A Democratic Wager: Has Wage Stagnation influenced Support for the European Far-left and Far-right?

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Democracies have become the norm when it comes to political modes in Europe. This system is commonly regarded as the most fair option when it comes to governance, and much concern is spent on topics such as democratic stability and democratic backsliding. Institutions such as the European Union or national governments have embraced the democratic mode of governance as the golden standard, and when claims are made of dictatorial behaviour or a lack of democracy in the functioning of institutions, it is meant as criticism or insult. A quote by Winston Churchill might summarise the situation best: “Democracy is the worst form of government - except for all the others that have been tried.” However, just as with any political system, there is no guarantee that democracy will always exist, or will be seen as the most benevolent of systems. In fact, a common paradox within democracies is that anti-democratic opinions still ought to be represented in a democratic way, in order to persue the most relevant representation of the electorate. It is usually extremist political parties that get labelled as being anti-democratic, here meaning parties that belong to the far-left or the far-right. While it can be argued if this is a fair criticism, this paper simply accepts that these parties exist, and that within liberal democracies people are willing to vote for them. In fact, the underlying question of why people are willing to vote for extremist parties is worth investigating to the same extent. In this regard, many papers have already been written on the different variables that affect support for either the far-left, the far-right, or both. However, one variable that has of yet not been linked to support for either is the trend of slowed down growth in wages over time, known as wage stagnation. While factors such as economic inequality have succesfully been linked to increased support for extremist parties, the speed at which wages have been reducing in growth has not yet been looked at more closely. This paper will investigate if the growth levels and the speed at which wages have been changing have led to more or less support for extremist parties in European national elections. The research question for this paper is ‘*What is the effect of wage stagnation on political polarisation in European liberal democracies?’.* Investigating the effects of worsening economic conditions through reductions in wage growth levels has increasing relevance during times of increased economic stresses, particularly for lower economic-classes. If it is found that the speed of wage stagnation could provide a relevant variable in predicting support for extremist parties, an impetus would be provided for sitting governments to adress growing economic insecurity.

Literature Review:

The theoretical foundation for the research question is based on two parts that come together to form the causal mechanism. Firstly, there is the effect of wage stagnation on economic inequality. Secondly, there is the effect of economic inequality on support for extremist political parties. The effect of wage stagnation on support for extremist political parties has not directly been investigated yet, but both distinct parts have had research done on them. The literature review section will therefore be split up into two sections, each exploring one aspect of the theoretical mechanism. Section I will look at how wage stagnation contributes to the effects of economic inequality by exacerbating economic inequality. Section II will look at how economic inequality has polarising results for electorates. Section II will further be split up into section II A and II B. This is because the effects of economic inequality on support for extremist parties manifests itself differently for extreme left parties and for extreme right parties. Section II A will look at the effects of economic inequality on support for the far-left, whereas section II B will look at the effects of economic inequality on support for the far-right.

Section I: The relation between wage stagnation and economic inequality

Wages have been slowing down in growth in Europe. The ECB by Nickel et al has reported that wage growth has been subdued and overpredicted for the period of 2013-2017. Wage stagnation has been pervasive throughout the EU. The reasons for the reduced wage growth are part cyclical and part structural. They operationalise wage stagnation as compensation per employee and hourly gross wage growth. Growth fell as a result of cyclical indicators, but slack is insufficient to explain the entire reduction in growth (Nickel et al, 2019). Wage trends have also experienced reduced growth in the US and in the UK. Between 1979-2018, real wage growth has slowed down, and for some demographic groups has even experienced shrinkage. A particular demographic of note is the income group that a person belongs to, income groups have also experienced an unequal reduction in growth of wages. In the US, the 90th percentile saw a wage increase of 37.6%, whereas the 10th percentile saw an increase of only 1.6%. When disaggregating the data into earnings quantiles, some demographic groups at the 10th percentile, and even at the 50th percentile, saw a decrease in real average wages, such as men or hispanics (Donovan & Bradley, 2019). A similar trend has been documented for the UK. Stagnation of real wages has meant that wages have grown less fast over time. Wage stagnation has affected all income groups across the wage distribution, yet it has affected the lower income groups more than higher income groups, contributing to further wage inequality. Since 2003, the real median wage has fallen by roughly 1.4 percentage points each year (Gregg et al., 2013).

Knowing that wage stagnation is a documented phenomenon, how does it affect economic inequality? It has been argued that income inequality has been made worse by real wage stagnation (Machin, 2016; Wisman, 2013; Gregg et al., 2013). This is because real wage stagnation affects improvements in living standards, which in turn makes societal inequality matter more. Since wage stagnation disproportionately affects lower income groups, the earnings gap between average wages and median wages has increased. In other words, earnings are increasingly unequally divided, and pool in the higher income brackets. Additionally, high-income families will have enough disposable income for investment opportunities, but low-income families will have to consume most of their income on mandatory purchases, limiting their potential for investment and other methods of diversifying income, and further increasing the wealth gap. Living standards are also related to social expectations, which includes social status through material possessions such as adequate housing. These expectations might motivate those in lower-income groups to engage in credit loans, further transferring wealth upstream towards high-income groups that provide the loans. Economic inequality makes this cultural aspect more tangible, as people can use class to identify and differentiate themselves when distinctions become sharpened (Wisman, 2013). Furthermore, unemployment levels affect real wages as well, which tends to target lower-income jobs more than it does higher-income jobs. High unemployment means that jobs see higher application rates, allowing employers to offer a lower wage than might have been accepted in a period of low unemployment. As lower-wage jobs tend to have higher turnover rates and fewer entry requirements, wage inequality is exacerbated during cyclical periods of higher unemployment, further increasing the wage divide. Recently, unemployment rates have had a stronger effect on real wages. In the 2003-2012 period, unemployment drove down real wages by 5 to 6 percent more than in previous periods, for which the burden is largely carried by lower income groups (Gregg et al, 2013).

Section II: How economic inequality leads to political polarisation

A link has been established in the literature between economic inequality and support for parties on the political fringes, and for political polarisation. Specific mechanisms for increased left-wing and right-wing support as a result of economic inequality will be discussed in the next sections, whereas this section will look at increased political polarisation in general. Winkler investigates whether an increase in the Gini-coefficient makes a person more likely to support a party at either end of the political extremes, using individual level data. He finds that an increase in income inequality leads to an increased support for both far-right and far-left parties. When the Gini-coefficient increases by 5 points, a given individual is roughly 2.6 percentage points more likely to support a party on the political extreme. However, this effect is only statistically significant for support for far-left parties. There was no significant association between the Gini-coefficient and increased voter support at

the extreme 5% of the political spectrum, but there was a positive and statistically significant association at the 10% and 25% interval of the ideological distribution. (Winkler, 2017). The effects of income inequality have also been linked to political polarisation in the United States, though as the U.S. has a two-party system, researchers focus on political partisanship instead. McCarty et al. find that partisanship has become more stratified along income lines, as lower incomes stagnate while the highest incomes become relatively wealthier. Wealthier individuals tend to be more likely to vote for the Republican party. Their paper was written in 2003, and they document this income-based division over a period of 40 years, with the effect becoming stronger in more recent times. They also find that the effects of income inequality persist when controlling for demographic variables such as age, education, or sex (McCarty et al, 2003). It should be noted that one ought to be careful when extrapolating findings from 2003 to a situation in 2022, or from the US two-party system to the multi-party systems of European liberal democracies. That said, McCarty's paper shows that links between economic inequality and political polarisation have been made for decades.

Additionally, economic inequality has been linked to more political effects than political polarisation, which could be relevant for increased support for the political extremes. For example, Filetti and Janmaat find that increased economic inequality generally reduces political participation, and reduces it relatively more for lower-income groups compared to higher-income groups (Filetti & Janmaat, 2017). As people become disillusioned with their economic conditions they might choose to abstain from voting. If lower-income groups disproportionately decide to no longer participate in elections, then higher-income groups will in turn become overrepresented in the electorate. The paper by Filetti and Janmaat does not mention how the reduced participation affects certain political groups, but it could be theorised that extremist parties tend to do relatively better during times of high disillusionment with the existing government, as extremist parties position themselves to be in opposition to mainstream politics.

Section II A: The effects of economic inequality on support for the far-left

In order to more accurately investigate the role of economic inequality on political polarisation, it will be necessary to separate the findings in the literature for far-left parties from the literature on far-right parties. This following section will look more in-depth at the effects of economic inequality on support for the far-left;

Walter establishes a link between the effects of globalisation of the individual on welfare state expansion. As individuals experience increased economic insecurity through globalisation, they demand to be compensated and protected from these effects, which leads to a preference for left-wing parties and their redistributive

policies, ultimately ending in an expansion of the welfare state. Walter finds that this effect exists, and that it is strongest for those classified as 'losers' of globalisation, which are predominantly non-educated individuals (Walter, 2010). As Walter looks at data on the individual level, he can distinguish between different occupational and demographic groups, and how strong the compensation hypothesis is for these distinct groups. This paper introduces the idea that large demographic differences between countries might lead to different levels of support for left-wing parties. A country with a large percentage of employment in import-sensitive industries might show more support for left-wing parties than a country with fewer import-sensitive industries might show. This distinction is important to keep in mind during cross-country analysis.

Hays et al. investigate whether the embedded liberalism theory holds at the micro-level. The embedded liberalism theory says that populations could be motivated to keep supporting open market policies if they are compensated for the risks they face through welfare policies. Individuals who are employed in import-competing industries, are the most at risk of unemployment due to international competition, and therefore tend to be most in opposition to free trade and in support of isolationist and protectionist policies. The authors find that they can moderate their positions of opposition to the free market through government intervention such as unemployment insurance or labour market programs. This paper shows us that those affected by open market trade, and who would otherwise be more inclined to support far-right parties due to their employment in import-sensitive industries, could be prevented from more isolationist attitudes if there is sufficient support from the state (Hays et al, 2005).

Winkler finds that his results support the median voter theorem, where increased inequality leads to increased support for redistributive policies, resulting in greater support for far-left parties (Winkler, 2017). In effect, this is the same theoretical link as the compensation hypothesis provides. Winkler's result is interesting, as the period he investigated was marked by a rise in far-right support, while the mechanism he details provides a stronger effect on the far-left. The explanation for this will be discussed in section II B. Similarly, Gidron & Mijs find that support for far-left parties has increased as a result of the 2008 recession in the Netherlands by people that have experienced a loss of income, but that this same increase for support was not found for the far-right (Gidron & Mijs, 2019). They specifically seek to prove that a change in economic conditions also results in a change for support for parties on the political fringes. The authors find that support for the far-left is correlated with an increased support for redistributive policies, as was earlier described by Walter, Hays et al., and Winkler. They also find a reversed effect, where individuals that saw an increase in income become less likely to support redistributive policies, and therefore less likely to support far-left parties. While no direct link was found between support for the far-right and a change in income in the general population, there was still an effect found on changes in income for support of the far-right when disaggregating the population into income groups. High-income individuals are more supportive of the far-right after income

losses, while low-income individuals are more supportive of the far-right after income gains, and that income losses are associated with a small increase in nativist attitudes. However, since this link is much less statistically significant than the link between income losses and far-left support, the authors are cautious to call this a causal link (Gidron & Mijs, 2019). The theoretical link between income and nativist attitudes will be further developed in section II B.

Pontussen and Rueda consider that different types of inequality might hold different partisan effects in regard to political polarisation. They specifically distinguish between wage inequality and other forms of income inequality. Left-leaning parties are much more responsive to wage inequality specifically, as the income of their core constituencies tends to be mostly derived from dependent employment. In contrast, the core constintuencies of right-wing parties are assumed to hold a larger share of self-employed individuals and those with substantial wealth in assets. Those that derive most of their income from government transfers are not considered as being part of either core constituency. The authors find that the link between wage inequality and support for left-wing parties is only statistically significant at medium and high levels of political mobilisation, which is operationalised through voter participation and union participation. While higher wage inequality is associated with more left-wing support, this only seems to hold true in countries with high political engagement. The authors also find that household income inequality is associated with right-wing support, but only holds at low and medium levels of political mobilisation (Pontussen & Rueda, 2008). The distinction that political polarisation is not just affected by economic inequality, but also by the degree of political mobility, is important to keep in mind when making cross-country comparisons.

Section II B: The effects of economic inequality on support for the far-right

Aside from the far-left, several authors have also looked at the link between increased economic inequality and support for far-right parties. The mechanisms, motivations, and context for when support for the far-right increases appears to differ from increased support for the far-left as a result of economic conditions. The following section will discuss the effects of increased economic inequality on electoral support for the far-right;

Jay et al. link the increase in far-right support to economic inequality. Economic inequality reduces the social cohesion and trust in others within a society. This is because economic inequality heightens the salience of belonging to a certain socio-economic group, allowing people to define themselves (and others) by their wealth group. Perceptions of tensions between income groups also increase. Wealthy groups fear losing income and becoming part of a poorer group, whereas

poorer groups fear further deterioration of their economic circumstances. As a means to cope with insecurity, people seek to form secure identities, which is often paired with in-out group divisions, and nationalism. Higher income inquality is linked to stronger national identification, and vice versa, a stronger national identification reduces support for more economically equitable policies. Far-right politicians can emphasise economic concerns, such as the division of economic gains of a country's native-born population with migrants, in an effort to rally support for their parties and guide which groups should earn the blame for the economic circumstances through scapegoating. Insecurity of status caused by rising inequality is thus key to explaining support for far-right parties (Jay et al., 2017).

