Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance: Assessing the Popular Legitimacy of International Climate Policymaking

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (henceforth the Convention) constitutes the main intergovernmental forum for multilateral climate negotiations (Kaya & Schofield, 2020: 478). These annual conferences are an opportunity for national delegations, as well as UN bodies and organisations, to review progress made towards the goals of the Convention, principally, the stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions (UNFCCC, n.d.). With the proliferation of global environmental conferences since the 1970s and international climate change treaty negotiations since the 1990s, the denationalisation of climate policymaking has to a certain extent become "reflexive" (Zürn, 2004: 262). However, when policymaking takes place at this level, it is far away from the domestic audiences who are significantly affected by the decisions made (Steffek & Ferretti, 2009: 39-40). In the field of the environment, the "intrusion" of global governance into national settings has consequently politicised the issue of international policymaking and established potential for resistance (Zürn, 2004: 261-262).

Where legitimacy can be defined as the belief that political institutions are, "the most appropriate and proper ones for the society," (Lipset, 1983: 64), global environmental governance is currently believed to suffer from a "legitimacy deficit" (Biermann & Gupta, 2011). As such, although demand for climate action has peaked in recent years (McGrath, 2021), when it comes to the institutions and regulations determining international climate policy, public support is muted. The disconnect between individuals and "executive multilateralism" is important, considering that the refusal of national publics to accept supranational regulation significantly limits the capacity of institutions to obtain compliance with internationally agreed-upon goals (Zürn, 2004: 283-284). With regards to one of the most pressing global challenges of our time, climate change, this is particularly problematic considering that the negotiation of a legally-binding and effective international treaty on climate change remains an overarching goal (Lövbrand et al., 2017: 581).

One proposed method for increasing the popular legitimacy of global governance is to include civil society actors in international policymaking processes (Scholte, 2011). Civil society is comprised of a range of characteristically non-profit organisations and networks, that seek to influence the rules and institutions shaping society (Bernauer et al., 2013: 88), by better representing the interests and more specifically, the "progressive values," of the people

(Anderson & Rieff, 2005: 29). Civil society actors include but are not limited to: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), labour unions, social movements, and knowledge-based institutions (Bernauer et al., 2013: 88). While the influence of these non-state actors on international policymaking, just as the legitimacy of global governance, has independently become the subject of significant academic debate, relatively few studies have engaged with civil society's effect on the *popular legitimacy* of global climate governance (Anderson et al., 2017: 1).

Furthermore, research conducted on this topic has not engaged with the profound societal changes that have occurred globally since the Paris Agreement was drafted in December 2015. Non-state actors, including civil society representatives, have increasingly been formalised as observers of international climate negotiations and in some cases even as participants, in the national delegations present at these occasions (Allan, 2020). In part, this aligns with the broader shift brought in by the Paris Agreement towards a "catalytic" model of international climate action (Hale, 2016: 13) in which non-state actors have a prescribed role in "agenda-setting, monitoring, and implementation" (Bäckstrand et al., 2021: 3).

Simultaneously, the boundaries between climate activism and policy engagement have been in flux since the signing of the Paris Agreement. The burgeoning of the 'climate justice movement' has reignited climate activism and generated a surge of interest in global climate politics. One example of this is the emergence and exponential growth of new social movements focussed on climate action, such as the youth-led 'Fridays for Future' movement. (Bäckstrand et al., 2017: 564). These networks of individuals and groups appear to be bridging the divide between activism and policymaking, by formulating concrete policy demands and increasingly making use of 'inside' or lobbying strategies that have commonly been associated with more established civil society actors such as NGOs (Corry & Reiner, 2021).

