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MASTER THESIS

POPULISM IN GREEK BUREAUCRACY

The Influence of the Syriza/Anel Government in the Public Senior Recruitment Policies

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1. Introduction

Public sector employs a big share of the labor market in every country around the world. The percentage ranges around 20% of the total employment worldwide (the World Bank, 2021). Not surprisingly then, and by taking into consideration the endless comparison with the private sector, the need for improvement is observed every day since the very first signs of the academic appearance of the topic (Weber, 1946). A notion known as New Public Management (NPM) which entails reforms and innovation policies for advanced performance and productiveness throughout the public organization and its personnel, has been extended scrutinized (Hood, 1995). Furthermore, contemporary international and European organizations expect from the public organizations of the countries to enhance their representativeness, in terms of their policy preferences in each other exchanges (Christensen, 2019). This characteristic, among others, appears to be absent from the bureaucracies of the southern European countries. These small group of European countries, including Greece, were late in the adoption of reformations based on the "Europeanization" reshaping that the more developed west European countries demanded after their accession in the European Union (Sotiropoulos, 2004a). Henceforth, a lot of research is on the rise in order to interpret, analyze and upgrade core policies revolving around the public sector's fields, and at a deeper level, public recruitment policy.

Regarding the public sector recruitment policies topic, a big amount of attention has been given towards the level and the type of competencies that an applicant needs to posse. In other words, to the competencies and the skills that the contemporary public sector's executives demand from the candidates for public civil servants. Know-how in leadership or managerial skills are some examples of expertise competencies which are vital for senior bureaucrat posts (Lewis & Waterman, 2013).

However, except the managerial skills which usually are vital, these upper-level layers also demand further skills the political executives are accustomed to make recruitments based in other, more political competences, especially in the area of the senior civil servants' recruitment (Moynihan and Roberts 2010).

But what happens when a change towards populism happens in a government?

Many researchers examined thoroughly the impact of a populist party in a country's government (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Peters & Pierre, 2004; Sasso and Morelli, 2020; Sotiropoulos, 2004). In practice, the authors' argumentation ranges around the change in the policy recruitment's methods the populism government make during their service in power. To be more specific, they support that the chances of a populism government to choose personnel more loyal to their party's political beliefs and ideology increases regardless the more meritocratic-based competences of an appointee (Mavrogordatos, 1993; Sasso & Morelli, 2020).

Christensen,Klemmensen and Opstrup (2014) are talking about the effect of politicization in the Denmark's top civil service. On the contrary, Brierley (2021) argue about the decision making between meritocratic and patronage recruitment whereas Sotiropoulos (2006) and Mavrogordatos (1997) are analyzing the phenomenon of bureaucratic clientelism in southern European countries and Greece respectively.

Admittedly, the enormous number of studies implies the relevance of this topic, especially in a case like Greece, of which public sector at one extreme contains components of the western European countries' bureaucracy and reforms, and at the other extreme presents periods of populism governments in power where the traditional patron-client relationship was established.

Historically, during eras of economic and social changes, populism finds its way to rise worldwide. Either the background is right or left oriented, or even socialist (like after the restoration of democracy in Greece 1981-1989) (Mavrogordatos, 1997), forms of populism are spotted the recent years even in the area of the conservative Europe. In a broader scope, one can observe a pearl of populism in the United Kingdom of the Brexit era and of course in Trump's United States (Peters & Pierre, 2019). At a more abstract level, however, Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008, p. 20) defines populism as:

“Populist democracy involves direct action of large numbers of people, which often results in the circumvention of institutional channels and ad hoc invasion of individual privacy”.

Many studies analyzed the phenomenon of the rise of the populism parties all around the world after the world financial crisis (Guiso et al. 2019; Sotiropoulos 2016). From the generalist perspective, the recent economic crisis boosted up the power of the populism parties and this is obvious enough the years after. And we can turn towards the case of Greece, in the middle of the big financial economic crisis and in an unfavorable period where 3 memorandums I total were applied to the country from troika coalition (European Union, Monetary Fund and European Central Bank) (Ladi, 2014). That is, a left-oriented populism party named Syriza under the leadership of Alexis Tsipras won the national elections in 2015, during the second memorandum of the country (Hellenic Parliament, 2021). In order to gain a majority and establish a government (because the number of votes they earned were not enough to construct a government) Syriza made a coalition with a right-oriented populist party named Anel (Independent Greeks). The new era of the promising change convinced the Greek citizens two times and stayed in power for four consecutive years. Apparently, many scholars tried to analyze this period from different points of view resulting in a plethora of research (Sotiropoulos, 2019b; Kakepaki et al., 2018; Mudde, 2017). Nevertheless, the topic of this thesis constitutes a gap in the already published literature.

This thesis is trying to estimate the effect of the new populism government of Syriza/Anel in the selection of senior civil servants during its tenure. As such, a large number of employees of the higher posts of the public bureaucracy (ministries) are going to be examined. For this purpose, the professional background of each one senior civil servant is going to be scrutinized via the use of online available data (e.g., CVs, LinkedIn profiles, news reports), novel data on the biographical backgrounds of employees appointed by Syriza. These data will contribute in the measurement of the variables of the thesis, to estimate the competency level of each civil servant. The findings are going to be compared with the findings of the same post during the previous conservative government of the ND/Pasok/Dimar coalition.

Hence, the research asks the following question:

"How did the competences emphasized in recruitment of senior civil servants in Greece differ between the Syriza government 2015-19 and the ND/Pasok/Dimar government 2012-15??"

In other words, the research is trying to estimate the criteria that the political executives took into consideration during the selection of the top bureaucrats in both governments and, by extension, the levels of top bureaucrats' political faith in each coalition in power. The research will be based of the dependent variables of "Expertise", "political Craft" and "Partisan Loyalty". These are the three most prominent competences qualities that may be emphasized in the top civil service recruitment. The independent variable "Syriza/Anel", as the thesis expects populism to have an impact on the recruitment process of the Greek bureaucracy and the Syriza government is identified as populist.

1. 1 Relevance of the Thesis

1.1.1 The Academic Relevance of the Thesis

From the academic scope, this thesis is trying to estimate the difference in the recruitment policies of the Greek public sector. The basic idea was inspired from the studies of Mavrogordatos (1997) and Sotiropoulos (2006) who analyzed in their research the origins of the patron-client relation in Greece. Even though the times have changed, and the country survived for the recent economic crisis, the traditional partisan bureaucratic clientelism is still observable. Mavrogordatos (1997) in his study mentioned the way a populism government used its power in the past over the public sector recruitment as a machine used to "lock" voters in the party. Additional, Sotiropoulos (2006) took the research a step further. In fact, the author analyzes the same form of politicization with the difference that the author does not only refer in the 80s and the decade of the PASOK (Panhellenic

Socialist Movement - Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα, a social democratic party which was in power most of the year from 1981 to the early twenties) but also in the New Democracy (ND) government of the early nineties. This research builds in their idea and expands the state of the art as it is trying to estimate the level of change of the public senior recruitment policy during the most recent populism government in Greece.

Nevertheless, recent years a gap is observed in the country's policy preferences regarding the public sector recruitments. Even though in the post-crisis period many reforms were applied in the public administration of the country and the topic was analyzed along several different lines of inquiry, an analytical study of the determinants of recruitment during the period of the Syriza/Anel government does not exist yet. Triantidis and Tsagroni (2017) tried to measure the levels of patronage and corruption by counting words focused in the aforementioned concepts in parliamentary speeches the last two decades before the crisis. but again, in their inquiry about the state capture strategies in the country, there is no an analytically examination of the civil servant's recruitments during that period.

This thesis is trying to fill these gaps with an analytical examination of the most prominent ministries and organizations' recruitment determinants. Admittedly, in terms of research design, the thesis's inputs in the current literature and, more precisely, in the Greek academia are essential.

Yet another, while Sotiropoulos (2019b) compared in his inquiry the state-society relations before and after the economic crisis of 2008 and the strict reforms by referring, among others, to the phenomenon of clientelism in a broader frame, he constructed an independent research based on the differences regarding the relationships of the political parties with the country's interest during on the same period (Sotiropoulos, 2019a).

Except the Greek public administration, this research also contributes to the broader literature which extends in the topic of the populism effects in the public administration of a country (Mudde, 2017; Peters & Pierre, 2019; Sasso & Morelli, 2020). Interestingly, the results of this thesis will either enhance the beliefs of the authors, which support that a populist government decreases the notion

of meritocracy though their policies with many consequences, or, if the thesis hypotheses will not be confirmed, contradict that idea. Again, if the thesis hypotheses will not be confirmed, the result will still be a positive contribution in the literature of the social sciences.

1.1.2 The Societal Relevance of The Thesis

From the societal scope, the research gives insights in the notion and the strength of the Greek bureaucracy. Although there have been many, endogenous and exogenous, changes in the construction of the Greek public sector, the desirable prestige, and independence of it is not observable yet (Sotiropoulos, 2004a). The author demonstrates that Greek bureaucracy, in comparison with other European countries, is not strong enough and, as a result, leans on each government. That increases the influence of the each newly elected government in every institution. The thesis will not only "shed light" in the policy recruitment of a populism government compared to a non-populism, but also in the frequency that two ideologically different governments are able to recruit civil servants with less meritocratic ways (Lewis & Waterman, 2013).

Secondly, it will confirm that Syriza government followed up its predecessors "bad habits", in contrast with the political line that the former prime minister Alexis Tsipras claimed the government would follow in the 2014 Thessaloniki international fair (This was the milestone speech of the former prime minister before the first election) (Kovaios, 2014). While feasible, many things changed during the party's service in as government, leading many to argue about the actual populism profile of Alexis Tsipras, as his decisions and attitude had reached the conservative levels of the most right-wing Greek governments of the past (Kazamias, 2019). Henceforth, this research will contribute to the ongoing discussion about the management of the public sector recruitment, and how merit was this procedure in comparison with the previous government.

1.2 Structure of The Thesis

The thesis will be structured as follows: the theoretical framework will start from the concept of populism in public administration and public recruitment under populism in order to develop sufficient theoretically hypotheses for the impact of the Greek populist government Syriza/Anel on senior civil service recruitments. For that purpose, the theory chapter will narrow down to the various competencies of the public recruitments, the theory of politicization and the politicization in the southern European countries. Based on the insights of the of the populist mentality, the regional and the cultural characteristics of the country and the recruiting mindset of the political executives, various hypotheses will be developed. Furthermore, in the methodology section the research design will be analyzed, the operationalization of the of the examined concepts as well as the variables will be presented. Moreover, the studied population the data collection and the methods of analysis will be analyzed in the same section. It will further present the reliability and validity of this thesis.

The analysis section will display the empirical findings and the visualizations of the analysis. After the correlation and regression examination of the variables, the data analysis results will provide insights in the various variables and by extension, the hypotheses of the research. As such, the hypotheses' rejection or confirmation will give insights in the research question and will be scrutinized in the discussion section of the thesis.

Finally, the conclusion of the research will sum up the results of the extensive research and answer the research question through the hypotheses. Also, there will be a reference to the limitations of these research as well as future prospects for research will be suggested.

2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

2.1 Populism and Public Administration

The topic of populism is vast, richly elaborated, and inconclusive. Apparently, it is used in a plethora of cases in the academia during the last fifty years (Canovan, 1983; Mavrogordatos; 1993; Mudde, 2004). Populism is identified through the years from left-wing (or new-left) to right-wing parties and governments in many regions across the world. Thus, it cannot be considered as a specific ideology, rather than that promotes the substitution of fundamental foundations of politics with irrational, more simplistic ideas and policies. It is mainly defined as *"an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people"* (Mudde, 2004). In other words, populists' main purpose is to demagogue, usually without rationale, the interest of the voters by contrasting them with the opposite party.

An earlier attempt for the evaluation of the concept was made by Canovan (1983), who tried to divide the notion of populism into shorter and more unambiguous concepts. Thus, the author established various subcategories of the notion similar to each other but with different characteristics. The purpose of this action was to reduce the gap between the vagueness, where scholars include different kinds of populism (locally and chronologically), and the exclusion, where scholars reject important examples in the name of clarity. In particular, two of them (Populist Democracy, Politicians' Populism) encompass the context of this thesis. She defines "Populist Democracy" as "*schemes and movements for making governments directly responsive to the people, notably by means of such methods as the popular initiative, referendum, and recall*" and "Politicians' Populism" as *"the use of calculatedly vague notions of 'the people' by catch-all parties or leaders who wish to blur established political divisions or to appeal away from politics*

altogether" (Canovan, 1983). These two sub definitions can extract a theory that covers the theory of the paper, whereas the reactions of a populist party towards the norms and the policies of a country can be described.

Mudde (2004), on the other hand, in his inquiry tries to define the whole concept of the populism. More precisely, he embraces Canovan's (1983) opinion that the notion is vague and differs in terms of region and ideology. Thus, the author define that "demagogy" is the main ingredient, and the foundation, of populism. Also, Mudde (2004), in order to narrow down the notion and be more comprehensive in his theory, stressed that "elitism" (elite versus people) and "pluralism" (groups based in differences other than the "elite versus the people") are the main opposites of the notion of populism. To put it even more succinctly, the author supports that the populist party leadership's main concern is the exclusive interaction with the supporters of the party, which is the main factor of their success (Mudde, 2004).

Relatedly, Mavrogordatos (1993) in his inquiry also demonstrates populism as an evolution of Peronism that "*pits the people as a whole"* against the elite. In addition, he supports that under the notion of unity of "the people", populist governments' goal is to "politicize" the civil service within the limits of legitimacy. The author's main references are in socialism as a form of populism and, as a consequence, in politicization. Mavrogordatos (1993) describes it as an action which causes the erosion of the bureaucracy and, as a result, the weakening of the civil service.

2.1.1 Recruitment Under Populism Government

Even though politicization is not a paradox of populism, Peters and Pierre (2019) support that the issue surges since populist parties are in power. According to this view, Sasso and Morelli (2020) point out the recruitment methods of the political executives after the advert of a populism government. Moreover, the authors found that regardless the time that a populism party will be in power, the results in the expertise of the public administration and policy implementation will be

observable. In fact, in order to succeed in implementing desirable policies, populism governments usually pay less attention in the training of the civil service. Instead, they tend to focus more on the political beliefs of the existing and newcomer employees (Christensen, Klemmensen & Opstrup, 2014; Sasso and Morelli, 2020).