Engler and Weisstanner find that increased income inequality leads to more support for right-wing parties, and that the effect is stronger in unequal societies, as the support for right-wing parties is mostly based on fears of a reduction in subjective social status. The authors use income and subjective social status as individual-level indicators for far-right support. They find that those experiencing a reduction in their subjective status are more likely to support the far-right than those experiencing objective decline of income. The threat of a reduction in social status also implies that the possibility of future decline could play a part in support for the far-right if income inequality heightens the degree of social status loss, by those that are currently relatively well off. High-income groups are more capable of securing their wealth, but middle-income groups experience the combination of both being able to lose income, without many options to mitigate this insecurity through alternative income sources. Middle-income groups therefore tend to support the far-right the most in the face of increased insecurity (Engler & Weisstanner, 2021). This finding is supported on a regional level by Stockemer, who investigates the effects of the 2008 recession on support for the far-right in several European countries. He finds that as an aggregate, there has only been a slight increase in support for the far-right, however there is large regional variance on the NUTS-2 level. Interestingly, it is not necessarily the regions that have been most negatively affected by the recession that show the greatest increase in support for far-right parties. Instead the strongest electoral gains for the far-right have been made in regions that have withstood the crisis relatively well. The reasoning for the increased support for the far-right in these regions is a response where these regions see the effects of the crisis in other regions, and do not want to become like them (Stockemer, 2017). In section II A it was mentioned that Gregg et al. did not find an increase in support for the far-right as a consequence of the 2008 recession. However, Gregg et al's paper focused on the individual level, and had a limited scope of a single country, the Netherlands (Gregg et al, 2019). The difference in scope could explain the difference in outcome of the two papers.

Colantone and Stanig argue that economic conditions can explain increased support for anti-immigrant and isolationist border policy, in line with right-wing parties. They show this relation by investigating the effect of the Chinese trade shock, as an exogenous variation within domestic economic performance, with

support for Brexit as an isolationist measure. The authors find that support for Brexit is systematically higher in regions that have fallen behind relatively as a result from struggling industries caused by the Chinese trade shock. This effect is likely caused by a lack of compensation for the effects caused by globalisation, causing some areas to feel left behind in relative terms. This article details how economic effects can lead to a nationalist response and further support for far-right parties and policies (Colantone & Stanig, 2018). As we looked at earlier, Walter, Winkler and Hays et al explained the effect of the compensation hypothesis or embedded liberalism on support for far-left parties. Colantone and Stanig suggest that the opposite might be true as well, namely that a lack of protection from open markets leads to isolationist reactions and further far-right support. This begs the question if left-right support exists on a scale of economic support from the government.

Ausserladscheider mentions how the rise of the far right in the literature is explained either through economic factors or cultural values, or through a combination of the two. She argues that economic nationalism is the lens used by far-right parties in order to tie cultural as well as economic arguments together to promote a nationalist isolationism. When economic conditions worsen, far-right groups can mobilise economic frustrations by turning out-groups into scapegoats, as the core constituency of these parties perceives their economic stability to be threatened by these groups. The perception of threat is made on a subjective basis, rather than on an objective reduction in economic conditions. The perceived loss of economic status is a more powerful mobiliser for the far-right to turn against out-groups. These economic scapegoats are often migrants, who get further ostracised through the promotion of traditionalist cultural values by far-right parties. Ausserladscheider concludes that cultural and economic factors are intertwined in the supply-side, to such an extent that deconstructing them into single variables misses the bigger picture (Ausserladscheider, 2019).

Earlier we read that Winkler found a stronger effect of economic inequality for the far-left, however the period that he looks at was characterised by a growth of the far-right. The explanation given for this by Winkler is a demographic variable, namely the role of older voters, who are more likely to vote for the far-right during times of economic inequality, and who tend to vote more than younger voters. He further specifies that Inequality mostly affects support for far-right parties through an increased anti-immigrant sentiment (Winkler, 2017).

Theoretical Framework

Now that we have investigated the relevant literature, we can move forward in creating a causal mechanism that links wage stagnation to increased political polarisation. From there, we can derive the hypotheses. The argument comes in two parts. Firstly, wage stagnation exacerbates the effects of economic inequality. Secondly, economic inequality increases support for parties on the far-left and the far-right. We have also seen that there are differences in the context for which economic inequality increases support for either far-left or for far-right parties. The main mechanism through which support increases for the far-left is through the framework of embedded liberalism. As insecurity increases due to economic inequality, voters will demand further protections against the volatility caused by economic inequality. Conversely, the far-right gains further electoral support as a result of economic inequality causing a preference for nativist and isolationist policies. The following sections will describe these mechanisms in more detail and introduce the two hypotheses for this paper;

Wage stagnation has been linked to an increase in economic inequality. Wage stagnation is usually operationalised as the decrease in real wages over time. Real wage growth has decreased disproportionally, affecting lower income groups more than high income groups. This effect is further exacerbated by the reliance of lower income groups on their wages as the primary form of income, whereas higher income groups might additionally have access to stocks or assets that further increase their wealth. As a result, the gap between lower and higher income groups widens by the decrease of real wages that has been documented in Europe. Several mechanisms through which income inequality might affect support for fringe parties have been proposed. Four mechanisms through which income inequality might lead to more polarised support are 1) increased economic insecurity caused by the relative risk of economic inequality, 2) increased social disintegration as a result of the stratification effect of inequality, 3) a reduction in trust of established politicians and parties as a result of inequality, and 4) a shift towards stronger national identities as a result of insecurity caused by income inequality (Stoetzer et al, 2021). Some of these mechanisms have a far greater effect for either left-wing or right-wing parties, rather than these mechanisms boosting polarisation in general for both directions. For example, people relying on stronger national identification as a coping mechanism for reduced trust caused by economic insecurity, would benefit right-wing populist parties much more than left-wing populist parties.

The main argument made in the literature for how economic inequality and support for left-wing parties are linked, is through a mechanism called the compensation hypothesis, also referred to as embedded liberalism. This concept states that, as the electorate experiences more economic insecurity, for example through increased open market policies, they demand to be compensated for the

perceived risk they experience. As far-left parties are more redistributive than parties in the center or right, voting preferences will shift to the left. It is expected that this effect is strongest in countries that see active participation in electoral politics, as well as high union representation. Furthermore, the degree to which countries have generous welfare states could also play a role. As economic insecurity increases as a result of further globalisation, citizens that have learned to rely on strong welfare state institutions would seek to expand further government support, such as unemployment benefits or active labour market policies. As the proposed mechanism relies on electoral participation, for the far-left as well as for the far-right, it becomes clear that the scope of this paper's research is limited to liberal democratic societies. The definition for the far-left used in this paper is provided by March. Far-left parties are parties that reject capitalism and the underlying socio-economic structures that are caused by capitalism, and instead advocate for alternative economic and power structures. Far-left parties see economic inequality as the source of current political and social struggles in the political arena, and argue for a major redistribution of resources from the political elite as the answer to fixing this inequality (March, 2012). This leads us to our first hypothesis;

H1: Wage stagnation, through increasing the desire for economic redistribution caused by increased economic inequality, leads to increased support for far-left parties.

Additionally, we have also seen that several papers explore the link between economic inequality and increased support for far-right parties. The definition that will be used for far-right parties in this paper is provided by Mudde. Far-right parties are parties that are both nativist and authoritarian. Nativism is an ideology that argues that countries should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native groups, and that non-native elements are dangerous to the existence of the country. Authorianism is the belief that a strictly ordered society with severe punishments for infringements is desirable (Mudde, 2007). The papers converge on the idea that economic conditions ultimately serve as a tool for far-right parties to construct issues that appear more social and cultural in nature. Economic conditions cause insecurities in the electorate because people are threatened by economic loss and / or a perceived loss of social status. This threat leads people to find security in stronger identities that are less subjective to economic cycles, such as identities based on nationalist identities. As the decline in economic conditions is relative in nature to other income groups within the country, it does not necessarily mean that the countries that experience the strongest increase in economic inequality would also per se see the strongest increase in support for the far-right. For this reason, it is expected that an increase in support for the far-right as a result of increased economic inequality is not as strongly linked to an increase in support for far-left parties as a result of increased economic inequality. Additionally, the threat of economic loss brought on by open market policies can lead to an isolationist response. It is expected that this response is stronger in countries that have

relatively weaker welfare state institutions. This is because, as opposed to citizens in countries with strong welfare programs, citizens in countries with weak welfare institutions receive most of their economic security from their employment directly. Therefore, as economic inequality increases as a result of increased globalisation, their primary response would be to prevent outsourcing of their jobs, or competition on the job market through immigration, by advocating for nativist and isolationist policies. This leads us to our second hypothesis;

H2: Wage stagnation, through an increased nativist and isolationist response caused by increased economic inequality, leads to increased support for far-right parties.

From the existing literature we can start to see the basis for a methodological framework. Many authors rely on individual-level data from census datas to show preferences for nativist policies or redistributive policies on the aggregate level, and link this change in preference to economic conditions. Trends in electoral support have been supported on the national level, or sub-national level, by tracing changes in make-up of parliaments or elected governing organs. Cross-country comparisons have been made when data is available for multiple countries for the same variables, usually rates of economic stagnation or changes in the Gini-coefficient. These observations will be used in the Methodology chapter of this paper as the foundation for the research.

Methodology & Data

The research will rely on cross-country panel data. As a reminder, the research question that will be answered is '*What is the effect of wage stagnation on political polarisation in European liberal democracies?'*. The independent variable is the degree to which wage stagnation is happening. The dependent variable is support for either far-right or far-left parties in the national parliaments of European countries. The degree of wage stagnation is a value that needs to be measured over time, and would have to account for average income levels at different sections of the income curve, as the literature has established that economic inequality affects political polarisation for individuals differently from different income groups. It is therefore important to show the different growth rate in gross wages relative to other income groups within the country. The OECD provides data on gross earnings as decile ratios. The values are based on the median, the 1st decile, or the bottom 10% of earnings, and the 9th decile, or the top 10% of earnings. The ratios that are provided show the median as a ratio of the bottom 10%, the top 10% as a ratio of the median, and the top 10% as the ratio of the bottom 10%. This means, for example, that if the Austrian value for interdecile ratio P50/P10 in 2005 is 1.7, that the median wage was 1.7x higher than the wage of a person at the bottom 10% of earnings. By comparing the changes in these ratios over the years, we can find if the earnings gap has become larger in certain countries, or if the earnings gap has closed. This will tell us if more income growth has taken place for lower-income groups, or for

higher-income groups. A series of percentage values for the same country taken for a specific period of time at consistent intervals also tells us whether wage stagnation is increasing in speed. Support for far-right and far-left parties is operationalised through the percentage share of seats in parliament held by parties that are classified as either far-right or far-left. The definition used to determine which parties are far-right is provided by Mudde, and the definition to determine which parties are far-left is provided by March, as mentioned previously in the paper. Many of the existing parties in European parliaments have already been classified as either far-right or far-left by the PopuList, an online dataset that tracks parties in Europe that are either far-left, far-right, populist, or Eurosceptic. The PopuList uses the same definitions of far-right and far-left as this paper. The percentage of votes held in parliament by either far-right or far-left parties can be calculated after each election for the duration for which data is available for the independent variable.

In order to check if any correlation is caused through the causal mechanism explained in the theoretical framework, a different check has to be performed for far-left support than for far-right support. Wage stagnation would have affected far-left support in countries that see a larger share of far-left seats in parliament when preferences for redistributive policies have gone up in the same period. The data on redistributive preferences can be found through the European Social Survey. This broad survey is held in several European countries with data available from 2002 to 2018. The question that is meant to measure preferences for redistributive policies is “Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” Participants could choose out of 5 options; Agree strongly, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, and Strongly disagree. Wage stagnation would have affected far-right support in countries that see a growth in the share of far-right parties in parliament when support for nativist and isolatinist policies has gone up in the same period. Data can be found through the ESS for this variable as well. The question that can be used to measure preferences for nativist and isolationist policies is “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?” Participants could answer on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being bad for the economy, and 10 being good for the economy. By checking for these two results using the survey it can be confirmed whether the proposed theoretical mechanisms are actually present, or if any correlation between wage stagnation and increased political polarisation is potentially only correlational or caused by some alternative variable.

