State, civil society and deforestation in Brazil: clash of positions

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Introduction

'Half of humanity is in the danger zone from floods, droughts, extreme storms and wildfires. No nation is immune. Yet we continue to feed our fossil fuel addiction. (…) We have a choice. Collective action or collective suicide' said United Nations (UN) Secretary- General António Guterres at the Petersberg Climate Dialogue in response to the current climate crisis and the lack of action by governments to mitigate climate change July 18, 2022 (UN 2022). The consequences of climate change are caused by humans and the way we use natural resources is at the root of the problem. It is therefore logical that the public and the UN are calling on governments to take responsibility to mitigate climate change. And during the last United Nations Climate Change Conference 2021 (COP26) many states agreed multilaterally to implement mitigation and adaptation policies to combat climate change. Several agreements were made, such as the declaration to end deforestation by 2030 endorsed by 145 countries, (UKCOP26 2021). Among which were, surprisingly, countries notorious for their high deforestation rates such as Brazil. As especially since the current President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-) has been in office deforestation rates has accelerated, and every year since then has registered a new record of deforestation.

But what makes such implementation of such agreements complicated is that within the states there are divergent interests, placing the international agreements against the interests of its society. Those countries and the populations want economic growth that often goes hand in hand, particularly in the Global South, with the extraction of natural resources which is precisely one of the main causes of the climate crisis. In addition, there are different wishes within the society in those countries people want to see improvement of their standard of living, the elites want more profit, and different interests within the government of a country, and this clashes very much with the implementation of climate policy that is necessary to somewhat mitigate the crisis. Apart from this, there are, of course, also those in the society for who it is in their advantage to combat deforestation and resource extraction, such as indigenous peoples. Creating support among the entire population is thus challenging, placing those states in a difficult position to effectively act to combat climate change. In addition, it can be questioned to which extend the government wishes to mitigate climate change or whether it is just about appearances. For Brazil to have signed the declaration to end deforestation does not mean anything then, as for the other states. Even so, it should not

diminish the attention given to the importance of forests for our planet and against climate change, which makes Brazil for having 70 per cent of the Amazon, the biggest rainforest in the world, on its territory an environmental power (Léna and Issberner 2017, i). At the same time Brazil is also known for its capitalistic vision of the forests, turning Brazil into a threat for climate change. And makes understanding Brazil's relationship with the forest even more important. Nevertheless, as mentioned, this relationship differs within the society and so does this differ between the state and society. How is then it possible to implement the policies with all these different, divergent visions? To understand this better, it is necessary to look at where and how exactly the visions within a state and the society clash. The research question of this thesis is therefore *which factors and interests do explain the clashes of positions and visions one can find between the state and civil society in Brazil regarding the causes of deforestation and its solution?*

The focus will be on civil society because this represents a sphere that exists outside the state is an effective way to look at the different actors within the society. Throughout de the thesis deforestation will be analyses in relation to resource extraction, as it is one of the main drivers of deforestation. To answer the research question this thesis is divided into three chapters and ends with a conclusion. The first chapter analyses from a more general perspective, while being analytical, what the relationship of the state and of civil society with natural resources are. In addition, it is required to see the interplay between what the state wants with natural resources and what this means for the people it encounters with to obtain the natural resources and this is strongly visible with deforestation. The second chapter analyses how the relationship is visible in Brazil, i.e., it gives a historical contextualization. The third chapter builds on to this contextualization but focusses on the part of the Amazon rainforest in the Brazilian northern state of Pará and zooms in on the issues related to the use of a river. And in an effort to also understand how the state and civil society *can* collaborate and also how the state influences their lives, two in-depth interviews will be used with local citizens of the inland of Pará.

Chapter 1

State, civil society, and visions on the use of natural resources

Introduction

As already mentioned in the introduction, the research question this thesis tries to establish *w*hich factors and interests do explain the clashes of positions and visions one can find between the state and civil society in Brazil regarding the causes of deforestation and its solution. To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the relationship of the state and of civil society with natural resources. Consequently, this chapter will first focus on the state's relationship with natural resources by looking at it from a historical perspective, then looking at how this is visible in the present, while also connecting it to state governance. Moreover, civil society in relation to natural resources will be analysed by problematising its meaning and looking at its relationship with natural resources. Finally, this chapter looks at how civil society and the state can clash with regard to deforestation by looking at the implications for the forests, local people, the state, and the management of natural resources.

1.1 In the name of development: the state's relationship with natural resources

To understand the state's relationship with natural resources it is first useful to establish where the contemporary notion of natural resources from the state stems from. According to Sawyer and Agrawal it can be traced all the way back to the start of Europe's colonialization and the expansion of European capitalism (Sawyer and Agrawal 2000, 81). Historians of science emphasize how for the economic expansion of Western European states the plants were played an important role (Schiebinger 2004, 247). Meant with this is that the natural environment the colonizers encountered with, needed categorization to understand its value for them to know how to display it in the home country in a way to profit from (Sawyer and Agrawal 2000, 81). For instance, across Europe political economists believed the knowledge of nature was important to accumulate national wealth and thus power (Schiebinger 2004, 247). The mapping of the environment by the scientist that was sent to the colonized land to categorize it hereby often became distorted with seeing economic prospect (Sawyer and Agrawal 2000, 81). In addition to this profits-oriented categorization of nature, nature was also referred to as feminine, especially the tropics (Harrison 2005, 59). It was seen as fragile and fertile and in need of protection by Europeans while at the same time also being seen as

dangerous and mysterious because it was unknown (Sawyer and Agrawal 75-6). The work of Mitchell shows how in this way the colonizers saw how 'the interaction among life forms could be observed, manipulated, and analyzed' (2011, 270).

Underlying this notion of natural resources as power, which is equivalent to national wealth, are also power relations that were created. It is about domination as Sawyer and Agrawal make clear with how nature was depicted at that time: 'Vital to European exploits was the symbolic slippage between land and a woman's body, between colonization and sexual mastery' (2000, 79). What this means is that the purpose and significance of nature/environment was hereby constructed by the Western scientists (Davis 2011, 3; Kothari et al. 2019, 164). This environmental representation and narrative have effects on the implementation of policy and power-relations from the past until the present (Davis 2011, 6). Having created this narrative and representation of for example the tropics as not only female but also non-white, different than Europeans, served as 'a meltingpot for uniting colonial power' (2000, 76). Owing to this development the study of Aníbal Quijano shows:

> '(…) that specific colonial structure of power produced the specific social discriminations which later were codified as 'racial', 'ethnic', 'anthropological' or 'national', according to the times, agents, and populations involved. These intersubjective constructions, product of Eurocentered colonial domination were even assumed to be 'objective', 'scientific', categories, then of a historical significance. That is, as natural phenomena, not referring to the history of power (…)' (2007, 168).

Quijano refers to this 'process of Eurocentrification of the new world power' as 'coloniality of power' (ibid, 171). So, during the colonization process not only were there power relations created amongst people and nations, but also about nature and its uses (Coscieme et al 2020, 37).

Extractivism: 'developing' through resource extraction

Natural resources are thus since colonization seen as way to gain economic prospect and the knowledge of nature was important to accumulate national wealth and thus power (Sawyer and Agrawal 2000, 81; Schiebinger 2004, 247). This line of thought continues to be true in the present. Especially in South America, resource extraction has been an economic enterprise and is carried out in public-private cooperation for the connected objectives of enhancing state power and corporate profits (Stevenson 2014, 140). It has also been a way for governments to finance the promised public goods, during elections, for their citizens (Stevenson 2014, 140; Kröger and Lalander 2016, 695). This is in Latin America and other regions in the Global South also referred to as '(neo-) extractivism', which are growth-oriented development paths with intensified extraction of raw materials in the region: 'These paths involve (1) extracting raw materials and natural elements such as minerals, energy carriers, and forest and agricultural goods; (2) exporting raw materials; and (3) using revenue to improve living conditions' (Burchardt and Dietz 2014, 468).