On the same vein, Mavrogordatos (1993) and Sotiropoulos (2018) argue about the negative consequences of populism in the well-being of public administration. Even though politicization can be identified in many different kinds of governments, scholars support that during populist parties in power, a rise of the levels of politicization is observed. Conversely, Allcock (1971) in his inquiry in the roots of populism points out the positive relation between populism and politicization, with the difference that he preserves populism as an aspect of politicization. In other words, even though the two notions are different to each other, and one can assume that populism is the most ambiguous one, the author supports that the former resides in the contours of the latter, and not vice versa. This specific point of view where populism depends on politicization makes sense as from the most recorded cases in the academia, when someone comes across populism in academic research, it is doubtless that aspects of politicization will also appear (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 1983; Mavrogordatos, 1997; Mudde, 2004; Peters & Pierre, 2019; Sasso & Morelli, 2020). Whereas not all papers where politicization is analyzed are made in populist governments (Bach & Veit, 2017; Christensen, Klemmensen, & Opstrup 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Peters & Pierre, 2004; Pravita, 2018; Sotiropoulos, 2004a).

Likewise, Peters and Pierre (2004), who are backing the aforementioned opinion of Allcock (1971), argue about populism in bureaucracy and its implications towards to it. They support that a populist government will be followed by the expected issues of partisan based recruitments and also a significant surge of a more clientelist relationship with the already existing civil servants (Peters & Pierre, 2019).

The recruitment methods that are applied is one possible way, among others, to examine how much and, more specific, in what direction a country's civil service has been altered. More to the point, if

the civil servants' recruitments of a populist party tend to be more politicized during its time in power in comparison with the former, non-populist one, then the populism way of governing played a vital role to that result (Bach & Veit, 2017; Christensen, Klemmensen, & Opstrup 2014).

2.2 Politicization

Contemporary governance demands a plethora of skills and knowledge in the field of policy making. As the demand is growing day by day, governments are in the need of public officials, whose knowledge excels among others (Peters 2018). On the other hand, the overstaffing of neutral, non-ideological bureaucrats' participation within the government may lead in unwanted policy-making. As a result, governments' attempt to recruit less bureaucrats like that, or patronage the recruitment is a common scene. A situation that is called politicization, whose definition, according to Peters and Pierre (2004), is:

"the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service".

The politicization of Bureaucracy is a common topic of the social sciences which has been scrutinized by the contemporary academia (Bach and Veit, 2017; Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014; Hood and Lodge, 2006). As it happens with every notion, politicization has also its positive effects. Nevertheless, even though, typically, a fresh elected government's main obligation is to maintain or upgrade the already existing public bureaucracy, this does not exceed the need for an uncomplicated implementation of its policy preferences. To achieve that specific target, political executives tend to substitute their preferences in terms of senior public recruitment from more merit competences (political craft, experience) to more politized (partisan loyalty) (Triantidis, 2016). One example of the issue, is the recent Bach and Veit's (2017) case. Their findings showed that the partisan-based recruitments and promotions in the German bureaucracy are as often as the recruitments based in more merit criteria (competence). In other words, in contemporary public

bureaucracy, even in the most developed countries of the world, party loyalty is still a very strong element of choice for the appointment of public service candidates.

Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup (2014) analyze in their study the different aspects of recruitment in Denmark under the notion of politicization. Specifically, the authors argue about the different approaches of selection the political executives go after in the of top civil servants' recruitment, by analyzing different competences like merit and political responsiveness. Conversely, an emphasize is given to the policy that the civil servants themselves adopt during their service in order to keep their position during a possible change of the government.

On the same wavelength, Bach and Veit (2017) prove the existence of politicization on the German public administration. As I mentioned above, their research was upon the German civil service and the way top civil servants reacted during their recruitment operations. More specifically, how much politicized were these recruitments and what kind of politicization was observed, partisan or functional.

- *Partisan politicization:* where appointees tend to replace senior officials in public administration based on their partisan loyalty (bureaucratic clientelism or patronage) (Bach and Veit, 2017).
- *Functional politicization:* where seniors officials, usually ministry officials, in order to provide advices to ministers, have to bear in mind the political effects due to their direct affiliation with the politicians (Bach and Veit, 2017).

The distinction of these two types of politicization is in the criteria that are taken into consideration to substitute the meritocratic ones.

Accordingly, Guy Peters (2013) also tried to divide the vague notion of politicization into smaller parts. In particular, the author presented six different theories. However, as some are observed in different constitutions, less affiliated with the current thesis (e.g., presidential regime) and others

were mentioned earlier in the theory (partisan politicization), below are presented the most relevant of them:

- *Professional politicization*: where the recruitments are partisan but the expertise of the new appointees is equal with their predecessors (Peters, 2013).
- *Redundant politicization*: where ministers appoint external policy advisors who tend to guide and supervise the senior public servants (Peters, 2013).
- *Anticipatory politicization*: where public servants' motivation is discouraged due to a biased ministry or public organization (Peters, 2013).
- *Social politicization*: where external social actors participate in the recruitment procedure of a ministry or public organization (Peters, 2013).

At a more abstract level, however, all these different types of politicization can cause nothing more than negative effects in the professionalization of a public bureaucracy.

Generally, the notion of politicization is consensus considered as a "carcinoma" in a prosperous government (Sotiropoulos, 2006; Bach & Veit, 2017; Trantidis & Tsagkroni, 2017). A rather than ethical purpose is observed in the vast majority of the cases, which encroaches vital principles for the constitution of democracy. Obviously, one effective way to cope with the rising levels of politicization in a public administration is reforms based on the new public management (NPM) literature. NPM reforms "clear the air" from political effect in the public sector as they encourage less interaction between politicians and senior bureaucrats' policy-making (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016). Nevertheless, politicians are not the only ones responsible as usually the agreement is reached on both sides. Transparency and clarity are expected to be pursued equally by politicians and bureaucrats without a trace of tolerance (Pravita, 2018). The author assumes that part of the responsibility for the vitality of the issue is delegated to the bureaucrats themselves, who grant permission to politicians to affect their opinion in the policy making process.

2.2.1 Bureaucratic Clientelism or Patronage

A very common exemplar of the notion of (partisan) politicization is bureaucratic clientelism or patronage. Bureaucratic clientelism is a global issue that is spotted mainly in countries with the absence of administrative elites (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Sotiropoulos, 2004a; Triantidis, 2016). The literature refers to the term as an interchangeable relationship between politicians (patrons) and their voters (clients). Triantidis (2016) define patronage as "*a vertical, dyadic alliance between people of unequal status, power and resources".* Usually, the relationship between both sides is well organized in networks in order exercise control over the voters (Mavrogordatos, 1997). For example, the patron-client system as a "machine politics" was used very effectively and it constituted the main cause of the continuous reelection of the socialist party PASOK in power in Greece during the 80s and the 90s.

Mavrogordatos (1997) points out the "party machines" as a more organized form of partisan clientelism apparatus in the same period. In particular, after the long-term presence in power of the populist-socialist party PASOK from 1981, to be a member of the party was promising enough for a professional rehabilitation in the near future. Not surprisingly then, during this period a special department was set up for the demands of the members of the party in the recruitment area. "A usual treatment of populist government towards to their loyal voters", as Sasso and Morelli (2020) indicate in their inquiry. Specifically, the main distinction between populists and non-populists is that populists demand from their bureaucrats to accept their policies, even if they are not match the state of the world. Thus, populist's choice criteria do not seem to be based on meritocracy as the preference of party loyalty excels expertise.

Kickert (2011) interprets, among others, clientelism as a characteristic of politicization, which is spotted usually in the southern European countries. In particular, Kickert (2011) in his inquiry defines bureaucratic clientelism as: *'Organized political party use of state resources to win the client's electoral support'*. Simply put, political executives tend to give posts to more loyal candidates to the governmental party, or exchange their loyalty with the recruitment. That

phenomena automatically enhance the politicization of the public sector. Moreover, it contradicts the notion of "universalism" by promoting self-absorption which spreads in every aspect of the society. Southern European countries', like Greece or Italy, bureaucracies are some examples, where this "corrupted" kind of exchange flourished the recent decades.

Patronage can be operationalized either in its individualistic form [patron politicians, party leaders)-client] or in its collective form (patron- organized client group or labour unions). From the generalist perspective, the two different types of clients receive different treatment from the patron. Nevertheless, sometimes the patron, which usually participates in the policy- making process (policy bias), is forced to make a distinction between two different treatments as individual clients may demand different benefits than a collective one (Triantidis, 2016). Thus, the affiliation of a client in a group (e.g. organized party recruitment groups) under the notion of "machine politics" became the only way to benefit citizens who could never succeed meritorious (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Sotiropoulos, 2004b). Rather than, for example, joining a legit labor union in order to retain and shield their interests, the citizens tend to choose the unorthodox way of patron- client relationship directly with the politicians. A relationship which usually lasts for years and move towards their children, who inherit the same behavior (Sotiropoulos, 2018).

From the existing literature, we deducted that populism governments tend to change the way they are appoint civil servants, senior officials, or policy advisors (Peters & Pierre, 2019). In fact, it is observed that they tend to choose applicants with main criteria their affiliation with the party. The stronger this affiliation is, the more likely is for the candidate to occupy a desirable public sector post. And at a deeper level, the more political are the determinants of the recruitment, the more loyal in the party the appointee will be.

2.3 Competencies in Public Administration Recruitment

Many existing studies analyze the different competencies of the public sector recruitment in many countries. In some more developed countries, the methods of selection of applicants change over

time but in others, the traditional way still exists (Christensen. 2017). Nevertheless, many countries which share cultural elements and gathered in unofficial groups (northern European, southern European etc.) are observed to implement similar policies and structures in the public bureaucracy (Painter and Peters, 2010).

From the generalist perspective, the forenamed characteristics combined with new contemporary reforms in public management could be the case. But what happens when a populism government comes in power?

Apparently, the authors classified the different types of competences according to the bargains of the most contemporary and different to each other at the same time, countries in the field of the public administration. Moreover, in the same study is observed the transition from the "specialist" desire to the most "generalist", a trend that contemporary public bureaucracy and therefore, political science scholars, followed (Hood and Lodge, 2004; Christensen, 2015).

For the purposes of this research, the discussion will take place around three different qualifications with the most influence in upper-level positions of the Greek bureaucracy. Following the example of Bach and Veit (2017) on the German senior civil service and the Peters and Pierre (2004) study in politicization, I will try to analyze the recruitments of the thesis in the following competences:

1) Political Craft
2) Partisan Loyalty and
3) Expertise

2.3.1 Political Craft

While this thesis refers to recruitment methods of posts that belong and represent the Greek public bureaucracy, the anatomy of those posts requires knowledge and experience of the political know-how of the country. Bach and Veit's (2017) inquiry is strong about the necessity of this specific

competence. The authors mentioned in their study the importance of political know-how skill in the upper levels of a bureaucracy by referring to it as "a key competency of senior officials to carry out their job effectively". In other words, political skills are vital for the confrontation of the day-to-day responsibilities in senior public sectors.

Moreover, the authors "baptize" the know-how of the competence at this level as "functional politicization", where the civil service appointees in positions which are close to a minister are obligated to provide assistance in their daily workload along with their political responsiveness in decision-making issues (Peters & Pierre, 2004). Moreover, Hood and Lodge (2006) quote the notion of political leadership, as the employees are called to scrutinize the decision-making process of each issue. The duties of a ministry official include advices regarding policies, norms and the political changes in the public as well as the private sector of the country. Information and knowledge which is obtained during these obligations (media adviser, political management) are vital for the construction correct advisory process and eliminate misjudgments (Bach & Veit, 2017).

According to this view, and considering that the general secretariats' positions form the upper level of the country's bureaucracy, which means that they are the first subsistent civil servants where the minister and the deputy minister are able to interact, their expertise and knowledge presupposes aspects of political responsiveness (e.g., media communicator, political coordinator, prepare the minister speeches) that exceed the usual management skills of an average senior civil servant (Askim, Karlsen, & Kolltveit, 2017). The political craft of the country, and not only, is a desirable competence especially when it is combined with other merit competences. The aspects the political executives will take into consideration as indicators of political craft are:

- Political sensitivity which indicates the ability of an employee to handle diplomatically affairs of political nature (Bach& Veit, 2017).
- Legislative advisory which refers to the political and legislative know-how of the current notional and international affairs (Peters and Pierre, 2004).

- Coordinate short term advices focused on the newspapers and the media as well as long-term political strategies (Askim, Karlsen, & Kolltveit, 2017).

2.3.2 Expertise

In contrast to the other two, more political, competences, the highest-ranking government officials' positions (which in Greece are the positions of general or special secretariats of the ministries) also requires a group of some more specific, expertise skills. But under the notion of the modernization and, for the most southern European countries, Europeanization, it is observed a change in the demand of the traditional management knowledge of the recruiters (Sotiropoulos, 2004a).

At a deeper level, a candidate should be expert in skills like policy knowledge and management experience, as well as a specific level of education. It seems that nowadays, candidates' profiles are examined with main focus in more generic skills in order to be accepted in senior posts, in comparison with the tight, more specialist system of the past (Jann and Veit 2015). In fact, management and leadership competences are high in demand from the political executives of the ministries.

As reported by Bach and Veit's (2017), the definition of the expert competences in senior public sector posts is as it follows:

"We define these competencies quite broadly as a senior official's ability to efficiently orchestrate complex tasks in the specific context of a ministerial department characterized by distinct formal and informal procedures and structures".

In the same vein, the background of the Greek senior civil servants consists of employees with a higher education diploma (postgraduate degree), usually in the sections of economics and business or public administration, and university professors (Sotiropoulos, 1999; Pravita, 2018).

In addition, a previous experience in a lower or similar position within a ministry or in the top layers of a public organization is always taken under consideration. The context of the top layers of the public sector is always different from various aspects. Political context, media attention and constant changes are some usual expected conditions which contributes to the complexity of the context (Bach and Veit, 2017). Even more desirable is that a candidate with a history in a similar position is able to enhance the network between ministries. As a result, it would be easier for a manager in a specific post within the ministry to cope with the workload by using the experience and policy knowledge which was acquired in the past (Bach and Veit, 2017).

In essence, the skills that a candidate should possess in order to be defined expert from the civil servants' council are:

- Management and leadership skills (Bach and Veit, 2017)
- Higher education (Pravita, 2018)
- Previous experience in a federal ministry (Bach and Veit, 2017; Sotiropoulos, 1999; Pravita, 2018)

2.3.3 Partisan Loyalty

Bureaucratic clientelism or political patronage is a notion that is not part of a specific ideology. Historically, one can detect aspects of the issue outside of specific patterns, but does every case have the same results? Do populism governments look alike in this specific issue?

The bureaucratic clientelism era rose during the same period in the most south European countries as party-led clientelism was excelled among other criteria (Sotiropoulos, 2006). In general, the research points out that the recruitment of senior civil servants increased significantly from the first years of socialist governments in the specific group of countries.