In light of these significant societal shifts, this thesis employs an explanatory study to empirically test the cause-and-effect relationship between civil society's inclusion in national delegations at international climate negotiations and public support for global climate governance. The research project is guided by the question: "*How does the inclusion of civil society affect the popular legitimacy of global climate governance?*" By conducting online survey experiments, this quantitative research project replicates to a certain extent, the study

carried out by Thomas Bernauer and Robert Gampfer (2013). As such, the primary objective of this thesis is to test the findings of these authors, as to the effect of including civil society organisations (CSOs) on the popular legitimacy of global environmental governance. The study aims to do so within the challenging research context of Germany, which has a strong civil society (CIVICUS Monitor, 2022) yet continues to underperform on its climate-related targets (Umweltbundesamt, 2022). As the most populated Member State of the European Union (EU), conducting research in Germany offers a proxy for understanding perceptions of global governance within similar, particularly European, democratic states.

In addition, beyond identifying the effect of including CSOs, the thesis also fills a research gap where it seeks to further analyse the specific characteristics that shape civil society's influence on the popular legitimacy of global climate governance. This includes the effect of different types of civil society actors – namely traditional CSOs such as environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs), as well as social movements, and actors independent from government funding – on public support for global climate governance. With these research objectives in mind, this study adopts a deductive approach in proposing eight research hypotheses before empirically testing the theoretical expectations underpinning these and assessing the quality of the predictions made. Beyond contributing to the broader literature on global governance legitimacy, it is the ambition of this thesis that the findings of this study also inform policy recommendations. Indeed, where legitimacy is regarded as imperative for effective environmental policy (Patt & Weber, 2014), civil society's inclusion in global governance could provide a thus far underutilised approach to addressing collective issues such as climate change.

To this end, the results of this thesis suggest that nation-states – along with the multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) through which states coordinate international environmental policy – could benefit from including CSOs in global climate governance. While the study's findings indicate the positive influence of these actors generally on the popular legitimacy of global governance, it is through the enhancement of output legitimacy that CSO inclusion is found to have a particularly strong effect. In other words, including CSOs in the national delegations present at international climate negotiations is perceived by individuals to facilitate effective policy outcomes, through enhancing the expertise and technical skills required to locate solutions to the collective issue of climate change. Where

this effect was not found to be equal for all types of civil society representatives, the results of this thesis also demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between the type of civil society actors that should be included in global climate governance.

The structure of the thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 provides the **Literature Review**, which takes stock of existing research into the legitimacy deficit of global governance and the role of civil society in environmental governance, before identifying the research gap which this thesis aims to fill. This is followed by Chapter 3, which outlines the **Theoretical Framework** of the study including the eight hypotheses it proposes, as well as Chapter 4 which covers and defends the **Methodology** utilised. The **Results** of the quantitative study will be presented in Chapter 5, including those of two robustness checks. Building on this, Chapter 6 then provides a detailed **Discussion** of the empirical findings and the policy implications of these, as well as opportunities for future research, before Chapter 7 presents the **Conclusion**.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The following literature review situates this thesis within current academic work. It begins by taking stock of the breadth of the existing literature on the legitimacy deficit of global governance, before exploring the ongoing normative debate on the inclusion of civil society actors in global environmental governance. These two strands of literature, which are independently comprised of a wealth of theoretical and empirical research projects, will then be analysed in tandem to highlight the importance of research into civil society's influence on the legitimacy of environmental governance. The review concludes by locating the research gap filled by this thesis within the limited empirical studies investigating civil society's influence on the *popular legitimacy* of global climate governance, drawing on the social movements literature to highlight the timeliness of the study presented in this thesis.

2.1. The Legitimacy Deficit of Global Governance

Global governance is the system of formalised policymaking that takes place beyond the nation state and seeks to resolve issues requiring international cooperation (Steffek & Ferretti, 2009: 39-40). While "the *interdependence of states* is a constitutive characteristic of the modern state system," (Zürn, 2004: 262) it was the creation of international institutions which enabled the extension of activities previously consigned to the nation-state to the international level (Zürn, 2004: 263-264). As global governance necessarily encompasses the negotiation of policy far

away from affected domestic audiences, citizens feel detached from such processes and accordingly also from their outcomes. For this reason, governance at the global level is thought to represent "executive multilateralism," (Steffek & Ferretti, 2009: 39-40) where decision-making is removed from the realm of "democratic responsibility" (Zürn, 2004: 260). As such, it has further been argued that supranational democracy is a "chimera" due to the absence of many features of "political community" at the international level (Omelicheva, 2009: 113). This includes, the lack of public accountability, inclusivity, and participation in global governance (Steffek & Ferretti, 2009: 37). Where governance is said to hold "popular legitimacy," only if it is regarded as "justified" by the broader public (Bodansky, 1999: 601), these deficiencies underpin the "legitimacy deficit" of global governance (Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013: 439).