Extractivism is very much in line with how it was during colonialism and the relationships between the Global North and the Global South are also still unequal. This has to do with the fact that countries in the Global South are mostly specialised in the trading of natural resources to developed countries that make less polluting final products (Issberner and Lena 2016, 8-9; Stevenson 2014, 139-140) while having a reliance on capital extraction and on the export of raw materials (Kröger and Lalander 2016, 695; Veltmeyer 2013, 79). This process, however, leads to 'unequal distribution of environmental burden' between developing countries and developed countries (Behrensa et al. 2007, 450). Moreover, negative environmental impacts and environmental degradation, such as over-fertilisation in agriculture and deforestation, are associated with the extraction of resources (ibid).

Democracy's implication on the state's relationship with natural resources

There seems to be a connection between extractivism, environmental degradation and democracy due to election driven natural resource extraction for improving living standards. There are factors that influence this relationship. For example, changes in presidential administrations influence the governance of resource extraction and the effectiveness of environmental policy in tackling environmental degradation (Konisky and Woods 2012, 544; Sprinz 2009 ibid, 5) or simply the perceptions of voters and politicians regarding those issues

at the time of the election, which affects the legislative process as well (Millner and Ollivier 2016, 229).

Li and Rafael (2006) and Behrense et al. (2007, 450) on the other hand, refer to this connection as being part of the 'Environmental Kuznets Curve' (EKC) which means that when countries have a low income per capita, the rising of income per capita causes more environmental degradation, but when the limit of low income is passed, a rise in income per capita can actually reduce degradation (Li and Rafael 2006, 953-4). But, to wait to pass this threshold for there to be less degradation, is not really an option since, for instance, forest degradation is already very critical in countries of the Global South as is visible in the rapid decay of biodiversity and water resources (Tester 2020 765). Apart from this, as noted by Tester, it is striking that in the Global South higher levels of democracy have significant, negative impact on rates of forest loss (2020, 777). A possible answer can be found in the article by Li and Reuveny, according to them there is a difference between democratization and higher levels of democracy (2006, 953-4). The process of *democratization* could indeed promote environmental degradation through its effect on the rising of national income. But when passed a certain level of development, degradation stops, i.e. the EKC (ibid). This means being in the initial stage of 'development' and in the process of democratization, leads to more environmental degradation.

1.2 Civil society and natural resources: local culture and traditions

Civil societies are believed to be a counterweight against the implications not only of democracy, but also against extractivism, environmental degradation and the colonial and capitalistic roots of the state with natural resources (Newton and Sullivan 2005, 197, 203, 207). Civil society encompasses 'all the organizations and associations that exist outside of the state (including political parties) and the market' (Carothers 1999, 19). Civil society also wields influence over the state as well as over the society (Overland 2018, 12). Think hereby about for example '(…) associations that exist for purposes other than advancing specific social or political agendas, such as religious organizations, student groups, cultural organizations (from choral societies to bird-watching clubs), sports clubs, and informal community groups' (Carothers 1999, 19). Understanding civil society in this way it is then a diverse sphere and a place where various with different interests meet (Chandhoke 2007, 612). But civil society only exists in relation to the state (ibid, 609 and Overland 2018, 12), because civil society as

understood in the present came into existence out of a reaction against the state and its logic of power which led the state to not always look after its citizens and to even oppress them (Carothers 1999, 19; Chandhoke 2007, 611). Particularly countries in the Global South where civil society offered the chance to step in as the states opted for neoliberal policies such as privatization and other market reforms and withdrew their help (Carothers 1999, 19). Due to this civil society became closely associated as a counterweight to state power and as being an important precondition for democracy (Chandhoke 2007, 608).

However, civil society as explained above entails a variety of groups and actors. Therefore, it must be considered that what for some civic actors means 'the public good' can mean something bad for another (Carothers 1999, 20 and Chandhoke 2007, 612). For example, with nature people can even form organizations that works against the health of the ecosystem (Newton and Sullivan 2005, 206). So, there are then different opinions, and this means that civil society is a contested sphere (Overland 2018, 4). And it should be since the purpose of a democracy, and civil society being seen as a precondition for this, is for all citizens to be heard and have a place. Unfortunately, in practice this is not the case because within civil society there also are power relations in place on several areas: 'some groups possess overlapping political, material, symbolic, and social power; others possess nothing, not even access to the means of life' (Chandhoke 2007, 613). In addition, some groups even have the power to methodically distort policy result to favor the rich (Carothers 1999, 23), in this case civil society can in fact distort democracy. Nevertheless, civil society is very much needed because it offers possibilities to take collective action through the government and within the public space (Newton and Sullivan 2005, 196).

Civil society and natural resources

How the actors within civil society relate to natural resources can, like within civil society itself, also differ and so can their vision. This relationship is for instance different for those living in the cities then for those living in rural areas. For example, among indigenous groups the notion of indigeneity can differ, as urban indigenous people may not stand against resource extraction per se, while also standing for the rights of nature (Vindal Ødegaard and Rivera Andía 2018, 25). According to Newton and Sullivan (2005) this is because 'human social patterns remain extensively influenced by natural surroundings, visibly and invisibly, for good and ill' (196). This means that the indigenous groups living in rural areas have a different vision of indigeneity and for the rights of nature. And adding to this Chandhoke argues that while in most countries in the Global South most of the population are rural, the use of civil society is dominated by the urban middle-class agenda (2007, 613).

The relationship of civil society and natural resources can thus be very different and so can the notion of nature (Coscieme et al 2020). A vision within civil society is for example 'the rights of nature' or 'Nature Rights' (Kothari et al. 2019, 243-6; Gallagher and Ofir 2021). Nature rights '(…) means that every being or aspect of nature, including people, must at minimum, have the right to exist, the right to occupy a physical place and the right to interact with other beings in a manner that allows it to fulfil its unique role in ecological and evolutionary processes' (Kothari et al. 2019, 24). Nature is in this way approached as also having its own will and its reactions to our actions (Rivera Andía 2019, 165-6), there is a reciprocal relationship. The Rights of Nature belongs to traditional and new forms of Indigenous governance and was defended by numerous groups within civil society (Gallagher and Ofir 2021, 142). It is thus closely associated with, and stems from, the indigenous concepts of Buen Vivir [Living Well] from South America (Artaraz, Calestani and Trueba 2021), which is 'defined as a holistic view of social life that no longer gives overriding centrality to the economy' (Escobar 2020, 78). The Rights of Nature/Buen Vivir is therefore seen as an important way of how to deal with problems such as environmental degradation and social inequality (Gallagher and Ofir 2021, 142). These problems are connected to how we interact with nature and with each other and also, to 'the extractivist 'translation of nature into resources' that exacerbates the world ecological crisis' (Vindal Ødegaard and Rivera Andía 2019, 24). In addition to this, indigenous values can serve as an example: 'social solidarity and harmony with nature, the envisioning of communal systems of production and consumption, the preservation of the

commons [water and land] and the construction of a non-homogeneous and non-hegemonising new world' (Veltmeyer and Delgado Wise 2018, 348). In consequence, not surprising that for the good management of natural resources, civil society is seen as important because it takes a bottem- up approach (Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2019, and Sawhney et al. 2007). This is because effective management of natural resources depends on an active and engaged civil society where all have a voice and the space to debate about natural resources issues (Overland 2018, 3).

