar discourse analysis for the Olympic Games of 2008 (Ma, 2018; Han, 2011). However, they focused on different aspects of the Olympic Games. Ma (2018) analysed the discourse of official and popular media texts. He focused on the torch relay in Paris and how these discussions shaped Chinese nationalist discourses. He concludes that the official newspapers strengthened the national pride of the Chinese with their “discursive power.” For example, one newspaper described the torch relay as “harmonious and peaceful,” even though the relay was disturbed by protests against the human rights situation in Tibet. This discursive power of the official media transformed the torch relay full of protests into a positive event for the image of China. Another element enhancing the nationalist sentiment was the media's use of the terms “we” (China) and “they” (the protesters). This element boosted a feeling of solidarity among the Chinese people, who all supported the torch relay and were against the protesters to protect Chinese pride.

Han (2011) focused on the torch relay of 2008 and tried to understand Chinese nationalism through the state-controlled domestic newspapers that covered this event. He also noticed the use of “we” versus “them” in the coverage of the torch relay. The official media put more focus on the “we's” in their stories and wrote less about the “them's” (e.g., pro-Tibet

protesters, “the West”). By using this kind of Chinese nationalist discourse in the coverage of a global event, the newspapers tried to present the Chinese government as the world leader to their readers. The media showed a kind of “Chineseness,” as Han explains, which underlined the nationalistic tendency in this global context (since the torch relay and the Olympic Games were global events). This “Chineseness” was expressed in multiple ways, namely through the domestic Chinese who celebrated the torch relay and with the support of the Chinese diaspora. The official newspapers also reported on the non-Chinese who supported China during the torch relay. The fact that foreigners supported the Chinese during the torch relay strengthened the Chinese pride. Both Han (2011) and Ma (2018) concluded that the Chinese government has the power over what kind of discourse the official newspapers create and that this official discourse strengthens Chinese nationalism.

Finlay and Xin (2010) also focused on the torch relay and the Olympic Games of 2008. They analysed Japan’s and the United States’ responses to China’s soft power strategies during these events. They conclude that the news coverage in Japan and the U.S. suggests that China’s soft power strategies and Chinese nationalism during the Olympics did not change Japan’s and America’s media perspectives on China. The news covering the Olympic Games and torch relay in the U.S. was mainly done by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) who used the opportunity of the Olympic Games to stress human rights issues. The Chinese government’s response to this was an anti-Western, nationalist response. Regarding the Japanese coverage of the events, it was important for the Chinese government to maintain a good relationship with the Japanese government. In Japan, protesters who supported Tibet disrupted the torch relay. However, in this case, the Chinese media responded differently to this turmoil. They tried to underline the efforts of the Japanese host that kept the relay event as safe as possible. During the Olympic Games, the propaganda department of the CPC (Communist Party of China) stimulated the Chinese media not to exaggerate the victories of the Chinese teams and “promote a new discourse of friendship and commonality between China and Japan” (Finlay & Xin, 2010). Their research demonstrates that China had different reactions to the news coverage of the Olympic Games and the torch relay in Japan and the U.S. The reaction of the Chinese government to different countries' opinions about the Olympics taking place in China can thus differ. This response depends on the relationship between the two countries and what the government wishes to accomplish with this relationship, as we could see with China’s response to the Japanese torch relay protests. Therefore, we can see that the Chinese government uses different discourses in reaction to different countries, such as the

department of propaganda of the CPC's decision to create a specific discourse using the Chinese media to improve the relationship with Japan.

Huang and Fahmy (2013) also looked at the framing of the torch relay by Chinese newspapers. Instead of focusing on text, they focused on the visual framing of the relay. They compared the photographs published in the U.S. and Chinese media. They demonstrate that the U.S. and China each display their values regarding the policy on Tibet and how much they support the Beijing Olympics. The Chinese newspapers mainly focused on the torch relay's success and harmony, while the U.S. media focused on human rights and Tibet. Huang and Fahmy conclude that a sporting event can be a "double-edged sword," meaning that it can be a booster for peace but simultaneously can cause a disturbance. They further explain that the protests during the torch relay threatened the nationalist pride in China and the authority of the Chinese government. By minimising the disturbances of the demonstrations in their media, the CPC could preserve their social stability (in economic and social developmental terms). The following paragraph also shows that (a threat to) national pride is not uncommon during the Olympic Games.

National pride and soft power for the host

The abovementioned articles show that China promoted nationalism and soft power in reaction to the turmoil of the Olympic Games and especially the torch relay of 2008. According to multiple studies, these global sports events are convenient for hosts to carry out soft power strategies (Dubinsky, 2019; Freeman, 2012; Grix & Lee, 2013; Wardęga, 2014). During the Olympics of 2008, China used the media to demonstrate its transformation to the world. Wardęga (2014) explains that the Chinese host used their soft power through their media to show their influence on the international scene. For example, China did not want countries to boycott the event; when they did, the Chinese press would no longer mention those countries' leaders. Wardęga also saw that the Chinese media did not try to change the opinions of the Western human rights activists who protested against the Olympic Games. Instead, their goal was to "unite the Chinese in China and the Chinese diaspora around the idea of defending China's 'face.'" He concludes that during the 2008 Olympics, China used "positive nationalism" and used the event for soft power. He also concludes that China's image improved due to the Olympics, especially from a technological point of view. Grix and Lee (2013) support the idea that hosts who suffer from international image problems, such as human rights issues, can benefit the most from using a soft power strategy during global events. However, they also refer

to Kurlantzick's (2007) article, which states that soft power can also fail. Kurlantzick explains that the Olympic Games could attract the world's attention even more to the negative issues of a hosting nation, which happened to China in 2008. By utilising a soft power strategy, a host consequently creates an environment where other countries can react to this strategy (Grix & Lee, 2013). Freeman (2012) argues that international sports can improve a nation's nationalist sentiment and its image towards other countries at the same time. Freeman does not discuss, however, how an international sports event can backfire on a nation (Kurlantzick, 2007; Finlay & Xin, 2010; Wang, 2021). In deciding to host the Olympic Winter Games of 2022, China created a space for other countries to react (for example, to the Uyghur situation).

Next to soft power, the Olympic Games also provide a host the opportunity to promote nationalism. As pointed out before, official media used a particular discourse regarding the Olympic Games in 2008, which contained nationalist characteristics. Both Ma (2018) and Han (2011) mentioned that the newspapers used an "us" and "them" dichotomy to accentuate nationalism. Another study confirms this dichotomy in the media framework of the Olympic Games to shape Chinese nationalism (Billings et al., 2011). They studied the reporting of the athletic performances by national telecasts, whereas I will review official newspapers. Rider and Llewellyn (2015) support the idea that hosting the Olympics gives that nation's government the chance to promote nationalist pride. These "national narratives" are not only for the world to see but also for the domestic audience. During the 1992 Olympic Games of Barcelona, the Catalonians used this event to promote their Catalan nationalism (Hargreaves, 2000). Also, during the Sydney Olympics of 2000, part of the campaign was to show that the non-Indigenous people no longer mistreated the Indigenous people. The event host was afraid the Indigenous people would protest during the Games. Therefore, the Australian media tried to create a particular image with nationalist stories to portray a reconciliation between non-Indigenous and Indigenous people. The media hoped to prevent protests and disruption during the Olympic Games (Elder et al., 2006). Wang (2021) shows that China, Japan, and South Korea each used the Olympics to strengthen nationalism. As we can see, hosts of the Olympic Games can use the event to promote nationalism in their own countries.

2.2 China's response to human rights issues

The protests against China regarding the violations of human rights during the Summer Olympics of 2008 were not the only ones. Before the Olympic Winter Games of 2022, some countries opted for a political boycott. The reason for the boycott was the violation of human rights in China, as seen in the introduction. I want to examine the reaction of the Chinese government to these human rights criticisms surrounding the Olympic Games of 2022. To understand this reaction, we should first look at how China has reacted to human rights issues in the past. Inboden and Chen (2012) have looked at the response of the Chinese government to the international pressure on China's infringement of human rights over the last three decades, starting from the Tiananmen Square protests. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, China faced massive criticism worldwide. Their response was to relieve the criticism of others to respect human rights by urging the United Nations (U.N.) to adapt the human rights system in favour of their state sovereignty. China did, however, partly give in to the pressure to respect human rights by, for example, signing international human rights agreements. Inboden and Chen conclude that the key feature of China's response to international pressure to respect human rights is not a disregarding one but one where the Chinese government demands to stay in control of the human rights agenda.

Seymour (2003) has reviewed Svensson's article on the history of China's human rights discussion. Svensson shows that the Chinese government only began actively developing a human rights discourse after 1989 to produce an answer to the criticisms concerning the protests of that time. She stresses that the Chinese government does not see human rights as "Western" or "Asian" but as a universal term. This aligns with Inboden and Chen (2012), who mention that China criticised the U.N. for having a country-specific approach to targeting countries for their human rights policy. Yuan et al. (2017) also argue that China will not just take over international human rights norms but "remould" these norms into something that fits their own context. State sovereignty is an important term in discussing human rights in China. Weatherley argues in his book that Confucianism and Marxism have shaped how people perceive the concept of rights in China. According to these systems of thought, individual rights are not needed as long as the collective interest is protected. Collective rights, therefore, are more important than individual rights. Weatherley also mentions that the Chinese government has a negative response to the criticism of the West regarding human rights because, in their view,

Western countries have not been innocent in terms of human rights and refers to the Western imperialism in China (Tan, 2000).