Existing research on global governance legitimacy has been characteristically normative with authors framing legitimacy in terms of acceptance (Alexander et al., 2017: 404) and emphasising input, process, and output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1997). Input legitimacy is a "political criterion" focussed on "government responsiveness" (Schmidt & Wood, 2019: 728). It refers, as such, to the "participation of the citizenry" in governance processes (Schmidt, 2013: 2) and more specifically, "how the interests of *relevant included actors* are represented" (Bäckstrand et al., 2021: 2). As the individuals negotiating issues at the international level are commonly "unelected technocrats," (Scholte, 2011: 3) a key indicator of input legitimacy is representation, or more specifically, "indirect representation" (Bexell et al., 2010: 86). This characteristic emphasises, in turn, the importance of process (sometimes referred to as throughput) legitimacy, which relates to the quality of the governance process itself (Schmidt, 2013: 2). Indeed, where input legitimacy reflects "participation *by* the people," process legitimacy concerns "consultation *with* the people" (Schmidt, 2013: 2). Hence, indicators of process legitimacy include normative benchmarks such as "accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness" (Schmidt & Wood, 2019: 730).

Input and process legitimacy – together referred to as *procedural legitimacy* – can be separated from a final, more substantive measure of legitimacy – output legitimacy (Bäckstrand et al., 2021: 3). Judged in terms of the effectiveness of governance "*for* the people," output legitimacy can be defined as the contribution of governance to the broader facilitation of policy outcomes (Schmidt & Wood, 2019: 728). In specific, output legitimacy hinges on the "*perceived*

effectiveness" of decision-makers among relevant stakeholders, in terms of their ability to solve complex problems (Biermann & Gupta, 2011: 1858). The importance of comparing the various types of legitimacy, specifically procedural with output legitimacy, has been emphasised in existing literature due to the concern that, "a fixation on efficiency can sideline and undermine democratic values," (Scholte, 2011: 16). As such, it is rather the accessibility and quality of governance processes, as well as the efficacy of their outcomes, that is regarded as central to an evaluation of the legitimacy of governance (Schmidt, 2013: 2-3).

The legitimacy of global *environmental* governance has become the subject of academic debate in line with the proliferation of global environmental conferences since the 1970s and international treaty negotiations since the 1990s (Bernauer & Betzold, 2012: 62). Global environmental governance includes all rules, policies, and institutions covering the international protection of the environment (UNEP, n.d.). In line with the broader trajectory of environmental awareness, climate change became a matter of global governance in the 1970s, when the idea that changes in the Earth's climatic conditions could be a result of human activity, first entered the political and social spheres (Jamison, 2010: 811). Subsequently, global responses to climate change began in the late 1980s, when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was made responsible for coordinating scientific input (Newell, 2011: 227). Nevertheless, it was not until the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed. It is under this framework that the annual COP meetings are held. The purpose of these engagements is to promote the implementation of the Convention by assessing national progress towards overarching climate objectives (UNFCCC, n.d.).

Noting the rising importance in world politics of environmental issues more broadly and climate change in particular, scholars have since engaged amongst others with the legitimacy of climate adaptation governance (Cashmore & Wejs, 2014), earth systems governance (Biermann & Gupta, 2011), and flood risk governance (Alexander et al., 2017). The findings of their research have highlighted several factors that influence the procedural and output legitimacy of global environmental governance. One such factor is the establishment of participatory policymaking (Stoll-Kleeman et al., 2001: 115) and more specifically, the involvement of civil society actors in policymaking processes (Scholte, 2011). This relationship is of particular relevance to global climate governance, considering the openness

of international environmental institutions to the access of non-state actors in terms of both information and participation (Bernstein, 2005: 148, 151).