In order to check for increased economic inequality as a result of wage stagnation, we will look at the OECD data on gross earnings as a decile ratio. This dataset will reveal to us if the wealth gap has increased further between different earnings levels, a sign that incomes of high-earners have grown faster than those of low income groups, or whether the wealth gap has closed over time, which would be a result of faster earnings growth for lower income groups relative to higher income groups. This dataset isolates the effect of wages on income inequality, and therefore

reveals which countries have been most affected by wage stagnation. Table 1 below shows us the differences in earnings ratios for P50/P10, P90/P50, and P90/P10 between 2006, until the last year that data is available for the specific country. In most cases, the earliest year that data is available is 2006, while the final year that data is available for all countries is 2018, with some countries also having data available for 2019 and 2020. 2006 is chosen as the base year, to facilitate more accurate comparisons of wage stagnation across countries. There are two countries for which no data is available for 2006, which are Estonia and Croatia, for whom 2010 is the earliest year in which data is available and for whom 2010 also will be used as their base year. The tables below show the differences in earnings ratios from 2006 to their final year, though the set of variables used in Stata during the analysis section of this paper has data points for 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018, in order to track shifts in the speed of wage stagnation over time. A table of the Stata variables can be found in the appendix.

Country	Unit	Ratio Value base year (2006 unless specified)	Ratio Value final year (2018, 2019 or 2020)	Difference between first and final value
Austria	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,72	1,62	-0,1
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,3	3,02	-0,28
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,92	1,87	-0,05
Belgium	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,39	1,52	0,13
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,43	2,56	0,13
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,74	1,69	-0,05
Czech Republic	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,88	1,77	-0,11
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,45	3,21	-0,24
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,83	1,81	-0,02
Denmark	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,43	1,48	0,05
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,43	2,6	0,17
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,71	1,76	0,05
Estonia	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	2,15	2,09	-0,06
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	4,44	4	-0,44
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,06	1,91	-0,15
Finland	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,43	1,47	0,04
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,47	2,56	0,09
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,73	1,75	0,02
France	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,45	1,49	0,04
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,78	2,86	0,08
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,91	1,92	0,01
Germany	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,88	1,78	-0,1
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,55	3,28	-0,07
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,78	1,85	-0,07

Table 1.1 - Change in relative income 2006-2018 per different income levels, Source: OECD

Country	Unit	Ratio Value base year (2006 unless specified)	Ratio Value final year (2018, 2019 or 2020)	Difference between first and final value
Greece	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,63	1,76	0,13
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,34	3,25	-0,09
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,05	1,85	-0,2
Hungary	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,94	1,28	-0,66
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	4,56	2,58	-1,98
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,34	2,01	-0,33
Iceland	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,62	1,57	-0,05
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,87	2,66	-0,21
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,77	1,7	-0,07
Ireland	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,87	1,91	0,04
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,59	3,91	0,32
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,92	2,05	0,13
Italy	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,49	1,46	-0,03
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,66	2,75	0,09
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,79	1,89	0,1
Latvia	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	2,49	1,88	-0,61
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	5,99	4,08	-1,91
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,4	2,17	-0,23
Lithuania	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	2,12	1,76	-0,36
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	4,69	3,54	-1,15
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,21	2,01	-0,2
Luxembourg	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,62	1,51	-0,11
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,22	3,29	0,07
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,99	2,19	0,2

Table 1.2 - Change in relative income 2006-2018 per different income levels, Source: OECD

Country	Unit	Ratio Value base year (2006 unless specified)	Ratio Value final year (2018, 2019 or 2020)	Difference between first and final value
Netherlands	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,62	1,62	0
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,87	2,92	0,05
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,76	1,81	0,05
Norway	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,34	1,43	0,09
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,14	2,34	0,2
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,61	1,64	0,03
Poland	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	2,05	1,73	-0,32
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	4,32	3,45	-0,87
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,11	2	-0,11
Portugal	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,76	1,43	-0,33
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	4,98	3,54	-1,44
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,82	2,48	-0,34
Slovakia	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,75	1,64	-0,11
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,51	3,09	-0,42
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,01	1,88	-0,13
Slovenia	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,82	1,65	-0,17
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,78	3,19	-0,59
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,08	1,94	-0,14
Spain	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,56	1,61	0,05
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,1	3,17	0,07
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,99	1,97	-0,02
Sweden	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,29	1,36	0,07
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,03	2,14	0,11
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,58	1,58	0

Table 1.3 - Change in relative income 2006-2018 per different income levels, Source: OECD

Country	Unit	Ratio Value base year (2006 unless specified)	Ratio Value final year (2018, 2019 or 2020)	Difference between first and final value
Switzerland	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,5	1,5	0
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,7	2,75	0,05
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,8	1,83	0,03
United Kingdom	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,82	1,69	-0,13
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,62	3,38	-0,24
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,99	1,99	0
Bulgaria	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,72	1,8	0,08
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	4,2	4,51	0,31
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,43	2,51	0,08
Croatia	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,85	1,74	-0,09
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	3,65	3,3	-0,35
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,98	1,9	-0,08
Cyprus	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,9	1,65	-0,25
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	4,04	3,8	-0,24
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,15	2,3	0,15
Malta	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	1,56	1,7	0,14
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	2,59	3,15	0,56
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	1,67	1,85	0,18
Romania	Interdecile ratio P50/P10	2,28	1,7	-0,58
	Interdecile ratio P90/P10	5,68	4,1	-1,58
	Interdecile ratio P90/P50	2,49	2,41	-0,08

Table 1.4 - Change in relative income 2006-2018 per different income levels, Source: OECD

A first glance at this data shows that there is not one singular trend, but rather a diversity in how many countries are experiencing a widening of income inequality as a result of wage growth / shrinkage. The degree by which the income gap has widened or shrunk also differs. Countries can be divided into roughly 3 patterns, and a country from each pattern will be briefly highlighted. The first group shows a trend of increased wage inequality. One example of this is Bulgaria. Bulgaria shows a value of 0,08 of both the interdecile ratio P50/P10, and for interdecile ratio P90/P50, meaning that the income gap between lower-class and middle-class incomes, as well as between middle-class incomes and upper-class incomes has slightly widened. However, the value for interdecile ratio P90/P10 is 0,31, which shows that the gap between lower-class incomes and upper-class incomes has grown much more compared to the other two values. This trend is also shown by countries such as Finland, Sweden, or France. The second pattern that can be distinguished is of reduced wage inequality. One example of this trend is Portugal, where all values have a negative signifier, showing that the income gap as a result of wages has reduced between different income groups. The interdecile ratio P90/P10, with a value of -1,44, has been reduced by more than the interdecile ratio P90/P50 and interdecile ratio P50/P10, with respective values of -0,34 and -0,33. Just as with pattern 1, where the largest increase in wage inequality was seen in the interdecile ratio P90/P10, the largest reductions can also be seen in interdecile ratio P90/P10 when there is a reduction of wage inequality across the board. This pattern is also

shown by countries such as Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Croatia. The third pattern displays neither a total increase or decrease in wage inequality, but a mixture of growth and shrinkage. This is the smallest group, as most countries display either all negative or positive values. One example of this pattern is Greece. In Greece, the wage gap between lower-income and higher-income groups shrank by a factor of -0.09, and the gap between lower-income and middle-income groups shrank by -0,2. However, the gap between middle-income and higher-income groups increased by a factor of 0,13. Luxembourg shows the inverse, where the gap between the middle class and the upper class shrank, but the gap between the lower class and the middle and upper class increased.

Another observation that can be made is that, in general, the gap between the middle class and upper class gets reduced more than the gap between the lower class and the middle class in the case of reduced wage inequality, and that the gap between the middle class and upper class widens less than the gap between the lower class and the middle class in the case of increased wage inequality. Examples of this are Cyprus, Lithuania, or the Netherlands. This shows us that, on average, most of the wage inequality is occuring because of either lower growth or higher shrinkage in the wages of lower-income groups.

The dependent variable, as mentioned previously, is the percentage share of seats held by either far-right or far-left parties in European national parliaments. In order to calculate these percentage changes over time, we first must know which parties classify as ‘far-left’ or ‘far-right’. As a reminder, far-left parties are defined as parties that reject capitalism and the underlying socio-economic structures that are caused by capitalism, and instead advocate for alternative economic and power structures. Far-left parties see economic inequality as the source of current political and social struggles in the political arena, and argue for a major redistribution of resources from the political elite as the answer to fixing this inequality (March, 2012). Far-right parties are defined as parties that are both nativist and authoritarian. Nativism is an ideology that argues that countries should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native groups, and that non-native elements are dangerous to the existence of the country. Authorianism is the belief that a strictly ordered society with severe punishments for infringements is desirable (Mudde, 2007). Both of these definitions are also used by the PopuList, an online database that tracks the far-left, far-right, populist, and Eurosceptic parties in European parliaments. However, the PopuList has data up to January of 2020. Since we are looking at the effect of wage stagnation from the period of 2006 to 2018, it is possible that certain countries have not had elections yet between 2018 and 2020. For this reason, it is important to extend the PopuList and update it to January of 2022. Since January 2020, 13 countries have had general elections. These countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia. Countries that have not had parliamentary elections since January 2020 will have their information copied from the current PopuList data, which includes their classification as being far-left, far-right, populist,

or Eurosceptic. Parties that were previously not included in the PopuList but that have since joined their national parliament or received more than 2% of the vote share in their national elections will be categorised into the 4 existing categories accordingly. The variable of ‘Has had elections since January 2020’ will also be added to make it easier to sort between countries that use data from the existing PopuList, and countries that have new data added. A detailed justifcation for the allocation of new parties as far-left, far-right, Eurosceptic, or populist can be found in the appendix. Since we are interested in the growth or shrinkage over time for these parties, a variable called ‘increase in support’ will also be added for the countries that have had elections since January 2020. This will be a dummy variable with a ‘1’ when a party has gained more seats, and a ‘0’ when a party has gained fewer seats compared to the previous election. Parties that were previously not included in the PopuList but that have since joined their national parliament or received more than 2% of the vote share in their national elections will receive a ‘1’ for the ‘increase in support’ category. Parties that joined their national parliament or received more than 2% of the vote share in a parliamentary election since January 2020, and had previously also met these criteria, but not in their most recent election, meaning that they are already in the PopuList dataset but did not receive enough support in the latest elections before January 2020, will receive a ‘1’ for the category of ‘increase in support’, as they are rejoining parliament. The table with the data for the extended populist can be found in the appendix. After categorising which parties count as either far-left or far-right, it becomes possible to go back through the election results since 2006, to track the increase or decrease in support for these parties. The results will also be disaggregated between support for far-left parties and far-right parties, as the literature predicts support for either extreme to have a different causal mechanism.

In order to check for the proposed theoretical causal mechanism, data from the ESS will be used in order to ascertain shifts in attitude regarding redistributive policies and for isolationist attitudes. The data gathered from ESS will start in Round 3 from 2006. This is because the data available on wages per decile from Eurostat starts in 2006. Not every country that is included in the ESS has sufficient data from 2006 onwards. There have been 6 surveys held from 2006 and onwards, including Round 3 itself. The final survey that covers the years also covered by the Eurostat data is Round 9 from 2018. Not every country surveyed during this period has data available for all rounds. Only the countries that had data available for Round 3 in 2006 as well as for Round 9 in 2018 are included in the research. This leaves us with a sample of 21 countries. Most geographical areas of Europe are covered with this sample, with the exception of the Balkans, where only Slovenia and Bulgaria are included. This means that extrapolating data to other Eastern European countries not included in this dataset is not recommended. Table 2 below shows the values for participants in the years 2006 and 2018 that agreed strongly with the statement “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” The final column shows the percentage points difference between the values participants had

in 2006 compared to 2018. In other words, this column shows us how preferences for redistributive policies have shifted in the available countries during the period of 2006-2018.

Country	A.S. % 2006	A.S. % 2018	A.S. % 2018 - A.S. % 2006
Austria	30.9	29.4	-1.5
Belgium	26.9	23.3	-3.6
Bulgaria	63.6	41.0	-22.6
Cyprus	28.6	32.1	3.5
Denmark	11.0	11.9	0.9
Estonia	30.4	16.8	-13.6
Finland	31.3	28.2	-3.1
France	43.8	40.7	-3.1
Germany	19.5	26.1	6.6
Hungary	53.4	45.8	-7.6
Ireland	18.5	20.2	1.7
Netherlands	15.8	16.2	0.4
Norway	17.1	23.4	6.3
Poland	30.5	24.6	-5.9
Portugal	41.7	36.8	-4.9
Slovakia	33.0	34.1	1.1
Slovenia	32.3	39.1	6.8
Spain	34.5	30.9	-3.6
Sweden	19.1	17.2	-1.9
Switzerland	22.4	18.5	-3.9
United Kingdom	14.2	22.7	8.5

Table 2: Percentage of population that supports increased government redistributive policy, source: ESS.

A first glance at the table shows us that support for redistributive policies has not seen the same trend across Europe. Some countries have seen an increase in support, while others have seen a decrease in support for redistributive policies. The degree to which support has changed also varies widely among countries, though most see about a 3-6 percentage-point shift over the 12 years.