Chen and Hsu (2018) studied *People's Daily's* news stories from 1989 to 2015 to determine how the CPC conceptualizes human rights. They concluded in their research that the CPC had two human rights conceptions since 1989. Since the nineties, the government regarded human rights as a threat to their regime and state sovereignty. For this reason, their reaction was to restrain and reject the concept of human rights. As of 2003 (the new presidency of Hu Jintao), the CPC used the human rights concept as a measure of its governing capacity. Hu Jintao thought that the protection of rights was associated with CPC's capacity to govern. Therefore, they accepted human rights and welcomed the concept. In the years after, the CPC used both reactions to human rights. These are responses to former human rights violations, however. What is the Chinese government's reaction during the Olympic Games of 2022 when other countries point out China's human rights violations?

2.3 Nationalism

As seen in the studies above, nationalism is an integral part of the discourse of Chinese media reporting on the Olympic Games. Benedict Anderson (1991) wrote an important book about nations, where he identifies these nations as "imagined communities," which means the citizens do not all know each other but do imagine the presence of their fellow citizens. Furthermore, he explains that the citizens of a nation believe in their nation as a "deep, horizontal comradeship." An important element in creating such a feeling of comradeship was print capitalism. Anderson explains that this print capitalism exists of certain discourse and language everyone could understand enabled through the printing press. This printing press would stimulate the citizens to relate to other citizens and create this feeling of nationalism. Anderson's notion of a nation and the printing press's influence is still relevant today. The printing press still exists in the form of, in this case, the Chinese media. The media create a particular discourse that could stimulate this feeling of fellowship among Chinese citizens.

Moreover, this study focuses on a foreign threat to the Chinese government. This threat consists of the boycotting countries accusing China of violating human rights. Herbst (1990) argues that external threats can influence nationalism since these threats could endanger the

nation and its people. Herbst mainly focuses on wars as external threats, and the human rights accusations are evidently not on the same level. However, the allegations do threaten the Chinese nation and its governance. This danger to their nation could let the Chinese government react in a nationalist sense to “save” their nation from the allegations. The criticism of foreign countries against China during the COVID-19 outbreak also brought a feeling of nationalism. Wang and Tao (2021) studied the response of Chinese media (Weibo) to Western countries. They criticised the performance of China at the beginning of the virus outbreak and later when the virus became a global pandemic. Their study concludes that external threats to a nation can result in two reactions: a counterattack to the foreign threats and accusations or a comparative response. The first mentioned reaction is a form of nationalism called the “Suppression of Ambivalent Attitudes toward the Nation.” The discourse on Weibo consisted of loyalty to the nation and criticism of Western standards in their COVID prevention. The latter response was a form of “Feeling of National Superiority” nationalism. This response consisted mainly of comparing China with the rest of the world in outbreak management and that China helped the world in its epidemic battle (and being superior in it). Wang and Tao show that external threats provoke certain Chinese responses with nationalist characteristics.

Nationalism in China

Chinese nationalism has been formed by a feeling of humiliation in China’s past (Pye, 1992; Mitter, 2020; Zhao, 2004), which originated in the ‘century of humiliation’ (1839 - 1949). Nationalism has an even more prominent role in China as the CPC faces “the collapse of communist ideology” (Gries et al., 2016). Xi Jinping embodies Chinese nationalism in his Chinese dream to rejuvenate China. Wang (2017) explains that in his “Chinese Dream” speech, Xi also referred to the past and its humiliations and tried to unify the Chinese people. Wang further elaborates that they need development and hard work for the dream to come true. As we can see, the president of China uses a particular discourse to unite the Chinese people and create a nationalist sentiment. All Chinese people suffered in the past, but together they can work toward a better future, possibly creating a sentiment of pride among the Chinese. As we saw in Anderson’s (1991) argumentation, the printing press also plays an important factor in creating a feeling of nationalism.

Kuo (2002) has studied how a *Guangming Daily* article displays this nationalism. This Chinese article responds to a *Washington Post* article, which argues that China will not rule Taiwan and opposes the idea of “One China.” Instead, the American article proposes a theory

of “Two China’s,” where Taiwan and China are separated nations. The Chinese article that Kuo studied entirely opposed this idea of “Two China’s” and used a certain discourse to reject this theory and save China’s integrity and sovereignty. Kuo explained that he analysed forms of “name-calling” to discredit the idea of “Two China’s.” The Chinese article labelled the *Washington Post* article negatively, such as “slanderous” or “ridiculous.” The author of the Chinese article used certain metaphors that further enforced the idea of “One China.” Kuo also looked at the use of modal devices that try to convince the reader that the “One China” belief is the right one. The article, for example, used words such as “absolutely” and “It is known to all” to let the readers believe it must be the truth if everybody shares this opinion. Kuo refers to Simon-Vandenberg (1996) to explain words such as “It is known to all.” These kinds of words can present one’s opinion as the truth “by presenting it as based on rationality and common sense” (Simon-Vandenberg, 1996, as cited in Kuo, 2002). Han (2011) also saw that Chinese newspapers exaggerate or diminish certain viewpoints to prove their point and promote Chinese nationalism. Like the abovementioned research, I also analyse a certain discourse. I focus on the Chinese newspapers’ responses to the accusations of China’s human rights violations in the context of the Olympic Games.

3. Methods

This chapter explains why I chose a discourse analysis method and how I have collected and analysed my data. I first describe what a discourse analysis entails. As this research studies two Chinese newspapers, I will explain the term “media framing” and why it is important to keep this in mind during the analysis.

3.1 Discourse analysis

With the help of discourse analysis, I could see what sort of discourse the Chinese government used in responding to the human rights accusations issued by the countries boycotting the Olympic Games. Taylor (2013) explains in her book *What is discourse analysis?* that this analysis allows a researcher to make connections between the language use of a specific text and the “larger social environment, the power structures and relationships within it.” In her book, she also cites Foucault, the pioneer of the term discourse and what it entails. Discourse is the language associated with the system one refers to, if there is even one good definition. By making a certain discourse, there is always a power involved. The one who creates a certain discourse holds power to decide what the discourse entails and influence others' perspectives on certain topics. The creator of a type of discourse can present their beliefs and thoughts to others as the truth (Foucault, 2001, as cited in Taylor, 2013). Fairclough (2015) also argues that mass media (the producers of media discourse) have power over their readers. The media can decide what the media items contain and what they leave out. He also mentions that for the media's power to affect its readers, they must be repetitive in their perspective and discourse. Fairclough explains that if a “discourse type” is dominant in an institution and thereby suppresses all the other discourse types, the dominant discourse will “naturalise.” This “naturalisation” means that the discourse on a specific issue will appear natural and can lead to the discourse being common sense (Fairclough, 2015). Conducting a discourse analysis on the Chinese official newspapers enables us to see what discourse the Chinese government creates and how they use this language to send a message. Consequently, we can see what the Chinese government lets others see as the “truth.” In order to see what message the government wants to send, I analyse what kind of language the government uses in the context of the Olympic Games and human rights.

3.2 Perspective of the media

I analysed two state-run Chinese newspapers for my research: the *People's Daily* and *Global Times*. These newspapers always have a particular perspective or angle from which they write their stories. This perspective is called “media framing.” Bryant et al. (2013) explain that framing in journalism can influence the reader’s viewpoint. Even though the media still inform readers with facts regarding a particular issue, they use specific language that can change the reader’s perception. This language use means they use particular words to describe these facts. Vreese (2005) elaborates on framing, saying that there are multiple types of framing: “frame-building” and “frame-setting.” The first type of framing concerns the “building” of the frame, which are the elements that influence the fundamental characters of the news framing. These can be internal or external (e.g., social movement or the elites) elements of journalism. Frame setting is about the existing knowledge of the readers and how the readers react to the media framing. Vreese explains that this type of framing “may affect learning, interpretation, and evaluation of issues and events,” and framing is all about how the news can feature a specific issue. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) also focused on media discourse and on how this discourse can influence the public’s opinion regarding nuclear power. They wrote that media discourse consists of multiple “interpretative packages” that all can frame the issue in the news item. These packages are metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images. According to Gamson and Modigliani, these packages can influence public opinion regarding a news topic.

