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"What Do We Keep On Fighting For?" Public Political Thought and the Decline of Legitimacy and Secular-Liberal Support for Conscription in Israel

Boender, Franka

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LEIDEN UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

“WHAT DO WE KEEP ON FIGHTING FOR?”

Public Political Thought and the decline in
legitimacy and secular-liberal support for
conscription in Israel

Boender, F.M.J. (Franka)
SUPERVISOR: ALP YENEN

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Introduction

From all countries engaged in an intractable conflict, Israel is one of the most well-researched examples. Many disputing arguments exist when it comes to its ideological foundation of statehood, civil-military relations, as well as its “uniqueness” overall. When it comes to conscription, it is seen as one of the few “western” democracies still upholding mandatory conscription not only for all men, but for all women as well. While this certainly has had an impact on the making of Israeli society as a whole, Israel too has recently been subject to declining participation rates as well as declining public support for its “People’s Army” model. Most academic research has aimed to explain this phenomena through a political science or sociological point of view.

While this research has been able to explain factors contributing to draft decline, it often fails to explain the lack of public support for an institution that for long has been considered a key part of the intractable conflict repertoire of Israel. This paper offers to shed a new light on the search for understanding the declining rate of public support for the People’s Army. It does this through combining sociology with political philosophy. When social actors engage in legitimating and supporting institution’s in politics, they do not only ask the rational, sociological “why”, but also the moral “why”. Recent scholarship indeed increasingly seeks to bridge the conceptual schism between the sociological *is* and the philosophical *ought* in the study of legitimacy, looking at public legitimating discourses to uncover the actual *social attitudes* toward *prescriptive principles*. This paper suggests that legitimating discourses can be applied similarly to political institutions such as conscription, and aims to understand the moral reasoning of societal actors for their support, and lack thereof, towards the people’s army, and aims to provide a better understanding of why that support is declining.

CHAPTER 1: Literature Review

1.1 Research Puzzle

Israel is one of the few western-democratic countries that still upholds mandatory conscription for all its citizens. The situation in Israel is often seen as unique, as it formally has a system of “conscription for all” – both men and women are drafted at the age of 18. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) therefore acquired the name “The People’s Army”, serving in which plays a central role for participating in Israeli Society.^{1 2}

The draft in Israel is traditionally understood to serve 2 purposes. First of all, it is a necessity stemming from Israel’s self-proclaimed status as a Nation-in-Arms, as protection against Israel’s international enemies. However, the draft also serves the socio-political purpose of creating a unified identity amongst Israelis.³ In the time of Ben-Gurion, when the draft was installed, it was reasoned that if a young person has to go through 2 (women) or 3 (men) years of military service, the experience shapes a sense of collective identity, which is necessary to succeed as a state in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.^{4 5}

Military service is still an important part of the normativity of Jewish society, because it serves to shape a unified and coherent collective identity. Part of this is due to the intractable conflict between Israel and the Arab states. Countries who find themselves caught in an intractable

¹ Sara Helman. “Militarism and the construction of community.” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 25, no. 2 (1997): 305 - 332

² Uri Ben-Eliezer. “A Nation-in-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel’s First Years.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37 (1995): 264–285.

³ Baruch Kimmerling. “*The Social Construction of Israel’s National Security*”, In “Clash of Identities” 154-178. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2008

⁴ Daniel Bar-Tal. “Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts.” *American Behavioral Scientist* 50, no. 11 (2007): 1430-1453.

⁵ Daniel Bar-Tal. (2000), “From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution To Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis”. *Political Psychology*, 21: 351-365.

conflict design a repertoire to create a sociopsychological infrastructure to deal with the insecurity such a conflict brings. They do this to cope with stress, withstand the rival and satisfy the threatened public's needs. Creating a narrative about the rival other as well as about the self; through shaping a shared history, identity and collective sense of belonging is important. One of the tools in Israel's repertoire to establish such a narrative is mandatory conscription. Full conscription serves society in a conflict in multiple ways; it provides the narrative of a heroic nation-in-arms, and it provides a feeling of security amongst citizens. In the cases of intractable conflict such as Israel, it also carries the narrative of unity, equality, and a shared sense of belonging.⁶ As part of the socio-psychological narrative of such a society, its normative value also becomes significant.

The normative influence of conscription can be seen in the consequences of compliance and rejection towards serving in the draft. On the one hand, almost all ministers, party leaders, and influential politicians in Israel held high positions in the military, with very few exceptions. Serving in the military is still an informal prerequisite for serving in most public institutions. Additionally, the existence of the "Security Elite" shows the influence of the military on society. This "Elite" holds key positions in the Security sector of Israel and stems from retired high-ranking officers in the army.^{7 8}

Similarly, the normative influence can be seen when dropping out of the army during or before one's mandatory service, which often results in social exclusion and stigma. Social exclusion

⁶ Bar-Tal. "Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts." 1430-1453.

⁷ Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer. ISRAEL'S "SECURITY NETWORK" AND ITS IMPACT: AN EXPLORATION OF A NEW APPROACH. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 38(2) (2000), 235-261.

⁸ Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer. "The Study of Civil-Military Relations in Israel: A New Perspective." *Israel Studies* 12 no. 1 (2007): 1-27

happens to many Israelis who did not serve in the draft.⁹ Additionally, societal terms for draft dodgers still hold strong negative connotations¹⁰. Thirdly, Jewish Israeli's who did not serve the draft are excluded through a lack of shared experience. This makes many Jewish-Israelis afraid to speak about their draft avoidance, especially when they did not make it as an explicit anti-militaristic choice.¹¹.

In Israel, the function of conscription in identity building goes beyond the standard functioning of intractable conflict. Israel's polity as an ethnic community contains deep-rooted insecurities regarding its existence and mortality as a polity.¹² Part of this existential fear results in what is termed the deep-securitization of Israeli Politics: a situation where outside threats to the nation are framed as existential, probable and impeding.¹³ According to Deep Securitization: "to politicize is to securitize, sectors intensely intertwine, political legitimacy's object is the polity/identity itself, and securitization steps are typically nonbinary and nonlinear. Empirically, if some securitizations are deeper than others, Israel's is one of the deepest".¹⁴ This means that the extreme framing of security issues in Israel become part of Israel's identity, and security and threats play an important role in the legitimation of politics in Israel. Military and conscription, are thus one of the back-bone institutions to Israel's identity.

⁹ Merav Perez. "State, resistance, and class reproduction: the case of military service avoidance in Israel." *Critical Military Studies* (2018).

¹⁰ Oren Livio. "Avoidance of military service in Israel: Exploring the role of discourse." *Israel Studies Review* 27, no. 1 (2012): 78-97

¹¹ Perez. "State, resistance, and class reproduction" (2018).

¹² Uriel Abulof, "'Small Peoples': The Existential Uncertainty of Ethnonational Communities," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 1 (2009): pp. 227-248

¹³ Uriel Abulof, "Deep Securitization and Israel's 'Demographic Demon,'" *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 4 (2014): pp. 396-400;

¹⁴ Ibid, pp 396.

However, both conscription rates and the support for the draft as a whole are experiencing a decline, threatening the idea of the “people’s army” underlying mandatory conscription in Israel. Due to demographic shifts in Israel, little more than half of all the people go to mandatory service. Even more importantly, research by The Israel Institute for democracy has monitored to what extent Israelis still support the draft in 2021. Recent numbers have shown that more than half of the population would be in favour of a professional army.¹⁵ This means that only half of the “people” consider a “people’s army” model legitimate.

The decline in public support for the people’s army model is interesting for two reasons. First, given that theory on securitization as well as intractable conflicts as well as the general identity forming that the “people’s army” serves as a fundament, all oppose such a decline in legitimacy. Second, and even more interestingly, is that despite the decline of support for the draft, no political party, even not the liberal ones, currently supports the abolishment of the “people’s army” in their program. If politics in Israel are genuinely changing in favour of a professional army because declining threats might have rendered the army obsolete, that would be expected.

This leaves us with a double research puzzle – why is the legitimacy of the people’s army declining, and why is there no political capitalization on such decline?

Extensive research has been done already to understand which factors influence the decline in conscription rates. The IDF, like any political institution, is not a static one, and neither is its

¹⁵ Changing public perceptions of the IDF: Special survey. The Israel Democracy Institute. (2021, November 23). Retrieved February 1, 2022, from <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/36683>

surroundings. The arguments explaining the decline in support for conscription and conscription rates can be divided into three parts.

The first argument to which scholars' point is therefore the decline in war and hostility coming from Israel's neighbouring states. This argument was made after both failures of Israel's military undertakings in the Lebanon Wars, after which international conflict decreased in imminence.¹⁶ The experience of Lebanon is seen as especially important, as it constituted one of Israel's first failures in armed conflict. The call for withdrawal from Lebanon during the First Lebanon War came from internal social movements who felt the war was too costly for Israel.¹⁷ The Second Lebanon War was not so much an intrastate conflict as an insurgency and ended partially due to international pressure and negotiation.

The second argument explaining a decline in conscript rates focuses on how transformation in type of conflict has influenced the make-up of the IDF significantly, thereby altering the selection process for the draft. After Israel's independence in 1948 Israel needed a quickly expandable and well-trained army to deal with international threats. As conflicts shifted more towards fighting irregular armed forces, this model became outdated. Instead, a smaller and specialized army became more beneficial.¹⁸ This leads to the creation of special programs in

¹⁶ Stuart A. Cohen. "The Israel Defense Forces (IDF): From a 'People's Army' to a 'Professional Military' - Causes and Implications." *Armed Forces & Society* 21, no. 2 (January 1995): 237-54.

¹⁷ Tamar Hermann. "*Winning the Mainstream: Arba Imahot, the Four Mothers Movement in Israel*". In: Stephan M.J. (eds) *Civilian Jihad*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. (2009): 17-30

¹⁸ Stuart A. Cohen. "The peace process and its impact on the development of a "slimmer and smarter" Israel defence force." *Israel Affairs* 1, no. 4 (1995): 1-21

the IDF such as the Atuda-Kravit and the establishment of highly prestigious units such as Unite 8200 and reduces the necessity for a conscript army.¹⁹

The third argument for the decline in conscript rates follows from the second and focuses on the dissatisfaction of conscripts. The division between elite units and less prestigious units consequently also has socio-economic impacts on the lives of conscripts. Combined with an increasingly liberal society, this transformation meant that a large part of those who served in the draft also felt not “necessary” for the protection of Israel. This stimulated the dropout rate amongst those who could not serve in highly specialized units. On the other hand, conscripts who did serve in highly specialized units realized their skills could be used in an economically more beneficial manner when applying them in technical jobs – a liberal and international job market in which serving in the draft was not a requirement. Conscripts who either served at the high end or the low end of this new model of the IDF, therefore expressed their objection to serving in the IDF.²⁰

¹⁹ Yagil Levy. "Is there a motivation crisis in military recruitment in Israel?". *Israel affairs* 15, no. 2 (2009): 135-158.

²⁰ Devorah Manekin. "The limits of socialization and the underproduction of military violence: Evidence from the IDF." *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 5 (2017): 606-619.

1.2 Research Gap

Changing geopolitical structures, consequential institutional make-up, and economic motivations all constitute rational sociological explanations for the decline in support for the “People’s Army” model and the dropping conscription rates.

Some of it may therefore explain individual decisions making - especially amongst conscripts-to-be. However, conscription is a pillar of the socio-psychological repertoire of Israel. Sociopsychological repertoires and the narratives they forward shape a constructed understanding of the world. This understanding is enforced through mass media, public discourse, and interpersonal interactions.²¹ These narratives do not have to be rational. Therefore, the above-mentioned research explains what could be mechanisms behind the change in Jewish-Israeli attitudes towards conscription, but fails to explain how these factors influence the normative and intersubjective value of the draft.

Especially in this case, the existing literature explains why individual motivation to participate in the draft is in decline. However, the research conducted by the IDI shows that collectively the legitimacy of the draft is declining as well, as the public not only does not want to participate, but also believes the institution as a whole should be replaced. This indicates that public support is in decline as well. The construction of public support and its decline for the “People’s Army” has until now not been researched.

The research gap of this thesis is therefore both methodological and theoretical. Through the application of Public Political Thought on the case of Israel’s decline in conscription, this

²¹ Elbaz Sagi and Daniel Bar-Tal. "Dissemination of Culture of Conflict in the Israeli Mass Media: The Wars in Lebanon as a Case Study." *The Communication Review (Yverdon, Switzerland)* 19, no. 1 (2016): 1-34; and Neta Kligler-Vilenchik, Yariv Tsfati, and Oren Meyers. "Setting the Collective Memory Agenda: Examining Mainstream Media Influence on Individuals’ Perceptions of the Past." *Memory Studies* 7, no. 4 (2014): 484-499

research aims to contribute to the research gap discursive and normative research regarding the decline in support for a conscript army in Israel.

Often, societies engage in moral deliberation to justify the decisions they must make and share an intersubjective understanding of why their choice is “right”.²² To understand why and how there is increasingly more public support for a professional army, it is required to understand not only the rational factors stimulating this change but also how these factors help in constructing and deconstructing discursive legitimacy for politics. Sociological approaches often look for causes that explain public support. Bar Tal’s explanation of Sociopsychological infrastructures and Abulof’s Theory of Public Political Thought regard public support and legitimacy in politics as a publicly constructed phenomenon.^{23 24} While the sociological explanations are therefore interesting, societies don’t only construct their norms and values rationally. In the words of Abulof, people don’t only ask themselves what “is” but also what “ought” to be. This latter question – why the legitimacy of the draft is declining, has not yet been researched in academia. Equally interesting in this case, is that while public support for the draft is declining, as per the survey of the IDI – and we can therefore assume a shift in discursive legitimation when it comes to the “people’s army” – this shift remains hardly reflected in politics by the fact that the issue of military service is almost entirely absent from any political party’s agenda.

²² Abulof, U. (2016), Public political thought: bridging the sociological–philosophical divide in the study of legitimacy. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 67: 371-391

²³ Daniel Bar-Tal. (2000). “Dissemination of Societal Beliefs” In *Shared beliefs in a society: Social psychological analysis*. Pp 55-73 Sage Publications.

²⁴ Abulof, Uriel. "Normative concepts analysis: unpacking the language of legitimation." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 18, no. 1 (2015): 73-89.

