The Responsibility to Protect What? Economics within the R2P: An Analysis of its Application During Kenya's 2008 Post-Election Violence

Hartery, Mark

Universiteit Leiden

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An analysis of its application during Kenya's 2008 Post-Election Violence

Mark J. Hartery - s3232093
m.j.hartery@umail.leidenuniv.nl
Leiden University

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1. Introduction

In an increasingly multipolar world, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine remains a highly contested and controversial norm, both in terms of its form and its desired or eventual results, despite often cited arguments detailing R2P's positive impact (e.g. Welsh, 2016). Even the very notion of protection itself is contested. For instance, does it also mean protecting the security, basic needs, and civil and political liberties of citizens or does it relate solely to the preservation of life? While values exert an important influence on these distinctions, the interests of all actors also texture the contestation surrounding R2P's operationalisation, especially geostrategic and economic concerns (Esteban et al., 2016: 176). Although most, apart from champions of state-sovereignty, agree that protection is necessary and desirable, differing conceptions of how to protect often conflict with the idea that there is only one way to do so (Garwood-Gowers, 2016). Combining these contestations questions how differing motivations for R2P can coexist and how diverging priorities can be reconciled to better coordinate action.

It will be argued that the humanitarian motive of R2P is overstated and does not exist in isolation while case-specific data highlights that although motivations to intervene or not can be subdivided, they all arguably link to economic dimensions, offering a systematic way to more thoroughly engage with economic motivations by incorporating related altruistic, geostrategic and security factors into the economic realm.

Much pessimism around the success of the doctrine stems from R2P's apparent co-optation and the ongoing failure to invoke R2P in all relevant cases. The best way to prevent this is by being more transparent about interests and motives, not just from states, but from non-state actors equally driving an economic agenda (multinational companies, international regulatory bodies and transnational social movements) and who consequently influence political agendas (Held et al. 1999). This may improve R2P's efficacy without the need for the 'reforms' advocated by mainstream R2P scholars. Thus, by examining whether R2P is, or has become, in part, an economic doctrine can shape the responses to the current challenges it faces. Addressing issues within the political-economic world order that inherently influence R2P's application may also bring more recalcitrant states on board with the doctrine, by better addressing concerns of inconsistency, economic domination or imperialism cloaked in humanitarian concerns, thus improving R2P's general applicability and success.

Therefore, to economically evaluate R2P, this study will first synthesise key debates in the scholarship on R2P pertaining to its motivations. Second, the methodology and theoretical approach used will be elaborated. Third, a case-study will be analysed in light of this thesis' key research question, before proceeding to the subsequent discussion and relevant conclusions.

1.1. Context

R2P emerged to address failures of previous humanitarian interventions in cases such as Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, where action was 'too little, too late, misconceived, under-resourced, under-executed, or all of the above' (Langer, 2011: 3). Others, such as the interventions in Iraq and Kosovo, were often unilateral, illegal, illegitimate or arguably preferenced the interests of the intervening state over civilian protection, (Chomsky, 2016), which was said to exhibit how states, particularly the US, use humanitarianism to legitimise seeking other strategic benefits (Slovic et al. 2016: 621).

The International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty's (ICISS) 2001 report based R2P around three key responsibilities: prevention, reaction and rebuilding. Furthermore, military interventions under the doctrine would have to satisfy six criteria, namely: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects (ICISS, 2001: 32).

However, the ICISS report was not operationalised. Instead, a modified version was adopted in 2005 by the United Nations (UN) World Summit which gave the UN Security Council (UNSC) sole control of authorising military action; removed the criteria detailing the appropriateness of military intervention; limited the scope of the doctrine to cover just four mass atrocity crimes — genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing — and changed the wording from 'unwilling or unable' to prevent violence to 'manifestly failing' to protect (Garwood-Gowers, 2016). R2P was then based upon three pillars: the responsibility of states to protect their populations (Pillar I); the responsibility of the international community to assist states in this protection (Pillar II); and the responsibility of the international community to protect when a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations (Pillar III). However, many of the previous debates and criticisms continue to be applied to R2P.

2. Literature Review

Despite increased support for R2P in recent years, atrocity crimes have risen globally (Hehir, 2019), raising important questions about R2P's effectiveness. Criticism of the doctrine centres around the belief that it has been weaponized by powerful states as a means of achieving their strategic political and economic objectives (Hehir, 2019; Chomsky, 2016), suggesting that there is a gap between R2P's claimed theoretical or principled motivations and motivations in practice. An examination of a 'spectrum of competing interests' that influence state behaviour (Hehir, 2019), enables a critique of the idea of a single motive for R2P — often cited by proponents of the doctrine — with the aim of problematizing these fragmented understandings. While some (e.g. Seybolt, 2008) believe that R2P should be judged by its consequences and not its motivation, and that policymakers are only concerned with human protection irrespective of whatever other motives are at play, in reality the motivations often have a significant impact on the occurrence, form, success and consequences of the intervention,[1] along with R2P's continued legitimacy as an international norm. This intrinsic link must be considered by policymakers, who should reconcile past evidence with theoretical views of R2P in order to enhance its outcomes. This literature review will explore the main motivational categories detailed by scholars of R2P, namely humanitarianism, security, geopolitics, and economics, by reflecting on these categories and their interplay with a common motive, i.e. economics, which is hypothesised as the preeminent driver for the R2P.

2.1. Humanitarianism

By definition, the evocation of R2P is grounded in humanitarianism and altruism, categorised by selfless concern for the lives of others, and often viewed by scholars as the only motivator for such interventions (e.g. Welsh, 2016). Notwithstanding the scant empirical evidence or research to support this claim, it has often been uncritically accepted (Jarvis, 2018). Within this view, we form part of a 'common humanity', and so crimes against humanity embody a threat to all of humanity,

[1] This has been examined in the case of Libya where motivations were criticised as being self-serving. The lack of consideration for the civilian population negatively affected the international community's ability to act for their benefit (Emadi, 2012), leading to large civilian casualty and war-crime allegations against NATO (ILAC, 2012).

and not just individual victims (Welsh, 2012). This establishes a normative moral and ethical obligation for the unaffected to act towards those in danger and it is this that distinguishes R2P from previous humanitarian intervention: R2P is seen to be victim-centred and does not cater to the interests of intervening states (Welsh, 2016), but rather unites them around a ‘shocked international conscience’ that translates into ‘decisive collective action’ (Thakur, 2015: 23), evidenced by claimed ‘successes’ of R2P in cases such as Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire and Kyrgyzstan (UN, 2015).

If altruism was the sole motivator for R2P, humans would be motivated to intervene in every case of violations. This has not been the case, exhibited by grave failures in Sri Lanka, Sudan, Myanmar, Yemen and Syria. (Evans, 2020). Debates around what level of human suffering constitutes grounds for intervention have been contentious and further limit R2P’s humanitarian ideals (Hehir, 2019: 37). In fact, others argue that humanitarianism is merely used to underpin R2P but not motivate action (e.g. Jarvis 2018). Instead, it is argued that decisions to intervene follow business-like cost-benefit-analyses, where the costs of (in)action — financial cost, loss of life, trade relations, security allies and domestic support — are considered and states will only intervene when it is in their interest to do so (Wheeler & Morris, 2007).

Endorsing or invoking R2P also appears to present states in a more positive light, ironically reinforcing a tendency towards self-serving altruism. For example, Saudi Arabia was heralded by Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect for expressing its support for R2P in 2017 despite being responsible for extensive bombing in Yemen and enabling a humanitarian crisis there (Hehir, 2019). In fact, the politicisation and subsequent inconsistent application of R2P has been extensively criticised. While Haas (2017: 6) opines that armed humanitarian interventions are rarely ‘apolitical’ and ‘solely humanitarian,’ Western countries in particular, are quick to denounce other countries for prioritising their economic interests in order to appear more altruistic themselves. For instance, China’s opposition to intervention in Darfur was condemned, stating that ‘there may be profit to China in turning a blind eye to all of this but there is no honour’ (Economist, 2007a), despite the fact that a Canadian company was simultaneously dominating Sudan’s mineral extraction, and Britain was also encouraging business investment there (Brautigam, 2011: 282).

