What Shall We Do with the Drunken Greeks? In Search of a Socio-Cultural Pathology of the Problematic Drinker in Ancient Greece

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Table of Contents

Introduction

Rufus Wainwright's 2002 song titled *Cigarettes and Chocolate Milk* opens with the following lines:

> Cigarettes and chocolate milk / These are just a couple of my cravings / Everything it seems I like's a little bit stronger / A little bit thicker, a little bit harmful for me
>
> If I should buy jellybeans / Have to eat them all in just one sitting / Everything it seems I like's a little bit sweeter / A little bit fatter, a little bit harmful for me

Wainwright sketches out at a feeling that will probably be recognized by most, if not all, listeners: giving in to a temptation of which you know that it will only please you briefly and might even harm you in the long run. An extra dimension to these lyrics is the fact that Wainwright separates himself from a 'norm' of self-indulgence, comparing to and separating himself from 'the rest': everything *he* likes is just 'a little bit stronger'. This image of Wainwright's own uncontrollable excessiveness could be interpreted as a reference to addiction. Nowadays, habitual, overconsumption of a substance with recurring negative consequences is pathologized and referred to by most as 'addiction'.[1] Modern definitions of the term differ per discipline, but at their core refer to repetitiveness of behaviour, excessiveness in usage, and a decreased feeling of self-control.[2] Having to eat the whole bag of jellybeans every time ticks all these boxes.

We can find similar references to 'resist[ing] anything, except temptation' throughout literature, even dating back as far as ancient Greek literature.[3] In ancient Greece, the most prominently consumed psychotropic substance is wine.[4] Whereas wine is something that is presented as a great good and of high significance for ancient Greek culture in the texts we

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1 In the psychological handbooks, the term 'addiction' is not the most up-to-date term to use. The DSM III had the word 'addiction' until 1994, when the DSM-IV changed it to 'dependency' (C. O'Brien 2011). The DSM 5, which is the most up-to-date version, now has 'substance use disorder'. However, for reasons of readability I have chosen to use the word 'addiction'. My project is not about modern-day addiction, but on whether a (socio-cultural) addiction concept existed in antiquity. For this reason, I do not feel obliged to use the most up-to-date terminology and feel free to use the most common term outside of the professional sphere to refer to the problem: (alcohol) addiction or alcoholism.

2 Cf. Pickard & Sinnott-Armstrong 2013, 862: 'Addiction is a strong and habitual want that significantly reduces control and leads to significant harm.' Carr 2011, 11: 'The *sine qua non* of alcohol dependence (and addictive illness generally) is loss of control, such as the inability to cut down, stop, or predict outcome once drinking starts despite adverse consequences.'

3 The famous quote 'I can resist anything, except temptation' is from Oscar Wilde's *Lady Windermere's Fan* (1892).

4 For a brief and clear overview of how the consumption of wine had a distinguishing function for ancient Greek culture as opposed to 'beer drinking cultures', see specifically two chapters in Nelson 2005, namely 'The Greek Prejudice Against Beer' (25-37) and 'The Two Drinking Ideologies of Ancient Europe' (38-44).

have extant, we also find many passages in which the dangers of (wrongly) consuming wine are mentioned, such as the following verse from Theognis' *Elegies*: οἶνος πινόμενος πουλὺς κακόν, 'wine is bad when drunk in large quantities'.[5]

In modern times, someone who is viewed as drinking too much, too often, and creating damage while drunk would quite likely be described as an 'addict' or 'alcoholic'. These pathological definitions have become part of mainstream culture and they generally are well-known by most people who live in a culture where alcohol is consumed on a regular basis. This clear presence of alcoholism in the modern-day world can give the impression that having alcohol addicts present is something that is inherent to a culture that consumes alcohol. And, indeed, many introductions to handbooks, articles, or book chapters on the issue of (alcohol) addiction in modern times contain statements that stress this seeming universality, such as the following quote from an article from the medical world: 'Alcohol dependency (alcoholism) has existed throughout recorded history. It remains a highly stigmatized illness, looked down on by society, the patients themselves, and the medical establishment.'[6] In ancient Greek literature, there are descriptions, specifically in the ancient Greek medical corpus, that seem to contain physiological descriptions of symptoms which we would now connect to (habitual) overconsumption of alcohol, such as liver cirrhosis or a delirium tremens. These bio-medical or physiological 'clues' for the existence of (physical) alcohol addiction in the ancient world have been extensively researched by (mostly) French classicists such as Jacques Jouanna or Pierre Villard.[7] A point rightfully raised by J.O. Leibowitz is that 'when we remember that alcoholic beverages have always been consumed in Mediterranean countries on a fairly wide scale it is remarkable to note that ancient literature provides us with few data about the mental *sequelae* of alcoholic addiction.'[8] This psychological dimension – how did excessive drinkers feel? How were they seen by the other drinkers? – to excessive alcohol consumption is less immediately traceable in the ancient writings and has not yet been studied within the field of classics.

With this project I want to provide a starting point to research the psychological dimension of excessive alcohol consumption in the ancient Greek world. My approach is text-

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5 Theognis, *Elegiae* v. 509. Ed. Young 1971. All translations are my own unless stated otherwise.

6 Carr 2011, 9.

7 E.g. Jouanna 2012, especially part two chapter 10 'Wine and Medicine in Ancient Greece' (pp. 173-194); Jouanna, L. Villard & Béguin 2002; P. Villard 1988. During a conversation with a lecturer from Sorbonne University, it was also brought to my attention that Pierre Villard has written a monograph on 'alcoolisme chronique' from a (to my understanding) physiological point of view, with a focus on the ancient medical corpus that has unfortunately remained unpublished. I have not been able to find any information on this project yet but hope to succeed in doing so in the future.

8 Leibowitz 1967, 83. The article by Leibowitz plays specific attention to a passage from the Hippocratic corpus that appears to describe someone who is suffering from a *delirium tremens*.

based and from a socio-cultural perspective. My main question is if the ancient Greek texts show that, on a socio-cultural level, habitual (over)consumption of alcohol was conceptualized as pathological. In short: were ancient Greek habitual drunks considered mentally ill?

The texts that I have selected for this project share that they all contain remarks that put (habitual) overindulgence of wine in a bad light, some in a serious, some in a lighter fashion. My focus, as said, is on the socio-cultural dimension of drinking and it is important for me to stress that this means that I maintain a relative concept to what problematic drinking is. This approach is in line with an anthropological, sociological or psychological interpretation rather than a bio-medical one.[9] From this socio-cultural perspective, problematic drinking is drinking behaviour that is disregarded by the social group the drinker belongs to and considered as undesirable from their perspective. (I will refer to the drinker's social group with the sociological term of 'in-group' throughout.[10]) Whether or not something is problematic then is related to what the in-group's socio-behavioural codes dictates: what do the rules of the group say you can or can't do, drink-wise? This view makes problematic a relative, rather than an absolute concept. Each different in-group has its own social (drinking) code, which implicitly defines how *not* to drink.

This last point is at the core of the premise of a volume edited by the renowned Mary Douglas on the social significance of drinking alcohol titled *Constructive Drinking* (1987):

> 'Drunkenness [...] expresses culture in so far as it always takes the form of a highly patterned, learned comportment which varies from one culture to another: pink elephants in one region, green snakes in another. [...] Drinking is essentially a social act, performed in a recognized social context.'[11]

This title has proven to be of invaluable worth for the development of my argument and references to it are made throughout. The different contributions to *Constructive Drinking* stress that drinking more often is constructive – in that it strengthens the ties of the in-group and has a positive social effect – than harmful. A similar remark is made by classicist Oswyn Murray:

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9 I will use 'problematic drinking' to refer to all instances that are relevant for my argument, namely those examples in which one of the drinkers causes a disturbance after disregarding what can be seen as the social drinking code of that moment.

10 As I have noted that the term 'in-group' has become very common to use also outside the social sciences and in day-to-day discourse, and as the term is so clear in what it signifies, I do not consider it necessary to provide an etiological account of this term. I also want to add that when I refer to the drinker, I will use 'he'. In the ancient Greek world, the drinkers of alcoholic beverages predominantly or almost exclusively were men. Therefore, a more gender inclusive reference does not feel historically correct. Whenever I refer to modern times however, I will refer to all genders as possible drinkers.

11 Douglas 1987, 4. Cf Room 1987, 171: 'In true Durkheimian fashion, the boundaries of the drinking group are often, however, as much a matter of exclusion as of inclusion.'

> 'Unlike most drugs, alcohol does not isolate the individual in a private world; it is normally consumed in a social context: its characteristic physiological effect of reducing inhibitory social barriers is seen not as leading to anomie, but as helping to create a sense of togetherness, of group bonding.' [12]

The volume by Douglas focuses on the social drinking codes of several geographically and culturally different in-groups (from roughly the second half of the 20th century onwards) from an anthropological perspective. The large differences between the accounts the book provides, underline that 'how to drink' should not be viewed as consisting of a universal set of rules. The act of drinking is highly socially construed, context bound and contains many different in-group specific details that are of particular importance for that specific drinking occasion and for that specific drinking in-group. Drinking according to the rules of your in-group is a *condicio sine qua non* for making drinking a socially constructive act. If the act of drinking is executed correctly, alcohol is a social lubricant. *Vice versa*, if one breaks with the drinking code, one also takes away the constructive dimension of drinking, even making it a socially *destructive* act. With whom you drink thus dictates how you drink, and with this each in-group for itself also dictates which drinking behaviour is *not* accepted. This relative and group-related approach to drinking is crucial to my research and has dictated the way I have organized my chapters.

The first part, titled 'The Ancient Greek Experience of Wine Consumption: *Graeco More Bibere?*', generally argues that correct drinking behaviour is not a universal concept, but a relative one that is dictated by the rules of the in-group. I will stress this in a twofold way. First, I will stress how the ancient texts show that drinking is a very much presented as a social act, that has to be executed in accordance with the rules of this social group and that if someone is unable to do so, he is 'othered'.[13] 'Othering' bad symposiasts is a frequent pattern in ancient Greek literature which, in my opinion, underlines the idea that drinking (according to the rules) is an essential act for social cohesion. Those who affect the effectivity of this act by disobeying the rules, are told to leave as they *destruct* the social cohesion, as we will see in my examples. A second point that I make in the first chapter is that the rules of the symposium should *not* be

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12 Cf. Murray & Tecuşan 1995, 4-5.

13 The term 'othering' is an important term within post-colonial studies, describing the discursive process of defining hegemony and hierarchy by categorizing participants based on their position in the food chain: are they in charge, or not? However, the term has also become relatively well-known outside of this discipline, especially in debates on racialisation and stereotyping (Thomas-Olalde & Velho 2011, 27). This term is thus linked to the idea of having an in-group and an out-group, as the process of 'othering' in a way is like out-grouping someone, but with an emphasis on the fact that the group the out-grouped/othered person is put in, in terms of status is less significant than that of the person (or group) that was the subject of othering.

seen as those that dictate all drinking behaviour of ancient Greece. I will argue that this is the case, by comparing the symposium to the Athenian Anthesteria and showing how those drinking codes not only differ strongly but can even be seen as each other's opposites. Nevertheless, both sets of rules, in their own contexts, are the right way to drink.

In the second part, titled 'The Wine Made Me Do It: Linguistic Representations of the (Harmful) Agency of Wine', I will focus on the aspect of damage that is created post-excessive consumption (I will refer to this throughout as 'problematic drinking') and consider how the ancient Greek language presents who to blame for the coming into existence of damage which stands in relation to a drinker's drunkenness. For this analysis, I will depend on several tools from the social sciences, namely the concept of 'semantic roles' from cognitive linguistics, and the concept of agency in a broader sense from a linguistic anthropological perspective.

In the third part, which is the last and concluding chapter titled 'Concluding Remarks: Lacking Ingredients for Developing a Socio-Cultural Pathology of Problematic Wine Drinking in Ancient Greece', I will return to the general question on whether on a socio-cultural level, habitual (over)consumption of alcohol is conceptualized in a pathological fashion in ancient Greece. And, as the title gives away, I will argue that I consider this not to be the case. I will refer to modern psychological theories that emphasize the importance of the right social conditions for a conceptualization of a mental illness to come into existence and argue that these conditions appear to be absent in ancient Greek society.

Chapter One:

The Ancient Greek Experience of Wine Consumption:

Graeco More Bibere?

1.1 Introduction: Wine and Drinking Codes

Wine is not all bad. Quite the opposite.[14] Wine can make the festive moments of life more festive, and it can make sad moments more bearable. In antiquity, wine also was explicitly described as having alleviating features.[15] In Alcaeus fragment 346 it is described as 'οἶνον […] λαθικάδεον', 'alleviating wine', that was given to mankind by the son Zeus and Semele.[16] In the first stasimon of *Bacchae,* we read how 'ὁ δαίμων ὁ Διὸς παῖς' (v. 417), 'the divinity the child of Zeus', has given 'ἴσαν δ' ἔς τε τὸν ὄλβιον | τόν τε χείρονα', 'equally to the rich and the poor' (vv. 421-422), 'οἴνου τέρψιν ἄλυπον', 'the painless joy of wine' (v. 423).[17] Similar references to this positive, soothing side of wine can be found throughout the ancient Greek corpus. However, there are also many examples in which the *bad* side of wine is stressed, often in comparison to its good side, such as here in Theognis' *Elegiae* vv. 509-510, which I also partly mentioned in the introduction:

> οἶνος πινόμενος πουλὺς κακόν· ἢν δέ τις αὐτὸν
> πίνῃ ἐπισταμένως, οὐ κακόν ἀλλ' ἀγαθόν
> Wine is bad when drunk in large quantities. But if someone drinks it knowledgably, it is not bad but good.[18]

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14 Cf. Bowie 1995, 113(-125) on how in Attic old comedy, wine is presented as 'a central constituent of the good life and an important catalyst of well-being, provided that it is correctly used.'

15 Cf. *Operi Galeni*, vol. 4, 777K.7-8: Λύπης δ' ἁπάσης καὶ δυσθυμίας κουφίζει σαφῶς οἶνος πινόμενος, ἑκάστης γὰρ ἡμέρας τούτου πειρώμεθα, 'drinking wine in a sensible fashion softens all pain and heartache, for of this we find proof every day.' As my focus is on approaching the pathological features of excessive wine-consumption from a socio-psychological, rather than a bio- medical perspective, I have chosen not to focus on the ancient medical texts for now. However, passages I will discuss below are also mentioned in Galen's treatise *On the Soul's Traits,* which I will mention in a footnote if it is the case. In a future project on this topic, I intend compare my findings to the discussion on correct usage of wine in the medical texts, but for now my focus will not be on this corpus. I am, however, aware of the fact that these texts contain highly relevant remarks on my subject.

16 Ed. Lobel & Page 1955.

17 Ed. Dodds 1960. Because I could not put it any better, for verse 423 I used the translation by Kovacs 2002. Cf. Dodds (1960, 127) on possible translations of ἄλυπον: 'either 'assuaging grief' or more probably 'causing no grief', 'innocent'.' Given the eventual fate of Pentheus, the fact that wine is described as something that provides 'τέρψιν ἄλυπον' obviously also is a beautiful example of dramatic irony. I will address the emphasis on the emphatic dual nature of wine, as something wonderful on the one side, and something gruesome on the other side later in this chapter.

18 *Elegiae* vv. 509-510. Cf. *Operi Galeni* vol. 4, 778K.13-15.