More to the point, partisan clientelism (or political patronage) predisposes a decent level of partisan loyalty in order to exist. Alternately, partisan loyalty derives a big amount of its power from the existence of partisan clientelism. What this implies is that these two aspects are interconnected and positive correlated as if the one increases, so does the other. In practice, the more a government is able to recruit civil servants with main selection criteria their political belief rather meritocratic criteria, the more loyal its voters are going to be (Bach and Veit, 2017).

While feasible, apart from the advantages in the voting area, this specific recruitment method gives the respective government a "safety net" of employees in terms of their policy preferences. In order to avoid persistence and enhance control over the current bureaucracy, political executives prefer to appoint employees in senior posts with similar political perceptions (Bach & Veit, 2017). As a result, easier desirable policy adoption, and transmission to the lower layers of the bureaucracy.

A phenomenon that is not only characteristic of the southern European countries or more populism governments while one can observe similar examples even in the more developed European countries (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Bach & Veit, 2017). If the choice of candidates based in political beliefs is not direct, it definitely constitutes a "bridge" to avoid the extensive screening of them. The paradox here is that, even if a candidate will be recruited with more meritocratic criteria than partisan loyalty, the permanent existence of the bureaucratic clientelism in the Greek public sector will lead the other candidates to perceive the method of the recruitment as a partisan one (Dierickx, 2003).

In general, the main attributes that a recruitment needs to be defined a partisan recruitment are:

- Active party membership, which means that the recruited employee is officially a supporter of the government party or was at least once candidate in elections with it (Bach and Veit, 2017).
- Family member or relatives of a minister or MP of the party in power (Sotiropoulos, 2019b).

While feasible, for the cases where the association with the competence of the partisan loyalty exists, the absence of one of the other two competences make the influence of the party even stronger.

2.4 Public Administration/Politicization in Southern European Countries

At a more abstract level, however, the Europeanization of the southern European countries did not provide the expected results. Countries like Greece and Italy, even though they demonstrated a lot of progress in other fields (economic, taxation), took slower steps in the modernization of the public sector (Sotiropoulos 2004b). Decentralization and privatization were some of the reasons southern Europe failed to efficiently follow the North Europe's path. In addition, adaptation of various institutional changes had to cope with the slower, in comparison with the rest of Europe, modernization of daily society aspects (Sotiropoulos 2004b).

From the generalist perspective, much more characteristics regarding the political, economic and social sector reveal the divergence between the Mediterranean and the northern, more conservative Europe (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001). Agriculture activities remained the main professional orientation of the citizens long after their integration in the European Union, which resulted in late industrialization than the rest of Europe (Gal, 2010). Apparently, the late industrialization of them depending on the domination of industrialized countries like Germany in the structural procedure of European Union established the distinction of the southerns. This led to the reliance of them in the European Union and its allowances (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001).

In the southern European countries, politicization surpassed the top layers of the public administration and spread in public organizations as wel as decentralized administrations. In fact, this political exchange (patronage) which, except its main usability of generating votes, was used to bury many significant affairs (unemployment rates etc.), caused the overstaffing of the state bureaucracies, an issue which was observed the last fifteen years before the turn of the century in all the aforementioned regions (Sotiropoulos, 2004a). Sotiropoulos (2006), distinguish the phenomenon in two forms: "the "privatization" of politics or the "colonization" of civil society".

The former refers the firsthand penetration in the political actions from the government with main goal the party's benefit and the latter to the partisanship of self-ruling public authorities.

Bureaucratic clientelism's appearance was more than noticeable. In Greece, as it was mentioned earlier, the first presence of a populism government was in the 80s from the populist/socialist party PASOK. That specific decade determined the mentality of the citizens, an attitude which continues to exist until the recent years of the Greek public sector (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Sotiropoulos 2019a; Triantidis, 2016). As a result, citizens started to support fanatically specific parties that were candidates in national elections with primary goal to be appointed in permanent public sector posts. What is more is that these permanent positions usually last until the next national elections (Sotiropoulos, 1999). This phenomenon is predominantly observed in senior posts of the civil service.

Moreover, similar incidents were also observed in the rest of the southern European countries. During the 80s and the 90s, socialist parties came into power in both Spain and Portugal (PSOE and PS respectively) (Sotiropoulos, 2004b). After their election, a mass recruitment of party affiliated citizens was recorded. Italy, on the other side displayed a more conservative profile regarding the country's governments during the same periods. However, following the example of the rest southern European countries, staff units and departments for the recruitment of loyal party appointees, were also created in Italy during the turn of the century (Sotiropoulos, 2004a). Importantly, as the socialism parties dominated the elections, the politicization started to diffuse in the bottom civil service layers also. So, after years of governing, the whole public sector, from top to bottom, consisted mainly from employees dedicated in the governmental socialist party (Sotiropoulos, 2004b).

In addition, in Greece and Portugal during the socialist decade of the 80s, the structure of the civil service leadership changed and positions (Directors General and Deputy Director General), as they were no longer in force, were obligated to be filled by the government's officials rather bureaucrats.

Spain tried to surpass the aforementioned countries as the biggest amount of the recruitments in the top level of civil service obtained an analogous position for the first time (Sotiropoulos, 2004a).

A negative result which all of the southern countries share from the continuous populism/socialism way of governing is the weakness of the public administration. Interestingly, the strong administrative elite that is observed in the northern European countries seems to be absent in the Mediterranean countries. The repeated erosion of the public sector system from the bottom layers based on the constantly devaluation of the power and the prestige of the senior bureaucrats led the countries

In many ways, the vast complexity of the Greek bureaucracy which was observed in the last quarter of the previous century as part of the 'southern model of the welfare" (Sotiropoulos, 2006) existed until the most recent years. As a result, political officials were able to "hide" their preferences in the public recruitment field behind the Greek constitution's distinct set of norms and regulations (Sotiropoulos, 1999). As a result, a vast majority of recruitments were made with anything but merit criteria. An incident which tended to be so common among the society, where it was not incriminatory any more (Mavrogordatos, 1997).

2. 4. 1 Greek Bureaucracy

Greece is a democratic country with a constitution called parliamentary democracy. Its bureaucracy was built upon the patterns of the Napoleonic model (Spanou, & Sotiropoulos, 2011). Which means that it consists of the top layer (the ministries) and Local public organizations (agencies), Public Legal Entities (public Autonomous organizations), decentralized administration (municipalities and administrative regions) and Independent Administrative Authorities which are induced in the ministries (Hellenic Republic, 2021). In the top layer, the ministries' staff, in additional to the operational issues of the ministry, also have under their jurisdictions to manage the lower layers of the public sector. Moreover, they are obligated to report to their supervisors (ministers, political

officials) which consist of in force elected politicians. In order to do that, In Greece, political officials are recruited from the current government in every ministry in all levels of a ministry (head of secretaries, special advisors etc.) (Sotiropoulos, 1999).

The Historical roots of these posts were noticed after the political changeover of 1974 and the election of Constantinos Karamanlis as prime minister. Karamanlis, in addition to many innovative, for the time, moves (joining of Greece in the European Community) established the political officials' posts in the ministries (Pravita, 2018). However, Karamanlis lost the next elections of 1982 from PASOK of Andreas Papandreou, who was the big visionary of the socialist party. Papandreou immediately restructured the public administration and abolished the political officials from the ministries (Sotiropoulos, 2004a). But 3 years later political officials' positions were back. They introduced though as political cabinets of ministers under the same Government and appointed as general secretariats and special secretaries.

Top official's hierarchy is distinguished in three posts (Sotiropoulos, 1999):

- general secretaries.
- head of directorate.
- head of a Public Organization.

Furthermore, the promotion of them is induced under the jurisdiction of a special council, according to the law of civil servants (OECD). Each ministry sets up a service council specialized in the recruitment of the general and special secretaries (Sotiropoulos, 1999). This special service council consists of five members, three directorates and two representatives who are all part of the same ministry. What is more is that the interdepartmental mobility of the civil servants is rather than a rare phenomenon in the Greek civil service. In fact, if the previous experience of the candidate was in a similar position (different ministry, minister's advisor etc.) or in another vacancy within a ministry, the chances of being hired in a desired position in a ministry are much increased (Bach & Veit, 2017; Sotiropoulos, 1999). Moreover, same holds for the in-force employees with the same

background. They obtain a bigger volume of possibilities to hold their posts during periods of government change due to elections or reformations within an existing government or a minister.

Interestingly though, the senior civil servants' recruitments were not always under the jurisdiction of the aforementioned councils. Ladi (2014) in her research indicates the new role of the Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection (ASEP). ASEP is an institution which established in 1994 and its main obligation is to promote transparency, publicity, objectivity, and meritocracy (ASEP) in civil servant's recruitment. After their applications, the participants are reviewed through a written exam. Even though this way of recruitment process promotes meritocracy, the transparency of them is not so objective as written examinations rule out many feedback regarding the organizational behavior of the participants (Pravita, 2018).

Moreover, from the article 103 of the civil servants' law in 2001, the constitutional review forbade the post-employment of employees with a fixed-term contract. Nowadays, and after the 3 memorandums, ASEP is in authority not only for the recruitments but also for the promotions of civil servants. On the contrary though, during the first memorandum and after the reforms proposed from the troika coalition at the time, ASEP was able to have authority in the recruitments of senior civil servants within the government's ministers, but after many objections in the parliaments the law was not implemented for almost one and a half year after the enactment of it (Pravita, 2018). As a result, the new government of the ND/PASOK/DIMAR coalition changed the specific restriction after the established of them in power.

2.5 Hypotheses

The expected outcomes of the research are flowing from the chosen theoretical observations on the research question of paper. The current research question tries to identify the impact of populism in public administration, and more specific, in the recruitment process of it. As it is mentioned in the

theoretical part, functional (partisan) politicization is a characteristic which is usually encountered in civil service.

The theoretical framework of the thesis gives us a better understanding of the roots of the expected outcomes of the research. In particular, evidences of populism in the post- junta period of Greece are more than obvious. The Greek public administration is one of the institutions that has been severely affected by the notion the last thirty years as the populism consequences are still visible today (Sotiropoulos, 2018).

Even though the politicization of bureaucracy did not introduce itself after the first socialism government in Greece (PASOK, 1981), since Greece is a Mediterranean country which entails much negative attributes, it flourished after the establish of socialism on power and surged the years after (Mavrogordatos, 1997). As a result, politicization has soaked in the DNA of the citizens and it is witnessed in the everyday contacts between the citizens and the state. Public recruitments and promotions are the most characteristic actions where the issue is spotted (Sotiropoulos, 2018).

Moreover, the theory highlights the positive relationship of the aforementioned phenomenon and the notion of populism. Namely, the relation of the populism government of Syriza/Anel with the heightened levels of politicization in the civil service. Thus, the expected outcomes examine the Syriza/Anel government's appointees in three different concepts of competency, based upon Bach and Veit's (2017) pattern. The concept of political craft (H1), the concept of expertise (H2) and the concept of partisan loyalty (H3). Furthermore, these outcomes will be compared with the same concepts' results of the previous ND/PASOK/DIMAR government. The difference between the two governments is expected to reveal the impact of the populism government of Syriza, and consequently the impact of populism, on the public recruitments of the country. In table 1 are summarized all the developed hypotheses.

1. *Hypothesis 1: Political Know-How*

Political craft is a mandatory skill in the contemporary senior public administration (Askim, Karlsen, & Kolltveit, 2017). Because this ability does not reflect so much as a meritocratic one, scholars brand political craft as functional politicization (Peters & Pierre, 2004). Far from their functional obligations (e.g., in a minister), this type of posts also concerns duties which demand political abilities. Media exposure, party conflicts and proper transmission of their supervisors' decisions and the lower-level civil servants are some issues assigned in the senior civil servants' daily routine (Askim, Karlsen, & Kolltveit, 2017).

However, the academia has found that senior public recruitments of populist governments tend to focus less on appointees with political know-how (Christensen, Klemmensen & Opstrup, 2014; Peters & Pierre, 2020; Sasso and Morelli, 2020). In fact, it seems that the political abilities of the loyal candidates lag behind of other more independent in terms of political ideology. In contrast, as an aspect of spoils-system bargain (Hood & Lodge, 2004), populists recruit employees who can be easily affected (less political responsive or representatives of the party) by them in order to control and establish their favorable policy-making with minimum opposition (Bach & Veit, 2017; Mavrogordatos, 1997; Peters & Pierre, 2019).

Generally, this hypothesis scrutinizes the negative relationship of the Syriza/Anel government's recruitments with the competence of political craft. In order to check levels of the skill (negative or positive) in the newcomer's competencies, the results will be compared with the results of the previous ND/PASOK/DIMAR recruits' skills levels (Bach & Veit, 2017). In essence, the hypothesis expects to be a negative change in the recruitments' method during the Syiza/Anel government. The following is expected:

> *H1: The recruitment policies in senior civil servants' positions of the Syriza/Anel government were based less in the characteristic of political craft in comparison with the previous government of ND/PASOK/DIMAR.*

2. *Hypothesis 2: Expertise*

Apart from the political aspect, managerial skills and expertise are vital for the productivity of the senior civil service (Peters, 2018; Bach & Veit, 2017). Education, training and experience are some of the characteristics the appointees must have in order to deliver a quality and efficient public service.

Specifically, the contemporary senior Greek public bureaucracy is still excessive and lacks of professionalism (Pravita, 2018). The durability of the aforementioned problems in combination with the old-fashioned, bad shaped structure of it made the need for reforms inevitable. Thus, the modernization of the Greek public administration was one of the core reforms mandated from the troika coalition (Ladi, 2014). As a result, a postgraduate degree as well as previous experience in a similar or a within-a-ministry position is mandatory (Sotiropoulos, 1999). That means a senior civil service post demands, at the very least, the competence of previous experience in a same or analogous position.

Building upon the theoretical framework and existing literature, the recruitment strategies of the Suriza/Anel government are expected to be more partisan based on the competencies of the chosen appointees. Thus, this thesis will examine the competence of expertise and how this changed in contrast with the previous coalition government:

> *H2: The recruitment policies in senior civil servants' positions of the Syriza/Anel government were based less in the characteristic of expertise in comparison with the previous government of ND/PASOK/DIMAR.*

3. *Hypothesis 3: Partisan Loyalty*

Secondly, based on the opinion that they desire to control the public sector, populist choose appointees who are loyal to them (Peters & Pierre, 2004). Except their votes and support, by recruiting loyalists, populists obtain more power in the bureaucracy, which is usually a construction of the previous (opponents) parties in power (Bach & Veit, 2017). So, as the previous were the "corrupted elite" and the populists are the only ones who represent the people, the replacing of them

is one way (Mudde,2004). As a result, the public sector fills with loyalists, but less professional, public servants who are gears of the political machine of the party inside it and pave the ground for their preferences.