Even Western NGOs are arguably guilty of non-altruism, as they have been virtually silent on atrocities that occur within economic and geostrategic allies/nemeses of the UK and the USA, such as Qatar, Bahrain or Palestine (Hehir & Moses, 2015; O'Reilly, 2019). As many of these organisations rely on government support and funding from other interest groups such as corporations, financial considerations significantly impact R2P's advocacy (Hehir & Moses, 2015; Benjamin, 2009). According to Hehir (2019: 198): the New York based Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect's (GCR2P) 19 funding governments are all either Western states or allies. Its private donors are all US-based. While it would be simplistic to conclude that this means that such organisations are 'controlled' by Western interests, he posits that 'the close association between certain Western states and R2P is undeniable.' Furthermore, Benjamin (2009:35) writes that, contrary to R2P's ideals, the 'already powerful corporate lobby is able to undermine representation of civil society by compromising the voice the disenfranchised and dispossessed may rely on.'

While we have seen examples of where economics appears to trump altruism, this does not mean that they are always necessarily opposed or mutually exclusive. For example, in 2015 Sweden stopped arms sales to Saudi Arabia citing human rights concerns, a decision which had financial and political implications (Taylor, 2015). So we must ask whether altruism necessarily nullifies benefits in the economic, geopolitical or security realms? Meanwhile, whether or not they intended for the intervention or crisis to occur, some corporations inherently benefit. For example, during the Kosovo crisis, Microsoft designed a computerised refugee registration system for the UN. While carried out pro-bono, such corporate social responsibility occurred during a period when Microsoft's share value and prestige had slumped. However, most would agree that the resulting humanitarian benefits outweighed potential gains for Microsoft (Suder & Nicolas, 2012). As a result one might also ask whether the derived economic benefits from intervention also nullify its moral motivations?

Critiques of morally justified interventions posit that R2P can often be a legitimising 'trojan horse' for intervention (Bellamy, 2008: 617). However, others claim that interventions with self-interested motives which still serve a broader humanitarian objective can be acceptable (Bellamy, 2004; Krieg, 2013). Some even believe that national interests improve the effectiveness of intervention, because the state will take more action to achieve both its own objectives and the humanitarian goal (Wesley, 2005). Krieg's (2013) empirical study on the motivations for humanitarian intervention deduced that, unlike altruism, national interests can be a sole motivator, as exemplified by the pre-R2P-era interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Generally, however, it is difficult to empirically separate altruism and self-interest (*ibid*, 62), because the humanitarianism of one actor may be conceived as self-serving by another. Thus, as Jarvis (2018) concludes, if humanitarianism will continue to be evoked by academics and diplomats to justify decisions based on R2P, then it should be more critically analysed to understand both reflexivity, and 'how moral claims translate into everyday political decision-making' (*ibid*, 120). It would appear that they often do not translate in the absence of other interests, what Weiss (2007: 7) labels as the 'disconnect between political reality and pious rhetoric.' This is especially salient, because continued inconsistent application of the highly contested norm of intervention, may eventually delegitimise it.

2.2. Security

In a globalised world, humanitarian crises are seen to have spin off implications for external countries. From an economic perspective, the subsequent exodus of those fleeing conflict not only poses a threat to peace and international security (Dubler & Kalyk, 2018: 575-581) but also threatens the intergenerational wealth transfer of rich Western populations (Milanovic, 2013: 207). Non-intervention may even cause the conflict itself to spill over national borders, and this spillover may affect the material interests of global powers in terms of terrorism and economic decline (Binder, 2017:11), along with the interests of multinational corporations, who may see their operations threatened by precarious humanitarian conditions (Miguel et al., 2004). Thus, security motivations are intrinsically linked to economics, and much of the literature that deals with business and peace posits that the private sector is essentially always opposed to the commission of mass atrocities, suggesting that altruism and economic motives can be reconciled (Forrer & Seyle, 2016). Firstly, this view assumes that the private sector is completely separated from the conflict, when in fact economic interests are 'rarely aggregated in such a rational fashion' and such industries' short-term profit motive can often fuel mass atrocities, financially or by other means (Bellamy, 2016: 221). Secondly, the very idea of security or stability is contested. For critical scholars, it refers to the continuation of the capitalist system, and so 'a region is "stable" if it is incorporated within the US-dominated global system with approved interests served' (Chomsky, 2016: 30). Following this logic, it is even possible to "destabilize" in order to bring "stability," such as the US-backed coup that toppled the Marxist-democratic government in Chile in the name of "stability," which also conveniently aligned with US economic interests (*ibid*, 31). R2P scholars liken such evidence to regime-change, such as in Libya, but do other actors like corporations and NGOs lobby such foreign policy decisions? A wider-ranging critical assessment of economic (in)stability as a R2P motivator should thus be investigated.

2.3. Geopolitics

Following well-established critiques of R2P as the enabler of foreign policy in the national self-interest, Libya has been extensively revisited as a case-in-point, mainly with reference to the USA, one of the only superpowers capable of providing the means for intervention (Radu, 2005). Economics is nonetheless relevant to such analyses. The key question is whether the motivation of such superpowers is to bolster more power or use their existing hegemonic positions to ensure the security of all, and whether this is in fact even possible. Many scholars argue for the former, believing that subduing an antagonistic nation superseded protection of civilians in Libya (e.g. Emadi, 2012). Abugre's (2011) discussion of French plans for regime change in Libya in the months before the humanitarian crisis would appear to support this view. Moreover, Chengu (2015) charts a pattern of new US military base construction following interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, where the intervention serves to justify the expansion of military power into new regions, such as the Seychelles, Kenya, South Sudan, Niger and Burkina Faso after Libya. This highlights how geostrategic interests cannot be fully disaggregated from economic motives, based on the massive gains enjoyed by the US' military-industrial-complex (*ibid*).

Geopolitics also significantly impacts decisions not to intervene. By way of illustration, Bahrain is strategically significant for the USA and UK, as a 'major non-NATO ally,' a growing base for naval fleets, and a major arms customer (Hehir, 2019). Despite both states acknowledging Bahrain's human rights abuses, Bahrain's position as an 'irreplaceable' ally meant it was never mentioned by the UNSC or sanctioned in any way (*ibid*). Similar reasoning was given for Russia's veto on R2P motions regarding Syria, where securing its strategically important, sole

Mediterranean naval base in Tartus, along with ensuring the control of Syrian oil by Russian companies, were proposed as motivating factors (Averre & Davis, 2015).

Although R2P is a largely state-centric principle, there is scope to further explore the intersection between geopolitics and economics: in terms of strategic markets and industries, competitive advantage and foreign aid, which can serve the interests of both states and business in order to better understand their impact on the R2P agenda.

2.4. Economic interests

The view that states engage humanitarian concerns to further their own economic objectives has been extensively analysed in the case of Libya, but in few other cases to the same extent. This lack of universal scholarship fosters an empirical anomaly because many assume state action is driven by their economic interests (Woods, 1995: 160). In light of this, it is difficult to accept some of Krieg's (2013) conclusions that economic motives were not at all present in some of the empirical cases of intervention that he studied.

Thus, it is important to consider what constitutes an economic motivation. Much work in this field mainly focuses on oil and natural resources as reasons for intervention (Joyce, 2011; Chossudovsky, 2011). However, this feeds a narrow conception of economic interests. One might thus reductively infer from Libyan data that, because other states might have comparatively less natural resources, they would not be subjected to the same urgency in intervention. Similarly, multinationals 'making a mint from robbing the region's rich mineral resources' was cited as a reason for non-intervention in Eastern Congo, suggesting that access to resources, the interests of multinationals, and not just states, can impact the nature of political action under R2P (Chomsky, 2016: 162).

Analyses of financial and institutional motivations also disproportionately focus on Libya. Under Gadaffi, Libya's Central Bank, extensive gold reserves, the development of a Libyan Investment Bank and African Monetary Fund, along with aspirations to a gold-backed African currency would have challenged the neo-colonial grip that powers such as France held through the use of the CFA Franc on the continent. Moving away from the dollar to trade resources threatened to render

Western powers more vulnerable due to their reliance on African oil (Muhammad, 2011). The provision of an alternative financial regulatory system also served to challenge the dominance of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the region, by offering an alternative to structural adjustment programmes (Abugre, 2011).

The very act of intervening can reassert Western dominance in an area, shoring up financial institutions into the future. In fact, some opine that military intervention can be considered as an extreme form of neoliberal structural adjustment (Kiely 2010: 219). This is intrinsically linked with the broader scholarship on economic hegemony that results from intervention, where intervention produces ‘a world in which the US model of capitalist democracy is unquestioned’ (Rupert, 2007: 166). In Libya, Gaddafi’s removal resulted in the cessation of his financial aid programmes to sub-Saharan states, which perpetuated the region’s underdevelopment (Abugre, 2011). From a critical political economy viewpoint, this underdevelopment allows continued exploitation by advanced capitalist powers, a form of *disaster capitalism*, where mass atrocity crimes can provide an opportunity to impose neoliberal reforms that would not otherwise be accepted (Klein, 2007).