Wine has the potential to be both bad and good, and consumption manner (πίνῃ | ἐπισταμένως) is what actualizes either side.[19]

In most modern cultures, drinking wine (or any other type of alcohol) is a perfectly acceptable and normal part of life. However, its dangers are also emphasized and drinking alcohol is governed up to a certain level. Next to these explicit rules such as the fact that it is illegal to drink and drive in most countries, the act of drinking wine, or alcohol in general, is also governed on a more implicit, more social level as the act of drinking is subject to a certain set of social rules. If the drinker drinks according to this 'drinking code', it will be a constructive act: an act that heightens social cohesion, inclusion, and acceptance by the rest of the group, which is the premise of *Constructive Drinking* (1987), which (as I mentioned before) shows that rather than viewing drinking as something bad and destructive – which had become the dominant view on alcohol in the scholarly world of the second half of the 20th century – drinking according to the rules of the in-group can be beneficial from a social perspective.[20] In *Constructive Drinking*, we find detailed accounts of several different drinking cultures, ranging from a comparison of palm wine-drinking rituals between the tribe of the Lele and the Cokwe to Georgian drinking fests, where excessive drinking is encouraged and viewed as heightening your social status.[21]

When reading the book integrally, one will notice that it very hard to pin down one universal set of rules that is at the basis of all drinking codes. Not even moderation appears to be one if we consider the Georgian example. The different accounts of drinking culture in *Constructive Drinking* thus present the idea of a 'drinking code' as a fluid rather than universal concept. Every group seems to govern their own drinking code, that is executed collectively and hereby (re)establishes social cohesion of the drinking-group.[22] *Mutatis mutandis,* 'bad' ways

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19 A reference to this as 'Schrödinger's bottle of wine' is a temptation hard to resist.

20 A critique voiced by sociologist Robin Room on ethnographers exploring cultural drinking values during the eighties of the last century touches upon this point. Room accused those scholars of either imposing the scholars' own (predominantly north American) in-group drinking values on the studied cultures too much, viewing all drinkers who exceeded the measure of north American alcohol consumption as alcoholics, *or* that they were so afraid that they would impose their own cultural drinking norms onto another society, that they banned any type of evaluative remark from their research, by way of speech, not seeing the great, pink elephant, even if it was right in the room with them. For this, including a brief correspondence history of the polemic between Room and a group of ethnographers (foremost Dwight Heath) on this point, see Room 1985.

21 For the African tribes of the Lele and Cokwe and how they differ in the execution of palm wine rituals, see Ngokwey 1987, 113-121. For the Georgian drinking fests, see Mars & Altman 1987, 270-279.

22 For this 'functionalist' way in which scholarship in general treats alcohol consumption, see Murray & Tecuşan 1995, 5: 'We thus interpret the rituals concerned with alcohol in a functionalist sense, as serving to establish group relations,or creating a religious atmosphere, or as offering a release from social tensions. We emphasize the *usefulness* of alcohol, even when we qualify that usefulness as usefulness for relaxation – as when the warrior group, in leisure moments, prepares itself for future conflicts through the pleasures of the male drinking group.'

of drinking, ones that are not according to the drinking code, will interculturally be equally fluid and non-universal and should always be understood in relation to the drinking *mores* of the in-group the bad drinker belongs to.

1.2 A Note on Pathologizing Ancient Drinking Behaviour

When trying to understand whether in the ancient Greek world we can speak of a pathological way of drinking in the emic sense, the accounts that we will study must be problematic in relation to the dominant *mores* of the in-group that problematic drinker belongs to, not to that of another in-group.[23] Again, the excessive drinker at the Georgian drinking fest, by participating on more than once occasion (which is likely), will probably tick enough of DSM-5 boxes for him to be diagnosed with alcoholism. However, if this way of drinking is the way that his in-group dictates, and in that way affects him positively in a social way, one can wonder whether there is any point in describing the behaviour as problematic or pathological, as this extreme drinker is really doing exactly what he must do from a social perspective.[24]

The question on how to understand concepts of disease from an emic point of view as an outsider is one of the main questions in medical anthropology. Kleinman and Kleinman (1991) strongly emphasize the importance of a relativist point of view in developing outlines for mental disorders specifically between different cultures. They describe the *experience* people from different cultures will have of these mental disorders as something that should be thought of as 'the intersubjective medium of social transactions in local moral worlds', explicitly mentioning the importance of interpreting the 'experiencer's experience' in his own cultural context to properly develop an understanding of how his or her suffering should be understood.[25]

In a monograph that also looks at pathologized behaviour in antiquity, Chiara Thumiger equates the challenges articulated by Kleinman and Kleinman as 'fundamentally the same as those arising in historical inquiries [into mental disorders]'.[26] For any description

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23 In her monograph on the ancient mind and mental health, Chiara Thumiger also discusses excessive drinking as a form of pathological behaviour (among other forms of excessive behaviour). However, Thumiger approaches the subject more from a physiological perspective, saying explicitly that she is leaving the social sciences out of sight: 'I shall thus mostly leave aside the anthropology and cultural relativity of emotional experiences to look at their less susceptible core.' (2017, 340) My approach thus is novel and complementary to her work.

24 I do however see that the physiological damage that will result from repeatedly over-intoxicating yourself, such as for example liver cirrhosis, is damaging as you probably die from it earlier than you would have without, and that is a plausible result of excessive drinking behaviour. However, as I have mentioned in the introduction already and in the previous footnote: in this research I am not looking at physiological damage, but I am looking at the socio-psychological damage that the 'destructive drinker' suffers because of the disapproval of his behaviour by the group.

25 Kleinman & Kleinman 1991, 277.

26 Thumiger 2017, 24. Cf. Kleinman & Kleinman 1991, 277: 'Ethnographers enter the stream of social

of ancient Greek behaviour to rightfully be described as pathological it is absolutely essential to do this from what we see as the *experience* of the ancient Greek. This, again, is in line with another remark by Chiara Thumiger, which presents quite clearly what the impetus of this chapter was: 'Statements regarding mental health also include, to some extent, an evaluation of states with reference to what a 'good life', i.e., a life worth living, happy and morally sound, might be.'[27] The research at hand thus requires an elaborate and detailed exploration of the emic values behind ancient Greek drinking code, which is the focus of this chapter.

1.3 The Ambiguous Nature of Wine

Wine was consumed collectively, and its consumption was of great significance for ancient Greek culture.[28] The ancient Greeks saw wine as a constructive, important and positive part of their daily lives: wine was very visible and present, so the confrontation with this substance must be imagined as a frequent one. The fact that wine played such a significant role in ancient Greek society implies that this potentially dangerous side of wine also often was close, so the drinker would often have to actively avoid letting the bad side of wine appear. On how ancient Greeks controlled wine consumption, François Lissarague mentions the following:

> 'control [of wine consumption] was necessary because, in the Greek imagination, wine was an ambiguous drink, like liquid fire, at once dangerous and beneficial. The myths that tell of the origin of the vine and of wine highlight their ambivalent nature, halfway between the savage and the civilized, functioning as a mediation between these two polar opposites.'[29]

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experience at a particular time and place, so that their description will be both a cross-sectional slice through the complexity of on-going priorities and a part of the temporal flow of changing structures of relevance. That such structures are contested, indeterminate, novel and changing means that the ethnographer's descriptions are always about a local moral world that can only be known incompletely, and for which the relative validity of observations must be regularly re-calibrated. […] A central orienting question in ethnography should be to interpret what is at stake for particular participants in particular situations.' For other relevant discussions on this point, see Geertz 1988; Morris, Leung, Ames & Lickel 1999; Mostowlansky & Rota 2016.

27 Thumiger 2017, 42. See also James Davidson on a relativist approach to ancient Greek pleasure specifically, in Davidson 2018, 5: 'For modern students of the ancient world, therefore, understanding the strangeness of ancient pleasure means understanding ancient pleasure in its ancient context, and an important part of that ancient context is the ancient temporal context. To understand how the Greeks thought about and even experienced pleasures of the flesh, it is helpful, or maybe even necessary, to think about how they had been plotted onto a timeline. We might even say that this temporal aspect of pleasure—the sense that pleasure has a history, a present and a past—is a central feature of how the Greeks understood pleasure.'

28 For a brief example of how ancient Greek (here: Homeric) drinking code emphasizes the fact that drinking is perceived as a highly social act, see Sherratt 2004, 307: 'The importance of wine-drinking as a highly significant social activity is underlined by the custom of giving kraters and drinking cups as guest friend gifts (*Il.* 6.220, 23.741, 24.233-234; *Od.* 4.591, 615-619, 8.430, 9.203, 15.85, 115-119, 24.275.'

29 Lissarague 1990, 5. Cf Davidson 2018, 35: 'The origin stories might also serve to account for another

A small example of the Greeks controlling their wine consumption can be seen in the fact that during great drinking festivals, *oinoptai* were appointed 'who had responsibilities for ensuring appropriate shares of wine', making sure that there would be a shared level of drunkenness, rather than having one person on one side of the table as 'drunk as a skunk', and having another who is still finishing his first glass.[30]

Euripides' *Bacchae* is one of the texts that provides a clear picture on this presumed ambiguous nature of Dionysos and wine and the potentially dangerous side of consuming it (wrongly). From line 266 onwards, Teiresias discusses the great importance of Dionysos' coming, telling the chorus about the two most important things among humans (τὰ πρῶτ', v. 275).[31] The first, as he continues, is Demeter, the goddess who provides feeds the humans with dry food (αὕτη μὲν ἐν ξηροῖσιν ἐκτρέφει βροτούς, v. 277). Then Dionysos is mentioned, or 'the man born from Semele', who provides mankind with the most important good, and it is this good that provides the counterbalance (ἀντίπαλον, v. 278) for Demeter's dry food: the wet drink to accompany it (ὑγρὸν πῶμ', v. 279) that Dionysos led from the vine and brought to the people. Teiresias later equates this wet drink to the divinity Dionysos himself and describes it as follows:

> [– –] ὃ παύει τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς 280
> λύπης, ὅταν πλησθῶσιν ἀμπέλου ῥοῆς,
> ὕπνον τε λήθην τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν κακῶν
> δίδωσιν, οὐδ' ἔστ' ἄλλο φάρμακον πόνων.
>
> It is this that ends misery for distressed people, when they are filled up with the stream of the vine, and it is this that gives sleep to forget daily sorrows, not is there another remedy against sufferings.[32]

These lines articulate awareness of a (positive) relationship between emotional (well)being and consuming wine. Wine consumption is presented as potentially alleviating trouble in a way that no other substance can. However, Pentheus' experience with wine/Dionysos that we will encounter later in the tragedy will not be an alleviation of his troubles, quite the opposite. I would say that exactly these two contrastive representations of wine/Dionysos in the *Bacchae*

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peculiar feature of Greek pleasure, the extraordinary elaboration of protocols, formulaic practices and pottery-assemblages with which in different cities basic instincts such as (homo)sexual lust and drinking alcohol are barnacled: the following of boys in a pack, the hanging outside doorways, the never modifying formula of the *kalos* inscription or, on the other hand, the correct sequence of toasts, the mixing with water, the lying on couches, the equal pouring of wine, the singing of songs by turns, all always moving from left to right.'

30 Fisher 2008, 185 f.n. 2.

31 Ed. Diggle 1994.

32 We find a similar description of wine in Euripides, *Bacchae* 772: παυσίλυπον ἀμπελον.

encompass the ancient perception of the substance: wine is simultaneously (very) good and (very) bad. We also see this very simply and clearly in the fact that wine is referred to often as a φάρμακον.[33] This word has a dual meaning, as the word signifies something that is (or can be) both 'healing and noxious', as the *LSJ* gives. Wine is not *only* good, or *only* bad, but can be, and in a way is, both.

1.4 The (Im)moderate Drinker(s) of Anacreon Fragment 356 *PMG*

Of all these social drinking contexts, the symposium is the social institution that is represented most frequently in the sources we have extant.[34] Many features of the symposium place strong emphasis on the idea of consuming collectively and strengthening group cohesion by doing so. For example, the group of men at the symposium share from one and the same krater that is placed in the middle of the drinking group. The fact that the krater is placed so centrally at the symposium, with the drinkers turned towards and around the krater, is a feature Lissarague emphasizes repeatedly as a visualization of the importance of the shared collectiveness underlying to the symposium.[35] The image and the idea of the symposium seems to be one of sharing: sharing amounts of wine, sharing conversation. Generally, the drinking code of the symposium that we can detract from the sources can be described as follows: one must drink the right mixture of water and wine, in the right social context (i.e., surrounded by the Greek male elite), and in a moderate fashion.[36] The following poem by Anacreon illustrates several of this features, and provides information on the correct and incorrect execution of this 'drinking code':

> ἄγε δὴ φέρ' ἡμν ὦ παῖ
> κελέβην, ὅκως ἄμυστιν
> προπίω, τὰ μὲν δέκ' ἐγχέας
> ὕδατος, τὰ πέντε δ' οἴνου
> κυάθους ὡς ἂν †ὑβριστιῶς†*
> ἀνὰ δηὖτε βασσαρήσω.

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33 Jouanna also emphasizes this point, cf. Jouanna 2012, 173-194.

34 For a discussion specifically on why the symposium is the social institute we know most about, see Murray 2018, 11-23.

35 Lissarague 1990.

36 Cf. Lissarague 1990 who refers to these three characteristics throughout. Cf. also, Garcia-Soler 2010; Villard 1988.

ἄγε δηὖτε μηκέτ’ οὕτω
πατάγῳ τε κἀλαλητῷ
Σκυθικὴν πόσιν παρ’ οἴνῳ
μελετῶμεν, ἀλλὰ καλοῖς
ὑποπίνοντες ἐν ὕμνοις.[37]

Yes, come, bring the cup to me, boy, so that I can finish it in one drought, filling it with ten measures of water, and five of wine, so that I shall once again have a bacchanal, frantically.[38]
Come, let us once again no longer drink the Scythian way with pounding and yelling over wine, but carefully sipping over beautiful hymns.

In the first stanza, we meet a man who clearly is up for a drink: the words ἄγε and φέρ’ show the speaker’s excitement. The speaker also stresses that he wants to drink everything in one go (ὅκως ἄμυστιν | προπίω) and seems to feel that the wine can’t come soon enough. This high tempo of drinking, however, is not in accordance with the ideal of moderation but the speaker seems to be aware of this. He corrects himself: his previous bibulous eagerness is interrupted by the fact that the speaker asks the boy to prepare the wine in the right mixture. The fact that the boy first will have to mix the wine will result in it taking longer for the speaker to receive his drink. However, waiting for that to happen will also result into him drinking according to the Greek drinking *mores*.

The speaker hereby gives an image of having tempered his own craving, correcting it in a way that it appears to be in accordance with the ideal of moderation and mixture. He adds, with a conjunction starting with ὡς, that the boy’s act of mixing later will serve as a condition for him to once again (δηὖτε) revel like a bacchant. For this (hypothetical) act, the speaker uses a rather unusual verb, namely (ἀνα)βασσαρέω. This verb refers to a Thracian name for Dionysos, *Bassareus,* that was used to worship Dionysus in the cult in Lydia.[39] Also, another

37 Anacreon fragment 356 *PMG.* Ed. Bernsdorff 2020 vol. I.

38 For a (to me) inexplicable reason, Bernsdorff translates the word ὑβριστιῶς, which is the word in between cruces in his edition, with ‘moderately’. In the section on this specific word in his commentary, he also says ‘this shows the religious connotation of the word: excessive drinking would be sacrilege against Dionysos.’ (2020 vol. II, 431) With all willingness I have tried to understand where the choice for ‘moderately’ comes from, but I do not understand this decision and have therefore translated the adverb with a word that has a more negative connotation.