My research focuses on the Chinese media and their response to human rights accusations during the Olympic Games of 2022. As seen above, all media have a particular perspective when they write their articles. The Chinese media is not an exception. In China, the CPC significantly impacts media content (He, 2008; Qin et al., 2018; Zhao, 1998). He (2008) explains that China has three ways to control the media: laws and regulations, the propaganda departments of the Party and the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), which monitor the media, and ideological control. Gong (2011) also looked at the influence of ideology on media discourse. He compared the ideology’s influence on China’s and Australia’s media discourse. Gong analysed the *People's Daily's* reporting covering Beijing's bidding for the 2008 Olympics and compared this to the reporting of an Australian newspaper. He

concludes that the report of the same event differed due to different ideological positions. He argues that the Chinese government built an official discourse on human rights issues. At that time, China wanted a “low-key” discourse where they suggested that Olympic values were more important than human rights. For my research, it is necessary to remember that every media provider writes from a certain perspective.

3.3 Data collection

I analysed two state-run Chinese newspapers. By applying discourse analysis to this media content, I found out how the Chinese government responded to the issues around the Olympics and what sort of discourse they created. The literature review shows that these global sports events tend to cause political discussions regarding the host country. This discussion also emerged before the Winter Olympic Games of 2022, as seen by the foreign accusations of human rights violations. Since there were many accusations and the event was worldwide, there were many responses by the Chinese media. These responses from the Chinese government created enough data for me to analyse. The media responded mainly to the boycotts the human rights issues caused. Most media wrote about these boycotts, and only some articles responded to the human rights accusations. Since these boycotts and human rights are related, I also analysed the media that only focused on the boycotts. I merely focused, however, on the boycotts that were announced because of the human rights accusations. Some countries also decided not to send government officials due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but these boycotts have not been included in my data gathering. The media do not relate the boycotts to human rights in every article. However, the boycotts they reacted to in their articles referred to the ones announced due to the human rights issues in China.

First, I will explain how I collected the data. The two newspapers I collected the data from are the Chinese versions of the *People's Daily* and *Global Times*. They are both nationwide newspapers. Since the Olympics were held in Beijing, which is also the political centre of China, I chose newspapers from this city. The *People's Daily* is known to be the central newspaper of the CPC, and the Party has direct supervision of the newspaper (He, 2008). The *Global Times* is a tabloid newspaper owned and published by the *People's Daily*, and this newspaper also is a mouthpiece of the CPC. I also used data from the *Global Times*, as the *People's Daily* did not provide enough data to analyse. These two newspapers represent the

opinions and thoughts of the government. Both newspapers also have an English version. I chose to study the Chinese version as both newspapers are originally Chinese (Mandarin), the official language of the CPC. Analysing the Chinese versions allowed me to better understand the discourse that the CPC created. The meaning and message of the CPC in the English versions might get lost in translation

I started to collect data over a large period of time. The data was collected from April 10th to May 4th, 2022. The data I collected was published from November 1st, 2021, until February 27th, 2022. The calls to boycott the Winter Olympics started around November. From the 1st of November, the newspapers began to write articles about the announced boycotts and human rights issues. The Olympic Games lasted from the 4th until the 20th of February, 2022. I decided to collect data until a week after the end of the event. This allowed me to search for data containing reactions after the Games themselves. I searched the Chinese sites of both newspapers (<http://people.cn/> for *People's Daily* and <https://www.huanqiu.com/> for *Global Times*). I used the following combined words: “奥运会人权” (Olympic Games human rights) and “奥运会抵制” (Olympic Games boycott). During my data gathering, I searched for articles that mentioned the Olympic Games in combination with human rights accusations or the boycotts. I ended up with 86 articles. The *People's Daily* provided 30 articles and the *Global Times* provided 56 articles.

I did not include particular articles in my data sample. Both newspapers did not always write the articles themselves but published articles from other newspapers. I still decided to collect these for the analysis since the *People's Daily* and the *Global Times* published them on their website and therefore endorsed them. Sometimes both newspapers published the same article that originated from another newspaper. As I would end up with identical pieces in my sample, I deleted one of the two identical articles. I also noticed that some articles referred to the same press conferences of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and only quoted what the Ministry's spokesmen had said in their articles without adding any further comments. If another article had already cited the spokesman's press conference, I deleted the articles that did not add any comments next to these quotes. These articles had the same information as other articles and did not add new information. After deleting these articles, I ended up with a sample of 23 articles from the *People's Daily* and 48 articles from the *Global Times*. This sample of 71 articles provided me with sufficient data. After around 60 articles, the main responses kept repeating themselves, and the articles did not add any new information for my research. After

my analysis, the 71 articles gave me enough data to provide evidence for my arguments. I did not analyse news reports covering the Paralympics Games (March 4th - 13th, 2022), even though the Paralympics are an essential part of the Olympics. This exclusion is due to the fact that during my data gathering, I noticed all the reports on human rights issues and the boycott referred to the Olympic Games. The media did not mention the Paralympic Games in this context.

After I collected my sample, I started to analyse the newspaper articles. My research mainly focuses on the newspapers' reactions to foreign human rights-related boycotts. I concentrated specifically on how the articles described these two topics and how in which manner they responded to these accusations and boycotts in combination with the Olympic Games. This allowed me to discover the Chinese government's discourse in their responses. I first analysed the original Chinese articles and then translated the quotes I used in my analysis into English.

4. Data analysis

In this chapter, I present the data I found in my sample. First, I look at the responses on a level of “name-calling.” This means I look at the adjectives, metaphors, and idioms that the articles use to describe the human rights and boycott situation. I also analyse the discursive techniques the articles use to, for example, downplay certain words. Next, I analyse the reactions in more detail and try to grasp the underlying messages of the responses. Ultimately, I analyse these two levels of responses altogether to see what exact messages the Chinese government tries to send in responding to the boycotts and human rights issues.

My research question is how the Chinese government has responded to the human rights accusations issued by the boycotting countries concerning Beijing's 2022 Winter Olympics. I distinguished the responses to the boycotts and human rights accusations in the analysis. The articles used different words and reactions for, on the one hand, the announced boycotts and the human rights accusations on the other. Most articles only responded to the announced boycotts, and fewer articles included a response to the human rights situation in China. As already mentioned in the introduction, most countries that did not send government officials did this because of the human rights situation in China. Almost all of China's reactions were regarding the Uyghur situation in Xinjiang. One article mentioned Hong Kong (GT40, reference in Appendix A).

Most of the reactions in the Chinese newspapers were to the American boycott. Therefore, most of the responses below are also about the U.S. statement to boycott the Olympic Games in China. I will specify if China's response is to another country than the U.S. The references used in the analysis to the newspaper articles are presented in Appendix A. Sometimes, I refer to many articles for one word or phrase. I will display the references in Appendix B if I refer to more than three articles. I will still display the number of articles the word or phrase refers to (with B1, B2, B3,...).

4.1 Harming them with words

Adjectives and metaphors

The articles described the boycott with adjectives that have negative connotations. One of the ways the articles tried to downplay the boycott is by calling it a “drama/show” (戏; 7 mentions, B1), “performance/show” (表演; 7 mentions, B2), or a “farce” (闹剧; 10 mentions, B3). These words minimise the seriousness of the message the boycotting countries want to deliver. Other diminishing words to show that the boycott should not be taken seriously are “doomed to fail” (注定失败; 10 mentions, B4), “laughing stock” (笑柄; 4 mentions, B5), “dissonance” (不和谐音; PD10), “unpopular” (不得人心; 16 mentions, B6), “joke” (笑话; PD9), “hypocritical/false” (虚伪; 5 mentions, B7), “hysterical” (歇斯底里; GT2), and “murmurs” (杂音; GT12). By reading these sorts of words, the readers might believe that the boycott is not something everyone supports or to be taken seriously. The countries who boycott even harm others, according to the newspapers, because it was a “threat to the justice and well-being of the international community” (对国际社会正义和福祉的潜在威胁, GT2), a “manipulation” (操纵; 23 mentions, B8), and “selfish and harmful” (自私且有害; PD1). These words even display the boycott as dangerous. I did not find any positive words to describe the boycott in the sample.

Furthermore, the newspapers used a few metaphors for the boycott. One way the articles described the boycott was as “damp dud” (潮湿的哑炮; GT1). A dud could refer to a complete failure or a bomb that fails to explode. GT4 uses a metaphor to ridicule the boycott of the U.S.: “It is just like Chinese people eating hot pot, and there is a layer of foam [from meat] on the soup. Some Chinese just ignore the foam and keep cooking the meat, but some more delicate people will scoop the foam and throw it away” (这种事就如中国人涮火锅上面漂出的一层泡沫, 很多人不搭理它们该怎么涮就怎么涮, 讲究的人还会把它们用勺子撇出来倒掉). This article compared the Americans to the foam, meaning that the Chinese would keep focussing on the Olympics and ignore or even throw the Americans away. By comparing the Americans with foam, the articles again aimed to ridicule the U.S. and their boycott and showed that they do not need the Americans for the Olympic Games. One article (GT5) used two

metaphors to ridicule the U.S. politicians: “If you ride a tiger, it is hard to get off, and they make a spectacle of themselves” (自我抵制, 纯粹是骑虎难下、丢人现眼) and “It is as ridiculous as a man standing in a boxing ring and competing alone in front of thousands of staring eyes” (就像一个人站在拳台上, 万目睽睽之下独自比划拳脚一样可笑). This last metaphor reinforced the idea of the little support the U.S. had received in its boycott statement. The *Global Times* also judged the statements of the White House by saying that their attitude towards the boycott “changes faster than flipping a book” (翻脸比翻书还快; GT11). They attempted to ridicule the countries that had accused them of violating human rights. The metaphors created an image that is easy to understand for the reader, reinforcing the argument the authors wanted to make. It allows the newspapers to express their emotion and opinions about the U.S. boycott. These metaphors clearly showed that the Chinese newspapers do not agree with the boycott and that the U.S. is making a fool of itself by announcing a failure of a boycott.