The research gap therefore leaves us with the following questions.

- 1 How does the Israeli public construct legitimacy regarding conscription to allow for a shift towards a professional army?
- 2 Why is there no call-out for the abolishment of the draft, despite the fact that there is no more public legitimacy for the people's army?

1.3 Specifying The Research Question:

Public Political Thought (PPT) is a relatively new field of research exploring how societies define not what “is” or what “can be” but what “ought to be” when it comes to politics and polities. Public Political Thought studies political legitimacy in the sense that it bridges the gap between political philosophy (principled justification of politics) and political sociology (public support for politics) by assuming all people can and do engage occasionally in moral reasoning in their life, and by extension in their support for politics.

While PPT has been conducted partially for research on the founding years of Israeli nationalism, little research of PPT has been done regarding the public moral legitimation for conscription and the normative concept of the “people’s army” in specific. The currently most available data to conduct a discourse analysis regarding legitimacy is the secular-liberal newspaper “Haaretz”, which is almost entirely translated to English. This means that this research will focus on how the secular-liberal Israeli public delegitimizes the “people’s army”. Speaking of a coherent “Israeli public” is extremely complicated and given that socio-moral realities are constructed by what are called “moral agents” that often do not represent nations as a whole, this thesis refers to specific part of Israeli society. Additionally, this is also one of the most interesting parts of Israel public society to research when it comes to the delegitimizing of conscription. The secular liberal public have traditionally been most prominent in draft-participation, while simultaneously being also most-opposed to the draft. This allows us to specify the research question as follows:

How does the liberal Israel public (de)legitimate the “people’s army”

To answer this research question, the following sub questions have to be answered.

A: Who legitimates politics and conscription alongside the “People’s Army” model?

B: What do social actors believe legitimates conscription along the “People’s Army” model, and why?

C: How is the “People’s Army Model” legitimated?

These questions will be elaborated upon in the methodology section of this thesis, through answering the question of how we can study the process of legitimacy. The former will be partially answered in the conceptual framework of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2: Theory, Methodology, and Method: Public Political Thought and understanding the construction of legitimacy Legitimacy

2.1 Theoretical Background on Methodology.

This paper aims to bridge the gap between the sociological and the philosophical “why” and focus on constructed public political legitimacy. Political philosophy regards legitimacy as a principled justification, sociology as public support. However, societies can and do engage in moral reasoning themselves. “Why do people fight wars” can for example be philosophically explained, as well as rationally understood through sociological factors. People, however, often support a country's decision to go to war (or not) not through its rational and tangible benefits, but to how much it fits into their framework of norms and values. When social actors ask themselves “why”, their answers are therefore also value driven, but constructed by the belief system they operate in. While we cannot study legitimacy, the process of making something legitimate (legitimation) through speech acts and discursive practices by socio-moral authorities is possible. In order to bridge the gap between the fields of sociology and philosophy, this paper will use Abulof's aforementioned methodology of Public Political Thought (PPT).²⁵

PPT draws on the theoretical frameworks of Bourdieu's theory of field, particularly its understanding of Habitus, and on Durkheim and Weber's theories of political sociology. PPT is a mixture of psychology, philosophy, cognition, and sociology, and aims to return to Durkheim's stance of using sociology to understand moral discourse.²⁶

Abulof's proposal in combining sociological and theoretical theories states that normative social actions of people follow a two-type ideal structure. Habitus means the habituated

²⁵ Abulof, "Normative concepts analysis" 73-89; and Abulof, "Public political thought", 371-391

²⁶ Craig Calhoun, "Morality, Identity, and Historical Explanation: Charles Taylor on the Sources of the Self," *Sociological Theory* 9, no. 2 (1991): p. 232

practice by a given culture, *nomos* means a social order built on moral reasoning. *Habitus* is implicit, common practice, *nomos* is explicitly reasoned.²⁷ In between both are social norms, which are reasoned explicitly but also often habituated. Actors of society become agents of normative and moral change when they confront their inner structure and outer structure, consisting of predispositions, behaviours, narratives, and practices. In the *habitus-nomos* balance, taking agency over normative narratives may tip the scale from *habitus* towards *nomos* and vice versa.²⁸ *Habitus* and *Nomos* are on the ends of a spectrum of dynamic and non-binary moral agency. The spectrum spans from automatic to autonomous. Human actions can be habituated or reasoned, or both. What matters most is the balance and movement between the two. Human actions can be patterned practices, prescribed practices, or both. How they change and why they change is what PPT aims to discover.²⁹

Hence, when social actors ask themselves why when it involves their political life, they may do that for their own benefit, but also for what they believe is “good” for the collective. This collective is constructed beyond tangible denominators and involves a set of constructed values to type its’ identity, meaning that social actors ask the “why” or “what is good” also in a value driven, moral sense. Hence, it focuses on political *legitimation* - the process of making something legitimate. It does not argue what *is* legitimate, but how a social moral order (nomination) is constructed by moral agents of society.³⁰ This can be researched by focusing on public moral actors’ deliberative language: what do social actors argue, implicitly or explicitly, that politics *ought* to be or pursue.³¹

²⁷ Abulof, “Public political thought”, 371-391

²⁸ *Ibid.* pp 374

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 380

³⁰ Abulof, “Public political thought”, 371-391, as well as

³¹ *Ibid.* 372

Research where Public Political Thought has been applied are for example the case of nationalism in the Arab Spring. While disputes in academia exist over the extent to which the Arab Spring had a “revolutionary” nature when measured through socio-political outcomes, Public Political Thought shows that the nature of nationalism on which the second uprisings took place indicates a significant political change for the region.³² Additionally, Public Political Thought is used to explain the difference in stability of oil state regimes operating under the “rentier state theory” by showing the extent to which the reigning government is considered “legitimate” by the public.³³ The theory of public political thought can therefore also help us understand the findings of declining public support for the “people’s army” in ways that traditional sociology would not cover.

Similar to other discourse theories in the sociological field, the combination of philosophy and sociology – Public Political Thought – argues that legitimation is built by moral agents who construct a socio-moral order.³⁴ These agents do not have to be the elite - social movements can also be moral agents in constructing new legitimating arguments.³⁵

³² Uriel Abulof, “‘The People Want(s) to Bring down the Regime’: (Positive) Nationalism as the Arab Spring’s Revolution,” *Nations and Nationalism* 21, no. 4 (2015): pp. 658-680

³³ Uriel Abulof, “‘Can’t Buy Me Legitimacy’: The Elusive Stability of Mideast Rentier Regimes,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 20, no. 1 (2017): pp. 55-79

³⁴ Both Calhoun and Abulof reference works of Durkheim, Habermas and Foucault, but Abulof makes the notification that unlike Habermas, legitimation does not have to occur open or democratic. See Calhoun, “Morality, Identity, and Historical Explanation,” pp232; and Abulof, “Public political thought”, 371-391

³⁵ Abulof, “Public political thought”, 371-391

2.2 Methodology:

This research will use the methodology of Public Political Thought, which rests on the observations that 1) people exercise moral reasoning to prescribe their political life; 2) driven by their conscience, the moral reasoning can defy social conventions- although often by affirming others; 3) sometimes, their moral reasoning transpires in the public through deliberation and 4) this deliberation can affect politics and political decisions by the public, such as the willingness to install a professional army and deviate from the “people’s army” model. ³⁶

This theory is applicable in the example of conscription in Israel. The case of the transition of public opinion from supporting mandatory conscription towards supporting the professionalization of the army is an example where social conventions believed to be rather robust are defied and support declines. While we can understand why this phenomenon is occurring through a sociological rationale, little is known about the normative process of that transition. By analysing how the Jewish-Israeli public morally reasons for this transition, we can understand more about the current normative values in Israel regarding conscription and “The People’s Army”.

Public Political Thought is studied by focusing on the process of legitimation and delegitimation. Political legitimacy is hard to study, but the process of legitimation can be analysed. PPT asks two complementary questions: 1) "What do social actors believe to legitimate X?"; and 2) Who legitimates X, why, and how?".³⁷

Some parts of the questions PPT raises, for example “who legitimates politics” can be answered through the theory regarding Psycho-sociological infrastructures in intractable conflicts, in which

³⁶ Abulof, “Public political thought”, 371-391

³⁷ Abulof, "Normative concepts analysis" 73-89.

media outlets are one of the actors disseminating narratives in society that create normative behaviour. Additionally, we know that normative values are established as a result of a “conflict ethos” that is created under the circumstances of an intractable conflict, which are likely to be reflected in these media.³⁸ In this case, because the research specifies on Liberal Legitimation, normative concepts will be analysed in Israel’s main liberal newspaper, Haaretz, and the speech acts of Members of Knesset from opposition parties that can be considered “Liberal”.³⁹

The other questions: “What, do social actors think legitimates X?” and “How do social actors legitimate X” require a conceptual-historic lens to understand and contextualize normative concepts to decide which prescriptive principles guide social attitudes. In order to do this, we need to understand the belief systems of socio-moral actors – which Abulof coins justificatory basic beliefs or “doxa”.⁴⁰ By accepting or rejecting doxa, people legitimate actors, actions and politics. Hence, if we need to understand what A believes legitimates B, we need to understand A: who legitimates, B: what A thinks makes B legitimate, and C: how that legitimacy is used. The method section will expand on how these questions will be answered.⁴¹ Public Political Thought often employs an exploratory and therefore non-linear research plan.⁴² This means that this research will assemble a conceptual framework to assess what doxa can be expected in the primary data, and use the primary data to assess the validity of these doxa, their usage and strength, and reflect or reassess the conceptual framework if needed. Abulof states:

³⁸ Bar-Tal. "Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts." pp1430-1453.

³⁹ This definition is used in the framework that they are secular, with liberal centrist or liberal views, and often stand in opposition to specifically religious governing parties. What is defined “liberal” and “centrist” may differ when it comes to European and Israeli Perspective.

⁴⁰ Abulof, "Normative concepts analysis" 73-89.

⁴¹ Abulof, "Public political thought", 371-391

⁴² Abulof, "Normative concepts analysis" 73-89.

“Instead of following a fixed sequence of steps, normative concept analysis typically involves as constant interplay between its main tasks. The leading research questions and the contextual causal mechanisms come first, but the subsequent phases of data selection, collection, analysis, and interpretation are not chronologically separated. Instead, these phases (or tasks) are conducted in an ongoing dialectics until they arrive at a thesis saturation point – that is, until a relatively stable conclusion is reached.”⁴³

This means that in order to understand the who, what and how questions asked at the beginning of this section, the research will be conducted through going back and forth between the construction of a conceptual framework and the primary data. This interaction between conceptual framework and primary data will be further explained in the Method section.

⁴³ Quoted from Abulof, "Normative concepts analysis" pp 83.

2.3 Methods

Public Political Thought asks the question of how normative structures in society help socio-moral actors to shape legitimacy. In order to understand this, it is required to also understand what norms exist and to what extent do they hold value? Normative Concept analysis is traditionally used to trace the aforementioned doxa via mixed methods research. A quantitative data study is used to assemble a corpus linguistics which allows for a broad understanding of the normative concepts present in society over multiple years. As mentioned before, this corpus linguistics regarding the normative concepts supporting “the people’s army” is yet to be assembled in Israel and requires a large quantitative study over multiple years from a large number of social moral authorities. This research will adopt an alternative method and assemble these people’s army normative concepts through creating a conceptual historical framework on the topics of Conscription, Civil Military relations and specifically secular-liberal politics in Israel, to create a basis understanding of the Who, What and How question that can be used as a framework to apply to the primary data.

How will normative concepts be assembled and traced to understand what legitimates politics, and who legitimates politics, and how? This section will elaborate on the research methods that this thesis will use to answer those questions.

2.3.1 What legitimates Politics?

To answer “what legitimates politics”, this research will, instead of using a broad corpus linguistics, create a conceptual framework answering studies that discuss legitimation processes of conscription in general and normative concepts used to legitimate liberal Israeli politics in particular. The conceptual framework will thus answer three questions:

- 1) What legitimates conscription, and how is conscription constructed and legitimated internationally, specifically in countries (at least somewhat) resembling Israel, in this case Russia and Turkey
- 2) What legitimates politics within Israel, specifically those within the civil-military field.
- 3) How are liberal-secular and civil-military relations legitimated in Israel?

Additionally, the normative concepts required to understand what legitimates politics will be assembled from a scan of returning phrases and slogans in the primary dataset existing out of speech acts of Members of Knesset, specifically those from the liberal and secular opposition parties, and opinion-pieces for Haaretz. These will be used to establish a current understanding the normative discourse around conscription and the “people’s army” in Israel today over the past 10 years. This is done to build an understanding and context upon which the argumentations in the primary data can be traced and analysed. This interaction between primary data and the conceptual framework is important to understand the value of the argumentations used in the opinion pieces, news articles and MK statements and their impact in delegitimizing conscription. This way, we can not only assess what norms and doxa can be seen, and how they are used but also to what extent they hold value and weight in society.

2.3.2 Who legitimates politics?

As mentioned in the methodology, this research relies on Israel's main secular-liberal news outlet as its dominant source. Haaretz ("The Land") is Israel's oldest newspaper, and while not the largest media-outlet in circulation, it is regarded as one of the most well-known leftist-central and liberal newspapers. This means it is likely to be more outspoken regarding normative concepts, allowing for a start in understanding the language of delegitimation in Israel. Additionally, it is accessible online in English, which allows the dataset to be more available for this research. The articles researched will date over the past decade, from 2010 until 2022. This has two reasons: previous research has pointed out that the decline of the ideal of the "people's army" happened as the nature of threats in Israel has declined. Since the end of the second Lebanon war, there indeed have been no inter-state conflicts that required the full mobilization of the Israeli reserve system, which makes it logical to place the period of research after the end of the war. Secondly, Haaretz newspaper archives at the time this research is conducted only allow to read back until 2005, with increasing numbers of articles discussing conscription and "the people's army" available after 2010.