Other economic considerations include the trade disruption hypothesis owing to mass atrocities, but few of these studies substantively deal with R2P (Anderton & Anderton, 2021). Another important consideration should be concerns for the functioning of markets, investments, manufacturing and agriculture. Furthermore, economic analyses still fail to explain what characterises a successful intervention, as the same intervention could be labelled either a success or failure by different interest-groups, depending on whether the motives of each involved actor are fulfilled, which relates to the overarching question of whether economics outrivals humanitarianism.

Such views, when considered alongside R2P’s supposedly humanitarian ideals, lead to an important research question: **how do economic drivers interact with other motivations within R2P?** To operationalise this ‘interaction’ one must ask: what form do such economic motivations take? Do economic motivations precede other motivations, and how is this determined empirically? What kinds of actors have economic interests vested in R2P? Do motivations differ between such actors? Are these interests reconcilable with the stated humanitarian purpose of R2P?

Given that, in former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's words: "effective external assistance proves that the responsibility to protect can work" (Weiss, 2010: 27), how do we ensure this effective assistance comes about? Given R2P's claimed impotence, it does not appear that moral motivations are sufficient, which is why it is important for scholars to understand its economic dimension. This is because 'the complex dynamics involving economic factors and mass atrocities complicate not only the analysis of the problem but also the response to it' (Gilpin, 2015:2). This tells us that 'if economic factors are central to understanding and driving mass atrocities, they must feature more prominently in efforts at resolution' (*ibid*). So far, few scholars have traced the link between the potential impacts of mass atrocities and the economic drivers behind atrocity response and prevention. Thus, the question of improving R2P's legitimacy in the face of continued atrocity can be done through improving the success of R2P insofar as protecting victims, firstly through a more realistic understanding of these external influences on the doctrine, taking into accounts key questions of imperialism, sovereignty and the global order.

3. Theoretical Framework

In order to answer the overarching research question "how do economic drivers interact with other motivations within R2P?" this research uses a qualitative within-case analysis method.

This study takes a critical analytical approach, theorising that although R2P's motives may be used for humanitarian ends, they may be evocative of a wider, less explicitly altruistic pursuit of economic hegemony by states and capital. Therefore, this framework of analysis will include:

3.1. Critical political economy

Critical perspectives on the global economy examine both how it is constituted by social relations, and how the pursuit of material advantage shapes behaviours within it by assuming that dominant groups will always prioritise their own interests. A key theory within this framework is neoliberalism, which, in political economy terms, refers to a new political-economic order wherein the state, and subsequently the institutional role, is to facilitate market-friendly environments, guided almost solely by neoclassical economics (Harvey, 2005: 2). Furthermore, current globalisation is considered to be a product of neoliberalism, and previously as a product of colonialism (Litonjua, 2008). Such critical perspectives are insightful because, even when acknowledging non-state actors within the realm of R2P, altruistic theoretical conceptions of R2P versus capitalism's profit motive can often form an insurmountable dividing line because capitalism sees human beings only as 'vague externalities' or manipulable labour inputs (Fort & Westermann-Behaylo, 2016: 56-57). Thus, neoliberalism forms an interesting backdrop to examine when altruism aligns with profit maximisation and when it does not, and what effect this can have for the outcomes of R2P.

3.2. Humanitarian Imperialism

Correspondingly, the notion of protecting populations is not removed from previous self-conceived altruism based on civilising populations for the West's own benefit (Bricmont, 2006; Damboeck, 2012). The concept of humanitarian imperialism stems from sceptics of intervention, who believe that it constitutes new forms of colonialism because 'the idea that our "universal values" [democracy and human rights] give the right and even the duty to intervene elsewhere' (Bricmont, 2006: 10), allowing states to reframe and re-legitimize their colonial methods of gaining (material) influence (Damboeck, 2012: 291). It is also worthwhile to interrogate if and how intervention can reproduce neo-colonial patterns of engagement, especially considering that primary examples where R2P has been invoked are former colonies. (e.g. Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Central African Republic, Syria, Burundi, Yemen). It also relates to the idea of economic interests through the view of colonialism as a capitalist exercise and not solely a pursuit of geostrategic power. Gamble (1999:128-135) writes that ruling [capital] class interests dominate foreign policy agendas, feeding a Luxemburgian (1972) process of capital accumulation via imperialism. From a political economy perspective, this allows a transcendence of the altruistic 'opportunity cost' idea of intervention: that it is an expensive way to save lives and that funds would be better spent elsewhere (Valentino, 2011: 66). Instead, in dependency-theory terms, (non)-intervention becomes a long-term investment to maintain cheap materials, labour and production costs for multinational corporations and their global-value-chains (Fort & Westermann-Behaylo, 2016: 56-57).

3.3. Depoliticisation

Depoliticisation thus compliments the above framework, as it represents a way in which humanitarian actions can be carried out for economic or other gains. By definition, depoliticisation refers to removing the political character from governance issues, what Habermas (1971: 104-105) terms as technical, problem-solving based governance. Axiomatically, R2P should be an 'anti-political theory' because its focus is said to be on the protection of civilians, and intervention is the subsequent technical process (MacLennan, 2021). However, as discussed previously, cases such as the noteworthy Libyan intervention question this pretence. This is because, for critics, depoliticisation is the result of certain material factors (*ibid*, 443), namely the pursuit of competitive advantages and profit by corporations, lobbyists and advisors (Crouch, 2004). Political economists often understand depoliticisation as a key instrument in sustaining neoliberal economic models because neoliberalism perpetuates the idea that politics/the state inhibits the efficient functioning of market economies (*ibid*). Thus, a depoliticised political regime works to legitimise and uphold the economic hegemony of the ruling class (Babic et al., 2017: 28) by reducing the agency of less influential groups and their respective concerns (traditionally represented by the state) behind the guise of experts employed by governments and institutions who often favour capitalist interests, allowing the advancement of capitalist economic growth trajectories in political decisions (Crouch, 2004). This aligns with Gramsci's (1971: 323-77) view that the capitalist class convinces other societal groups that their interests coincide with those of society as a whole, which would legitimise other objectives (i.e. economic) in the context of mass atrocities by reconciling them with humanitarianism, meaning that depoliticisation, as a process, can also be co-opted by the powerful, like R2P itself (Hehir, 2019). Thus, instead of solely seeking the protection of human beings through intervention, other actors could in parallel seek the accumulation of capital, suggesting that capitalist-economic objectives can translate into R2P's wider political context. R2P therefore provides a case worth investigating because this theoretical process opposes the idea of altruistic international behaviour.

Therefore, combining these theories provides a framework within which to investigate the economic aspect in all categories of motivations, by understanding how economic drivers are operationalised.

4. Methodology: Within-Case Analysis

The methodology of this study will be a single-case study because case-studies provide an opportunity to inductively identify the effects of complex interactions (George & Bennett, 2005). Furthermore, if rigorously examined, the results of case-studies boast high conceptual validity. This is because small-N analysis addresses causal complexity by considering mechanisms, patterns and processes with less scope for certain measurement errors found in large-N studies. It can also incorporate other tools of analysis such as historical narrative; content and discourse analysis; interviews; and archival research to strengthen the quality of evidence used (*ibid*).

In this research, the advantage of the case contributing to broader discussions (Mahoney, 2015) is limited as no two R2P cases are ever said to be completely comparable (Weiss, 2010: 25). Moreover, within-case analysis is limited by the following factors: firstly, large amounts of evidence are required but not always present, which leads to data-gaps and missing causal links, especially when pertaining to unrecorded elite-led personal networks (Irwin, 2015) and a lack of transparency in certain information which still influences causation, such as lobbying behind closed doors. In general, data collected in a turbulent period may be subject to greater measurement error. Moreover, motivations are challenging to measure, as they are often subjective and seldom explicitly stated. This means that actors may have had hidden underlying motivations for which no data exists, which can undermine the credibility of inferences. In order to overcome this, this study will triangulate a variety of sources by looking as widely as possible. These include official documents, academic literature, economic indicators, survey data, news/policy reports and official statements from the financial, public and private sectors and actors so as to ascertain motivations. This level of detail should still provide an overall general trend.