39 Ridgeway 1896, 21. *Bassareus* has been etymologically explained as a reference to the fox skin the bacchants wore while revelling, but there is no full consensus on this point. The word as I mention above, has a Lydian ring to it. It is interesting to note that the Lydian power collapsed in the middle of the sixth century BCE (cf. Murray 2018, 141), which appears to be around the date this poem was published. The poet’s estimated date of birth is around 575 BCE (Bernsdorff 2020 vol. I, 3). This would make it possible to carefully assume that this poem is written *after* the collapse of the Lydian empire. Using a word – and I want to note once more that it is a remarkable and unusual word that would catch the attention of the audience – with a Lydian connotation to refer to a ‘bad symposiast’ seems to be extra significant from

'foreign' aspect of the drinker's drinking-plans is the word used for the drinking cup: κελέβην. In his commentary on the poem, Bernsdorff mentions that it is a 'word of unknown etymology', that has a far broader meaning that merely drinking cup, but due to its context must denote something in the line of a drinking vessel.[40]

The imagined setting, the mixing and the moderation that play a role in this poem seem to point in the direction of the speaker being a 'good' symposiast. However, a closer look at the five κύαθοι the speaker brings up, might alter this image. The 10:5 (*de facto* 2:1) ratio that is mentioned in the poem, is mentioned in Plutarch's *Questiones Convivales* 657c-d (3.9) as a ratio that is 'in contrast to other proportions. It is mentioned as the middle ground between 3:1 which produces a 'sober and feeble mixture (νήφαλιοις καὶ ἀδρανὴς κρᾶσις), suitable for magistrates in the prytaneium or logicians, and 3:2 which produces profound rest. The ratio 2:1, however, causes a state in which the soul is disturbed and brought into motion'.[41] In his commentary on the Anacreontic poems, Bernsdorff also discusses the link between the poem and this remark by Plutarch. Bernsdorff mentions that whereas the 10:5 ratio *de facto* might be moderate, the imagined quantity of five κύαθοι 'would mean 625 to 1250 ml of wine, which is rather a large quantity, all the more so if drunk in one draught.'[42] Therefore, the way the speaker advises the boy to mix the wine is contrastive not only in contrast with the speaker's previous exaltation to drink everything in one draught, but also in itself, in that it emphasizes the relation between excessive drinking and 'normal' or moderate drinking. Also, and this might be understood in relation to the extravagant quantity of wine the speaker mentions, the image of Lydia that is referred to through the verb βασσαρέω is often used as a trope to refer to vain and overdone luxuriousness.

In this same hypothetical, post-mixing situation, we find a text problem. The edition by Bernsdorff (the one I use) has ὑβριστιῶς, which would emphasize the revelling side of the drinking party. Using words related to the idea of *hybris* is relatively common to use for extreme drinking. For example, in the opening speech of a tragedy by Eubulus on Dionysos (extant through Athenaeus), the character Dionysos refers to the third krater, which is the one 'that is no longer his', as the krater belonging to *Hybris*.[43] Following this idea, drinking ὑβριστιῶς

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the perspective of the political status of the Lydians. However interesting this point may be, I have decided not to discuss this point in more detail for now because it is not necessary for my argument here. However, in an upcoming paper I will give at the Society of Classical Studies' Conference of January 2023 on the representation of the bad symposiast in Anacreon fragment 356 *PMG,* I will discuss this point in more detail.

40 Bernsdorff 2020 vol. II, 427. For a detailed account of this word, see Athenaeus 11.475c-f.

41 Bernsdorff 2020 vol. II, 428.

42 Bernsdorff 2020 vol. II, 428.

43 Ed. and most relevant commentary to this text is Hunter 1983.

represents a way of drinking that does not belong to the Dionysiac ideal. In my terminology drinking ὑβριστιῶς might be interpreted as *not* according to the ancient Greek drinking code, thus making it a destructive rather than a constructive act.

It is my conviction that the lines I discussed above should be interpreted as presenting its listeners with a 'bad' symposiast. The speaker in the first stanza is trying to be a good symposiast but fails on all three criteria: the 'foreignness' of some of the language indicate that he is not a proper Greek in-grouper (i.e.: the right social context is lacking), and the extravagant quantity of wine that is mentioned together with the odd ratio also make him fail on both the ideal of moderation and the right mixture.[44] The foreignness of the speaker's language is most clear in the verb (ἀνα)βασσαρέω, which refers to a non-Greek Dionysos cult. Him referring to this foreign ritual places the speaker outside of the symposiast's in-group, because *barbaroi* like the Lydians are traditionally not part of the symposium.[45]

I consider the content of the second stanza as strengthening my interpretation of the first stanza. In the second stanza, the tone changes completely: the speaker seems to correct the drinker of the first stanza by calling for a far less measureless act that is in accordance with the ideal of Greek moderation. In the opening line of the second stanza, we read a repetition of the word δηὖτε, which seems to respond to the δηὖτε of the last sentence of the first stanza. However, here, in this opening line, the 'once again' is negated, and it is especially said that we are *not* going to revel in that 'barbaric' (namely: Scythian, Σκυθικὴν πόσιν) with pointless noisemaking (πατάγωι τε κἀλαλητῶι). The speaker of the second stanza seems to know how to have a correct Greek symposium, as the behaviour he promotes in the last lines of the poem, has a very Greek, civilized, and moderate ring to it, when he proposes to drink moderately and sing nice songs (ἀλλὰ καλοῖς | ὑποπίνοντες ἐν ὕμνοις).

In my view, we thus have an example of an immoderate drinker in the first stanza, or a 'bad symposiast', who proposes a way of drinking that in a sense is problematic, as it contains many (well-hidden) non-Greek elements. In the second stanza, we find a moderate drinker, the

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44 Ewen Bowie has written much about how in Attic old comedy the theme of 'unusual drinkers' (slaves, (old) women) is a recurrent and prominent one. For a detailed account of 'unusual drinkers' in Aristophanic comedy, see for example 'Wine in Old Comedy' in Murray & Tecuşan 1995, 113-125; Bowie 1997.

45 In an article on the usage of particular language discourse when speaking about alcohol by Nigerian youths, Eyo Mensah argues that 'identity and masculinity are framed in rural youth's discourses of alcohol and drinking behaviour.' (2020, 2) Mensah makes a remark on why this type of discourse is used that is in line with the point I am intending to make here: 'Language use in this context is basically a social practice particularly in delimiting the borders of belonging and social acceptance in a specific in-group. This entails that young people use exclusionary mechanisms in their social practices and linguistic behaviour to side-line others from their social structures and interactions, which are dictated by forces of stratification in the wider society.' (ibid.)

'good symposiast' who behaves according to the Greek *mores* which would be perfectly in line with the drinking rules of the in-group, as we are to imagine an archaic, Greek male symposium as the context in which the text was performed. The second speaker corrects and, in that way, maybe even places himself above the speaker of stanza one, which I see as an example of 'othering' the 'bad symposiast'.

1.5 'Out-Grouping' Bad Drinkers in Theognis' *Elegiae*: 'You Can't Sit with Us'

We will now turn to another comparison of a bad versus a good symposiast, which we encounter in Theognis' *Elegiae* 475-491:

αὐτὰρ ἐγώ—μέτρον γὰρ ἔχω μελιηδέος οἴνου—
ὕπνου λυσικάκου μνήσομαι οἴκαδ' ἰών.
ἥξω δ' ὡς οἶνος χαριέστατος ἀνδρὶ πεπόσθαι·
οὔτε τι γὰρ νήφω οὔτε λίην μεθύω.
ὃς δ' ἂν ὑπερβάλληι πόσιος μέτρον, οὐκέτι κεῖνος
τῆς αὐτοῦ γλώσσης καρτερὸς οὐδὲ νόου·
μυθεῖται δ' ἀπάλαμνα, τὰ νήφοσι γίνεται αἰσχρά,
αἰδεῖται δ' ἔρδων οὐδέν, ὅταν μεθύηι,
τὸ πρὶν ἐὼν σώφρων, τότε νήπιος. ἀλλὰ σὺ ταῦτα
γινώσκων μὴ πῖν' οἶνον ὑπερβολάδην,
ἀλλ' ἢ πρὶν μεθύειν ὑπανίστασο—μή σε βιάσθω
γαστὴρ ὥστε κακὸν λάτριν ἐφημέριον—
ἢ παρεὼν μὴ πῖνε. σὺ δ' 'ἔγχεε' τοῦτο μάταιον
κωτίλλεις αἰεί· τοὔνεκά τοι μεθύεις·
ἡ μὲν γὰρ 'φέρεται φιλοτήσιος', ἡ δὲ 'πρόκειται,'
τὴν δὲ 'θεοῖς σπένδεις', τὴν δ' 'ἐπὶ χειρὸς ἔχεις'·
αἰνεῖσθαι δ' οὐκ οἶδας.

But I – for I have had my measure of honey-sweet wine – shall put my mind to sleep that removes all evil and go home. I have reached the moment in which wine is most beneficious to have been drunk by man: for I am sober nor buzzing with drink. But he who exaggerates what measure to drink, that person no longer controls his own speech nor mind. He shares ridiculous stories, stories that appear scandalous to those who are sober, while doing so, he has no shame, when he is drunk, previously of sane mind, now a lunatic. But you, knowing those things, do not drink wine immoderately, but rise before you are drink – do not attack your body like a bloody day labourer

> does — or stay, but don't drink. But you chatter 'pour' every time: because of this you are utterly drunk. For it is either 'make a toast on friendship', or it is 'it's in front of me!', and 'you, pour a libation for the gods', and 'you have it in your hand already'. You do not know how to say no.

The speaker begins by praising himself on the fact that he knows when it is time to go home (from the symposium), namely when he has consumed the right amount of wine: μέτρον γὰρ ἔχω μελιηδέος οἴνου (v. 475). The speaker then tells the audience that he has reached that moment after having drunk wine which is most pleasurable to men (ἥξω δ' ὡς οἶνος χαριέστατος ἀνδρὶ πεπόσθαι, v. 477). The highest level of post-wine pleasure is described as a golden middle, in which the drinker is neither drunk nor sober: οὔτε τι γὰρ νήφω οὔτε λίην μεθύω (v. 478). The speaker thus seems to present himself as an exemplary drinker, one who both knows and behaves according to the etiquette of the drinking party and has the required level of self-control and moderation. After the speaker's praise of himself, we turn to the 'bad' drinker. First described in the third singular, he is presented as someone who repeatedly drinks so much that he loses control over what he says and thinks: οὐκέτι κεῖνος | τῆς αὐτοῦ γλώσσης καρτερὸς οὐδὲ νόου (vv. 479-480).

In the following lines we find a description of the behaviour of this type of man: he has lost all decorum and makes up stories ramblingly (μυθεῖται δ' ἀπάλαμνα, v. 481). It is mentioned that he is normally not a ridiculous person: he first might have been a wise man but is now an idiot (τὸ πρὶν ἐὼν σώφρων, τότε νήπιος, v. 483). Then, we shift to a second singular, and the speaker addresses the excessive drinker directly, saying that even though he *knows* that he shouldn't drink as he does, does this nevertheless: ἀλλὰ σὺ ταῦτα | γινώσκων μὴ πῖν' οἶνον ὑπερβολάδην (vv. 484-485). The speaker warns the addressee to stop with this drinking pattern during social drinking occasions in the future, or to not drink at all.

A very interesting feature of the speaker's admonition towards the 'bad symposiast' addressee that is somewhat like the Scythian-insult in Anacreon 356 *PMG* and in-group/out-group thinking, is that the speaker refers to the addressee's undesirable drinking behaviour as that of 'a bloody day-labourer' ([…] ὥστε κακὸν λάτριν ἐφημέριον, v. 486). With this remark, the speaker excludes his overly inebriated addressee from the present in-group. At the symposium, the in-group consists of elite males, and not of day-labourers who belong to a much lower social stratum and would not be invited nor present normally. The impetus behind the remark of the speaker in this elegy by Theognis, seems to again show an idea of 'othering' as well as a strict admonition towards the addressee. The speaker in a way threatens the addressee to become excluded from the in-group if he continues to behave in this way, which also

occurred in the Anacreon poem we discussed. Drinking according to the rules of the symposium is important if you want to continue with being part of the collective of elite Greek males *at* the symposium. If you drink in a way that is in discordance with the way you should, you might be othered and thus exluded. Relevant to this 'out-group' versus 'in-group' drinking in the sympotic context, is the discussion on how clear the cut was between the aristocratic citizen and the everyman in ancient Greece. Oswyn Murray stresses that 'the distinction between aristocracy and the rest of the community was in many ways an uncertain one, lacking a clear institutional or economic basis.'[46] In a later publication, Oswyn Murray remarks that 'even the Theognidean corpus, which offers the most extreme expression of a desire for aristocratic exclusivity, is obsessed with the permeability of the group of the sympotic *aristoi* by the low-born and wealthy.'[47]

The point Murray makes about the 'obsession' Theognis has with the 'permeability' of his in-group is very relevant for my analysis, and that my analysis also supports this observation. As I have mentioned before, at the beginning of this chapter, drinking according to the drinking rules, 'constructive drinking', should be seen as an act that heightens social cohesion and generally strengthens the group, and that opposite behaviour leads to an opposite result of damaging this group. In the admonition (or even threat) by Theognis' speaker towards the addressee, the speaker makes clear that this 'unconventional' drinking behaviour should stop. I deem it probable that the motivation behind the speaker expressing these thoughts is that he wants to avoid the addressee damaging the group's cohesion, making it a remark that is intended to very explicitly *preserve* the well-being of the in-group. This, in turn, could mean that the in-group Theognis' speaker is trying to protect, in a way (in his mind) is a fragile one that might need a certain level of protection. This last remark thus is very much in line with Murray's claim, as Murray emphasizes both Theognis' wish for a clear distinction between aristocrat and everyman, as well as a certain 'fear' of the fact that this distinction might not be as impermeable as Theognis ideally would have it be.

1.6 Reversing the Rules: The Athenian Anthesteria

Exclusion as a result of disobeying drinking code thus seems to be a common way to address overly excessive, and therefore, 'bad' symposiasts. However, it is important to keep in mind

46 Murray 1980, 219. Even though the discussion mentioned by Murray is relevant for my argument, I would say that a detailed discussion of it for now lies outside of the scope of my argument as I am now focusing on behaviour on a much smaller scale than that discussion covers, which is why I decided not to provide a detailed account of it for now.

47 Murray 2018, 140.

that the drinking code as it is set for the ancient Greek symposium, which was the social context of both of the previous examples, is not the only imaginable drinking code. The criteria that dictate how to behave at the symposium do not account for *all* moments in which wine is consumed. There is no standard set of rules for all occasions: the 'bad' symposiast might be a perfectly fine drinker in another setting, and the 'good' symposiast might be a terrible drinker in another setting.

An example in which the code regarding wine drinking is very different from the symposium, are the Athenian Anthesteria. This is a festival dedicated to Dionysos, to wine, to death, 'a feast of all souls', 'a celebration of "flowering Dionysos" which takes place for three days in the month of Anthesterion (February-March)', celebrating the connection between Dionysos and wine.[48] The role Dionysos plays during the Anthesteria, differs from the Dionysia, as Martha Habash mentions: 'In the Dionysia [Dionysos] is invoked as the god of the seed. In contrast, the Anthesteria rejoices in the blossoming of the seed. While the Rural Dionysia celebrates Dionysos' wine for its power as a treaty and as peace, the Anthesteria celebrates the new, abundant wine of the season.'[49]

The festival is tripartite. The *Choes* ('The Pouring'), is the second part of the festival, viewed as the most important one and the part of the festival we have the most information on, which I will discuss below. The *Choes* is celebrated on the 12th of the month called Anthesterion. The first part of the festival is called the *Pithoigia,* celebrated on the 11th, 'The Opening of the Jar', and the third part is referred to as *Chytroi,* 'The Pot Feast', which takes place on the 13th. During the *Choes* the participants are all specifically allotted their own, individual portion of mixed wine.[50] They then have a drinking competition, which occurs in total silence.[51] The participant who has finished his own jug first, is the winner. The wine was mixed with water, so the ideal of the right mixture rather than drinking straight was present. However, the ideal of moderation and the ideal of sharing in the correct social context that are present so emphatically at the symposium are markedly absent during this competition. The rules of the

48 Van Hoorn 1951, 19. Sorkin Rabinowitz 2008, 62.

49 Habash 1995, 575.

50 Van Hoorn 1951, 1. Burkert 1972, 238 ff. Hamilton 1992, 2. Habash 1995, 567 ff.

51 Burkert 1972, 238 ff. The academic tradition on the Anthesteria is somewhat complicated, as the available sources do not fully provide with a closing image of the festival in its entirety. For a detailed discussion of the problems regarding scholarship on the festival, see the introduction (pp. 1-4) of Hamilton 1992 for a summary, and the book as its whole for a discussion of all problematic aspects regarding the scholarly tradition on the festival. For the research at hand, a detailed discussion of this complex tradition is not necessary, as the most relevant part of the festival for my argument is the *Choes,* 'for which alone there are multiple literary references and for which alone there is visual testimony that has a convincing claim as evidence for the festival.' (Hamilton 1992, 3) For a brief overview of the other aetiologies of the Anthesteria and the role Icarius might have played are role in how the rituals of the Anthesteria are interpreted, see Davidson in Harris 2018, 26; Parker 2007, 375-376.

symposium are in that sense inverted during the Anthesteria, even though these events could easily take place in a close time span: the Anthesteria might be once a year, but holding a symposium was a frequent thing to do. The point of me comparing the symposium to the Anthesteria, thus is to stress that drinking code was *not* universal or set in stone, but that multiple different drinking styles could exist simultaneously, and according to which style the drinker drank was determined by the social context.