2.3.3 How are politics legitimated?

The answer to the question how politics regarding conscription in Israel are legitimated, specifically regarding secular-liberal politics, will be answered in the conceptual framework, through assembling previous research on civil-military relations and liberal politics in Israel. Additionally, the question will be answered through tracing normative concepts detracted from the conceptual framework and the primary dataset – Haaretz and the MK speeches - in which the moral deliberation takes place, we can research "how" these concepts are used to delegitimize politics. Delegitimation can be analysed via the language of legitimation used by the actor that is (de)legitimizing through arguments (if a passive audience is involved) and/or deliberations (in

communicative argumentations). Most data available for this thesis falls into argumentative category, as newspaper articles will provide the main data for this research. Argumentative tracing requires us to ask the question: what do actors think “should” happen. For example, if we use the liberal value of “liberty” as a normative concept, the research should ask “do socio-moral actors think there should be liberty in order to have a “people’s army”.

CHAPTER 3: Conceptual Framework

3.1 What legitimates Conscription?

Discursive practices to legitimize conscription are often categorized by four “myths” of conscription. These myths do not have to tangibly exist in society, but societies must believe that conscription is an important tool in achieving these myths. The way these myths are used to legitimate conscription varies per framework in which civil-military relations in societies operate, which can be either republican, liberalist, or ethno-national.⁴⁴

The first myth argues that conscription serves as a societal melting pot. Conscription here is regarded as a means to let all factions of society meet with each other, create social mobility and make people act towards a similar objective – to ensure the security of the nation. The second myth regarding conscription is that it serves as a “School of the Nation”, implementing civic virtues of the nation into its conscripts.⁴⁵ Conscription narratives frame this as the loyal, virtuous and self-sacrificing conscript in contrast to the civilian who may enjoy a peaceful life. This myth puts forward the narrative that a conscript should be loyal to the polity and the nation other than the family, clan, or ethnicity, and serves as a vehicle for nationalism. The third myth about conscription argues its significance in the construction of civilian institutions and political life, and citizenship rights are exchanged by virtue of serving in the military.⁴⁶ The fourth and final myth argues conscription as a central instrument to control the use of force in society. This claim is made on psychological grounds that there is an innate need in societies for violence, and conscription serves as an outlet under conditions closely controlled.

⁴⁴Anna Leander, “Drafting Community: Understanding the Fate of Conscription,” *Armed Forces & Society* 30, no. 4 (2004): pp. 571-599

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* pp473-476

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp477-479

Additionally, it argues the control of violence in society over that of private actors – thereby empowering the mandate of the state.⁴⁷

These myths construct the importance of conscription towards a public. Therefore, the ability of a state to frame the reality of society into fitting into one of those myths is more important than how far that reality actually diverges from the myth. In order to understand why conscription reform or endorsement prevails, it is not only important to look at which arguments were at the disposal of politicians, but also which and how arguments were imposed. It is therefore important to understand the weight of certain myths around conscription that give meaning to it. In order to understand this, it is required to understand the “discursive ideal” by which different societies operate, specifically when it comes to citizenship, conscription and civil-military relations. These discursive ideals can be categorized in and analysed through three frameworks: Republican, Liberal and Ethno-nationalist.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* pp480-481

3.2 How is conscription Legitimated?

The Republican framework sees conscription and consequential civil-military relations through the lens of the Republican Equation. It is noteworthy here that the word “republican” refers to the fact this framework is grounded in nation-state theory and the reciprocal relationship between the state and its citizens, and is not exclusive to what is understood as a democratic republic. Republican ideals of citizenship are based upon the ideal of the “common good” as a shared moral purpose within a community which is regarded as the foundation of civic virtue, and thereby provides the criteria for what constitutes a citizen.⁴⁸ The community being more important than the individual means that societies functioning under republican discourses require active participation of citizens in the political community; citizenship is an actively practiced, and identifying with the community's morality and purpose is an important requirement for citizenship. Hence, military service is often considered an essential citizenship duty; it actively aids to protect the normative community. In democratic republican societies, Payne even remarks that the citizen-soldier is a mechanism to transfer authority from the ruler to society. Their fulfilment of the highest obligation of citizenship – conscription – makes these soldier citizens moral authorities to the polity.⁴⁹

Contrasting this stands the Liberal ideal of society. This regards citizens not as active participants practicing their citizenship, but as passive agents to whom citizenships and rights are a given, with a negative role of the state that functions to protect citizens “from governments and another, in their inalienable rights”.⁵⁰ The citizen is free from familial, community or any other ties, and focuses on the self and the possession of rights instead of duties. Community,

⁴⁸ Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, “Citizenship and Stratification in an Ethnic Democracy,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 3 (1998): pp. 408-427

⁴⁹ Laura Payne, “Re-imagining the Citizen-Conscript: Examining the Dynamics and Efficacy of Conscription as an Arena for Citizenship Construction in Israel and Turkey.” University of Utrecht Master's thesis, 2010. Pp 13-16

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* pp13-19

solidarity and by extension conscription are however not entirely exclusive to liberal societies. argues that citizens can, however, even under liberal societies, have shared “responsibilities” or interests in which they engage, especially when these responsibilities exist in order to protect their own individual rights and liberty.⁵¹

The ethno-nationalist framework sees citizenship as solely determined through membership of a common descent group, instead of an expression of individual rights or one’s contribution to the common good. Unlike liberalism and republicanism, it adds a cultural identity dimension to the concept of citizenship through shared heritage, which limits opportunities for integration. Nations are inscribed into the identity of their members and there is little possibility of cultural assimilation. Therefore, ethno-nationalist go against the idea that military service is a pre-requisite for citizenship, where existential threats are still likely to create narratives to support the defence of the collective as a virtuous act.⁵²

Of course, countries do not operate under one discourse exclusively and perfectly, as this chapter will later discuss when reviewing the situation in Turkey and Israel, where nationalism follows both republican, liberal and ethnic ideals in different layers of citizenship. For example, countries can operate both liberal and republican in matters considering citizenship construction. Additionally, ethno-nationalist frameworks inherently focus on communal times that resemble republican discourse, allowing for their combination in discourse as well.⁵³

⁵¹ The concept is used and framed as such in Michael A. Principe. "Solidarity and responsibility: Conceptual connections." *Journal of social philosophy* 31, no. 2 (2000): 139-145. And Ruud ter Meulen, "Solidarity, Justice, and Recognition of the Other," *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 37, no. 6 (2016): pp. 517-529

⁵² ^LLaura Payne, "Re-imagining the Citizen-Conscript: Examining the Dynamics and Efficacy of Conscription as an Arena for Citizenship Construction in Israel and Turkey." University of Utrecht Master's thesis, 2010.

⁵³ Shafir and Peled in Shafir and Peled, "Citizenship in an Ethnic Democracy" . 408-427, use Israel as an example of mixed use of citizenship discourses.

Militaries with minority groups that are conscripted under a republican discourse, but due to their possible ethnic ties are deployed away from their homeland can be another interesting example of this.

Research regarding reform and decline of conscription are predominantly analysed through the republican framework.⁵⁴ The decline in conscription is then often attributed to the violation of the republican equation in either socio-economic or political ways. Conscripts no longer enjoy increased benefits in terms of civil states and political rights from their service, their willingness to serve in the military declines.⁵⁵ In academia, this argument is often used in the combination with the increasing modernization of warfare; lower and -middle social class citizens could – quite literally – rise in the ranks of society via military service. The increasing modernization of warfare requires an increasing amount of educated conscripts, but also requires a far smaller number of higher educated conscripts.⁵⁶ Consequentially an increasing amount of power and status is attributed to conscripts who enjoyed (the possibility for) a higher education.⁵⁷

While it may therefore seem like these frameworks are only occupied in academia to explain tangible shifts in societal relations, societies themselves resort to them as well when it comes to practices of legitimation. All three frameworks construct narratives on citizenship and what function conscription has in obtaining and sustaining that citizenship. Legitimation and delegitimizing of conscription can happen either because the norms upholding conscription fail in the fulfilment of their functions within one framework, or because societal norms transit

⁵⁴ Levy. "Is there a motivation crisis", 135-158, as well as Levy, Yagil. "Israel's violated republican equation." *Citizenship Studies* 12, no. 3 (2008): 249-264.

⁵⁵ Cohen "The peace process and its impact Israel defence force." 1-21.

⁵⁶ Ibid., see also Levy, "motivation crisis" 2009

⁵⁷ Yagil Levy, "Military inequality: A conceptual framework." *Theory and Society* 27, no. 6 (1998): 873-904.

from one framework to another. Within each of these discursive ideals Leander's myths of conscription can be integrated and explained, while varying in content and normative pressure. While they are traditionally seen to be most befitting within the republican framework, the strictness – or lack thereof- of these “myths” as explained by Leander means that they can be integrated into new discursive ideals if societies for example shift from one framework to another.

The European example Leander mentions here are the cases of Sweden and France. While both countries have defenders and critics of conscription both within the military and civil society, France abolished conscription while Sweden reformed it. When French conscription ceased to look legitimate on the basis of traditional interpretations of the myths of conscription, the very clarity and centrality of the criteria these myths set made reform difficult to be justified into new frameworks when the former reasoning behind conscription – the “myths” – no longer held true in the light of increasing liberalization and decreasing security threats. The reform of French conscription was paradoxically enough hampered by the centrality of conscription in the republican tradition. As for Sweden, the vaguely articulated, largely intuitive, and very imprecise justification of conscription made it easier to reform old myths by inventing new criteria for judging their validity and putting them into a new framework.⁵⁸ This can now be seen in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict where both Sweden as well as Finland apply to NATO membership, where both countries have a strong tradition of military reserves and mobilization in fear of a potential Russian invasion.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Leander, “Drafting Community” pp

⁵⁹ Jason P. Gresh. "The realities of Russian military conscription." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 24, no. 2 (2011): 185-216.

The difference between these cases indicates that even when transitioning from a republican framework to a liberalist framework in society, conscription can be either reformed or re-legitimated. Regardless of the practical shifts that could transform a society heavily relying on republican values to liberalist values, such as economic liberalization or increased technological complexity of warfare, the correct legitimization practices used in the correct framework are important in legitimating the draft. In countries under ongoing threat or conflict, states enjoy an increased monopoly over these legitimization practices by virtue of that longstanding and ongoing conflict. While European states recently experience threats themselves as well, countries with ongoing conflict that directly threatens their border since the founding of their nation – in which conscripts have a tangible chance to make the highest sacrifice of their life during service – are understood to have a larger monopoly over legitimization practices in media and public discourse by virtue of installing the willingness for this sacrifice in their citizens.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Daniel Bar-Tal, Neta Oren, and Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “Sociopsychological Analysis of Conflict-Supporting Narratives,” *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 5 (2014): pp. 662-675; as well as

3.3 What Legitimizes conscription and how is conscription legitimated?: Similar examples

The two cases most comparable to the Israeli example are Russia and Turkey. This comparative is made on the basis that both states have a mandatory service policy of 1 year, as well as the possibility for conscripts to be sent to active armed conflicts near or within their border (i.e. become casualties of combat).

The Russian military has been resistant to reform, despite challenges in manpower.⁶¹ During the Medvedev presidency in Russia, renewed efforts were made to cut back conscription in favour of a professional or increased contract-based army.⁶² While a large part of the Russian population and civil elites often lean in favour of professionalization, military elites are often opposed to a change of the status quo. The politics of Russian conscription are influenced by the complexity of the need for modernization, cultural masculinity practices and fiscal difficulties.⁶³ When it comes to legitimation, the influence of elites and the complexity of challenges shows the struggle of changing normative values and ingrained socio-moral authorities regarding conscription. Discursive practices by politicians and newspapers to legitimate conscription resort to a threefold of arguments, mainly operated under a republican discourse: The provision of loyal soldiers, the inability of the country to function under a professional military, and the importance of nationalism to the masculinity cult of the nation which the draft sustains.⁶⁴ Additionally, the cooperation between the Russian Patriarchate and

⁶¹ Alexander M. Golts, and Tonya L. Putnam. "State Militarism and Its Legacies: Why Military Reform Has Failed in Russia." *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004): 121–58.

⁶² Nadja Douglas "Civil–Military Relations in Russia: Conscript vs. Contract Army, or How Ideas Prevail Against Functional Demands", *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 27:4, 511-532, es 24, no. 2 (2011): 185-216.

⁶³ James A. Marshall, "Russia's Struggle for Military Reform: A Breakdown in Conversion Capabilities," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 27, no. 2 (March 2014): pp. 189-209 as well as Golts and Putnam, 2004 and Marina Yusupova, "Between Militarism and Antimilitarism: 'Masculine' Choice in Post-Soviet Russia," *Gender and Choice after Socialism*, 2018, pp. 187-215

⁶⁴ Douglas, "Civil-Military Relations in Russia", pp185-216

the Duma under the claim that it is something a “pious citizen would do” to counter the large number of individualist conscientious objectors.⁶⁵

Opposition to the draft and subsequent support for professionalization is mainly based on the poor treatment of Russian conscripts during their "hazing" and the increased security capabilities a professional army would have.⁶⁶ The former argumentation is further backed not only by soldiers but specifically also by groups of soldier's mothers. This argumentation gained strength in the light of increased liberalization of political discourse within parts of Russia.⁶⁷ Individual opposition to the Russian draft happens informally through practices of bribery.⁶⁸ Most opposition to conscription is individualist, and hence liberal, although it is used by large numbers of conscripts, and thereby starts to form a collective problem. Legitimation and delegitimizing in Russia therefore appears mostly to be a clash between the state's use of a republican framework and the population's increased liberalist stances.

Turkish citizenship discourse has been regarded as traditionally republican. Individual support regarding conscription and professionalization in Turkey is based on upholding the "myths of conscription", predominantly regarding the creation of equality and the provision of education for the poorest parts of Turkey.⁶⁹ While moderate opposition to these myths exist, specifically in the form of questioning their validity to benefit the individual. Overall, the divergence in

⁶⁵ Hansen, Flemming S. "The Moscow Patriarchate and the Right to Conscientious Objection." *Religion, State & Society* 37, no. 4 (2009): 403-417.

⁶⁶ Valerie Sperling, "Making the Public Patriotic: Militarism and anti-militarism in Russia" in Laruelle Marlène, *Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia* (London: Routledge, 2010).

