



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

The Beginnings of One Zambia, One Nation: The Zambian First Republic and the Lumpa Sect

Matthias, Rhiannon

Citation

Matthias, R. (2023). *The Beginnings of One Zambia, One Nation: The Zambian First Republic and the Lumpa Sect*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master thesis in the Leiden University Student Repository](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3454610>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Rhiannon Matthias
s2885670

Masters of Science: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Development



The Beginnings of One Zambia, One Nation: The Zambian First Republic and the Lumpa Sect

Rhiannon Matthias

s2885670

Supervisor: Dr Frank de Zwart

Second Reader: Dr Leila Demarest

9900 Words

Abstract

This thesis uses a single case study on the Lumpa Church, a movement whose growth and practices wreaked havoc during the late colonial period in Zambia. The conflict between the sect and the state represented a period of violence and devastation in a country reputed for its unity in diversity and peace, therefore there exists a fundamental need to provide a comprehensive account of how the state was able to overcome such bloodshed. This thesis explores the historic anomalies and conscious policy that united the Zambian state in order to challenge ahistorical and essentialised readings of identarian conflict and Sub-Saharan Africa as a region.

List of Figures and Tables

Item	Description
Figure 1	Map of Zambia's Northern Province
Figure 2	Lenshina in Police Custody
Figure 3	An ethnolinguistic map of Zambia
Figure 4	Aerial view of the Kamutola Church, Kasama
Table 1	Education funding and enrolment rates per province in 1964 and 1969
Table 2	Regional developmental funding until 1970
Table 3	Population changes due to immigration from 1963
Table 4	Changes in sex ratio (male to female) 1960-1980

Table of Contents

Abstract	2
List of Figures and Tables	3
Introduction.....	6
Literature Review: Governance of Diversity and Economic (Dis)incentives for Peace	12
Three Lenses for Exploring Identity: Primordialism, Instrumentalism, and Constructivism .	13
Institutions, Modernisation, and Identification with the Nation-State	17
Hypothesis.....	20
Approach	20
Chapter 1: The Rise and Fall of the Lumpa Sect, the Beginning of Party Politics in Zambia, and the Significance of Repression.....	22
Situating the Lumpa Movement: The Grievances of the Peasantry and the UNIP’s Struggle for Political Hegemony	22
Political Parties versus AICs: Coercion and the Struggle for Legitimacy	27
The end of a Movement: A case of Successful Repression?.....	29
Chapter 2: The Need for Modernisation, the First National Development Plan (FNDP), and We- berian Nation-Building in Zambia	32
The State in The Immediate Post-Colonial Period.....	32
The FNDP: Key Components, Successes, and Limitations	35
The Significance of Rural-Urban Migration	39
Conclusion	43

Introduction

Following the Cold War and in the final years of the polarised world order, the threat of inter-state violence was overshadowed by the emergence of intra-state violence. No other region has seen as many short and protracted civil conflicts as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Collier et al. 2003:114–5), several states have experienced various levels and depths of violence, from sporadic episodes of violence to protracted civil wars, and even genocide. There is an abundance of literature dedicated to explaining the ubiquity of violence in this region, often linking it to weak nationalism (Robinson, 2014: 709). The general assumption is that problems arise where attachment to state-defined national identity is weak in relation to subnational attachments such as ethnicity and religion. This consolidates negative ideas of SSA as a region and the idea of ethnic and religious fractionalisation as being an insurmountable obstacle to peace and economic development. However, Azam points out that for each example of a divided African state where civil wars have broken out there several examples of states with similar demographics that have remained peaceful or experienced limited violence (2000:1).

There is less academic attention to these deviant cases and their potential to provide rich insights into the governance of diversity and nation building. This thesis focuses on one of those deviant cases—Zambia, a former British colony in Central-Southern Africa and a country that presents many risk factors that are associated with weak nationalism and violent conflict. Zambia is a poor country with 73 distinct ethnolinguistic groups and the salience of ethnicity is stronger in former British colonies due to the use of “extreme” ethnic categorisation as part of the divide and rule strategy (Robinson, 2014: 717). Since 1960 several of its neighbours experienced violent conflict, therefore, its relative peace is remarkable and foments notions of exceptionalism (Burnell, 2005).

However, upon further evaluation Zambia's exceptional status is questionable, whilst Zambia has not been the backdrop of civil war, she has not known peace and stability throughout her history. A clear reflection of this was the perpetual state of emergency that characterised the country's First Republic.




Figure 1: Maps Zambia, n.d

It followed a period of unprecedented and unmatched violence in the country's Northern Province as what was then Northern Rhodesia, found herself on the cusp of self-rule. The unarmed peasants that were adherents of Alice Lenshina Mulenga's Lumpa Church (1953-1964) faced an unlikely

alliance between Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the security forces still under colonial control (Gordon, 2008: 45). By July of 1964, there were at least 1500 casualties, and one of the worst refugee crises in the region with 20 000 fleeing across the northern border (46). In addition to the bloodshed and destruction caused by the conflict, it produced insecurity in the nascent republic, as there was a high likelihood of reprisal attacks by those in exile due to the porousness of the Congo-Zambia border (Munga,2016:18). The church continued in exile and the experience of violence legitimised narratives of persecution, amplifying the possibility for further radicalisation of some members (Dawson, 2018). These narratives of persecution are corroborated by official and non-official accounts, it is agreed that local UNIP branches incited the violence in the years leading up to the conflict (Gordon, 2008: 50).

There is also a consensus that the Lumpa were not prepared for conflict, or at least, that their preparation, which centred on spiritual guarantees of immunity to bullets and limited weaponry, proved insufficient. Though the Lumpas lacked modern weaponry and effective defensive tactics, they outnumbered their assailants, the movement grew to at least 60 000 by 1959 in an area with a population of 400 000 (51). Racial justice was not explicit within Lumpa hymns and scriptures, but its growth inextricably tied to Black nationalism in parts of rural Northern Rhodesia as well as the growth of anti-UNIP sentiments in these regions. As it expanded its membership, it broke away from the secular nationalist movement, not only challenging the legitimacy of UNIP but also rejecting any earthly authorities (Munga, 2016: 14). Eventually, Lumpas separated themselves from mainstream society and took on separatist and millenarian dimensions. Therefore, its eventual conflict with the state represented a clash between religious and secular forms of nationalism – for the Lumpa African liberation was a strictly apolitical concept that was not tied to legal or territorial sovereignty.


Even further, violence towards the Lumpa by the state represented a “major trauma to the nationalist dream”, one in which UNIP malfeasance was indicated in the findings of by the official Commission of Enquiry (Gordon, 2008: 63). The suppression of the Lumpa sect and its memory have been described as the early signs of Kaunda’s despotism and intolerance to alternative identities and organisations (Gordon, 2008: 47). In his early speeches he employed the violence against the Lumpas as the ultimate warning against sectarianism and dissent. For example, in 1965, Kaunda warned opposition parties that if they “misbehaved” in the same way as the Lumpas, their organisations would be outlawed (see Van Binsbergen, 1976:100). The narrative fomented by UNIP was that of the state fulfilling its obligations to maintain law and order during a crucial point in its genesis. In line with this, the state banned the Lumpa religion, destroyed any potential *lieux de mémoire* (see Nora, 1984), and imprisoned the sect’s synod. The UNIP regime’s demobilisation of a movement that was rooted in the grievances of the rural peasantry and predominated by state’s largest ethnic group, goes against much of the literature on approaches to governing diversity, nation-building and civil conflict.