2.2. Civil Society & Global Environmental Governance

Governance necessarily encompasses a transition away from state-led policymaking (Alexander et al., 2017). Indeed, in contrast to 'government', 'governance' has been associated with a blurring of the state and society (Orsini & Smith, 2010: 38). As environmental issues are characteristically more scientific and technical, it is logical that 'experts' including environmental non-governmental organisations, knowledge-based institutions, and broader epistemic communities play a particular role in environmental governance (Hale, 2020: 205). In practice, civil society appears to take on an increasing role in formulating and implementing environmental policy, as states have gradually sought to include non-state actors in their national delegations at international negotiations (Bernauer & Betzold, 2012: 62-63). This has stimulated a normative academic debate in which contemporary political theory has advocated for the enhanced presence of regular citizens within global governance (Steffek & Ferretti, 2009: 39).

Civil society actors contribute a number of functions to policymaking (Albin, 1999: 371), but their inclusion by state actors at the international level is explained by two overarching arguments. Firstly, civil society is regarded as a medium for democratisation (Pasha & Blaney, 1998: 418). Hence, the inclusion of civil society representatives makes international policymaking more connected and as a consequence more accountable to all domestic constituents (Albin, 1999: 382). Secondly, civil society contributes to the function, or more specifically the "epistemic quality," of decision-making (Steffek & Ferretti, 2009: 42). In other words, the resources, knowledge, and expertise of civil society organisations enhances the problem-solving capacity of governments, as they seek to solve international cooperative issues such as climate change (Nowrot, 1999: 592-593).

Despite the proposed virtues of incorporating civil society actors in policymaking, some scholars remain sceptical of the "normatively important functions of civil society participation" (Steffeck & Feretti, 2009: 56). The ability of civil society to democratise governance has been challenged on account of the authority that these actors derive for themselves (Sikkink, 2002: 306). Civil society organisations are perceived to act without a clear mandate or constituency

(Scholte, 2002: 163) having not been elected by the individuals that they claim to represent (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014: 129). Further to this, NGOs in particular are considered to reflect their own principles – inviting individuals to become constituents of these – rather than seeking out and representing the pre-existing ideals of the population (Anderson & Rieff, 2005: 29). These characteristics have the potential to undermine the accountability of CSOs, particularly if these organisations are not self-reflective and have limited mechanisms for rectifying harm caused by their conduct (Scholte, 2011: 39).

Scholars of interest group politics have further argued that CSOs cannot be disentangled from public or commercial spheres (e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2009). One particular source of concern regards the reliance of these organisations upon external funding from governments to ensure their survival, despite the dampening effect of this on CSOs' ability to criticise state in(action). It has been argued, that a maximum of 50% of the total funding, of an NGO for example, can be received from such external sources, before the organisation becomes the subject of heightened political pressure from government funders (Vincent, 2006: 25). Therefore, while "non-governmental" organisations in particular have the appearance of independence, they are frequently "de facto strongly connected with (and financially dependent on) state apparatuses" (de Souza, 2013: 258). Additionally, reflecting on the epistemic claims of CSOs, the contribution that these organisations can make depends upon their internal strengths including their strategies, leadership, and access to resources, which shape their problem-solving capacity (Böhmelt, 2012: 77). Relatedly, the inclusion of non-state actors has been accused of impairing, rather than contributing to, regime effectiveness by creating policy gridlock (Raustiala, 1997: 720).