⁶⁷ Gresh, Jason P. "The realities of Russian military conscription." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 24, no. 2 (2011): 185-216.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹

socio-economic equality in Turkey creates a general positive attitude for their functioning.⁷⁰ Organized opposition to conscription exists in the form of non-binary gender identity, which is used as a medical exemption on psychological grounds.⁷¹ Other forms of objections are conscientious objections on the basis of religion, which can be argued as a form ethno-nationalist discourse.⁷² Islamic conscientious objectors protest against the state's justification for conscription with the argumentation that conscription is only allowed when it comes to protecting the transnational community of faith, and a secular state lacks the rights to claim religious legitimacy for the army.⁷³ In contrast to Israel, the Turkish state does not yet recognize conscientious objectors as a legal status, but instead often punishes draft dodgers on other grounds or for other crimes when non-complying with the draft.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Payne, L. E. "Re-imagining the Citizen-Conscript: Examining the Dynamics and Efficacy of Conscription as an Arena for Citizenship Construction in Israel and Turkey." Utrecht University Master's thesis, 2010.

⁷¹ Oyman Basaran, "You Are like a Virus," *Gender & Society* 28, no. 4 (October 2014): pp. 562-582, see also Barrett Greenwell. "Do Ask, Do Tell: The Exclusion of Gay Men from Universal Male Conscription in the Republic of Turkey." (2016).

⁷² Pinar Kemerlin. "Necropolitics, Martyrdom and Muslim Conscientious Objection." In Turkey's Necropolitical Laboratory, edited by Banu Bargu (2019): 139-159.

⁷³ Pinar Kemerli, "Religious Militarism and Islamist Conscientious Objection in Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 47, no. 2 (2015): pp. 281-301,

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp 282; see also https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2021-004123_EN.html regarding the current status of legal matters regarding conscription and objection in Turkey

CHAPTER 4: What Legitimizes Politics of Conscription in Israel? (Extended Conceptual Framework)

This thesis looks at how the “People’s Army” model is delegitimized in Israeli secular-liberal media. For this, we need to understand what legitimizes Israeli Politics, and more specifically, what do Israeli’s believe legitimizes “The People’s Army”. Israel is argued in academic literature to be an interesting combination between an ethnic state and a liberal democracy, coined by Smootha as an “ethnic democracy” or “illiberal democracy”.⁷⁵

Nations have a large hand in shaping their own public morality and identity; they “*not only eat from the ‘tree of the knowledge of good and evil, but plant this tree themselves, shaping their own public morality’*”.⁷⁶ Israel’s identity as a nation includes a schism in between liberal and ethnic elements; while defining itself as a liberal democracy to the outside world and the only liberal democracy in the Middle East, it simultaneously identifies as a “Jewish Nation”, and privileges Jewish Israeli citizens over predominantly Arab Israeli minorities living in Israel.⁷⁷ These struggles of identity can be seen in its foundational nationalist rhetoric; Liberal elements together combined with strong religious elements that are at the foundation of Israel’s Zionist nationalistic ideology.⁷⁸ Zionism, in itself, is a practice of legitimation: it gives legitimacy to the existence of a Jewish state in Israel.⁷⁹ However, Zionist’ inability to resolve its’ dichotomies between for example a liberal, secular democratic and an ethnic state have

⁷⁵ Sammy Smootha, “The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State,” *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 4 (2002): pp. 475-503; and Sammy Smootha, “Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype,” *Israel Studies* 2, no. 2 (1997): pp. 198-241; and Oren Yiftachel, “Debate: The Concept of ‘Ethnic Democracy’ and Its Applicability to the Case of Israel,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 15, no. 1 (1992): pp. 125-136

⁷⁶ Quoted in the introduction from: Uriel Abulof, “National Ethics in Ethnic Conflicts: The Zionist ‘Iron Wall’ and the ‘Arab Question,’” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37, no. 14 (June 2014).

⁷⁷ Smootha, “The Model of Ethnic Democracy” (2002), pp 475- 476

⁷⁸ “*Jews and Zionists*” in Uriel Abulof, *The Mortality and Morality of Nations* (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Pp132-200

⁷⁹ Uriel Abulof, “The Roles of Religion in National Legitimation: Judaism and Zionism’s Elusive Quest for Legitimacy,” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 53, no. 3 (2014): pp. 515-533

created a rhetoric of what Abulof calls “bad faith” – the believe that all efforts of legitimating Zionism are doomed.⁸⁰

What Legitimizes Politics in Israel?

Historically, Liberal secular norms stem from the secular statist ideas originate in the secular statist ideology of Zionism founding fathers. These norms have their foundation in classical French, American and English ideas of liberal democracy, and focus on the right to self-determination and popular sovereignty.⁸¹ because traditional forms of Liberalism and socialism were understood by the founders of the state as incompatible with territorial nationalism, Israel’s “liberal democracy” was developed in the tradition of Rousseau’s “civil-religion’, coined “Mamlachtiyut”.⁸² While socialist Zionism in the pre-state Yishuv was based on a Jewish society based on equality and cooperation, Mamlachtiyut focused on the state of Israel as a source of loyalty and commitment as a unifying factor for the Jewish people.⁸³ This system was predominately made in order to create a secular, modern state out of Israel, in which the secular-Ashkenazi Jewish Israelis held dominant political influence. It is therefore also this group of Israeli’s that is most represented in high Military office.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ “*The Zionist Absurd*”, Uriel Abulof in Ofra Mayseless and Pninit Russo-Netzer, *Finding Meaning: An Existential Quest in Post-Modern Israel* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2022), Chapter 9; For Israel’s struggle with ethnic existential uncertainty, see also: Uriel Abulof, “‘Small Peoples’: The Existential Uncertainty of Ethnonational Communities,” *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 1 (2009): pp. 227-248

⁸¹ Yoav Peled, “Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State,” *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 2 (1992): pp. 432-443; and Uri Ram, “Historiosophical Foundations of the Historical Strife in Israel,” *Journal of Israeli History* 20, no. 2-3 (2001): pp. 43-61.

⁸² *Ibid*, pp. 43-45; and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Changes and Developments in Israeli Civil Religion: 1982–2017,” *Israel Studies* 23, no. 3 (2018): p. 189

⁸³ *Ibid*, p 189

⁸⁴ Oren Barak and Gabriel (Gabi) Sheffer, “The Study of Civil-Military Relations in Israel: A New Perspective,” *Israel Studies* 12, no. 1 (2007): pp. 1-27; Barak and Sheffer specifically coin this group the “Security Elite”

The legitimation for the strength of influence military service has in politics stems from Israel's security dilemma regarding the ongoing conflict with the Arab world. While increasing diplomatic ties are fostered with its neighbouring countries, decades of international conflict with its Arab neighbours have left its print on Israeli politics by creating a narrative of what securitization theory calls "profound existential uncertainty about the nation's own survival".⁸⁵ The influence of security in politics is called securitization, where security provision in itself becomes a legitimating norm transferred through speech acts. Under Israel's system of "deep securitization", to securitize is to politicize, and framing politics and political problems as existential threats to the survival of the nation is an important rhetoric in legitimating decisions.⁸⁶ Other than the existential question of their identity, the existential question on safeguarding the future of their polity has, through deep securitization, also shaped what is seen as morally "good" in Israel. Hence security issues and the army in themselves become a legitimating value for politics. When deep securitization takes place, military service in itself becomes part of the legitimating discourse to the state and its identity instead of being a subsequent part of it.⁸⁷

By virtue of being most represented in the military, the secular Ashkenazi Jewish Israeli became seen as the "warrior hero" ideal.⁸⁸ Following the dominance of security discourse in politics in Israel, this enhanced the legitimation of this ideal to justify military ideals in politics. Hence, it is also the secular Ashkenazi middle class that is most represented in the security elite

⁸⁵ Uriel Abulof, "Deep Securitization and Israel's 'Demographic Demon,'" *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 4 (2014): pp. 396-400;

⁸⁶ *Ibid*; introduction (397)

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, pp 396-415

⁸⁸ Nehemia Stern et al., "Tunnel Operations in the Israel Defense Forces: Adapting the Warrior Ethos to Post-Heroic Conflict," *Armed Forces & Society* 48, no. 2 (February 2020): pp. 343-363. See also Steven Pressfield's description of "Warrior Ethos" in *Chapter 1*, Steven Pressfield, *Warrior Ethos* (Black Irish Entertainment LLC, 2011)

- former high officials in the military that hold a large influence over politics and policy – and that construct its legitimating discourse.⁸⁹ Together with the aforementioned ideals of commitment, it allows for a rhetoric of sacrifice and a “warrior ethos” that encourages sacrifice, which are important when it comes to the legitimacy of conscription.⁹⁰ Building legitimating values around the warrior ethos starts far before military service; ceremonies in school support the creation of what Lomsky-Feder calls “traumatic nationalism” where the dominant group of Israeli society, the upper middle class secular Ashkenazi Jew exploits their historical monopoly of the warrior ethos and reinforces it.⁹¹ Subsequently, the strength of these values is reflected in the fact that important officers in the military are translated to elite places in society.

What Legitimizes Conscription?

Despite the influence of military culture in Israel, the term “militarism” to describe Israeli society is loaded and often rejected.⁹² While militaristic identities are indeed integrated in the identity of Israel, they are justified under a rhetoric of “no other choice”, which is reflected in its justifications to engage in armed conflict. On the one hand, classic militarism or “praetorian” elements can be seen, such as masculine idealization and the ability for both material and mental mobilization.⁹³ Yet, Israel’s “civil-militarism” means total military influence over politics is restrained and happens through the influence of the aforementioned “security network”, meaning that former high officers from the military now represent both private and public interests in an intertwined manner. This makes the lines between the civilian

⁸⁹ Barak and Sheffer, “The Study of Civil Military Relations”, pp1-10

⁹⁰ Stern et al “Tunnel Operations” pp343-350; see also Alp Yenen. “Legitimate Means of Dying: Contentious Politics of Martyrdom in the Turkish Civil War (1968–1982).” *Behemoth: A Journal on Civilisation* 12, no. 1 (2019): 14-3 on the influence of death and sacrifice in conflict.

⁹¹ Edna Lomsky-Feder, “Competing Models of Nationalism: An Analysis of Memorial Ceremonies in Schools,” *Nations and Nationalism* 17, no. 3 (2011): pp. 581-603

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp585-590

⁹³ *Ibid.* pp. 581-603

and military spheres blurred, but also means that there are civil restraints on total influence of the military.⁹⁴

This dynamic is reflected in the way military service is justified. Legitimizing discourse for the existence of military service and the influence of the military in politics is done through republican ideals. Military service is discursively justified under a republican ethos that defined Israeli society's devotion to the military effort as a supreme social value under the guise of its' statist democratic ideology. The validity of military service is strengthened by the existential framing of the intractable Arab – Israeli conflict, meaning military service became a decisive standard by which rights were awarded to individuals and groups that were portrayed as acting in the service of the state.⁹⁵ Accordingly, under these republican ideals, male Ashkenazi “warriors”, identified with the glorification of the military, succeeded in translating their dominance in the military into what was regarded as legitimate social dominance.

Consequently, Levy explains that military service by this secular Ashkenazi public was and is legitimated through the “republican equation”, meaning that the quid-pro-quo relationship between military service and sacrifice versus social and economic gains is what established legitimacy for service.⁹⁶ However, the increasing influence of neo-liberalism and economic growth and the ability to access socio-economic benefits without military service challenged the republican discourse and question the validity of the “republican equation” from which this

⁹⁴ Uri Ben-Eliezer, “Rethinking the Civil-Military Relations Paradigm,” *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no. 3 (1997): pp. 356-374; see also Baruch Kimmerling, “Patterns of Militarism in Israel,” *European Journal of Sociology* 34, no. 2 (1993): pp. 196-223 and

⁹⁵ The argument on mobilization is explained in Daniel Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 50, no. 11 (2007): pp. 1430-1453; the citizenship argument can be found in Yoav Peled, “The Evolution of Israeli Citizenship: An Overview,” *Citizenship Studies* 12, no. 3 (2008): pp. 335-345

⁹⁶ Yagil Levy, “Israel's Violated Republican Equation,” *Citizenship Studies* 12, no. 3 (2008): pp. 249-264;

group benefitted.⁹⁷ Additionally, globalization and the economic neo-liberal transformation of the 80's and 90's in Israel strengthened the influence neo-liberal thinking in Israeli politics, As it was the secular-liberal Ashkenazi class which predominantly benefitted from Israel's economic growth and have influenced their public normative thinking. As military-service had a high conversion rate to socio-economic and political benefits, the Israeli high-tech sector has a high rate of recruiting liberal-secular Israelis from high positions in the army.⁹⁸ This means the influence of economic neo-liberalization is likely to still be present in the normative belief system of the secular-liberal Israeli public. Yet, this economic process also increased a market economy ethos and disrupted republican ideals in creating hierarchy. While simultaneously being the group most benefitting from this process, those benefits are delegitimizing their positions as well. Secular Ashkenazi middle class Israelis are once again stuck in an interesting dynamic regarding legitimacy: that what legitimates them on the one hand delegitimizes them on the other.

The growing influence of ethno-religious norms in politics challenged the dominant status of military values and military officers as the dominant legitimators. This has led military officers to take up additional political space in liberal political spheres of peace and protest movements. Liberal peace movements have integrated high military officers because of their relative higher normative status in politics, while these officers gained additional normative status from participating in additional political spheres. However, because of the integration of high military officials as their legitimators, liberal peace movements have been limited in their free liberal speech. On the other hand, militarism is justified by the "self-critique" that these military

⁹⁷ Ibid (Levy), pp249-250; as well as Yagil Levy, Edna Lomsky-Feder, and Noa Harel, "From Obligatory Militarism to Contractual Militarism; Competing Models of Citizenship," *Israel Studies* 12, no. 1 (2007): pp. 127-148

⁹⁸ Gil Baram and Isaac Ben-Israel, "The Academic Reserve," *Israel Studies Review* 34, no. 2 (January 2019): pp. 75-91; See also Levy, "Israel's Violated Republican Equation" pp249-254

officers express through these movements. This creates an interesting dichotomy where the secular-liberal public legitimates itself through criticizing the normative system that has established their legitimacy.⁹⁹ This means that the secular-liberal Israeli public, which is most involved in the creation of this discourse, is likely to follow military ideals such as the “warrior ethos” and collective republican ideals.

What Normative Values Legitimate the People’s Army?