Similarly to finding the shift in atittudes for redistributive policies for the specified period of time, a shift in the nativist attitudes will also be checked for. The ESS question that is meant to reveal nativist preferences is “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?” This question was selected as it specifically links the topic of immigration to economic concerns, whereas nativist attitudes in general are influenced by a wider series of factors rather than exclusively economic ones. The format of the question also differs slightly from the question used to find redistributive policies. The previous question allowed participants to answer Strongly Agree,

Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree, effectively a 5-point scale. The question that measures nativist attitudes allows participants to answer from a 0 to a 10, with 0 being the value that is most strongly associated with isolationist and nativist attitudes. This is an 11-point scale. For the purposes of table 3 below, answers of 0, 1, and 2 are considered to be strong nativist attitudes. While the exact point value where one no longer considers a person's nativist attitude to be 'strong' is relatively subjective, the main purpose is to find the changes in attitudes over time, and not a total percentage point value. As long as the cut-off point considered is consistent for both measuring points, a comparison can be made that reveals the change in atittudes. For this purpose, the current point values considered are adequate. Data is again taken from the years 2006 (Round 3) and 2018 (Round 9) to find the shifts in nativist attitudes over this period of time. The 2nd and 3rd column show the cumulative values of 0, 1, and 2 scores as a percentage point of the total population per country. Column 4 shows the changes in nativist attitudes over this period of time. A negative sign means that nativist attitudes have been reduced, while a positive sign means that nativist attitudes have increased during the 2006-2018 period.

Country	Combined 0, 1, & 2 scores, 2006	Combined 0, 1, & 2 scores, 2018	2018 values - 2006 values
Austria	15.1	14.8	-0.3
Belgium	18.1	11.1	-7.0
Bulgaria	21.5	29.4	7.9
Cyprus	33.9	26.7	-7.2
Denmark	11.7	12.0	0.3
Estonia	19.0	16.3	-2.7
Finland	10.5	9.7	-0.8
France	20.0	17.1	-2.9
Germany	19.3	8.0	-11.3
Hungary	40.7	33.6	-7.1
Ireland	10.3	9.0	-1.3
Netherlands	9.3	6.9	-2.4
Norway	8.7	6.9	-1.8
Poland	11.5	10.5	-1.0
Portugal	17.5	6.4	-11.1
Slovakia	19.2	35.9	16.7
Slovenia	25.4	24.8	-0.6
Spain	10.7	11.0	0.3
Sweden	11.5	9.2	-2.3
Switzerland	7.5	5.1	-2.4
United Kingdom	23.8	9.9	-13.9

Table 3: Percentage of population that shows strong nativist attitudes based on economic concerns, source: ESS.

Most countries have seen a reduction in nativist attitudes in 2018 compared to 2006. Only 3 countries have seen an increase, with two of those countries, Denmark and Spain, only seeing a 0.3 increase in nativist attitudes. However, many countries that have seen a reduction in nativist attitudes have not done so by more than 3 percentage points. Changes are thus relatively small when compared to shifts in attitudes of redistributive policies.

Results and analysis:

The following section will make use of Stata to compute the regressions. A full table of the variables and their data can be found in the appendix. The first regression that we are interested in running is to see if the changes in wages lead to different levels of support for extremist parties, either far-left or far-right. Three variables were created, nWage10_Change, nWage50_Change, and nWage90_Change, to capture the effect of the percentage difference in wages on electoral support for extremist parties at the 10th decile, median, and 90th decile income levels. The results are found in Table 4 below:

TotalShare	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10_Cha~e	.0209004	.0532626	0.39	0.696	-.0850182	.126819
nWage50_Cha~e	-.4627652	.7077285	-0.65	0.515	-1.870161	.9446306
nWage90_Cha~e	.2842787	.696127	0.41	0.684	-1.100046	1.668603
_cons	22.58467	2.536993	8.90	0.000	17.53959	27.62976

Table 4: Effects of wage growth on total support for extremist parties, source: Stata.

When looking at the P-values, there is no statistical significance of changes in wages affecting support for extremist parties, at any of the 3 income levels. Similarly, when the dependent variable is specified as either support for far-left parties, or for far-right parties, no statistical results can be found either at all 3 income levels, which can be seen in table 5.1 and 5.2 below:

ELeftShare	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10_Change	.0088748	.0277322	0.32	0.750	-.0462737	.0640234
nWage50_Change	-.1221805	.3684925	-0.33	0.741	-.8549682	.6106073
nWage90_Change	-.1188506	.3624519	-0.33	0.744	-.839626	.6019248
_cons	10.2066	1.320934	7.73	0.000	7.579781	12.83343

Table 5.1: Effects of wage growth on support for far-left parties, source: Stata.

ERightShare	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10_Change	.0069503	.0524934	0.13	0.895	-.0974387	.1113393
nWage50_Change	-.2401958	.6975077	-0.34	0.731	-1.627266	1.146875
nWage90_Change	.2936687	.6860736	0.43	0.670	-1.070664	1.658001
_cons	12.7815	2.500355	5.11	0.000	7.809267	17.75373

Table 5.2: Effects of wage growth on support for far-right parties, source: Stata.

Seeing as there is no statistical significance to be found for the effects on wage stagnation on support for radical parties at either end of the political spectrum. The next step is to see if changes in wages affect changes in support for political parties at either extreme, and for far-left and far-right parties specifically. The results are found in Table 6 below:

nTotalShare_~e	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10_Change	-.0164758	.024272	-0.68	0.499	-.0647433	.0317917
nWage50_Change	.0172801	.3225145	0.05	0.957	-.6240754	.6586357
nWage90_Change	-.0253299	.3172277	-0.08	0.937	-.6561719	.6055121
_cons	2.945029	1.156117	2.55	0.013	.6459633	5.244095

nELeftShare_~e	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10_Change	-.0171138	.0156553	-1.09	0.277	-.0482461	.0140184
nWage50_Change	.2284291	.2080201	1.10	0.275	-.1852416	.6420998
nWage90_Change	-.2528589	.20461	-1.24	0.220	-.6597484	.1540307
_cons	1.176092	.7456891	1.58	0.119	-.3067926	2.658977

nERightShare~e	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10_Change	-.0052036	.0206894	-0.25	0.802	-.0463467	.0359396
nWage50_Change	-.1656587	.274911	-0.60	0.548	-.7123493	.3810319
nWage90_Change	.1876601	.2704044	0.69	0.490	-.3500688	.725389
_cons	1.790034	.9854728	1.82	0.073	-.169687	3.749755

Table 6: Effects of wage changes on changes in support for all extremist parties, left-wing parties, and right-wing parties, source: Stata

In all cases, the P-values are also not statistically significant when it comes to the effect of changes in real wage growth for increased support over time for far-left parties, far-right parties, and both extremist party groups combined. While the effect is more significant for far-left parties, the results still do not see a statistically significant correlation. This means that H1 and H2 have to be rejected. It does not

appear that the speed at which wage stagnation takes place leads to a significant increase or decrease in support for extremist parties, even when disaggregated to only left-wing or right-wing parties. Out of interest, it is also possible to look at the real wages, not their percentage change, to see if real wage levels affect support for extremist parties. The results are found in table 7 below:

TotalShare	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10	-.008993	.0074207	-1.21	0.228	-.0236933	.0057074
nWage50	.0260754	.0172531	1.51	0.133	-.008103	.0602538
nWage90	-.0141443	.0091459	-1.55	0.125	-.0322621	.0039736
_cons	21.43553	3.296129	6.50	0.000	14.90592	27.96513

ELeftShare	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10	.0048225	.0039349	1.23	0.223	-.0029725	.0126175
nWage50	-.0141165	.0091486	-1.54	0.126	-.0322399	.0040069
nWage90	.0080596	.0048497	1.66	0.099	-.0015476	.0176668
_cons	3.361697	1.747804	1.92	0.057	-.10069	6.824084

ERightShare	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10	-.0133775	.0070707	-1.89	0.061	-.0273844	.0006294
nWage50	.0413448	.0164393	2.51	0.013	.0087786	.0739109
nWage90	-.0229901	.0087144	-2.64	0.010	-.0402533	-.0057268
_cons	18.22449	3.140649	5.80	0.000	12.00289	24.44609

Table 7: Effects of real wages on support for all extremist parties, far-left parties, and far-right parties, source: Stata

The results in this metric show themselves to be much more statistically significant. For all 3 categories, significance can be found to be close to the 10%-level, and in the case of support for the far-right, real wage levels for middle-income groups and high-income groups show a significance around the 1%-level. When looking at support for the far-right, we see that there is a negative coefficient at the 10th decile and 90th decile. This means that, as real wages increase, support for the far-right decreases. Conversely, the coefficient for nWage50 is positive, meaning that support for the far-right increases as the middle class receives higher wages. These trends can be explained through the literature. As mentioned during the theoretical framework, Ausserladscheider found that immigrants were often scapegoated as the source of economic hardship, a tactic that particularly persuaded lower-income voters to support the far-right (Ausserladscheider, 2019). However, if wages for the lower classes are growing, it becomes harder to scapegoat immigrants for economic hardship, explaining the

negative correlation between support for the far-right and wages of lower-income groups. When it comes to explaining the middle-class and the upper-class, we turn to Engler and Weisstanner. As they explain, concerns for economic backsliding are often relative. Higher-income classes fear that increased immigration might mean that they become part of lower-earning classes. This effect is strongest for the middle-class, as they have relatively more to lose than lower-income classes, but they have fewer safety nets, such as diversifying incomes or purchasing of assets, as the upper-income classes have (Engler & Weisstanner, 2021). This explains why the coefficient has a positive sign for the middle-classes, as when they earn more they have relatively more to lose if economic conditions change and they are more at risk of becoming part of the lower-classes. However, this pressure is less for the upper-classes, which can explain why they tend to support the far-right less as their incomes increase.

These results do beg the question why there is a large gap in statistical signifance between real wages, and the percentage change of wages, in their effect on support for far-left and far-right parties. It appears as if, while wages are still a relevant factor in how much support extremist parties on either end receive during an election, the speed at which these wages grow or decrease is not of importance. The results indicate that the net change is of more relevance than the change as a percentage. In other words, if there are two individuals, once with a wage of 1000, and one of 2000, and both see a decrease in their wage of 10%, the person with the higher wage will on average be more affected in their support of extremist parties than the person with the lower wage, as 200 is a larger net change than 100, even though as a percentage both individuals see the same reduction. In this sense, the height of wages is still a relevant factor in determining support for the far-left and far-right, but the speed at which wage stagnation is happening does not seem to be statistically related to an increase or decrease in support for these parties.

While H1 and H2 are at this point rejected, it is still worthwhile to see if support for redistributive policies and nativisit attitudes are affected by the speed at which wage stagnation is taking place. The effects are shown in Table 8 below:

nRedisPol_SA	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10_Change	-.0696125	.0311986	-2.23	0.036	-.1341518	-.0050733
nWage50_Change	.7607166	.5109292	1.49	0.150	-.296221	1.817654
nWage90_Change	-.510966	.5268159	-0.97	0.342	-1.600768	.5788356
_cons	25.95182	2.615193	9.92	0.000	20.54188	31.36176

nNatAtt_SA012	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
nWage10_Change	-.0114394	.0315699	-0.36	0.720	-.0767468	.0538679
nWage50_Change	-.6341187	.5170097	-1.23	0.232	-1.703635	.4353973
nWage90_Change	.7591049	.5330854	1.42	0.168	-.3436664	1.861876
_cons	17.52925	2.646316	6.62	0.000	12.05492	23.00357

Table 8: Effects of wage changes on support for redistributive policies, and nativist attitudes source: Stata

When looking at the P-values, we see that the statistical signifance for the effects of wage changes on redistributive preferences is much stronger for lower-income groups than it is for higher-income groups. This is in line with the established literature which says that lower-income groups are much more likely to support redistributive policies from governments. The sign of the variable nWage10_Change is negative. This negative relationship means that if wages grow faster for the lower-class, that they support redistributive policies less, but that if wages shrink faster, they will support redistributive policies more. The P-values are inversely related for nativist attitudes, affecting higher-income groups more than lower-income groups, but as all values are above the 10%-level, they can be regarded as not relevant.

Conclusion:

This paper sought to discover in what ways wage stagnation affects political polarisation. Along the way, other questions were introduced as well, such as whether the far-left or far-right was more affected by political conditions, or if real wage levels or the speed at which wages are changing has the larger impact on support for parties at either end of the political spectrum, or whether the effect of wages presents itself differently for different income groups. The regression results show that the speed at which wages are changing does not have a statistically significant effect on the elections that were held after the changes in wages had occured. One important discussion point here is that different access to data might have yielded a different result. The data from the OECD only exists for certain key years, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018. However, the years in which elections are held in European countries differ, meaning that at times the nearest election to a data point was almost 3 years after a year from which OECD data was available. The further the year of the wage level data point is removed from the election, the less reliable it becomes as an indicator. Furthermore, this also meant that necessarily election years that were held shortly after when the wage data was gathered had to be compared to election years that were held much further after the wage data point was gathered. Results would be more accurate if it had been possible to use wage data from one year before each election year, in order to improve consistency in the comparisons across countries. The regression results might have shown a different

conclusion if a larger dataset had been available with wage levels for each individual year. The reason why this paper decided to accept the limitation is because of the desire to differentiate between wage levels at the 10th, median, and 90th decile, and to see if this distinction yielded different levels of support for either far-left or far-right groups. However, since no statistical significance was found when it came to the speed at which wages were stagnating, future research could look at only median wage levels, for which more data is available, and investigate if a statistical significance can be found if all wage values were taken from the year before an election year.