Based on lies

The reactions to the human rights accusations I found most in my sample were that these accusations are “lies” (谎言; 12 mentions, B9), which means that, according to the newspapers, the boycotts were based on lies. PD2 quoted John Ross, a British blogger and supporter of the Chinese government. Ross stated that the accusations were false and called the Xinjiang “genocide” a lie. He declared it as propaganda of the U.S. The article directly quoted John Ross: “It is on the same level as their completely false claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, which they used to launch the invasion of Iraq” (这与他们完全错误地声称伊拉克拥有大规模杀伤性武器的说法处于同一水平, 他们以此来发动对伊拉克的入侵). He mentioned the Uyghur athlete Dinigeer Yilamujiang who was one of the torchbearers during the opening of the Olympic Games. According to Ross, the fact that she held the torch proved that there is no oppression of the Uyghur people. When an article quotes a particular person, the authors of the newspapers put this person in an authoritative position and make them look like an expert on this issue. The *People’s Daily* directly quoted John Ross and thus presented him as an expert on this issue. Moreover, one of the *Global Times* articles (GT6) mentioned that China had already explained Xinjiang's human rights situation and that they do not have to do this once

again. The author wrote that China “used data and facts to disprove the lie of ‘genocide’” (以数据和事实戳穿了“种族灭绝”的谎言). The articles show that the Chinese response is to negate the human rights accusations and act as if nothing is wrong with their human rights situation.

Other words with negative connotations in the article's responses to the human rights accusations were “absurd accusations” (荒诞指控; GT4), “slanders” (污蔑; GT4, PD7), “joke” (笑话; GT10, GT29), “fallacy” (谬论; PD2), “untenable” (站不住脚; GT10, GT29), “groundless and totally unfounded” (毫无根据, 完全是无中生有; GT40), and “completely upside down, wrong on top of wrong, and self-deceiving” (完全是颠倒黑白、错上加错、自欺欺人; 5 mentions, B10). GT7 also used the idiom “子虚乌有的说辞” to describe the human rights accusations, which means “unreal/non-existent excuse.” Besides these responses to the human rights accusations, the newspaper articles wrote “so-called human rights” (所谓人权) almost every time they mentioned human rights. In doing so, they minimise the human rights issues.

Moreover, the official newspapers also minimised these issues by referring to Western articles which state that there were no calls for respecting human rights during the Olympics. An article (GT8) mentioned how the *German Editorial Network* says that the athletes did not call for human rights during the Olympic Games. An Australian newspaper, mentioned in the same *Global Times* article, also stated that most controversies went away as soon as the athletes started the Olympics. By referring to a German and Australian article, they tried to show that a boycotting country's media (Australia) agreed that the performance of the athletes was more important than political issues.

“A joke to the Chinese people”

The articles mentioned the Chinese people a few times in their discourse about human rights. One, for example, said that their “human rights situation has never been better, and no unbiased person can deny this” (权状况处于历史最好时期, 任何不带偏见的人都无法否认这一点; GT9). Another article (GT10) quoted Zhao Lijian, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, who

said that “the U.S. smears Xinjiang with ‘genocide’ and ‘forced labour’, which is a joke to the Chinese people” (美方抹黑新疆存在“种族灭绝”“强迫劳动”，对中国人民来说，这简直就是笑话). Zhao also states the following: “To be honest, this ‘human rights card’ routine has tired the Chinese people a bit” (说实话，这种“人权牌”的套路搞得中国老百姓都有点审美疲劳了; GT11). “老百姓” (*laobaixing*) refers to the ordinary people in China. By using words and phrases such as “ordinary people” and “the Chinese people,” the newspapers try to create a feeling of unity. With just these words, they try to make the readers believe that everyone in China agrees with the fact that the human rights issues are laughable and an old tale.

Underlying presumptions

The Chinese newspapers also used discursive methods to minimise or emphasise certain entities. One of the words they used multiple times is “some” (一些; 18 mentions, B11) or “individual” (个别; 20 mentions, B12) to describe the countries or people who wish to boycott the Olympic Games or express their human rights concerns. For example, the authors wrote “some Western governments” (一些西方政客; GT41) or “some people in certain countries” (个别国家一些人; GT25, PD11). They also used “a (small) number of” (少数; 10 mentions, B13) to describe Western politicians or governments. By adopting this approach, they downplay the number of countries and people that support the boycott. Another way they downplay the boycott and human rights accusations is by using air quotes. For example, almost all articles wrote “human rights (issues)” or “diplomatic boycott,” when referring to these terms. They also did this the other way around. For the countries that support China and the Olympic Games, the articles sometimes used words such as “most/majority” (大多数; 5 mentions, B14). Another example is that “a large number” (一大批) of national leaders or senior officials have said that the Olympic movement should not be politicised and that they support the success of the Beijing Winter Olympics (PD4).

PD3 used the phrase “As we all know” (众所周知) when saying that the mission of the Olympic Games is to promote unity. These kinds of words have underlying presumptions and

try to make the reader believe that everyone should know that the Olympic Games promote unity. The *Global Times* (GT12) used multiple techniques in one of their articles:

Despite the murmurs of a "diplomatic boycott" from individual countries, most countries worldwide have always supported the Beijing Winter Olympic Games. The depoliticisation of sports and support for the Beijing Winter Olympics has become the general consensus of the international community and the common voice of the international sports community (尽管个别国家鼓噪“外交抵制”杂音，但全球绝大多数国家始终力挺北京冬奥会。体育非政治化、支持北京冬奥会，已成为国际社会的普遍共识和国际体育界的共同心声)

By using these kinds of words, the Chinese articles try to create an image of many people standing behind them and supporting them.

4.2 Underlying messages of the Chinese government

Us versus them

One message the articles try to convey is an “us” versus “them” sentiment. They have multiple responses that contain this sentiment, which I will elaborate on below.

One of the responses to the boycotts was that the articles attacked the boycotting countries. They pointed their finger at the U.S. and said the U.S. breached the Olympic Truce in 2004 by attacking Iraq (PD7). Moreover, the newspapers brought up how the Biden administration has had the lowest domestic approval rating since it took office and only wanted to pressure China to improve its ratings (GT14). GT1 further says that “as the failed boycott demonstrates, the U.S. is struggling all around” (正如失败的抵制行动所表明的那样，美国正在四处挣扎). In one of the articles posted by the *Global Times* (GT15), the author was *Macau Post Daily* President Xia Li Xian. He states that only nine countries support Biden's initiative. GT16 reinforces this limited support by saying that according to “some international experts (...) the U.S. has difficulties allying with their allies to boycott the Olympic Games” (有

国际问题专家认为...美国很难与盟友结成联合抵制北京冬奥会的同盟). Another article writes about the list of boycotting countries that “the numbers are as shocking as they are pitiful” (少得可怜的数字一样令人震惊; GT1). The *Global Times* (GT11) also mentioned how the Americans had made up words, such as "diplomatic boycott." The White House constantly went back and forth with its statements about boycotting the Winter Olympics, and according to the article, this shows that the diplomacy in Washington is becoming “petty and vicious” (小鼻子小眼了, 而且恶毒; GT4). GT12 wrote about two Western newspapers that showed some Western media oppose the White House's statements. The *Washington Post* labeled the diplomatic boycott as “symbolic,” and the *Agence France-Presse* mentions that the Olympic Committee of the U.S. itself opposes a complete Olympic boycott, especially in the hard times of the COVID-19 epidemic (GT12). The Chinese newspapers mention that the Chinese spokespeople of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have threatened the U.S. by taking countermeasures if the U.S. continues its boycott (9 mentions, B15). These criticisms of other countries are a way of creating an “us” versus “them” sentiment. The articles besmirch the image of the U.S., which puts China in a better light.