What do Israelis believe legitimates Politics, and specifically, “The People’s Army”? Concluding this extended framework, the answer to this question seems that a large part of Israeli national values have elements of all categories: liberalism, ethno-nationalism and republicanism. However, the draft specifically finds its original justification in the ethno-republican system of Mamlachtiyut, which by virtue of the discussed political and economic development shifted towards a republican, and later even a republican-liberal system.

In order to make use of this conceptual framework, “what legitimates Israeli draft politics” it must be reduced to “doxa” as mentioned in the methodology; conceptualized values along which the primary data can be traced. These values, following from the aforementioned framework, will be “Liberty”, “Equality” and “Solidarity”.

Historically, The Israeli secular public justified Israel’s “Liberal” democratic identity through statist ideals of self-determination and public sovereignty, relating to liberty. When it comes to the draft, liberal and republican ideals are mixed in legitimating the draft as well: on the one

⁹⁹ Michael Feige, “Peace Now and the Legitimation Crisis of Civil Militarism,” *Israel Studies* 3, no. 1 (1998): pp. 85-111

hand collective republican ideals are present in the legitimating discourse for the draft. This collective discourse is strengthened by the existence of Israel's intractable conflict situation, putting forward ideals of military sacrifice and the "warrior ethos", relating to – solidarity and equality. On the other hand, the increasing influence of neo-liberalism in the material benefits that stem from the republican equation influence legitimating values as well. Finally, in response to strengthening ethno-religious elements in Israeli politics, the secular-liberal public seeks to expand and combine its legitimating efforts with liberal self-critiquing elements with for example peace movements such as "Peace-Now". Hence, Liberty, Equality and Solidarity are doxa likely to be present in the moral argumentation within the secular-liberal media. How those values are interpreted and argued will be explored in the following chapters, which will answer the question "how is the People's Army" delegitimated?

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CHAPTER 5: Analysis.

5.1 Preliminary Data Discussion

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As discussed in the methodological framework, Abulof proposes to converse between the preliminary data and the conceptual framework from which the normative concepts (doxa) are derived in order to establish the validity of these doxa, as well as their scale and scope. This thesis has therefore conducted a preliminary scan of the data, which findings will be discussed in this preliminary analysis chapter. First, it is important to understand and clarify how and what exactly is normative concept analysis. Let us look at the following example.

If politics are legitimated based on the idea that liberty is important, and the public perceives liberty as promised to be provided by the current state of politics and their institutions, then the absence of that very liberty, especially in the interpretation it was intended, is likely to cause unrest. If liberty continues not to exist within or by the institution, either one of the following things may occur. First, the institution is called illegitimate, because it does not provide the value it promised to provide, which thereby would have legitimated it; this concept would be called “descriptive legitimacy”; the promised, legitimating value does not exist within politics and political institution. However, this does not mean that a public also believes that liberty should not exist. Following from the descriptive legitimacy, either of two options may then follow; the public believes that liberty should not exist, and politics indeed do not have to provide them, or certain political institutions providing this liberty should be abolished: or that liberty should exist within politics and political institutions, and they should be provided by them. This is called prescriptive legitimacy.

The preliminary data analysis shows that at first glance, “descriptive legitimacy” falls into the negative: most authors appear to agree on the fact that the values the “People’s Army” as a political concept and institution should be providing are not provided, and hence they express criticism over the state of conscription. The critical points on which they express these criticisms are the inequality and lack of solidarity vis-à-vis the Ultra-Orthodox public, gender inequality, and the reducing status of and need for reserves and combat soldiers. Interestingly however, most articles do not conclusively express prescriptive legitimacy, but stick with describing the problems of the status quo. Articles that do provide some form or prescription are often contradictory in their stances: they either argue for an increase in inclusion of people in conscription or a total abolishment of conscription, and a shift towards a professional army. In order to make sense of this dichotomy, and to find a pattern into how the draft is delegitimated, the following chapters will perform discourse tracing to provide an in-depth understanding of moral discourse within the primary data along the values of liberty, equality and solidarity.

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5.2: Data Analysis 1: Liberty

The first chapter will answer the question: How does the secular liberal public delegitimize the “People’s Army” model through the concept of Liberty? In order to understand this question, this chapter will answer the following sub-questions; how and what concepts of liberty are used? How do these forms legitimate the draft? And subsequently – should there be a draft depending on what form of liberty there is?

5.2.1). Should there be Liberty? (And what liberty should there be?)

The secular liberal public uses multiple interpretations of liberty when delegitimizing the draft, which are often exclusive to one another. On the one hand, there is a republican form of liberty; including liberty for the collective and “equal” liberty amongst citizens.¹⁰⁰ These are the forms of liberty that are used to legitimate the draft: to protect the country from foreign intervention, and for everyone to be equally restricted in their own freedoms to sustain the nation. On the other hand, “liberal” liberty focuses on individualist liberty. This can be either “negative” liberty – lack of interference from the state, or “positive” liberty; the freedom to find self-fulfilment.¹⁰¹

Both within newspapers and MK speeches, the Republican interpretation of “Equal liberty” amongst citizens appears dominant. This is the concept of liberty that legitimates the draft: “Equally sharing the burden”, the returning phrase in most articles, implies that the draft is only legitimate when restrictions on liberty are made equally amongst citizens; This is argued to be for the sake of the second concept of republican “collective liberty”: the security and prosperity of the nation in both military and economic terms.

¹⁰⁰ Frank Lovett, “Civic Republicanism and Social Justice,” *Political Theory* 44, no. 5 (2016): pp. 687-696, (Part III)

¹⁰¹ Alex Gourevitch, “Labor and Republican Liberty,” *Constellations* 18, no. 3 (2011): pp. 431-454

For example, Shtrasler criticizes the Ultra-Orthodox “freedom” with civilian service, which is profitable and light, against the hard combat-like circumstances of secular soldiers:

“Recently it turned out that dozens of young ultra-Orthodox men were sent to Chabad centers all over the world, from Thailand to Argentina. Yeah, that’s just like service in the Golani. One NGO director said: “No ultra-Orthodox man does national service because of ideology. It’s all because it’s worth their while.”¹⁰²

Rosenberg contemplates the effect this lack of service has on Israel’s future as a whole:

“It’s hard to imagine how Israel can survive, much less be prosperous and secure, if a third of Israelis are poor, jobless and uneducated.”¹⁰³

Equal Liberty is used especially in the articles focussing on the exemptions of Ultra-Orthodox Israelis from the draft. Republican liberty – in the form of equal liberty amongst conscripts – is shown through the constant implicit and explicit mention of how the freedom of secular conscripts is restricted by either the draft or the religious influence, such as in Shtrashler’s quote:

The “people’s army” is falling apart. Secular liberals cannot continue to serve in it. More and more of them will seek a way out. The host of recent examples of religious coercion and the protest they have sparked represent a blessed awakening of the secular mule, but also highlight the fact that there is no lasting solution on the horizon.¹⁰⁴

A similar complaint is made by Melamed, who argues:

¹⁰² Nehemia Shtrasler, “Army or nothing: Israel should ax its 'national service'”, *Haaretz*, 17 December 2021

¹⁰³ David Rosenberg, “It’s time to get down and dirty, and draft the ultra-Orthodox”, *Haaretz*, April 24 2012

¹⁰⁴ Uri Misgav, “Israel’s ‘people’s army’ is being torn apart by efforts to meet the competing, contradictory goals of sexual equality and religious rights”, *Haaretz*, 22 July 2018

“In the current climate, the exclusion of women in the army is considered necessary to “protect” religious soldiers, while ever higher obstacles are placed on women’s road to attaining equal rights and duties in the military, amid derision of their contributions.”¹⁰⁵

Restriction of freedom is problematic when it isn’t done equally, which then is linked to a problem for the “people’s army” model. “Equal liberty” for the sake of collective liberty is strengthened in importance through its contextualization with elements of the “warrior ethos” elements of danger and sacrifice, against which religious exemptions are juxtaposed:

“There are some substantial arguments to support the continuation of obligatory service: the ability to choose the pick out of all of the graduating high-school classes to flight school, elite units, and to intelligence; or the participation of society’s social and economic elites in the burden of mandatory and reserve service, as well as in the danger of being killed, wounded, or taken captive. Those justifications, however, must be placed against the demographic facts, which are turning the IDF into the “obligatory army for some” or “the army excluding Haredim and Arabs.”¹⁰⁶

“Equal” liberty for the purpose of “collective liberty” is used also in MK speeches. Tamar Zandberg mentions the decline of the “People’s Army” ethos in reference to the restrictions placed on women in order to appease religious conscripts. The references in her statements regarding the UN declaration on women’s rights may appear as an individualist, liberalist interpretation of the concept of liberty.¹⁰⁷ However, similarly to the Haaretz articles, the criticism is put forward through the argument that secular soldiers, including women in combat, contribute to the country

¹⁰⁵ Ariana Melamed, “Sex crimes in the army: Let every Jewish mother and daughter be aware” *Haaretz*, 2 December 2016

¹⁰⁶ Aluf Benn, “Influence of Israeli Arabs, Haredim on Israeli society spells end of mandatory IDF service,” *Haaretz*, 3 July 2012

¹⁰⁷ Tamar Zandberg (Meretz), The 145th-19th Century Yeshiva of the Twentieth Knesset, July 12, 2016, Knesset Remarks from <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/pages/sessions.aspx>

and sacrifice their own liberty in favour of the collective, making it a republican statement. Hence, the secular liberal public argues that their “individual” liberty is allowed to be restricted as long as it is equal and done so for the sake of the collective safety.

5.2.2 Should There be a people’s army?

Interestingly, while authors agree on the importance of this republican form of liberty in order to have a legitimate draft, they disagree on whether the draft is capable of installing it.

On the one hand, Ofer Shelah’s quote in Yonathan Lis’ article states that the problem is that in the absence of equal drafting, and thereby “equal liberty” of citizens, mentioning “*The state... does not have the moral authority to draft soldiers*”, and hence take away that freedom if not done equally.¹⁰⁸ Harel remarks that inequality is a problem because it makes it harder to convince the secular public to “*Sacrifice his life as a combat soldier while a large percentage of people is exempt from doing so*”.¹⁰⁹ While they appear oblivious to which side the coin should flip: abolishment of the People’s Army or a re-establishment of it, they implicitly prefer the latter, by calling for the drafting of the Ultra-Orthodox. This means there “should” be equal liberty, and implicitly, that such equal liberty should then preferably express itself through a “people’s army”. Shtrashler even explicitly calls for the drafting of the Ultra-Orthodox as “*the only way to heal society*”.¹¹⁰

Yet simultaneously, Misgav and Shtrashler claim that “*Secular liberals cannot serve in [it]*” and “*The host of The host of recent examples of religious coercion and the protest they have sparked*

¹⁰⁸ Ofer Shela in Jonathan Lis, "Proposed amendment would defer Israeli military service, sanctions for ultra-Orthodox" Haaretz, 8 November 2015

¹⁰⁹ Amos Harel, The Israeli army needs to draft ultra-Orthodox Jews - for society's sake and its own, *Haaretz*, 13 September 2017

¹¹⁰ Nehemia Shtrashler, “What About Equality at Military Funerals?”, *Haaretz*, 5 February 2020

represent a blessed awakening of the secular mule".¹¹¹ With regards to the implementation of civilian service tracks, he states "*the army or nothing*", remarking the failure to integrate the Ultra-Orthodox into the army.¹¹² The contradiction here is that while on the one hand there is a constant expression of a moral argument on the basis of republican liberty for the creation of a people's army, while on the other hand, a simultaneous expression of the impossibility for this value to exist. Additionally, when it comes to the concept of equal restriction of liberty and the provision of collective liberty vis-à-vis the exempted Ultra-Orthodox and the conscripted population, the secular-liberal public seems to be indecisive – on the one hand, they should be drafted, while on the other, there influence is a problem.

The uncertainty in whether there should be a People's Army on the basis of the value of Republican interpretations of liberty is similarly expressed when it comes to the problem of differentiations and modernization of service. On the one hand, the increasing modernization of the army makes most authors contemplate whether the IDF should become paid and professional: Yet, when we look at the articles expressing a possibility of switching towards more professional army and promote liberty from a liberal, individualist standpoint, they show increasing doubt of its feasibility.

On the one hand, liberal liberty in the form of freedom of choice and non-intervention by the state through abolishing the draft is doubted in the context of Israel's security dilemma. On the one hand, there seems to be a slight willingness to opt and believe in the liberal interpretation of liberty based on an economic argument of "market forces". Harel notes the "calculated gamble" the IDF makes "*based on the assumption that talented young people will agree to sign up for an additional*

¹¹¹ Nehemia Shtrasler, "Army or nothing" *Haaretz*, 17 December 2021 and Misgav "It's time to replace the Draft" 22 July 2018

¹¹² Nehemia Shtrasler, "Army or nothing: Israel should ax its 'national service'", *Haaretz*, 17 December 2021

year of service in an important – and to a certain extent interesting – position, even if it does not require becoming an officer or serving in one of the prestigious elite units”, Benn remarks that as long as the army provides wages similar to other professional armies, a transition makes the army more efficient.¹¹³ Yet on the other hand, Harel also acknowledges that “The risk, of course, is that the temptation of an early release will outweigh the advantages provided by a short-term commitment in the regular army”.¹¹⁴

The word “maybe” is therefore dominant amongst most arguments dealing with the inequality of conscript services and the modernization of the army. The authors themselves therefore don’t resolve the question “Should there be a People’s Army on the basis of Republican Liberty or a professional army on the basis of Liberal, Individualist Liberty?” either. An example of the constant struggle between the importance of collective liberty and individual liberty is expressed as well in the example of both Benn and Arlosoroff’s article, who argues the time has come to switch to a professional army, because conscripts time is used inefficiently at this moment. This shows hints of the liberal interpretation of liberty – the ability to choose one’s life for themselves, or by extension to find self-fulfilment¹¹⁵. Benn and Harel argue a professional army is “*by default more efficient*”.¹¹⁶ Yet here too expressed a fear that it will not be enough to sustain the “collective liberty” in Israel. In the same article where he contemplates the professionalization of the People’s army, Hagai Amit even asks in his conclusion: *Does the IDF know for sure it won’t need a massive reserve call-up in a future war?*¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Amos Harel, "The beginning of the end of the Israeli people's army", *Haaretz*, 8 September 2018; and Benn, , "Influence of Haredim spells end of mandatory IDF service," 3 July 2012

¹¹⁴ Amos Harel, "The beginning of the end of the Israeli people's army", *Haaretz*, 8 September 2018

¹¹⁵ Benn, , "Influence of Haredim spells end of mandatory IDF service," 3 July 2012; and Meirav Arlosoroff, "In dealing with issue of equal national service, should Israel scrap its 'people's army' model?", *Haaretz*, September 3 2019

¹¹⁶ Benn, "Influence of Haredim spells end of mandatory IDF service," 3 July 2012.