Other findings correlate with what was described in the literature, though it is interesting to note that the real wage levels seemed to have a stronger statistical relation with far-right support, as there is more contention on the effect of economic conditions on support for the far-right, as there is on support for the far-left. Another finding was that the rate at which wage stagnation happens does affect preferences for redistributive policies for lower-income groups. However, no relation could be found for left-wing support. This is likely because support for redistributive policies does not automatically translate into electoral success, and there could be several reasons why voters could still hold this preference but simultaneously not see an increase in support for far-left parties, such as other policy positions taking priority in making voting decisions, or simply no option to vote far-left in an election. In summary, the real wage level appears to be a more important variable in determining support for extremist parties, than the rate at which wage stagnation is happening. As proposed, future research into this topic could prioritise average wages before election years instead of finding shifts in electoral support across different income groups, in order to facilitate a more consistent method of comparing countries. A different direction that future research could take is related to the strength of welfare states in relation to support for extremist parties on either side of the scale, using the embedded liberalism framework that was also used in this paper. The theory is most often used in the literature to explain increased support for far-left parties, as increased economic insecurity caused by free-market policies results in demands by the electorate for ‘compensation’ by the government in the form of welfare policies. However, it was also established that countries with historically weak welfare institutions see a larger reliance on people’s employment for financial security. In such countries, increased globalisation can result in a higher tendency to support nativist and isolationist policies in an effort to protect people’s jobs from foreign economic shocks, and thus increase support for far-right parties as they tend to be the most nativist and isolationist. Therefore, future research could investigate whether it is possible to produce a scale on whether a country might be more likely to increase support for either the far-left or the far-right dependent on the preexisting welfare protections available to the population. The creation of such a scale based on the embedded liberalism theory has to my knowledge not yet been attempted, and could provide an interesting avenue for future research on how economic factors affect political polarisation.

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Appendix:

The following section contains a detailed description of the parties of countries that have had general elections since January of 2020. The parties that were already included in the PopuList retained their old classifications. New parties that had not previously been included in the PopuList contain a justification for why they are classified as far-left, far-right, populist, or Eurosceptic.

Bulgaria: General elections took place on 14 November 2021, which were the third general elections held in 2021, with the other 2 elections being held in April and July, as the previous elections failed to form a government. The voter turnout was low, at 38%, but this was affected by this being the third general election in one year, as the April election saw a turnout of 49,1% (CSIS, 2021). Bulgaria uses an electoral system where parties can form coalitions together and campaign as a single party. The PopuList uses the coalition parties for its analysis, rather than the smaller individual parties that make up the coalition parties. The extension of the PopuList will also use the coalition parties as the level of analysis.

GERB is a populist party, but is not far-right, far-left, or Eurosceptic. In November 2021 they received 59 out of 240 seats. In 2017 they were also in parliament and held 95 seats. Support has steadily dropped for them, which could also be seen in the elections in April and July, where they received 73 and 63 seats.

BSPzB is a coalition party that includes far-left, populist, and Eurosceptic parties. However, the coalition party itself does not clarify as far-left, populist, or Eurosceptic, which is why the coalition party was not included in the PopuList, and also will not be included in the extension of the PopuList.

ITN is a new party that was founded 16 February 2020. The party was founded by popular talk-show host Slavi Trifonov. The party is populist, right-leaning but not far-right, and promotes further integration with the EU (CSIS, 2021). They received 25 out of 240 seats.

Revival is a party that split from IMRO due to internal disagreements over leadership, but both parties hold the same policy program. They will be listed as two separate parties in the extended PopuList. IMRO is a far-right, Eurosceptic populist party that was included in the PopuList but was not in parliament. IMRO did not receive enough votes to enter parliament, but Revival received 13 out of 240 seats. Because Revival split from IMRO, a party that was previously incorporated in the PopuList, they will be given a ‘1’ for the ‘increase in support’ variable.

The NSFB and Volya party that were elected into parliament in 2017 and were included in the PopuList did not receive enough votes to enter parliament in 2021, and will thus be moved to below the dotted line.

Croatia: General elections were held on 5 July 2020, with a voter turnout of 46.44%. Similarly to Bulgaria, parties can choose to run in coalitions as one single party, and the coalition parties will be used in the extended PopuList.

DP was founded on the 29th of February, 2020. The party is far-right, populist, and Eurosceptic (Domovinksi Pokret, 2022). They won 16 out of 151 seats during their first run for national parliament.

MOST is a populist party that was in parliament during the last update to the PopuList. They are right-leaning but not classified as far-right, and also not classified as Eurosceptic. They received 8 out of 151 seats in 2020, which is a reduction from 13 seats in 2016.

The HDSSB and Živi zid parties were in parliament during the creation of the previous PopuList. The HDSSB party did receive one seat, but ran as a party coalition under HDZ, which is not populist or far-right. The Živi zid party did not receive enough votes to get into parliament in 2020. This means that both parties will drop below the dotted line in the extended PopuList.

Cyprus: General elections were held on 30 May, 2021. The House of Representatives has 80 seats, with 56 seats for Greek Cypriots and 24 seats for Turkish Cypriots. However, the 24 Turkish Cypriot seats have been empty since 1964, meaning that there are a de facto 56 seats.

AKEL is a far-left, Eurosceptic party. They lost 1 seat from 2016 to 2021, giving them 15 seats.

ELAM is a far-right, Eurosceptic party. They doubled their seats from 2 to 4 in the 2021 election.

The SYM party that was in parliament during the previous PopuList has since been fused into the EDEK party, which is neither populist nor far-left.

Czech Republic: The Czech elections were held on the 8th and 9th of October, 2021. There was a voter turnout of 65.43%. The Czech Republic has a electoral treshold of 5% for single-party coalitions, which means that several parties got over the 2% of votes required to enter the PopuList, but simultaneously did not receive votes to enter parliament, meaning that new parties can be added to the extended PopuList below the dotted line. This also means that a new party can score a ‘1’ for ‘Increase in support’, even though they are not in parliament.

ANO is a populist party that dropped 6 seats, receiving 78 seats out of 200 in 2017, and 72 seats in 2021.

SPD is a populist, far-right, Eurosceptic party that dropped 2 seats, receiving 22 out of 200 in 2017, and 20 in 2021.

PSH is a populist party established on the 27th of January, 2021. PSH received 4.68% of the vote, making it the 5th largest party in 2021, but not receiving enough to enter a seat in parliament. The party is populist as the founder, Róbert Šlachta, centered his party as an alternative to fight the corruption of the ruling political elites (Fendrych, 2021). Even though the party received no seats, as a new party they still earned more votes about the 2% treshold of the PopuList, meaning they will be entered into the extended PopuList and given a ‘1’ in ‘Increase in support’. The party is not far-right, far-left, or Eurosceptic.

KSCM was in parliament during the creation of the PopuList, but did not receive more than 5% in the 2021 election, meaning it is not in parliament and will drop below the dotted line.

Germany: Elections were held on the 26th of September 2021, with a voter turnout of 76.6%. No new Eurosceptic, populist, far-right or far-left parties received over 2% of votes, and no parties already added in the PopuList left parliament.

AfD is a populist, far-right, Eurosceptic party. They dropped 11 seats, from 94 in 2017, to 83 in 2021.

Die Linke is a populist, far-left, Eurosceptic party. They dropped 30 seats, from 69 in 2017, to 39 in 2021. This large drop in seats can partly be explained by the rise of the center-left SPD and Die Grüne, who each gained over 50 seats.

Iceland: Elections were held on the 25th of September, 2021, with a voter turnout of 80.09%. Iceland has an electoral threshold of 5%, which means that parties can receive above the required 2% of national votes to be included in the PopuList, even if they receive no parliamentary seats. No parties that were in parliament during the creation of the PopuList dropped out of parliament in the 2021 elections. No new parties that qualify to be in the extended PopuList entered parliament, meaning that the parties above and below the dotted line remain the same.

Sj is a Eurosceptic party that received the same amount of seats in 2021 as they did in 2017, with 16 out of 63 seats. While they did not drop any seats, they also did not gain any seats, meaning that they will receive a ‘0’ in the category of ‘Increase in support’.

F is a Eurosceptic party that gained 5 seats, going from 8 in 2017, to 13 in 2021.

FIF is a populist and Eurosceptic party that gained 2 seats, going from 4 in 2017 to 6 in 2021.

M is a populist and Eurosceptic party that lost 4 seats, going from 7 in 2017 to 3 in 2021.

Ireland: Elections were held on 8 February 2020, with a voter turnout of 62.9%

SF is a far-left, populist, Eurosceptic party that gained 14 seats, and rose from 23 seats in 2016 to 37 seats in 2020, making it the largest party.

PBPA is an alliance of 3 far-left and Eurosceptic parties. During the creation of the Populist they were not in parliament, and were included below the dotted line. In 2020 they received 5 seats, and will be placed above the dotted line. The part is now known as PBP / Solidarity, but will be included in the extended PopuList under the original name.

Lithuania: Elections were held on the 11th and 25th of October, 2020, with a voter turnout of 47.8%. There are two voting dates because Lithuania relies on a two-round system.

DP is a populist party that gained 8 seats, rising from 2 seats in 2016 to 10 seats in 2020.

LCP is a populist, Eurosceptic party. They lost one seat. Since they had one seat in 2016, it means that they are not in parliament since 2020, and will drop below the dotted line.

LT is a new party that was created by fusing LLS and TT. TT was previously in the PopuList, but will be dropped below the dotted line, as the party no longer exists. However, even though they are a newly formed party, TT received 8 seats in 2016, and LT received a single seat in 2020. Because the merger contains a party included in the PopuList who experienced a reduction in support, they will receive a '0' for 'Increase in support', despite being a new inclusion in the extended PopuList.

Netherlands: The Netherlands had their election from the 15th to the 17th of March, 2021. There was a voter turnout of 78.71%. The elections were planned to be held on the 17th, but due to Covid concerns some polling stations were opened early in order to allow elderly and immunocompromised people a safer voting environment.

PVV is a populist, far-right, Eurosceptic party. They received 17 seats in 2021, which is a reduction of 3 seats compared to 2017.

SP is a populist, far-left, Eurosceptic party. They received 9 seats in 2021, which is a reduction of 5 seats compared to 2017.

FvD is a populist, far-right, Eurosceptic party. They received 8 seats in 2021, which is an increase of 6 seats compared to 2017.

PvdD is a Eurosceptic party. They received 6 seats in 2021, which is an increase of 1 seat compared to 2017.

JA21 is a new party established in 2021. The party split from the populist, far-right, and Eurosceptic FvD, and its founder Joost Eerdmans was once also a member of the LPF, another populist and Eurosceptic party included in the PopuList. JA21 will be added to the extended PopuList as a populist, far-right, Eurosceptic party (Ravensbergen, 2021). They received 3 seats.

SGP is a Eurosceptic party. They received 3 seats in 2021, which is the same amount of seats they received in 2017. For this reason, they will receive a '0' in 'Increase in support'.

50PLUS is a Eurosceptic party. They received 1 seat in 2021, which is a reduction of 3 seats compared to 2017.

BIJ1 was established in 2016. While they participated in the 2017 elections, they did not receive enough votes to enter the Dutch parliament (which also automatically would have occured if the party had gotten 2% of the votes), and were therefore not included in the PopuList. The party is far-left (BIJ1, 2022).

Norway: Elections were held on 13 September, 2021, and saw a voter turnout of 77.1%. All parties that were included in the PopuList remained in parliament, and no new parties that qualified to enter the extended PopuList entered parliament or received 2% or more of the vote.

SP is a Eurosceptic party. They saw an increase of 9 seats, going from 21 in 2017 to 28 in 2021.

FrP is a populist, far-right, Eurosceptic party. They saw a decrease of 6 seats, going from 27 in 2017 to 21 in 2021.

SV is a far-left, Eurosceptic party. They saw an increase of 2 seats, going from 11 in 2017 to 13 in 2021.

Rodt is a far-left, Eurosceptic party. They saw an increase of 7 seats, going from 1 in 2017, to 8 in 2021.

KrF is a Eurosceptic party. They saw a decrease of 5 seats, going from 8 in 2017 to 3 in 2021.

Portugal: Elections were held on the 30th of January, 2022, with a voter turnout of 51,5%. No new parties that were previously not included in the PopuList but that do qualify for inclusion were created since the previous election in 2019.

BE is a left-wing, Eurosceptic party. They saw a decrease of 14 seats, going from 19 seats in 2019, to 5 in 2022.

CH is a far-right, populist, Eurosceptic party. They saw an increase of 11 seats, going from 1 seat in 2019, to 12 in 2022.

CDU is a left-wing, Eurosceptic party. They saw a decrease of 6 seats, going from 12 seats in 2019, to 6 in 2022.