Figure 2 (Northern Rhodesia Police Association, n.d)

Elsewhere in the region, spirit mediums and prophets with ethnic linkages of varying strengths have successfully led insurgencies, withstanding violence from the state, and societal shifts around them (Behrend, 2000). For instance, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) in Uganda was initially centred on the teachings of Alice Aume and the spirit that possessed her but quickly grew to include a military wing that remains active several decades later (22). Of course, the HSM is an exceptional case, but what can be derived from its active status four decades later, is AICs and spiritual movements demonstrate an ability to rapidly attract members, particularly in rural areas. The Lumpa faith continued to be practiced in exile and was re-established in Zambia following

the end of Kaunda's presidency, but it remained small and has not challenged government authority. Nonetheless, during the First Republic the Lumpa could have posed a long-term and insurmountable threat to a new and highly heterogeneous state, be it in the form of reprisal attacks or ethno-religious based justice claims. Rather than romanticising unaccommodating approaches to achieving national cohesion, there is a need for more nuance and consideration of additional factors that led to the creation of the Zambian nation-state.

Figure 2: Northern Rhodesia Police Association, n.d



There is a consensus amongst scholars that repressive approaches alone do not increase the levels of identification with the nation state, and often exacerbate existing levels of fragmentation (Kebedi, 2000). This project explores the circumstances under which individual loyalty to conceptions of identity weakens in favour of collective national identity. More concretely, I am considering the methods that heterogenous nascent states can use when faced with subversive ideologies and groups that resist incorporation into the nation-state. This research aims to highlight the ahistoricism behind the “One Zambia, One Nation” concept and shed additional insights into enduring aspects of the country’s political culture (Van Donge, 1995). More broadly, it is intended to contribute to the scant literature on territorial nationalism in SSA and break with doom and gloom centred narratives that “other” the region. I evaluate the “success” of UNIP repression in suppressing the Lumpa movement *vis-à-vis* additional factors that have been framed as having a positive correlation with strong national identification.

This thesis is not a comprehensive account of the actual events of the Lumpa Massacre, instead it answers the following question: **To what extent did UNIP’s developmental agenda address the grievances that led to the rise of the Lumpa Sect during the Zambian First Republic (1964-1973)?**

Chapter Synopsis

Chapter 1 outlines the main existing analytical perspectives on identity formation and subnational violence in SSA, and then focuses on the impact of national institutions and modernisation in overcoming the colonial legacy of divisionism and consolidating homogenous national identity. Chapter 2 explores the grievances and cleavages that shaped life in rural Northern Rhodesia, the rise and fall of the sect amidst the rise of party politics in Northern Rhodesia. It is in this chapter that I consider alternative explanations for the disappearance of this group and its ideology outside of conscious policy. Chapter 3 analyses UNIP's attempts at modernising Zambia and my main hypothesis. I the outcomes of UNIP's Emergency Development Plan (EDP) and how these increased support for UNIP and weakened sectarianism in Northern Zambia.

Literature Review: Governance of Diversity and Economic (Dis)incentives for Peace

This literature review engages with various analytical perspectives on ethno-religious fragmentation and conflict and the importance of economic (dis)incentives for identification with the nation-state. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) literature on identity, modernisation, and conflict often attributes contemporary ills to the “ethnic problem” (Kebedi, 2000). Fox argues that, in practice, strong religious and ethnic identification are intertwined and mutually enforcing variables that can influence levels of violence (2004: 715). For this reason, some of the literature discussed in this chapter is research on ethnic violence. To address fragmentation, most postcolonial African leaders have

tried to minimise the salience of identity through repressive measures such as, the banning of ethnic organisations and/or the establishment of a one-party state (Kebedi, 2000: 266). However, in many cases this approach fomented antagonism between groups. Kaunda's approach to governance centred around the consolidation of a homogenous national identity that rested on the non-recognition of identarian movements, however it did not lead to increased animosity or dissent.

Three Lenses for Exploring Identity: Primordialism, Instrumentalism, and Constructivism

The link between conflict and diversity often appears self-evident because many movements and organisations that become violent actors are formed adjacent to or directly on ethnic and/or religious lines. There are three main schools of thought on identity formation: primordialism, instrumentalism (structuralism), and constructivism. Primordialism frames identity as a naturally formed based on physical geography or individuals in the distant past that directly produces a strong probability of inter-group violence (Sambanis, 2002: 227). This outlook overlaps with evolutionary theory, humans have an innate drive to form groups as a guarantee of security and survival. Within groups, suspicion of the "other" is so entrenched that there is little that state institutions can do to ameliorate violence (Harvey, 2000: 41). In his text 'Balkan Ghosts' (1993:7), journalist Robert Kaplan attributes the origins of the Balkan War to 'ancient hatreds', he hypothesises that conflict is the inevitable result of perennial, irreconcilable hostile feelings between groups in a heterogeneous society.

It is argued that the diversity within African states predisposes them to the formation of immovable cleavages that underpin the weakness of the postcolonial state. In Posner's work (2003) on ethnic cleavages in Zambia he puts forward that it is not an abundance of ethnic and religious pluralism that leads to inherently weak states. Rather, it is the distribution of diversity –that is, the number of members, relative sizes, and spatial distribution of groups- that has this effect. Countries

containing a single large ethnic or religious group, or two groups of equivalent size are more prone to violence than those with a larger number of equally sized groups, this partially explains the stability of the Zambian First Republic (127). In his comparative work on the Chewa and Tumbuka in Zambia and Malawi (2004), he found that the size of either group - being small in Zambia versus being the two most numerous tribes in Malawi- produces binarily opposed interactions between them. In Zambia, they consider one another sister tribes, whereas in Malawi they share a more antagonistic relationship, forming separate and clearly discernible political parties and voting patterns (530).

Nonetheless, this antagonism has not resulted in outright violence, indicating that biologically-informed notions of natural competition between groups with distinctive characteristics –be they cultural, linguistic, or phenotypic require further qualification. Primordial theory is diametrically opposed by instrumentalist and constructivist accounts of identity formation, these two schools of thought have gained overarching legitimacy to the extent that there now exists a consensus amongst social scientists that identity is dialogical, fluid, and malleable as opposed to a fixed primordial reality (Taylor, 1992; Chandra, 2004; De Zwart, 2005; Posner, 2004). Instrumentalists argue that actors invest in identity because it offers them the best available means by which to obtain desired benefits, and not because it possesses an inherent value or weight (Chandra, 2004: 12). From this perspective, violence is not a natural phenomenon, it is one that arises when other members of a group magnify the differences between their own and the out-group. Gilley (2005) points out that in heterogenous societies cooperation, rather than conflict is the norm, he puts forward “ethnicity” as a response to socioeconomic deprivation and a lack of political representation (2005).

Gilley's line of thought suggests that in multicultural states where the government ensures favourable conditions for all citizens, identity does not become a source of conflict. Constructivists argue that it is both structural and historical factors that determine the implications of heterogeneity, identities are seen as shapable, multifaceted, and non-monolithic (Fearon and Laitin, 1997; Cerulo, 2000). Identity is the amalgamation of several factors including a common culture, religion, a consciousness of group solidarity, and an emotional commitment to a shared history (Du Plessis, 2001: 16). Even further, individuals rarely belong to one category, Cerulo points out that some individuals, such as those with mixed ancestry, can choose which category they want to emphasise depending on the external climate around ethnicity (2006: 389). This outlook provides a more nuanced understanding of ethnic identity; however, it also overstates individual agency in "choosing" as often there are limits to individual agency when it comes to identity formation and individuals cannot control their external environment.

Existent identities in postcolonial states illustrate the limits to individual agency, they are often the legacy of colonial constructions that created and exploited inter-group differences to consolidate states that were arbitrarily carved out with no consideration of cultural affinities. Fearon and Laitin (1997: 858) highlight the longevity of colonially constructed understandings of ethnicity and ethnic difference by using the example of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, upon gaining independence these colonially reified categories were then instrumentalised by political entrepreneurs in their pursuit of resources and power.