In a monograph on the Athenian Anthesteria, Richard Hamilton refers to the festival as 'the most complicated set of rituals recorded for ancient Athens […] mirroring the complex and contradictory Dionysus we meet in Euripides' *Bacchae.*'[52] And indeed, the drinking rules at the Anthesteria seem elusive and the extravagance of the behaviour that is expected appears almost as tempting wine's savage side to manifest. In that light, the drinking code of the Anthesteria seems to temporarily invert and overthrow the normal social drinking order that we, for example, saw in the previous examples related to the symposium.

The most fully extant ancient sources on the oddities of the drinking rituals of the Anthesteria, most notably Aristophanes' *Acharnians* and Euripides' *Iphigeneia in Tauris,* connect them to Orestes. The aetiology by Euripides has a very earnest ring to it, whereas the one by Aristophanes focuses on the Anthesteria as a festival of 'foolishness', as Martha Habash puts it.[53] This 'foolishness' is not hard to imagine, as during the drinking competition, everyone had to drink as fast as they could. We can imagine that the type of drinking that occurred during the competition was gluttonous, and people would get drunk quickly, which generally sounds like the type of uncontrolled behaviour that befits old comedy. This emphasis on drunkenness as a result of the competition, is what we see clearly in Aristophanes' *Acharnians,* where the character Dikaiopolis is described as lavishly drunk in detail, repeatedly.

In Euripides' *Iphigineia in Tauris,* we find one of the foundational myths on the fact that the drinking was done in solitude at the Anthesteria. Even though there is little to no consensus about which foundational myth we should deem as *the* foundational myth, I want to take a brief look at the passage in which we come across Orestes' dining in solitude, as I consider it an excellent way to emphasize how uncommon we should consider solitary dining or drinking in ancient Greece: doing so is a very marked and therefore remarkable act. Starting in verse 939, Orestes tells Iphigeneia about his wanderings before arriving there in Athens. He here makes

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52 Hamilton 1992, 1. In a chapter in William Harris' *Pain and Pleasure in Classical Times,* James Davidson writes that the Anthesteria probably were 'the closest thing they had to Christmas, it has been said, in terms of emotional appeal.' (2018, 25). This made me wonder how James Davidson celebrates Christmas on the one side and wanting an invitation on the other.

53 Habash 1995, 569.

explicit that he will not speak about the bad things that his mother had done, (or the bad things he did *to* his mother, depending on whether we read μητρὸς as an objective or subjective genitive: τὰ μητρὸς ταῦθ' ἃ σιγῶμεν κακὰ, v. 940). We then read about how Orestes attempted to find a host to provide him with something to eat. First, all men turn away from him and do not want to host him, as he was hated by the gods: πρῶτα μέν μ' οὐδεὶς ξένων ἑκὼν ἐδέξαθ', ὡς θεοῖς στυγούμενον, v. 947. However, there were people who eventually did invite him out of *aidōs*, but in a very different manner than how one would usually invite a guestfriend, as Orestes was very explicitly kept apart from the rest, which he explains to Iphigeneia:

> οἳ δ' ἔσχον αἰδῶ, ξένια μονοτράπεζά μοι
> παρέσχον, οἴκων ὄντες ἐν ταὐτῷ στέγει,
> σιγῇ δ' ἐτεκτήναντ' ἀπόφθεγκτόν μ', ὅπως
> δαιτός τ' ὀναίμην πώματός τ' αὐτῶν δίχα,
> ἐς δ' ἄγγος ἴδιον ἴσον ἅπασι Βακχίου
> μέτρημα πληρώσαντες εἶχον ἡδονήν.[54]
>
> But those who felt a sense of obligation, offered guest friendship in the form of a dinner for one to me, even though they were under the same roof, they set it up in a way that I was unspoken to, in silence, so that I was able to enjoy both my daily bread and water separate from them, and having poured an equal vessel, a measure of Bacchus, to all separately, they celebrated.

Having a solitary symposium is what we also see during the *Choes'* drinking competition I previously mentioned.[55] The participants all drink alone, together, which Burkert refers to as 'Bindung durch symbolische Verschuldung'.[56] The social context and sharedness of the symposium thus seems to be markedly absent in the context of the Anthesteria, as I said before.

The solitary drinking context the *Choes* begins with, also appears as very incompatible with another sympotic ideal, namely that of moderation. To return to the point about the

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54 Ed. Diggle 1981.

55 Many sources, also relatively recent publications on the Anthesteria I discussed before, consider the story of Orestes as the etiology for the solitary drinking competion of the Anthestheria. In *Iphigeneia in Tauris,* Orestes indeed closes this part of by saying that he has heard that this event of him grievingly dining in solitude has become a ritual that is still executed during an Athenian festival: κλύω δ' Ἀθηναίοισι τἀμὰ δυστυχῆ | τελετὴν γενέσθαι, κἄτι τὸν νόμον μένειν (958-959). This, obviously, does not have to meant that this indeed was the correct etiology of the ritual, especially as Euripides is known to transform certain mythological details. As said before, the Anthesteria are considered to be one of the most complex festivals of ancient Greece and finding out how to best explain the background of the rituals that were performed at the festival would probably be a project much larger than the whole of the project at hand. My reference to Orestes is to illustrate how marked we must imagine solitary eating or drinking, not to express that I believe the Orestes' myth is the most probable foundation to the ritual.

56 Burkert 1972, 245.

importance of drinking in the right social context at the symposium: participant-wise the festival also differs extremely from sympotic drinking occasions. During the Anthesteria 'auch Sklaven und Taglöhner, ja sogar die Kinder' were allowed to participate.[57] Enslaved people, day labourers and children would usually be excluded from drinking (which we explicitly saw in the Theognis example). Walter Burkert also clearly points to this reversal of the normal consumption order when he says the following:

> '[Chous] war freilich die deutliche Antithese eines gewöhnlichen' Festtagsessens. Jeder Teilnehmer Hatte seinen eigenen Tisch, und während sonst zum Gelage ein großer Mischkrug mit Wein und Wasser angesetzt wurde, aus dem die Schenken reihum die Trinkschalen füllten, erhielt an den Choen jeder Teilnehmer ein für alle Mal seine eigene Kanne, eben den Chous' mit etwa 2% Litern gemischten Weins.'[58]

The fact that during the *Choes* everybody sat alone, emphasizes the individuality of the drinking act. This solitude, together with the fact that participants tried to drink their wine as quick as possible, and the participants also consisting of people who were normally excluded, make the Anthesteria stand out strongly in regard of drinking code. Rules such as drinking the wine as fast as you can as you did at the start of the festival, would be unwished for at the symposium. They could be acts that lead to exclusion there, whereas at the Anthesteria exactly this act is what ultimately leads to 'togetherness' and correct execution of the ritual, and with that enforcement of social cohesion.

Drinking your own cup of wine, by yourself, as fast as you can is what we should see as constructive drinking at the Anthesteria. Just like the emphasis on shared, moderate drinking in the symposium is constructive in that context, an emphasis on solitary drinking can be seen as constructive if this act is governed by a set of rules that is shared by all participants. In short, there is not one single, omnipresent set of drinking rules that account for every possible situation. Therefore, destructive drinking *also* is not something universal, as it can only be defined in relation to what is a constructive way of drinking in a specific setting.

1.7 Conclusion: Drinking Rules Are Social, Not Universal

With this chapter I hope to have made clear that drinking is a highly socially constructed and fluid act, that takes different shapes per context. When we think about drinking, we must

57 Burkert 1972, 241. Cf. Habash 1995, 568.
58 Burkert 1972, 243.

imagine it as lacking a clear universal set of characteristics that describe drinking behaviour that is either correct or faulty. Whereas I am willing to admit that there is some sort of universality in the bio-medical damage one does to their body while repeatedly drinking destructively, I very strongly want to argue that the socio-psychological 'damage' is highly dependent on the context. Therefore, a very clear and thorough exploration of ancient Greek drinking attitude is necessary for one to even begin to speak of a (non-biomedical) pathology of problematic drinking.[59]

And as we saw, even *graeco more bibere* does not signify one type of act with specific rules, but takes different forms of shapes, depending on what the *mores* of that moment are. Therefore, problematic drinking, drinking that is socio-culturally harmful for the drinker, will also take many different forms and shapes.[60] Pinpointing which drinking behaviour is so problematic in that it perturbs the dominant drinking code, thus requires a very careful analysis of the social context in which the drinking is taking place. I also intended to argue that for ancient Greece, the social dimension to drinking can also be seen in a simple way in the emphasis on collective consumption of the symposium, and maybe also in the very marked *solitary* wine consumption at the Anthesteria, which emphasizes that drinking wine normally is something that occurs within the context of a group. Furthermore, the 'othering' response to problematic drinkers again underlines the importance of collectiveness during ancient Greek drinking occasions: drinking is not something you can just do the way you want it to do, you must do it the way the group wants, otherwise you are excluded.

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59 Cf. Kleinman & Kleinman 1991, 293: 'Because of the social construction of the flow of experience, psychosomatic processes are transmitters and receivers of cultural codes. Because of the psychophysiological grounding of experience, cultural codes cannot make of each of us precisely what they will. There is also a panhuman constraint on the continuities and transformations that represent our lives and our networks which derives from the limited number of social ways of being human.'

60 For clarification, see the following remark by Mensah 2020, 1: 'Every culture has meaning and connotations regarding the norms and expectancies about alcohol consumption. These parameters in drinking practice may vary cross-culturally depending on cultural beliefs, religious orientation or even abstention. […] This implies that alcohol consumption is a culturally endorsed social practice, and every culture stipulates the norms that govern such a practice […].'

Chapter Two:

'The Wine Made Me Do It': Linguistic Representations of the (Harmful) Agency of Wine

2.1 Introduction: Who to Blame?

At the beginning of the previous chapter, I presented the Greek mentalization of wine as something that has a highly ambiguous nature. Whereas many texts discuss the benefits of drinking wine, the potential harmful, savage, or disastrous side of wine is equally represented, as we can gruesomely see in the fate of Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae,* or more mildly in regard of the addressee in the previously discussed elegy on the 'bad symposiast' by Theognis. This chapter discusses how, in problematic drinking situations, the Greek language represents damage as a consequence of (excessive) alcohol consumption. I am interested specifically in whether the language attributes a level of responsibility or agency to wine when any form of damage occurs that stands in (in)direct causal relation to the behaviour of a destructive drinker. To provide an answer to this, I will look at how the semantic roles of agent, patient, and instrument are distributed over the entities that partake in the drinking action, with a specific focus on how agency is represented. I will depend strongly on studies from the field of cognitive linguistics that focuses on semantic roles, and on studies from linguistic anthropology that focus on agency in a more general sense. (In the next paragraph, I will briefly elaborate on these 'tools' that I have borrowed from the social sciences for further clarification.) I want to note that this approach to discovering whether a seeming non-agentic entity such as wine can have (semantic) agency is a relatively novel one and, as to my knowledge, there are no fully focused studies from Classical scholarship that I can depend on.[61] Especially because of this last point, I want to stress that I have used these tools heuristically, and I will elaborate on this last point at the end of this chapter.

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61 A 2005 monograph by Coulter H. George titled *Expressions of Agency in Ancient Greek* does cover the question of agency, but George focuses almost exclusively on passive constructions and uses a linguistic rather than a cognitive linguistic approach, making his work less relevant for the question I intend to answer in this chapter. In the volume edited by Luraghi and Narrog I will mention quite often throughout this chapter, we find a contribution by Eugenio Luján and César Ruiz Abad on the ancient Greek language and that also discusses agency. However, their approach again is very technical in a linguistic sense and does not contain the cognitive dimension that is needed for my approach.

2.2 Semantic Roles, Agency, and Accountability

In a study on the typology of language titled *Perspectives on Semantic Roles*, Silvia Luraghi and Heiko Narrog (2014) simply but aptly describe semantic roles as 'the roles taken by participants in an event'.[62] The most prominent of these roles are that of the semantic agent, 'the participant who brings about an event voluntarily', that of the semantic patient, 'the participant which undergoes a change of state brought about by the agent', and that of the semantic instrument, 'the participant used by the agent to bring about the event'.[63] Luraghi and Narrog here use the example 'Mary cut the rope with a knife', to give a basic idea of how these three participants could be represented in a phrase: Mary is the agent, the rope is the patient, and the knife is the instrument. In my analysis of the Greek texts later in this chapter, I will use 'agent', 'patient' and 'instrument' in the same way Luraghi and Narrog approach the terms.

Agency, generally put, can be understood as the level of power or influence any entity has over what happens within a given situation. The entity that has the most power and choice over what will happen, can be seen as the entity that has the highest level of agency. Adding a social perspective to agency, as Paul Kockelman argues, makes that a heightened level of agency implies a heightened level of responsibility and accountability:

> 'Agency might initially be understood as the relatively flexible wielding of means toward ends. For example, one can use a range of tools to achieve a specific goal, or one can use a specific tool to achieve a range of goals. In this way, flexibility may involve having lots of options open or having a strong say in which particular option will be acted on. […] Finally, with this flexibility usually comes accountability: the more agency one has over some process, the more one can be held responsible for its outcome and thereby be subject to praise or blame, reward or punishment, pride or shame.'[64]

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62 Luraghi & Narrog 2014, 1. The study of 'semantic roles' emerged in the mid-sixties of the 20th century, most notably by Jeffrey Gruber's 1965 dissertation titled *Studies in Lexical Relations,* and later by Charles Fillmore 1968; 1971. In the following decades semantic roles became a broadly studies concept in linguistics. However, as Luraghi and Narrog mention too on this same page, the concept 'semantic roles' has also been criticized strongly over the years. They refer to a 2010 article by Frederick Newmeyer who in response to Martin Haspelmath 2010 criticizes 'universal comparative concepts [such as the semantic roles 'agent' and 'patient'] and language-particular descriptive categories [as being] each highly problematic in and of themselves. It is only by means of working out the interplay between the language-particular and the language-independent that we can hope to understand either.' (Newmeyer 2010, 688) He continues by criticizing cross-linguistic 'structuralizing' studies, saying that they lack a properly shared terminological frame: 'In my view there is no construct as murky in ANY subdivision of linguistic theory as that of 'thematic role'. […] What precisely ARE the definitions of Agent, Patient, Theme, Goal, and so forth? Little agreement exists, and where there is a consensus, the criteria lead to conflicting or counterintuitive results.' (Newmeyer 2010, 689) This is a highly valuable discussion that I did not want to leave unmentioned. However, the critique as voiced by Newmeyer mostly problematizes the usage of the terminology cross-linguistically. I look at the Greek language only and am not comparing my findings to other languages (yet).

63 Luraghi & Narrog 2014, 1.

64 Kockelman 2007, 375.

In a more recent publication titled *Distributed Agency* (2017), edited by Kockelman and Enfield, we find a further specification how agency functions, how it is distributed and how it is perceived in a social context. In their understanding of how agency operates, the terms flexibility, 'who (or what) has a hand or say in the creation of some effect, object, idea or action?', and accountability, 'how are those with agency held accountable […] for their contribution?', play a significant role.[65]

2.3 Are Some 'Things' More Agentic Than Others?

In the social sciences agency has become an important subject and the scholarship on the subject is extensive. Within this field, whether seemingly non-agentic/non-living entities such as, for example, a table, a lump of bread or wine (like in our case) can be perceived as 'agents' has also been a specific point of discussion.[66] In regard of the scope of this project, the scholarship on the topic is too elaborate to present comprehensively. Nevertheless, to briefly illustrate how one can think about attributing agency to 'non-living' things, I will compare the arguments of two leading scholars, Alfred Gell and Bruno Latour.