Romania: Elections were held on the 6th of December, 2020, with a voter turnout of 31.94%. During the creation of the PopuList, there were no parties in the Romanian parliament that were defined as far-left, far-right, populist, or Eurosceptic. Since then, one party that fits some of these criteria has been elected into parliament.

AUR was established on the 19th of September, 2019. The party described itself during their campaign as being against the current political system, and advocate for the rights of Romanians in all diasporas based on a shared history and culture (G4Media, 2020). Because of this, the party will be added to the extended PopuList as populist and far-right.

Slovakia: Elections were held on the 29th of February, 2020, with a voter turnout of 65.81%. There is an electoral treshold of 5%, but if parties choose to run as a coalition, the electoral treshold is 7% for coalitions of 2 or 3 parties, and 10% for coalitions of 4 parties or more.

OĽANO is a populist party. In 2016 the party received 17 votes, and in 2020 the party received 45 votes, which is an increase of 28 votes. OLaNO ran with a different party coalition in both years. In 2016 they ran as a two-party coalition with NOVA, and received 19 seats total (17 for OLaNO). In 2020 they ran as a five-party coalition with KÚ, NOVA, ZZ, and DÚS, which received 53 seats total (45 for OLaNO). The party will receive a ‘1’ for ‘Increase in support’, but it is difficult to determine how large the increase in support would have been if there had not been a changee in the party coalition, which might have affected how electorally viable OLaNO was seen as.

Smer is a populist party. They lost 11 seats, dropping from 49 seats in 2016 to 38 seats in 2020.

SR is a populist, far-right, Eurosceptic party. They gained 6 seats, rising from 11 seats in 2016 to 17 seats in 2020.

ĽSNS is a far-right, Eurosceptic party. They gained 3 seats, rising from 14 seats in 2016 to 17 seats in 2020.

SaS is a Eurosceptic party. They lost 8 seats, dropping from 21 seats in 2016 to 13 seats in 2020.

SNS is a populist, far-right, Eurosceptic party. They did not pass the electoral treshold of 5% of the votes, meaning that they did not enter parliament and lost all their seats. They lost 15 seats, and will drop below the dotted line in the extended PopuList.

VLASŤ is a new party that did not receive 5% or more of the electoral vote to enter parliament, but they did reach above 2% of the vote, which is enough to be included in the extended PopuList. VLASŤ opposes increased European federalism and perceived European overreach in order to protect Slovak culture and families from corrupted governments (VLASŤ, 2022). The party will be included in the extended PopuList as populist, far-right, and Eurosceptic. Even though they did not receive any seats in parliament, they will still receive a ‘1’ for ‘Increase in support’ due to receiving 3% of the electoral vote while being a new party.

The extended populist:

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Austria									0
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Freedom Party of Austria	FPÖ	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZÖ	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Liste Dr. Hans-Peter Martin	Hans-Peter Martin's List	Martin	1	0	0	1	0	0	
Team Stronach	Team Stronach	TS	1	0	0	1	0	0	
Belgium									0
Partij van de Arbeid - Parti du Travail de Belgique	Workers' Party of Belgium	PVDA / PTB	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Vlaams Blok	Flemish Interest	VB	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Front National	National Front	FN	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Lijst Dedecker | Libertair, Direct, Democratisch	Libertarian, Direct, Democratic	LDD	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Parti populaire	People's Party	Pp	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Bulgaria									1
Grazhdani za Evropeysko Razvitie na Balgariya	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	GERB	1	0	0	0	1	0	
Ima Takav Narod	There Is Such a People	ITN	1	0	0	0	1	1	
Vazrazhdane	Revival	Vazrazhdane	1	1	0	1	1	1	
Natsionalen Front za Spasenie na Balgariya	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	NSFB	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Volya	Will	Volya	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Ataka	Attack	Ataka	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Balgarija bes Zensura	Reload Bulgaria / Bulgaria Without Censorship	BBZ / BBT	1	0	0	1	0	0	
Balgarski Biznes Blok	Bulgarian Business Bloc	BBB	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Natsionalno Dvizhenie Simeon Vtori	National Movement Simeon II	NDSV	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Red, zakonnost i spravedlivost	Order, Law and Justice	RZS	1	1	0	0	0	0	
VMRO - Balgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie	IMRO - National Bulgarian Movement	IMRO	1	1	0	1	0	0	

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Croatia									1
Domovinski Pokret	Homeland Movement	DP	1	1	0	1	1	1	
Most nezavisnih lista	Bridge of Independent Lists	MOST	1	0	0	0	1	0	
Hrvatski demokratski savez Slavonije i Baranje	Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja	HDSSB	1	1	0	0	0	0	
Živi zid	Human Shield	Živi zid	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Hrvatska gradanska stranka	Croatian Civic Party	HGS	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Hrvatska stranka prava	Croatian Party of Rights	HSP	0	1	0	1	0	0	
Hrvatska stranka prava dr. Ante Starcevic	Croatian Party of Rights - Dr. Ante Starcevic	HSP-AS	0	1	0	1	0	0	
Hrvatski laburisti - Stranka rada	Croatian Labourists - Labour Party	HL - SR / CL - LP	1	0	1	0	0	0	
Hrvatski rast	Croatian Growth	Hrast	0	1	0	1	0	0	
Cyprus									1
Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú	Progressive Party of Working People	AKEL	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Ethniko Laiko Metopo	National Popular Front	ELAM	0	1	0	1	1	1	
Symmaxia	Citizens' Alliance	SYM / SYPOL	1	0	1	0	0	0	
Czech Republic									1
Akce nespokojených obcanu	Action of Dissatisfied Citizens	ANO	1	0	0	0	1	0	
Svoboda a prímá demokracie Tomio Okamura	Freedom and Direct Democracy - Tomio Okamura	SPD	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Přísaha	Oath	PSH	1	0	0	0	0	1	
Komunistická strana Cech a Moravy	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	KSCM	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Komunistická strana Ceskoslovenska	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia	KSC	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Sdruzení pro republiku - Republikánská strana Ceskoslovenska	Coalition for Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia	SPR - RSC	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Strana svobodných obcanu	Party of Free Citizens	SSO	0	0	0	1	0	0	
Suverenita - blok Jany Bobošíkové	Sovereignty - Jana Bobosikova Bloc	S - JB	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Úsvit prímé demokracie	Dawn-National Coalition	Dawn	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Veci verejné	Public Affairs	VV	1	0	0	0	0	0	

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Denmark									0
Dansk Folkeparti	Danish People's Party	DF	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Enhedslisten - De Rød - Grønne	Red - Green Alliance	En - O	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Nye Borgerlige	The New Right	NB	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Socialistisk Folkeparti	Socialist People's Party	SF	0	0	1	0	1	0	
Fremskridtspartiet	Progress Party	FrP	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Tjóðveldi	Republic (Faroe Islands)	T	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Estonia									0
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond	Estonian Conservative People's Party	EKRE	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Eesti Kodanik	Estonian Citizens	EKo	1	1	0	0	0	0	
Erakond Res Publica	Res Publica	ERP	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Sõltumatud Kuningriiklased	Independent Royalists	SK	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Finland									0
Demokraattinen Liito | Vasemmistoliitto	Left Alliance	VAS	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Suomen Maaseudun Puolue | Perussuomalaiset	Finns Party	Ps	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Sininen tulevaisuus	Blue Reform	SIN	1	0	0	1	0	0	
France									0
Debout la république | Debout la France	Republic Arise | France Arise	DLR | DLF	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Front national	National Front / Rally	FN / RN	1	1	0	1	1	0	
La France Insoumise	France Unbowed	FI	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Parti communiste français	French Communist Party / Left Front	PCF / FdG	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Mouvement pour la France	Movement for France	MF	0	0	0	1	0	0	
Rassemblement pour la France	Rally for France	RPF	0	1	0	1	0	0	

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Germany									1
Alternative für Deutschland	Alternative for Germany	AfD	1	1	0	1	1	0	
PDS | Die Linke	The Left (Germany)	Linke	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Greece									0
Elliniki Lisi	Greek Solution	EL	1	1	0	1	1	0	
European Realistic Disobedience Front [MeRa25]	European Realistic Disobedience Front [MeRa25]	MR25	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas	Communist Party of Greece	KKE	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Synaspismós Rizospastikis Aristerás	Syriza - The Coalition of the Radical Left	SYRIZA	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Anexartitoi Ellines	Independent Greeks	ANEL	1	0	0	1	0	0	
Dimokratiko Koinoniko Kinima	Democratic Social Movement	DIKKI	1	0	1	1	0	0	
Laïkós Orthódoxos Synagermós	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Laikos Syndesmos - Chrysi Avg	Golden Dawn	Golden Dawn	0	1	0	1	0	0	
Oikológoi Enallaktikoí	Alternative Ecologists	OE	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Politiki Anixi	Political Spring	POLAN	1	1	0	0	0	0	
Synaspismós tis Aristerás	Synaspismos - The Coalition of the Left	SYN	1	0	1	1	0	0	
Hungary									0
Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség	Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance	FIDESZ	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary	Jobbik	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	Christian Democratic People's Party	KDNP	0	1	0	1	1	0	
Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség / Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Party / Christian Democratic People's Party	Fi + KDNP	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	MIÉP	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Magyar Munkáspárt	Hungarian Worker's Party	MMP	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Mi Hazánk Mozgalom	Our Homeland Movement	MH	1	1	0	1	0	0	

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Iceland									1
Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn	Independence Party	Sj	0	0	0	1	1	0	
Framsóknarflokkurinn	Progressive Party	F	0	0	0	1	1	1	
Flokkur fólksins	People's Party	FIF	1	0	0	1	1	1	
Miðflokkurinn	Centre Party	M	1	0	0	1	1	0	
Alþýðubandalagið	People's Alliance	Ab	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Borgarahreyfingin - Hreyfingin	Civic Movement - The Movement	B - H	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Frjálslyndi flokkurinn	Liberal Party	Ff	0	0	0	1	0	0	
Ireland									1
Sinn Féin	Sinn Féin	SF	1	0	1	1	1	1	
People Before Profit Alliance	People Before Profit Alliance	PBPA	0	0	1	1	1	1	
Democratic Left	Democratic Left	DLP	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Sinn Féin The Workers' Party	Sinn Féin The Workers' Party	SFWP	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Socialist Party	Socialist Party (Ireland)	SP	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Italy									0
Forza Italia - Il Popolo della Libertà	The People of Freedom / Forza Italia (FI)	FI / PdL	1	0	0	0	1	0	
Fratelli d'Italia - Centrodestra Nazionale	Brothers of Italy	FdI	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Lega (Nord)	(Northern) League	LN	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Movimento 5 Stelle	Five Star Movement	M5S	1	0	0	1	1	0	
Sinistra	Left Ecology Freedom / Left	SEL / L	0	0	1	0	1	0	
Fiamma Tricolore	Tricolor Flame Social Movement	MSFT	0	1	0	1	0	0	
Il Popolo della Libertà	The People of Freedom / Forza Italia (FI)	PdL	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Lega d'Azione Meridionale	Southern Action League	LAM	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Liga Veneta	Venetian League	LV	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Movimento Sociale Italiano	Italian Social Movement	MSI	0	1	0	0	0	0	
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani	Party of the Italian Communists	PdCI	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Partito della Rifondazione Comunista	Communist Refoundation Party	PRC	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Rivoluzione Civile	Civil Revolution	RC	0	0	1	1	0	0	

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Latvia									0
Kam pieder valsts?	Who owns the state?	KPV LV	1	0	0	1	1	0	
Jaunais Laiks	New Era	JL	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Latvijas Komunistiska partija	Communist Party of Latvia	LKP	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Latvijas Socialistiska partija	Socialist Party of Latvia	LSP	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Latvijas Vienibas Partija	Latvian Unity Party	LVP	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Reformu partija	Reform Party	ZRP	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Tevzemei un Brivibai	For Fatherland and Freedom	TB	0	1	0	0	0	0	
Lithuania									1
Darbo Partija	Labour Party	DP	1	0	0	0	0	1	
Laisvė ir Teisingumas	Freedom and Justice	LT	0	0	0	1	1	0	
Lietuvos Centro Partija	Lithuanian Centre Party	LCP	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Tvarka ir teisingumas - Liberalu Demokratu Partija	Order and Justice	TT	1	0	0	1	0	0	
Drasos Kelias	The Way of Courage	DK	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Jaunoji Lietuva	Young Lithuania	JL	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Lietuviu tautininku sajunga	Lithuanian National Union List	LTS	0	1	0	1	0	0	
Lietuvos komunistu partija	Communist Party of Lithuania	LKP	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Lietuvos komunistu partija TSKP platformoje	Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform	TSKP	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Lietuvos laisves sajunga	Lithuanian Liberty Union	LLaS	1	0	1	1	0	0	
Socialist People's Front	Socialist People's Front	SPF / Fronto	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Tautos prisikelimo partija	National Resurrection Party	TPP	1	0	0	0	0	0	