Accommodation and/or Repression and Government Legitimacy

Due to the strength of colonial ethnic divisions and the inequality between ethnic groups postcolonial regimes inherited weak states whose territorial and political integrity was highly vulnerable. Faced with this challenge regimes faced what De Zwart refers to as "the dilemma of recognition", in

his 2005 eponymous article, considering this dilemma he identifies three approaches regimes may adopt. These are: accommodation (the multicultural approach), denial (the ideal-typical liberal solution), and replacement (a mixture of the two) (137). In SSA, despite both empirical (Kebedi, 2000: 267) and normative arguments (Taylor, 1994) in favour of accommodation, few postcolonial regimes opted for accommodative adjustments. It was common for regimes to suppress the expression of alternative identities and the discourses of sectarian entrepreneurs through coercive means (Kebedi, 2000: 267). In “Repression and Political Order”, Davenport (2007) identifies the circumstances in which states use repression: to respond to challenges from dissident groups or to generate compliance with policies.

Young (2013) argues that repression is inherently costly and damaging to citizens and the government. Repressive regimes impose costs on citizens to generate their compliance (519). The state is required to maintain the apparatus capable of repressing the populace, meaning sizeable portion of the national budget is consigned to the funding of coercive instruments and bodies. This is funding that could be spent in other areas, such as infrastructural development or education- both of which are associated with improving citizens perceptions of the government (529). Bell and Murdie (2018) and Lichbach (1987) largely agree with Young, however they add additional factors that determine the effects of repression. Bell and Murdie argue that repression only correlates with violence in countries with a history of civil war, due to the existing social organizations and knowledge of effective violent strategies to carry out violent protest (349). Lichbach’s model contains three propositions: 1) government repression affects group choices between violent and non-violent tactics 2) whether increased repression increases violent activities of dissidents depends on the opposing group’s overall efficacy in influencing government policy 3) accommodative and repressive policies that are inconsistent increase dissent.

Lichbach argues that it is the third proposition that is the most decisive factor in terms of the effect of repression. Gurr (2000:59) elucidates the link between accommodation and peace in divided societies that by granting differentiated status and rights, governments can avoid the excessive material and social costs associated with violence (Gurr, 2000: 59). Conversely, in “The Limits of Cultural Politics”, Barry critiques analyses of conflict that emphasise cultural difference, arguing that conflicts arise based on competition over unequal distribution of common goods (1998: 307).

Institutions, Modernisation, and Identification with the Nation-State

Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000:260) argue that antagonism and competition between groups take place within the framework of political institutions and therefore it is the responsibility of the entrusted bodies to prevent escalation. High quality institutions, that is, those that maintain rule of law, a rational bureaucracy, and freedom from government expropriation are best equipped to make accommodative adjustments successfully (Easterly and Levine, 1997). Good institutions improve prospects for sound economic management that sustains growth and ensures equal distribution of resources, and therefore reduces tension between factions competing for scant resources (261). In “Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernisation of Rural France (1870-1914)” (1979), Weber analyses how undeveloped parts of France was integrated into the modern world and the official culture of French urban centres (x). He emphasises how the “unity of mind and feeling” (95) required for a sense of nationhood was absent in France before the twentieth century. In fact, France was a deeply fragmented and multilingual society with many antagonisms between its rural and urban constituents (47).

For Weber, nation-building is a combination of institutions constructing a nation and exogenous shocks –the advent of the industrial revolution in this case (86). Upon gaining independence, many African states inherited economies and institutions that were underdeveloped and maladapted to

capitalist production or sustaining economic growth (Mabogunje: 2000: 6). As states attempted to mediate the economic implications of colonialism and moved towards more modernised economies and political institutions, there were hopes that national unity and identification with the nation-state would follow (Robinson, 2014). Where institutions fail and exogenous shocks prove insufficiently strong, there is weaker identification with the nation-state. Robinson's 2014 article cites classic modernisation theories, proponents of modernisation argue that the processes inherent in modernisation should inevitably lead to the demise of primordial factors such as religion and ethnicity (Fox, 2004: 716).

These processes include but are not limited to urbanisation, universal education, access to mass media, and industrialisation. Robinson's argument aligns with those made by Weber, she cites this text as the backbone of her argument, emphasizing that the political will to build a nation only succeeded in France once economic and political modernisation had occurred (2014: 737). Weber links industrialisation, education, and increased mobility due to the state's capacity to facilitate movement through infrastructural improvement. Once movement from the periphery to the core became an accessible reality, the French peasantry experienced an ideological shift, they were now exposed to diverse material conditions, mentalities, and a new political awareness that was shaped by incorporation into urban capitalism. Alongside this new awareness there was a sweeping linguistic transformation, French was associated with progress and modernity, and the tongue shared by rural emigres and urbanites (1976: 82). Widespread emigration, and the increasingly straightforward nature of commuting, gradually linked Paris, and other cities to the countryside.

Rejai and Enloe (1969: 155) call intrajurisdictional bonds – these include lines of communication, postal systems, and schools- as linkages that authorities governing over a non-nation-state can use

to construct a base to support nation-building. Weber also focuses on the role of schools and education in the development of national identity, in the late 1800s the French state doubled its budget for public instruction (309), built some 17 320 new schools and new roads to reach them, and made elementary education free (303-320). Schools planted symbols and concepts in their pupils' consciousness that would serve as "points of reference that straddled regional boundaries exactly as national patriotism was meant to do" (337). Education is often linked to weaker religious identification, much of the literature on this relationship posts that educational achievement impacts negatively on religious commitment (Albrecht & Heaton, 1984: 45).

Hypothesis

Based on Weber's arguments in *Peasants to Frenchmen* I hypothesize that the *Lenshina's* ideology lost its place in the collective imagination of rural Zambian society because of significant and irreversible changes to the external environment. From the 1930s onwards Zambia was one of the most urbanised countries in SSA due to (Macmillan, 1993:681). Following independence, rapid urbanisation spurred by increased and permanent emigration to from rural areas due to the end of the *chitupa* (colonial pass) laws that restricted Black migration, the policy of Zambianisation that increased opportunities for Blacks, and the manpower demands of the mining and manufacturing sectors (Silavwe, 1994: 241). Nevertheless, Zambian society did not become secularised, Christianity remained a large part of UNIP political discourse and public administration, the Catholic Church was regarded as an important "partner in development" (Hinfelaar, 2008: 132). It was sects and religious reformation movements that wished to antagonise the state that lost their support base.

Approach

This thesis uses Zambia as the object of what Lijphart refers to as a deviant case study (1971: 692). Zambia was chosen because it challenges the generalisations on violence and weak nationalism in SSA as well as certain aspects of modernisation theory. To explain what happened in Zambia this project will use explaining outcome process tracing, I first examined the existing literature to identify potential mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 63). I will follow this step by using empirical data to identify case-specific mechanisms and either confirm or deny my hypothesis. Due to the bureaucratic challenges that face developing states, particularly during periods of transition and the preliminary stages of nationhood, I will consider a broad range of documents as empirical evidence. Relatedly, due to time constraints and the limitations of archival research in developing countries, I am mostly analysing secondary sources. The information I am considering is also informed by Weber's account of French modernisation, this includes primary school enrolment rates, education funding in various parts of Zambia, literacy rates, emigration/ migration between Northern Province and the nearby cities of The Copperbelt, and employment rates.

To a lesser extent I will also carry out brief linguistic analyses of Kaunda's public speeches as he is considered the Father of the Nation, his words reflect his vision for the future of the Zambian Republic as well as his strategies to co-opt and shape the past.