¹¹⁷ Hagai Amit, "The Israeli army's big windfall – massive cuts in reserve duty", *Haaretz*, 13 September 2017

5.2.3: Concluding analysis on Liberty

How does the Secular Liberal Israeli public then delegitimize the “People’s Army” through the concept of Liberty? The influence of this constant doubt on whether there should be liberty, what form of liberty there should be, and whether that means there should (or should not) be a people’s army can be explained through the ideas of “politics of Bad Faith”. Bad Faith as a concept means on the one hand acknowledging that the secular, republican form of “equal liberty” is seen as important and needed to legitimize the draft, while on the other, there is the acknowledgement that this form of liberty currently does not exist, and most importantly cannot exist. When it comes to the question of the Ultra-Orthodox enlistment, secular liberals are both restricted in their freedom when the Ultra-Orthodox are included, as well as when they are not. Hence, liberty is an important value, and the army an important institution to install that value, but it is impossible to be installed and integrate the Ultra-Orthodox without giving up on those values – the rhetoric becomes a circle argument resulting in “giving up” on the People’s Army without arguing directly against it.

“Bad Faith” is seen as well when it comes to the question of the army’s growing inequality in freedom due to modernization and semi-professionalization. There is an unwillingness amongst some authors to delegitimize the draft directly or transition towards a liberal mindset on “liberty”. While on the basis of “equal liberty” this would resolve a problem, the fear of “collective liberty” coming in jeopardy makes most authors uncertain. While few articles are willing to consider the possibility for a professional army, with the transition towards promoting liberal conceptions of liberty, the most common expression appears to be this is impossible; both the people’s army model, as well as a professional army. Hence, the authors limit their argumentations towards staying critical of the status quo and the lack of traditional values in the “People’s Army”, through which they delegitimize the institution, without arguing directly against it.

5.3) Data Analys 2: Equality

5.3.1) Should there be Equality?

On the issue of equality, the question that needs answering is “ought there be equality” in the people’s army. On the surface level, the answer to this appears to be an obvious yes. The empirical data is filled with references to equality – or the lack thereof, as a problem for the existence of conscription and “The People’s Army”. Most directly, the answer to “should there be equality, and should there be a “people’s army” is reflected in the MK speeches.

“The IDF is indeed the people's army, and as such it is its morally valuable duty to strive for full equality for all those who serve in it.”¹¹⁸

and

“The Knesset today marks a salute to IDF soldiers, their equality in the IDF, their partnership, their significant service in the IDF, which is a compulsory army and the people's army, where service also has educational, egalitarian, national and other values.”¹¹⁹

On the surface, this means that there “should be equality”, and therefore, there “should be a people’s army”. However, on the other hand, Aluf Benn in Haaretz argues the exact opposite: there shouldn’t be equality, and there shouldn’t be a people’s army either:

The [IDF website](#) writes that the IDF's goal is to "protect the existence, integrity, and sovereignty of the State of Israel, as well as the wellbeing of its citizens, and to thwart enemy efforts to disrupt normal life." It doesn't say that the army's purpose is to bring about an egalitarian Israeli society,

¹¹⁸ Deputy Defense Minister Eli Ben-Dahan, The 145th-19th Century Yeshiva of the Twentieth Knesset, July 12, 2016, Knesset Remarks from <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/pages/sessions.aspx>

¹¹⁹ Tamar Zandberg (Meretz), The 145th-19th Century Yeshiva of the Twentieth Knesset, July 12, 2016, Knesset Remarks from <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/pages/sessions.aspx>

*to enlist most young men and women to its ranks".*¹²⁰ While disagreeing with the conclusion, the notion of equality being overwrought is seen in Rosenberg's article too: *"the Army has never been equal anyway."*¹²¹

The notion of equality, in both these instances, is used in a republican sense: they focus on the idea of shared, collective equal sacrifice for the community and for society. While the former statements argue this normative value should be present, the latter appears to reject the idea of a republican collective ideal of equality. Because it is these values that the draft is originally legitimated on, their differences are also reflected in the conclusions that these statements draw: should there be a "People's Army"? On this, the Haaretz authors are internally divided. To understand this dichotomy, it is useful to understand how equality is discursively interpreted.

The concept of equality in this interpretation is used to problematize the status quo of the draft on two topics: inequality on who will be drafted, predominantly focused on the lack of drafting of the Ultra-Orthodox, and equality between those who are drafted, focusing on gender equality and equality between combat soldiers and elite units. When it comes to the largest body of critique regarding the lack of equality – the lack of equality with the Ultra-Orthodox, it is these republican values, based on the idea of collective sacrifice and the "warrior Ethos" that are used to critique the current state of the "People's Army" model:

"The time has come for us to understand that the Haredim's defiant refusal to serve in the army doesn't derive from religious reasons. They just don't want their kids to get hurt. They'd

¹²⁰ Aluf Benn, "Influence of Israeli Arabs, Haredim on Israeli society spells end of mandatory IDF service," *Haaretz*, 3 July 2012.

¹²¹ David Rosenberg, "It's time to get down and dirty, and draft the ultra-Orthodox", *Haaretz*, April 24 2012

*rather see the secular donkey get hurt, or even pay with his or her life, as they defend the Haredim and the country”.*¹²²

The critique here is based through the comparison of the self-sacrificing, collectively oriented secular soldier versus the draft-dodging Ultra-Orthodox. This collective interpretation is used even beyond military service: *“let him at least work for a living, and share the burden of the economy”* reinstates the call for collective sacrifice (or contribution) further.¹²³

5.3.2) Should there be a people’s Army?

However, if it is these republican values that “Should” be present, and they are also what legitimates “the People’s Army”, then conclusively, there “should” also be a people’s army. Indeed, this article concludes with:

*“The Haredim should be drafted, without tricks. This is the only way to achieve an equal sharing of the burden. It’s the right way. It’s the way to avert a rebellion by religious-Zionist and secular young people who will no longer agree to bear the military burden alone. It’s also the way to integrate the Haredim into society and the workforce.”*¹²⁴

How then, are the articles stating there “shouldn’t be” a people’s army delegitimizing the people’s army? Interestingly, through the same values as mentioned above; the importance of a collective form of equality, focused on equal sacrifice and contribution, and the criticism of lack of these values when it comes to draft policy regarding the Ultra-Orthodox.

Recently it turned out that as part of their national service, dozens of young ultra-Orthodox men were sent to Chabad centers all over the world, from Thailand to Argentina. Yeah, that’s

¹²² Nehemia Shtrasler, “Israel’s ultra-Orthodox win even when they’re in the opposition”, *Haaretz*, 3 September 2021

¹²³ Nehemia Shtrasler, “Army or nothing: Israel should ax its ‘national service’”, *Haaretz*, 17 December 2021

¹²⁴ Shtrasler, “Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox in the opposition”, 3 September 2021

just like service in the Golani. One NGO director said: “No ultra-Orthodox man does national service because of ideology. It’s all because it’s worth their while.” One of the “volunteers” said: “It’s the easiest money I’ve ever made.” His colleague added: “I heard from a friend that if you’re married it’s very lucrative, so I went for it.” In other words, national service is just a total waste of public funds that pass from the state budget to the ultra-Orthodox community.¹²⁵

His conclusion, however, is: *So, it’s better to completely exempt every young ultra-Orthodox or Arab man who doesn’t join the army.¹²⁶*

Instead of re-legitimizing the draft through this interpretation of equality as a normative value, it is the impossibility of these values to exist that delegitimizes the existence of the “people’s army”. The existence of a republican, collective ethos is portrayed as incompatible with drafting the Ultra-Orthodox. This is further shown in the constant criticism – and subsequent failure – of all the policies aimed to bridge the gap between the secular, republican ethos of the “People’s Army”:

The legislation makes a laughingstock of the notions of “equally sharing the burden” and “the people’s army.” Once it’s passed by the Knesset, the Haredim will be able to shirk army service very easily.¹²⁷

Hence, when it comes to the “people’s army”, the draft is delegitimized through politics of “bad faith”, not because these values make it illegitimate, but because it cannot be legitimized. This incompatibility is the main way in which the draft is delegitimized:

“There cannot be a mass conscription of Haredim, religious Zionists and Haredi Zionists (so-called Hardalim) while also protecting the rights and dignity of women in the army. To be frank,

¹²⁵ Shrasler, “Army or nothing”, 17 December 2021

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ Shtrasler, “Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox in the opposition”, 3 September 2021

it is already impossible to defend the rights and dignity of liberal secularists, male or female. The balance was upset long ago. The bridge is always one-way. In Israel in 2018, to “consider” and “avoid offending” the religiously observant, one must oppress and trample on secular liberals.
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Instead of active “delegitimation”, such as “There shouldn’t be a draft”, the collective, republican values on which the draft is built are “given up”: There should be a “People’s Army”, but there cannot be a “people’s army”. Again, the army is delegitimated through “Bad Faith”. While recognizing and sticking to their own values, the secular-liberal public admits their own values are impossible to reach. Giving up, as it seems, on the collective ideal of equality in the republican sense, as used to be the case for “The People’s Army”, is expressed through the statement of “*They will not continue to be the Messiah’s Donkey*”, which shows the feeling of soldiers being cheated by a system of the values they believed in, or thought should be there. These “bad faith” statements can also be seen in the previous statements arguing for the abolishment of “the people’s army”: “The draft was never equal anyway” is not a statement arguing that it shouldn’t be, but that equality is, and always has been impossible.

On the issue of gender inequality, these politics of “bad faith” in relation to Ethno-religious influences in the army are shown. Melamed writes: “*All these women, including the brave ones in combat roles...are in a weaker position to begin with....The exclusion of women in the army is considered necessary to “protect” religious soldiers, while ever higher obstacles are placed on women’s road to attaining equal rights and duties in the military, amid derision of their*

¹²⁸ Uri Misgav, “Israel’s ‘people’s army’ is being torn apart by efforts to meet the competing, contradictory goals of sexual equality and religious rights”, *Haaretz*, 22 July 2018

*contributions - And now comes a plea bargain showing that the system won't fight alongside a woman who makes a sacrifice and accuses someone of rape.”*¹²⁹

Her framing to women as contributing to the state and the reference to brave combat roles shows the appeal to the republican, collective values and warrior ethos. On this basis, she claims there is no people's army anymore. However, she ends her speech not with calling for an abolishment of “the people's army” or a reinstalment, but with “let every mother and daughter be aware” – the system is unsavable.

Another discussion point in the “lack of equality” is the lack of equality between conscripts and their compensation: In some papers, the notion of equality when it comes to this issue is discursively “liberal”. There should be “equality” in Israeli politics, and the draft, creating liberal inequality, should therefore be abolished. Liberal interpretations of equality are predominantly used in the context of economic arguments:

*“Half of all those reaching draft age are not drafted and among those who do serve, there is a distinction between the rich and well-connected, who go to elite units such as the [Intelligence Corps](#)' Unit 8200, and everyone else”. “Economically weak people who desert because they need to help support their families are the ones put in army prison,”*¹³⁰ The criticism here is also based on the failure of the republican ideal of equality, but the conclusion the article draws: to implement an entirely professional army, shows the support for “equal-opportunity”, in the liberal sense.

Arlosoroff's article is however an exception; most articles drawing on inequality between draftees use predominantly republican values within their arguments; in other articles

¹²⁹ Ariana Melamed, “Sex crimes in the army: Let every Jewish mother and daughter be aware” *Haaretz*, 2 December 2016

¹³⁰ Dror Lavy quoted in Meirav Arlosoroff, “In dealing with issue of equal national service, should Israel scrap its 'people's army' model?”, *Haaretz*, September 3 2019

discussing the inequality between compensation of combat conscripts or reservists, these groups are constantly framed as the “self-sacrificing”, good soldiers who protect the country, thereby supporting the collective values of the “people’s army”. However, their situation is criticized simultaneously through politics of “bad faith” – there cannot be both conscription and privatization.

*The IDF can't privatize some of its operations when its business model is still based on the assumption that it can legally draft personnel without paying for it. This issue also explains why some conscripts feel like the “suckers” of Israeli society.”*¹³¹

The feeling of “suckers”, similar to the feeling of the “messiah’s donkey” which is mentioned in reference to the inequality with the Ultra-Orthodox, shows the feeling not on rejecting the republican ideals, but on losing faith in them: The Israeli draftees feel cheated on in the values they believed in.¹³²

This problem shows the incompatibility with the modern, partially specialized form of the army, which is believed to enhance the states security. Inequality between units is problematized by framing those put into “lower” ranks, resembling most the collective, sacrificial ideal of service, as a violation of the People’s Army’s ethos.¹³³ Yet compensation through modernization, for example by shortening service, is also seen as opposing the ideal of the people’s army: Amos Harel calls the modernization “A step further away from the people’s army”. A

¹³¹ Meirav Arlosoroff, “In dealing with issue of equal national service, should Israel scrap its 'people’s army' model?”, *Haaretz*, 3 September 2019

¹³² Shtrasler, “Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox in the opposition”, 3 September 2021

¹³³ Haaretz Editorial, “The 'Grunts' in Israel's Army Shouldn't Be Going Hungry”, *Haaretz*, 13 February 2022

similar problem occurs with the compensation of reservists, where “equal compensation” opposes collective ideals, which Ofer Shela also mentions is “problematic in terms of the people’s army”.¹³⁴

Yet on the other hand, the differentiation is accepted as necessary to keep the army up to standards for the security threats it is facing, meaning that neither Harel nor Shela conclude their articles with definite statements on what should be done. Instead, statements such as “we have a problem” are rather common amongst all authors, and Harel even diverts the topic to the fact fighters would be interested in meaningful service, instead.¹³⁵

5.3.3) Concluding Analysis Equality

How do secular-liberal Israeli’s delegitimize the draft through the concept of Equality? To an extent, they do not: the value of Equality is present in the texts addressing the problems of the “people’s army” in a republican, collectively oriented interpretation. It focuses on the sacrificial, warrior ideal of the combat soldier who serves in the Golan, the woman who makes a sacrifice for her country, and the reservist who actively protected the country for many years. These are however also exactly the values that would legitimize the ideal of a people’s army. The way the draft is delegitimized, and the answer to the question “should there be a people’s army”, is therefore done through politics of “bad faith”. The common sentiment the texts have is the incompatibility of these values with the current state of the army, while simultaneously expressing the sentiment that those problems seem unsolvable. The draft is therefore not actively delegitimized, but “given up”.