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Luxembourg									0
Aktionskomitee Rente - Comité d'action pensions | Alternativ Demo -kratesch Reformpartei - Parti réformiste d'alternative démocratique	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	ADR	1	0	0	1	1	0	
Déi Lénk - La Gauche - Die Linke	The Left (Luxembourg)	Dei Lenk	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Kommunistesch Partei Lëtzebuerg - Parti Communiste Luxembourg -eois - Kommunistische Partei Luxemburg	Communist Party of Luxembourg	KPL	0	0	1	1	0	0	
National Bewegung	National Movement	NB	0	1	0	1	0	0	
Netherlands									1
Partij voor de Vrijheid	Party for Freedom	PVV	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Socialistiese Partij	Socialist Party (Netherlands)	SP	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Forum voor Democratie	Forum for Democracy	FvD	1	1	0	1	1	1	
Partij voor de Dieren	Party for the Animals	PvdD	0	0	0	1	1	1	
Juiste Antwoord 2021	Correct Answer 2021	JA21	1	1	0	1	1	1	
Staatkunding Gereformeerde Partij	Political Reform Party	SGP	0	0	0	1	1	0	
50PLUS	50PLUS	50PLUS	0	0	0	1	1	0	
BIJ1	Together	BIJ1	0	0	1	0	1	1	
Centrum Democraten	Centre Democrats	CD	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond	Reformed Political League	GPV	0	0	0	1	0	0	
Leefbaar Nederland	Liveable Netherlands	LN	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Lijst Pim Fortuyn	Fortuyn List	LPF	1	0	0	1	0	0	
Norway									1
Senterpartiet	Centre Party	SP	0	0	0	1	1	1	
Fremskrittspartiet	Progress Party (Norway)	FrP	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Sosialistisk Venstreparti	Socialist Left Party	SV	0	0	1	1	1	1	
Rød Valgallianse	Red Party	Rodt	0	0	1	1	1	1	
Kristelig Folkeparti	Christian Democratic Party	KrF	0	0	0	1	1	0	
Kystpartiet	Coastal Party	Kp	1	0	0	1	0	0	

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Poland									0
Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja	Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic - Liberty and Hope	KORWiN	0	1	0	1	1	0	
Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja KORWiN	Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic - Liberty and Hope (KORWiN)	ZRP	0	1	0	1	1	0	
Kukiz'15	Kukiz'15	Kukiz'15	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Lewica Razem	Left Together	LR	0	0	0	0	1	0	
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc	Law and Justice	PiS	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Ruch Narodowy	National Movement	RN	0	1	0	1	1	0	
Liga Polskich Rodzin	League of Polish Families	LPR	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Partia Razem	Together Party	Razem	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Partia X	Party X	X	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza	Polish United Workers' Party	PZPR	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Polski Zwiazek Zachodni	Polish Western Union	PZZ	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Ruch Odbudowy Polski	Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland	ROP	0	1	0	1	0	0	
Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej	Self-Defense of the Republic Poland	SRP	1	0	0	1	0	0	
Unia Polityki Realnej | Kongres Nowej Prawicy	Real Politics Union | Congress of the New Right	UPR | KNP	0	1	0	1	0	0	
Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe	Christian National Union	ZChN	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Portugal									1
Bloco de Esquerda	Left Bloc	BE	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Chegal	Enough	CH	1	1	0	1	1	1	
Coligação Democrático Unitária	Unitary Democratic Coalition (PEV & PCP)	CDU	0	0	1	1	1	0	

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Romania									1
Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor	Alliance for the Union of Romanians	AUR	1	1	0	0	1	1	
Partidul Poporului - Dan Diaconescu	People's Party - Dan Diaconescu	PPDD	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Partidul România Mare	Greater Romania Party	PRM	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Partidul România Unita	United Romania Party	PRU	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Partidul Socialist al Muncii	Socialist Party of Labour	PSM	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Partidul Socialist Democrat Român	Romanian Socialist Democratic Party	PSoDR	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Partidul Unitatii Nationale a Romanilor	Romanian National Unity Party	PUNR	1	1	0	0	0	0	
Slovakia									1
Obycajní ludia a nezávislé osobnosti	Ordinary People	OLANO	1	0	0	0	1	1	
Smer - sociálna demokracia	Direction - Social Democracy	Smer	1	0	0	0	1	0	
Sme Rodina - Boris Kollár	We are family	SR	1	1	0	1	1	1	
Ludová strana Naše Slovensko	Kotleba - People's Party Our Slovakia	ĽSNS	0	1	0	1	1	1	
Sloboda a solidarita	Freedom and Solidarity	SaS	0	0	0	1	1	0	
Slovenská národná strana	Slovak National Party	SNS	1	1	0	1	0	0	
VLASŤ	Homeland	VLASŤ	1	1	0	1	0	1	
Aliancia nového obcana	Alliance of the New Citizen	ANO	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Komunistická strana Slovenska	Communist Party of Slovakia	KSS	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Obcianska konzervatívna strana	Civic Conservative Party	OKS	0	0	0	1	0	0	
Pravá Slovenská národná strana	Real Slovak National Party	PSNS	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Strana občianskeho porozumenia	Party of Civic Understanding	SOP	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Združenie robotníkov Slovenska	Association of Workers of Slovakia	ZRS	1	0	1	1	0	0	

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Slovenia									0
Levica	The Left	L	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Lista Marjana Šarca	List of Marjan Sarec	LMS	1	0	0	0	1	0	
Slovenska Demokratska Stranka	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS	1	1	0	0	1	0	
Slovenska nacionalna stranka	Slovenian National Party	SNS	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Združena levica	United Left / The Left	ZdLe / L	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Socialisticna stranka Slovenije	Socalist Party of Slovenia	SSS	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Spain									0
Bloque Nacionalista Galego	Galician Nationalist Bloc	BNG	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Compromís | A la valenciana	Compromise | A la valenciana	C | AV	0	0	1	1	1	0	
En Comú Podem	In Common We Can	ECP	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Euskal Herria Bildu	Basque Country Unite	EHB	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Grupo Común da Esquerda	Common Group of the Left	GCdE	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Podemos	Podemos	Podemos	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Vox	Voice	Vox	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Chunta Aragonesista	Aragonese Council	CA	0	0	1	0	0	0	
En Marea	In Tide	EM	1	0	1	1	0	0	
Herri Batasuna	United People	HB	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Partido Communista | Izquierda Unida	United Left	IU	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Sweden									0
Sverigedemokraterna	Sweden Democrats	SD	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Vänsterpartiet (kommunisterna)	Left Party	V	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Ny Demokrati	New Democracy	NyD	1	1	0	0	0	0	

Original Party Name	English Party Name	Abbreviation	Populist	Far-right	Far-left	Eurosceptic	Has Seats	Increase in Support	Elections since Jan 2021
Switzerland									0
Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union - Union Démocratique Fédérale	Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland	EDU - UDF	1	0	0	1	1	0	
Lega dei Ticinesi	Ticino League	LdT	1	1	0	1	1	0	
Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz	Swiss Party of Labour	PDA	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Schweizerische Volkspartei - Union Démocratique du Centre	Swiss People's Party	SVP	1	1	0	1	1	0	
solidaritéS	Solidarity	S	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Auto-Partei | Freiheitspartei der Schweiz	Automobile Party | Freedom Party of Switzerland	FPS	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Mouvement Citoyens Genevois	Geneva Citizens' Movement	MCR	1	1	0	1	0	0	
Nationale Aktion - Action Nationale | Schweizer Demokraten - Démocrates Suisses	National Action - Swiss Democrats	NA | SD	0	1	0	1	0	0	
Partito socialista autonomo	Autonomous Socialist Party	PSA	0	0	1	0	0	0	
United Kingdom									0
Conservatives	Conservatives	Con	0	0	0	1	1	0	
Democratic Unionist Party	Democratic Unionist Party	DUP	0	0	0	1	1	0	
Sinn Féin	Sinn Féin	SF	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Respect - The Unity Coalition	Respect - The Unity Coalition	R	1	0	1	1	0	0	
United Kingdom Independence Party	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP	1	1	0	1	0	0	

Table 9 - The Extended PopuList, Source: PopuList, 2022.

Variable data used in Stata:

Country	Year	Wage10	Wage10_Change	Wage50	Wage50_Change	Wage90	Wage90_Change	ELeftShare	ELeftShare-Change	ERightShare	ERightShare_Change	YearElections	TotalShare	TotalShare_Change	RedisPol_SA	RedisPol_SA_Change	NatAtt_SA012	NatAtt_SA012_Change
Austria	2006	642	X	2124	X	3702	X	0	X	23	X	2008	23	X	30,9	-1,5	15,1	-0,3
Austria	2010	660	2,8	2288	7,7	4024	8,7	0	0	18,6	-4,4	2013	18,6	-4,4	X	-1,5	X	-0,3
Austria	2014	710	7,6	2494	9	4386	9	0	0	21,9	3,3	2017	21,9	3,3	X	-1,5	X	-0,3
Austria	2018	1586	123,4	3066	22,9	4966	13,2	0	0	27,9	6	2019	27,9	6	29,4	-1,5	14,8	-0,3
Belgium	2006	1226	X	2438	X	3806	X	0	X	12	X	2007	12	X	26,9	-3,6	18,1	-7
Belgium	2010	1313	7,1	2749	12,8	4341	14,1	1,3	1,3	2,7	-9,3	2014	4	-8	X	-3,6	X	-7
Belgium	2014	1470	12	2956	7,5	4643	7	8	6,7	12	9,3	2019	20	16	X	-3,6	X	-7
Belgium	2018	1967	33,8	3360	13,7	5121	10,3	8	0	12	0	2019	20	0	23,3	-3,6	11,1	-7
Bulgaria	2006	84	X	193	X	353	X	0	X	12,9	X	2009	12,9	X	63,6	-22,6	21,5	7,9
Bulgaria	2010	132	57,1	332	72	601	70,3	0	0	12,5	-0,4	2014	12,5	-0,4	X	-22,6	X	7,9
Bulgaria	2014	179	35,6	420	26,5	757	26	0	0	16,3	3,8	2017	16,3	3,8	X	-22,6	X	7,9
Bulgaria	2018	267	49,2	608	44,8	1103	45,7	0	0	5,4	-10,9	2021	5,4	-10,9	41	-22,6	29,4	7,9
Croatia	2006	X	X	X	X	X	X	0	X	2,6	X	2007	2,6	X	X	X	X	
Croatia	2010	437	X	980	X	1616	X	4	4	4,6	2	2011	8,6	6	X	X	X	X	
Croatia	2014	457	4,6	1033	5,4	1689	4,5	0	-4	0,7	-3,9	2016	0,7	-7,9	X	X	X	X	
Croatia	2018	573	25,4	1179	14,1	1894	12,1	0	0	10,6	9,9	2020	10,6	9,9	36,9	X	23,4	X	
Cyprus	2006	782	X	1815	X	3284	X	33,9	X	0	X	2011	33,9	X	28,6	3,5	33,9	-7,2
Cyprus	2010	847	8,3	1980	9,1	3607	9,8	33,9	0	0	0	2011	33,9	0	X	3,5	X	-7,2
Cyprus	2014	764	-9,8	1798	-9,2	3216	-10,8	33,9	0	3,6	3,6	2016	37,5	3,6	X	3,5	X	-7,2
Cyprus	2018	898	17,5	1909	6,8	3446	7,2	26,8	-7,1	7,1	3,5	2021	33,9	-3,6	32,1	3,5	26,7	-7,2
Czech Republic	2006	341	X	714	X	1102	X	13	X	0	X	2010	13	X	X	X	X	
Czech Republic	2010	428	25,5	922	29,1	1448	31,4	16,5	3,5	7	7	2013	23,5	10,5	X	X	X	X	
Czech Republic	2014	416	-2,8	909	-1,4	1438	-0,7	7,5	-9	11	4	2017	18,5	-5	X	X	X	X	
Czech Republic	2018	631	51,7	1225	34,8	1862	29,5	0	-7,5	10	-1	2021	10	-8,5	15,7	X	26,1	X	
Denmark	2006	721	X	3062	X	5025	X	15,7	X	14	X	2007	29,7	X	11	0,9	11,7	0,3
Denmark	2010	815	13	3642	18,9	5983	19,7	15,7	0	12,3	-1,7	2011	28	-1,7	X	0,9	X	0,3
Denmark	2014	560	-31,3	3690	1,3	6295	5,2	12,3	-3,4	20,7	8,4	2015	33	5	X	0,9	X	0,3
Denmark	2018	2522	350,4	4473	21,2	6845	8,7	15,1	2,8	11,2	-9,5	2019	26,3	-3,7	11,9	0,9	12	0,3
Estonia	2006	211	X	599	X	1086	X	0	X	0	X	2007	0	X	30,4	-13,6	19	-2,7
Estonia	2010	295	39,8	777	29,7	1370	26,2	0	0	0	0	2011	0	0	X	-13,6	X	-2,7
Estonia	2014	379	28,5	999	28,6	1732	26,4	0	0	6,9	6,9	2015	6,9	6,9	X	-13,6	X	-2,7
Estonia	2018	530	39,8	1285	28,6	2272	31,8	0	0	18,8	11,9	2019	18,8	11,9	16,8	-13,6	16,3	-2,7
Finland	2006	1442	X	2466	X	3736	X	8,5	X	2,5	X	2007	11	X	31,3	-3,1	10,5	-0,8
Finland	2010	1600	11	2848	15,5	4314	15,5	7	-1,5	19,5	17	2011	26,5	15,5	X	-3,1	X	-0,8
Finland	2014	1789	10,6	3094	8,6	4701	9	6	-1	19	-0,5	2015	25	-1,5	X	-3,1	X	-0,8
Finland	2018	2104	10,9	3360	8,6	4990	6,1	8	2	19,5	0,5	2019	27,5	2,5	28,2	-3,1	9,7	-0,8
France	2006	1173	X	2342	X	3766	X	2,5	X	2,6	X	2007	5,1	X	43,8	-3,1	20	-2,9
France	2010	1112	-5,2	2400	2,5	3929	4,3	1,7	-0,8	0,3	-2,3	2012	2	-3,1	X	-3,1	X	-2,9
France	2014	1170	5,2	2603	8,5	4225	7,5	4,8	3,1	1,4	1,1	2017	6,2	4,2	X	-3,1	X	-2,9
France	2018	1566	33,8	2895	11,2	4611	9,1	4,8	0	1,4	0	2017	6,2	0	40,7	-3,1	17,1	-2,9
Germany	2006	560	X	2457	X	4327	X	12,2	X	0	X	2009	12,2	X	19,5	6,6	19,3	-11,3
Germany	2010	410	-26,8	2520	2,6	4587	6	10,1	-2,1	0	0	2013	10,1	-2,1	X	6,6	X	-11,3
Germany	2014	413	0,7	2620	4	4910	7	9,7	-0,4	13,3	13,3	2017	23	12,9	X	6,6	X	-11,3
Germany	2018	1600	287,4	3349	27,8	5563	13,3	5,3	-4,4	11,3	-2	2021	16,6	-6,4	26,1	6,6	8	-11,3
Greece	2006	761	X	1563	X	2718	X	11,3	X	5	X	2009	16,3	X	X	X	X	
Greece	2010	862	13,3	1744	11,6	2871	5,6	27,7	16,4	6	1	2012	33,7	17,4	X	X	X	
Greece	2014	606	-29,7	1511	-13,4	2500	-12,9	53,3	25,6	6	0	2015	59,3	25,6	X	X	X	
Greece	2018	488	-19,5	1356	-10,3	2344	-6,2	36,7	-16,6	3,3	-2,7	2019	40	-19,3	X	X	X	
Hungary	2006	251	X	608	X	1035	X	0	X	80,3	X	2010	80,3	X	53,4	-7,6	40,7	-7,1
Hungary	2010	320	27,5	729	19,9	1288	24,4	0	0	78,4	-1,9	2014	78,4	-1,9	X	-7,6	X	-7,1
Hungary	2014	382	19,4	774	6,2	1309	1,6	0	0	78,4	0	2018	78,4	0	X	-7,6	X	-7,1
Hungary	2018	502	31,4	996	28,7	1644	25,6	0	0	78,4	0	2018	78,4	0	45,8	-7,6	33,6	-7,1
Iceland	2006	658	X	2891	X	5256	X	0	X	0	X	2009	0	X	X	X	X	
Iceland	2010	673	2,3	1996	-31	3386	-35,6	0	0	0	0	2013	0	0	X	X	X	
Iceland	2014	720	7	2535	27	4357	28,7	0	0	0	0	2017	0	0	X	X	X	
Iceland	2018	2675	271,5	4854	91,5	7516	72,5	0	0	0	0	2021	0	0	37,7	X	1,9	X
Ireland	2006	1029	X	3142	X	5542	X	2,4	X	0	X	2007	2,4	X	18,5	1,7	10,3	-1,3
Ireland	2010	1196	16,2	3274	4,2	5662	2,2	10,8	8,4	0	0	2011	10,8	8,4	X	1,7	X	-1,3
Ireland	2014	1205	0,8	3340	2	6005	6,1	18,4	7,6	0	0	2016	18,4	7,6	X	1,7	X	-1,3
Ireland	2018	1733	43,8	3760	12,6	6430	7,1	26,3	8,1	0	0	2020	26,3	8,1	20,2	1,7	9	-1,3