1.3 Deforestation: where civil society and the state clash

Forests are not only important for the health of our earth system, but the trees also capture greenhouse gases and hereby, as the Rainforest Alliance (2018) points out, they are 'our best ally in capturing the staggering amount of [Greenhouse gases] GHGs we humans create'. Trees have trough their roots created a network underground and topsoil, through this they sort of have a family that supports one another, which makes them live for hundreds of years, fight diseases and hereby better at absorbing GHG (Wohleben 2016, 79-81) As a result the trees within such a network are much more resilient and better able to withstand extreme weather (ibid). Unfortunately, forests continue to be cut, burned, or removed and instead of capturing GHG, it releases it (Tester 2020, 765). Forest loss in the tropics is especially problematic where in 2019 there was a forest loss of close to 30 soccer fields worth of trees every minute (World Wildlife Fund n.d.). That this is the case is not surprising since deforestation happens because of resource extraction and as already mentioned, resource extraction, extractivism, is a way for developing countries to have economic growth. Moreover, during the past decades there has been an ongoing natural resources extraction boom in mainly, although not limited to, South America (Veltmeyer 2013, 79; Kröger and Lalander 2016, 682). In addition to extensive foreign investments in land, water, and natural resources of which Veltmeyer from a critical perspective refers to as 'land grabbing, not to mention 'water grabs' and 'resource grabs' (2013, 79). For example, due to this, investments in mining explorations in South America increased severely with 2000 per cent compared to 90 per cent worldwide (Vindal Ødegaard and Rivera Andía 2018, 13). This all has implications for local citizens living there where the extraction is to happen/ happens.

Indigenous rights and territories vis-a-vis state's development plans

Undoubtedly the implications on people are reflected in the land and environmental defenders that are being murdered, which according to human rights organization Global Witness had its highest record registered in 2020 (Global Witness 2021). Extractivism is therefore often researched in combination to the implications this has on indigenous rights and territories, because the indigenous territories are there where the state and cooperation's wish to extract (Vindal Ødegaard and Rivera Andía 2018; Kröger and Lalander 2016). From the point of view of the state the indigenous rights and territories then seem to stand in the way of the state's development plan. Even though it may seem this way, it does not guarantee the rights are uphold and it neither guarantees that the state through its own laws cannot still extract (Kröger and Lalander 2016, 682). When this is done these lost areas are deemed necessary for the economic development of a country and can be viewed 'as human and environmental sacrifice zones' (Vindal Ødegaard and Rivera Andía 2018, 24). An example of this is the building of hydroelectric dams. It provides electricity for thousands of citizens, but the people living directly around it are that suffer most (Castro, Hogenboom and Baud 2016, 264). Therefore, they protest against the state, because such extractive projects can have 'radial changes to people's ways of life, alteration of their environment and means of subsistence (in some cases through forced displacement), and the often disproportional effects of detrimental by-products from extractive projects' (Vindal Ødegaard and Rivera Andía 2018, 24). Not only countries in the Global South, but this has also in Europe led to movements of protests and resistance because the extraction affects those living around the area (Issberner and Lena 2016, 8-9). So, while the state views these areas as important to develop, it is a way of live for local people and this can make them clash with one another.

Contesting national versus local natural resources management

Although the positions between local citizens and the state can clash it does not mean that the state does not accept responsibility to diminish the environmental consequences (Duit 2016, 70). Such as preventing 'overexploitation of natural resources through environmental regulation and policies, environmental taxes and subsidies, and mitigate environmental impacts through the production of public goods such as public transport systems, renewable energy systems, habitat preservation and restoration schemes, and sustainable resource utilization' (ibid, 71). But at the same time the natural resources extraction boom, especially in the Global South, undermines these types of measures. And the reliance on the export of

primary commodities also undermines the effectiveness of environmental laws and weakens environmental protections in the Global South (Tester 2020, 776-7). This, thus, shows how there is a clash between resource extraction and environmental protection and how they are 'counteractive forces' within a state itself (ibid). Moreover, there are the four stages that are connected to the life cycle of a raw material commodity chain where conflicts arise: 'extraction, transport, processing, and final disposal' (Castro, Hogenboom and Baud 2016, 76). For example, 'technologies of extraction and expansive transport infrastructures such as ports, ships, rail lines, (…); these changes secure access to far-flung raw materials in national territories and enhance a country's general capacity to export all kinds of goods and services.' (Tester 2020, 776). This all contributes to deforestation and conflicts with the local citizens and civil society. Furthermore, there can also be a struggle between local governance and national governance due to difference in policy and whether there is a decentralized political authority (Sprinz 2009, 4-6).

Even so, the latter does not mean something negative. As already mentioned, local people acting together to solve collective problems have proven effective because of the bottem-up approach. For instance, looking at the decentralization of forest management to local governments is considered to streamline the input from locals, promote transparency, and reinforce the responsibility for sustainable forest management (Tester 2020, 778). Nevertheless, governance on all levels still have a lot of influence on the management of natural resource (Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2019, 44). In other words, nation states remain to be the dominant way for social and political organization and an important place for collective decision- making (Duit 2016, 70). But without involving local people, conflicts are bound to happen and therefore participation improves the government's efficiency with resources and helps to build trust between the government and the society by giving people more voice in the regulation and management of natural resources (Sawhney et al. 2007, 129). Not to mention the importance of the contribution of local and indigenous knowledge for natural resource management 'since it has been accumulated, adapted, modified, and used by communities over several generations so as to minimize ecological damage and degradation' (ibid, 122).

Conclusion

While perhaps ideally the government should involve local people in the management of natural resource, the way the state views natural resources appear to lead to a clash between such an approach and the state's desire. This is because since the colonization of Europe natural resources are seen as way to gain economic prospect, knowledge of nature was hereby important to obtain wealth, which equals power. The created power structures are referred to by Quijano as 'coloniality of power'. In the present this is visible in how resource extraction is used to 'develop' by states, especially in the Global South where this process is referred to as (neo-)extractivism. However, environmental degradation is associated with (neo)extractivism. This creates that countries in the Global South have a reliance on resource extraction.

Turning to role of the citizens in this relationship, civil societies are believed to be a counterweight because it contains a variety of groups and actors that can influence the state and society. And when necessary, step in. Still exactly because of its many differences, civil society is a contested concept whilst at the same time being an important public sphere for enabling change. This relates to natural resources because humans still remain influenced by our natural environment, whether aware of this or not. When actors within civil society then referrer to natural resources this can be very different depending on where they live or can even not be referred to as only natural resources, like with Nature Rights and 'Buen Vivir' (Living Well). Having these types of views within civil society makes them to be seen as important for the good management of natural resources. Especially when it comes to forest management it is important because of the importance of the trees for people's livelihood and for combating climate change. Unfortunately, deforestation in the Global South due to extractavism and the commodities boom is most acute. Yet, while the state views these areas as important to develop, it is a way of life for local people, and this can make them clash with one another. This is strongly visible with the conflicts between the state and indigenous communities because their visions of natural resources are so different. However, a modus vivendi can be achieved among both by involving local people in resource management.

Chapter 2

Visions on the exploitation of natural resources in Brazil: An historical contextualization

Introduction

Turning to Brazil to understand the exploitation of natural resources, a historical context must be given. As was made clear in the first chapter, the state's relationship with natural resources has its roots in the colonisation process by Europe. Brazil is hereby part of these roots and is also home to almost 70 per cent of the biggest rainforest of the world: the Amazon rainforest.

It is certainly not my intention to give the complete history of Brazil with regard the exploitation of natural resources since colonization until the present. Therefore, only the most important developments will be addressed relevant for this thesis. This will be done chronologically but divided in three parts. Starting with the history of Brazil until 1985, because until then Brazil was much more viewed as an open space for resource extraction while having much less inclusion of the Brazilian society. The handling and visions of natural resources in Brazil are anchored in this period. A good understanding of this period is therefore necessary to better understand the current conflicts and therefore this chapter will devote more attention to this period. After that I will pay attention to the exploitation of natural resources in Brazil following the military regime and the democratic restoration. Finally, I will analyse the situation of resource extraction under President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-), followed by a conclusion.

2.1 Brazil up to 1985: (internal) colonialism, development, military dictatorship and economic growth

Having the origin of its name coming from a natural resource, pau-Brasil[1] (Brazilwood), that the Portuguese encountered with upon arrival at the territory already gives an idea of what it should serve (Melo et al. 2007). Brazilian nature has since colonization been about the natural riches it could give and makes it that the Brazilian (hi)story has since its colonization in 1500 been interwoven with Europe. The economy has since colonization been aimed at the

[1] '(…) This tree soon became the most valuable source of red dye, an important colonial export item, to a point that it gave Brazil its name' (Melo et al. 2007, 1269).

extraction of natural resources and this has been continued by the succeeding governments. But there cannot be spoken of a Brazil that really was participating in the global economy, except that it was a provider of primary resources and that it had its production for the national market (Padua 2016, 27). Over time while the population grew and the civil society developed, the wishes modernize and to have a dignified life, also changed (Maio, Hochman and Lima 2010, 2-3). But inequality continued, and a big part of society did not really have a voice, such as the indigenous people, the rural landless population, afro-descendants, low-income population (Evans et al. 2017, 390).