Rhiannon Matthias
s2885670


Chapter 1: The Rise and Fall of the Lumpa Sect, the Beginning of Party Politics in Zambia, and the Significance of Repression

Situating the Lumpa Movement: The Grievances of the Peasantry and the UNIP's Struggle for Political Hegemony

The Lumpa Church has been labelled a peasant movement (Van Binsbergen), a Bemba nationalist organisation (Gordon, 2008: 73) and even a colonially backed farce that fit into the British divide and rule scheme (Burnell, 2005: 113). Allegations of colonial-backing are unsubstantiated by documentary evidence and will not be considered in this thesis. Instead, I analyse Lenshina's sect as a Bemba-based peasant movement that falls under the African Initiated Church (AIC) umbrella. AICs emerged at the turn of the twentieth century, their common *raison d'être* was the racial and gendered hierarchy upheld by European Christian Missions and their denigration of indigenous African beliefs (Kangwa, 2018). AICs were intersectional, anticolonial institutions that fused together three strands of experience –missionary Christianity, anti-sorcery sentiments that were part of indigenous belief systems, and the profound frustration of colonised Blacks (78). The sect was founded in the Bemba heartland by a Bemba woman and its scriptures and sermon were primarily elaborated in ChiBemba. The Bemba are the most numerous tribe in Zambia and were at the front-line of anti-colonial resistance in Northern Rhodesia (Henderson, 1975: 592). Nevertheless, the growth of the sect is not linked to rhetoric of Bemba supremacy. It was Lenshina's alleged ability to eradicate witchcraft, predict future events, and perform healing miracles (82).

Figure 4: Beresford, 1965

Tribal and Linguistic Map of Zambia



In its
1957
con-
stitu-
tion
The

Lumpa self-identifies as “non-racial, not a political party, and not opposed to the laws of the country” (Van Binsbergen, 1976: 120). Of course, the Lumpa’s eventual attempt at rural reconstruction and breaking away from the nation-state would violate both customary and common law. Lenshina’s transition from a rank-and-file member of the peasantry to renowned prophet is shrouded in mystery and skepticism, nonetheless, it is documented that it began with a near-death experience in 1953 after which she began receiving visions (Van Binsbergen, 1976: 118). Lenshina experienced an internal shift, separating herself from dominant ideas and questioning the legitimacy of hegemonic institutions. Since the establishment of Northern Rhodesia Africans across the territory sporadically resisted colonial rule, but protests intensified in 1953, when Britain established the Central African Federation (CAF) amidst widespread African opposition. The CAF centralised control over Northern and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) (Henderson, 1975). It was framed as an accommodating alternative that would provide a middle way

between fervent Black nationalism in the north and settler colonialism in the south, and gradually amplify the possibilities for Black political participation (Butler, 2008: 317).

Regardless of its stated aims, the contemporary African elite and several scholars denounced it as a strategy to keep White-dominated socio-political structure firmly intact for the near future, Africans in the North believed that the federation would be dominated by Southern Rhodesia and lead to further discrimination and segregation – the colour bar. These fears were validated when the Federal government mounted a proposal to take over the governance of “African affairs” from the government in London and began scaling back on African development (Rotberg, 1965: 311). This meant the potential dismantling of the already limited autonomy of African institutions and further limitations on African political representation. To understand the birth of UNIP, it is crucial to understand the grievances that plagued Africans in the urban and rural settings. Africans living in Lusaka, the cities of The Copperbelt, and areas with intensive agricultural activities embodied what Van Binsbergen refers to as intensive contact situation. This meant those that had frequent interactions with or even lived alongside Europeans, had developed a working knowledge, and understanding of capitalism, and a worldview that expanded beyond the local and rural levels (1976: 112). T

their vantage point meant that their feelings of alienation had additional dimensions, firstly, intensive contact meant more frequent experiences of discrimination and abuse. Their proximity to whiteness meant they had additional insights into the inequality of colonial society; they were aware that White labourers were paid significantly more and the education for Black children was rudimentary and limited compared to schools for non-Blacks (Phiri, 2019: 315). Following the Great Depression and the closure of several mines, the colonial government increased taxation on urban Africans by 50 percent to “encourage” them to return to the villages. During this period, welfare

associations of African intellectuals were established (see Hooker, 1966), and several unsuccessful labour strikes broke out on The Copperbelt. Although the grievances of African miners were not addressed following the strike, this failed resistance and the looming threat of the federation galvanised cooperation between welfare associations and labourers on The Copperbelt from the 1940s onwards (Henderson, 1970: 594). It was from welfare associations that early party leaders rose to prominence, the first party the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1948.

For Rhodesians outside of situations of intensive contact, racial hierarchisation was less prominent, the more salient manifestations of racism that had mobilised the urban nationalist movement played out within the framework of capitalist production which most of the peasantry were excluded from (Van Binsbergen, 1976: 114). Nonetheless, the imposition of taxation in these areas and the displacement of natives from fertile land forced some Northern peasants to emigrate to mining towns to work on colonial infrastructural projects (Phiri, 2019: 311). Therefore, the peasantry was not completely removed from capitalism and had been exposed to urban nationalist sentiments. For those that did not emigrate to or become familiar with the narratives of injustice from other emigres, the Christian Missions replicated the intensive contact situation even in remote areas (1976: 112). Missions were formalised and bureaucratic in nature, they held exclusive control over land rights, the distribution of certain supplies, education, and consequently upheld the racist hierarchy where Africans were second-class citizens.

At the Lubwa mission in Chinsali many missionaries supported racial segregation and during Holy Communion, Europeans were offered before Africans (Kangwa, 2018: 80). Missions were underpinned by colonial condemnation of indigenous belief systems and authority figures, chiefs, once

the centre of rural power structures, customs, and laws, were now subordinate officers in the colonial hierarchy (81). Colonial authorities appointed individuals with no traditional legitimacy, whose appointment was tainted due to its orientation around the colonial taxation and labour regimes (Ferguson, 1990: 390). Relatedly, native courts became ceremonial institutions with limited authority, notably they could not try Europeans, (Hoover, Piper, and Spalding, 2003: 53). The Witchcraft Ordinance was passed in 1914, this law banned the inditement and prosecution of alleged witches, regarding the practice as inhumane and anachronistic (Phiri, 2019: 313). However, as shown by Lenshina's ability to rapidly attract followers based on her alleged ability to eradicate witchcraft, it remained a major concern for those in rural areas (Van Binsbergen, 1976: 112). Implementing a ban on witchcraft trials and christianising the rural peasantry without the complementary modernising influences such as progressive education did not diminish belief in witchcraft or other indigenous practices. Instead, it created widespread resentment and an ideological and political vacuum that was easily filled by Lenshina's sect.

Figure 5: The British Empire, n..d



Political Parties versus AICs: Coercion and the Struggle for Legitimacy

The significance of spirituality in rural anti-colonial attitudes and activism was also reflected in the growth of the Watchtower- the first AIC- across villages in Northern Rhodesia. Coercive attempts were made by the colonial and UNIP regime to incorporate these sects into political activities (Assimeng, 1970: 97). In this regard, the Lumpa sect is comparable to Watchtower, as neither identified with any form of secular authority, and their UNIP represented a battle between religious sectarianism and secular nationalism Van Binsbergen, 1976: 124). For those that formed part of religious sects, their struggle was multifaceted. It meant simultaneously resisting the repression of the colonial regime and attacks from UNIP cadres over their refusal to register as voters or join the party. In Lumpa discourse, parallels were drawn between *vitupa* that Africans were required to carry, hut tax and the voter cards and party membership fees, both of which were an alternate form of identity that expressed and projected UNIP authority in place of the colonial administration (Gordon, 2008: 53). The North was dominated by UNIP, therefore a subversive movement's wholesale demonisation of the party was particularly detrimental as the 1964 elections grew closer.

UNIP was formed after radical members of the ANC broke away due to dissatisfaction with Nkumbula's leadership (see Kalusa, 2011: 67). From its inception UNIP faced unbending opposition from the ANC and threats from settler and Federal authorities that wished to crush African nationalist ambitions (68). UNIP performed poorly in the 1962 15-15-15 elections, local UNIP branches were determined to eliminate support for UNIP's main African rival, particularly as it showed signs of limited but increasing support in the Northern Province. Despite the threat posed by the ANC there was little violence between UNIP and ANC factions in the years leading up to the 1964 election. Burnell argues that this was due to their common opposition to the CAF and White minority rule (2005: 112), and the North-South binary that meant they were not competing

for the same rural constituents. Instead, UNIP cadres resorted to violence and intimidation against the Lumpa, burning down Lumpa churches, assaulting Lenshina's followers and forcing them to register as voters (Gordon, 2008: 51). The escalating climate of violence led some ANC supporters, and those that abstained from voting for religious reasons to purchase voter cards as a means of personal protection (52).