Italy	2014	1106	8	2337	6.6	3699	8.6	0	-5.9	24.9	20.6	2018	24.9	14.7	X	X	X	X				
Italy	2018	1486	34.4	2520	7.8	3819	3.2	0	0	24.9	0	2018	0	0	33.2	X		22.7	X			
Latvia	2006	129	X	431	X	827	X	0	X	8	X	2010	8	X	X	X	X	X				
Latvia	2010	180	39.5	573	32.9	1058	27.9	0	0	14	6	2011	14	6	X	X	X	X				
Latvia	2014	226	25.6	692	20.8	1270	20	0	0	17	3	2014	17	3	X	X	X	X				
Latvia	2018	490	116.8	1158	67.3	2000	57.5	0	0	13	-4	2018	13	-4	41.7	X		11.9	X			
Lithuania	2006	175	X	441	X	806	X	0	X	0	X	2008	0	X	X	X	X	X				
Lithuania	2010	213	21.7	525	19	953	18.2	0	0	0	0	2012	0	0	X	X	X	X				
Lithuania	2014	272	27.7	640	21.9	1144	20	0	0	0	0	2016	0	0	X	X	X	X				
Lithuania	2018	453	66.5	970	51.6	1611	40.8	0	0	0	0	2020	0	0	41	X		15.6	X			
Luxembourg	2006	1402	X	3112	X	5325	X	1.7	X	0	X	2009	1.7	X	X	X	X	X				
Luxembourg	2010	1620	15.5	3501	12.5	6043	13.5	3.3	1.6	0	0	2013	3.3	1.6	X	X	X	X				
Luxembourg	2014	1910	17.9	3913	11.8	6809	12.7	3.3	0	0	0	2018	3.3	0	X	X	X	X				
Luxembourg	2018	2315	21.2	4630	18.3	8090	18.8	3.3	0	0	0	2018	3.3	0	X	X	X	X				
Netherlands	2006	288	X	1917	X	3488	X	10	X	16	X	2010	26	X		15.8	0.4	9.3		-2.4		
Netherlands	2010	379	31.6	2281	19	4191	20.2	10	0	10	-6	2012	20	-6	X		0.4	X		-2.4		
Netherlands	2014	1432	277.8	2964	29.9	4747	13.3	9.3	-0.7	14.7	4.7	2018	24	4	X		0.4	X		-2.4		
Netherlands	2018	1510	5.4	3076	3.8	4926	3.8	6.7	-2.6	18.7	4	2020	25.4	1.4		16.2	0.4	6.9		-2.4		
Norway	2006	1259	X	3546	X	5670	X	6.5	X	24.3	X	2009	30.8	X		17.1	6.3	8.7		-1.8		
Norway	2010	1176	-6.6	3987	12.4	6546	15.4	4.1	-2.4	17.1	-7.2	2013	21.2	-9.6	X		6.3	X		-1.8		
Norway	2014	1307	11.1	4403	10.4	7325	11.9	7.1	3	16	-1.1	2017	23.1	1.9	X		6.3	X		-1.8		
Norway	2018	2877	120.1	4743	7.7	7012	-4.3	12.4	5.3	12.4	-3.6	2020	24.8	1.7		23.4	6.3	6.9		-1.8		
Poland	2006	237	X	648	X	1112	X	0	X	36.1	X	2007	36.1	X		30.5	-5.9	11.5		-1		
Poland	2010	330	39.2	793	22.4	1316	18.3	0	0	34.1	-2	2011	34.1	-2	X		-5.9	X		-1		
Poland	2014	402	21.8	946	19.5	1617	22.9	0	0	60.2	26.1	2015	60.2	26.1	X		-5.9	X		-1		
Poland	2018	508	26.4	1105	16.6	1803	11.5	0	0	53.5	-6.7	2019	53.5	-6.7		24.6	-5.9	10.5		-1		
Portugal	2006	448	X	1135	X	2247	X	13.5	X	0	X	2009	13.5	X		41.7	-4.9	17.5		-11.1		
Portugal	2010	523	16.7	1231	8.5	2378	5.8	10.4	-3.1	0	0	2011	10.4	-3.1	X		-4.9	X		-11.1		
Portugal	2014	551	5.4	1209	-1.8	2277	-4.2	15.7	5.3	0	0	2015	15.7	5.3	X		-4.9	X		-11.1		
Portugal	2018	680	23.4	1293	6.9	2330	2.3	13.5	-2.2	0.4	0.4	2019	13.9	-1.8		36.8	-4.9	6.4		-11.1		
Romania	2006	108	X	332	X	607	X	0	X	0	X	2008	0	X	X	X	X	X				
Romania	2010	171	58.3	444	33.7	803	32.3	0	0	0	0	2012	0	0	X	X	X	X				
Romania	2014	203	18.7	512	15.3	934	16.3	0	0	0	0	2016	0	0	X	X	X	X				
Romania	2018	412	103	951	85.7	1686	80.5	0	0	10	10	2021	10	10	X	X	X	X				
Slovakia	2006	240	X	519	X	834	X	0	X	6	X	2010	6	X		33	1.1	19.2		16.7		
Slovakia	2010	356	48.3	758	46.1	1223	46.6	0	0	0	-6	2012	0	-6	X		1.1	X		16.7		
Slovakia	2014	412	15.7	908	19.8	1497	22.4	0	0	26.7	26.7	2016	26.7	26.7	X		1.1	X		16.7		
Slovakia	2018	580	40.8	1164	28.2	1866	24.6	0	0	22.7	-4	2020	22.7	-4		34.1	1.1	35.9		16.7		
Slovenia	2006	541	X	1198	X	2039	X	0	X	36.7	X	2008	36.7	X		32.3	6.8	25.4		-0.6		
Slovenia	2010	734	35.7	1470	22.7	2442	19.8	0	0	28.9	-7.8	2011	28.9	-7.8	X		6.8	X		-0.6		
Slovenia	2014	789	7.5	1571	6.9	2605	6.7	6.7	6.7	23.3	-5.6	2014	31	1.1	X		6.8	X		-0.6		
Slovenia	2018	879	11.4	1719	9.4	2792	7.2	10	3.3	32.2	8.9	2018	42.2	11.2		39.1	6.8	24.8		-0.6		
Spain	2006	726	X	1597	X	2697	X	0.6	X	0	X	2008	0.6	X		34.5	-3.6	10.7		0.3		
Spain	2010	743	2.3	1775	11.1	3079	14.2	3.1	2.5	0	0	2011	3.1	2.5	X		-3.6	X		0.3		
Spain	2014	696	-6.3	1829	3	3224	4.7	20.3	17.2	0	0	2016	20.3	17.2	X		-3.6	X		0.3		
Spain	2018	1061	52.4	2043	11.7	3400	5.5	10	-10.3	14.9	14.9	2019	24.9	4.6		30.9	-3.6	11		0.3		
Sweden	2006	1271	X	2510	X	3793	X	6.3	X	0	X	2006	6.3	X		19.1	-1.9	11.5		-2.3		
Sweden	2010	1454	19.8	2809	11.9	4222	11.3	5.4	-0.9	5.7	5.7	2010	11.1	4.8	X		-1.9	X		-2.3		
Sweden	2014	1706	17.3	3286	17	4957	17.4	6	0.6	14	8.3	2014	20	8.9	X		-1.9	X		-2.3		
Sweden	2018	2335	36.9	3488	6.1	4933	-0.5	8	2	17.8	3.8	2018	25.8	5.8		17.2	-1.9	9.2		-2.3		
Switzerland	2006	X	X	X	X	X	X	0.5	X	31.5	X	2007	32	X		22.4	-3.9	7.5		-2.4		
Switzerland	2010	1249	X	4112	X	6921	X	0	-0.5	28.5	-3	2011	28.5	-3.5	X		-3.9	X		-2.4		
Switzerland	2014	1559	24.8	5103	24.1	8515	23	0.5	0.5	34	5.5	2015	34.5	6	X		-3.9	X		-2.4		
Switzerland	2018	1852	18.8	5624	10.2	9729	14.3	1	0.5	27	-7	2019	28	-6.5		18.5	-3.9	5.1		-2.4		
United Kingdom	2006	719	X	2893	X	5256	X	0.8	X	0	X	2010	0.8	X		14.2	8.5	23.8		-13.9		
United Kingdom	2010	600	-16.6	2504	-13.4	4582	-12.8	0.8	0	0	0	2010	0.8	0	X		8.5	X		-13.9		
United Kingdom	2014	724	20.7	2795	11.6	5090	11.1	1.1	0.3	0	0	2017	1.1	0.3	X		8.5	X		-13.9		
United Kingdom	2018	1556	114.9	3258	16.6	5482	7.7	1.1	0	0	0	2019	1.1	0		22.7	8.5	9.9		-13.9		

Table 10: Variable data used in Stata.