Another strong reason for the existence of this desire is the patron-clientelism (vote exchange) of the government with the recruited appointees (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Sotiropoulos, 2018). More prosaically, the pre-election promises the party's supporters demand from the populist to fulfill in exchange for their loyalty. So, as a thank you, populists give their supporters a permanent position in the civil service.

In line with the foregoing discussion, Greece is a huge example of this aspect of politicization (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Sotiropoulos, 2018; Triantidis, 2016). For many years, most of the public sector recruitments and promotions were based in the competence of loyalty. This "bad habbit" exaggerated during the government of the socialist party PASOK in the 80s and the 90s (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Sotiropoulos, 2006). Thus, the system modified and restructured form the populists upon the characteristic of the patron-client relationship (Mudde, 2004). So, it was ready for the new potential populism government in order to follow the "elephant's path" of the partisan recruitment. It is hence reasonable to expect the following:

> *H3: The recruitment policies in senior civil servants' positions of the Syriza/Anel government were based more in the characteristic of partisan loyalty in comparison with the previous government of ND/PASOK/DIMAR.*

Table 1: *the expected theoretical hypotheses of this thesis*

	Expectations

1)	H1: The recruitment policies in senior civil servants' positions of the Syriza/Anel government were based less in the characteristic of political craft in comparison with the previous government of ND/PASOK/DIMAR.
2)	H2: The recruitment policies in senior civil servants' positions of the Syriza/Anel government were based less in the characteristic of expertise (managerial experience) in comparison with the previous government of ND/PASOK/DIMAR.
3)	H3: The recruitment policies in senior civil servants' positions of the Syriza/Anel government were based more in the characteristic of partisan loyalty in comparison with the previous government of ND/PASOK/DIMAR.

3. Research Methodology

In this chapter will be explained the method and the data that were used to address the hypotheses and answer the research question. Firstly, the research design of the paper will be briefly described. Then it goes on to the elaboration of the case selection and the population as well as the presentation of the dependent, independent and control variables. Next, the data collection strategy will be analyzed along with the data analysis methods presentation and explanation. At the very least, a brief description of the validity and reliability of the research in the existing literature will be presented.

3.1 Research Design

The research of the paper is X-Y focused. More prosaically, it will estimate the impact of the independent variable, which is the populist government of Syriza/Anel, on the dependent variable which is the senior civil servants' recruitment in Greece (general/special secretaries and Head of directorates). In order to achieve this, I will evaluate the preference of the political executives of the aforementioned government through three different competences (Political Craft, Partisan Loyalty, Expertise) and I will compare the results with the previous government of the ND/Pasok/Dimar coalition. To perform this step, the biographical data of upper-level bureaucrats during the first structural reform of each government in a period of 4 years (ND/PASOK 2012-2014 and Syriza/Anel 2015-2016) are collected and will be analyzed. Thus, a unique dataset which contains 140 cases (70 from each government) was constructed. The dataset is quantitative and large-N in nature (N=140). Moreover, the scores of each case will be demonstrated as dichotomous type variables. The research, through this dataset, will try to demonstrate the public recruitment policy's discrepancies between two ideologically opposed governments.

3.2 Case selection

There are various significant reasons regarding the choice of the case selection. At first, Greece, as a southern European country, has a large tradition in populist governments. As this thesis mentioned, Greece was under populist governments for more than two decades when the socialist party PASOK was in power (Sotiropoulos, 2018). During these years, a lot of changes have been made in the construction and the management of the public administration of the country (Spanou & Sotiropoulos, 2011). Subsequently, following some big breaks with no populists on power and one global economic crisis, the Greek government is dominated again from a new populist coalition, Syriza/Anel. Which means that the Greeks again chose the "elephant's path" (the already tested option) and elected a populist government to get the country back on track.

The research intents to analyze the previous experience and the attributes of the senior civil servants recruited after the establish of a populist party in power in comparison with a non-populist one in 3 different variables.

In order to be more specific, I am going to clarify below what this thesis names senior civil servants in the Greek public administration. Also, a brief situation of the Greek constitution.

3.2.1 The Greek Senior Public Bureaucracy and studied population

After the big financial economic crisis which much affected Greece, the Greek government signed the memorandum of Understanding (2010) with the European union, the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and the European bank for the rescue of the country from bankruptcy (Kostopoulos, 2020). In exchange, the government had to implement some structural reforms which delivered big changes in the structure and management of the public bureaucracy (Ladi, 2014).

The crisis situation led the country in constant early elections during the era of the memorandums, where a party from a different political ideology was elected each time. In 2009, PASOK, which is

considered a center-left oriented in terms of the political position (beliefs) was elected in power. Three years later, in 2012, the early elections won by the conservative party New Democracy (center-right), which also served from only three years. In 2015, Greeks decided for first time after the 40-year domination of the Greek bipartisanship (two-party system) (PASOK-New Democracy) to give power in Syriza, which only obtained a percentage around 5% in elections before the outburst of the economic crisis (Hellenic Parliament). The two governments of ND/PASOK/DIMAR coalition Syriza/Anel coalition which are used for the purposes of the thesis, were the only two with a full-term service after the outbreak of the financial crisis.

More to the point, the organization of Greece is induced under the treaties of the European Union, in which is a member since 1981, even though, the bureaucracy of the country was built in the standards of the Napoleonic administration and the European administrative law (Sotiropoulos, 2004a). This particular regime is characterized by popular sovereignty. To put it even more succinctly, the people of the nation produce all powers (legislative, executive and judicial) for the nation (the Constitution of Greece, 2004). Moreover, the government, which is the top layer of the executive power of the country, consists of the ceremonial president but the prerogatives of managing the country are exercised from the Cabinet, which are the prime minister, his staff, and the ministers with their staff (Sotiropoulos, 1999).

Civil servants under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet are not part of the actions of policy formulation and execution assigned to the it. Under this layer, the country extends through a vast and extensive public sector. As it is mentioned above, each Ministry employs a large proportion of political appointees, whose main obligation is to help the Minister in policy issues. Although, this particular staff is not induced under the ASEP law, as the rest of the lower layers, they have the authority to temporary replace top civil servants under them (Pravita, 2018; Sotiropoulos, 1999).

According to the Greek constitution, this kind of political appointees can avoid the permanence law for civil servants in comparison with the rest of the senior civil servants, whose position stays permanent until their retirement (the Constitution of Greece, 2004). As a result, if a new political

party wins the national parliamentary elections and come to power, is able to recruit new staff in the aforementioned senior civil servants' posts. This possibility generates big issues, as the already appointed employees are usually replaced when a new different government takes place (Mavrogordatos 1997, Sotiropoulos 2019b).

In essence, the positions of the general and special secretariats constitute the first and more significant layer of the Greek Bureaucracy (Sotiropoulos, 1999). So, a lot of attention is given in the people who fills these posts, as a lot of power is exercised upon and through these civil servants, even though is not the only example of non-merit recruitment in the Greek bureaucracy (Sotiropoulos, 2018).

In addition, as these positions consist the top layer of the Greek public administration, are admittedly more challenging, regarding the knowledge and experience of the appointees. That means that the competencies and the skills of them are vital for the productivity and the efficiency of a ministry, making their presence in the appointees' background unavoidable (Bach & Veit, 2017). As a result, if there is indeed a difference between a populist and a non-populist recruitment policy in the public sector, it is very likely to be detected in these specific senior posts than in lower layers of it.

From the generalist perspective, special and general secretariats are the most suitable group of positions of senior civil servants with the same characteristics regarding the choice for the answer of this thesis' research question, but not the only one. General managers of public organizations or public hospitals are employees whose daily tasks demands skills and knowledge similar with the senior civil servants of the ministries (Pravita, 2018). But the difference is that, even though these posts usually obtain considerable attention and are significant enough to be patronized, the position and the context of the most of them attract even more patrons regardless of political beliefs (decentralized administrations, labor unions, Church etc.) in comparison with the clear partisan treatment of the Ministries' secretaries (Sotiropoulos, 2018). As such, the internal validity of the of the population is increased while the possibility of selection bias diminished (Toshkov, 2016).

Moreover, even though the significance of the political change in the governance of the country was massive, as the profile of the new elected government of Syriza/Anel can be characterized as a populist/ left oriented one, and a plethora of inquiries tried to analyze the change from various aspects, there is no existence of a peer- reviewed research upon the specific argument of the senior civil servants' recruitment (Mudde, 2017; Sotirakopoulos, 2016; Sotiropoulos, 2018; Sotiropoulos, 2019a).

Bach and Veit's (2017) study in the high public office of Germany constituted the pattern of this thesis. Furthermore, the inquires of Pravita (2018) and Sotiropoulos (1999) which mainly analyze the posts of the senior civil servants within the Greek Ministries, provided valuable feedback towards the familiarity with the general and special secretariats' posts. But, due to the absence of studies based on this kind of senior public employees, a unique data set was created in order to back up the structure of this research.

3.3 Operationalization

In this section, the indicator variables of the research will be evaluated to compute and measure the public administration's recruitment competencies and the change of them during the two governments. Furthermore, following the Back and Veit's (2017) methods, a plethora of online biographical data (e.g., CVs, LinkedIn profiles, news reports) will be used to estimate the skills' quality of each recruited employee in order to examine the hypotheses of the paper.

3.3.3 Dependent Variable

The aforementioned recruitment competencies are the dependent variables of the research. They form the measurement indicator of the concept of senior recruitment procedure, as they cover different aspect of skills. Thus, the measurement is distinguished in three different layers, directly

based on the Bach and Veit's (2017) approach of measure the German public recruitment competencies. Professional previous experience ('Expertise'), political skills demanding by the nature of the posts ('Political craft') and loyalty in the government party ('Partisan Loyalty') are the most common qualifications that senior public executives demand from their candidate employees. That is, the three aforementioned concepts are going to be the 3 dependent variables of the thesis. In addition, all three of them are binary variables in terms of the measurement level, which means a case is able to take either the value "1", if the appointee meets the requirements of the specific concept or "0" if the case does not apply sufficient in the conditions of the variable.

3.3.3.1 Bureaucrat Competencies

Expertise

The first competence is the competence of 'Expertise'. To measure this vague competence, I will distinguish it in two different covariates, following the example of Bach and Veit's inquiry. The operationalization of the competence of different aspects of previous experience (Expertise) by the aforementioned authors consists of two different covariates:

- *Leadership experience within a ministry*: where a senior civil servant has a previous work experience in a similar position (general or special secretary or as a head of a section) within the same ministry for at least 9 months. If this covariate applies, the case takes the value "1" in the competence of previous experience (Expertise =1) (Bach & Veit, 2017).
- *Inter- ministerial mobility*: where a senior civil servant had worked in a post within a different ministry for more than 7 months. If this parameter exists, the case also takes the value "1" in the competence of previous experience (Expertise =1) (Bach & Veit, 2017).

The thesis will avoid to use other criteria (educational level etc.) for the recruitment of the senior civil servants. That decision was taken because, even from the lower posts of the Greek public administration, the required educational level of them is high (MBA/MA) or the highest (PhD)

(Sotiropoulos, 1999). As such, no civil servant would be able to acquire a position within a ministry and, by extension, obtain the desirable managerial experience without a high educational degree.

To sum up, there is no need for both of the above covariates to be valued as "1". If only one of them is valued one, the indicator of the case in the competence of 'Expertise' takes the value "1". At last, cases that do not provide nor the first neither the second measurement condition, takes the value of "0" (Expertise = 0) based on the dichotomous nature of the measurement.

Partisan Loyalty

Secondly, the competence of 'Partisan Loyalty' does not offer direct indicators of measure. In this occasion, again in line with Back and Veit's work, a selection of proxy covariates is going to cover the measurement of the competence in each case. Specifically:

- *Loyal to government:* applies when a senior civil servant was a member of the political party, which was part of the government during his service in the public post. This specific employee was counted as partisan loyalist if he/she had a previous work experience as a special advisor to an MP or within the organization of the specific party (party headquarters) or private institutions and offices induced in it. If so, the case takes the price "1" in the competence of 'Partisan Loyalty' (Partisan Loyalty =1) (Bach and Veit, 2017).
- *Candidate with the party:* Each senior civil servant who was a candidate, elected or not, with the specific party (which was part of the government during his service in the public post) or a faction of it (usually in elections of local governments and decentralized administrations) is considered as a loyalist to the government and takes the value "1" in the loyal to government competence (Partisan loyalty =1).
- *Close family relationship:* When an appointee had close family relationship with a member of the government (Prime Minister, Minister or MP) is counted as a loyal to the government and takes the value "1" in the competence of 'Partisan Loyalty' (Partisan Loyalty = 1). The

'close family relationship' refers to appointees who are close family or second generation's family members.

If the appointees do not provide at least one of the aforementioned conditions, then the senior civil servant is considered as a non-loyalist to the government and the competence takes the value "0" (Partisan Loyalty = 0) (Sotiropoulos, 2019b).

Political Craft

Third, the variable 'Political craft' is also inspired from the operationalization of Bach and Veit's (2017) study. This competence is measured by civil servants whose skills obtained in:

- *Previous work experience within a ministry*: Where an appointee used to work in a post of a ministry, regardless the level of it, for more than 7 months. That can be on a top-level post (e.g., General/special secretariat) or the lowest levels of the ministry (political advisors etc.). If a civil servant's biographical data covers this covariate, then the competence 'Political Craft' of the specific case take the value "1" (Political Craft = 1). If not, then the case takes the value "0" (Political Craft = 0) (Bach and Veit, 2017).
- *Previous work experience in senior elected position:* Senior civil servants who were candidates and they got elected officials in a senior position (MP, Mayors, governors etc.) are considered skillful individuals in the political know-how and cases which meets this condition takes the value "1" in the competence of the political craft (Political Craft = 1). Obviously, if the appointee does not meet the requirements of the covariate, the case take the value "0" in the competence of the Political craft (Political Craft = 0). However, this criterion does not include only candidates who were elected with the governmental party at the time of their recruitment. So, for example, if a bureaucrat was one of the of the Syriza/Anel recruitments and was in the past elected with the Dimar party, the case takes the value "1" in the political craft competence.

Even though the criteria seem to look alike with those of the expertise competence, the measurement of the experience gaining here is different in nature. As such, an employee is able gain experience in both managerial and political competences. The difference in this thesis is in the time period and of course the nature of the position of each civil servant.