Not only did they attack the U.S., but the articles also stated that the U.S. attacked China by boycotting the Olympics. When the U.S. announced they would (diplomatically) boycott the Winter Olympics on December 6th (2022), PD9 responded that the U.S. was suppressing China by announcing the boycott. One *Global Times* article quotes Lü Xiang, a Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher. He said that mentioning a diplomatic boycott by the U.S. media “shows they [the U.S. media] want to add to the chaos of the Sino-U.S. relations” (说明是想给中美关系添点乱; GT23). “The diplomatic boycott (...)”, according to a *People’s Daily* article, “is essentially to incite international anti-China public opinion and engage in ideological confrontation” (此次“外交抵制”(…)本质就是煽动国际反华舆论, 大搞意识形态对抗; PD7). The boycott prevents China and the U.S. from improving their relationship (PD8). Zhao Lijian said that "it will undermine dialogue and cooperation between the two countries in a range of important areas and international and regional issues" (将损害两国在一系列重要领域和国际地区问题上的对话合作; GT14, GT20, GT21). It has affected the relationship

diplomatically and in the world of sports. Zhao said that this boycott had destroyed future Sino-U.S. sports exchanges and their Olympic cooperation (GT21, this was a response to whether China will boycott the Los Angeles Olympic Games in 2028). This reaction shows the Chinese readers that the U.S. is to blame for their stormy relationship, and it is their fault, not the Chinese government's. The newspapers also try to show that China is morally superior and can dodge foreign criticism, thus reinforcing an "us" vs. "them" dichotomy.

Ridiculing the other countries

As seen above, the two newspapers used certain words to ridicule the announced boycotts. Next to using certain adjectives or metaphors, the articles also ridicule the boycotting countries in other ways. They create the sense that they do not take the boycotts seriously. The articles respond that for the Winter Olympic Games to become successful, the Chinese do not even need certain countries' officials to attend the event. One article (PD5) said that "if some Western politicians are less involved and do not add to the mess, the Olympic Games will be even more refined" (某些西方政客少掺和、不添乱, 冬奥会才会更精). Another article (GT1) mentioned that the Olympics of 2008 showed the world what China had to offer and the Winter Olympics of 2022 showed a significant decline of the U.S.'s influence (in general). In other words, "the U.S. boycott is almost inconsequential" (美国的抵制行动几乎是无足轻重的; GT1).

Moreover, the two newspapers mentioned that the Chinese hosts of the Games did not invite the Americans to the Winter Olympics. They explain that the host did not invite the government officials of other countries according to the rules of the Olympic Games. One article (GT11) further explained that "the host and organisers only provide the facilities and nothing else" (东道主、主办方只是提供便利而已). Yang Yang, chairman of the Beijing Winter Olympics Organising Committee's athletes' committee, concluded that the boycott is "not valid" (不成立; PD6) as the U.S. announced a boycott without an invitation. Wang Wenbin, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, also mentioned that "nobody cares whether they [Australian officials] come or not" (他们来或者不来, 没有人会在意; GT13). By saying that nobody cares about the Australians coming or not, he tries to imply that the rest

of the world does not care either whether they come. "So," one article concluded, "what drama are some Western politicians forcing on themselves?" (个别西方国家的政客, 强行给自己加的是什么戏呢?; PD5). The same author also mentioned the coronavirus as it would even have been inappropriate to invite many guests, which "anyone with a little common sense and reason can understand" (对此稍有常识和理智的人都能够理解; PD5). Consequently, the countries that wanted to issue a diplomatic boycott should not even have announced this boycott in the eyes of the Chinese newspapers since the countries were not invited in the first place. The newspapers create a feeling of not needing the Western countries that boycott the Olympic Games and therefore disregard their boycotting intentions and reasons. These responses ridicule the countries that announced they wanted to boycott the Olympic Games.

Shifting their focus

The Chinese newspapers also try to create an image that the Olympic Charter and the athletes are more important than politics. One of the themes they repeatedly mentioned is the Olympic Charter and the Olympic Spirit. The Charter contains the rules and laws of the International Olympic Committee and shows the fundamentals of Olympism. One article (GT11) explained that the Olympic Charter states that the Olympic Spirit is "mutual understanding in the spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play." Boycotting the Olympic Games is a "serious violation" (严重违背; 7 mentions, B16) of this spirit and a threat to the athletes (8 mentions, B17) and the international Olympic cause (4 mentions, B18). In this manner, they tried to put the Olympic Spirit and athletes in the spotlight.

Two words they used for politics in a sports event are "politicisation of sports" (将体育运动政治化) or "politicisation of the Olympic Games" (将奥运会政治化). They made very clear that they are strongly opposed to this politicisation (23 mentions, B19), and Wang Wenbin has said that "China hopes that the individual countries will put themselves in the right position" (中方希望个别国家摆正自己的位置; PD11). Here the article expressed that a boycott is not only against the Olympic Spirit but even the wrong position. This expression implies that China is in the correct position. By making clear that it is "contrary to the new Olympic motto of 'more solidarity' and strongly opposed by the international community" (与"更团结"的奥林

匹克新格言背道而驰，遭到了国际社会的强烈反对; GT24) they kept making the Olympic Charter the authority everyone has to abide by. According to one of the *People Daily's* articles (PD9), the politicisation of sports is not only harmful to the international community and the athletes but even "a grave offence to the entire Chinese people" (对全体中国人民的严重冒犯).

Furthermore, the newspaper articles often mentioned that the Beijing Winter Games unites the world (5 mentions, B20) or makes it a better world (PD4, PD6) when discussing the announced boycotts. This unification is also part of the motto of the Olympics, which the newspapers quote as well: "Faster, Higher, Stronger - Together" (更快、更高、更强——更团结; GT15, PD4, PD12) in which the "Together" part was only added in 2021 by the IOC (2021a). The articles often emphasise that the boycott is an offence to this "togetherness" of the new motto (8 mentions, B21) and one article (GT28) mentioned that U.N. secretary-general Guterres said the Olympic Winter Games would become a booster for world peace. These newspapers that refer to the Olympic Spirit and the athletes put the boycott in another perspective. The boycott is related to human rights issues, but the articles pulled the boycott out of this original context. Their perspective is that the boycotts attack the Olympic Spirit and the athletes rather than issuing human rights accusations. Consequently, they did not have to answer to the human rights issues and can deflect the accusations.

Another reaction of China to the (athletic) boycott and politicising of the Olympic Games was that the Olympic Games were for athletes and not a stage for politics (20 mentions, B22). Besides the Chinese media explicitly saying that the Olympics are not an event for politics, they often said that the athletes are the real protagonists of the Beijing Olympic Games (18 mentions, B23). Boycotting the Olympic Games would crush the athletes' dreams (PD3). The *People's Daily* quoted Yang Yang, China's first Winter Olympic champion and chairwoman of the Athletes' Committee of the Beijing Winter Olympic Organizing Committee. They quoted her in one of their opinion pieces: "Not only do the boycotts harm the athletes and those who love sports and peace, but they also harm children who see the athletes as their role models!" (抵制不仅会伤害运动员和那些热爱体育、热爱和平的人们，更会伤害那些将运动员视为榜样的孩子!; PD1). In another reaction to politicising the Olympic Games, Wang Wenbin

said that this violates the human rights of the athletes (GT27, PD4). Wang Wenbin counter-attacked the boycott and uses their human rights argument against the boycotting countries. By focussing on the athletes, the articles tried to minimise the boycott announcements and shift the focus to other elements than the human rights issues.

The sample also shows that the Chinese media focused on the human rights issues of the countries boycotting the Olympic Games. One article accused the U.S. and the West of their "famous double standard" for attending the 1936 Berlin Olympics of Nazi Germany and the 1976 Olympics in Canada. PD8 quoted a New York netizen for his reaction to the U.S. boycott. This netizen said that "if the so-called 'genocide' had to be used, 'the only correct boycott would probably have been the 1936 (Berlin Olympics)'. However, when facing Nazi Germany and Hitler, who used the Olympic Games to propagate racism, the U.S. did not boycott this event" (如果非要拿所谓“种族灭绝”做文章, “唯一一次正确的抵制或许应该是 1936 年 (的柏林奥运会)”。然而, 面对借奥运会宣扬种族主义的希特勒和纳粹德国, 当时的美国并没有抵制).

Meanwhile, GT11 explained that many African countries boycotted the Olympic Games of 1976 because of their support for apartheid in South Africa, but the U.S. went nevertheless. Moreover, The *Global Times* published an article in which they cited the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Lijian, with the following quote: "The crimes committed against the Native Americans in the history of the U.S. are the real 'genocide'!" (美国历史上对印第安原住民犯下的罪行才是真正的“种族灭绝”! ; GT6). The fact that the newspaper selected this quote shows they support what the spokesman says about the 'genocide' in the U.S., which is a controversial phrase to apply to the U.S. GT5 also referred to the genocide against the Native Americans when they wrote about the human rights issues in the context of the Olympic Games. The *People's Daily* quoted a Dutch netizen, who says that the U.S. politicians are hypocritical and should look at their human rights behaviour in Afghanistan if they care about those rights (PD8). The fact that the *People's Daily* article chose to quote netizens is interesting to see. This quotation makes netizen in New York or Rotterdam an expert on the issue in the eyes of the newspaper. The *People's Daily* quoted multiple netizens from around the world in the PD8 article and the *Global Times* quoted a netizen as well (GT3). The Chinese media did not only attack the U.S. They also accused the Canadian government of their

crimes against the Aboriginal peoples. They claimed the following: “To this day, systematic racial discrimination in Canada is still very severe. The Canadian side is not qualified to act as a ‘teacher’ on human rights issues”(直到今天，加拿大国内系统性种族歧视仍十分严重。

加方根本没有资格在人权问题上充当“教师爷”；GT9). This phenomenon of accusing other countries of human rights issues is called whataboutism. Whataboutism allows the Chinese government to try to deflect attention from their issues and dismiss the criticism without going into detail about the foreign accusations. The Chinese government can thus dismiss the responsibility for their human rights situation. They state that their own country does not have human rights issues, but the other countries do. By putting their own country in a better position in the world than other countries, they try to reinforce the Chinese nationalist sentiment.