Regarding the type of governance that was applied since the colonial period until the nineteenth century, Brazil is regarded as one of the most decentralized countries in the region. This was reinforced through local despots with economic power and political power, which was based on the exploitation of natural recourses and slavery (Heller 2017, 330; Padua 2016, 25). The environmental implications were devastating especially for tropical forests and other local ecosystems that were seen as areas always open to be occupied accompanied by the mentality of slash and burn. After the areas lost its fertility, they were abandoned, and they moved on to the next area. Still, because the economy of Brazil was not so big, it was possible to limit the environmental impact.

The first decennia of the twentieth century Brazil was in its essence an extension of the territorial model of the ninetieth century (Padua 2016, 32-33). Only after World War I big changes happened nationally. Between 1910 and 1930 there was a process urbanization and industrialization, the influx of new immigrants and nationalism (Souza et al. 2009, 3-4). This in combination with the wish to participate in the global economy led the government to develop a big migration plan, which included to whiten (eugenics) the Brazilian society (Souza et al. 2009) and to inhabit the inland and make the population grow, a process also referred to as internal colonialism and territorial expansion (Jones 2017). This relates to the concerns of the Brazilian intellectual and political elites to construct ‘a civilized nation in tropical lands (inhospitable for some) with a mixed population (whom some regarded as degenerate)’ and regarded race and the tropical climate as the decisive factors of ‘backwardness’ (Maio, Hochman and Lima 2010, 3, 6). This path of eugenics was then seen as a way to improve the population and to close the gap with and to find a place for afro-descendants, indigenous natives, mixed race, immigrants and those seen as socially incompetent in order to create a

'civilized Brazil' (ibid, 3- 4). So, both needed to be resolved by whitening the society and by occupying the tropical land to be able to modernise and participate in the global economy.

Military dictatorship, Economic Growth and Neoliberalism

The international context of post-WWII and the increased accessibility to foreign credit, has led many statesmen to the dream of development and to the possibility to really participate in the global economy. This had already started a bit before with the Brazilian president Getulio Vargas (1930-1945 and 1951-1954) who promised to focus more on the internal market and the development of the inland 'with the aim of occupying and improving agricultural production in more backward regions' (Diniz Alves and Martine 2016, 41). This was during his first term implemented by social policies such as, fostering population growth, as well as actively supporting international migration for economic and eugenic reasons (ibid). This was succeeded by President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1960) with the prioritization of development and economic growth and made a national development plan to make it happen expressed in his slogan: '50 years in 5' (Almandoz 2016, 39). As part of this national development plan the capital Brasília was created in 1960 under Kubitschek to be more centrally located in Brazil while also facilitating the communication to have a better integration and development of the hinterland (ibid). More importantly, the capital was built to have better control and access to the natural resources and to dedicate to territorial expansion.

Since Kubitschek, all following development plans have aimed at accelerating this growth (Léna and Issberner 2017, 7). Owing to this it can be said that the Brazilian economy and governance underwent big transformations from 1945 compared to the centuries before. The wish to have economic growth is also visible in how for example before 1945 Brazil already ad big iron reserves, but only in 1946 was the first state-owned company created to actually make profit from it. Firstly, this happened against the background of the financial crisis from 1929 which made clear that being too depended on the export of monoculture makes an economy vulnerable. Secondly, it happened against the background of the political revolution in 1930, which had a strong military participation, that generated a stronger and more central action from the national state for urban-industrial growth. Thirdly, new urban middle classes desired modernization (Pádua 2016, 31).

What is clear is that having economic growth in Brazil advanced hand in hand with the extraction of natural resources. During the military dictatorship (1964-1985) this view was reinforced by the great importance the government had on the integration of the Amazon in the north and the Cerrado Savana project in Southern Brazil because it was rich in resources. With the implementation of the National Integration Programme (NIP) in 1970 it turned reality. NIP included: infrastructure building, migration and settling of 500.000 farmers, giving lands to private companies, tax reliefs and the construction of big dams, for instance Tucuruí hydroelectric power plant opened in 1984 (Léna and Issberner 2017, 7). A critical sidenote is that the NIP was implemented without regard for the rights and territories of indigenous and traditional peoples (Joanoni Neto and Guimarães Neto 2021, 376). This has intensified conflicts between those migrating to those areas and those already living there that got, often violently, displaced. With the occupation and exploitation of both regions, and the destruction it led to, also started Brazil's contribution to the global ecological footprint and its damage to the global ecosystem (Léna and Issberner 2017, 6).

2.2 Brazil after the dictatorship: power to the people, neoliberalization, extractivism and poverty alleviation

When the military dictatorship ended in 1985 a process of democratization started, and a new Constitution was enacted in 1988. This brought electoral democracy and new participatory structures with stronger participation by civil society, changing the course of the political and economic foundations of exclusion since colonization (Evans et al. 2017, 391; Heller 2017, 330). At the same time, Brazil, had been suffering a strong debt crisis throughout the 1980s. The solution to get out was to be found in applying a set of neoliberal measures known as the 'Washington Consensus', which 'in Brazil consisted of a vast privatisation programme that included the sale of public companies in strategic areas such as energy and telecommunications, sometimes at prices below their market value' (Garcia and Borba de Sá 2021, 150). These policies were implemented under the term of, social democrat, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) (ibid). While during his two terms these marked-friendly policies helped finance anti- poverty programs, they were also accompanied by high deforestation rates of around 77.000 km^2 per term (LADB Staff 2019, 2-3). It leads to violent conflicts with local citizens, such as the massacre in Eldorado de Carajás (1996), where 21 people were killed by military police in the state of north-eastern state of Pará (Joanoni Neto and Guimarães Neto 2021, 379). So, democratization of the political institutions since 1985

did not really change the development model adopted after the Second World War and neither did it try to revert the main drivers of environmental degradation (Pádua 2017, 31).

Under the leadership of the Workers Party (2002- 2016) Lula da Silva (2002-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2010-2016), like under Cardoso, public policies were aimed at reducing poverty, such as through 'Bolsa Familia'[2], with an increase in social investment (Heller 2017, 331), while also having economic growth. The difference, however, with the Cardoso administration is that the state would again have a central actor in enabling economic growth (Garcia and Borba de Sá 2021, 150). This enabling of economic growth and the financing of social policy advanced hand in hand with neo-extractivism, extraction of natural resources and its exportation (Pahnke 2016). This is visible in the deforestation rates that, especially under Lula's first term from 2002/3 to 2005/6, equalled 84.400 km^2 (LADB Staff 2019, 2). A possible explanation to the deforestation rates spike can be found in the research by Rodrigues-Filho et al. that show that these high rates of deforestation in the Amazon are related to 'large administrative shifts caused by presidential elections which results in periods of managerial instability associated with episodic inefficiency, leading to weak institutions unable to properly combat illegal deforestation' (Rodrigues-Filho et al. 2015, 111). Since 2005, however, surveillance and regulatory actions plans have helped to combat deforestation and environmental institutions were strengthened (ibid; Prividelli and Souza 2018; Menezes and Barbosa Jr. 2021). Also characteristic to the administration of Lula, although this also had happened under Cardoso, was that he involved Civil Society Organisations (Hochstetler 2008, 43).