Table 2: Operationalization of the Dependent Variables

Operationalization of Variables		
Variable	**Indicator**	**Measurement**
Expertise	Prior work experience in a same or a similar position within the ministry for at least 9 months. **-or-** Prior work experience in a different ministry for at least 7 months.	Fulfilled/Not fulfilled - 1/0
Partisan Loyalty	Prior work experience in the organization of the party (headquarters, institutions, offices) or as a special advisor in an MP. **-or-** Participate in elections with the party regarding the success of the of the election. **-or-** Close family relationship with the Prime Minister, Ministers or MPs.	Fulfilled/Not fulfilled - 1/0
Political Craft	Prior work experience within a ministry regardless of the level of the position for at least 7 months. **-or-** Elected in general or decentralized) elections and serve in a senior elected post.	Fulfilled/Not fulfilled - 1/0

3.3.2. Independent Variable

The independent variable of the thesis is the government coalition of Syriza/Anel. It is expected to have influenced the recruitment methods of the senior civil servants towards a not so meritocratic approach. In order to compare the results with the previous government though, the previous government of ND/Pasok/Dimar constitutes an independent variable too. As a result, the independent variable will consist of two different binary variables, one for each government. So, the independent variables will be: "Syriza/Anel recruitments" and "ND/Pasok/Dimar recruitments".

3.3.3. Control Variables

For the sufficient examination of the hypotheses, the thesis needs to take into consideration one or more different variables in addition to the independent variables. Control variables refer to the dependent variables that are able to substitute the independent variable or to alter the relationship between a dependent and an independent variable (Nishishiba, Jones, & Kraner, 2013). To put it even more succinctly, Berman and Wang (2018) define control variables as:

"Variables used to detect whether relationships between independent and dependent variable hold up under the presence of alternative, rival explanations for the observed pattern off outcomes".

Even though Greece is a country that consists of a big number of public organizations, privatization, or semi-privatization, occurred in many of them the last couple decades (Ioannou, 2013, Sotiropoulos, 2018). Obviously, many changes happened to each one of them in terms of context and policy-making methods. Nevertheless, although the most of them were induced in the private sector of the country, they continued to deliver services in the same (and of course higher through the years) rhythm as they used to do in the past (Triantidis, 2016).

Henceforth, each labor union maintained the influence in the government, even after the privatization of them (Kennedy, 2016). In addition, the unions obtained influence in the private part of the management of the organizations. As a result, more the share of the policy-making was divided in more parts, than only in the governmental authorities and the leadership of the labor unions (Kennedy, 2016; Sotiropoulos, 2018; Triantidis, 2016). So, as the unions had the power to affect the government's decisions, now they were fighting for the interests of the organizations themselves, as private entities, and vice versa.

This influence obviously affected the recruitment policies of the organizations and not only. That means that in addition to the preferences of the political party in power, the political executives took into consideration also the preferences of third parts in the higher layers of civil servants' recruitment (Kennedy, 2016). Big companies of the areas of merchant shipping and the industry of the country could affect the government's policies through their foundation and the influence on the labor unions. In other words, senior civil servants were recruited due to their loyalty, but this time not necessarily in the party, but in the private companies (Triantidis, 2016).

Admittedly, these recruitments can be considered as loyalty-based recruitments. But as they are not partisan-based, and their existence is observed in both governments in the same level (all cases with the same characteristic showed zero change as the senior civil servants retained their positions during the substitution between the two governments of the study), their influence on the final results of the examination of the thesis is considered negligible.

On the other hand, differences in ranking level within the Greek public administration are observed in the various posts covered by the thesis. In particular, the posts "Head of Directorate" and "President of Organization" within the ministry are typically the higher ranks of the Greek public sector. Below them are the rank "Director" and then follows the scales A, B, C, D, and E (where E is the lowest rank of a Greek civil servant) (OECD, 2021). Nevertheless, bureaucrats in these posts possess less power regarding the management of the ministry, as in the above levels, and below the minister and his cabinet, are the posts of the General and Special Secretariats (Sotiropoulos, 1999).

As such, the posts of the General and Special secretaries are considered as non-permanent and the appointees' recruitment procedure is nonidentical with the rest bureaucrats. As a result, to that point of view, the ranking of the examined population is a variable that can be considered as a control variable.

Moreover, as the variable can detect if an appointee is of the higher ranking of the Greek public administration, or it was a personal choice of the current government as a non-permanent secretary. Again, the variable is dichotomous in nature as it takes only two variables, 0 and 1, same as the independent and dependent variables. In essence, the variable "Post Rank" takes the value "1" if the case is either general or special secretary position, as these positions are the core of the research. Otherwise, the variable takes the value "0" if the position is one of the rest ministry vacancies of the examined population.

Nevertheless, the variable does not indicate much. Even if a difference in the various posts can be observed, it is not significant due to the fact that the permanence of the higher level of the civil service (Presidents of organizations within the ministries or head of directorates) amounts to three years. Which is also the usual establishment of the general and the special secretaries. As a result, each government have the opportunity to make reforms in the biggest part of the management of the ministries and not only in the level below the ministers and the junior ministers (general and special secretaries) (Sotiropoulos, 1999). However, an increase of the loyalty in each government in the highest levels of the bureaucracy it is expected to be observed (Pravita, 2018).

3.4. Data Collection

The main purpose of the data collection was to collect the total number of senior civil servants of each government. In line with the research of Bach and Veit (2017), the thesis gathered leadership staff from the office holders of the Greek ministries. Specifically, the thesis mapped the appointees

in the posts of “General Secretary”, “Special Secretary” and “Head of Directorate” from all 15 ministries right after the election and the first transformation of each government.

Moreover, even though the ministries of the first government exceed in number those of the second due to changes in terms of structure and name of a small number of them (17 ministries under the jurisdiction of Samaras’ government versus 15 of Tsipras government) there was no change in the posts analyzed by the study, as the offices remained as they were in the former government (Eklogika, 2021; General Secretariat for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, 2021a; General Secretariat for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, 2021b). Nevertheless, for practical reasons this thesis mentions the posts as they are induced in the ministries of the most recent government (Syriza/Anel).

Hereby, a large number of the Greek ministries’ leadership bureaucratic positions was gathered through governmental and online newspaper websites (Eklogika, 2021; Ravanos, 2012; Real, 2015). For transparency reasons, the findings were verified through the National Printing Office and the governmental press releases (F.E.K), where the recruitments were officially published (Printing Office, n.d.). Furthermore, after collecting the name of each individual served in the aforementioned positions (N = 140), the trace of their biographical background followed. Since there is no existence of an official source of career information online, the collection was made one by one through ministry and agency websites, media coverage, LinkedIn profiles, sites focused in political elections and personal websites following the example of Bach and Veit’s (2017) study. Each case is exhaustively scrutinized for the translucence and clarity of the research, since the applicants emphasize information that they believe will be most useful in securing a merit appointment and support their post. Appendix 2 provides the analytical mapping of the senior bureaucrats of the data set.

The data set of the 140 cases consists of information regarding the coalition in power (e.g., Syriza/Anel), the ministry in charge (e.g., Ministry of Development) and detailed specialization of the post (e.g., General Secretariat for Strategic & Private Investments) (Bach and Veit, 2017).

Subsequently, the data set demonstrates the scores of every civil servant in the dependent variables of the study.

3.5 Methods of Analysis

The research design of the thesis is quantitative comparative analysis in nature. For the analysis' results of the research, the Descriptive statistics of the variables will be provided, followed by the correlation matrix and, subsequently, several models of logistic regression analysis will be applied (Allen, 2017; Menard, 2008). The correlation matrix of the Pierson's phi coefficient (φ) will display a clear view of the statistical significance of each variable (Antonius, 2003). Furthermore, as the data set demands a large-N design and the dependent variables are all binary-type, logistic regression analysis is the most prominent method to provide sufficient results (Hosmer et al., 2013, Menard, 2008). According to that, an SPSS logistic regression will be used for the examination of the cases based on the competencies of each appointee (Antonius, 2003). In order clarify the discrepancies in a higher level, each case will be classified into 3 different categories depending on their competence level. The categories of the classification are:

- *Skillful*: if the appointee scores "1" in both of the "Expertise" and "Political Craft" competencies.
- *Moderate*: if the appointee scores "1" in one of the "Expertise" and "Political Craft" competencies.
- *Only Partisan:* if the appointee scores "1" in the competence "Partisan Loyalty" and "0" in the both of the "Expertise" and "Political Craft" competencies.

The analysis section will provide the descriptive statistics of the majority of the variables presented in this thesis. In this section the minimum and maximum, mean, median and standard deviation values of the observations will be displayed. Subsequently, the correlation matrix of the variables offers insights regarding the associations between the variables of the research. For more adequate

results concerning the multicollinearity of the variables, a number of logistic regression models will be applied. In particular, two different logistic regression analysis will be applied each one for every variable (models 1-12). The first table will provide insights regarding the relationship between each dependent variable and the independent variable "Syriza/Anel". The second table will scrutinize the same relationships but with the presence of the control variable "Post Rank". As a result, the relationship of the independent variables with the dependent variables will be displayed analytically. This method provides a larger pool of information regarding the change of the recruitment policies between the two governments rather than just make a simple comparison of the findings from the coding of the cases. As such, the score of the logistic regression models will give more information about the employees' competences presented, in order to compare the strategies of each government.

In other words, the Regression models will expose valuable information towards the influence of the two governments in the recruitment perceptions which were adopted by the political executives of the public sector. Specifically, they will reveal the number of the skillful/moderate appointees who were not "loyal" to each government, the number of the skillful/moderate who were "loyal" to each government and the number of them whose main competence was just the loyalty to the government. As such, the regressions' scores will be able to give answers in the expected hypotheses of the thesis. Hereby, depending the outcomes (rejecting or confirming the hypotheses), the research will have a clear view of the level of the effect of populism in the recruitment of the senior civil servants, which corresponds to the main goal of the research.

As far as logistic regression models are concerned, the main parameters that the thesis analysis will be based its results are three. Firstly, the regression model, as well the correlation models, indicates the statistical significance of the variables' relationship. If the relationship is significant, which means the p-value is smaller than the significance levels indicated in the correlation matrix, then the result is not a random outcome (Ekstrom, 2011). Furthermore, the coefficients values indicate the relationship between the variables applied in the regression models. The outcomes give information in terms of the strength of the relationship between the variables (Allen, 2017). Then it goes to the

Pseudo R^2 value which displays the variation of the dependent variable which is generated by the independent variable (Menard, 2008). For this value, the research will take the McFadden's R^2 as the most appropriate value to indicate the measures (McFadden, 1974). At last, the more the Odds ratio (confidence interval) displays a small value, which means a small variation, the more the reliability of the research increases (Allen, 2017).

3.7 Reliability and Validity

For the credibility and the legitimate gravity of this research in the existing literature, it is vital to examine the validity (internal or external) as well as the reliability of this thesis (Toshkov, 2016).

At first, the term external validity refers to the capableness of the research to generalize its findings in a wider population than the studied sample (Toshkov, 2016). To ensure, for example, that except the general/special secretaries and heads of directorates, the findings of this thesis are able to apply in a wider population of senior civil servants or lower layers of civil servants, within or outside the Greek territory. However, because of the vagueness nature of the notion of populism (Canovan, 1983), we cannot assume that the findings can apply in wider population outside the borders of the Greek public administration. Moreover, as the research is retrospective in nature again it is not valid to assume that the same populist methods will be adopted from every populist party coalition that was, or will be, in the governance position of Greece. Thus, the external validity is expected to result poor values.

On the other hand, the generalization of the findings in a wider population is not the goal of this thesis. Instead, as it was stated in the "relevance of the thesis" part of the paper (see chapter 1.1), this research reveals the actual validity and significance that the Greek Bureaucracy obtains towards the independence of it from each government (Sotiropoulos, 2004a). Moreover, the paper contributes on the filling of the chasm of the Syriza/Anel "populist" reactions (Sotiropoulos, 2018) in the already scholarly research upon the Greek populist governments' traditional patron-client relationships (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Sotiropoulos, 2018).

The internal validity of the research needs also the same amount of attention (Toshkov, 2016). Specifically, the data set analyzed in the thesis was created specific for this research. This implies that it was not part of another peer-review research, and the cases were operationalized here for the first time. However, the population used constitutes the biggest amount of the top civil servants within the Greek ministries. That means the first and most crucial layer of civil servants, below the ministers (Sotiropoulos, 1999). So, if anyone wanted to exercise control and handle a population of civil servants, that would be the first target.

Secondly, this research based upon the research of the Bach and Veit's (2017) inquiry. In particular, the procedures of the population choose, the independent variables selection and the operationalization of the cases followed the exact same path with the above research. As a result, the threat of the insufficient indicators existence is diminished (Toshkov, 2016). Moreover, the selection bias, which constitutes a possible threat for the validity of the research, is ignored due to the fact that this level of bureaucrats' seniority has been used in a previous paper (Bach & Veit, 2017).

Third, the existence of potential confounders has been neutralized, as the causality follows the topic's way towards the hypotheses of the research (Toshkov, 2016). As such, the thesis secures the causal part of the internal validity (Toshkov, 2016).

On the other hand, measurement reliability refers to the threat of a potential difference in the measurement of the same data source, with the same measurement instrument (Toshkov, 2016). In other words, if another researcher, who is not part of a research project, follow the same procedure of measurement of the specific project with the same data, the result must be almost identical. Otherwise, the reliability of the research is considered low. In consonance with Toshkov's words, this thesis encounters a treat regarding the coding and the evaluation of the cases into the dependent variables. However, the coding again was applied in the pattern of peer-reviewed studies (Bach & Veit, 2017), reasoning that the covariates are tested and the information was dragged entirely form the personal CVs (Curriculum Vitae) of the civil servants. As a result, information of the

bureaucrats' backgrounds that are not mentioned in their CVs does not causes any difference in the variables of "Expertise" and "Political Craft" since it would be impossible for a civil servant of that level to hide vital information which are able to contribute meritocratic in the final recruitment of them. As such, the concealment of these specific information is considered intentional from them.

In contrast, in terms of the political inclination's rationale, one could expect a possible absence of information which contribute on the third dependent variable (Partisan Loyalty). For example, if a civil servant tried to hide his past relation with a specific party, since the research is retrospective in nature, so she avoids to mention such information in his CV, the coding of the case is not considered reliable. Nevertheless, as it is mentioned in the data collection section of the paper, each case was exhaustively scrutinized and different online (governmental or non-governmental) sources (old elections, local government parties that were affiliated in the specific party etc.) were used for the verification of the findings.