Finally, there is a risk of subjectivity in the interpretation of evidence and the selection of a case, along with selection bias: when certain evidence is overlooked in favour of obtaining conclusions preferable to the author’s hypothesis. To mitigate this, a broad scope was retained and potential biases of both the author and sources were considered. In this case, ‘economics’ was not used as a search title to isolate these areas of concern, and motivators were researched more generally, owing to the fact that most existing sources did not specifically address economic motivations alone. Furthermore, when specific economic data/R2P analyses were included, it was based on the underlying assumption that economics is an important factor, with the aim of analysing its connection to other aspects, underscoring that the aim of this research is not looking at whether or not economics 'trumps' other motivators, but rather investigating their interaction.

In the Kenyan case, the dependent variable is the decision by the international community to intervene in the name of R2P. The independent variables are the economic or other motivations of each involved actor. The literature review previously made the case for operationalising geopolitical and security motivations through an economic lens in this study. Thus, the research design focuses on unpacking the way in which overall economics motivates humanitarian intervention by means of its interaction with all other motivators. This is affected by six economic drivers derived from previous literature: both strategic, geo-economic and normative mechanisms, which affect the relationship between the independent variable (motivations/drivers: X) and the dependent variable (R2P intervention: Y). These include natural resources, the hegemony of capitalism, trade and markets, the (global) economic climate, financial institutions (along with their debt and currency concerns), economic rehabilitation and aid. Each will be examined using empirical evidence to assess the extent to which they are present in the case, a process that Mahoney (2015) calls ‘inductive discovery’.

Figure 1 illustrates the *research design*:
Figure 2 illustrates *observable implications*:

Figure 1.



Timeline: Includes observable motivations both before and throughout the mediation process.
Accepted Parameters:
→ Economic Driver: for profit/gain/benefit, whether public or private, financial or non-commercial.
→ Application of R2P: Action corresponding to the three R2P pillars endorsed by the UN, which will also be referred to as "intervention" or "mediation."

Figure 2.

Observable Implications:

- x1 - concern for employment loss; market functioning; supply chains; strategic industries.
- x2 - concern for resource access/security and the loss of resource utility for the (global) economy.
- x3 - concern for aid passage; poverty; dependency; and reducing the cost of rebuilding.
- x4 - concern for debt and tax revenue; currency strength and its potential impacts (domestic and international).
- x5 - concern for GDP growth; investment climate and potential spin offs for other actors.
- x6 - concern for potential of threats to Western-led economic paradigms and systems, affecting their stable functioning.

4.1. Case Selection: 2007-2008 Post-Election Ethnic Violence in Kenya

This case was chosen by virtue of its complexity and multiple involved actors: namely civil society and its diverse ethnic groups, CSOs, the private sector, international along with regional institutions, and states – all to varying degrees, along with and a history of public-private partnerships for humanitarian action (Drummond & Crawford, 2014: 1) which enhances the scope for complex nuance in analysis. The linguistic profile of Kenya, where English is the primary language of bureaucracy and big business, also facilitates access to official documents and primary sources.

Furthermore, the Kenya case is widely considered as the most successful invocation of R2P, which many believed should serve as a model for future action (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2008). While it is acknowledged that business and economic interests were at play during the crisis (Obath & Odundo-Owuor, 2016), they have not been systematically compared with other motivating factors. In light of the move towards more ‘market sensitive’ intervention options in Kenya (Drummond & Crawford, 2014: 1), examining such an interaction through a positive case study has real-world relevance in terms of how R2P’s motivations are conceptualised.

Against this, some critics argue that the Kenyan case does not qualify as a ‘clear-cut R2P case’ because the language of R2P was not forcefully evoked at the time save for French foreign minister Bernard Koucher’s reference to the concept (Junk, 2016: 55). Despite allegations of a post-hoc framing, and for the purpose of this study, Kenya’s status as an R2P intervention will be endorsed because it fulfilled the criteria to be classified as such at the time, whether explicitly or not (Badescu & Weiss, 2010). The same critics even admit that the case will be ‘nonetheless relevant for the future trajectory of R2P’ (Junk, 2016), consolidating its importance.

Finally, given recent shifts away from contentious military action under R2P, and increases in R2P’s invocation but arguably not its successes (Hehir, 2019), lessons from a non-military case can contribute to ongoing debates on the form of intervention, notably *how* to protect. For instance, is continued economic engagement a necessary safeguard or does it offer a ‘lifeline’ to such authoritarian governments, exacerbating humanitarian problems? The West and other states (such as China) diverge on this (Friedberg, 2018), and so the Kenya case can be instructive in this regard.

Furthermore, Junk (2016) reflects on how most of the BRICS, except for South Africa, were not actively involved in solving the crisis, due to their lack of geopolitical interest in Kenya at the time, even though most also have economic interests in Kenya (Shilaho, 2021). Their restraint either speaks to either different respective interpretations of R2P or the parallel debate about how economic considerations can also hinder R2P's invocation for certain actors, suggesting that a specific interaction of motives is necessary for R2P action. This is important given the increasing influence of emerging powers on R2P's normative development, such as Brazil's *Responsibility while Protecting* and China's *Responsible Protection*.

4.2. Historical Introduction to Case

From late 2007 and into 2008, Kenya's rapid descent into ethnically-driven violent conflict surprised the international community who considered Kenya and its growing market-economy as increasingly peaceful and democratic, despite unstable regional surroundings (Chege, 2008). Violence was sparked by a disputed presidential election on December 27th, 2007. Incumbent Mwai Kibaki from the Party of National Unity (PNU) was proclaimed the winner three days later, against his opponent Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and re-inaugurated just hours later. The violence that followed was widespread and systematic.

In the following two months, 1,133 Kenyans were killed, 900 were raped or sexually assaulted, over 600,000 were displaced, and over 110,000 private homes were damaged. According to the International Criminal Court, the fighting between ethnic Kikuyus, Luos, and Kalenjins in the Rift Valley, Mombasa, and other urban areas amounted to crimes against humanity. Victims were targeted based on their ethnicity and their support for a specific presidential candidate, with violence orchestrated by individuals, militias, and police (GCR2P, 2019). The government, and its weak institutions, failed to address early warning signs for the conflict or its underlying causes, which was a manifest failure of its responsibility to respect the Kenyan people (*ibid*).

This sparked a swift intervention by the African Union (AU), supported by the international community. The ODM and PNU appointed Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities' Chief Mediator on January 10th, 2008. A coalition of civil society groups along with the business sector also engaged with the diplomatic and aid community on a regular basis. When mediation began on January 22nd, the parties agreed to address three agenda items in four weeks: firstly, ending the violence; secondly, addressing the humanitarian crisis and allowing the internally displaced to return home; thirdly, forming a coalition government and a commission of inquiry to examine the violence associated with Kenya's electoral process (GCR2P, 2010). On February 28th, 2008, both sides signed a power-sharing agreement, which later led to the drafting of a new constitution and a new electoral system. Kibaki was named President and Odinga was named Prime Minister, allowing Kenya to rehabilitate its economy and democracy with the help of external states and institutions (*ibid*).

5. Case Study (Data And Analysis)

The post-election violence was not solely motivated by ethnic hatred. Economic tensions — namely Kenya's neopatrimonial political economy (Gilpin, 2015), where land and resources were seen to be unfairly distributed by the government — had a specific role to play. Although the economy was growing, the benefits were not felt by most citizens, leading many to believe that President Kibaki and the Kikuyu ethnic group were running the country to serve themselves (Barkan, 2008). Hence, it makes sense that an economically motivated problem would have, to some extent, an economically motivated solution.

According to Khadiagala (2008: 8), actors are informed by both altruistic and pragmatic motives to mediate between parties and seek a multilateral solution. When it comes to economic motivations for intervention in Kenya, these appear on three separate levels: international, domestic (macro-levels) and the individual (micro-level) and are exhibited by states, international institutions, civil society organisations, aid and development agencies, business groups and individuals.

The private sector and civil society were said to have little faith in the domestic government's humanitarian responses. Kenya's well developed business associations were already engaging on humanitarian issues which directly impacted them such as political violence (Drummond & Crawford, 2014: 1). In fact, the 'actors associated with deep economic interests are either directly involved in the state or exert a disproportionate amount of influence on the political order'

(Kanyinga & Long, 2012: 36-7). This can be observed for domestic and international actors in Kenya, which explains how their same motivations can become a reality.