On the one hand, voting was an alien concept for most villagers as few met the voter criteria established by the Federation government (Kalusa, 2014: 67). On the other hand, UNIP's use of violence to secure votes does not equate to genuine support for party ideology or policy. UNIP's constant intimidation led the party to be associated with darkness and tyranny in the eyes of the Lumpa, and Lenshina's teachings that used light (*ulubuto*) and individual freedom legitimised the Manichean good-evil dichotomy within the religion (Gordon, 2008: 75; see Hinfelaar, 1991). Lenshina's followers living in UNIP strongholds began evacuating their home villages and setting up independent settlements in 1963 (56). In line with Lichbach's propositions (1987:287), UNIP adopted coercive measures before there was violent opposition by the Lumpa, and as a result the sect became more insular and defiant. The repressive tactics used to neutralise the sect's threat to UNIP's political dominance escalated tensions between the two groups. Granted, Lumpa settlements violated customary and common law, the sect was appropriating land that belonged to the chiefdom and resisting colonial hut tax (Munga, 2016: 6).

The end of a Movement: A case of Successful Repression?

On several occasions, sect members resisted – at times violently- repatriation attempts and settlements continued to grow in the years preceding the 1964 election. UNIP's determination to weaken the sect was both a struggle for a positional advantage politically and ideologically in the home

province of several of the party's founding members. Gordon (2008:47) argues that UNIP demonstrated similar fanaticism to the Lumpas, as well as and a messianic worldview through which they were the only true rulers of the Zambia nation and their party the only legitimate embodiment of the nation (Kalusa, 2011:68). The bedlam of 1964 provided an ideal pretext for the banning of the sect and erasing all traces of its existence, the Kamutola Church in Kasama was knocked down in 1972. Kaunda explicitly warned "to those evil people, if you are so ugly and barbaric in your actions that you are ashamed to operate in the open, then by all means go underground in peace, but do not raise your ugly heads." (Pettman, 1974: 243). Indeed, the Lumpa Sect remained underground, the only documented attempt at revising UNIP's rendition of the violence was a hand-scrawled note sent by Lenshina's son to the British Prime Minister in 1968.

The note read: [...] the ferocious UNIP leaders called at [sic] troops of soldiers, who went through the sect villages under the guidance of UNIP members. Mercilessly, uncountable people of the sect were shot to death. Some were left orphans while others were widows and widowers. At the sect headquarters (Sion), almost everyone was killed. The leader of the sect (Alice Lenshina) and a few of the members were [sic] survived. The survivors had to spend many days into [sic] the wilderness (Gewald, Hinfelaar, and Macola, 2008: 9). The effective silencing and erasure of a powerful movement by a new regime appears to validate the use of repression. Rather than exalting repression as a panacea for weak nationalism, firstly the Lumpa was a rural movement that did not have the organisational capacity to withstand violence from the state. It is debatable whether the Zambian state would have withstood an urban-based movement of a comparable size. UNIP's ability to drive the movement underground is best explained by looking at the particularities of many of the grievances that led to Lenshina becoming a prominent force in Northern politics - widespread discontent over colonial rule and colonial restrictions on indigenous beliefs.

The changes in low contact scenarios meant that Blacks had the same citizenship entitlements as the few Whites that received preferential treatment in all facets of life. It is plausible that the sect lost its main *raison d'être* after direct colonial control over rural lives and gatekeeping within religion ended following independence. At the same time, the fight against colonial rule was still taking place in some neighbouring states therefore there could have been cross-fertilisation between the Lumpa and rebels in border provinces. The more concrete negation of this idea is the fact that the faith grew in exile in a postcolonial environment (Gordon, 2008: 79). For example, when the Congolese government under pressure from Kaunda, issued an ultimatum to Lumpas near the border to either return to Zambia or move to a location deeper in The Congo, many chose the latter so they could continue to practice their faith (74). Those that agreed to return to Zambia were forcefully separated into smaller groups and sent to different villages in Northern and Eastern Province, they continued to pray in clandestine gatherings. It was not possible for the state to surveil and prosecute thousands of people, but Lenshina and most of the church's synod were kept in life-long restriction.

There was no space for group-specific justice claims in the new republic, Kaunda focused on a universal history of injustice and marginalisation as Black colonial subjects. Zambia's status as a frontline state in the fight against White minority rule provided an additional platform on which to promote a homogenised narrative of universal suffering, and a sense of duty amongst the Zambian population to fight for the liberation of others (Scarrit, 1987: 154). Kaunda fomented a common identity based on a shared history of oppression and situated the Lumpa's fate alongside widespread colonial abuses – after all it was the colonial army that fired the shots- all the while erasing any notions of UNIP' culpability. As the country's first Black head of state, he was considered a champion of the people, it is likely that his legacy as a freedom fighter also exempted him from accusations of carrying out violence against some of the most downtrodden members of society.

Rhiannon Matthias
s2885670

The decolonisation of several states in the region and the rise of a collective Black consciousness can be seen as exogenous shocks that united the Zambian populace. Therefore, repressive measures were not sufficient factors in unifying the Zambian population, it was the broader socio-political context that favoured UNIP's co-optation of the Lumpa Massacre.

Rhiannon Matthias
s2885670

Chapter 2: The Need for Modernisation, the First National Development Plan (FNDP), and Weberian Nation-Building in Zambia

The State in The Immediate Post-Colonial Period

When Zambia gained independence 24 October 1964, it bore the psychosocial scars and physical scars of violence and the militancy of some factions in pre-independence society was a concern for the new government. There is evidence that parts of Northern Zambia dealt with negative economic implications because of the Church-State conflict(s), the state immediately intervened to provide security, food, and shelter to those that had been affected (Munga, 2016: iv). There were also measures taken to revamp agricultural production in areas where it had all but ceased due to the conflict. This was a crucial step because The Lumpa movement grew in conditions of widespread illiteracy, land poverty, and its growth was symbiotic to wider conditions of hostility and insecurity. Undoubtedly, the period of singularity that saw the growth of Lenshina's sect would not be repeated, and the racial injustices of the colonial regime remained in the recent past. To ameliorate the legacy of colonial rule that affected all the government prioritised universal access to public services and same economic opportunities based on their equal value as human beings.

Power and resources in the new republic were to be shared between the different ethnolinguistic groups through the implementation of ethnic balancing throughout state institutions (Lindemann, 2011: 16). This strategy was so pervasive that within the national defence a quota system was introduced to ensure that had recruits from each of the nine provinces (14). It contained a specific

form of “positive discrimination” when it came to the position of vice-president, this was unofficially reserved for candidates from smaller ethnic groups (Sishuwa, 2019). The first UNIP Government had four Bemba speakers (including Dr Kaunda himself), four Lozi, three Nyanja speakers from the Eastern Province, two Tonga, and one Soli (Hall, 1969). Other measures to de-emphasize difference included the adoption of English as the official language, linguistic affinity is necessary for communication and mobilisation in a multilingual state (Dresang, 1974:165). UNIP outlawed opposing organisations and the eventual establishment of a one-party state in 1973. One of the recurring justifications for eliminating multiparty politics was the risk political disintegration because of competitive parties developing along tribal or regional cleavages and the need to mobilise people and resources for development (Pettman, 1974: 232).