Overall, scholars reasonably concede that states, rather than non-state actors, remain the central drivers of global governance (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009). Nevertheless, this ongoing normative debate on the value of civil society participation in environmental governance, has stimulated two decades of theoretical and empirical studies into the influence of civil society on environmental policymaking processes at the international level (e.g. Wapner, 1996; Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004; Betsill & Corell, 2008; Koubi et al., 2020). Much of the existing research has focussed on understanding whether and through which means ENGOs are able to influence global governance (see Albin, 1999). This focus is the result of the consistency with which organisations such as 'Friends of the Earth' and the 'World Wildlife

Fund' have pushed for positive climate action since the 1980s (Newell, 2011: 233). At the same time, such ENGOs continue to have the greatest access to international fora, in contrast to other non-state actors (Hale, 2020: 213).

The influence of CSO inclusion on the *popular legitimacy* of global environmental governance has, in comparison, received little scholarly attention. This is despite the fact that decisions made at the global level increasingly touch the lives of individuals, which widens the gap between those making decisions and the national publics which are affected by policy outcomes (Nasiritousi et al., 2016: 924). Linked to this, existing literature has highlighted that public opinion is a key determinant of policy changes, particularly in democratic countries. This is not least the case where public attitudes indicate the ease with which policy decisions made at the global level can be implemented at a national level (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016: 856). As such, it can be understood from the existing literature that the ability of CSOs to influence the popular legitimacy – or public support – of global environmental governance, could contribute to the formation and implementation of more effective climate policy.

2.3. Civil Society Inclusion & the Popular Legitimacy of Global Climate Governance

Existing research has utilised survey-embedded experiments to demonstrate the effect of including CSOs in international policymaking on the legitimacy of global environmental governance. These studies, which empirically test public support for global environmental governance, indicate the preference of individuals for the presence of civil society actors in international climate policymaking (e.g. Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013; Bernauer et al., 2016). Addressing the debate between procedural (input and process legitimacy) and output legitimacy, CSO inclusion has been demonstrated to have a statistically significant influence on both of these pathways. In addition, it has been observed from these studies that individuals pay the most attention to *changes* in the status quo of civil society inclusion, rather than static conditions. In other words, the inclusion or exclusion of CSOs from the national delegations present at international negotiations, increases or decreases public support respectively (Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013: 446).

While existing studies have pursued research within different political systems (e.g. Bernauer et al., 2016), projects have nonetheless centred around a limited number of countries as case studies including the US, India, and China (Anderson et al., 2017: 1). This has restricted the

generalisability of the findings. As such, a study that recreates the conditions of previous empirical research, but focusses its attention on a distinctly different, European context is needed. Due to its strong civil societies (CIVICUS Monitor, 2022) and ambitious climate goals, which are particularly challenging to implement at a national level (European Commission, n.d.), Europe is the region where a study into the relationship between these two elements can have significant policy implications.

Further to this, the aforementioned research projects have noted the preference of individuals regarding the inclusion of certain types of CSOs. In specific, it has been found that environmental non-governmental organisations are favoured over business groups (Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013). However, considering the multitude and varying characteristic of civil society actors operating in the field of environmental governance (Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004: 56), there is significant room to expand on these identified preferences. Hence, in addition to replicating the second experiment of Bernauer & Gampfer's (2013) study in analysing the effect of CSOs on the popular legitimacy of global climate governance, this thesis also investigates the role of specific characteristics in further shaping this influence. In specific, this thesis seeks to investigate both the effect of the (financial) independence of CSOs from governments, as well as the influence of including non-traditional actors – specifically social movements – on the potential relationship between civil society and popular legitimacy.

Although there is a lack of consensus on the definition of social movements, it is generally agreed within the existing literature that these are networks of individuals and organisations that often engage in collective action to achieve social change (Saunders, 2013: 6; Betzold, 2013: 308). Since the transnationalisation of environmental issues in the 1970s, social movements focussed on climate action have tended to be global in their reach, drawing participants from across borders together with a common language of "human interconnectedness" (Koukouzelis, 2017: 749). The rise of the 'climate justice movement' over the last decade, has given prominence to social movements, by rejuvenating the centrality of climate activism (Bäckstrand et al., 2017: 564). Indeed, social movements are distinctive in their ability to push the boundaries of what civil society means, where they frequently combine "revolutionary forces and energies" to challenge the status quo, rather than simply supplement the apparatuses of states (de Souza, 2013: 259). This characteristic does not, however, prevent social movements from engaging in the formal politics of decision-making (Saunders, 2014).