Even the UN publication *Africa Renewal* acknowledged that donor pressure for a rapid and meaningful resolution that could be maintained in the long-term, grew in response to the violence's possible regional implications (Kimani, 2008). The International Crisis Group (ICG), most explicitly referenced the interplay of motivations for R2P by tying security to economics:

> 'The stakes go beyond Kenya, whose political and economic health is an essential ingredient for the security and prosperity of Eastern and Central Africa and indeed for how the entire continent's future is assessed by investors. Kenya's stability determines regional access to energy supplies and basic commodities and guarantees a relatively safe environment for hundreds of thousands of Somali and Sudanese refugees' (ICG, 2008: ii).

Similarly, the AU expressed 'deep concern' for the 'social, humanitarian and economic consequences' of the violence before calling for cooperation with mediation efforts and welcoming other external efforts (AU, 2008). The UNSC expressed concern at the 'political, security and economic impact of the crisis in Kenya on the wider region' whilst also seeking to support the mediation efforts (UNSC, 2008a: 1-2). The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) report devoted a specific section to the economic impact of the crisis, stating that: 'the economy is spiralling to a halt and no one has been spared. Handcart pushers and hawkers, neighbourhood shopkeepers and multinationals are all affected. So are real-estate tycoons, hotels, farmers, airlines, and players in rail and road transport' (UNICEF, 2008). According to the Secretary General of the Kenyan chapter of the Central Organisation of Trade Unions, Francis Atwoli, the only way out of the crisis was for Kibaki and Odinga to cooperate with Kofi Annan's mediated solution (New Humanitarian, 2008a). Owing to the gravity of the situation, Marx Kahende, Kenyan ambassador to Belgium, even believed that more extreme measures could become necessary, stating that: "democracy can't be built in a void ... Maybe NATO forces are required, I don't know" (Daily Nation, 2008b).

Therefore, in order to understand how specific factors drove such responses, this section will trace how economic drivers influenced actors' economic, humanitarian, security and geostrategic concerns, however tacitly.

5.1. Trade, Markets, Industry

Kenya is East Africa's strongest international trade and investment player, and a transport, logistics, tourism, banking and services hub, giving Kenya a strategic competitive advantage, which has had positive spillover-effects for neighbouring economies in terms of economic growth and wellbeing (MacNamee, 2016). In fact, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon held a specific phone conversation with Kofi Annan to consider the serious economic impact of the violence. He later stated that "Kenya can remain stable and prosperous, a model to all Africa," and that "we must all do our utmost to ensure that it does so" (UN, 2008b).

5.1.1. Manufacturing/ SMEs

Manufacturing, a majority employer (75%) in certain areas (Porhel, 2008), felt a 30% drop in productivity in January and February (WB, 2008: 10). According to the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, it would take 12-18 months to recover the levels of activity achieved in 2007 (Porhel, 2008) and the situation could further deteriorate, should there be no 'quick settlement to the political crisis' (ICG, 2008: 10). Kenyan Finance Minister Amos Kimunya stated: "one can consider as the very first victims the business people, who very quickly suffered slow business, at best, or at worst, a total disappearance of their merchandise" (Porhel, 2008:7), highlighting how importantly economic impacts featured in discourses surrounding the violence. Countless shops were shuttered and the lucrative matatu (informal transport) industry was decimated due to high insecurity (ICG, 2008:19). The violence also instilled a distrust among workers, and many returned to their tribal homelands, leading to a regional skills shortage (*ibid*, 20). Accordingly, on the 8th of February, Annan berated both mediating sides' lack of progress:

> "You have heard the business community talk about what this crisis is doing to the economy. 49,000 people have already lost their jobs and more may be on the way. Farmers can't get to the farm to till their land; some cannot get their produce to the markets. Women, children and men are displaced in the open sun.

> Is this what leaders are put in the office to do? So they realize they have a responsibility" (Khadiagala, 2008).

5.1.2. Transport

At a February meeting of the UNSC, it was stated that Kenya's transport disruption was having significant regional impacts. Uganda and Rwanda's reliance on Kenyan ports for over 80% of imports and the ports' facilitation of trade and humanitarian assistance in the DRC, Burundi, Sudan and Tanzania meant that these countries faced severe disruption which stunted efforts at improving economic integration (UNSC, 2008b: 4). 100 million people were dependent on Kenya for consumer products (Porhel, 2008). Although aid agencies were considering alternative contingencies, it was said that a peaceful Kenya 'remained by far the preferred option' (UNSC, 2008b: 4). Most goods passing via the port must also pass through Kenya's Northern Corridor of roads to neighbouring countries, which contained up to 40 illegal roadblocks (Kimani, 2008) Similarly, sections of the Kibera railway were destroyed, threatening the economic isolation of Nyanza, North Rift and Western provinces (ICG, 2008: 19). Alternative routes were underdeveloped due to lack of investment (Kimani, 2008). Army convoys were being used but they were slow, costly and not viable in the long term. There was only a 50% probability of receiving goods in good condition, which meant securing resources was challenging (Porhel, 2008). In Uganda, the price per litre of petrol rose from 2400 to 6000 Ugandan Shillings (*ibid*) and in Rwanda fuel rationing was necessary.

At its peak, there were 19,000 abandoned shipping containers in neighbouring Dar Es Salaam port, and 5,000 more in Mombasa, and 21 ships were waiting to offload their cargo (UNICEF, 2008). Regional air traffic had declined or ceased completely. Kenya Airways, the largest carrier in the region, also suspended direct flights to Paris, impacting many African transit passengers (Kimani, 2008). Such disruption motivated the chair of the East African Community, Yoweri Museveni, to meet Kibaki and Odinga in Kenya on 22-24 January to encourage a rapid solution (ICG, 2008: 21). The crisis was seen as the first instance where political violence extensively affected business. It is said that it was for this reason that the private sector and its network of business associations pressured the government to address the root causes of the violence to sustain long-term peace, motivated by business and humanitarian concerns (Drummond & Crawford, 2014: 14). Given the centrality of depoliticisation as a framework, and its inextricable link to economics, in terms of manufacturing one sees how economic motivations can also exist on their own or predominate in certain areas, because of the rhetoric and actors that viewed the crisis solely economically. For example, the Uganda Manufacturers' Association and their concern for how finished goods could not reach consumers (New Humanitarian, 2008c).

5.1.3. Agriculture

Even those not directly affected by the violence had their livelihoods threatened due to inaccessible markets (New Humanitarian, 2008b). High transport costs and a shortage of labour meant that producers could not prepare for the harvest season (Porhel, 2008:8) and only 10% of the land had been prepared for planting (Kimani, 2008), threatening long-term food security (ICG, 2008:19). An estimated 3 million bags of maize were lost and the Food and Agriculture Organisation, noting the pre-existing scarcity of essential cereal products, feared an eventual crisis (Porhel, 2008). The sugar industry, indirectly supporting 450,000 people, also collapsed (Kimani, 2008). Long-term food aid is expensive and offers little payback in benefits to donors. In this case it may have been cheaper for international actors to support the intervention. Furthermore, a UN Africa spokesperson was quoted saying: "the problem with giving food assistance to urban areas is that it destroys the functioning of the market, and we don't like to do that" (Daily Nation, 2009a), suggesting that a possible goal of intervention is to restore distorted market-systems, thus texturing how economic concerns interact with human-wellbeing concerns.

As a result of the above factors, there was a 200% domestic inflation in fruit and vegetable prices, with food products accounting for approximately half of Kenya's consumer price index (WB, 2008), meaning that these tangible impacts along with individual property damage became a personal economic motivator for ordinary citizens, which explains their 'overwhelming support' for the mediation (Crossley, 2013: 207).

5.1.4. Flowers

Pre-2008, Kenya was providing 36% of Europe's cut flowers, with horticulture earning nearly Ksh 50 billion. according to the Central Bank, of which 63% came from cut flowers (Porhel, 2008). European buyers were concerned about the long-term security of supply (Kimani, 2008). The resulting action was the Netherlands-Eldoret airlift of humanitarian supplies which aimed to ‘make the town attractive once again’ (Porhel 2008:8), exhibiting how business and humanitarianism can be compatible, even if the ulterior motive was to ensure supply of goods.

5.1.5. Tea/Coffee

Kenya is the world’s leading exporter of black tea. The crisis, which was projected to reduce overall crops by 7% or 25 million kg according to the Kenya Tea Board, owing to crop damage and reduced labour supply, would affect global supply (Kimani, 2008) and compound difficulties arising from a previously weak shilling which had reduced Kenyan exports (ICG, 2008: 20). Furthermore, the Kenyan Coffee Board estimated that the 2007/8 crop output would fall 22% to 42,000 MT from 54,000MT the previous year (WB, 2008: 9). The subsequent effect on global prices became an international concern. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, in a report to the Global Dubai Tea Forum, forecasted that average global tea prices would reach an all-time high, compounding international food inflation, felt most by the poorest aid-reliant populations, with domestic Kenyan prices rising a further $2.50 per kilogram (Blas, 2008).