4. Empirical Findings

In this section of the thesis the empirical findings of the analysis will be demonstrated. At first, the descriptive statistics of the variables' correlations will be demonstrated and discussed. Furthermore, the hypotheses of the paper will be examined based in the t-test technique and the regression models' results. The final chapter of this section consists of the discussion upon the analysis results and the hypotheses' outcomes which will answer the primary research question of the thesis.

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

In this section, the descriptive statistics of all cases (N= 140) are analytically presented. Table 3 provides information regarding the mean, median and standard deviation values of the variables.

Table 3. *Descriptive statistics of the variables*

Variables	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
Dependent variables					
Political Craft	140	.371	.484	0	1
Expertise	140	.550	.499	0	1
Partisan Loyalty	140	.714	.453	0	1
Skillful (Political Craft + Epertise = 2)	140	.310	.463	0	1
Moderate (Political Craft + Expertise = 1)	140	.310	.463	0	1
Only Partisan	140	.314	.466	0	1
Independent Variables					
Appointed by ND/Pasok/Dimar	140	.500	.500	0	1
Appointed by Syriza/Anel	140	.500	.500	0	1
Control Variables- Post Ranks					

General/Special Secretaries	140	.800	.401	0	1
Head of Directorates	140	.200	.401	0	1

First of all, all the variables (dependent and independent) were observed for the same number of observations (N = 140).

Analytically, the variable "Expertise" which refers to the previous work experience of a senior civil servant shows a mean value of 0.550. Meaning that only 77 (55%) of the appointees of both governments displayed adequate prior experience for the examined vacancies. This suggests that 63 of the 140 appointees did not have a previous experience for at least 9 months in a same or similar position or more than 7 months in another ministry. Simirarly, recruited civil servants with political skills were less than the average, as the variable "Political Craft" yield a mean value of 0.371 which corresponds to the 37% of the examined populations as such, only 52 bureaucrats were familiar with the political know-how demanded from the senior civil sector. On the contrary, the variable "Partisan Loyalty" presented a mean value of 0.714, which means that 100 out of 140 senior civil servants had at the time, them or another member of their close family, close relationships with the respective party in power.

Figures 1, 2 & 3: *Histograms of the variables "Political Craft", "Expertise" and "Partisan Loyalty".*



Moreover, the variable "Skillful", which consists of the sum of the variables "Political Craft" and "Expertise", displayed a mean value of 0.310. That is, 43 of 140 of the observations showed both the characteristics of political craft and managerial expertise (31%). In addition, the variable "Moderate", which is also a sum of the variables "Political Craft" and "Expertise", also displayed mean value 0.310. That means 31% of the appointees (43/140) showed only one of the aforementioned skills. What this implies is that the 38% of the examined cases do not display the competences of political craft and managerial experience at all, as the 62% of the shows at least one.

Figures 4, 5 & 6: *Histograms of the variables "Skillful", "Moderate" and "Only Partisan".*



Analytic results of the variables are displayed in Figure 7.

Last but not least, the control variable “Post Rank” showed a mean value of 0.800, meaning that 80% of the positions of the cases examined are secretariat’s managers. The rest post covers the amount of the 20% of the observations (Head of Directorates, Chairmen of Divisions and Presidents of Ministerial Organizations).

Then it goes to the empirical findings of the variables. Figure 7, as we mentioned again displays the competencies each government took into consideration for the senior civil personnel. The graph shows differences in the sums of the examined cases in all three competencies. In addition, it

shows how many of the appointees has as set of skills (Skillful) at least one skill (Moderate) and how many of them presented only the affiliation with the government (Only Partisan).

Figure 7: *Top Bureaucrats' characteristics.*



Relatedly, the figures 8 and 9 displays the divide of the skills based on the nature of the posts. According to the graphs, the appointees in the general and special secretaries' positions displayed much more discrepancies in the way the two coalitions recruited them. Interestingly, even though there is not much difference in the "partisan Loyalty" competency of the two governments, the fact that the rest two competencies (Political Craft & Expertise) presented enormous antithesis respectively, makes it significant. In fact, the appointees of the ND/Pasok/Syriza coalition with the

aforementioned skills were more than double in comparison with those of the Syriza/Anel coalition government. On the contrary, the rest of the post (Head of directorates etc.) reveal only a difference in the competence "Expertise", while the other two variables presented same values. As a result, the difference in competences seems to hold only for the top positions (General/special secretaries).

Not surprisingly then, it is quite obvious from the descriptive statistics that both of the governments, each of them on its own way, focused more in the posts of General and Special secretaries while the rest of the senior public posts were treated almost the same.

Figure 8: *Competencies of the 2 Governments in the General and Special Secretaries' Posts within the Ministries.*



Figure 9: *Competencies of the 2 Governments in Ministerial Head of Directorates and Presidents of Organizations Posts.*



4. 2 Correlations of Variables

This section of the research contains and analyzes the correlation of the variables. The purpose of the correlation is to measure the strength and the direction of a relationship between the variables (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2012). For that, and taking into consideration the nature of the total of the variables (dichotomous), a Pierson's phi coefficient was applied (φ). Specifically, Pierson's phi coefficients tool is the most appropriate correlations tool for dichotomous variables (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2012). The significant level will set at 1% (a = 0,01) and 5% (a = 0.05) (2-tailed). This value is going to reveal if the correlation is statistically significant or it is considered as a random sample. The coefficient ranges between the values "1" and "-1", where "1" indicates a perfect positive relationship and "-1" indicating a perfect negative relationship. Obviously, "0" indicates no relationship at all (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2012).

Table 4 presents the detailed correlation coefficients of all dependent, independent and control variables. The independent variable "Appointed by Syria/Anel" is negatively correlated with the variable 'Political Craft" (φ = - 0.325, $p<0.01$). Likewise, it is strongly negatively correlated with the competence "Managerial Experience", as the variable demonstrates a φ-correlation coefficient of - 0.473 ($p<0.01$). The significance level of both of them is at 1%. Conversely, the independent variable is uncorrelated with the competence "Partisan Loyalty" ($\varphi = 0.063$), a correlation which is insignificant (0.458). Moreover, in terms of the final two variables "Skillful" and "Moderate", the independent variable is highly negatively correlated ($\varphi = 0.418$, $p<0.01$) with the former and uncorrelated ($\varphi = 0.015$) as well as heavily insignificant (0,856) with the latter.

The dependent variable "Political Craft" is fair significantly correlated with the dependent variable "Managerial experience" ($\varphi = 0.428$, $p<0.01$). Moreover, even though the competence "Partisan Loyalty" is not correlated as it demonstrates a φ correlation of -0.011. Nevertheless, "Partisan Loyalty" is showing again an insufficient correlation coefficient (0.476) which makes unavailable for conclusions (Allen, 2017).

Accordingly, the dependent variable "Managerial Experience" displays a negative weak correlation with the dependent variable "Partisan Loyalty" ($\varphi = -0.191*$). This correlation coefficient is the only significant one containing the variable "Partisan Loyalty" with significance level at 5%. Also, the expertise is highly and fair negatively corelated with the variables "Skillful" ($\varphi = 0.602**$, $p<0.01$) and "Moderate" ($\varphi = -0.322**$, $p<0.01$) respectively. The correlation coefficient between the last two variables is $\varphi = -0.443**$ ($p<0.01$).

Table 4. *Correlation Matrix*

	Appointed by Syriza/Anel	Comp A (Political Craft)	Comp B (Managerial Experience)	Comp C (Partisan Loyalty)	Skillful	Moderate	Only Partisan	Post Rank

Appointed by Syriza/Anel	1.000	-0.325**	-0.473**	0.063 (0.458)	-0.418**	-0.015 (0.856)	0.369**	0.000 (1.000)
Comp A (Political Craft)	-0.325**	1.000	0.428**	-0.011 (0.476)	0.866**	-0.223**	-0.520**	-0.022 (0.795)
Comp B (Managerial Experience)	-0.473**	0.428**	1.000	-0.191*	0,602**	-0.322**	-0.748**	-0.057 (0.500)
Comp C (Partisan Loyalty)	0.063 (0.458)	-0.011 (0.476)	-0.191*	1.000	0.044 (0.605)	-0.230**		0.237**
Skillful	-0.418**	0.866**	0,602**	0.044 (0.605)	1.000	-0.443**	-0.451**	-0.093 (0.275)
Moderate	-0.015 (0.856)	-0.223**	-0.322**	-0.230**	-0.443**	1.000	-0.451**	0.101 (0.237)
Only Partisan	0.369**	-0.520**	-0.748**	0.428**	-0.451**	-0.451**	1.000	
Post Rank	0.000 (1.000)	-0.022 (0.795)	-0.057 (0.500)	0.237**	-0.093 (0.275)	0.101 (0.237)	0.031 (0.718)	1.000

**Correlation is significant at the a<0.01 level. (2-tailed)

*Correlation is significant at the a<0.05 level. (2-tailed)

4. 3 Logistic Regression models' Results

The tables below (table 5 & table 6) present the logistic regression analysis results of the SPSS tool (Antonius, 2003). Subsequently, the outcomes of each variable's regression analysis with or without the control variable will be discussed. that means, the value of the variables for every one new value of the independent variable Hosmer et al., 2013). For that purpose, the odds ratio outcome will be used as a predictor (Menard, 2008). In addition, Pseudo R^2 value gives additional information regarding the variation that the independent variable can explain in the majority of the independent variable (Menard, 2008). Also, the observations in all models are 140, which is the entire quantity of the data set.

Table 5. *Logistic regression analysis comparing Syriza/Anel appointments to ND/Pasok/Dimar appointments.*

	Model 1: Political Craft Competence	Model 2: Managerial Experience	Model 3: Partisan Loyalty	Model 4: Skillful	Model 5: Moderate	Model 6: Only Partisan
Appointed by Syriza/ Anel	-1.414** (0.377)	-2.079** (0.389)	0.281 (0.376)	-2.048** (0.445)	-0.067 (0.366)	1.735** (0.417)
Constant	0.114 (0.239)	1.299 (0,291)	0.780	-	-0.780	-1.792
Observations	140	140	140	140	140	140
Odds ratio confidence interval (95%)	0.243 (0.116; 0.509)	0.125 (0.058, 0.268)	1.324 (0.634; 2.765)	0.129 (0.054; 0.309)	0.935 (0.456; 1.918)	5.667 (2.503; 12.831)
Pseudo-R^2	0.082	0.170	0.003	0.150	0.000	0.114

Cells report the regression logistic coefficients (left) and standard errors (parentheses).

***Correlation is significant at the a<0.01 level. (2-tailed)*

Table 5. *Logistic regression analysis comparing Syriza/Anel appointments to ND/Pasok/Dimar appointments with the presence of the control variable "Post Rank".*

	Model 7: Political Craft Competence	Model 8: Managerial Experience	Model 9: Partisan Loyalty	Model 10: Skillful	Model 11: Moderate	Model 12: Only Partisan
Appointed by Syriza/ Anel	-1.415** (0.377)	-2.090** (0.390)	0.298 (0.387)	-2.072** (0.449)	-0.068 (0.368)	1.737** (0.417)
Post Rank	0.127 (0.459)	0.376 (0.488)	-1.202 (0.441)	0.594 (0.495)	-0.593 (0.503)	-0.195 ((0.498)
Constant	0.089 (0.256)	1.231 (0.303)	1.053 (0.286)	-0.117 (0.259)	-0.673 (0.271)	-1755 (0.353)
Observations	140	140	140	140	140	140
Odds ratio confidence interval (95%)	0.243 (0.116; 0.509)	0.124 (0.058; 0.266)	1.347 (0.631; 2.875)	0.126 (0.052; 0.304)	0.934 (0.454; 1.924)	5.678 (2.506; 12.864)
Pseudo-R^2	0.083	0.173	0.047	0.158	0.009	0.115

Cells report the regression logistic coefficients (left) and standard errors (parentheses).

***Correlation is significant at the a<0.01 level. (2-tailed)*

Set 1: Political Craft

In this first set of models, the regressions containing the dependent variable "Political Craft" are analyzed (model 1 & model 7). Also, both models were applied with the independent variable "Syriza/Anel" as the covariate variable of the regression. The difference is that the second (model 8) was applied with the presence of the control variable "Post Rank".

Both models indicates that the relationship between the independent variable "Syriza/Anel" and the dependent variable "Political Craft" is statistically significant, with or without the presence of the control variable "Post Rank" ($p<0.01$). That means the regression rejects the null hypothesis (no relationship at all) and the two variables appears to have strong multicollinearity. Interestingly, the model displays a highly negative relationship with an odds ratio value of 0.243 and confidence interval value (95%) between 0116 and 0.509. That means that the Syriza/Anel government affected negatively the senior civil servants' recruitments in terms of political know-how. In other words, the new employees of the Syriza/Anel government were less skilled regarding the competence of political craft than their predecessors of the ND/Pasok/Dimar coalition government.

Hypothesis 1 expected the populist government Syriza/Anel to affect negatively the recruitment policies based in the characteristic of political craft. The regression models' outcomes containing the specific competence supports strongly this assumption. The statistically significant negative relationship indicates that appointees of the Syriza/Anel government tend to be less familiar with the political know-how of the country than appointees of the previous coalition in power. as such, hypothesis 1 is confirmed.

Set 2: Organizational Experience

The models which contain the dependent variable "Expertise" (Managerial Experience) are analyzed in the second set (model 2 & model 8). Also, the same exist in these models too, regarding the presence of the independent variable and the independent variable in accordance with the control variable in models 2 and 9 respectively.

Both models present a highly negative, statistically significant relation between the dependent variable “Expertise” and the independent variable “Syriza/Anel. The odds ratio of the regressions is even smaller than the previous set (0.124) which indicates an even smaller confidence interval (95%) (0.058 - 0.266). That regression outcome supports that the appointees of the government Syriza/Anel are highly negatively related with the competence of expertise compared with the appointees of the ND/Pasok/Dimar government.

Hypothesis 2 proposed that the government of Syriza/Anel recruitment policies will be based less in the competence of managerial experience. Also here, the expectation is heavily supported by the regression models’ outcomes, as the statistically significant negatively relationship of the two variables demonstrates that the senior bureaucrat appointees were less skilled in terms of managerial experience in comparison with the appointees of the previous government. The hypothesis 2 is therefore confirmed.

Set 3: Partisan Loyalty

The third set of models contains regressions between the independent variable of the thesis and the dependent variable “Partisan Loyalty”, where again in the second model of the set, the control variable joins the regression (model 3 & model 9).

This set contains models almost no multicollinearity at all. Interestingly, the regression models indicated that both models are not statistically significant. Also, the odds ratio outcome displays an adequate positive (over 1) value (1.347) with confidence interval fluctuating between 0.634 and 2.875. an outcome that is bigger, compared with the results of the previous variables. However, the confidence interval covers the value 1, which also means that the relationship is not significant. As such, there is no statistical support for this set.