Social anthropologist Alfred Gell makes a distinction between primary and secondary agency. Primary agency – the philosophical concept of agency 'in itself' – is attributed to animate entities ('social agents', entities that live, that can have 'goals and intentions') and secondary agency – the form of agency that exists only in relation to a patient – (also) to inanimate entities (entities that don't live, nor have goals or intentions).[67] He emphasizes that in practice, it is important to approach the concept of agency as a relational concept: 'for every agent, there is a patient, and conversely, for any patient, there is an agent.'[68] He elaborates on this with the example of his car breaking down in the middle of the night. In this event, he describes himself as being the patient and the car as agent, but stresses that the car only is an agent in the relation to him as patient. The car is not an 'agent in itself' and can't be, according

65 Enfield and Kockelman 2017, xii. Cf. also Enfield 2015; Kockelman 2007.

66 To briefly add something on this last point, in archaeology the concept 'agency' has become more and more visible in the late 20th century. Here, a question that is raised which appears to be in line with the inclusive approach to agency as proposed by Latour is whether seeming non-agentic entities such animals or the material an object consists of should be perceived as having a certain level of agency in the creation of the objects (or subjects) that are studied by archaeologists (e.g.: was the material in any way perceived as co-operating in the creation of the objects?) Lindstrøm 2015, 207: 'While human agency is often regarded not as an individual quality, but as depending on social structures, contrastingly, animal agency is increasingly recognized, and even inanimate objects/things are argued to have agency 'in themselves', not only as 'secondary' or 'distributed' agency.' For a brief overview of the state of the art until 2015, see Lindstrøm 2015, 208. For a monograph on agency as an archaeological concept in relation to the written material sources, see Englehardt 2012.

67 Gell 1998, 21-23. Cf. Lindstrøm 2015, 209; 214 ff.

68 Gell 1998, 22.

to Gell. However, in its current interactional relation to Gell, in which something changed in the car that affected Gell without him being able to do something about it, the car *is* an agent and is conceptualized as having agency. The car and Gell's respective agent and patient roles thus are entangled and exist only in relation and interaction with each other: 'agent/patient relations form nested hierarchies […]. The concept of the 'patient' is not, therefore, a simple one, in that being a 'patient' may be a form of (derivative) agency.'[69]

As opposed to Gell, sociologist Bruno Latour does not maintain a division of levels on agency based on whether any given entity is perceived as 'living' (having goals and intentions) and even departs from imposing a distinction between possibly agentic entities based on any characteristics at all in his work. He argues that 'the type of actors at work should be increased', meaning that we should perceive agency as something that all entities, animate or not, can (hypothetically) have.[70] He clearly stresses that we should *not* see human (or living) agency as necessarily at the top of the agency-food chain and that we should be willing to recognize the ability of a non-living agent to (fully) be an agent 'in itself' (to use Gell's terminology), not only in relation to other, living agents.

In Gell's view, if 'interaction' occurs between a 'living' and 'non-living' entity, all entities hypothetically can be agents. In Latour, all entities can always be agents. All the examples I will discuss in this chapter are text examples in which a living entity interacts with a substance (mostly wine). Therefore, all the examples are events in which we can speak of interaction and relation, thus making all participating entities possible agents in the views of both Gell and Latour. The reason why wanted to oppose specifically these two theories, is because they differ in the fact that at its base, Latour departs from any form of agency-hierarchization, whereas Gell maintains a certain agency-hierarchization. Whether or not a hierarchy should be maintained is a relevant distinction for our case. In my conclusion to the chapter, I will return to the question of hierarchization of agency in the case of the ancient Greek drinker and wine.

2.4 The Case of Eurytion in the *Odyssey*

Having discussed the heuristic framework of the chapter, let us turn to the text material and apply the frame. In this first discussion of an ancient Greek passage (the case of Eurytion in *Odyssey* book XXI.288-304), I will emphasize the division of the semantic roles in a more

69 Gell 1998, 23.

70 Latour 2005, 64. His point on the agency of objects is one he makes in several publications, but the most specific overview of this argument can be found in the chapter 'Objects Too Have Agency' in Latour 2005, 63-86.

emphatic way than I will do with later passages. The reason behind this is that since my approach is relatively uncommon in the discussion of ancient Greek texts, I wanted to, at least in the first instance, quite explicitly demonstrate how I mean to use it in the practice of analysing texts. However, for reasons of readability and avoiding redundance I will be less explicit in the analyses that follow.

In the twenty-first book of the *Odyssey*, we encounter the story of the centaur Eurytion, who is described as a clear example of someone who experienced the malicious effects of being overly drunk. This story is told by 'the most unrestrained of the suitors', Antinous, during a Homeric warrior feast on Ithaca, just after Odysseus' arrival back on the island, when Odysseus is among the suitors and disguised as an old beggar.[71] The disguised Odysseus is present at this Homeric warrior feast, but not as a full participant. He is described as drinking alone (thus separated from the group) and not partaking in the activities, which in this case come down to a bow-shooting competition (next to the standard sympotic interaction of drinking and conversing). Odysseus informs if he can *fully* participate in this social ritual and asks if he can also shoot some arrows. Antinous then scowls Odysseus, addressing him with 'ὦ δειλὲ ξείνων' (288) and calling him ridiculously empty-headed (ἔνι τοι φρένες οὐδ' ἠβαιαί, v. 288).[72] He criticizes Odysseus request to (fully) participate in a ritual that he is no real part of, and says that Odysseus has already received more than he deserves, as he has been able to enjoy their conversations from up-close, something that no other stranger like him ever was allow to (αὐτὰρ ἀκούεις | μύθων ἡμετέρων καὶ ῥήσιος; οὐδέ τις ἄλλος | ἡμετέρων μύθων ξεῖνος καὶ πτωχὸς ἀκούει, vv. 290-292).

This out-grouping is even more emphasized by the fact that Antinous seems to compare Odysseus implicitly to the centaur Eurytion. Eurytion, as the *Pauly* gives, is known for (mainly) two things: being the (terrifying) leader of the centaurs and committing a very harmful act due to his intoxication at the palace of king Perithoos. While drunk, the centaur Eurytion steals king Perithoos' bride Hippodameia during Perithoos' and Hippodameia's wedding and tries to run

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71 This is the description *Brill's New Pauly* has for Antinous, son of Eupeithes. And indeed, an example of Antinous' outbursts can be found in *Odyssey* book 17.462 ff. where Antinous angrily throws a θρῆνυς ('foot-chair') at Odysseus.

72 Ed. Fernández-Galiano, Heubeck & Privitera 1986. Eleanor Dickey has contributed a very insightful chapter titled on forms of address to Bakker 2010. On forms of address that ought to be interpreted as an insult, she says: '[…] it is clear that addresses like κάκιστε "worst" or καταγέλαστε "ridiculous" were always rude. Another obvious example of expressive address is terms of pity, such as ταλαίπωρε "miserable" or ἄθλιε "pitiful". These terms were often used to convey sympathy for the addressee, but they could also be employed as insults.' (2010, 331) The word δειλὲ 'wretched' also contains some form of duality in its meaning, as the *LSJ* gives meanings that convey a feeling of insult and also that of pity. Here, however, I would argue that in the light of the further context of comparing Odysseus to Eurytion, the latter being presented in quite an undesirable manner and generally as a bad example, we should read this as an insult.

away with her. However, he is caught and heavily mutilated (his nose and ears are cut off) in revenge. This drunk misbehaviour is described as the *primum movens* for the conflict between the centaurs and the Lapiths (ἐξ οὗ Κενταύροισι καὶ ἀνδράσι νεῖκος ἐτύχθη, v. 303). So, one can imagine that being compared to Eurytion is no compliment.[73]

As a centaur, Eurytion is an outsider to mankind in general and this framing seems to entail that he also is a brute who cannot hold his drink.[74] Likewise, Odysseus (even though he as king of Ithaca in fact is top dog of the in-group), due to his current appearance, should be viewed as an outsider to the in-group of the Homeric warrior feast. The fact that Antinous intends to compare (seeming) outsider Odysseus to Eurytion, is stressed in Antinous' references to both of their φρήν. Antinous mentions Odysseus' φρήν in verse 288 (ἔνι τοι φρένες οὐδ' ἠβαιαί), when he says that he is thick-headed. And later Eurytion's φρήν is mentioned, when Antinous says that he damaged it with wine (ἄασεν οἴνῳ, v. 297) and became insane (μαινόμενος, v. 298). And at the end of his speech, Antinous predicts a similarly horrid fate for Odysseus if he will participate in the bow-shooting.

The moral of the story seems to be that Antinous wants to say that outsiders cannot be insiders because they will ruin everything due to their incapability to hold their drink, thus saying 'no' to Odysseus request to participate in the bow-shooting.[75] Antinous concludes with a remark that allows Odysseus to drink, but not in a collective fashion: Odysseus is separated from the others, as Antinous tells him to drink quietly and mind his own business (ἀλλὰ ἔκηλος | πῖνέ σὺ μηδ' ἐρίδαινε μετ' ἀνδράσι κουροτέροισι, vv. 309-310).

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73 Antinous does refer to Eurytion as ἀγακλύτον later in the text. However, regarding the context and the behaviour Antinous attributes to Eurytion, as well as the demeaning tone in which he is speaking to Odysseus and the fact that he is comparing Odysseus dressed as an elderly beggar to Eurytion, this reference should be interpreted as an ironical one.

74 Another mythological tale about centaurs and their inability to drink, is in the story of Pholus and Heracles. Heracles visits Pholus in his cave, where Pholus has a jug of wine that he is forbidden to open. However, Pholus eventually does open the jug, pours Heracles wine, and they drink together. The smell of the wine attracts other centaurs, who frantically approach the cave, also wanting a taste of the wine. Heracles fights them back and, in this process, also (accidentally?) kills of Pholus, next to the other centaurs. References to this myth can be found in Stesichorus PMGF S 19 = 181 p. 162; Theocritus 7,149; Diodorus Siculus 4,12,3ff.; Vergil *Georgica* 2,456; Vergil *Aeneid* 8,294. Cf. Davidson in Harris 2018, 16-17. That 'others' can't drink is a trope in Greek literature, and Centaurs, like Scythians as we saw in the Anacreon example, are the usual suspects for this.

75 This pattern in which the 'other' is excluded from the drinking party, resembles what we saw in the previous chapter when I discussed Anacreon 356 *PMG* and Theognis *Elegies* 468 ff. This type of exclusion is probably still quite common nowadays, as some groups of men will compare their fellow men to women if they refuse or are unable to drink as much as the rest of the group. For an interesting article on 'how identity and masculinity are framed and negotiated through interactional discourses which are related to alcohol consumption and drinking culture by rural youth in Southern Cross River State, South-Eastern Nigeria' see Mensah 2020.

To develop a better understanding of how Antinous presents the Eurytion example as harmful, I want to look at the different states of affairs that express act of harm, to see who is presented as the 'agent' in regard of causing damage. In the Eurytion example, the harmful interaction between Eurytion and wine is expressed by five different states of affairs.[76] I have listed them here below, with the direct contextual information between square brackets:

1) οἶνός σε τρώει [μελιηδής] […] (v. 293)
2) […] ὅς τε καὶ ἄλλους | βλάπτει [ὃς ἄν μιν χανδὸν ἕλῃ μηδ' αἴσιμα πίνῃ] (vv. 293-4)
3) οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον [ἀγακλυτὸν Εὐρυτίωνα] | ἄασ' [ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ μεγαθύμου Πειριθόοιο] (vv. 295-6)
4) […] ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ φρένας ἄασεν οἴνῳ | [μαινόμενος κάκ' ἔρεξε δόμον κάτα Πειριθόοιο] (vv. 297-8)
5) οἳ δ' αὐτῷ πρώτῳ κακὸν εὕρετο οἰνοβαρείων (v. 304)

In the first example, syntactically, Odysseus is the direct object of the verb τρώω (τιτρώσκω), that has a connotation of harming, hurting, or even killing, which has honey sweet wine as its subject. In the second example, the direct object is the collective of people that drink wine in one drought and do not keep the right measure. Wine is also the subject of the second and third example, which both contain verbs that denote an infliction of harm, namely 2) βλάπτω and the epic verb 3) ἀάω. In the third example, Eurytion is the direct object. In the fourth situation, the subject of (again) ἀάω is Eurytion. A domino effect of harm seems to have taken place: the wine affected Eurytion, and then Eurytion affected his mind (the object is his φρήν in epic plural), with wine in a dative position (and this eventually effected into a harmful relation between the Centaurs and the humans).[77]

An interesting question to raise regarding the division of semantic roles in the fourth example is whether wine, being a dative, is to be perceived as an *auctoris,* and thus a semantic agent, or as an *instrumentalis,* and thus as an instrument. In my opinion it is specifically this question that emphasizes the ambiguity of viewing wine as an agent. If we read the wine as an instrumental dative, and thus as the semantic instrument, Eurytion would become the agent of an act of self-harm that is expressed by the verb ἀάω. This act, executed by Eurytion himself, then expresses an impediment of one's own cognitive ability which appears to be an act that removes future agency. A question we can ask in regard of this situation, is whether an act that

[76] The story of Eurytion is also mentioned in *Operi Galeni* vol. 4, 778K, lines 3-8.
[77] Cf. Fernández-Galiano, Heubeck & Privitera 1986, 180, vv. 296-302: 'Ha inizio un insistito gioco di parole (ἄασ'… ἄασεν…ἀασθεις…ἄτην…ἀεσίφρονι) per sottolineare gli effetti ottenebranti della ἄτη.'

takes away the possibility to act, can be an act that expresses agency. Viewing wine as an *auctoris*, would take away this problem. Wine then is the semantic agent, and Eurytion and his mental capacity are the semantic patients. This would be in line with the first three examples, in which wine assumes the role of agent from a semantic and syntactic perspective, but it would not explain why the syntactic structure of the sentence is so different. I want to argue that exactly the ambiguity in regard of the distribution of semantic agency in this phrase is significant, as it shows an idea of co-agency between the drinker and the drink in the creation of such post-inebriation damage.

The fifth example continues this co-distribution of semantic agency that I argue verse 297 shows, but in a more complex way. The sentence that we find before this specific phrase, reads: ἐξ οὗ Κενταύροισι καὶ ἀνδράσι νεῖκος ἐτύχθη, 'from this, the strife between the Centaurs and mankind came into existence' (*sc.* v. 303).[78] Augustus Murray translates verse 304 as follows: 'but it was for himself first, that he found evil, being heavy with wine.'[79] Giuseppe Privitera translates it as 'ma, ubriacandosi, causò la sventura per primo a se stesso'.[80] The general meaning of this phrase in relation to the previous sentence thus seems to be that *before* Eurytion's misbehaviour effected into mankind and the Centaurs becoming enemies, it was he himself who he hurt or who got hurt, emphasized by the words αὐτῷ πρώτῳ. If we approach the rest of the sentence from the perspective of how the semantic agency is distributed, there are two features in this phrase I want to stress: first, the significance of the medial form εὕρετο; and second what a verb like οἰνοβαρέω says about the semantic agency of its syntactic subject. The fact that the verb εὕρετο is a medial form, might be seen as underlying the fact that it is a self-harming act. The direct reflexivity of the verb, however, does not benefit the subject in this case but harms it. The combination of the verb and its direct object κακὸν shows similarity with the previous situation regarding ἀάω and Eurytion's semantic relation to this verb, as one could once again wonder why one would be the semantic agent of a verb that denotes an act of finding bad things. The fact that the sentence also contains the participle οἰνοβαρείων can be interpreted as an explanation for the fact that the phrase contains an illogical act of attracting 'bad things': the participle conveys an idea of cognitive impediment, which makes it understandable for 'agents' to commit senseless acts. This last example, like the fourth example, shows a certain level of interplay between the drinker and the drink in how the semantic agency in regard of causing damage is divided.

78 299-204 del. Nitzsch. 303-304 del. Duentzer. 303 del. Bothe.
79 A. Murray (rev. Dimock) 1995, 333.
80 Fernández-Galiano, Heubeck & Privitera 1986, 29.