5.1.6. Tourism

As Kenya’s main source of revenue (15% of national wealth), the violence, which occurred during the high season, led to an immediate loss of Ksh 4bn in revenue and 120,000 jobs in its first week. It was estimated that the sector would lose 78% of income in the first quarter of 2008 (Porhel, 2008). Hotel occupancy rates were 20% versus the usual 85% (ICG, 2008: 20). Every tourist lost was said to translate into 8 job losses (UNICEF, 2008). The link between job losses and humanitarianism was seen by their ‘multiplier effect.’ An average single-earner household in Kenya supports up to 10 others, meaning a million people would be adversely affected (New Humanitarian, 2008a). Another important domestic motivator for mediation was the possibility that renewed violence could encourage a shift towards other competing African tourism markets, such as Tanzania, Mauritius, Botswana and South Africa according to Fred Kaigwa, chief executive of Kenya Tour Operators (Kimani, 2008).

5.1.7. Multinational Corporations

Given that Kenya prioritises multinational corporations (Crossley, 2013: 208), it is no surprise that the international response was pro-business (Drummond & Crawford, 2014: 4). The private sector makes up 80% of the country's GDP and over half of wage employment. Furthermore, many privatisation programmes were on hold, such as the joint venture between Kenyan Safaricom and Vodafone (Porhel, 2008), leading the EU to express concern about the position of multinationals in strategic Kenyan markets (Kubosova, 2008).

5.2. Natural Resources

Given that natural resources have a generally positive effect on economic development (Gilpin, 2015), they are also important to analyses of Kenya's crisis mediation. Kenya is said to be a resource-poor economy in terms of oil, however fuel is said to be 'the most critical item for Kenya's landlocked neighbours' (New Humanitarian, 2008c). Kenya imports and refines crude oil at Mombasa, before piping it to Nakuru, Eldoret and Kisumu. From there, it is transported to Uganda and other Great Lakes countries. At the time, Uganda required 35 truckloads of petroleum per day from Kenya to meet its daily demand of 1.75 million gallons of diesel and petrol. Price hikes were passed onto consumers (*ibid*), exhibiting a dual-level economic concern driven by resource insecurity.

5.2.1. Pyrethrum

Kenya is the top producer of pyrethrum, used to manufacture some of the world's most effective insecticides. In 1998, Kenya accounted for 90% of global output (13,000 tonnes). The flower from which pyrethrum is extracted is grown in the Rift Valley, the region most affected by the violence and where planting was inhibited. Tanzania and Rwanda, who grow smaller volumes, had attracted foreign investment in an effort to boost outputs, threatening Kenya's monopoly position (Kimani, 2008). However, according to Manfred Pfersich of the Kenya Pyrethrum Information Centre in Austria: shifting production and meeting Western import regulations takes time, which is why the most prudent business decision was to protect existing capital investments by restoring political stability, which would have been supported by international buyers who, by switching to synthetic substitutes, could have deprived East African farmers of essential revenue (*ibid*). Although questions might remain about Kenyan agency in the pyrethrum industry, the evidence certainly does not support the view of R2P as legitimising imperial resource-grabbing in this case, due to the intrinsic domestic motivations.

5.3. Aid/Rebuilding

Over 40% of Kenya's $2.3billion development budget in health, education and roads relied on donor funding (ICG, 2008: 28). In 2006-07, the top 5 donors were the United States ($304m per year); the United Kingdom ($133m); The European Commission ($115m); Japan ($113m); and the WB ($111m) (OECD, 2009). Thus, Kenya's dependency on economic assistance fostered 'a strong relationship of mutual dependency, which both donor and recipient [...] could not afford to allow to deteriorate' (Crossley, 2013: 208). Moreover, the West and Rift-Valley risked becoming long-term disaster areas due to 'discrepancies in access to aid and the economic consequences of the violence' (ICG, 2008: 20). Considering that crises contribute to cycles of underdevelopment with humanitarian impacts (O'Reilly, 2019: 115), and that there were significant fiscal risks to development projects (WB, 2008: 14), previous progress was threatened, which became a 'powerful motivator for outsiders' who sought to 'avoid watching decades of investment and development assistance go up in smoke' (Weiss, 2010: 28). However, UN agencies and NGOs were offering agricultural inputs and basic construction kits to re-establish small enterprises along with their basic humanitarian aid (New Humanitarian, 2008c), exhibiting how economic means can be used for humanitarian ends and that not only investor interests were considered.

Kenya, which itself hosts 160,000 Somalian refugees and 90,000 from Sudan, risked creating an exodus of refugees into politically unstable neighbouring states such as Somalia, constituting a significant security risk. Uganda was hosting up to 12,000 Kenyan refugees and, according to John Holmes at the Security Council, the humanitarian consequences of this could "dwarf anything we have seen so far" (*ibid*). The internally displaced, also risked exacerbating ethnic divisions in land distribution, leading to an 'explosive land crisis' (ICG, 2008: 18) owing to the link between security and economics.

5.3.1. Strategic Importance of Aid/Stability/Security

When addressing the question of donor funding, an Economist (2008) article stated that international donors would eventually side with Kibaki due to the strategy of Kenya in the global war on terror, suggesting that aid is combined with other objectives. It is also interesting to note that the US was the only Western donor to endorse Kibaki's victory, before quickly adjusting this stance. It is even alleged that a US exit-poll that gave Odinga an 8% lead was withheld before the election (Brown, 2009: 10). Furthermore, the internal memo sent by Colin Bruce, WB representative in Kenya, suggested that the WB was also inclined to endorse Kibaki (*ibid*), which certainly aligns with the view of supporting favourable regimes to further economic goals.

Although the US reversed their position, it does not appear that the new stance was fully altruistic. This is because when consensus shifted towards power-sharing, it was the Kikuyu business community, supported by Colin Bruce, and consisting of CEOs, farm, hotel and coffee estate owners who had benefitted from liberalisation and infrastructure under Kibaki previously (ICG, 2008:21), that first met to draft a document outlining 'Principles of Agreement' that coincided with the pre-mediation visit of the AU's John Kufuor on January 10 and which consequently influenced the eventual political settlement brokered by Annan and the international community (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: 273). This may explain why international donors subsequently supported the Annan mediation, through states' coercive measures on unaffected hardliners who threatened the mediation process such as travel bans, revoking visa statuses and threats to aid from actors such as the US, UK and Switzerland (Crossley, 2013).

According to Kanyinga & Walker (2013: 37), the institutional separations between economic development and peacebuilding have been increasingly blurred but many development practices still prioritise investor interests, such as large portions of aid being used to pay donor-country consultants for advice on its distribution. Similarly, the pool of resources used to finance the crisis response ensured 'a very close relationship between political and development actors.' In fact, the UNDP funded much of the mediation process by establishing a multimillion-dollar trust fund, through which the private sector could contribute (Drummond & Crawford, 2014), perhaps to influence the mediation and eventual reforms to protect their economic interests. Against this, there is evidence that suggests that some of this action was altruistically motivated, because some donors took further political risk by 'separately funding the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights to conduct early investigations of the violence' (Kanyinga & Walker, 2013:12) and the findings contributed to the reconciliation process. Thus, the willingness to take political-economic risk in a volatile situation must have been motivated to some extent by seeking to alleviate human suffering.

5.3.2. Poverty

The WB reported that poverty headcounts had increased by 22%, threatening welfare gains made in the previous five years (WB, 2008: 3), showing how diverging actors can use an economic lens to consider humanitarian concerns. The ICG classified 75% of the Rift Valley's displaced population as destitute and criticised the government's inability to provide adequate security for them (ICG, 2008: 17). However, the Security Council did not favour a quick fix at all costs which could worsen the humanitarian situation. Instead, the "'responsibility" of all politicians to reach durable solutions with the support of the international community, was stressed (UNSC, 2008b: 4). While Annan's strategy of a depoliticised 'technical legal solution' (Weiss, 2010: 23), avoiding the question of who had won the election did benefit the negotiations, and subsequently Kenya (Khadiagla, 2008), visions of this solution varied among other actors owing to what their vision of a technical solution represented. So while the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator might have stated that Kenya represented a "protection-of-civilians crisis" (UN, 2008c), that is because their objectives and concerns were more altruistic than most.