These claims can be interpreted as another example of Kaunda and UNIP’s despotic nature, but it is also true that UNIP inherited a “crisis of expectations” (Dall, 1989:10) and was under immense pressure to deliver, partially as a means of inducing historical amnesia amongst former adversaries. UNIP’s co-optation of alternative identities and consolidation of its narrative of national unity were complemented and bolstered by a nationwide developmentalist agenda that sought to overturn the economic legacy of settler colonialism (Gewald, Hinfelaar, and Macola: 2008: 11). Colonies experienced economic growth and infrastructural development, but the indigenous colonial population did not reap the benefits of these changes. Infrastructure was designed to facilitate the extraction and export of primary commodities and only a marginal amount of the wealth generated in the colony was re-invested into the welfare and advancement of the non-White population (Mabogunje, 2000: 1). Zambia’s main railway passes through the provinces that were the backbone of the colonial economy and these were the provinces with the highest indications of economic development (Dresang, 1974: 162). Provinces that did not have mining or agricultural potential,

or border other states under British dominion were all but neglected in terms of infrastructural development, therefore, there were high levels of regional inequality.

Colonial education policy also undermined Zambia's economic potential due to its negligence towards Black education illiteracy was the norm, according to the 1963 census, 76.6% of men and 95.6% of women were illiterate. Most of the rural population had no formal education whatsoever, only 15% of men and 3% of women had more than four years of primary education across rural Zambia. By 1964, 1200 Zambians had obtained secondary school certificates, and 100 had university degrees, the estimated workforce requirements stood at t 23,400 secondary certificates and 5,6000 university graduates (Alexander, 1983: 205-6).

The FNDP: Key Components, Successes, and Limitations

Part of the incompatibility between UNIP and the Lumpa were their stances on the kind of society conducive to African advancement and freedom. In many ways, Lenshina was retrogressive, her activism was vying for aspects of the precolonial past with the village and rural reconstruction, whilst Kaunda was progressive and focused on modernisation and urban development (Hinfelaar, 1991: 104). The erasure of the Lumpa faith can be analysed from an interactionist perspective, considering societal changes that created an inhospitable external climate for its survival and replication. Factors, that include but also transcend political repression and fear and amounted to a partial redress of past grievances and led to irreversible long-term changes in Zambian society (Bromley & Hammond, 1987). In areas that were once Lumpa villages, the already bleak educational outcomes were exacerbated by the fact that children of sect members either stopped attending or were excluded due to their beliefs (Munga, 2016: 20). It is plausible that if the Lumpa, and other potentially subversive rural movements were to be driven underground, there was a need to

fundamentally transform rural Zambia and incorporate the rural peasantry into the new nation-state.

It is necessary to point out that much of the academic literature on Zambia's post-colonial economy focuses on the economic downturn that began during the mid-1970s, the economic burdens of Zambia's frontline state status and subsequent economic liberalisation that undid the projects of UNIP during the First Republic (6). Nevertheless, the FNDP allocated \$410 528 (then \$50 400, or 360 000 000 Kwacha) to achieve the following goals: 1) increase per capita income from K120-200 by 1970 2) increase employment from 300 000 to 400 000 by 1970 3) diversify the economy from mineral production to agriculture 4) Increase opportunities for education and training (Dall, 1989: 14). The incumbent party spent an unprecedented portion of the national budget on education as part of the FNDP in order increase opportunities for education and vocational training and as part of Kaunda's wider goal of zambianisation. Zambianisation refers to generating a workforce that reflected national demographics by reducing dependence on foreign expertise and reconfiguring corporate structures so that Blacks were no longer underrepresented in senior roles (Burawoy, 2014). The specific educational targets for the four-year period were to achieve universal primary education, increase progression rates to secondary education, and promote equitable access to tertiary education (Dall, 1989: 14).

Weber himself advocates the importance of education in consolidating and articulating national identity. Schools help shape "individuals to fit into societies and cultures broader than their own and [to persuade] them that these broader realms are their own" (1976: 331). In expanding education, UNIP could inculcate the masses with their values and conception of national identity, UNIP promoted the values of equity, tolerance, and community help as being inherent in the African psyche and juxtaposed them with Western individualism (Dall, 1989: 14) Educational facilities

were expanded significantly under the FNDP, rural self-help schemes were introduced that involved entire communities in the construction of school infrastructure. Staff were recruited from the cities, there were even plans to introduce mobile libraries to encourage literacy in rural areas (15). By 1970 58% of school-age children enrolled in the first grade by 1970, all primary-school children in urban areas would complete this phase of their education, 75% of children in rural schools would complete the first four years of primary education and a third of primary school graduates nation-wide progressed to the next phase of their education (16).

Table 1 (Dresang, 1974: 164)

Table 1 (Dresang, 1974: 163)

Province	Planned Expenditures (in Kwacha)	Actual Expenditures Up to Dec. 31, 1969 (in Kwacha)	Planned Expenditures Per School Age Child 1969 (in Kwacha)	Actual Expenditures Per School Age Child 1969 (in Kwacha)	1964		1967		1969	
					No. of Students	% of School Age Pop. in School	No. of Students	% of School Age Pop. in School	No. of Students	% of School Age Pop. in School
Copperbelt	5,247,000	140,000 ^a	23.8	0.6 ^a	82,645	56	116,005	61	135,594	62
Central	4,399,000	3,062,000	22.8	15.8	55,199	41	169,440	50	105,395	55
Southern	1,739,000	719,000	12.9	5.4	60,722	48	82,505	63	96,165	68
Luapula	1,882,000	998,000	20.7	11.0	33,535	35	47,164	51	58,828	65
Northern	3,401,000	1,797,000	23.8	12.2	50,316	33	75,583	51	94,379	64
Western	2,149,000	1,549,000	19.4	13.9	38,151	38	50,176	48	63,736	58
North-Western	1,273,000	839,000	20.3	13.4	15,360	27	23,278	39	29,948	47
Eastern	3,058,000	986,000	22.2	7.2	42,711	52	60,657	53	77,236	56
Total	24,148,000	10,090,000	22.0	5.0	378,639	42	539,353	53	661,281	60

Northern and Western were the rural provinces that received the highest amount of funding and there were exponential changes in the percentage of school attendance (Table 1). Despite these achievements, UNIP's educational reform was limited by poor management and administrative

support, those in charge were mostly ex-teachers that did not have prior experience in project-management. Due to the ambitiousness of the plan, administration staff were deeply overwhelmed and unable to meet demands in a timely fashion (Dall, 1989: 17). Rural areas were beneficiaries of this plan, but their progression rates were significantly lower than in urban areas and it was impossible to retain urban educational staff due to the living conditions in most of these areas (19). Rural development centred on agricultural intensification and innovation, Alexander (1989) argues that agriculture was the lifeline of rural regeneration, an imperative aspect of economic growth and national wellbeing. UNIP established farming collectives as a way of incorporating the rural peasantry into the modern nation-state. Cooperatives received modern farming implements and state support, incentivising their cohesion to the new nation (Bowman, 2011).

Cooperatives eventually became part of a wider “Go Back to the Land” campaign (Kanduza, 1989: 24), UNIP hoped to slow the rates of rural-urban migration and absorb surplus labour in line with the FNDP, by including small-scale producers in economic activities that were previously inaccessible (Bowman, 2011: 208). The number of farming collectives grew from 100 in 1964 to 1000 in 1969, they were obliged to include “as many people as the project could carry”. More manpower did not lead to increased agricultural output, the target of a 9% increase by 1970 was not met, agricultural growth averaged at 3.3%, nor did it make farming more lucrative or attractive to villagers (218). The collectivisation of agriculture and attempts to deal with urban overpopulation were denounced by some as forceful impositions by the state, limiting the options for Zambians in the same way the colonial state had with its Northern Rhodesian subjects (Kanduza, 1989: 24). The broader expansion of basic services into rural areas was limited in relation to urban areas, however when contrasted with the negligence of the colonial state there was some progress. Ultimately, the redistributive policies of UNIP were part of the politics of survival of the party-state.

This meant that urban areas, the historical hubs for political unrest were always prioritised (Dall, 1989: 15), and regional inequality was not lessened by the FNDP (see Table 2).