Nevertheless, a return to democratic rule, the stronger involvement of social movements and civil society, and the building of a welfare state since the 90s has all led that the political elites were passed over and the influence of the traditionally clientelist parties to be substantially restricted (Heller 2017, 331). This development and the more reformist agrarian strategy, amongst others, led to the coup d'état, again with interference of the U.S., of Dilma in 2016 (Prividelli and Souza 2018, 238). The elites and especially the agricultural elites wanted to regain their influence and were already since her re-election in 2014 paving the way to make this happen (ibid). After the coup the conservative vice-president Michel

[2] 'Bolsa Familia, Brazil's now famous conditional transfer program (…) but transformed the lives of tens of millions of poor Brazilians, (…) helped to reduce the severity of poverty and inequality' (Evans et al. 2017, 391).

Temer under Dilma became interim president (2016-2018) and reaffirmed neoliberal policies (Menezes and Barbosa Jr. 2021, 231). How Temer's presidency is connected to agrarian elites is visible in how, although being accused of corruption, this exactly having been the main reason for the coup op Dilma, the promise of weakening deforestation monitoring and a review of environmental conservation areas for extraction led to the support of 230 congressional votes to not be impeached himself (ibid, 237).

2.3 Brazil in the 21st century: back to exploitative roots

The government of former army captain Jair Bolsonaro (2019- present) represents a complete rupture with his predecessors (Araújo 2020, 2) and can be described as 'one that privileges the expansion of the agribusiness frontier over the country's forests and natural ecosystems, as well as unrestrained extractivism even within environmentally protected areas or indigenous reserves' (Garcia and Borba de Sá 2021, 152). While Bolsonaro's image is strongly associated with privileging the expansion of the agribusiness at the expense of the forests and natural ecosystems, the government of Bolsonaro is not governing that differently than his predecessors with regard to deforestation causes for example. Between the end of 1960s to the mid of 1990s, as well as under Lula and Dilma, most of the deforestation was because of large landowners who came to the Amazon for cattle breeding and for farming of genetically modified organisms (GMO), soy and corn (Léna and Issberner 2017, 8, 10). Under the neo-extractivism of Lula and Dilma the public authorities did not counter the rapid growth of GMOs and neither did it oppose the growth in the use of pesticides in agriculture, making Brazil one of the largest consumers of pesticides worldwide (Pádua 2017, 35). In the same way, as PT could count on the strong support of civil society and social movements, so could, Bolsonaro count on the strong support of the evangelical community in Brazil which was a decisive factor in his election (Fogel and Pagliarini 2021, 103).

This latter example shows how a strong civil society can also reflect dangerous political weaknesses and can have a rhetoric of exclusion rather than inclusion (Chandhoke 2007, 609). With the emphasis on dangerous, because the major differences of Bolsonaro with his predecessors are: the loosening environmental regulation policies, the complete disregard for indigenous reserves and environmentally protected areas, intensification of deforestation such as the loss of one third of the wetland Pantanal; defunding and dismantling of environmental institutions and protection, cutting of environment related- staff and allowing

for example around 1500 new pesticides since being in office (Gonzaga 2022; Araújo 2020; Garcia and Borba de Sá 2021, 152). Related to these issues is the increase in conflicts between loggers, miners and land-grabbers invading indigenous lands (Menezes and Barbosa Jr. 2021). In 2020 a record high of 1576 land conflicts since 1985 were registered, hereby over 41 per cent of the conflicts were related to indigenous communities (Gonzaga 2022). Unfortunately, all this destruction seems to have been in vain. The structural changes implemented by Bolsonaro's free- market agenda has not been able to achieve the expected economic growth (Garcia and Borba de Sá 2021, 152).

It is not a secret that Bolsonaro has strong ties with the military as is visible in the amount of military police officers placed in high- ranking positions in the government agencies linked to the Ministry of the Environment. Bolsonaro often speaks with appraisal about the military dictatorship (McCoy and Sá Pessoa 2021) and the policies the Bolsonaro government is implementing seem to be headed in that direction: seeing the amazon as an open space for resource extraction and economic growth without regarding the local citizens; while strengthening the elites and having authoritarian impulses. This line of thinking that presents development as 'good for the country' disregards traditional ways of life and transforms the original wealth of the Amazon into products for an economy that excludes as it grows' (Joanoni Neto and Guimarães Neto 2021, 382).

Conclusion

Analyzing Brazil and the vision of the state about natural resources shows how, as discussed in chapter one, this vision is indeed defined by the need for economic growth and for the development of Brazil. This is strongly visible in the creation and implementation of development plans and to participate in the global economy, such as the National Integration Programme (NIP) in 1970 during the military dictatorship (1964-1985). With the explicit purpose of integrating the Amazon and the Cerrado Savana because of its richness in resources, the NIP hereby represents this capitalistic vision of natural resources for development. But in the name of development local citizens are ignored and this inevitably can lead to (violent) conflict. The ignoring of local citizens, especially of indigenous peoples, can be seen throughout the Brazilian history because they are after all located where the state wants to extract. And similarly, it is in these areas where there are high rates of deforestation.

This is because of state driven occupation of land and migration leading to displacement of local citizens, also a factor that leads to conflict.

Although extraction was done at a time where oppression was more common and where not all Brazilians had a voice, the turn to democracy in 1985 did not change the vision of extraction for development by the government. It did change the course of the political and economic foundations of exclusion since colonization, new participatory structures increased the influence of civil society and social movements in politics. This development created a power shift and the political (agrarian) elites to be bypassed, but extraction was used for the financing of social policies. Granting, once more, with total disregard of the local citizens.

Where under the military dictatorship resource extraction was regarded a matter of national security, under the succeeding governments it was regarded as the wish of the society as visible with the neo- extractavist under the PT administrations (2002-2016). How the wish of civil society can be problematic is visible with the election of President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-) and his administration that puts agribusiness first, applies neoliberal policies, dismantled environmental institutions, the complete disregard for indigenous reserves and environmentally protected areas. Bolsonaro's government tries everything to have economic growth without real success, while paradoxically destroying at alarming high rates that which they believe gives economic growth: forests.

Chapter 3

State discourse and civil society contestation on the use of natural resources and deforestation Pará: from Lula to Bolsonaro

Introduction

To answer the research question this thesis looks at the part of the Amazon rainforest within the Brazilian state of Pará. The choice for the Amazon rainforest and for Brazil is because the clash is strongly visible there with the infrastructure development plans of the government in Pará and the positions of the local citizens living on the places of the development plans from the government of Lula da Silva until the government of Bolsonaro. Also to compare the different governments.

This chapter will therefore first focus on the development plans in Pará under Lula da Silva, succeeded by Dilma Rousseff, and the environmental impact of these plans with a focus on the use of legislation. Then this chapter will turn to local contestation of the development projects on the use of, specifically, the Tapajós river. Finally, this chapter will attempt to searching for consensual ways to deal with exploitation of natural resources and deforestation in Pará with the help of two in-depth interviews, one with a civil servant from the small municipality Tomé- Açu and with a member of family famer from the small municipality Nova Timboteua.

3.1 Development plans in Pará: economic growth, environmental impact and the use of legislation

Since President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961) development plans in Brazil have explicitly been aimed at economic growth (Léna and Issberner 2017, 6). Construction of infrastructure and extraction of natural resources in Pará were part of those plans. For instance, the construction of the Tucuruí hydroelectric power dam in the 1970s under the military dictatorship, inaugurated in 1985, in the Amazon rainforest in Pará for electricity and for navigation represents the start of the Amazon as a commodities frontier. The objective of the Tucuruí was the mining undertakings and when it was in operation vast areas of forests were cleared. Southeast Pará and Western Maranhão, to where the energy of the dam is sent from, are therefore known as the ‘Arc of Deforestation’ (Joanoni Neto and Guimarães Neto 2021, 378-9). This area has from then until the present ‘seen the largest social tensions and violent

conflicts over land, and invasions of indigenous lands and forest reserves, in the Amazon' (Joanoni Neto and Guimarães Neto 2021, 378-9). The military police were also involved in conflicts in Pará and sometimes even got ordered to kill people standing in the way of either going to or being at the extraction site (ibid). While Pará has much mineral wealth it has the worst GDP per capita among the Brazilian states and this is reflected in the economic uncertainty and shortfall in the areas of education and health of the local population (ibid).