5.4. Debt/ Currency

Kenya's external debt stood at 16.9% of GDP in 2008, which was above the regional average of 11% (Economist, 2008). Given the decline of industry, the need to finance rebuilding, and foreign exchange difficulties linked to reduced tourism (WB, 2008:7), there was a risk of defaulting or failing to service loans, which would have been a concern for international creditors' interests. By February 28, The Kenya shilling had depreciated by 13% against the Great British pound and US dollar and by 18% against the euro (WB, 2008:19). While this may have otherwise benefitted Kenya's balance of trade, it had no exports to offer, and currency depreciation could spread to neighbouring states. Furthermore, daily losses of tax revenues in the region of Ksh 2 billion meant that a cash-strapped Kenya had to sell national assets to finance emergency relief, such as the privatisation of Telkom Kenya (ICG, 2008: 19), engendering losses of public wealth. Worse again, the fiscal losses would force Kenya towards more external borrowing to implement its monetary policies (Porhel, 2008), further reducing fiscal autonomy.

5.5. (Global) Economic Climate

According to Justino (2016: 216), armed conflict can engender changes in the market pricing of products sold and purchased by households; savings; risk behaviour and preferences. The Kenyan situation was said to renew interest in gold and other commodities, exhibiting a “renewed anxiety about global financial stability,” according to JPMorgan (Moore, 2008).

The effect on Kenya’s GDP growth was part of wider trajectory of fluctuations corresponding to elections:

Figure 3: Kenya’s GDP Growth Rates (1990-2010) Source: Kanyinga & Long, 2012



Given this, and the fact that Article 4 of the mediation document proposed political and economic reform aimed at reducing such fluctuations and shocks in Kenya’s economy, it is likely that the long-term possibilities served as an economic motivation for actors. Depoliticisation is once again instructive, because for actors, R2P invocation can become a way to solve such economic problems, without explicitly considering the overarching humanitarian context.

5.5.1. Investor Confidence

Razia Khan, from the UK's Standard Chartered Bank, stated that the crisis could impact investor confidence "more widely in Africa" (Kimani, 2008). After previous periods of aversion to foreign investment, Kenya had only recently increased its foreign funding (Porhel, 2008), meaning that the Kenyan market was ripe for capture by investors and could not be risked. While the Stephen Hayes Group, one of the US' largest companies, advised investors to withdraw from Kenya (*ibid*), many involved in manufacturing suffered capital losses (Kimani, 2008). Given that the difficulties in selling up in a bad climate are considerable for long-term investments, it would have been financially prudent to support an intervention. The EAC Secretary-General stated: "We can only promote and attract investments sustainably, as well as assure effective intra-regional trade, if we have enduring peace and stability." (*ibid*). This was compounded by the poor performance of the Nairobi Stock Exchange, which, on January 2nd fell by 277 points and lost 5% of its value in one day, before later collapsing, affecting Kenyan financial entities such as Barclays and Equity Bank (Porhel, 2008).

According to Gilpin (2015: 5) most investors 'choose to exert influence to either reduce the duration for return on investment [...] or ensure political continuity and stability.' The US echoed this mentality through Condoleeza Rice's comments on 18 February, stating that "the US, as a friend of Kenya, expects power sharing to take place" (Khadiagla, 2008: 23). U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Fraser was also quoted saying that "we'll find an international mechanism if they can't find it internally" (*ibid*, 11), representing what was seen as a technical solution to both US and Kenya's worries. Furthermore, the Economist (2008), writing predominantly for an economic class, wrote that mediation efforts were "finally" getting underway and given that the power sharing agreement did actually restore some confidence in the markets (Porhel, 2008), it is feasible to deduce that economic climates were a contributing motivator.

5.6. Hegemony of Capitalism

Prior to the election, an Economist (2007b) article stated that 'Mr. Odinga makes many queasy' and that 'bankers fret about his Marxist youth.' Given this pre-existing fear, Kibaki's moderately successful neoliberal policies following the economic stagnation of the Moi era (ICG, 2008: 5), along with the overarching background of global capitalism, it makes sense that the international community sought long-term constitutional reforms and international trade liberalisation (Justino, 2016: 222) so that the growth that capitalism requires to survive could be enshrined in a way that protected the West's interests. In fact, the distinguished Kenya analyst, Professor Makau Mutua, underlined the US' need to avoid a repeat of the violence because "Kenya will go to hell, and its strategic importance will be gone entirely. The US has no choice but to press for reforms. That's a completely self-interested position for it to take" (Daily Nation, 2009b).

As an important R2P catalyst, and the epicentre of global capitalism, the threat to US interests arguably shaped the global politics of Kenya's intervention when it comes to geopolitics and security especially. Seen as 'America's indispensable partner,' Kenya is as economically, politically, and strategically important as other anchor states such as Egypt, Nigeria or South Africa (Karari, 2016). Along with hosting a UN headquarters, multiple Bretton Woods institutions, multinational corporations and NGOs, the US' largest sub-Saharan embassy is in Nairobi (*ibid*).

The US-led war on terror uses Kenya as a base to target the failed states of the Horn of Africa and Middle East. US military aircraft can land in Kenyan airports at just 24 hours' notice and Kenyan ports accommodate US naval vessels. Furthermore, Kenya serves as a base for multiple peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy missions in exchange for US military and economic aid (Cooke, 2009). Therefore, Kenya's instability could render it a new epicentre for terrorism, threatening the geostrategic and political interests of the West (*ibid*).

Mass atrocity economic shocks mean that even as the economy begins to recover, it does so from a reduced base, especially in terms of human capital, which has a negative effect on economic activity (Anderton & Brauer, 2016: 20). This can lead to dependency, as was exhibited by the need for a $200 million loan from the IMF to address financing issues resulting from the crisis (Adogamhe, 2008) which required structural measures to ensure economic recovery, risking compounding debt and reducing expenditure on health and education that is vital for development, with the inherent consequence being a continuation of the cycle of social insecurity and violence (*ibid*). Furthermore, using Møller's (2018) analysis of peace as a commodified public good, we can further understand R2P as a depoliticised instrument in maintaining economic and governance systems worldwide, where communal benefit is hopefully a welcome by-product. Again, one must critically interpret what ‘protection’ even means. So, while many critics believe that ‘the focus on security should shift from protecting regimes and the assets of natural resource firms to emphasising the security of each citizen’ (Gilpin, 2015: 10), capitalism’s proponents believe that this is possible within pre-existing systems, although the evidence is debatable. Nonetheless, capitalism is so internationally embedded that it becomes an interest whether we acknowledge it or not.

Using the intervention as a way of dealing with some existing socio-economic problems such as land reforms would benefit the people but would open the door for aligning Kenya’s policies with Western preferences, blurring the altruism of international engagement. In this sense, it could be argued that the view of needing to socialise less developed countries into Western-prescribed paradigms as a spin-off impact of R2P does somewhat represent previous paternalistic and imperial patterns of capitalist democracy promotion. Against this and given that the general public largely supported the mediation, anti-colonial rhetoric surrounding the intervention was said to be minimal (Crossley, 2013). In this sense, it is moreso the capitalist system and not R2P itself that replicates imperial patterns of engagement and trade, although both cannot be fully delinked, given the imbalance of power between an intervening parties which have the protection of aid flows as one stated purpose, and where aid is seen as a tool of the West to promote ‘favourable yet dependent African regimes’ for the own geopolitical and economic goals, namely cheap access to markets and resources and to prevent the migration of poor people to rich nations (Shikwati, 2008). Therefore, was one goal of the intervention, whether explicit or not, to create the link between economic reform, debt, liberal trade policies and peace or was intervention truly influenced by moral-political will? Or, were they solely reconcilable in this case?

Furthermore, interrogating why it was in the interest of Western states to ensure Kenya’s development through the mediation should be seen against Robert McNamara of the WB’s 1972 ‘War on Poverty’ as a move to ensure that the poor did not turn to communism (Pugh, 2005). Although pro-poor development is seen to manage the ‘crisis of capitalism,’ its end goal was still integration into global capitalist markets, without reform of international finance institutions, which are unequal and perpetuate a system that incentivises benefitting the already wealthy (*ibid*). Such debates came to a head following the intervention, with one MP stating that the bailouts needed from Western governments proved how there was no such thing as 'unchecked capitalism' and that many of the reforms would perpetuate African underdevelopment. Instead, citing Malawi's policy of subsidising farmers which has led to food self-sufficiency, against Western prescriptions, they argued that "they [the West] are the worst hypocrites. They heavily assist their farmers and advise us not to do so" (Daily Nation, 2008a).