To conclude, I want to stress that in the first three examples, wine seems to quite simply assume the role of a semantic agent in verbs that denote causation of damage. Odysseus is the (hypothetical) semantic patient of the first state, all the other people who drink too much and not according to the drinking rules are the patient of the second, and Eurytion is the semantic patient of the third. I want to close off this section with the point that if we look at the Eurytion example in general, we can see indications for the fact that in this story wine in a way is represented as an entity that is able to let things happen, either independently or together with a drinker. This is a starting point to approach wine as something that should not simply be viewed as a non-agentic entity that is non-living. I am under the impression that this is a pattern we can also note outside of this example, and I will provide more examples of it below.

2.5 Tales of Reckless Consumption: *Odyssey* IX

In general, it can be said that a lot of (wine) consumption occurs in the Homeric epics: the Homeric heroes like to feast, and they do it a lot, throughout both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.[81] Whereas feasting, or consuming goods, thus plays a prominent role throughout the *Odyssey*, in book nine of the *Odyssey* the role of consumption is very clearly present. To add, in this book consumption is not presented as a neutral act but as an act that can lead to terrible consequences if executed incorrectly (which is in line with the point I made in the previous chapter). I view this last point as a thematic line that flows through the whole book. With this section I intend to show that in book nine of the *Odyssey* consumption is presented as something that can highly influence, and damage, the series of events and that consuming wrongly is in that way presented as a potentially dangerous act, which supports the idea that wine was perceived as something that can 'do things'.[82]

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81 Cf. Sherratt 2004, 301: 'Feasting appears as arguably the most frequent activity in the Odyssey and, apart from fighting, in the *Iliad*. It is clearly not only an activity of Homeric heroes, but helps demonstrate that they are indeed heroes. Thus, it seems shown doing it at every opportunity, to the extent that much realism is sometimes lost-just as a small child will invariably picture a king wearing a crown, no matter how unsuitable the circumstances.' 2004, 302: 'Feasting is ubiquitous and constant – it is what Homeric heroes do in company at every opportunity.'

82 Since feasting is a very prominent act in the Homeric epics, there is a lot of feasting and consuming going on, and not all of them necessarily are pretty. I have focused on book nine because I view it as a compact whole in which reckless consumption plays a thematic role. There are far more examples that would suit my argument here, than the ones I discuss in this section, such as for example the rather irresponsible feast of the suitors in Odysseus' palace (cf. Sherratt 2004, 304). In a more extensive version of this project I would include more, but for space reasons I will not do so in this project.

Book nine takes place at banquet at the castle of king Alcinous, during a speech that is held by Odysseus at the banquet. Here, Odysseus speaks about the highest form of pleasure, and connects it to commensal joy[83]:

> οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ γέ τί φημι τέλος χαριέστερον εἶναι
> ἢ ὅτ᾽ ἐυφροσύνη μὲν ἔχῃ κάτα δῆμον ἅπαντα,
> δαιτυμόνες δ᾽ ἀνὰ δώματ᾽ ἀκουάζωνται ἀοιδοῦ
> ἥμενοι ἑξείης, παρὰ δὲ πλήθωσι τράπεζαι
> σίτου καὶ κρειῶν, μέθυ δ᾽ ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσων 10
> οἰνοχόος φορέῃσι καὶ ἐγχείῃ δεπάεσσι.[84]
>
> For I indeed say that there is no more pleasurable fulfilment than when delight encapsulates the entire group of people, and dinner-guests, sitting side by side in the halls, listen to a singer, near tables that are filled with bread and meat, the wine-pourer repeatedly pouring wine from the krater and pouring it in the cups.

The banquet context makes that Odysseus praise of commensality can be interpreted as him showing his gratitude for their hospitality and the current situation. However, I want to add that in the way Odysseus focuses on the joy of collective consumption, he emphasizes the underlying social code, when he explicitly mentions many of the social rituals that are part of participating in a banquet. In the stories that we are told in the rest of the book we are confronted with several examples of 'consumption gone wrong'. Therefore, I would say that the introduction of Odysseus' speech is not only an expression of politeness, but that it should also be read in a programmatic sense. This opening, in which an ideal way of collectively consuming is emphasized, contrasts the examples of 'bad' consumption we see in the stories he shares: we hear about Odysseus' men who drink too much wine and end up in a fatal battle with the Cicones (*Odyssey* IX.39-61), we hear about Odysseus' men who almost quit their *nostos* after consuming lotus (IX.82-104), and as a climax, we hear about the bloody fate of the drunk Cyclops Polyphemos (IX.105-566). A general link between these three stories is the emphasis on fragility of life, which is a common subject to address in a sympotic or commensal setting.[85]

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83 Murray 2018, 216: 'But for most [death] is the absence of pleasure, and pleasure is defined from Homer onwards as the pleasures associated with the drinking group [. The *symposion*] is a world of youth, of love, sexual enjoyment, and music. Already old age brings a dimunition of life and its pleasures, and is therefore lamented in the poetry of the *symposion*.'

84 Ed. Heubeck & Privitera 1983.

85 Murray 2018, 216: '[i]f the poetry of death has a certain place here, it is because intimations of mortality are often most present to a man in his moments of greatest pleasure, when intensity of life recalls its fragility.'

We hear about disasters that were, up to a certain level, averted last-minute: most men survive the Cicones' second strike, the lotus-eating men are forced by Odysseus to return to their *nostos*, and Odysseus and a remainder of the group escape the man-eating Cyclops. A more specific overlap between the stories Odysseus tells is that in all examples in which disaster was averted, a certain consumed good plays a crucial role: the red wine that is drunk after the initial battle with the Cicones; the lotus that is eaten on the island of the Lotus-eaters; and in a two-, or even threefold way in the Cyclops episode: the consumption of Polyphemos' sheep by Odysseus and his men, some of Odysseus' men becoming consumption themselves, and most importantly for the plot, Polyphemos consuming the Maron wine.

Book nine thus consists of three 'groups' Odysseus and his men interact with: the Cicones, the Lotus-eaters, and the Cyclops. I consider the interaction with the Cyclops as by far the most climactic of this book. Not only in general (as it takes up almost the entirety of book nine), but also in terms of 'consumption gone wrong'. My discussion of the two previous accounts is to provide context for the Cyclops episode and to illustrate my point that 'bad' consumption seems to play a role in the whole book. However, the Cyclops episode is the one I consider to be the most important for my argument.

2.5.1 At the Cicones'

The first interaction that we hear about is the battle between Odysseus and his men and the Cicones on Ismarus. Odysseus introduces this story by saying (in first singular) that he sacked the city and slew their men (v. 40), that they (in first plural) took the Cicones' wives and 'much treasure' (κτήματα πολλὰ, v. 41), and that it then was Odysseus' intention to leave.[86] However, the rest of the men did not listen because were out of their minds (τοὶ δὲ μέγα νήπιοι οὐκ ἐπίθοντο, v. 44) as they had decided to drink a lot of wine and slaughter a lot of sheep and 'spiral horned cattle of shambling gait' (ἔνθα δὲ πολλὸν μὲν μέθυ πίνετο, πολλὰ δὲ μῆλα | ἔσφαζον παρὰ θῖνα καὶ εἰλίποδας ἕλικας βοῦς, vv. 45-46).[87] This drinking and cattle-slaughtering intermezzo does not end well for the Achaeans. The inland Cicones – who are more in number and power, ἅμα πλέονες καὶ ἀρειους (v. 48) – are called upon by the inshore Cicones. All Cicones gather on the shore to fight the Achaeans, interrupting their feast, and they make the Achaens suffer much harm (ἵν' ἄλγεα πολλὰ πάθοιμεν, v. 53). This battle costs

86 Cf. De Jong 2001, 229: This tale displays an interesting pattern with respect to Odysseus' use of the personal pronoun: the wind drove *me* to Ismarus (having been alone for so long, Odysseus-narrator seems to think automatically in solitary terms); *I* sacked their city and killed the inhabitants (pride of the general); *we* divided up the booty […].'

87 Translation by A. Murray (rev. Dimock) 1995.

the lives of six of Odysseus men per ship (vv. 60-61). This loss of Odysseus' men thus occurs *after* the initial battle with the Cicones, and their greatest defeat began while they were consuming far too much wine on the shore. As we saw, Odysseus expresses that he tried to convince his men to leave quickly after the slaying of the Cicones took place (ἔνθ᾽ ἦ τοι μὲν ἐγὼ διερῷ ποδὶ φευγέμεν ἠμέας | ἠνώγεα, vv. 43-44) but that they were not thinking straight anymore (νήπιοι, v. 44), which eventually resulted into them being (drunk) sitting ducks when the Cicones arrived, making them vulnerable for damage and unable to properly defend themselves. The feast the men hold on the shore of the Cicones' island, is presented as being held at an inappropriate time (as Odysseus stresses) and we are also told that an inappropriate measure is consumed. And it is this inappropriate manner of wine consumption that ends up playing a key role in the fatal damage that follows.

2.5.2 At the Lotus-eaters'

Their journey continues after this near-death experience (ἄσμενοι ἐκ θανάτοιο, v. 63).[88] Odysseus continues by sharing how the men spent several disastrous days at sea, in which they consumed themselves out of agony (the Greek here also uses a consumption-verb, namely: ἔδω): ἔνθα δύω νύκτας δύο τ᾽ ἤματα συνεχὲς αἰεὶ | κείμεθ᾽, ὁμοῦ καμάτῳ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι θυμὸν ἔδοντες (vv. 74-75). We then hear about the arrival on the land of the Lotus-eaters, where the people eat flowerlike food, οἵ τ᾽ ἄνθινον εἶδαρ ἔδουσιν (v. 84). In the passage that follows, there is a focus on consuming: δεῖπνον ἕλοντο (v. 86), σίτοιό τ᾽ἐπασσάμεθ᾽ ἠδὲ ποτῆτος (v. 87), οἵ τινες ἀνέρες εἶεν ἐπὶ χθονὶ σῖτον ἔδοντες (v. 89). A difference in regard of the previous story is that none of the men are killed, but a similarity is that, again, consuming a psychotropic substance (before: wine, now: lotus) affects their journey. The Lotus-eaters famously feed the men that were sent out by Odysseus to explore the area lotus and this lotus-eating makes Odysseus' men want to stay with the lotus-eaters and forget about their *nostos* (τῶν δ᾽ ὅς τις λωτοῖο φάγοι μελιηδέα καρπόν, | οὐκέτ᾽ ἀπαγγεῖλαι πάλιν ἤθελεν οὐδὲ νέεσθαι, | ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῦ βούλοντο μετ᾽ ἀνδράσι Λωτοφάγοισι | λωτὸν ἐρεπτόμενοι μενέμεν νόστου τε λαθέσθαι, vv. 94-97). Odysseus has to force his men to leave and drags them back to the ship while they are crying (τοὺς μὲν ἐγὼν ἐπὶ νῆας ἄγον κλαίοντας ἀνάγκῃ, v. 98). This, in a way, also is an example of 'bad consumption', as lotus is a psychotropic substance the Achaeans are unacquainted with, which

[88] *Nomen est omen:* at the Lotus-eaters that what is consumed is not wine, but lotus. I however have decided to include a discussion of this section because the subject of problematic consumption is maintained, which makes that it nevertheless is relevant (admittedly at a lower level) for the subject of this chapter.

will make it hard for them to consume it correctly (which in a way is similar to how the Cyclops treats wine).

In the interaction with the Lotus-eaters, it is interesting to note that Odysseus specifically remarks they did not want to kill his men, but that they wanted to feed them (vv. 92-93). The absence of killing or fighting seems to be explicitly substituted with commensality. This move away from strive and harm, and towards consuming together (even though this consumption turns out to be something negative) in a way is a reversal of what happened at the Cicones. Here, the feast the Homeric heroes had at the shore of the island was interrupted and switched into the fight with the Cicones. Presenting commensality and sympotic activity and death as substitutionary activities is a very common reference in the poetry that was performed at banquets.[89] However, in our cases, the consumption-related acts and the harm-causing acts are not necessarily separated, as the fact that Odysseus' men respectively drink too much red wine and eat Lotus plays a crucial role in the damage that follows. As both instances in different respects are occasion of bad consumption, the fact that consuming incorrectly can have negative consequences (just as consuming correctly, can have positive ones).

2.5.3 At the Cyclops'

This image of (bad) consumption intertwined with (bad) outcome is continued in the story of the Cyclops. Here, however, the line between moments of consumption and (fatal) destruction is completely blurred. We encounter a full merge of consumption and destruction: consumption of Odysseus' men by the Cyclops is what leads to their end, and consumption of Maron wine by the Cyclops is what leads to his.

The introduction to the Cyclopes' land is very consumption focused, as we find a detailed account of the island's agricultural set-up (vv. 107-135), of which a remarkable detail is that 'tutto cresce senza che sia seminato'.[90] Also, it is mentioned clearly that the island holds an ample collection of vines, ἀμπελοι, αἵ τε φέρουσιν | οἶνον ἐριστάφυλον (v. 110-111), and μάλα κ᾽ἄφθιτοι ἄμπελοι εἶεν (v. 133), whereas we later will find out that the Cyclops is unacquainted with wine(making). Privitera remarks the following on whether this is an indication of a certain level of viticulture on the island of the Cyclopes: 'È dubbio se qui debba attribuirsi ai Ciclopi la conoscenza di come si produce il vino: communque οἶνος non può significare «grappoli» […] È importante che qui la frase relativa non sia detta riguardo alla terra dei Ciclopi, ma in

89 Cf. Murray 2018, 216 ff.
90 Heubeck & Privitera 1983, 192.

generale.'[91] I follow Privitera on this last point and would interpret the emphasis on the presence of vines an emphasis of the absence of viticulture. In the description of the Cyclopes' island, we seem to be told that all things that the Greeks cultivate, with a focus on vines and thus wine, are present on the island, but that the Cyclopes do not control them yet through cultivation processes (as opposed to the Greeks). Later in the story, when we find out that the Cyclops does not know about the existence of wine, nor how to drink it, we know that the fact that he has not become acquainted with it is not because his habitat does not provide with the sources to produce wine, but that he simply lacks the knowledge to do so. This, in my opinion, stresses the fact that the Cyclops is presented as an uncultured, un-Greek brute, lacking a lot of know-how that the Greeks do have about how one can 'control' nature and that this is the case because of how he is, not because the land around him would not provide for him to develop cultivation processes.

The consumption-theme continues when we hear how upon arrival on the land of the Cyclopes, the men gather to hunt for goats, shoot a great number of goats and have a goat-meat and wine feast: ὣς τότε μὲν πρόπαν ἦμαρ ἐς ἠέλιον καταδύντα | ἤμεθα δαινύμενοι κρέα τ' ἄσπετα καὶ μέθυ ἡδύ (vv. 161-162). Odysseus then mentions that there still was red wine left in the ships, even though the men had previously (namely: at the island of the Cicones) drunk so much of the wine. By implicitly mentioning the Cicones episode, we are also brought back to the post-consumption horror that took place on the island which cost the lives of many of Odysseus' men and again are confronted with the relation between consumption and destruction. This is strengthened by the fact that the men once again are feasting on the shores of an island of unknown people, just as they did on the island of the Cicones. This will bring back the picture of how being drunk and feasting led to serious damage for Odysseus and his men. I would say that this triggers a high level of suspense and that it imprints in the minds of the audience that future instances of consumption might have terrible consequences, as we very recently encountered examples in which exactly that happened.

Odysseus continues by telling how he and a group of his men start to explore the island. He specifically mentions that he brings the Maron wine with him, which will play an important role later (vv. 196-215). Here, Odysseus presents the flask of Maron wine as a weapon, saying that his θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ already had told him that he might need it later on, when he might be confronting an enemy of enormous strength (vv. 213-214.) The way wine is presented here emphasizes how wine can be (and will be) used (by Odysseus) in the semantic role of instrument

91 Heubeck & Privitera 1983, 192.

within the act of inflicting harm, and even as an instrument of such strength that it is able to beat a very strong contestant. With this, Odysseus also makes clear that he knows how to 'control' wine in this instrumental role (this is also an important point in Euripides' *Cyclops*, which I will discuss below).