Program for the Acceleration of Growth (PAC) in the Amazon in Pará and the legislative 'suspension'

Under the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff the development plans was Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC) [Program for the Acceleration of Growth]: PAC 1 from 2007 to 2010 and PAC 2 from 2010 to 2015 and extended (Léna and Issberner 2017, 6). The purpose of the PAC is to enable economic growth though investments in strategic economic sectors which includes the energy sector, that is considered essential for the global economic development, and the civil construction sector (Chagas, Carvalho and Marquesan 2015, 271; Silva, Martins and Neder 2016, 841). This also allows tackling the problem of job creation, due to the PAC being intensive in labour, and simultaneously the shortage of affordable housing[3] (Chagas, Carvalho and Marquesan 2015, 271). Within the PAC the allocation of resources is concentrated on the expansion of investments in transport, production, and energy infrastructure, with emphasis on increasing the ability to exploit fossil fuels (Chagas, Carvalho and Marquesan 2015, 271; Silva, Martins and Neder 2016, 841; PAC 2012b). Moreover, PAC 'takes into account the regional necessities' says Lula da Silva himself in 2007 right before approval of the PAC (Jornal da Gazeza 2007, 0:33- 0:37). Implementation of the PAC should bring about regional development and decrease regional inequality within Brazil, something that did not happen (Silva, Martins and Neder 2016).

On a geopolitical international level, the PAC is the Brazilian contribution of an infrastructure plan advanced by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) with the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) (Walker and Simmons 2018, 4). IIRSA seeks expansion and economic modernization for a complete

[3] This corresponds with the description of '(neo-) extractivism' from Burchardt and Dietz (2014), see chapter one.

integration of South America in the global economy whereby the Amazon should be transformed into a transportation passage and as a source of hydropower through hydroelectric dams and the building of other smaller dams (Walker and Simmons 2018, 4; Chagas, Carvalho and Marquesan 2015, 271). As part of PAC 2 is the building of dams on the Tapajós River in Pará to make, amongst others, the 'Tapajós Waterway' for transporting soybeans from the state Mato Grosso, Brazil's biggest soybean producer south of Pará, to ports in Santarém, Santana and Barcarena and hereby giving access to the Amazon River and the Atlantic Ocean for export[4] (Fearnside 2015, 428; Walker and Simmons 2018,5). However, impacts of the dams are flooding of indigenous lands and conservation units [protected areas], for the river to be navigable for barges. And this drives deforestation in the area around the Tapajós river in Pará and in the northern part of Mato Grosso because the waterway 'would also encourage soy plantations in the cattle pastures that currently dominate land use in areas that have already been cleared in this part of Mato Grosso' (Fearnside 2015a, 432). Moreover, it has been shown that deforestation in Pará can be traced back to the advancement of soy production in Mato Grosso (ibid, 434). Furthermore, deforestation happens due to 'clearing by displaced residents, from road construction, from migrants and investments attracted to the area, and from agribusiness made viable by waterways associated with many of the dams' (Fearnside 2016, 125). And not to mention the impacts of the dams on indigenous peoples like the loss of fish and other resources from the river that support local livelihoods, but also loss of aquatic biodiversity (Fearnside 2015a, 426; Brazil 2012; Runde Hallwass and Silvano 2020). These issues correlates to the work of Castro, Hogenboom and Baud (2016) and the four stages of primary commodity chain, see chapter one.

The named implications are visible in for example the massive hydroelectric Belo Monte dam in Pará on the Xingu River, also part of the PAC1 and PAC2 and fourth largest powerplant on the planet, and the devastation it has caused (Fearnside 2016, 125). The Belo Monte project, originated from the military in 1975, was completed in 2019 but has yet to uphold to foreseen electricity promised by its contractors and has low operation and economic performance. The designers have underestimated, not without warning from critics

[4] The PAC and the IIRSA show the export oriented vision with natural resources and the building of the infrastructure projects creates, as Kröger and Lalander (2016) and Veltmeyer (2013 explain, see chapter one, a reliance on extraction and export.

and local citizens, the flow rates and fluctuations of the Xingu River between wet and dry seasons (Ioris 2021, 15; Higgins 2020). Despite the caused damage of the Belo Monte dam, the government under Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff did at least meet with local people, including the indigenous community, to merely *hear* their concerns because they were not happy with the construction as is visible in a video of one of these reunions (PAC 2012a)[5]. This shows the more democratically approach of the PT compared to their precedents. Besides, although in vain, to have a more environmentally efficient approach under the PT, they tried a run-of-the-river design that requires a smaller reservoir and floods while using less lands (Burrier 2016, 351; PAC 2012b). Still these small gestures do not compare to the overall damage.

The question then is, how it is possible that with all this predicted impact, projects still go through while violating Brazil's own environmental law and indigenous rights? A possible answer can be found in the Brazilian legislation and a 'security suspension' in security law No. 12.016 of August 7, 2009, which states the following:

> 'When, at the request of an interested public legal entity or of the Public Prosecutor's Office and in order to avoid serious harm to public order, health, safety and the economy, the president of the court to which the respective appeal falls, in a reasoned decision, suspends ,the execution of the preliminary injunction and the sentence, this decision will be subject to an appeal, without suspensive effect, within a period of 5 (five) days, which will be brought to trial in the session following its filing.' (Brazil 2009, Art. 15 of Law No. 12.016)

This law states that it is allowed to suspend an appeal made in court in order to protect the Brazilian economy, which is considered a matter of national security. Notably, Law No. 12.016 from 2009 is a replacement of a law from the military dictatorship Law No. 4.348 (Art. 4) from 1964 (Brazil 1964). Actually, as explained in chapter two, it was under the notion of being a matter of national security that it was found essential to integrate the Amazon into the Brazilian economy during the military regime (Loureiro 2014, 325; Joanoni Neto and Guimarães Neto 2021, 368). Under the 'security suspension' dams are still allowed to be constructed to avoid serious economic harm to the country despite social or environmental violations (Fearnside 2015a, 434). In other words, the economy is prioritized. And the security

[5] This correlates to how Carothers (1999) and Chandhoke (2007) explain that civil society only exists in relation to the state, see chapter one.

of the Brazilians does not apply to all Brazilians since the indigenous peoples' rights are violated and even of nature. More importantly, this shows how these areas corresponds with what Vindal Ødegaard and Rivera Andía called 'human and environmental sacrifice zones' (2018, 24), see chapter one.

3.2 Local contestation to development projects on the use of the Tapajós river

The most recent development project under the government of Bolsonaro, although started under Temer in 2016 weeks after Rousseff's coup, is called the Partnership and Investment Program (Programa de Parcerias em Investimentos, PPI), this program is created by the federal government to coordinate and establish, once again, infrastructure[6] activities and investment and public- private partnership policies (STP 2021, 23; Brazil n.d.). In a discourse by President Bolsonaro on the Latin America Investment Conference organised by global investment bank Credit Suisse[7] on January 26, 2021, he emphasized 'We intend to accelerate concession and privatization auctions, especially within the scope of the Investment Partnerships Program, the PPI, which has a portfolio of long-term, low-risk strategic projects with attractive and stable rates of return' (Brazil 2021).

PPI also involves plans around the Tapajós river basin and nineteen indigenous lands (STP 2021, 22), particularly the Ferrogrão [Grainrail] railway of 933 km, connecting Mato Grosso and Pará described as a 'êxito do PPI [success of the PPI]' by Bolsonaro (Brazil 2021). Within his discourse there is no mention of what it means for the environment and the people in the region, the emphasis is on the economic opportunity. While it has been proven that this kind of infrastructure increases deforestation (Fearnside 2015b, 381), as is visible with the Highway BR-163 parallel to the Ferrogrão with 'the highest levels of illegal settlement, logging, small-scale mining and land-grabbing in the Tapajós region' (STP 2021, 22). Moreover, there are plans to build 54 terminals at the side of Ferrogrão for loading and unloading (ibid). Making the region even more attractive for people.

[6] The focus on infrastructure is, as explained by Tester (2020) in chapter one, understandable because it secures access to far-flung raw materials.