This certainly casts doubts on who post-conflict peacebuilding and development really serves, when it is arguably 'dominated by specific capitalist interests' and when 'the prevailing mode of ownership' and 'economic wisdom resides with the powerful' (Pugh, 2005: 38). It is for this reason that many African governments are sceptical of such Western organisations and ideas which are seen to more so promote foreign agendas than consider local concerns (Benjamin, 2009:35).

6. Discussion

Therefore, political, economic and strategic interests were both interconnected and influential in Kenya, with the latter claimed to exhibit R2P's 'lack of impartiality' (Karari, 2016; Junk, 2016). While Slovic et al.'s (2016: 621) behavioural-economic analysis stipulates that 'when multiple objectives are in play, highly regarded humanitarian values appear to collapse in relation to national-security and economic-security objectives,' it again raises the question of how we measure the success of R2P interventions, which is yet another contested issue, along with when and how economic and security objectives produce humanitarian benefit, which largely determines whether or not this can be said to be the case.

Given that economic motives *might* be front and centre, and that it is exceedingly difficult to objectively isolate or quantify the extent of any one motivator,[2] it is more so about how we act upon each potential motive that is altruistic, forcing a return to the question of whether economic concerns nullify humanitarian ones. Furthermore, although previous theories, which believe that humans solely consider their own material objectives, have been disproved by empirical experiments that exhibited human ability to simultaneously consider altruism and fairness (Anderton & Brauer, 2016: 8), we have a situation where although economic concerns might

[2] The possibility to conduct field interviews might have helped strengthen such inferences, by seeking to quantify how much the economic variables were felt by population samples and involved actors.

precede for a certain group, they may not be operationalised if they compete with other motivations held by different actors. Remaining cognizant of the potential level of influence exerted by different actors to promote their concerns is important to ensure humanitarian outcomes regardless of motivations.

On certain levels, different categories of motivations can coexist. Using the intervention to work towards a fairer, more participatory socio-economic system is decidedly altruistic, relating to debates about the type of economic gains derived from intervention. Moreover, when considering the overarching perspective of global capitalism, and the lengths required to maintain competitive advantages and growth, a critic would argue that the motivation of maintaining an economic and geopolitical status quo becomes less altruistic with the passing of time (Brown, 2009: 1). The question remains, if Kenya were not seen to be so internationally economically important, and if geostrategic, economic concerns did not feature so heavily in the domestic conflict, how motivated would the international community have been to swiftly mediate the crisis?

On the other hand, taking a solely economic lens, such as the belief that conflict and humanitarian crises that waste human and material capital or complicate accumulation must be eliminated (O'Reilly, 2019: 212), does not take stock of a complex political reality and the clashing interests of actors that created the same conflict, where no one factor can ever sufficiently explain a compulsion to act to save lives or capital. Economics itself can create moral motivations too. For example, Human Rights Watch reminded Western leaders that their 'decades of turning a blind eye to corruption, impunity and mismanagement by Kenya's governments' had 'contributed to the crisis' (Weiss, 2010). Other businesses, such as Safaricom, whose telecommunication technology was an important tool in instigating and coordinating the violence, were also said to feel a responsibility to protect as a result of their implication (Martin, 2016). Therefore, a key takeaway is the necessity of aligning as many respective actors and interests as possible, by exhibiting how respective interests are interconnected and co-constitutive, thus improving R2P's support and applicability using more than just moralistic rhetoric.

6.1. Generalisability of Results

Although analysis of R2P is decidedly case-specific, it is still theoretically useful to consider some comparisons within what should be a universal doctrine. Comparing the more debated cases of Libya and Syria, scholars have argued that policymakers did not 'exhaust reasonable efforts as negotiation' (e.g. De Groof, 2016: 30), raising important questions as to why negotiations persevered in Kenya and not elsewhere. Further policy-oriented research should be conducted on the link between differing motivations and the eventual method of intervention. Understanding the rationale for such action and its possible links to diverging motivations can better inform future responses.

Given that only a few Western and neighbouring states engaged meaningfully in Kenya, this raises further doubts about R2P's universal, humanitarian 'never again' premise; whether it is ever possible to have universal support for R2P; and whether this actually matters for R2P's success. Nonetheless, although motivations might appear clearer after the fact, the Kenya mediation-response was said to exhibit 'a systematic thinking' of how issues were interconnected, combining economic, social and political concerns, which enhanced its success (Abdi, 2008:4).

However, the mediation's success was also said to be more so attributed to specific case-specific factors than R2P's ability to effect change (Crossley, 2013: 214). It was in both Kibaki and Odinga's political interest to stop the violence, so the former would not tarnish his political legacy, and so the latter could demonstrate his reformist credentials ahead of the 2012 election (Kanyinga & Long, 2012: 34). However, in autocratic states, where legitimacy is less important, it may be more difficult to mediate between sides. Kofi Annan's specific character and skill-set was also said to have been highly influential on the outcome (Khadiagala, 2008). Moreover, the regional-led approach was also praised for its success (Weiss, 2010). However, other regional organisations, such as the fractured Arab League, have exhibited their impotence in upholding R2P in cases such as during the Syrian crisis owing to the diverging interests of actors (Küçükkeleş, 2012). Although it has been argued that understanding a broad spectrum of motivations can more positively influence R2P's application, motivations are not the only affecting variable, and the weakness of certain regional organisations may further complicate the universal aspiration of R2P.

When it comes to the question of non-state actors, particularly the business community given both their direct and indirect engagement with R2P, policymakers should move away from the promoting the view that humanitarian response can improve profits (Drummond and Crawford, 2014: 2) in an effort to increase popular support for R2P, because it enables the doctrine to be co-opted by those who seek to appropriate profit at all costs. Instead, a cultural reset, that allows R2P to exist outside global capitalist expansion, would allow a truly altruistic focus on human welfare, however unrealistic. Policymakers must therefore examine the broader structural factors impacting R2P response everywhere, of which economics is a major consideration.

Even alternative cultural worldviews — such as relationality from Daoism; African ubuntu; or Latin American sumak kawsay, which see humanity's relation and connectedness as a better motivator for R2P than viewing protection solely as moral duty (Smith, 2020) — all essentially exist within the global economic system that essentially encourages the appropriation of resources for profit and from which basic necessities are derived. So while one could rather simplistically argue that capitalism still allows humans to 'do good' through aid, encouraging development or improving quality of life, these actions still often reinforce the historically rooted and arguably neo-colonial 'us/them dichotomy' from the Global North towards the Global South that R2P-proponents argue against (*ibid*). Thus, seeing R2P as an extension of ourselves is insufficient if we are socialised not to think in this way.

7. Conclusion

In examining how economic drivers interact with other motivations within R2P, this research concludes that in Kenya, economic motivations for R2P took many forms and were deeply interlinked and embedded in the very social fabric of Kenyan society, owing to the economic preconditions for the crisis and Kenya's integration in the global economy. From farmers whose vegetables could not reach the market; to the manufacturing employer whose staff and supply chain were disrupted; to the humanitarian organisations across the Great Lakes region who could not transport their aid; to the Ugandan consumer facing food shortages and fuel inflation; to the business analyst concerned about Kenya's investment climate; to the US government official concerned about Kenya's stability as a regional economic powerhouse; to the very reason that aid was needed in the first place, it is clear that multiple groups on various levels held such humanitarian, security and strategic economic motivations, both domestically and internationally.

Although it has been shown that global institutions do reference economics in reference to the R2P, critics often lack nuance in their analysis, by classifying economic interests as entirely self-interested. It also highlights that economics, while an important recurring motivation, is rarely implied (at least rhetorically) in isolation from political/altruistic motives. This research has sought to be one small, tentative corrective step. Furthermore, given the political-economic context within which the R2P exists, and given the exhibited hegemony of capitalism, it is my personal opinion that economic motivations do systematically influence other motivations, meaning they can sometimes even exist on their own. Even so, being an equally economic doctrine does not mean that human lives cannot be saved, or humanitarian benefits derived, because a successfully functioning economy can induce human benefits. As a result, economic interests *can* be reconcilable with the stated purpose of R2P under the right conditions. Thus, investigating the conditions for this compatibility constitutes an important area for future research. One possible approach could be an aggregated examination of the interaction of economic motivating factors in all R2P cases to seek overall trends that can take stock of underlying external influences and the interaction of actors and their respective interests with R2P more generally. In this way, R2P can be better poised to universally achieve its desired form, legitimacy and results instead of previous reformist visions seeking to improve R2P by focusing on R2P itself.

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