The story continues, Odysseus encounters the Cyclops, which, to put it mildly, does not go very well as the Cyclops eats some of Odysseus' men, paired with loads of fresh milk and eventually falls asleep, locking Odysseus and the rest of his men in his cave. Then, the Cyclops wakes up. He spends his day herding and milking his cattle and returns for another man-eating feast. In the meantime, Odysseus has come up with his plan for revenge in which the Maron wine plays an important part (vv. 216-344). When Odysseus famously presents the Cyclops with this flask of wine, which is a substance the Cyclops is unacquainted with, what he does *not* do is present the Cyclops with the rules of how to consume wine. This, in a way, parallels the previous remark about the island of the Cyclopes holding vines abundantly but lacking viti*culture*. And, indeed, we see that the Cyclops does not drink in accordance to any of the drinking rules: he drinks alone as Odysseus does not join him, and he drinks the wine completely measureless and asks one refill after the other: τρὶς μὲν ἔδωκα φέρων, τρὶς δ'ἔκπιεν ἀφραδίῃσιν, 'I brought and gave it to him three times, and he drank it witless three times' (v. 361). I want to briefly remark that like Eurytion, the Cyclops, being a Cyclops, is an outsider to mankind in general, and Greek men in particular. His 'otherness' in this sense again seems to be a frame of which the fact does not know how to consume wine is an important feature, as he executes the act of drinking badly, which eventually makes it into an act that will harm him, like it harmed Eurytion.

In terms of the semantic roles, the following phrase is interesting to look at: αὐταρ ἐπεὶ Κύκλωπα περὶ φρένας ἤλυθεν οἶνος, 'but then wine wrapped itself around the mind of the Cyclops.'(v. 362)[92] This sentence quite emphatically puts the Cyclops in the position of a semantic patient, as it emphasizes how his cognitive capability is wrapped, or taken over, by wine, presenting wine as the entity that now has taken control over him, in this way assuming the position of a semantic agent. The story continues, and the Cyclops, who drunkenly falls asleep also becomes a (drunk) sitting duck, but now for Odysseus, who destroys the Cyclops' eye (and with that ruins the Cyclops himself) which offers him and his men a way out.[93]

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92 This remark specifically stresses the fact that due to him gulping all this wine, the Cyclops has seriously impeded and maybe even disqualified his own cognitive ability. Cf. Heubeck & Privitera 1983, 207: 'letteralmente « il Ciclope e più precisamente le sue φρένας ».'

93 I consider it remarkable that in the case of Eurytion it were two sense-organs, his nose and his ears, that

The fact that the Cyclops is presented as losing cognitive ability after drinking too much wine, and hereby losing control, forms a clear contrast with Odysseus, who (repeatedly) presented himself as the controller (or agent) of wine. Between them, the most significant difference is that Odysseus has experience with wine and the culture of wine-drinking, whereas the Cyclops has none. This difference very considerably affects the outcome of their interaction with wine: Odysseus can defend himself with wine as a weapon, the Cyclops (un-knowingly) self-destructs with wine. This large contrast in how wine affects Odysseus' and the Cyclops' lives respectively in a positive and in a negative way, recalls the ancient Greek perception of wine as something that has an ambiguous nature. Wine has the potential to be both good and bad, and treating wine knowledgably is the key to letting either of this side become present. Because of Odysseus' knowledge of wine, he was able to use it as an instrument, to control it in a clear agent-role, rather than be controlled by it. The Cyclops lacks this knowledge and becomes a full patient in regard of wine as the agent, which acts in co-operation with Odysseus.

2.6 Wine and Euripides' *Cyclops*

The idea of Odysseus as 'controller' of wine versus the Cyclops as the opposite of that is present also in Euripides' *Cyclops*. In their commentary to the text, Richard Hunter and Rebecca Laemmle pay close attention to the connection between Euripides' Polyphemos-account, and *Odyssey* book IX. They also stress a difference between Homer and Euripides accounts which is relevant for this research, namely that in Euripides' *Cyclops* wine is more emphatically presented as the ultimate causation of Polyphemos' misery than it is in the *Odyssey*:

> 'The Οὖτις scheme is therefore much less important in *Cyclops* than it is in Homer – it is almost included just because any version of the Cyclops-story would have to have it; this is in keeping with the general tendency of the drama to downplay the planning and stratagems which dominate the Homeric narrative. Wine is all you need.'[94]

If we look at the text of the Euripidean *Cyclops* and the instances in which drinking wine is connected to the coming into existence of damage, we again see that semantically wine is quite clearly granted an 'agentic role' in regard of actively damaging Polyphemos. I agree with

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were mutilated, and that in the Cyclops episode it is also a sense-organ that is mutilated, namely his eye. The fact that specifically sense-organs suffer so literally from the excessive drinking is interesting, and I would connect this to the ancient concept of ἄτη, which, as we saw in the Eurytion example, was hinted at as a 'gioco di parole' (cf. f.n. 77). I intend to explore this point further in future research.

94 Hunter and Laemmle 2020, 16.

Hunter and Laemmle that Odysseus is presented less as the controller or agent of all that happens to the Cyclops in Euripides than he is in Homer. However, I consider 'wine is all you need' too strong, as in the text we see wine presented as acting independently, but also as acting in an entangled fashion together with Odysseus. Here, again, like in the Eurytion example and in the Homeric account of the Cyclops, wine is presented as a co-operator, whose actions are intertwined with those of the drinker (or wine-pourer, in the case of Odysseus), rather than wine simply being an independent agent in the events that involve post-inebriation harm as 'wine is all you need' would imply.

The first instance in which we read about Polyphemos drinking wine, is in verse 417. It is part of a long monologue by Odysseus who tells the chorus about Polyphemos' abominable meal (τῆς ἀναισχύντου βορᾶς, v. 416).[95] Here, Odysseus shares all the gory details of Polyphemos' man-eating supper which had two of Odysseus' men on the menu next to an immensurable amount of sheep's milk that had been poured into a humongous mixing-bowl (vv. 382-411). In his account of the previous happenings, Odysseus presents them as appalling to him. As something that has made him very emotional, building the story up so that his wine-filled revenge appears to be a relatable response to such atrocities. Odysseus even refers to the idea he had to get Polyphemos drunk on the Maron wine as something divine: τι θεῖον (v. 411). In the context semantic roles, that last remark can be perceived as Odysseus 'breaking' with his role as semantic agent over the eventual fate of Polyphemos. By presenting the divine as responsible for (the execution of) his plan, which appears as in line with the remark by Hunter and Laemmle, he also presents himself as an instrument in achieving it. The devised plan that ruins Polyphemos then is something outside of him, a divine plan, whereas in Homer the

95 Ed. Hunter and Laemmle 2020. Let's take a brief sidepath to Euripidean consumption vocabulary. I am aware of the fact that this is somewhat of a regression, but it is still related to the question how consumption is presented and perceived, and I found it an interesting find in general. One might expect that such an atrocious meal as Polyphemos has had would be described in an unusual and marked way. Within the Euripidean corpus, the usage of βορά is quite common and need not directly be interpreted a marked reference for Polyphemos' meal. Euripides uses the word often, relatively and absolutely: it is attested 27 times in his works and the TLG gives that Euripides is in the top four of authors who use the word, taking up almost half of all the attestations in the fifth century (27/60). Also, within the *Cyclops,* the word is used frequently relatively and absolutely, as 10 of the 27 attestations are found in the *Cyclops.* The account that I mention in the main text is the last time the word occurs in *Cyclops*. The word is used by all characters. Twice by Silenos (88; 122), once by Polyphemos himself to refer to the fact that he will not be able to resist the flesh of men as he hasn't been able to have some for such a long time (249), once by the chorus (367) and six times by Odysseus (98; 127; 254; 289; 409; 422). The word occurs nowhere in the Homeric account of Polyphemos and Odysseus' encounter. (In the Homeric account there is little focus on the act of eating. In lines 311 and 312 we find resp. δεῖπνον and δειπνήσας.) I would say that due to the frequent usage withing the play, and the absolute and relative rareness of the word, passages containing this word would stand out specifically to the audience also vocabulary-wise, making the whole act of eating and then drinking wine strongly marked events.

emphasis was on Odysseus' cunningness in devising it.[96] However, in vv. 420-422 Odysseus presents himself very much as a semantic agent, with wine in an instrumental role:

> ἡσθέντα δ' αὐτὸν ὡς ἐπησθόμην ἐγώ,
> ἄλλην ἔδωκα κύλικα, γιγνώσκων ὅτι
> τρώσει νιν οἶνος[97] καὶ δίκην δώσει τάχα.
> Since I saw that it pleased him, I gave him another cup, knowing that wine would harm him and justice would soon follow.

These verses hold two verbs that emphasize the fact that he is aware of his acts (ἐπησθόμην and γιγνώσκων). The verb ἔδωκα clearly presents him as 'acting' and together with the ὅτι-clause that depends on γιγνώσκων (τρώσει νιν οἶνος), Odysseus makes clear that he knows he is committing a harmful act. Odysseus hereby presents himself as the entity that is able to control wine and has agency over wine, whereas Polyphemos is presented as an entity that is simply enjoying wine (which has a ring of dramatic irony to it), which is expressed through the passive, accusative participle construction: ἡσθέντα δ' αὐτὸν. The language here thus seems to express a certain hierarchy of the characters of the play and their relation to wine, which is an observation exactly in line with David Konstan, who says that 'Odysseus' relationship to wine is different from that of Silenos and Polyphemos: [Odysseus] controls it and uses it; it is for him a means, and not, as it is for them, exclusively an end and a satisfaction in itself.'[98] A similar controlling of wine by Odysseus is expressed in vv. 423-424, where Odysseus says the following:

> ἐγὼ δ' ἐπεγχέων
> ἄλλην ἐπ' ἄλλῃ σπλάγχν' ἐθέρμαινον ποτῶι.
> And I, pouring one cup after the other, warmed his heart through drink.

Odysseus here thus is a clear agent (and also *not* the consumer of wine), Polyphemos (specifically: his heart), who is the consumer of wine, is the patient, and wine is an instrument in regard of achieving the goal of warming. We see Polyphemos explicitly handing over the control of wine to Odysseus in verse 566, when Polyphemos orders Odysseus to be his wine-pourer: λάβ', ὦ ξέν', αὐτὸς οἰνοχόος τέ μοι γενοῦ, 'stranger, grab the bowl and be my wine-pourer!' On a first

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96 Hunter and Laemmle make a remark in their commentary along the same line of thought, saying that '[i]n Homer the idea of making the Cyclops drunk is the result of Odysseus' plotting and μῆτις (*Od.* 9.316-18), as the bringing of the wine to the cave was the result of his forethought (9.213-4) These themes are played down in *Cycl.* […].' (2020, 186)

97 Cf. Hunter & Laemmle 2020, 188: 'οἶνος = ὁ οἶνος'

98 Konstan 1990, 213.

sight, these imperatives might give the impression that Polyphemos controls the situation. However, Polyphemos knows nothing about wine, and thus does not know that wine can be bad, and therefore lacks information that is necessary to be in control: he cannot be an agent. He also does not know that Maron wine is extra strong and should be drunk even more carefully than any other wine. Odysseus, in turn, is very much aware of all these points, he accepts his task of wine-pourer and with this accepts full control and agency over the situation.

In how Odysseus relates himself to wine, wine seems be in an instrumental position. However, in its relation to Polyphemos, wine seems to be an agent, which is emphasized by the chorus. The chorus here sings about what will happen to Polyphemos, and they say the following: ἀλλ' ἴτω Μάρων, πρασσέτω, | μαινομένου 'ξελέτω βλέφαρον | Κύκλωπος, ὡς πίηι κακῶς, 'but let Maron wine come, let it act, let it remove the eye of the manic Cyclops, so that his drinking went wrong' (vv. 616-619).[99] First, I would say that this final clause expresses explicitly that Polyphemos' drinking behaviour is bad and therefore will have bad consequences, because wine should be drunk accordingly and wisely to have a positive effect. Polyphemos is fully unable to do any of this, as he lacks all knowledge about how to do so, which in an almost satirical way presents him as a tragic character. Second, which is very interesting in regard of the whole idea of agency, the entity that is put forward by the chorus as the agent in the rest of the phrase is Maron wine: it is the wine that will act (πρασσέτω), and wine is described as the entity that is responsible for the ultimate removal of Polyphemos' eye ('ξελέτω βλέφαρον). However, in verses 657 onwards, it is Odysseus the chorus encourages in performing this same act of burning out the eye of Polyphemos.

We thus have two agents that are explicitly presented as the ones who cause the action of the eye-removal: Maron wine *and* Odysseus. In regard of this last point, I found it striking to realize that when Polyphemos *himself* attempts to point at the semantic agent of his own eye-removal, he famously refers to this entity as 'no-man', οὖτις (v. 672 ff.). The chorus also (ironically?) repeats after him, 'so no one has harmed you' in verse 672b (οὐκ ἄρ' οὐδείς <σ> ἠδίκει). In the light of my analysis about the agency above, I consider it worth discussing whether 'the 'οὖτις scheme' not only is a cunning move by Odysseus, but that this occurs specifically in a situation where wine is presented as an 'actor'. I will return to this point below.

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99 For 'ὡς πίηι κακῶς', Hunter and Laemmle suggest 'so that his drinking has a miserable end' (2020, 230). Seaford remarks that 'πίνειν κακῶς' is presumably to suffer from the bad effects of drinking, and so makes a cruel understatement here.' (1984, 214) I would say that this remark has to do with the idea of the good and the bad drinker's behaviour, and how the act of drinking is connected to wine either manifesting itself as a harmful, or beneficious entity. We saw in the previous chapter in the Theognis example from *Elegies* 509-510: οἶνος πινόμενος πουλὺς κακόν· ἢν δέ τις αὐτὸν πίνῃ | ἐπισταμένως, οὐ κακὸν ἀλλ' ἀγαθόν.

In vv. 677-678, Polyphemos describes the act of harm that was committed against him with Odysseus in the role of semantic agent, and wine as the instrument: ὁ ξένος ἵν᾽ ὀρθῶς ἐκμάθῃς μ᾽ απώλεσεν | ὁ μαρός, ὅς μοι δοὺς τὸ πῶμα κατέκλυσεν, 'so that you know this well, the stranger ruined me, the wretched man, he, after giving me the juice, drowned me.' In the next verse, the chorus respond as follows, in which they switch away from attributing the agency over the situation to Odysseus (as Polyphemos does), to attributing it to wine: δεινὸς γὰρ οἶνος καὶ παλαίεσθαι βαρύς, 'wine indeed is dangerous and tough to wrestle'.

To round of this section, in regard of the damage that is done to Polyphemos wine is presented as the agent (most often by the chorus) and so is Odysseus (either named or unnamed) with wine as the semantic instrument by both Polyphemos and Odysseus himself. Next to that, the agent that Polyphemos himself presents most explicitly as the one accountable for what happens to Polyphemos, at the end, is 'no man', οὖτις. In regard of Odysseus' 'οὖτις scheme' that traditionally is part of accounts on Odysseus and Polyphemos accounts, it is interesting that in regard of the previously discussed 'who dunnit?'-question multiple entities were presented as the accountable parties, as well as 'no one'. I therefore want to suggest that it might be the case that the 'οὖτις scheme' is more than just a clever find of Odysseus to trick Polyphemos in never knowing who harmed him. I consider it carrying significance regarding the fact that Polyphemos' downfall is connected to wine, and that excessive consumption of wine by a drinker makes it complex to determine who is held accountable. Is it wine, for messing with Polyphemos' mind? Is it Polyphemos for drinking too much wine? Or is it Odysseus, for pouring Polyphemus too much wine? When thinking about the case of the downfall of drunk Polyphemos, is there really one, predominant agent? Polyphemos commits the act of drinking, which is indirect self-destruction, Odysseus in cooperation with the divine are presented as the enticers of the plan, and in many instances wine itself was also presented as a semantic agent. This complexity of who to blame, and more explicitly, who can be held accountable, in a way cumulates in the fact that when this question is asked who harmed Polyphemos, the answer he gives is: 'no one'.