[7] A side note, Credit Suisse where Bolsonaro spoke is among the financial institutions providing credit to potential stakeholders of the projects on the Tapajós river (STP 2021, 48).

However, 40 per cent of the Tapajós river basin are occupied by protected areas and indigenous territory and already in 2016 licensing was halted because lands belonging to the Munduruku tribe would be affected by the building of the Tapajós Waterway, the Tapajós Hydroelectric Dam and the Ferrogrão railway (ibid; Fearnside 2015a, 431). Due to delay in the process of the official demarcation of the territory of the Munduruku, they have taken the matters into their own hands and are self-demarcating the boundaries of their lands by opening up a trail through the forest while removing possible invaders (Vega, Torres and Loures 2022). Juarez Munduruku, chief, explains how this was done: 'We took the map, the map of the land. And we looked for a researcher, who knew the lay of the land. So, through this, following the lines on the map, we did the self-demarcation' (APIBOFICIAL 2022, 1:03-1:15).[8]

When boundaries are unclear to the loggers and the federal government gives licences for extraction around the area of the Munduruku, clashes are bound to happen. Although not always necessarily violent, but of visions definitely (Rocha et al. 2021, 9). This quote below by someone from Munduruku in the report 'Voices from Tapajós: Indigenous views on planned infrastructure projects' explains this best:

> 'We see these projects as a death sentence by the government. (…) Development has a different meaning for us than it does for them. For us, it means clean water, the intact forest, it means us living off the forest, not depending on the Ferrogrão railway, hydroelectric power, and industrial waterways. They claim these are economically sustainable projects for Brazil, but they couldn't care less about our people. And we know these huge projects are never beneficial for the society. The only ones who benefit are them, the capitalists. These railways, waterways, dams and the like are not acceptable as far as we are concerned (Anderson Munduruku, 2020)' (STP 2021, 82).

What this quote makes clear, is that is not only about a clash of visions, but it is also about the right to live life without being poisoned from mercury because of mining activities (Meneses et al. 2022), to have access to food, to have the right to live without being imposed the logic of progress[9]/ development through these infrastructure projects that only bring wealth to a

[8] The self- demarcation concurs with how Carothers (1999) elucidated that specifically in the Global South civil stepped in as the state withdrew its help, see chapter one.
[9] As is said on the Brazilian flag: Ordem e Progresso [Order and Progress].

few people while destroying lives of thousands (Tosold 2020). The important role of water, and of all other life within the biome of the Amazon, is reduced to a commodity, to a waterway, to electricity and to agricultural expansion[10] while fulfilling such complex and heterogenous roles and the indigenous peoples for living on these 'resources' clash with the state simply by living another life than that of development and economic growth.

3.3 Searching for consensual ways to deal with exploitation of natural resources and deforestation in Pará

Although there can be a clash between the state's development plans and the local citizens living on the territory where the state wishes to develop through extraction, it does not mean that the state and local citizens cannot complement one another. In two conducted interviews for this thesis, it is shown to be possible. One interview was conducted with a civil servant, Ederson Rodrigues da Silva (26), from the municipality Tomé-Açu in the north-east of Pará who coordinator of the Alimenta Brasil Program is – PAB [Feed Brazil], former Food Acquisition Program – PAA in his municipality (Appendix I). And the other interview was conducted with a member, Cristiane Gondim, of a family farm from the small town of Nova Timboteua also in the east of Pará (personal interview).

The objective of PAB is to buy products from family farmers like that of the family Gondim and distribute nutritional baskets, with fruits, vegetables and fruit pulp, to 300 vulnerable families under the network of social assistance (Silva 2022). Moreover, this program has as objective to expand access to food and encourage the production of family farmers, extractavists, artisanal fishermen, indigenous peoples and other traditional populations while valuing biodiversity, and organic and agroecological food production (Brazil Ministry of Citizenship n.d.). The program falls under the Ministry of Citizenship and is part of the Rural Productive Inclusion, so it is all about collaboration between citizens and the state. Furthermore, Silva described that he was responsible to pay technical visits to farmers registered in the program, 'with this, I always encourage them to produce in an ecologically sustainable way and economically viable. Aiming at profit, but without causing damage to the environment' (Silva 2022).

[10] Or in the words of Vindal Ødegaard and Rivera Andía in chapter one: 'the extractivist 'translation of nature into resources' (2019, 24).

The family Gondim actually explains how through these technical visits, but then from EMATER (Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Company of the State of Pará), they learned and had their vision expanded after President Lula to produce more sustainably and went on to produce organically all types of products: different types of peppers, fruits and vegetables. Hereby also stopping deforesting their lands. She explains how they first had a slash and burn practice and first produced coinciding Brazil's production cycle (Pádua 2016, 27-9) rubber, coffee, sugar, to in 1982 even becoming the biggest producer of black pepper. Gondim describes how 'The vision is more conserved. But if you have a government that encourages, we can change'.

PAB is a federal program that is implemented by municipalities. And herein lies the issue because Silva explains how the government of Bolsonaro has since this year, 2022, cut the funding of PAB and without giving any explanation. The only information he had was that the former 'Bolsa Familia' now 'Auxílio Brasil [Brazil Aid]' increased to 400 reais [Brazilian currency] and to make this happen some programs were cut. Silva believes this to be a political strategy since it is election year and his opponent, Lula da Silva, also running for office, is best known for the Bolsa Familia, which also explains the change of name. Nevertheless, cuts in this type of social programs have been characteristic to the government of Bolsonaro: 'The government prioritizes big businesses over small ones' (Silva 2022). Besides, Silva explains how poverty is returning in Brazil 'so cutting this type of program only worsens people's situation'(ibid). Notably the PAB has been cut to 144 municipalities and this is only Pará, in the rest of the Brazilian municipalities the same has happened. This means a big part of the population is affected: the vulnerable families and the family farmers. And does not recompensate the increase of 'Auxílio Brasil'. The cuts have also been felt by the family Gondim that cannot count on the same support as before from EMATER under Lula compared to Bolsonaro. Election driven unfavourable choices by the current government are made in order to get votes, Silva therefore hopes the program returns with a new government. The example of Silva clarifies how in chapter one Sprinz (2009) stated that there can be a struggle between local governance and national governance due to difference in policy. And how promises made during elections can have negative implications for natural resources management and the use of a poverty reduction program during elections, see chapter one.

Even though Silva is not able to do his job, he is leading the council of food security and nutrition in Tomé-Açu. This allows 'the creation of community kitchens, restaurants

communities, social gardens and more programs that encourage the progress of needy families and reduce the rates of hunger and poverty in the country' (Silva 2022). Such a council is an example of what Joanoni Neto and Guimarães Neto have argued about how social exclusion are seen as burdensome to municipalities in the Legal Amazon and how certain development models have now been directed in traditional agriculture and sustainable agroforestry extraction (2021, 380-1). Tomé- Açu is actually known for the agroforestry, producing different types of products next to another without deforesting and the use of pesticides while harvesting the whole year (IDAM Rural 2021).

In the research by Siqueira-Gay et al. into positive scenarios for the Amazon forest in Pará scenario 3 that 'envisions regional sustainable development together with environmental awareness and behavioural change' (2020, 14), Nova Timboteua and Tomé-Açu reveal to be practical examples of this scenario. Part of this scenario is, amongst others, conservation and sustainable use of undesignated public lands, an educational behavioural change towards sustainable consumption with the positive outcomes of increased social development; employment generation based on Nature's Contribution to People's provision and maintenance; cultural empowerment through social learning (ibid). All the mentioned were in one way or another implemented by both municipalities. And demonstrates how involving local people improves the government's efficiency with resources as Sawhney et al. (2007) and better collaboration. Besides, Heller found that stronger engagement between the local state and citizens can counter and displace the power-based politics because it is more decentral (2017, 312). In contrast, if a government exactly represents the power-based politics then centralization is more in its interest and empowering civil society is then actually a threat. Cutting down funds for institutions empowering citizens seems from this perspective logical. Especially if this power-based politics represent political and economic elites which have their power exactly based on exclusion of the inhabitants of Brazil and on the exploitation of natural resources. A weaker civil society makes their objective easier accessible, especially if this includes those in civil society standing in the way of development plans, makes opting for an (authoritarian) governance easier. And this is visible in the current government of Bolsonaro and their 'business first' governance and has also become clear from the stories from Ederson Rodrigues da Silva and Cristiane Gondim.