Table 2 (Dresang, 1974: 163)

Province	Development Expenditures up to 31 Dec. 1971	Per Capita Expenditures up to 31 Dec. 1971	Development Expenditures Total Estimated Cost	Per Capita Total Estimated Cost
Copperbelt	1,579,000	2.90	9,124,000	16.78
Central	5,410,000	10.71	9,430,000	18.66
Southern	4,236,000	9.09	10,078,100	21.63
Luapula	4,860,000	10.81	10,166,000	28.48
Northern	5,152,000	9.12	9,991,000	17.71
Western	5,784,000	15.93	11,185,000	30.81
North-Western	3,761,000	13.09	7,866,000	37.28
Eastern	4,795,000	9.99	10,123,000	21.09

The Significance of Rural-Urban Migration

	(%)			
	Population Growth		Growth Rate Due to Migration	
	1963-69	1969-80	1963-69	1969-80
Lusaka*	13.4	6.7	10.9	3.6
Kitwe	8.4	3.2	5.9	0.1
Ndola	9.5	4.1	7.0	1.0
Mufulira	5.0	2.3	2.5	-0.8
Chingola	9.6	2.1	7.1	-1.0
Luanshya	4.2	1.5	1.7	-1.6
Kabwe	8.9	6.2	6.4	3.1
Livingstone	5.4	2.8	2.9	-0.3
Chililabombwe	4.6	2.1	2.1	-1.0
Kalulushi	7.2	4.7	4.7	1.6

Table 3 (Ogura, 1991: 149)

Although UNIP's rural development initiatives marked a break with historical patterns of neglect, nevertheless, rural-urban migration intensified because Africans now had freedom of movement,

this transformed migration in the qualitative and quantitative sense (see Table 3). Colonial migration from Northern Province to The Copperbelt was mostly circular in nature and migrants were young males (Ogura, 1991: 149). A 1971 survey carried out with mineworkers in Kitwe revealed that 93% of married miners lived with their families, compared with 46% in 1947 – showing a clear shift in postcolonial migration patterns (152). The duration and gender dynamics of migration also changed (see Table 4). Ogura demonstrates a positive correlation between school attendance amongst women and girls and migration from the periphery to the core (1991: 150), more female migrants moved to cities to join their husbands, than to continue their education or find work, Increasing numbers of Zambians were drawn to The Copperbelt by the policy of Zambianisation, they were permanently migrating to urban centres, due to the limited educational and employment opportunities in rural settings, in part because of the failure of collectivisation and education reform many were drawn to urban centres.

Table 4 (Ogura, 1991: 150)

Table 4 (Ogura, 1991:150)

	1960	1963	1969	1980
Zambia	—	98.5	96.0	96.2
Lusaka	122.4	161.4	110.8	105.5
Kitwe	126.3	134.7	—	107.1
Ndola	125.8	127.2	112.0	106.9

Migrants still retained ties to their home villages (Ogura, 1991: 160), but they were exposed to diverse material conditions, mentalities, and a new political awareness that was shaped by incorporation into urban capitalism (Weber, 1979: 1). It is unclear how far they broke away from rural

belief systems, but the need to sustain themselves and their families in a highly competitive environment with few safety guarantees may have diminished the practice of certain rituals and customs. Life was no longer a battle against the evils of witchcraft, it was a battle of adaptation and survival in a new setting. Whilst village life was organised around kinship with individuals from a few families, a single language and a single culture, migrants were now living alongside people from various parts of the country. All Zambians had been exposed to varying degrees and aspects of capitalist production under the colonial regime, however, becoming part of the workforce in the new republic was vastly different from the forced proletarianisation that characterised the colonial labour regime (Silavwe, 1994: 242). Emigres were now fully proletarianised, permanently urbaned, and part of a settling Black working class (Ferguson, 1990:385), Blacks now exercised more agency over their own destiny and circumstances and many were beneficiaries of intentional government policy.

Robinson mentions the importance of policy in fomenting identification with the nation-state (2014: 737), by implementing policies that centred around the creation of opportunities, UNIP was seen as supporting the interests of all Zambians. This perception may have been enhanced by the historical specificities of the party's rise to power, specifically its succession from the colonial regime that hoarded opportunities and resources and reserved them for settlers, and the small Black elite. Therefore, UNIP's exercise of power and past implication in violence were not problematised by the majority of the population, for whom voting, access to healthcare and education, and freedom of movement, represented drastic improvements. UNIP's FNDP was able to provide many of the common goods, that rural cults of affliction did not have the intention or capacity of providing. Witnessing and experiencing the successes of UNIP policy and seeing the fall of the Lumpa in 1964, undoubtedly reduced the appeal of the movement, and the appeal of subversive activities in general. These changes were so significant that even after a return to democratic governance in the

1990s, a reformed Lumpa Church emerged, but remains small, marginal, and of minimal concern to the state (Gordon, 2008: 75)

Conclusion

Zambia's First Republic represents a triumph of policies of intolerance and repression with a limited form of inclusiveness, and widespread economic transformation. This approach, as discussed in this thesis, was the continuation and broader articulation of the tactics UNIP employed during the late colonial period to guarantee its success and survival as an organisation. What had changed, was the pressure facing the regime to consolidate its legitimacy, force and coercion were not enough, performance was crucial to the party's legitimacy and the legitimacy of its "One Zambia, One Nation" narrative. Material conditions needed to change drastically, if sectarianism would remain a thing of the recent past. UNIP implemented some accommodative policies, notably, it was committed to ethnic balancing and avoiding the dominance of the Bemba tribe. However, there was no recognition of alternative identities that were subversive in nature. Several African regimes adopted similar strategies, fusing coercion and obligation with positive economic incentives, what distinguishes Zambia is the success of the First Republic following its turbulent and violent coming of age story.

The levels of violence against civilians from the country's main ethnic group theoretically paved the way for a future of reprisals, violence, and identity-based justice claims. Zambia escaped this fate, by what I argue is a combination of ambitious and inclusive policy, and a historical context that prevented the failures of said policies from weakening national cohesion. Relatedly,

it was the anomalous nature of the Lumpa Sect, as a movement started by an individual in a remote and sparsely populated corner of the country that kept this movement underground and out of discussions of conceptions of justice during the First Republic. I believe that due to the transitional context, UNIP was also able to frame the Lumpa conflict as both a colonial atrocity, and a clear example of the dangers of any form of sectarianism for the new state. Thus, the question of accountability did not concern them, especially as most of the adherents were either killed, exiled, or in hiding. However, had similar levels of violence been used against an urban-based movement I do not believe - based on the the nature of political action during the independence struggle- that repression and silence would have been sufficient in preventing a resurgence of violence and subversive ideas.

Additionally, the Lumpa sect's legitimacy and moral authority would have invariably been undermined and phased out by the increasing levels of emigration to urban centres (Burnell, 2005: 113). Even if Lumpa adherents chose not to migrate, their contact with other villagers would have exposed them to modern technologies and the new social arrangements that were essential to rural development in the new Zambia. Whilst slogans and ideology are not a sturdy foundation on which to build a nation, the effective consolidation of these components consolidates the notion of "One Zambia, One Nation". Therefore, in considering the persistence of civil and democratic peace in contemporary Zambia, an evaluation of the First Republic, its unique challenges –unique in terms of Zambian history- and the ways these stereotypical obstacles to peace were avoided. Doing this could go a long way in reformulating understandings of Zambian history, but more broadly, it also breaks with stereotypes of Sub-Saharan Africa as a region and framings of heterogeneity as a risk factor for conflict.