2.7 Conclusion: Can Wine Do Things?

To conclude, let's return to a simplified version of the question I opened this chapter with: can wine *do* (bad) things? As we saw, different texts at least seem to present wine as semantic agent of an event. However, reflecting on whether this also means that wine in a more general sense is perceived as having agency, the implied accountability and flexibility that is connected to the concept of agency seems complex and ambiguous. As we read in the definition of agency by

Kockelman, there is a positive relationship between the 'flexibility' of the agent (i.e.: the agent can choose between many different actions) and the responsibility and accountability of the agent.[100] In the light of the definition by Kockelman, did wine have any 'flexibility' in regard of causing this damage? For example, in the Polyphemus case, did the wine have a choice in how it would affect Polyphemos, if Polyphemus demanded such an excessive amount, and Odysseus poured that amount? I would say that it does not. Which side of wine manifests itself, is not something that occurs at random. Both the bad and the good side of wine seem to be the result of the specific drinking behaviour of the drinker, which is an act that lies outside of wine itself. The fact that wine thus seems to have little options to 'choose' from –as it will be good when consumed in the right way and *vice versa* – makes that wine has a low flexibility. Likewise, the question of accountability is a complex one: how could you hold wine accountable?[101]

Because of these points it might be tempting to say that wine lacks agency if we follow the definition as proposed by Kockelman. However, as I stressed at the beginning, my usage of this terminology was heuristically and I believe that looking at wine through the perspective of agency in the definition I used, has proved to be fruitful. Simply saying that wine does not have agency because it lacks accountability or flexibility seems too straightforward compared to how often wine is presented as the syntactic and semantic agent in the texts we discussed above. Therefore, I consider it more fruitful to be very willing to attribute agency to an entity like wine in antiquity, even though it might not contain all features we would attribute to a human agent. Therefore, and I will return to this below, I would say that the inclusive line of reasoning as proposed by Latour is most befitting for our issue.

In the analyses of the texts, an overlap was that wine quite often co-acted with another entity and that the semantic agency of wine often was entangled with the agency of this other entity. In the discussion of the Eurytion passage, Eurytion and wine were presented as acting together, with even an emphasis on wine as an agent. This ambiguity in regard of who to blame was recurrent in the examples I discussed. However, it was present most prominently in the Cyclops examples, which end with blaming 'no one'. How the agency is distributed in situations

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100 Kockelman 2007, 375.

101 I would like to add a brief anecdote to emphasize why attributing a level of accountability to something that is non-human. This morning, my good friend, who is not a cat-person but lives in a house with cats, told me that one of the cats had peed on her bed. She said that when she saw this, she got very angry at the cat who did it, but then stopped being angry when she realized that blaming a cat is not very satisfying. However, the cat *did* perform this act and the fact that it is not held accountable lies merely in that it will not reply to this (probably). I would say that the accountability of wine can be viewed in a similar way. We do not hold wine accountable, because that will not satisfy our need for a response, whenever we hold someone accountable, not necessarily because that entity, i.c. wine, necessarily has nothing to do with the coming into existence of damage that one wants to blame that entity for.

in which drunk damage occurs seems to be complex, and the fact that this in antiquity also was perceived as complex seems to be visible in the texts that I have discussed in this chapter.

I will now summarize my last point and come to my conclusion. Based on my usage of the definition of agency as a heuristic tool for understanding how the Greeks perceived the ability of wine to act, I want to argue that whereas wine might not have agency in the sense of flexibility of accountability, wine is nevertheless presented as an entity with agency over events once a drinker has started drinking it and either the good or the bad side is activated through the behaviour of the drinker. This view in a way combines features of the relational approach to agency as proposed by Gell, with the broadened approach to it by Latour. I think that we should perceive the agency of wine as something that can only exist in relation to (at least) a person who handles the wine (implying an initial hierarchy: someone must *pour* a drink). However, once this person starts interacting with wine, wine is perceived as something that continuously affects the flow of events. This is very different than Gell's example of the broken car, as the breaking down of the car might put Gell in the position of semantic patient, but after that, the car does nothing new to maintain Gell in that position. There is one, single event that puts Gell in that position. With wine it is different, because getting (extremely) drunk is a process, and the moment in which drunkenness takes over is far less instantaneous than a car breaking down and stopping. Wine, or for that: psychotropic substances in general, influence a person or a situation more gradually and their potentially negative influence also becomes progressively larger the more of the substance is consumed.

In that way, there is a constant movement in the development of the interaction between the drinker and the drink. Therefore, I think that the more inclusive approach to the agency of wine that Latour proposes in the end is more valuable to consider cases like ours, in which the interplay between a consumer and a psychotropic substance is at stake. I want to add that Gell's emphasis on interaction as of high importance for the determination of how agent/patient roles are divided is very much in line with my approach and that his line of reasoning was valuable for the development of my argument. However, in the end, a psychotropic substance like wine does not seem to fit in either of Gell's categories. It does not fit into his category of secondary, non-living agents only, as wine, once consumed, seems to be able to portray behaviour of an independent agent, as an agent 'in itself'. It, however, also does it fit in the category of primary agents, because without being consumed, wine will not be able to start doing something 'in itself'. The inclusive approach by Latour might focus less on the interactional part that played a central role in my analysis, but its broadness allows far more space for developing a distinctive identification of the agency of wine than Gell's. To round of,

even though which category of agency would be best suited for wine in antiquity is yet to be articulated, I think that we can conclude the following for the conceptualization of wine in ancient Greece: it can do things.

Chapter Three:

Concluding Remarks: Lacking Ingredients for a Socio-Cultural Pathology of Problematic Wine Drinking in Ancient Greece

3.1 Introduction: The Real Alcoholics Anonymous of Ancient Greece

The main question of this project was whether ancient Greek habitual drunks were considered mentally ill. Or, more eloquently: whether the ancient Greek texts show that, on a socio-cultural level, habitual (over)consumption of alcohol was conceptualized as pathological behaviour. My answer to this question is (and with this answer have kept the spirit of consumption present) that I consider the necessary ingredients in order to develop a pathologized understanding of problematic drinking as absent in antiquity. I therefore consider it implausible that a such a concept was present in antiquity.

Psychologist Raymond Cochrane strongly discusses the importance of social surroundings in regard of the 'aetiology of […] mental disorders', and emphasizes how during the late 20th century, due to 'the reduction of the level of prejudice against the mentally ill […] feelings of anxiety or unhappiness which in certain sections of society were once taken for granted as part of the natural order of things are increasingly being defined as evidence of 'neurosis' or 'depression'.[102] Cochrane thus emphasizes that for a mental illness to 'become one', certain social conditions must be present. It is my view, in line with the remark by Cochrane, that for a socio-cultural pathologized form of drinking to develop, two (cumulative) conditions are required. First, the behaviour must pass the 'criterium of remarkableness', and second: it must pass the 'criterium of closeness'. My 'criterium of remarkableness' articulates that the behaviour that is observed needs to be perceived as something that is unusual, which is in line with the second part of Cochrane's remark. If it is not perceived as such, the 'observer' of that behaviour will not have to develop a concept that helps explain why the behaviour occurs. My 'criterium of closeness' expresses the idea that for a pathology to come to existence, the observer of the behaviour needs to have the desire to approach and understand the person expressing unusual behaviour, which is in line with the first part of the remark by Cochrane.

Due to the ancient conceptualization of wine as something that can be bad – as I discuss in the second chapter – behaving in a bad way while overly drunk will not be surprising. This is not inexplicable as the ancient Greeks, as I mentioned and stressed in the first chapter, 'knew

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102 Cochrane 1983, 2.

that control [of wine consumption] was necessary because, in the Greek imagination, wine was an ambiguous drink, like liquid fire, at once dangerous and beneficial'.[103] If they did not control their drinking behaviour it was evident that the bad side of wine would manifest. Once an excessive drinker causes damage, the ancient Greek can explain that based on the fact that they know that wine does that when consumed incorrectly. Due to the fact that the response to unusual (drinking) behaviour appears to that of 'othering', as I argued for mainly in chapter one, but also in chapter two, and we saw no examples in which the behaviour of the problematic drinker was approached and analysed, I would say that the 'criterium of closeness' also fails.

Since I consider these two criteria a *sine qua non*, I do not consider it plausible that a socio-cultural pathology of problematic drinking existed in ancient Greece. If there were 'alcoholics' – with this I mean people whose problematic drinking behaviour is pathologized – in ancient Greece, I don't think that they would be viewed as having a problematic relation with wine (which our modern concept of 'alcoholism' entails). In this sense, the 'alcoholics' of ancient Greece literally were anonymous.

3.2 Avoiding Primitivist Remarks: Different, Not Better

I want to briefly return to the relativist point about the coming to existence of mental illness Cochrane makes. In the history of the study of mental illness, we can find many examples of how the *Sitz im Leben* of the problematized behaviour led to pathologizing the behaviour. A well-known example is 'drapetomania', proposed in 1851 by physician S.A. Cartwright. 'Drapetomania', a term that signifies 'the crazed urge to run away', was the mental illness that was used to explain why enslaved people tried to flee captivity which often was 'treated' through severe corporal punishment.[104] Another now obsolete but previously widely diagnosed mental illness is 'hysteria', which, again in the 19th century, was used to diagnose women who expressed themselves emotionally in an emphatic or extreme way which Freud connected to the fact that women never processed the traumatic loss of their penises.[105] Social surroundings thus appear to have a very strong influence on which behaviour will be pathologized and how. (Fortunately, social conditions have also changed in such a way that 'drapetomania' and 'hysteria' have now become obsolete diagnoses.)

The development of mental illness thus is a product of the social surroundings in which behaviour occurs. As I mentioned before, because I am under the impression that the social

103 Lissarague 1990, 5.
104 Colman 2015.
105 The scholarship on hysteria is extensive. Arecent publication on its history is Bogousslavsky 2014.

surroundings were not present that are necessary to pathologize problematic drinking behaviour, the ancient Greeks did not yet have such a concept. In my last phrase, I want to stress that the words 'not yet' are meant in a purely temporal sense, as compared to now, not in an evaluative sense. This comparative remark is *not at all* intended as evaluative in a primitivistic sense, as that would express the view that in the ancient world the people were not yet *able* to comprehend such a concept because they lacked a genuine understanding of the mind that we, in turn, have developed in modern times, which would imply that modernity is superior in that respect. I see that my argument might be associated with Bruno Snell's *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, who presents the discovery of the 'self' in the ancient world as a gradual process of self-discovery in a linear way, with the modern (western) world as its summum.[106] However, thinking that the human ability to perceive oneself and one's behaviour is something that develops linearly, and that we are therefore better at it in the modern world than in antiquity is something I very seriously oppose. Discovery of how the mind works is *not* always an improvement and I only have to point back to the examples of drapetomania and hysteria to make this point.

I want to illustrate this point further by again pointing to the remark by Cochrane who mentions that forms of mental distress 'in certain sections of society were once taken for granted as part of the natural order'.[107] That certain forms of mental distress once *were* and once *were not* perceived as mental illness should also not necessarily be interpreted as an evaluative remark in favour of the former. One can imagine that in the case of pathologizing more forms of human behaviour, more behaviour in general will be marked as a cause of distress or a mental illness. Then, more events might be experienced as markedly grievous and as affecting one's life, than it might be when the behaviour would be presented as so common that it need not even be noticed. On the other side, 'underpathologizing' behaviour can understandably also result into negative consequences. For example, imagine a neurodivergent person who is excluded from society because they are perceived as 'different', making them into 'the fool in the hill'. With the same conceptual tools in the form of a diagnose that would explain and clarify the behaviour to the non-neurodivergent people so that they can understand them, the neuro-divergent person could far easier participate in society.

How we approach mental illness in general thus seems to be in motion and is to be seen as a dynamic rather than static process. This is also clear when we look at the modern field of addiction studies as the concept of 'addiction' is under constant revision. Not only in regard of

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106 Snell 1946. Transl. as *The Discovery of the Mind* by T.G. Rosenmeyer in 1953.
107 Cochrane 1983, 2.

how to name it (as I mentioned in the introduction) but also how to understand it.[108] An example of this, is the relatively new field of scholars who follow the 'choice model' to addiction. Unlike scholars that maintain the 'disease model' or the 'weakness of will-model' (in which addicts are viewed as fully lacking agency over all their substance-related behaviour) the 'choice model' approach views substance use by addicts as a *choice* that is based on a weighing of the pros and cons of either using or not, which is considered to be a rational process. Whereas the decision to use the substance of choice physiologically might not be desirable, it needn't immediately viewed as being fully irrational, as many different types of considerations could affect a final choice.[109] This approach, opposite to the disease model or the weakness of will-model, attributes the user with (a level of) agency over his usage, rather than making them into a literal and semantic patient in regard of their preferred substance. This is a very different take to addiction than the 'disease' or 'weakness of will'-model would assume, which highly impacts how the behaviour is problematized and in turn pathologized.[110]

3.3 Conclusion: Reflection in Our Drinking Cups

With this brief regression to modern psychology, I wanted to stress that our views of what is normal or not, what is problematic or not, and what is pathological or not, are strongly influenced by the world in which we live. Therefore, I also consider what we do or do not pathologize a reflection of how we view the world. With this project I hope to have emphasized that, metaphorically speaking, what we see reflected in our drinking cups also reflects the social realm we are an 'in-grouper' of. To continue this metaphor, I would say that it is only in the reflection the drinking cup of our in-group that we can properly evaluate (that is: problematize

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108 Cf. f.n. 1.

109 Most of us can probably find examples of decisions that we have made that might have been bad for us in the long run physiologically, but that were functional and helpful due to for example social or stress related reasons. An approach along the line of the 'choice model' in a way follows the principle of charity, as it first explores what rational choices might be at the foundation of a decision to continue using even though the user is aware of possible, future adverse consequences, rather than immediately marking this as an irrational or bad decision. For scholarship that very eloquently articulates this point, see the scholarship by Hanna Pickard on her 'Responsibility Without Blame'-model, e.g. Pickard 2017.

110 For an extensive volume on scholarship in line with this 'choice model' which is a popular model within the studies that approach addiction from a philosophical perspective, see Pickard & Sinnott Armstrong 2013; Pickard 2017; Ahmed & Pickard 2018; Pickard 2021a; Pickard 2021b. The 'disease model' is the approach to addiction that makes the user a literal patient, which is the more common approach to use when studying addiction from a physiological or bio-medical perspective. For examples of the 'weakness of will'-model, which is prominent in more pragmatic approaches to addiction that are mainly focused on prevention rather than understanding such as the worldwide *Alcoholics Anonymous* organization (where addicts meet with fellow addicts to discuss their experiences and troubles outside of a professional setting, for a brief overview of how they operate, see Antze 1987), or by psychologists that have an intervention-based approach to addiction, see Heather & Segal 2013; Heather & Segal 2017; Heather 2020. For more information on how the *Alcoholics Anonymous* orgaz

or normalize) behaviour. Having an ancient drinker look into a modern-day drinking-cup, for example by comparing ancient drinkers to the criteria for 'alcohol use disorder' as laid out in the DSM-5, would be an anachronistic approach and provide little to no information on antiquity.

The main question of this project was whether a socio-cultural pathology of problematic drinking existed in antiquity, which I answered negatively. I hope to have been successful at looking into the ancient drinking-cup and hope to have contributed to classical scholarship on ancient mental illnesses more generally. We must be hesitant and careful when imposing modern psychological concepts onto a society distant (ancient Greece) from the society in which those concepts arose (modernity). Doing so might come down to imposing problems that were non-existent at that time, leading to no new knowledge on the ancient world. To stress my point one last time, I want to refer to the legal maxim that comes down to treating like cases alike, and unlike cases as not alike. My main point is that the ancient Greeks were *not* like 'us'. We therefore should strongly avoid treating them as if they were. Prominently having a concept like alcoholism in modern society, does not imply that the ancient Greeks did too. 'We' might find something problematic, but our problems are not 'theirs'.

This last point brings us back to the song by Wainwright I opened the introduction with. Wainwright closes of by asking the listener to please excuse his behaviour, stressing that he is just a little different, part of a different 'in-group', thus part of a different consumption code:

> I'm just a little bit heiress, a little bit Irish | A little bit Tower of Pisa […] So please be kind if I'm a mess.

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