As a result, the regression models partially support what the hypothesis 3 was not predicted. H3, which expected that the political appointees of the Syriza/Anel government were based more in the

competence of partisan loyalty, rather than the previous government of ND/Pasok/Dimar, is not confirmed from this set.

Set 4: Skillful variable

The variable "Skillful" analyzed in the set 4 is a combination of the first two variables (Political Craft & Experience), as it is explained in the methodology section. The two models consist of the aforementioned variable, whereas a logistic regression was applied with the dependent variable of the thesis in the former and the dependent variable accompanied form the control variable in the latter (model 4 and model 10 accordingly).

Both regressions are statistically significant and strongly negative related, an outcome which was expected as both of the variables that were the origin of the "Skillful" variable displayed the same result. The odds ratio and the confidence interval values range in very low levels too.

The purpose of these models is to give extra insights in the hypotheses 1 and 2. In fact, these regressions supported the relationship of a combination of skills with the Syriza/Anel government coalition. The case that the Syriza/Anel appointees encompass both of political craft and Expertise competence in their skillset is highly negative related. As such, the ND/Pasok/Dimar demonstrated more cases where one appointee displayed both of the above variables.

Set 5: Moderate

Set 5 was structured exactly like the rest of the variables, but it includes the variable "Moderate" as a dependent variable (models 5 and 11). In accordance with the set 4, these regressions were also applied to support the hypotheses 1 and 2, as the variable "Moderate" indicates whether aan observation displays either the competence political craft or the competence expertise.

The models are not statistically significant as the p-value of both of them are bigger than the significance level a. The odds ratio value is also inaccurate (0.935) which guide us to avoid these two models from the analysis.

Set 6: Only Partisan

In this final set, the models analyze the relationship of the variable "Only Partisan" with the independent variable "Syriza/Anel". Following the flow of the regression table, the first model (model 6) indicates a regression applied between the above two variables and in the second model of the set (model 12) the control variable "Post Rank" was added.

Interestingly, the regressions provide highly positive, statistically significant relationships between the two variables (1.735). In addition, the odds ratio value ranging in very high levels with a minimum of 2.503 and a maximum of 12.831. That means the government of Syriza/Anel is highly related with the occasion that a case will display the partisan loyalty competence in accordance with the absence of the rest to analyzed competences of the research in comparison with the ND/Pasok/Dimar government.

More prosaically, the number of the appointees of the Syriza/Anel government that displayed in their professional background only the affiliation with the party characteristic is much bigger than the respective appointees of the previous government. This outcome does not only give insights in the hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the absence of the political craft and expertise competence but in the hypothesis 3 as well. Here, the assumption that the government of Syriza/Anel based their recruitment policies more in the characteristic of partisan loyalty rather than the previous government did was supported by the strong relationship of the variables tested. As such, the hypothesis 3 is confirmed.

Lastly, the Pseudo-R^2 values, which explain the variance, are very low in all models. Meaning that, as the log likelihood of a perfectly fitting model is zero, the model explains the variation of the dependent variable in a sufficient level (McFadden, 1974).

In short, the outcomes of the logistic regressions indicates that the former government (ND/Pasok/Dimar) based their recruitment policies more in the competencies of prior managerial experience (expertise) and the political know-how of the country than the latter government of Syriza/Anel. On the other hand, the levels of the affiliation with the governing party are higher for the appointees of the Syriza/Anel compared with the previous coalition in power. Interestingly, the difference is even higher for cases where, from the three competencies analyzed, the senior bureaucrat displayed only the affiliation with the government and none of the rest two.

Figure 11: *Regression Results for the Comparison of Syriza/Anel Appointments With ND/Pasok/Dimar Appointments (Models 1-6).*



4. 4 Discussion

In the current section the empirical findings of the regression analysis will be discussed. By extension, the hypotheses' forecasts (confirmed or rejected) will be analyzed and explained. In addition, the results will be compared and blend with the theory's assumptions in the corresponding topics. Table 6 displays the outcomes of the expected hypotheses based on the regression analysis' outcomes.

Hypothesis 1

The models 1 and 6 resulted in a significant negative relationship between the competence of political craft and the government of Syriza/Anel. This outcome indicates that the specific skill was supported more by the previous conservative government and, by extension the hypothesis 1 of the thesis is confirmed with strong negative relationship between the variables. In addition to that, the academic theoretical assumptions whereas the specific expectation was based are also verified (Bach & Veit, 2017; Christensen, Klemmensen & Opstrup, 2014; Mavrogordatos, 1997; Peters & Pierre, 2020; Sasso and Morelli, 2020). Christensen, Klemmensen and Opstrup, (2014) inquiry as well as Peters & Pierre's (2020) indicates the affiliation of populist governments, and in general populism, with unskillful personnel. Meaning that populist governments will choose easier a candidate without the general knowledge in the political craft of the country rather than an expert who is able to support another opinion and, by extension, oppose their policies and preferences.

Apparently, outcomes like that does not happen incidentally, as this policy constitutes one of the most powerful characteristics of populist governments. Moreover, as Sasso and Morelli (2020) point out that civil servants without specific skills are usually loyal to the specific government than others with a more extensive professional background. For sure, the aforementioned scholars side with the general opinion that populist aim is to work with senior civil servants who can be easily affected, and that predisposes the absence of the competence of political know-how.

As it is aforementioned, the research confirms what theory suggests. That is, the first round of senior civil bureaucratic recruitments after the establish of the coalition government of Syriza/Anel was based less in the characteristic of the political know-how, in comparison with the ND/Pasok/Dimar coalition. For the country it is not unusual to choose employees with no specific skills, even in the top layers of public administration (ministers), which were analyzed in the current thesis. Theoretical assumptions which were stated also by Mavrogordatos (1997) and Sotiropoulos (2018),

based in the modern political history of the country (80s-90s) and in general of the southern European countries, explained systematic the induction into the public service of a bunch of party supporters, in order to conquer as a whole, the country's bureaucracy.

Hypothesis 2

Models 2 and 8 also displayed a significant negative relationship between the Syriza/Anel government and the competence of expertise. Here same as with the hypothesis 1, the hypothesis 2 of the thesis is confirmed and fully supported as the relationship between the analyzed variables displays a highly negative outcome. Which means that the government of the Syriza/Anel based less their senior civil service recruitments in the managerial experience of the candidates than the previous coalition in power (ND/Pasok/Dimar).

The main idea in this hypothesis is based in the same roots as the previous one. Populist governments always adopt the strategy of appointing unskilled individuals where, most of the times, are loyal to the governmental party or they become after their induction to the bureaucracy and their job securing (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Sasso & Morelli, 2020). Here though, the negative relationship is stronger. What is more is that in comparison with the political craft, which is induced in the functional form of politicization, the managerial experience in this kind of posts is more vital making the avoidance of those a solid example of elitism and of pure politicization (Bach & Veit, 2017; Mudde, 2004; Peters and Pierre, 2019). Based in the results of the research, and the comparison of the two different ideologically government during the same period with the same external environment (economic crisis), the aforementioned assumptions are justified.

To justify the previous hypotheses (1 & 2), the models 4, 10, 5 and 11 ("Skillful" and "Moderate" variables accordingly) displays that the Syriza/Anel government based much less in a combination of the abovementioned competencies or at least at one of them, compared to the prior governing jurisdiction. Meaning that the difference between the two governments is big (more than doubled)

and both competencies were clearly avoided from the populist government. AN outcome that is also based in the theoretical assumption that public administration is dominated from loyalists during periods of populists in power (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Mudde, 2004, Sotiropoulos, 2018).

Hypothesis 3

The models 3 and 8 resulted an insignificant result regarding the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable. A possible explanation for the insignificance of the logistic regressions with the "Partisan Loyalty" variable is the same, almost, number of cases with the same characteristic in each government. But, on the other hand, the variable "Only Partisan" which consists of cases that did not display any skills except the affiliation with each governmental coalition, showed a significant relationship with a strong positive relationship with the independent variable. In other words, the appointees who displayed only their loyalty, were surged after the establish of Syriza/Anel in power. Hence, the hypothesis 3 can be partially confirmed.

Elitism, which according to Mavrogordatos (1993) is an evolution of Peronism, is the most representative notion of populism regarding their ideas (Mavrogodratos, 1993, Mudde, 2004). People versus the corrupted elite. It seems though, based on the results of this research, that by people, they mean themselves and their supporters. A strategy usually followed very carefully and, in many cases, a whole recruitment machinery is structured for the accuracy and certainty of the sufficient results (etc. the southern European countries of the 80s and the 90s) (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Sotiropoulos, 2018).

Mavrogordatos (1997) and Sotiropoulos (2018) talked about the roots of the already usual phenomenon of bureaucratic clientelism. This aspect of politicization contains close relations of the patron (party leadership) and the client (people). Secure individuals with positions that they do not deserve in terms of meritocracy, with exchange their loyalty (Peters & Pierre, 2019; Sasso & Morelli, 2020). The more people one can demagogue in the public administration, the most power

can be obtained (Mudde, 2004, Peters & Pierre, 2019). This result in more favor in policies and decision-making, more votes and by extention, re-election (Mavrogordatos, 1997).

The same also happened in Greece. The populist coalition of Syriza/Anel based their recruitment to a great extend in the loyalty of the candidates. Hence, they followed the same tested pattern, to fill the bureaucracy with party members, and to obtain power. A governance which looks significant familiar with the modern history of the post-junta period where the socialist party Pasok was in power.

To sum up, almost all hypotheses were confirmed and, more interestingly, strongly in terms of regression relationship. That means that, except partisan loyalty, all variables displayed a significant relationship with the independent variable "Syriza/Anel". As a result, the theoretical claims of the thesis, which expected that the populist government of Syriza/Anel affected the senior civil service recruitments was answered. They coalition affected the recruitment policies in the most "populist" way. The outcomes of the research, As Kazamias (2019) and Mudde (2017) predicted, support strongly that the government of Syriza/Anel appointed individuals based in their political preferences in a much bigger level than the previous conservative government and by avoiding other significant competencies.

Table 6: *Hypotheses' confirmation or rejection.*

	Expectations	

1)	H1: The recruitment policies in senior civil servants' positions of the Syriza/Anel government were based less in the characteristic of political craft in comparison with the previous government of ND/PASOK/DIMAR.	Confirmed
2)	H2: The recruitment policies in senior civil servants' positions of the Syriza/Anel government were based less in the characteristic of expertise (managerial experience) in comparison with the previous government of ND/PASOK/DIMAR.	Confirmed
3)	H3: The recruitment policies in senior civil servants' positions of the Syriza/Anel government were based more in the characteristic of partisan loyalty in comparison with the previous government of ND/PASOK/DIMAR.	Partially-Confirmed

5. Conclusion

This thesis project was an attempt to scrutinize the populist methods of the Syriza/Anel government towards the senior civil service recruitment. The research was conducted in general and special secretariats as well as the senior public positions (Head of Directorates etc.) within the Greek ministries. In order to confirm the possible effect of populism, the Syriza/Anel government's methods were compared with the previous conservative government of the ND/Pasok/Dimar.

The theory indicated that the populists tend to choose appointees with less experience and knowledge but with similar political beliefs. In other words, they mainly choose people that will not anticipate their preferences and, by extension, their policy making. As such, they politicize the government and the bureaucracy with supporters, who will be grateful enough to vote for them again and again.

For the examination of this phenomenon, three hypotheses were derived from the theoretical section with main goal to prove that the theoretical arguments are confirm through the populist government of Syriza/Anel. Thus, a new large-N data set was structured (N = 140) with the background characteristics of the highest-level public personnel within the Greek ministries. The same posts were examined for both governments.

For each hypothesis, a specific dependent variable was created. These variables were based in either in the professional background ("Expertise" and "Political Craft") or their political affiliation with the government at the time of their recruitment ("Partisan Loyalty"). As such, the research managed to bring to the surface the motives of the political representatives behind the choices of every populist and non-populist recruitment and, by extension, to answer the research question of the thesis.

In order to do that, multiple models of logistic regressions were applied to reveal the relationship between the independent variable with every independent variable of the thesis. In addition, for further clarification of the results, the independent variable also tested with several composite

variables (“Skillful”, “Moderate” and “Only Partisan”) as well as a control variable (“Post Rank”). The results of the regression models displayed a strong attention of the populist recruitment policy of the Syriza/Anel government in the loyalty of every candidate. On the other hand, the significant professional previous experience or the political know-how of them “took the back seat” as the absence of them in the background of the most candidates’ profiles were not taken into account.

In essence, the research question *“How did the competences emphasized in recruitment of senior civil servants in Greece differ between the Syriza government 2015-19 and the ND/Pasok/Dimar government 2012-15?”* was answered by the analysis part. The ND/Pasok/Dimar coalition recruitment policies were largely rejected from the Syriza/Anel coalition government, as the policy officials of the latter coalition based their preferences in more partisan, populist-based, ways of recruitment.

5.1 Reflection of the literature

The main goal of the research is to contribute in the literature of the senior civil servants’ recruitment and, by extension, to provide insights regarding the effects of politicization and precisely of populism on a bureaucracy (Canovan, 1983; Mudde, 2004; Peters & Pierre, 2019). In addition, the study tried to fill gaps in the existing literature on the populism effect in Greece and, more specific, on the Greek public administration (motivated by Mavrogordatos, 1993 and Sotiropoulos, 2018).

For the former, the research supports the existing theories of the populism effect in governance and in public administrations by giving more examples of the way that populist governments are used to interact with the civil servants. Even though the notion of populism attracted the interest of many scholars, there still is a gap in the interaction of it with the public administration (Christensen, Klemmensen & Opstrup, 2014; Sasso and Morelli, 2020). On the other hand, the big Greek populism tradition is poorly scrutinized for the longevity of it in the governance of the country since the 80s and the 90s. Moreover, the examination of the effects of the reappearance of populism in the Greek governance the recent years during the Syriza/Anel coalition in power was even poorer (for example

Pravita, 2018). As such, this thesis shed lights on the difference of the populist recruitment policies, the way Greek populist governments handle the public administration and, by extension, the Greek people and of course, in the notion of populism in general.

In particular, the research confirms the perception of politicization and populism in public administration. Peters and Pierre (2019), Sasso and Morelli (2020) and Mavrogordatos (1993) indicates the rise of politicization during populist governments and the long-term negative effects on the public administration of a country. That is, populists prefer to recruit loyalists, usually with minimum or zero experience and, at the same time, diminish the experts within the bureaucracy, especially in the upper levels of it. An act that can be consider costly long after the end of the populist party in power, as most of the times is impossible to remove a civil servant from his position (Sotiropoulos, 1999). With that way, a populist government will be able to exercise power easier in the senior bureaucracy and apply desired policies that will favor themselves and only (Christensen, Klemmensen & Opstrup, 2014).