Bibliography

Albrecht, S., & Heaton, T. (1984). Secularization, Higher Education, and Religiosity. *Review Of Religious Research*, 26(1), 43. doi: 10.2307/3511041

Rhiannon Matthias
s2885670

Alexander, D. (1983). Problems of educational reform in Zambia. *International Journal Of Educational Development*, 3(2), 203-222. doi: 10.1016/0738-0593(83)90026-3

Assimeng, J. (1970). Sectarian Allegiance & Political Authority: the Watch Tower Society in Zambia, 1907-35. *The Journal Of Modern African Studies*, 8(1), 97-112. doi: 10.1017/s0022278x00019376

Azam, J. (2000). *Civil Peace and Commitment to Ethno-Regional Redistribution in Africa*, [Ebook] (pp. 1-3, 6). Paris: World Bank. Retrieved from https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/760221468741349093/820140748_2004041400400457/additional/28754.pdf

Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. (2013). *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (1st ed., pp. 63-65). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Beresford, W. (1965). *Tribal and Linguistic Societies of Zambia* [Image]. Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/content/qt0j58j1nz/qt0j58j1nz_no-Splash_722fa5535e1db42b1e78e8f041f9aa2d.pdf

Burawoy, M. (2014). The Colour of Class Revisited: Four Decades of Postcolonialism in Zambia. *Journal Of Southern African Studies*, 40(5), 961-979. doi: 10.1080/03057070.2014.946213

Burnell, P. (2005). From low-conflict polity to democratic civil peace: Explaining Zambian exceptionalism. *African Studies*, 64(2), 107-133. doi: 10.1080/00020180500355470

Collier, P., Elliot, V., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynol-Querrol, M., & Sambanis, N. (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Democracy* (pp. 113-5). Washington, DC: World Bank.

Dall, F. (1989). *Confronting the Basic Education Crisis: The Zambian Dilemma* [Ebook] (pp. 1-36). Cambridge: Harvard University. Retrieved from https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABI700.pdf

Davenport, C. (2007). State Repression and Political Order. *Annual Review Of Political Science*, 10(1), 1-23. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216

Dawson, J. (2018). 'Satan's bloody claws': how religious persecution, exile and radicalisation moulded British Protestant identities. *Scottish Journal Of Theology*, 71(3), 267-286. doi: 10.1017/s0036930618000327

Rhiannon Matthias
s2885670

Dresang, D. (1974). Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambian Case. *American Political Science Review*, 68(4), 165-177. doi: 10.2307/1959945

Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997). Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. *The Quarterly Journal Of Economics*, 112(4), 1203-1250. doi: 10.1162/003355300555466

Elbadawi, I., & Sambanis, N. (2000). Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict. *Journal Of African Economics*, 9(3), 244-269. doi: 10.1093/jae/9.3.244

Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2000). Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity. *International Organization*, 54(4), 845-877. doi: 10.1162/002081800551398

Ferguson, J. (1990). Mobile workers, modernist narratives: a critique of the historiography of transition on the Zambian copperbelt[part one]. *Journal Of Southern African Studies*, 16(3), 385-412. doi: 10.1080/03057079008708243

Fox, J. (2004). The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001. *Journal Of Peace Research*, 41(6), 715-731. doi: 10.1177/0022343304047434

Gordon, D. (2008). Rebellion or massacre? The UNIP-Lumpa conflict revisited. In J. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar & G. Macola, *One Zambia, many histories: towards a history of post-colonial Zambia* (pp. 46-48). Leiden: Brill. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/20391>

Gurr, T. (2000). Ethnic Warfare on the Wane. *Foreign Affairs*, 79(3), 52. doi: 10.2307/20049729

Henderson, I. (1970). The Origins of Nationalism in East and Central Africa: The Zambian Case. *The Journal Of African History*, 11(4), 591-603. doi: 10.1017/s0021853700010471

Henderson, I. (1975). Early African leadership: the Copperbelt disturbances of 1935 and 1940. *Journal Of Southern African Studies*, 2(1), 83-97. doi: 10.1080/03057077508707944

Hinfelaar, H. (1991). Women's Revolt: the Lumpa Church of Lenshina Mulenga in the 1950s. *Journal Of Religion In Africa*, 21(2), 99-129. doi: 10.1163/157006691x00258

Hoover, E., Piper, J., & Spalding, F. (1970). One Nation, One Judiciary: The Lower Courts of Zambia. *Zambia Law Journal*, 2(1-2), 47-67.

Rhiannon Matthias
s2885670

Kalusa, W. (2011). The Killing of Lilian Margaret Burton and Black and White Nationalisms in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) in the 1960s. *Journal Of Southern African Studies*, 37(1), 63-77. doi: 10.1080/03057070.2011.552544

Kanduza, A. (1989). Towards a History of Ideas in Zambia. *Transafrican Journal Of History*, 19, 24-42. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24328673>

Kangwa, J. (2018). Prophecy, Divination and Gender Justice in the Lumpa Church in Zambia. *Feminist Theology*, 27(1), 75-92. doi: 10.1177/0966735018794485

Kashimani, E. (1991). Zambia: The Disintegration of the Nationalist Coalitions in UNIP and the Imposition of a One-Party State. *Transafrican Journal Of History*, 24, 23-69. Retrieved from <http://JSTOR>

Lichbach, M. (1987). Deterrence or Escalation?. *Journal Of Conflict Resolution*, 31(2), 266-297. doi: 10.1177/0022002787031002003

Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *The American Political Science Review*, 65(3), 692. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1955513>

MacMillan, H. (1993). The Historiography of Transition on the Zambian Copperbelt — Another View. *Journal Of Southern African Studies*, 19(4), 681-712. doi: 10.1080/03057079308708379

Macola, G. (2008). Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the roots of authoritarianism in nationalist Zambia. In J. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar & G. Macola, *One Zambia, many histories: towards a history of post-colonial Zambia*. Leiden: Brill.

Maps Zambia. *Map of Northern Province Zambia* [Image]. Retrieved from <https://maps-zambia.com/map-of-northern-province-zambia>

Munga, E. (2016). *The Economic Impact of the Lumpa Church in Lundazi* (Master). University of Zambia.

Northern Rhodesia Police Association. *Lenshina in Police Custody* [Image]. Retrieved from http://www.nrpa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Lumpa_22.jpg

Ogura, M. (1991). RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION IN ZAMBIA AND MIGRANT TIES TO HOME VILLAGES. *The Developing Economies*, 29(2), 145-165. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-1049.1991.tb00204.x

Pettman, J. (1974). Zambia's Second Republic —the Establishment of a One-Party State. *The Journal Of Modern African Studies*, 12(2), 231-244. doi: 10.1017/s0022278x00009228

Rhiannon Matthias
s2885670

Phiri, J. (2019). How race and law influenced activities in Northern Rhodesia. *African Identities*, 17(3-4), 310-320. doi: 10.1080/14725843.2019.1693336

Posner, D. (2003). The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Cleavages: The Case of Linguistic Divisions in Zambia. *Comparative Politics*, 35(2), 127. doi: 10.2307/4150148

Posner, D. (2004). The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4), 529-545. doi: 10.1017/s0003055404041334

Rejai, M., & Enloe, C. (1969). Nation-States and State-Nations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 13(2), 140. doi: 10.2307/3013942

Rejai, M., & Enloe, C. (1969). Nation-States and State-Nations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 13(2), 155. doi: 10.2307/3013942

Samoff, J. (1993). The Reconstruction of Schooling in Africa. *Comparative Education Review*, 37(2), 181-222. doi: 10.1086/447181

Scarritt, J. (1987). President Kenneth Kaunda's Annual Address to the Zambian National Assembly: a Contextual Content Analysis of Changing Rhetoric, 1965-83. *The Journal Of Modern African Studies*, 25(1), 149-157. doi: 10.1017/s0022278x00007655

Silavwe, G. (1994). Effects of Rural-Urban Migration on Urban Housing in Zambia. *Housing*, 61(366/367), 240-246. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43623181>

van Binsbergen, W. (1976). Religions Innovation and Political Conflict in Zambia: A Contribution to the Interpretation of the Lumpa Rising. *African Perspectives*, (2), 101 - 135. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/1887/8924>

Weber, E. (1976). *Peasants into Frenchmen*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.