Zhao Lijian stated that not only could other countries not lecture China, but it was also none of their business. He said that the Xinjiang affairs are purely a matter of internal affairs in China and that people from the outside are not allowed to intervene in these internal affairs (GT10, GT29, GT32). One element of nationalism is that a nation is free to govern itself and should not encounter obstruction from other nations. The articles in my sample often mentioned other themes besides the boycotts or human rights. Topics that the articles mainly mentioned were the COVID-19 pandemic in context of the Olympics (29 mentions, B24), other boycotts in history (13 mentions, B25), and foreign praise and support of the Winter Olympics (22 mentions, B26). By referring to the pandemic, the newspapers could focus on the virus instead of human rights. The foreign praise and support showed that most of the world supports China’s Olympic Games. The articles in the sample referred to boycotts in history (mainly the one of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games) and mention that these boycotts did not accomplish anything.

5. Discussion

The Chinese government has responded in different ways to the foreign statements about human rights accusations issued by the boycotting countries concerning Beijing's 2022 Winter Olympics. One message they try to communicate is an “us” versus “them” narrative. The articles attack the boycotting countries and claim that the U.S. is attacking China and their relationship. This narrative could strengthen the nationalist sentiment of the Chinese readers. When they read these articles, they see this image of the U.S. and the boycotting countries as being on the opposite sides of the news stories. Phrases such as those saying that the human rights accusations are “a joke to the Chinese people” reinforce this sentiment. When the articles display words such as “the West” or “the American politicians,” they often use the quantifier “a small number” to minimize “them.” On the other hand, they emphasise “us” by using quantifiers such as “many” and tell that many others support the Chinese opinion regarding the boycotts. By saying that others support China in this boycott discussion, they can create a feeling of the Chinese government being right in the situation, possibly resulting in nationalist sentiment. The articles portray the ‘others’ who criticise China and their handling of human rights as different and hostile. Thus, the Chinese government cannot reason with them and does not have to respond to the accusations.

Another message is that they ridicule the boycotting countries. The Chinese host of the Olympic Games does not need the Western countries for the event to succeed. The Chinese newspapers repetitively mention that the Chinese host did not even invite the boycotting countries, which makes a boycott unnecessary, according to the newspapers. These newspapers also ridicule them with certain metaphors or adjectives, such as labelling the boycott as ‘drama’ or ‘unpopular.’ By ridiculing the announced boycotts, the newspapers try to put the countries in their place and make their boycott invalid. In their opinion, they cannot take the boycott seriously this way and do not have to respond properly to human rights accusations.

Next to these responses, the media also draw attention to other elements than the boycotts and human rights accusations. The authors of the articles write about the importance of the Olympic Spirit and the athletes themselves. Politicising the Olympic Games goes against this spirit. The Olympic Games are not a stage for politics but for athletes. In this manner, the articles draw less attention to the boycott announcements and give a clear message that they

disagree with the intermingling of sports and politics. Lastly, the newspapers focus on the other countries' human rights issues. This phenomenon called whataboutism is another way of deflecting the real issue, namely the human rights issue. Moreover, the articles mention that the accusations are lies. They create an image of China not having human rights issues, while at the same time, they accuse other countries of having violations of human rights. These accusations are again a way of shifting the focus and negating the human rights issues. By shifting its focus, they thus reject the accusations.

It is also important to look at what the articles did not mention. The newspapers mainly focused their attention on the boycott of the U.S. Most of the ridiculing and attacking were thus targeted at them. The newspapers also attacked Canada, Australia (as seen above), and Lithuania (GT25) for announcing a boycott. They also wrote about the U.K. boycott several times (8 mentions, B27) but did not ridicule and attack the U.K. itself. However, these countries were not the only ones that announced a boycott due to the human rights issues in China. Next to the above countries, the countries that declared a diplomatic boycott are Denmark, Estonia, India, Kosovo, and Belgium (BBC News, 2022). The *People's Daily* and *Global Times* did not respond to their boycotts once. As seen in previous research (Finlay & Xin, 2010), China responded differently depending on their relationship with certain countries and how they wanted to maintain their relationship with the concerned country. As the newspapers are published domestically, they also want to show their relationship to their readers. Thus, the Chinese government tries to create an "us" versus "them" sentiment vis à vis the U.S. However, the articles often mention "the West" (西方; 24 mentions, B28) when they refer to the boycotting countries or the countries that blame China for human rights violations.

6. Conclusion

My research question was what the response of the Chinese government has been to the human rights accusations issued by the boycotting countries in the context of the Beijing Winter Olympics of 2022. In order to answer this question, I conducted a discourse analysis of two mouthpiece newspapers of the Chinese government. This discourse analysis provided me with a sample that showed what discourse the Chinese government used to react to the human rights accusations. These responses have a nationalist sentiment, and the government repetitively deflects what the boycotts are about, namely human rights. In their responses, the Chinese government also tries to save its reputation.

In the analysis, I focused on three main responses of the Chinese government to the boycotts and related human rights accusations. One of the responses, reflected by the articles, is trying to create an “us” versus “them” sentiment, especially towards the U.S. The Chinese newspapers created this sentiment in multiple ways. One method was to attack the “others” who issued a boycott. The articles targeted the U.S. and “the West” in general. Finlay and Xin (2010) also concluded that the Chinese government’s response to human rights accusations of the U.S. was “anti-Western.” They also concluded that the Chinese government's discourse and soft power strategy depends on the countries they respond to. In this case, China mainly reacted negatively to the U.S. and one or two times attacked Canada and Australia. The Chinese government, however, did not respond to the other seven countries that announced a boycott. This confirms Finlay and Xin’s conclusion that the response of the Chinese government depends on the accusing country. The articles also blamed the U.S. for attacking China and their relationship with this politicisation of the Olympic Games. Next to these attacks, the Chinese media described the boycotts as a “joke to the Chinese people” and used discursive methods to create this “us” and “them” sentiment. This last method of using certain phrases to enforce the idea of “us” and discredit “them” in the language was also seen by Han (2011) in the discourse of the torch relay protests. As we saw in Kuo’s research (2002), Chinese media use phrases such as “As we all know.” These underlying presumptions try to let readers believe that everyone supports the ideas of the Chinese media or frames their opinion as the truth (Simon-Vandenberg, 1996). All these methods try to create an “us” versus “them” sentiment that can strengthen the nationalist pride of the Chinese. “Them” being the ones who want to boycott the Olympics, an action that is considered unnecessary and is not supported. And “us,” the Chinese, who get to host the Olympics for unity and peace and receive worldwide support.

As Han (2011) also noted, this dichotomous narrative also tries to present the Chinese government as a world leader in the eye of Chinese readers.

Another response was to ridicule the boycott. The newspapers tried to create an image of not needing them (the U.S. primarily) to host a successful event. The articles also mentioned that the Chinese host did not invite the boycotting countries and that announcing a boycott was therefore irrelevant. Kuo (2002) noticed “name-calling” in his *People’s Daily* article. The articles from my sample also show this language use by labelling boycotts and human rights accusations with specific adjectives. Kuo explains that using certain adjectives to label an idea, in this case the boycott, discredits this idea. Metaphors, according to Kuo, can also emphasise an idea. The metaphors from my sample ridiculed the Americans for announcing the boycott. These metaphors thus enforce the idea of the U.S. acting ridiculous. The newspapers try to make the boycotts invalid and therefore do not have to respond to the human rights issues.

Lastly, the Chinese newspapers tried to shift the focus and deflect the human rights accusations. They instead put the spotlight on the Olympic Spirit and the athletes. Concerning the human rights accusations, they reversed the attention to the human rights issues of the other countries. The articles also labelled the foreign accusations of violating human rights as lies and rejected the accusations. Weatherley already saw in his study that China’s government tends to negatively respond to Western criticism because the Chinese side blames the West for not being innocent regarding human rights violations (Tan, 2002). My research confirms this response of whataboutism. Shifting the focus enables them to deflect the accusations and save their reputation. Using the media to save China’s “face” is not a new phenomenon (Wardęga, 2014).

Saving face and Chinese pride

The rejection of the human rights accusations fits in the existing literature on China’s response to human rights. Chen and Hsu (2018) argued that the CPC maintains two human rights conceptions, one of which was to reject and restrain the concept of human rights. The accusations can be a threat to the CPC’s sovereignty. My data shows that the Chinese government rejects human rights accusations. However, they briefly mention the athletes’ human rights, which they say they support. This could be a form of accepting those human rights, as accepting human rights can be a strength of governing capacity (Chen & Hsu, 2018). The Chinese government responds to human rights issues as long as it fits their state sovereignty.