¹³⁴ Amos Harel, "The beginning of the end of the Israeli people's army", *Haaretz*, 8 September 2018

¹³⁵ Ofer Shela in Hagai Amit, "The Israeli army's big windfall – massive cuts in reserve duty", *Haaretz*, 13 September 2017

5.4) Data analysis 3: Solidarity

How does the Secular-liberal Israeli public delegitimize the draft through the concept of solidarity? Solidarity is a core concept when it comes to republican values: its focus on a collective ethos naturally includes solidarity in its discursive repertoire. Liberal ideology often struggles with the concept but does not necessarily always exclude it. Despite the focus on individualism, “solidarity” in the liberalist discourse can be interpreted as “shared responsibility” instead of “shared duty”. This happens especially when it comes to shared responsibility in the support for other liberal, individualist values.¹³⁶ Republican forms of solidarity often focus on the state or nation and the duty citizens have to both follow and recreate those values. They differ in the fact that solidarity in Republican sense is more an end than a means, as the state is an end in itself as well. In order to understand how the “People’s Army” is (de)legitimized through the concept of solidarity, the analysis focuses again: Should there be solidarity in the People’s army? And, based on that question – Should there be a People’s Army?

The previously seen dichotomy continues to plague the moral discourse of the secular-liberal public. On the one hand, the value of solidarity is expressed through a republican form of collective duty to protect Israel, on the basis of which the people’s army is supported. On the other hand, the value of solidarity is seen as something inevitably disappearing from society. Predominantly, the expression of collective duty exists to sustain the country in economic terms. Within Knesset speeches, solidarity is used as an end in itself – solidarity is a core part that sustains the nation and the spirit of Israel. Similar to the concept of equality, the delegitimizing of the people’s army is done by pointing out the lack of republican, collective values, coined in the

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phrase “sharing the burden”. The majority of Knesset speeches and news articles acknowledge that these were the values upon which the People’s Army used to be legitimated, but they differ on whether these values are still legitimate; on the question of “should there be (republican) solidarity in the people’s army?” The speeches from Members of Knesset answer an almost universal yes. While they admit there is too little solidarity at this moment, on both the issue of solidarity between conscripts and non-conscripts, i.e., the Ultra-Orthodox public, as well as between conscripts themselves.

5.4.1) Should there be solidarity?

The way secular-liberal MK’s legitimate the concept of solidarity is through the adoption of an ethno-republican discourse. On the one hand, they constantly refer to “all citizens” – “*Every Israeli citizen at the age of 18 must enlist in the IDF*”.¹³⁷ All citizens should share the burden and “*carry the civilian stretcher*” in the draft, which is mentioned as “*a civic burden*”.¹³⁸ On the other hand, every mention of “the people” of Israel always has a strict referral to the Jewish people, especially when it comes to criticizing the Tal Law. The elements through which this legitimation is done focus on the lack of nationalism and the problem of economic progress:

*Therefore, there is no need for a developed imagination in order to understand the need for a shared burden-bearing in this reality. It is a shared carrying of the civic, national burden. To put a shoulder under the civilian stretcher, to work, to pay taxes and to economize Israel, for the benefit of the entire population, for the benefit of future generations, for the benefit of moving the economy forward - with the burden of growth. This is a struggle for the future of the State of Israel. It is a struggle for unity.*¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Amar Bar-Lev (Zionist Camp), The sixty-sixth session of the 20th Knesset, (November 23, 2015) Knesset Archives, from <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/pages/sessions.aspx>

¹³⁸ MK Haim Yellin (Yesh Atid), The sixty-sixth session of the 20th Knesset, November 23, 2015)

¹³⁹ Yaakov Perry (There is a Future), The sixty-third session of the 20th Knesset, (November 16, 2015), from Knesset Archives, from <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/pages/sessions.aspx>

Additionally, again, the republican ideal of “shared sacrifice” are used to reinstate the national values that support the “people’s army” model:

*“And we’ve been deceiving ourselves for years, because we’re basically saying: the IDF is the army of the people, our children, and it’s our children, but it’s not all our children”.*¹⁴⁰

Implicit in this phrasing is that in order to have a people’s army, it “should be” everyone’s children. The lack of solidarity between Ultra-Orthodox and Secular Jewish Israelis is problematic, because it goes against the original ethos of the ‘people’s army’. It is often only directed to other Jewish conscripts, but with reference to the secular, statist ideals. Similarly when it comes to solidarity between conscripts, the problem and different treatments of different units is framed as problematic because of the “sacrifice” conscripts make; *“IDF soldiers come from the people and return to the peoples, claiming “their war...their bravery is for the glory of the people”.*¹⁴¹ This implies that the IDF cannot function as a professional or even semi-professional army – it is not for profit, but for the people, so solidarity amongst conscripts is an important value for the nation, and therefore, for the people’s army.

When it comes to public media, Haaretz’ authors once again predominantly express “bad faith” – the acknowledgement that while the republican form of solidarity is necessary to have a People’s army, it is impossible to share “solidarity” with the Ultra-Orthodox. Some however, move towards bridging the ethnic and republican gap through installing the idea of “equal responsibility”, especially framed through the necessity of economic prosperity and education. This is still done

¹⁴⁰ Tzipi Livni (Kadima), The Thirteenth-Hundred-Twelve Meeting of the Eighteenth Knesset, (January 23, 2012), <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/pages/sessions.aspx>

¹⁴¹ Akram Hasson (Kulanu), The three-hundred-hundred-and-fifty yeshiva of the Twentieth Knesset (June 26, 2018), <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/pages/sessions.aspx>

with republican elements; responsibility is necessary for the survival of the nation as a whole instead of the individual: Shtrashler, and Harel both argue for the drafting of the in some of their articles, on similar arguments as the members of Knesset: for the sake of a working economy, and additionally, for the sake of solidarity itself.¹⁴² Otherwise, “*Young secular people will no longer bear the burden alone*”.¹⁴³ The focus here is specifically on how it affects the secular public that already serves, and implicitly states therefore that there should be a people’s army. This acknowledges the republican ideal of solidarity as an important value to legitimate the people’s army, which therefore should be implemented. A similar sentiment can be seen in the sentence “*it will certainly bother their parents*” – arguing for the inclusion of the former generation that supports the “people’s army” model.¹⁴⁴

5.4.2 Should there be a people’s army?

On the other hand, the authors of Haaretz express the need for a people’s army on the basis of solidarity for the sake of economic prosperity and education is strongly expressed. Not creating solidarity in the republican sense of sharing the “economic burden”, as stated in the speeches, is according to Benn a “*perverse luxury that Israeli society cannot afford*.”¹⁴⁵ The statements are republican, by focusing on a shared duty to the state, and do so by focusing on republican “myths” for conscription to educate the nation: solidarity is important, it is argued, because it can bring education and integrates people into the workforce.

¹⁴² Nehemia Shtrashler, “Israel's ultra-Orthodox win even when they're in the opposition”, *Haaretz*, 3 September 2021; and Amos Harel, The Israeli army needs to draft ultra-Orthodox Jews - for society's sake and its own, *Haaretz*, 13 September 2017

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Aluf Benn, "Influence of Israeli Arabs, Haredim on Israeli society spells end of mandatory IDF service," *Haaretz*, 3 July 2012.

Yet simultaneously, authors like Shtrahler, Misgav, and Benn reject the idea that solidarity can be created amongst the secular public and the Ultra-Orthodox, even though they argue that it should. While acknowledging solidarity is important to have a “people’s army”, they reject the possibility for it to exist, and go even as far as to reject the concept of solidarity as a legitimating value as a whole.

*“The melting pot is dead. The seams are fast unravelling. There is a price to pay for religious ultranationalist tyranny, for the wild behaviour of the populist, pro-Netanyahu right, for the constant capitulation to Haredi whims.”*¹⁴⁶

Here, a repeating pattern of “bad faith” is stated; there cannot be solidarity with the Ultra-Orthodox, and therefore, there cannot be a People’s Army. “The call to enlist Haredim and Israeli Arabs to the military, or to civilian service, exposes a reality in which the Israel Defense Forces is no longer a “melting pot.”. Misgav remarks that “the Melting pot is dead”. This implies that there has been one, and that it was important to legitimate the “people’s army”, therefore still integrating the concept in his legitimating repertoire. Benn on the other hand states that solidarity seen as impossible for the creation of the “people’s army”, it is simultaneously also seen as an “outdated” and “old fashioned” concept:

*It becomes harder and harder to hold on to the tired old slogans, such as “the people's army” and “melting pot.”*¹⁴⁷

Here, “bad faith” in the concept of solidarity goes so far that not only is it impossible to be a legitimating for the people’s army, but it is also no longer possible for the concept to exist at all and therefore goes even further in rejecting the concept as a whole.

¹⁴⁶ Uri Misgav, “Israel’s ‘people’s army’ is being torn apart by efforts to meet the competing, contradictory goals of sexual equality and religious rights”, *Haaretz*, 22 July 2018; see also Benn, 2012; and Shtrahler, 2021

¹⁴⁷ Benn, “Influence of Haredim spells end of IDF service,” 3 July 2012.

“Bad faith”, the idea that “solidarity” is impossible to exist, is also shown when it comes to solidarity amongst conscripts. For example, regarding women’s status in the army, Melamed writes:

*In the current climate, the exclusion of women in the army is considered necessary to “protect” religious soldiers, while ever higher obstacles are placed on women’s road to attaining equal rights and duties in the military, amid derision of their contributions.*¹⁴⁸

“Amid derision of their contribution” reflects the republican ideal of “sharing the burden” for the state. Equal rights for all citizens – including women – which is another republican note, is exclusive to the inclusion of religious soldiers.

Interestingly, unlike the previously seen forms of “bad faith” in Liberty and Equality, when it comes to equality, the articles show that solidarity as a concept is more able to be compromised in itself. While equality is important, it cannot not be created. Solidarity, similarly, “cannot” be created, but is simultaneously also questioned in its importance. While authors agree that solidarity is important – especially solidarity with combat soldiers and active reservists, if it is not necessary for the sake of the country’s security, it is compromised.

In order to have conscription, there should be solidarity towards those who “bear the burden” more than others. On the other hand, they admit that increasing differentiation in compensation means that the republican ideal of solidarity is declining, and that that undermines the legitimation for the people’s army. For example, the Haaretz Editorial states that “Grunts, combat

¹⁴⁸ Ariana Melamed, “Sex crimes in the army: Let every Jewish mother and daughter be aware” *Haaretz*, 2 December 2016

soldiers, cannot be treated with less quality of provisions as long as there is mandatory conscription”

Again, the tendency amongst articles mentioning the concept of solidarity amongst secular conscripts seems to include a willingness to install a professional army by virtue of “giving up” on the idea that a people’s army is possible. When it comes to reservists, xxx states that the army should strive towards more compensation for those who “bear the burden more than others”. Ofer Shela, quoted in Haaretz by Hagai Amit, states that “*the meaning of service has always been the compensation*”, which is interpreted in the previous lines of the article as solidarity with the nation: the meaning the service has to the nation, is important to have a people’s army.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, he claims the lack of solidarity amongst reservists as a problem for the people’s army.¹⁵⁰ But while simultaneously admitting that such lack is problematic, he also calls for more tangible compensation of those reservists is exclusive to the “people’s army model.”¹⁵¹ Hence, he too claims there should be a people’s army model, but there cannot be, thereby “giving up” on the ideal.

5.4.3 Concluding Analysis Solidarity:

How does the Israeli secular-Liberal public delegitimize the “People’s Army” model through the concept of solidarity? Similarly to the concept of equality, a republican interpretation of “solidarity” is used. This concept is used in a more ethno-republican sense in the speeches of Members of Knesset, and more strictly republican sense in the newspaper articles. While members or Knesset predominantly refer to solidarity amongst Israeli Jewish citizens to participate

¹⁴⁹ Ofer Shela in Hagai Amit, “The Israeli army’s big windfall – massive cuts in reserve duty”, Haaretz, 13 September 2017

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

in the draft, Haaretz authors also occasionally mention the inclusion of Arab citizens. Solidarity in this interpretation is on the one hand seen as something important to the nation, and thereby exactly that what legitimates the draft, but because of its absence, the draft is expressed to not be legitimated. In contrast to equality, the concept as a whole in articles where the focus is on solidarity with the Ultra-Orthodox, bad faith regarding the concept of solidarity is giving up entirely, and consequentially so is the People's Army model. In articles where the focus is predominantly on solidarity between different units of conscripts, similar bad faith regarding the possibility of solidarity is expressed. However, compromise towards the draft is more often expressed. this compromise exists in the form of willingness to install differentiation of compensation between units or the possibility for "civilian service" tracks.

CHAPTER 6: Conclusion:

Conclusively, this thesis aimed to answer the question “How does the secular-liberal Israeli public (de)legitimate the People’s Army? It answered this question by first researching who delegitimizes – the secular public- and what makes something legitimate – the values liberty, equality and solidarity.

How does the Israeli Liberal-Secular public delegitimize the concept of the “people’s army” through moral language? To an extent, this thesis concludes they don’t. The values that legitimate the existence of a “people’s army”, republican interpretations of liberty, equality, and solidarity, are values that this public believes should exist in the army. They also state both implicitly and explicitly that those values should be brought forward through the draft. However, a dominant perception across the articles and speech acts that are analyzed in this thesis show that while there is a call for the army to install those values, there is a growing disbelief that a “people’s army” model will be capable of doing so.