Furthermore, politicization and bureaucratic clientelism is expected to be increased from many scholars (Canovan, 1983; Mavrogordatos, 1993; Mudde, 2004; Peters & Pierre, 2019; Sasso & Morelli, 2020). Interestingly, Greece as a southern European country, has a big tradition in populism, and especially socialist governments. This research on the latest populist Greek government identifies the aforementioned issues through the recruitment policies of the higher level of public officials within the Greek ministries and widens the state-of-the-art of the existed literature by comparing the results with the previous conservative government of ND/Pasok/Dimar.

In addition, the thesis gives insights in the professional background of the appointees. Meaning, that with this brand-new data set the study contributes in the characteristics of the top-level bureaucrats recruited by two different-ideologically governments (non-populist-populist). In other words, the research analyzes the levels of experience and loyalty that is desired from the vast majority of governments in Greece, as the bigger parties of the Greek parliament form the last forty years were parts of the two coalitions analyzed here.

5.2 Limitations of the Research and Possible Recommendations for Further Research

This thesis revealed some limitations regarding the research. First of all, the research finds the previous experience as an adequate competency for the meritocratic choose of appointees. Aspects like education or previous academic experience were not taken into consideration. The exclude of the education criterion for a possible experience was decided due to the nature of the posts and can be considered as a venue for future research. As it was mentioned in the methodology part, the level of these posts requires a specific previous experience which could not be obtained with the absence of a higher education diploma. However, the same research would display interesting results if the education level of the appointees would be added as a dependent variable.

Secondly, the operationalization of the variable "Partisan Loyalty" is limited, as it was based on the biographical data and the family relations of each civil servant. As such, it was inevitable to discover possible relationships of appointees with each government which was not mentioned online or could not be mentioned at all in a CV or a resume. For example, it is possible for a candidate to be recruited due to his/her affiliation with a specific political representative of a government. However, it was inaccessible to reach such information online and, more important, to prove such affiliations and use them unbiased in the study.

Third, the research focuses only in specific senior public positions within the Greek ministries. That means that a lot of public organizations, public hospitals, decentralized administrations and of course the lower levels of the Greek public bureaucracy were excluded. Even though the internal validity of this research was achieved, the inclusion of only a small part of the public administration gives a limited reflection of the whole picture of the effect of the Syriza/Anel populist government.

Last but not least, the focus on the Greek public administration provides limited insights in the general notion of the effect of populism in public bureaucracies of the other countries. Even though the research in the Greek public administration could familiarize more and provide feedback in the rest of the southern European countries, it gives limited general insights in other countries. As it was aforementioned in the theory part, the southern European countries' public administrations are

considered to be weak, with limited power, which makes them vulnerable to each government. A characteristic which seems to be vanished from the most developed countries.

All of the above limitations can be considered as possible future research. For example, the addition of more variables which could give more insights regarding the competences of the Greek senior civil recruitments could be scrutinized in depth. In addition, a generalized study which could include more cases and more aspects of the Greek public bureaucracy is more than suggested. It seems that the patronage is observed to be increased in the lower levels and the organizations or public hospitals of the country (Sotiropoulos, 2018). Also, a generalized research in the southern European countries' recruitment policies could shed lights in the way populist governments reacted while they were in power and compare the similarity the political officials adopted during their tenure.

Appendix:

Appointed by ND/Pasok/Dimar:

1	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Vassilis Kaskarelis
2	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	General Secretariat for International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation	Panagiotis Michalos
3	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	General Secretariat for European Affairs	Aristidis Kalogeropoulos
4	Ministry of Finance	General Secretariat of the Ministry	George Mergos
5	Ministry of Finance	General Secretariat of Information Systems	Haris Theocharis
6	Ministry of Finance	General Secretariat of Fiscal Policy	Christina Papakonstantinou
7	Ministry of Finance	General Secretariat of Public Property	Abraham Gounaris
8	Ministry of Finance	General Directorate of the Financial Crime Prosecution Corps (SDOE)	Stilianos Stasinopoulos
9	Ministry of Finance	Chairman of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission	Sokrates Lazaridis
10	Ministry of Finance	Chief Executive Offficer of the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)	Anastasia Sakellariou
11	Ministry of Finance	Chairman of the Board of the National Bank of Greece and the Hellenic Banking Association	Georgios Zanias
12	Ministry of Interior	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Giannis Ioannidis
13	Ministry of Interior	General Secretariat for Population and Social Cohesion	Angelos Syrigos
14	Ministry of Interior	General Secretariat for Gender Equality	Zeta Makri
15	Ministry of Administrative reform and Electronic Governance	General Secretariat of Public Administration & e-Governance	Dimitrios Stefanou
16	Ministry of Administrative reform and Electronic Governance	General Secretariat of th National Center for Public Administration	Anna Anagnostopoulou
17	Ministry of Administrative reform and Electronic Governance	Special secretariat of the National Printing Office	Georgios Apostolinas
18	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Seraphim Tsokas
19	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Public Investments (NSRF)	Georgios Giannousis
20	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Telecommunications & Posts	Menelaos Daskalakis
21	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Commerce	Stefanos Komninos
22	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Industry	Spyros Efstathopoulos
23	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Consumer	George Stergiou
24	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Public Works	Stratos Simopoulos
25	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Transport	Nikos Stathopoulos
26	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat for Research and Technology	Vassilis Magglaris
27	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat for Strategic & Private Investments	Petros Selekos
28	Ministry of Development	Special secretary of Public Transportation	Ioannis Oikonomou

29	Ministry of Development	Special secretary of Hellenic Railways Organization	Panagiotis Theofanopoulos
30	Ministry of Development	President of Invest in Greece organization	Aristomenis Suggros
31	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Athanasios Kyriazis
32	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat of Religions	George Kalaitzis
33	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat of Culture	Stella Mendoni
34	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat of Sports	Kiriaki Giannakidou
35	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat for Lifelong Learning	Eleni Karanzola
36	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat for Youth	Panagiotis Kanellopoulos
37	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	President of the National Organization for the Certification of Qualifications & Vocational Guidance (EOPPEP)	Theodoros Kartsiotis
38	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	President of the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund	Takis Athanasopoulos
39	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Maro Evangelidou
40	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	General Secretariat for Spatial Planning and Urban Environment	Socrates Alexiadis
41	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	General Secretariat for Energy and Climate Change	Constantinos Mathioudakis
42	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	President of the Hellenic Petroleum (HELPE)	Christos Komninos
43	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	Head Director of the Energy Regulatory Authority (RAE)	Nikos Vasilakos
44	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	Head Director of the Public Power Corporation (PPC)	Arthur Zervos
45	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Anna Stratinaki
46	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	General Secretariat of Welfare	Efthymia Bekou
47	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	General Secretariat of Social Insurance	Panagiotis Kokkoris
48	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	General Secretariat for the Management of Community and Other Resources	Anna Delaporta
49	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	Special Secretary of the Labor Inspection Body	Michail Kandarakis
50	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	Special secretary of the Agricultural Insurance Organization	Dimitrios Kontos
51	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	Special Secretary of the Manpower Employment Organization (OAED)	Ilias Kikilias
52	Ministry of Health	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Pelopidas Kalliris
53	Ministry of Health	General Secretariat of Public Health	Christina Papanikolaou
54	Ministry of Health	President of the National Organization for the Provision of Health Services (EOPYY)	Eleftherios Papageorgopoulos
55	Ministry of Health	Chairman of the Board of the National Organization for Public Health (HRT)	Jenny Kremastinou

56	Ministry of Rural Development and Food	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Moschos Korasidis
57	Ministry of Rural Development and Food	General Secretariat for Agricultural Policy and International Relations	Dimitrios Melas
58	Ministry of Rural Development and Food	Helenic Food Authority (EFET)	Ioannis Tsialtas
59	Ministry of Rural Development and Food	President of the Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid (OPEKEPE)	Gregorios Apostolakos
60	Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Nicolaos Kanellopoulos
61	Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights	General Secretariat for Transparency and Human Rights	Georgios Sourlas
62	Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights	General Secretariat of Anti-Crime Policy	Marinos Skandamis
63	Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Athanasios Andreoulakos
64	Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection	General Secretariat for Civil Protection	Patroklos Georgiadis
65	Ministry of Tourism	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Tasos Liaskos
66	Ministry of Shipping	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Athanasios Bousios
67	Ministry of Shipping	General Secretariat of Ports & Port Policy	Konstantinos Moutzouris
68	Ministry of Shipping	General Secretariat of Navigation Security	Athanasios Christopoulos
69	Ministry of Shipping	General Secretariat of the Aegean & Island Policy	Ioannis Spilanis
70	Ministry of Defence	General Seretariat of the Ministry	Antonios Oikonomou

Appointed by Syriza/Anel:

70	Ministry of Defence	General Seretariat of the Ministry	Antonios Oikonomou
71	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Dimitrios Paraskevopoulos
72	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	General Secretariat for International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation	Georgios Tsipras
73	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	General Secretariat for European Affairs	Panagiotis Pavlopoulos
74	Ministry of Finance	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Eleni Papadopoulou
75	Ministry of Finance	General Secretariat of Information Systems	Petros Triarxis
76	Ministry of Finance	General Secretariat of Fiscal Policy	Fragkiskos Koutentakis
77	Ministry of Finance	General Secretariat of Public Property	Nikolaos Matzakos
78	Ministry of Finance	General Directorate of the Financial Crime Prosecution Corps (SDOE)	Konstantinos Xristou
79	Ministry of Finance	Chairman of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission	Socrates Lazarides
80	Ministry of Finance	Chief Executive Offficer of the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)	Aris Xenofos

81	Ministry of Finance	Chairman of the Board of the National Bank of Greece and the Hellenic Banking Association	Panagiotis-Aristeidis Thomopoulos
82	Ministry of Interior	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Konstantinos Poulakis
83	Ministry of Interior	General Secretariat for Population and Social Cohesion	Vasileios Papadopoulos
84	Ministry of Interior	General Secretariat for Gender Equality	Foteini Kouvela
85	Ministry of Administrative reform and Electronic Governance	General Secretariat of Public Administration & e-Governance	Georgios Florentis
86	Ministry of Administrative reform and Electronic Governance	General Secretariat of th National Center for Public Administration	Ifigeneia Kamtsidou
87	Ministry of Administrative reform and Electronic Governance	Special secretariat of the National Printing Office	Dimitrios Papadimitropoulos
88	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Ilias Xanthakos
89	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Public Investments (NSRF)	Alexis Haritsis
90	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Telecommunications & Posts	Dimitrios Tzortzis
91	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Commerce	Antonios Papaderakis
92	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Industry	Ioannis Tolios
93	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Consumer	Antonios Papaderakis
94	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Public Works	Georgios Dedes
95	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat of Transport	Theopisti Perka
96	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat for Research and Technology	Thomas Maloutas
97	Ministry of Development	General Secretariat for Strategic & Private Investments	Theologos Lamprianidis
98	Ministry of Development	Special secretary of Public Transportation	Zoi Georgiou
99	Ministry of Development	Special secretary of Hellenic Railways Organization	Georgios Apostolopoulos
100	Ministry of Development	President of Invest in Greece organization	Christos Staikos
101	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Ioannis Pantis
102	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat of Religions	Georgios Kalatzis
103	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat of Culture	Maria Vlazaki
104	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat of Sports	Ioulios Sinadinos
105	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat for Lifelong Learning	Gerasimos Spathis
106	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	General Secretariat for Youth	Pafsanias-Andreas Papageorgiou
107	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	President of the National Organization for the Certification of Qualifications & Vocational Guidance (EOPPEP)	Vasileios Dagdilelis
108	Ministry of Education, Religions, Culture, Sports	President of the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund	Stergios Pitsiorlas
109	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Christina Mparitaki

110	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	General Secretariat for Spatial Planning and Urban Environment	Eirini Klampatsea
111	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	General Secretariat for Energy and Climate Change	Michael Verroiopoulos
112	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	President of the Hellenic Petroleum (HELPE)	Efstathios Tsotsoros
113	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	Head Director of the Energy Regulatory Authority (RAE)	Nikolaos Mpoulaxis
114	Ministry of Enviroment, Energy and Climate Change	Head Director of the Public Power Corporation (PPC)	Michael Panagiotakis
115	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Andreas Nefeloudis
116	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	General Secretariat of Welfare	Dimitrios Karellas
117	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	General Secretariat of Social Insurance	Nikolaos Fragkos
118	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	General Secretariat for the Management of Community and Other Resources	Dimitra Chalikia
119	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	Special Secretary of the Labor Inspection Body	Ioannis Soukos
120	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	Special secretary of the Agricultural Insurance Organization	Athanasios Mpakalexis
121	Ministry of Labor, Social security and Welfare	Special Secretary of the Manpower Employment Organization (OAED)	Maria Karamesini
122	Ministry of Health	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Petros Giannoulatos
123	Ministry of Health	General Secretariat of Public Health	Ioannis Baskozos
124	Ministry of Health	President of the National Organization for the Provision of Health Services (EOPYY)	Sotirios Bersimis
125	Ministry of Health	Chairman of the Board of the National Organization for Public Health (HRT)	Athanasios Giannopoulos
126	Ministry of Rural Development and Food	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Nikolas Stoupis
127	Ministry of Rural Development and Food	General Secretariat for Agricultural Policy and International Relations	Charalampos Kasimis
128	Ministry of Rural Development and Food	Helenic Food Authority (EFET)	Ioannis Tsialtas
129	Ministry of Rural Development and Food	President of the Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid (OPEKEPE)	Antonios Moisidis
130	Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Konstantinos Kosmatos
131	Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights	General Secretariat for Transparency and Human Rights	Konstantinos Papaioannou
132	Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights	General Secretariat of Anti-Crime Policy	Eftyxios Fytrakis

133	Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Dimitrios Anagnostakis
134	Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection	General Secretariat for Civil Protection	Ioannis Kapakis
135	Ministry of Tourism	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Gerasimos Zaharatos
136	Ministry of Shipping	General Secretariat of the Ministry	Ioannis Theotokas
137	Ministry of Shipping	General Secretariat of Ports & Port Policy	Christos Lampridis
138	Ministry of Shipping	General Secretariat of Navigation Security	Ioannis Kourouniotis
139	Ministry of Shipping	General Secretariat of the Aegean & Island Policy	Giannis Giannelis Theodosiadis
140	Ministry of Defence	General Seretariat of the Ministry	Ioannis Tafillis

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