Inboden and Chen (2012) also showed that China's response to previous human rights issues was to release this pressure by trying to adapt the human rights system in favor of their state sovereignty. Huang and Fahmy (2013) underline that the government can preserve its nationalist pride and governing authority by minimising the disturbance in Chinese newspapers. My research supports this theory of saving face by minimising a disturbance, in this case, the human rights-related boycotts. So in the responses of the Chinese government to the foreign accusations of human rights violations regarding the Olympics Games of 2022, the government tries to save their face.

Next to rejecting the human rights accusations, an essential element in their response is nationalism. The research in the literature review already showed that the Chinese government's discourse consists of many nationalist characteristics. The "othering" and creating a dichotomy of "us" and "them," where "their" boycott is ridiculous and should not be taken seriously, could cause the Chinese readers to feel a sense of pride. Focusing on other countries' human rights can also lead to nationalist sentiment. It can create an image of China doing nothing wrong, which the Chinese readers can be proud of. Many pieces of research showed that nationalism is not uncommon in the discourse of the CPC (Billings et al., 2011; Han, 2011; Finlay & Xin, 2010; Ma, 2018; Wardęga, 2014) in the context of the Olympic Games. The discourse the Chinese government created in their response is in favour of their nationalism and integrity.

My research only focused on China's viewpoint of the boycotts and human rights accusations. It would be interesting for further research to look at the statements of the countries that announced they would boycott the Olympics and why they boycotted the event. This viewpoint could give a broader view of what exactly the Chinese government reacted to and how they used this for their nationalist discourse. Further research could also investigate the English versions of the articles and compare these to the Chinese articles. This comparison could show whether the English articles showed different reactions or phrases than the Chinese versions and if the government wants foreign readers to receive different messages than the Chinese readers.

To conclude, we can state that the Chinese government conveyed multiple messages in their responses to the foreign human rights accusations in the context of Beijing's Olympic Winter Games of 2022. This study broadens the discussion and research on the Chinese government's discourse on human rights. Their response consisted mainly of using nationalist

discourse elements and attempts to save their integrity. This does not come as a surprise, considering the existing research. The Chinese government claims sports and the Olympics should not be politicised. They defend themselves against the human rights-related boycotts of the Olympic Games of 2022 by positioning themselves strategically and politically as a global power in the eyes of their Chinese readers. The Chinese government further uses sports-related foreign criticism to fuel its internal drive for unity and strength with a nationalist discourse.

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8. Appendix

The following appendices display the references which I used in my data analysis.

8.1 Appendix A

This appendix shows the references to the articles that I used in the data analysis. The order of the articles is arbitrary.

Global Times

Code	Title article	Date	Url
GT1	【英】马丁·雅克：这届冬奥会给世界上上了一课	08-02-2022	https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/46j5O7QEnS
GT2	希腊媒体：美对北京冬奥会态度有道德缺陷	18-12-2021	https://oversea.huanqiu.com/article/461uoFBd4k
GT3	继法国部长表态后，马克龙就北京冬奥发声：不应将奥运政治化！	11-12-2021	https://yrd.huanqiu.com/article/45w6xFppN0Y
GT4	社评：美国需要清楚，裸奔不是艺术	07-12-2021	https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/45tKNAFH0ty
GT5	徒劳的“外交抵制”，可笑的政治作秀	09-12-2021	https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/45uw5vwUMg8
GT6	“外交抵制”冬奥会是个“伪命题”	08-12-2021	https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/0f0789/45u3NZmX3HJ?p_a6e281e0ab57d5eae3726f02584b3c42
GT7	美媒又把网友逗乐了	20-02-2022	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46tQgMEFnR1
GT8	北京冬奥再现“无与伦比”，巴赫中文“祝贺中国”	21-02-2022	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46ttRyhGv3f

GT9	特鲁多宣布不派“外交代表”出席北京冬奥会，中国驻加拿大使馆回击！	09-12-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45uauS1dQb
GT10	白宫回应拜登考虑“外交抵制”北京冬奥，美反华议员还嚷嚷“全面抵制”，中方严正驳斥	20-11-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45eqYB8qQax
GT11	【侠客岛】美国“外交抵制”北京冬奥会，那又怎样？！	08-12-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45u3SkPsSqs
GT12	国际社会：把奥运会政治化会导致奥运会的终结	13-12-2021	https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/54dc9a/45yCLhbJbkw
GT13	跟风美国！澳英加入“外交抵制”闹剧，中方：作秀炒作	09-12-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45uUuRpAMEH
GT14	美“外交抵制”北京冬奥遭狠批，专家：美此举更像“自行加戏”的拙劣政治表演	08-12-2021	https://yrd.huanqiu.com/article/45teoEY1hkn
GT15	北京 2022 年冬奥会——一场团结安全的盛会	30-01-2021	https://m.huanqiu.com/article/46cBmPpJxPz
GT16	17 名议员公然煽动，立陶宛奥委会回应：拒绝抵制北京冬奥会！	25-11-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45ioYMrIZz9
GT17	美冬奥前出阴招遭中方驳斥，热切期盼北京冬奥会是主流声音	27-01-2021	https://yrd.huanqiu.com/article/46Z7bVvb5Un

GT18	俄高官批美国“外交抵制”北京冬奥：试图达到政治目的，有违奥运精神	07-12-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45t6qEzyTGL
GT19	国际奥委会：奥运会和运动员的参与超越政治	08-12-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45tkY2gAPIJ
GT20	快讯！外媒：克宫批美国“外交抵制”北京冬奥：奥运会应摆脱政治影响	07-12-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45tMMwhIna1
GT21	外交部：美方应停止干扰破坏北京冬奥会的言行	08-12-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45tr5T1feDI
GT22	蹭热度！特朗普声称反对抵制冬奥会：这让我们看起来像是输不起的人	20-12-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/463spBdmkFD
GT23	中美元首视频会晤更多内容披露，沙利文：未来美中双边接触可分为四个层面	18-11-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45cxTcWBssJ
GT24	海外网评：北京冬奥会不是政治作秀的舞台	08-12-2021	https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/21eee3/45u3QDDvzOh?agt=20/
GT25	你不来冬奥会就办不好？别自作多情了！	13-12-2021	https://china.huanqiu.com/article/45y7r3qIIAd
GT26	北京冬奥会开幕式惊艳世界	05-02-2022	https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/de583b/46gXiSBIbEW
GT27	国际奥委会主席：大多数国家，不跟！	16-12-2021	https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/a4d1ef/460hI34khIF

GT28	联合国秘书长古特雷斯： 北京冬奥会定能成为促进 和平的助推器	15-01-2022	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46P7g64RwxG
GT29	拜登声称美国正考虑对北 京冬奥会进行“外交抵 制”，中方回应	19-11-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45eJ1RpXx6q
GT30	扎哈罗娃痛批：西方正围 绕北京冬奥会制造另一个 肮脏的阴谋	21-01-2022	https://yrd.huanqiu.com/article/46UKj6rihDp
GT31	驻德国使馆发言人就德媒 体炒作个别官员表示不出 席北京冬奥会事表明立场	31-12-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46CrVCDVtaI
GT32	“五眼联盟”考虑“外交抵制” 冬奥？外交部：有关炒作 只会损害各国运动员的利 益	23-11-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45hBNeRQAR
GT33	立陶宛奥委会拒绝抵制北 京冬奥会，外交部回应	26-11-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45kALUEB0P
GT34	多国政要注册出席北京冬 奥会，法国拒绝追随美国 “外交抵制”	10-12-2021	https://yrd.huanqiu.com/article/45vPCL7NcDb
GT35	澳媒称美澳等没签奥林匹 克休战决议，中国驻联合 国代表：只能让他们更加 孤立	04-12-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45qSLRh0Gm
GT36	抵制冬奥会？傲慢又荒唐 的美式“闹剧”当休矣！	08-12-2021	https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/45trfiQSPzk

GT37	俄外交部发言人：美国正试图以各种行动干扰北京冬奥会举办	25-11-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45jSGV8yDnD
GT38	中国驻法大使接受法媒采访，被问涉台尖锐问题，卢沙野一一回应！	18-01-2022	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46S4EeNsVj7
GT39	上月叫嚣“外交抵制”，如今派出大批官员！中方确认“美官员团队冬奥期间来华”	20-01-2022	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46TShmwRHX C
GT40	被韩国电视台询问“《终战宣言》有可能签署吗”，中国驻韩国大使回应	22-11-2021	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/45gs5ShiPo5
GT41	环球网评：携手迎冬奥，一起向未来	10-11-2021	https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/45WvuxPwG ys
GT42	捷克总统泽曼力挺北京冬奥会，专家：他的表态在欧洲内部应该算是共识	17-01-2022	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46QprVuJc0A
GT43	首金！冬奥见证中国自信	06-02-2022	https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/de583b/46hPd04n8tD
GT44	阿根廷总统出席冬奥开幕式，还将带来一所足球学校！阿教练培训中国球员！	03-02-2022	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46fHlMJ9ts2
GT45	独家：阿根廷总统将在冬奥会访华期间参观瞻仰毛主席纪念馆	28-01-2022	https://m.huanqiu.com/article/46acrYXRsoG