The preliminary data-analysis predicted a negative descriptive legitimation and a contradictive prescriptive legitimation of the “people’s army” model of conscription. After conclusive discourse tracing on the basis of the doxa Liberty, Equality, and solidarity, this prediction appears to be correct.

In all three chapters, both authors and members of Knesset appear to agree on the fact that those three doxa are important requirements for the legitimate existence of a people’s army model. They are interpreted in a republican and sometimes ethno-republican manner. They are also regarded as absent, explaining the negative descriptive legitimation.

When it comes to descriptive legitimation – whether those values should be present and installed through the existence of a People’s Army model- the members of Knesset often unanimously are often in favour of a “People’s Army” model. Newspaper authors are often divided or inconclusive when it comes to whether or not there should be a people’s army, and what that army would look like. They too resort too often resort mainly to republican interpretations of a “People’s Army”.

The pattern found through discourse tracing that can explain the dichotomies in prescriptive delegitimation is the constant expression of all authors of “bad faith”. Almost all authors address the importance of the republican interpretation of the doxa legitimating the “People’s Army” model, and simultaneously express the incompatibility of integrating these values with ethno-religious values, gender differences and challenges from military modernization amongst themselves and with each other. Most of the arguments, both descriptive and prescriptive, are strengthened in their rhetoric through the inclusion of elements such as the “warrior ethos”, especially when it comes to values such as equality and solidarity, as well as elements of economic liberalization when it comes to liberty. This corresponds well with the conceptual framework.

A nuance must be added that the three different doxa are used differently when it comes to how they are legitimating the “People’s Army” model of conscription. All values are similarly interpreted in a predominantly republican manner from the start, and in their descriptive legitimation argued to be absent. Prescriptively, they differ in the way they delegitimize the “People’s Army” model. When it comes to “Liberty”, most writers resort to a practice of “bad faith” when it comes to the republican interpretation of the value, but some writers that a more liberal interpretation of the value of “liberty” could be possible, and therefore argue for the professionalization of the army.

When it comes to equality, the prescriptive legitimation again differs, but predominantly focuses on the concept of the impossibility of equality, as well as a “People’s Army” that would create such equality, and resort to “bad faith” statements again. They do however regard equality as an important value that should exist.

When it comes to solidarity, most papers descriptively state the value to be absent, but important. However, especially when it comes to the issue of incompatibility with the Ultra-Orthodox and the upcoming modernization, not only is a “People’s Army” model on the basis of solidarity regarded as impossible, while some authors even go further and reject the value as a whole.

The most common pattern in all three doxa is the appearance of “Bad Faith” – the idea that the values the “People’s Army” should have in order to be legitimate, are impossible to achieve. This differs from standard delegitimation and criticism of the “People’s Army”, because the institution is often till prescriptively legitimated by virtue of the public appeal to the values that would call for the institution’s existence. Descriptively, especially news-authors argue that on a moral basis, there is no “People’s Army”, because the current People’s Army model is not in line with the values that it should have. Standard delegitimation would look like a unanimous asking for the abolishment of the institution because these values don’t exist (delegitimation). Or, for the implementation of these values (re-legitimation), which would be expected when the values in themselves are seen as “good”. “Bad Faith” is different, are neither are done – the values are seen as good, but the institution is “given up” by virtue of the impossibility of the implementation of these values. This phenomenon differs from active delegitimizing, because the authors give up on the values that they think legitimates politics, and thereby gives up on politics and political support for their own system, without creating support for a new system. They thus give up on their own political participation in society.

The thesis therefore concludes that the “People’s Army” delegitimated by the Israeli secular public. This public believes that a republican interpretation of liberty, equality and solidarity legitimates the “People’s Army” model. They however adopt a fatalist discourse regarding these values in order to undermine the legitimacy of the Institution.

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APPENDIX 1: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

All articles are retrieved from: <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/pages/sessions.aspx>

Knesset. Knesset Remarks (2016) Debt to 33, Yeshiva Kama. *The 145th-19th Century Yeshiva of the Twentieth Knesset*. (Tuesday, Friday in Tammuz 5776 (July 12, 2016)) Jerusalem, Knesset, 16:00

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Knesset. Knesset Remarks (2013). *Booklet 16. Yeshiva 39. The Thirti-Nineth Yeshiva of the Nineteenth Knesset*. (Tuesday, Tuesday in Tammuz 5773 (June 11, 2013)). Jerusalem, Knesset, 16:00

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Knesset. Knesset Remarks (2011). 4th Session / Yeshivas of Racha -Razag /9-11 in Kislev 5772 / 5-7 December 2011 / 6. Booklet F. Yeshiva Racha. *The 2001-2016 meeting of the Eighteenth Knesset*. (Monday, 9:00 BST (December 5, 2011)). Jerusalem, Knesset, 16:00

Knesset. Knesset speeches (2015). G / Second Session / Yeshivot Su - Sach / 11-23 Kislev 5766 / 23–25 November 2015/7. Booklet G. Yeshiva Su. *The sixty-sixth session of the 20th Knesset*. (Monday, 11 Kislev 5766 (November 23, 2015)). Jerusalem, Knesset, 4:00 p.m.

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APPENDIX II: Newspaper Opinion Pieces, Editorials and Reports.*

Amit, Hagai. “The Israeli army’s big windfall – massive cuts in reserve duty”. *Haaretz*, October 29, 2018.

<https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/2018-10-29/ty-article/.premium/the-armys-big-windfall-massive-cuts-in-reserve-duty/0000017f-dbe4-db22-a17f-fff51d990000>

Arlosoroff, Meirav. “In dealing with issue of equal national service, should Israel scrap its 'people’s army' model?”. *Haaretz*. September 3, 2019

<https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2019-09-03/ty-article/.premium/should-israel-scrap-its-peoples-army-model/0000017f-f264-da6f-a77f-fa6e09bd0000>

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Cohen, Gili; Pulver, Sharon; Lis, Jonathan. “Israeli court delays appointment of top army rabbi who implied rape permitted in wartime”. *Haaretz*. November 21, 2016

<https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2016-11-21/ty-article/.premium/high-court-delays-controversial-top-idf-rabbis-appointment/0000017f-e73d-da9b-a1ff-ef7f51fd0000>

Editorial. “The 'grunts' in Israel's army shouldn't be going hungry”. *Haaretz*. February 13, 2022.

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Editorial. "IDF enlistment for all: An ongoing debate". *Haaretz*. July 8 2012.

Harel, Amos. "Israeli Army Needs To Draft Ultra-Orthodox Jews – for Society's Sake and Its Own". September 13, 2017.

Harel, Amos. "Why the ultra-Orthodox enlistment law matters". *Haaretz*. June 26, 2012. <https://www.haaretz.com/2012-06-26/ty-article/why-ultra-orthodox-enlistment-matters/0000017f-da7b-d938-a17f-fe7bac9e0000>

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Harel, Amos. "Why public support for Israeli army has reached a 13-year-low". *Haaretz*, Jan 7 2022. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-01-07/ty-article/.premium/why-public-support-for-israeli-army-has-reached-a-13-year-low/0000017f-f242-dc28-a17f-fe77c5f90000>

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Shtrasler, Nehemia. "What about equality at military funerals?". *Haaretz*. <https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2020-02-25/ty-article-opinion/.premium/what-about-equality-at-military-funerals/0000017f-e718-dea7-adff-f7fb81fe0000>

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<https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2018-07-22/ty-article-opinion/.premium/its-time-to-replace-the-draft-with-a-professional-army/0000017f-dba0-d3a5-af7f-fbae976b0000>

Lis, Jonathan. “Israeli committee backs bid to criminalize Haredi draft-dodgers”. *Haaretz*. February 20, 2014. <https://www.haaretz.com/2014-02-20/ty-article/.premium/israeli-committee-backs-bid-to-criminalize-haredi-draft-dodgers/0000017f-f361-dc28-a17f-ff7750e30000>

* Not all newspaper articles are directly cited in the text. They are however used to establish a stabilizing outcome regarding the used doxa as mentioned in the preliminary analysis, which can be seen in Appendix III. They are also used for the standard analysis, even if not directly quoted.

APPENDIX III: PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS

| Inclusivity of Minorities | Efficiency/Security | Equality within the army | Topics 2 | Writer | Date | Link |
|---------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|---|-------------------|------------|---|
| x | | | Demography, Haredim, Security, Efficiency | Meirav Arlosoroff | 06/09/2019 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/most-israelis-don-t-serve-in-the-army-right-solution-for-now-1.7796047 |
| x | | | Demography, Reserves, Inequality | Editorial | 28/12/2014 | https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/peoples-army-1.5353411 |
| x | x | | Efficiency, Costs | Amos Harel | 28/12/2014 | https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-prepare-for-end-to-mandatory-draft-1.5353411 |
| | | | Efficiency, Economics | Hagai Amit | 29/10/2018 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium-the-army-massive-cuts-in-reserve-duty-1.6602022 |
| | x | x | Efficiency, Inequality | Amos Harel | 08/09/2018 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/beginning-of-the-end-of-israel-s-military-people-s-army-1.6463145 |
| | | | Efficiency, Security | Yagil Levy | 04/01/2022 | https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/units-saved-israel-s-military-draft-1.10608083 |
| | | | Equality | Editorial | 13/02/2022 | https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/the-grunts-in-israel-s-army-shouldn-t-1.10608083 |
| x | | | Equality, Minorities | Haaretz Home | 14/07/2005 | https://www.haaretz.com/1.471235 |
| x | | | Equality, Feminism | Yaniv Kubovich | 15/04/2019 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/despite-a-successful-pilot-program-israel-decides-station-women-tank-soldiers-1.5353411 |
| x | | x | Equality, Efficiency | Amos Harel | 07/01/2022 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/public-support-for-israeli-army-has-remained-low-1.10520725 |
| | x | x | Gender Equality | Amos Harel | 18/08/2019 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/women-israeli-army-could-learn-from-us-1.7688663 |
| x | | | Haredim | Gili Cohen | 13/06/2016 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israeli-military-chief-stands-by-continued-for-top-rabbi-1.5409713 |
| x | | | Haredim | Yuval Elbasha | 03/05/2013 | https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-israeli-army-becoming-more-religious-1.5240811 |
| x | | | Haredim, Equality | David Rosenberg | 24/04/2019 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/time-to-get-down-and-dirty-and-draft-ultra-orthodox-1.7162580 |
| x | | | Haredim, Equality | Nehemia Shtrasler | 03/09/2021 | https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/ultra-orthodox-win-even-when-they-lose-opposition-1.10176842 |
| x | | | Haredim, Equality | Nehemia Shtrasler | 05/02/2021 | https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/about-equality-at-military-funerals-1.10176842 |
| x | | | Haredim, Equality | Jonathan Lis | 10/04/2018 | https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-committee-backs-bid-to-criminalize-dodgers-1.5324265 |
| x | | | Haredim, Minorities | Nehemia Shtrasler | 17/12/2021 | https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/nothing-israel-should-ax-its-national-religion-1.10475934 |
| x | | | Haredim, Women | Gili Cohen | 21/11/2016 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/court-delays-controversial-top-idf-rabbi-appointment-1.5464345 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|-------------------|------------|---|
| x | | | Haredim, Equality, Women | Tal Laor | 24/11/2016 | https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/propel-israel-s-army-against-the-en-1.5465142 |
| | x | | Haredim, Inequality | Amos Harel | 03/09/2017 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/the-israeli-army-needs-to-draft-the-1.5450338 |
| x | | | Haredim, Inequality | Editorial | 08/07/2012 | https://www.haaretz.com/the-idf-e-1.5265107 |
| x | | | Haredim, Inequality | Jonathan Lis | 08/11/2015 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/proposed-amendment-would-defer-haredim-1.5418655 |
| x | | | Haredim, Inequality | Jonathan Lis | 08/07/2012 | https://www.haaretz.com/likud-app-report-1.5265099 |
| x | | | Haredim, Inequality | Yossi Verter | 08/07/2012 | https://www.haaretz.com/analysis-he-s-no-ariel-sharon-1.5265011 |
| x | | | Haredim, inequality, Minorities | Uri Misgav | 22/07/2018 | https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/to-replace-the-draft-with-a-professi-1.6294170 |
| x | | | Haredim, Minorities, inequality | Gili Cohen | 08/07/2012 | https://www.haaretz.com/thousands-for-universal-draft-1.5265005 |
| x | | | Haredim, Security, Ethos, Efficiency | Meirav Arlosoroff | 03/09/2019 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/high-time-to-reduce-the-period-of-c-1.7799545 |
| x | | | Haredim? Politicians. | Yossi Verter | 07/07/2012 | https://www.haaretz.com/call-up-n-1.5265005 |
| | x | | Inequality | Amos Harel | 23/11/2021 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.HIGHLIGHT-new-p-1.10407893 |
| | | | Inequality | Yaniv Kubovich | 03/12/2017 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israeli-army-education-ministry-to-p-1.5627625 |
| x | x | x | Inequality, Efficiency, Haredim | Aluf Benn | 03/07/2012 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-mu-1.5200216 |
| x | x | | Inequality, Haredim, Efficiency, Security | Amos Harel | 06/07/2012 | https://www.haaretz.com/idf-must-1.5202310 |
| x | | | Inequality, Haredim, Melting Pot | Amos Harel | 26/06/2012 | https://www.haaretz.com/why-ultra-1.5187595 |
| x | | | Inequality, Melting Pot, Haredim, Minorities | Aluf Benn | 07/07/2012 | https://www.haaretz.com/aluf-benn-1.5264999 |
| | | | Liberalism, Efficiency in Security, Social Inequality, Melting Pot Myth | Iris Leal | 29/11/2021 | https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/myth-of-battlefield-camaraderie-the-truth-1.10422974 |
| | | | Liberalism, Efficiency in Security, Social inequality, Melting Pot Myth | Meriav Arlosoroff | 09/03/2019 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/should-israel-scrap-its-people-s-arm-1.7793216 |
| x | x | | Liberalism, use of Force | Amos Harel | 05/11/2016 | https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/the-israeli-peoples-army-lost-the-pe-1.5265005 |

| | | | | |
|---|-----------------|-------------------|------------|--|
| x | Women, Equality | Ariana Melamed | 02/12/2016 | https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/crimes-in-the-army-let-every-jewish 1.5468530 |
|---|-----------------|-------------------|------------|--|