Conclusion

The development plan 'Program for the Acceleration of Growth' (PAC) and the Partnership and Investment Program (PPI) show the clear relation of the state between economic growth and the extraction of natural resources and in Pará this is visible in infrastructure plans for the use of rivers and the areas around it. The building of (hydroelectric) dams and of a waterway on the Tapajós River and the Xingu River has shown to have several implications for the environment and for people. While it is against the environmental law and against the rights of indigenous peoples of Brazil to cause all this damage, projects are still aloud to go through due to the 'security suspension' prioritizing the Brazilian economy over people and the environment. The PPI has plans, around the Tapajós river: Tapajós Waterway, the Tapajós Hydroelectric Dam and the Ferrogrão railway. However, 40 per cent of the Tapajós river basin are occupied by protected areas and indigenous territory. Due to delay in the process of the official demarcation of the territory, the Munduruku are self-demarcating their territory and removing possible invaders. They see these projects as a death sentence by the government. The indigenous peoples for living, i.e. their location, on these 'resources' clash with the development plans of the state simply by living another life than that of development and economic growth.

With the interviews of the civil servant, Ederson Rodrigues da Silva, and a family farm member, Cristiane Gondim, the possibilities for a good collaboration between the state and its citizens regarding a sustainable management of natural resources appear to be possible. The state can stimulate family farmers to produce organically and teach about such technologies or organize food security councils. For this is important to have a government that stimulate and gives funding for such things, this was the case under Lula with a more decentral governance. Under Bolsonaro, more centralized governance, the funding and assistance they used to get, was drastically cut and the program of Silva has even been suspended. The government of Bolsonaro represents the power-based politics of economic and political elites, centralization is more in their interest because empowering local citizens can displace their power.

Conclusion

The research question this thesis tried to establish is *which factors and interests do explain the clashes of positions and visions one can find between the state and civil society in Brazil regarding the causes of resource extraction and deforestation and its possible solution*. Overall, this thesis has found that there are four main spheres where the clash is most visible: location, legislation, development plans and economic growth, and type of governance.

From a more general perspective the interests of the state can be found in the view of natural resources as a way to have economic growth and to develop. And it is in this vision that there can be a clash in Brazil between the state and civil society regarding deforestation and it is linked to the economic prosperity that the state sees for certain areas, such as the Amazon. This clash happens because these areas are regarded rich in natural resources and have been integrated into state's development plans for the export the resources, but these areas are inhabited. And upon implementation they encounter resistance from local citizens. Because the development plans interferes in their way of life due to deforestation and disruption of the natural environment such as the dams on the Tapajós River in Pará.

This thesis has shown how in Brazil several development plans since the sixties have involved infrastructure projects within the Amazon. So, the clash in the Amazon are mostly between the state and indigenous peoples and the way the infrastructure projects for facilitating the export of natural resources, like the PAC and the PPI, violates their rights as stated in the law. However, as made clear in chapter three, these rights can be ignored due to the 'security suspension' in another law and can hereby be used to the advantage of the economic interests that are according to that law regarded a matter of national security for the Brazilians. And the same goes for the environmentally protected areas. This not only shows the embeddedness of the economic interests within the Brazilian state, as chapter two showed has since colonization been connected to natural resource extraction, but it also shows how the Brazilian national security does not cover all Brazilians, especially not those located where the state wants to develop. Thus turning areas like the Tapajós River into human and environmental sacrifice zones. And makes that the state is actively contributing to environmental degradation by facilitating the building of dams for waterways and electricity that leads to deforestation, biodiversity loss and contamination of the river.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that civil society is not consulted before implementation of the projects and neither that there is not an environmental impact assessment. But it is more a formality than it is to take their rights into account, because in the end projects always go through while having warnings for detrimental environmental effects and human rights violation. Although, it can make a difference when the government does involve the civil society more and has a more democratic approach because it builds more trust between them and makes it less prone to conflict and more environmentally friendly. However, weakening the institutions on which civil society and environmental protection can fall back, which at the same time strengthens them, is an effective way for the government to keep economic interests going without encountering too much resistance. Or rather, making it easier to ignore the resistance and protection of nature.

The possibilities for a good collaboration between the state and its citizens appear to be for grabs. But with the dominant notion of nature as a source for economic growth combined with a global demand for natural resources while having a forest the size of western- Europe on its soil rich in resources, makes the Brazilian presidents continue to dream of development and catching up, while creating a dependence on these resources and causing more and more destruction, as if the Amazon is a bottomless pit. Luckily other articulations are possible, and it does not need to be the developmental state against the people. And as already expressed in the Rights of Nature, when turning to nature differences matter and every organism has its function and right to exist in a way to fulfil its unique role.

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Appendix I

Email exchange with civil servant Ederson Rodrigues of municipality Tomé- Açu in Pará.

Van: **Ederson Rodrigues** edersonrodsil@gmail.com
Onderwerp: Re: Perguntas
Datum: 29 juni 2022 om 14:10
Aan: amanda gomes lobo amandafortaleza@msn.com

ER

Ederson Rodrigues
Engenheiro Agrícola - UFRA
Coordenador do Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos - Tomé-Açu
(91) 99171-8259

- *Qual é seu nome?*

Ederson Rodrigues da Silva
26 anos

- *Pode descrever seu cargo e como é o programa? Como você apoia a agricultura familiar?*

Coordenador do **Programa Alimenta Brasil - PAB**, antigo **Programa de aquisição de alimentos - PAA.**
O objetivo do programa permanece o mesmo, porém no início de 2022 mudou o nome.
O objetivo do PAB é comprar produtos provenientes da agricultura familiar e distribuir às famílias atendidas pela rede socioassistencial, por isso, dentro do meu município (Tomé-Açu), o programa está inserido na Secretaria Municipal de Trabalho e Assistência Social - SETAS.

Mudou só o nome, mas o programa é o mesmo.
Compra alimentos de agricultura familiar e distribui para as famílias mais vulneráveis através da Assistência social.
Mudou uma regra no antigo **Bolsa Família**, aumentou para 400 reais e o nome passou a ser **Auxílio Brasil**, com isso o Governo Federal deixou de investir em alguns outros programas, como o Programa Alimenta Brasil.
Eles não forneceram uma explicação para a descontinuação do programa.
É ano de eleição, acredita-se que seja uma estratégia política.
Espera-se que o programa volte com a troca de gestão e que o próximo presidente volte a dar recursos.
Corte no dinheiro da secretaria dele desde o governo Bolsonaro e assim é a situação com várias coisas.
O governo prioriza os grandes negócios e não os pequenos.
Voltando a linha de pobreza no Brasil então o corte desse tipo de programa só piora a situação das pessoas.

- *Como o estado e a sociedade civil podem se complementar? Como é tua experiência também no trabalho do ano passado?*

Através do Conselho de segurança alimentar e nutricional. Permitindo a criação de cozinhas comunitárias, restaurantes populares, hortas sociais e mais programas que incentivem o progresso de famílias carentes e diminuam os índices de fome e pobreza no país.
Durante o ano passado, tivemos mais recursos financeiros e com isso diversas famílias foram beneficiadas, seja de agricultores, que puderam vender seus produtos, ou de famílias vulneráveis que receberam as cestas nutricionais, contendo frutas, legumes, verduras e polpas de frutas.

- *Como seu trabalho se relaciona ao uso sustentável de recursos naturais?*
- Através do Programa Alimenta Brasil, eu também sou responsável por prestar visitas técnicas aos agricultores cadastrados no programa, com isso, sempre os incentivo a produzir de maneira ecologicamente sustentável e economicamente viável. Visando o lucro, porém sem causar prejuízos ao meio ambiente.