GT46	捷克总统泽曼力挺北京冬奥会 反对将奥运会政治化	17-01-2022	https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/21eee3/46R13oDpY70?agt=20tt_group
GT47	北京冬奥在全球“实力圈粉”，闭环防疫打脸“失控”预言	17-02-2022	https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46qVuYCAA5J
GT48	北京冬奥会 新任匈牙利奥委会主席：反对抵制北京冬奥会	30-01-2022	https://m.huanqiu.com/article/46cIRIHQeIw

People's Daily

Code	Title article	Date	Url
PD1	评论：鼓噪“外交抵制”自私且有害	01-12-2021	http://ent.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1201/c1012-32296053.html
PD2	英国学者：北京冬奥会的成功影响世界，美国“外交抵制”彻底失败	21-02-2022	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0221/c1002-32356028.html
PD3	评论：抵制冬奥会对奥林匹克精神的亵渎	28-11-2021	http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1128/c1003-32293780.html
PD4	外交部：将奥运会政治化是对奥林匹克精神的亵渎	15-12-2021	http://sh.people.com.cn/n2/2021/1215/c134768-35051520.html
PD5	新华时评：西方个别政客抵制冬奥会纯属自作多情	30-11-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1130/c1002-32295429.html
PD6	走近冬奥 杨扬：奥运会是运动员的舞台，不是政治的作秀场	09-12-2021	http://ent.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1209/c1012-32303340.html

PD7	国际观察：“外交抵制”北京冬奥会是一场政治闹剧	08-12-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1208/c1002-32302727.html
PD8	华盛顿的“外交抵制”充斥谎言，唯一真相是北京压根就没邀请它	07-12-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1207/c1002-32302024.html
PD9	新华国际时评：美国“外交抵制”冬奥会行径注定失败	07-12-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1207/c1002-32301936.html
PD10	评论：鼓噪“外交抵制”严重违背奥林匹克核心价值	28-11-2021	http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1128/c1003-32293832.html
PD11	成功精彩的奥运会不取决于个别国家官员是否出席	30-11-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1130/c1002-32294906.html
PD12	弘扬奥运精神 彰显大国担当	25-02-2022	http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0225/c40531-32359387.html
PD13	中方：已全力支持东京奥运会 轮到日方体现基本信义	13-12-2021	http://cjkeizai.j.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1213/c368504-32306623.html
PD14	中国常驻联合国代表：抵制北京冬奥会不得人心 注定失败	03-12-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1203/c1002-32298880.html
PD15	中国驻法国大使卢沙野：奥运会是各国运动员的竞技场，不是个别国家政客的表演场	19-01-2022	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0119/c1002-32334853.html
PD16	赵立坚：中方已全力支持日方举办东京奥运会，日方应有基本信义	26-11-2021	http://japan.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1126/c35421-32292763.html

PD17	俄罗斯外交部：反对将奥运会政治化	26-11-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1126/c1002-32292832.html
PD18	被质疑“帮中国宣传”，美公关公司：我们只是突出奥运会的完整性和尊严	24-01-2022	http://usa.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0124/c241376-32338487.html
PD19	蒙古国奥委会官员：以任何方式抵制奥运会都是错误的	03-12-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1203/c1002-32298522.html
PD20	俄罗斯奥委会官员：反对抵制奥运，相信北京冬奥会一定会取得圆满成功	08-12-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1208/c1002-32302325.html
PD21	南非共产党总司库：奥运会不应成为政治化的对象	09-12-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1209/c1002-32303266.html
PD22	澳大利亚独立议员、前奥运选手斯特戈尔反对外交抵制北京冬奥会	01-12-2021	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1201/c1002-32296525.html
PD23	坦桑尼亚奥委会秘书长：抵制奥运影响的是运动员们	17-01-2022	http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0117/c1002-32333163.html

8.2 Appendix B

This appendix shows words/phrases of the data analysis that had more than three references.

Code	Translation	Chinese original	Articles
B1	drama/show	戏	GT6, GT14, GT24, GT27, GT36, PD5, PD8
B2	performance/show	表演	GT4, GT6, GT14, GT24, GT25, GT34, PD15
B3	farce	闹剧	GT2, GT13, GT14, GT17, GT25, GT34, GT36, PD3, PD5, PD7
B4	doomed to fail	注定失败	GT5, GT9, GT15, GT20, GT21, GT24, GT30, GT35, PD9, PD14
B5	laughing stock	笑柄	GT5, GT17, GT36, PD7
B6	unpopular	不得人心	GT9, GT17, GT20, GT21, GT24, GT30, GT32, GT33, GT34, GT35, GT36, GT37, PD3, PD7, PD13, PD14
B7	hypocritical/false	虚伪	GT6, GT18, GT22, GT39, PD8
B8	manipulation	操弄	GT5, GT6, GT9, GT13, GT14, GT18, GT20, GT21, GT22, GT24, GT25, GT30, GT31, GT33, GT34, GT36, PD3, PD4, PD7, PD8, PD9, PD11, PD13
B9	lies	谎言	GT5, GT6, GT9, GT14, GT20, GT21, GT37, GT38, PD2, PD3, PD7, PD15
B10	completely upside down, wrong on top of wrong, and self-deceiving	完全是颠倒黑白、错上加错、自欺欺人	GT5, GT20, GT21, GT24, GT30
B11	some	一些	GT2, GT6, GT11, GT15, GT25, GT28, GT32, GT35, GT38, GT39, GT41, GT42, GT43, PD3, PD6, PD9, PD11, PD12
B12	individual	个别	GT10, GT12, GT22, GT25, GT27, GT31, GT32, GT33, GT34, GT35, GT36, GT37, GT38, GT43, PD5, PD9, PD11, PD14, PD15, PD16
B13	a (small) number off	少数	GT10, GT25, GT35, GT36, PD1, PD4, PD5, PD9, PD10, PD14
B14	most/majority	大多数	GT12, GT27, GT34, GT35, GT43
B15	take countermeasures	坚决反制*	GT5, GT6, GT14, GT18, GT19, G20, GT21, GT22, PD8

B16	serious violation	严重违背	GT9, GT13, GT20, GT21, PD8, PD9, PD10
B17	threat to athletes' interests	损害运动员的利益**	PD3, PD9, GT10, GT29, GT32, GT33, GT36, GT37
B18	threat to Olympic cause	奥林匹克事业*	PD3, PD5, PD9, GT37
B19	opposed to politicisation	将奥运会政治化 / 将体育运动政治化*	GT5, GT10, GT19, GT20, GT21, GT22, GT25, GT27, GT28, GT29, GT32, GT33, GT42, GT44, GT45, GT46, PD4, PD5, PD6, PD7, PD9, PD13, PD17
B20	Beijing Winter Games unites the world	团结*	GT8, GT26, PD1, PD3, PD12
B21	offence to "togetherness" of new motto	对奥林匹克格言“更团结”的轻慢与亵渎**	GT5, GT9, GT21, GT24, GT25, GT27, PD8, PD11
B22	Olympic Games are for athletes and not a stage for politics	奥运会是广大运动员和的盛会，不是政客们作秀表演的舞台**	GT6, GT14, GT18, GT20, GT21, GT22, GT23, GT24, GT25, GT29, GT30, GT31, GT32, GT33, GT34, PD1, PD6, PD9, PD11, PD13
B23	athletes are the real protagonists	运动员才是主角**	GT5, GT6, GT9, GT10, GT14, GT18, GT20, GT21, GT23, GT29, GT31, GT32, GT35, GT36, PD3, PD5, PD8, PD14
B24	epidemic	疫情	PD2, PD3, PD5, PD6, PD7, PD8, PD9, PD10, PD12, PD15, GT1, GT2, GT5, GT6, GT7, GT8, GT10, GT12, GT15, GT17, GT23, GT26, GT31, GT36, GT40, GT41, GT43, GT44, GT47
B25	boycotts in history	-	PD1, PD3, PD7, PD8, PD9, PD23, GT1, GT3, GT10, GT11, GT34, GT42, GT46
B26	foreign praise/support for Beijing's Olympics	-	GT3, GT10, GT12, GT14, GT17, GT19, GT24, GT25, GT26, GT27, GT28, GT34, GT40, GT42, GT44, GT45, GT46, PD4, PD8, PD9, PD21, PD23
B27	U.K. boycott	-	PD13, PD18, GT3, GT13, GT27, GT32, GT34, GT42
B28	"the West"	西方	GT1, GT2, GT9, GT11, GT13, GT15, GT16, GT22, GT23, GT25, GT26, GT27, GT30, GT35, GT36, GT39, GT41, GT43, GT47, PD1, PD3, PD5, PD10, PD12

* These are paraphrasations. I only show the keyword that all phrases had in common

** An example phrase. Some articles phrased it in different ways