Particularly in the field of climate change, social activism intersects with "policy processes, knowledge production and insider expertise" (Corry & Reiner, 2021: 198).

In Germany, 'Fridays for Future' is one of the fastest growing social movements in the field of climate change, demanding more ambitious climate action at a national and international level. Originally associated with the 'climate strikes' of school children, the movement which continues to engage in 'outside lobbying' by mobilising people through rallies, boycotts, and non-violent civil disobedience (Tresch & Fischer, 2015: 356), has sought to bridge the gap between protest and policymaking by constructing policy demands in coordination with scientific experts (Fridays for Future, n.d.). Considering that the nexus between activism and policymaking remains an underexplored area of social movement literature (Corry & Reiner, 2021: 213), this revelation highlights the importance of expanding existing empirical research, by measuring the effect that social movements have on the popular legitimacy of global governance, in comparison to more 'traditional' CSOs.

Overall, noting several gaps in the existing literature, this review has identified the timeliness of this thesis which draws on the scholarship of global governance legitimacy, interest group politics, and social movements, to test and expand upon existing empirical research on the popular legitimacy of global climate governance in a new and challenging research context. Building on the concepts presented in this review, the following chapter presents the theoretical framework that will underpin the quantitative study of this thesis.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Civil Society Inclusion & Public Support for Global Climate Governance

This research project relies on a sociological understanding of legitimacy. As such, legitimacy is regarded as the "belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed" (Hurd, 1999: 381). In this relational model, governance draws legitimacy from its social relationship with the public, and primacy is given to the perceptions of individual citizens. From this model, it can be extrapolated that the more positive the public perception of an institution's governing right, the stronger its popular legitimacy (Bodansky, 1999: 601). The perceptions of individuals can be shaped by the substance of governance, as well as the procedure upon which it is founded (Hurd, 1999: 381).

Civil society contributes to legitimacy by strengthening the procedural characteristics of policymaking – procedural legitimacy, as well as by improving the performance of governance – output legitimacy (Biermann & Gupta, 2011: 1858). These two levers can be explained in turn by the theoretical contributions of democratic pluralism and functionalism. The former, explains the ability of CSOs to democratise governance processes. Corresponding with the "participatory and deliberative models of global democracy," (Nasiritousi et al., 2016: 926) democratic pluralism suggests that civil society actors can bridge the divide between international decision-making and national publics. As such, democratic pluralism explores not only civil society's enhancement of critical procedural characteristics (Willets, 2006: 315), but also the facilitation of "public dialogue between agencies of public governance and those affected" (Nasiritousi et al., 2016: 926). Functionalism meanwhile, highlights the contribution of CSOs to output legitimacy through their knowledge and expertise (Nasiritousi et al., 2016: 925) which facilitates more effective decision-making at the global level (Willets, 2006: 313).

It follows from these theoretical arguments, that if global governance's existing legitimacy deficit is attributable to deficiencies in the qualities outlined above and to the extent that these matter to individual perceptions of legitimacy, civil society's ability to enhance these qualities should increase public support for global climate governance (Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013: 439). Hence, where the inclusion of CSOs in national delegations is the independent variable, and public support – illustrative of the popular legitimacy of global climate governance – is the dependent variable, it can be hypothesised that:

H1: The inclusion of CSOs in national delegations at international climate negotiations increases public support for global climate governance.

3.2. Types of Legitimacy

Thus far, it has been hypothesised that public support for global climate governance is stronger if individuals regard the procedural (specifically 'input' and 'process'), as well as the 'output' aspects of governance, as legitimate (Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013: 439). However, beyond the more general measure of public support, the mediation channels through which CSOs shape individual perceptions of legitimacy are also of interest. In existing literature, three indicators are regarded as particularly suitable for quantifying this relationship and are therefore essential to compare. These are: representation, transparency, and expertise (Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013). Engaging with each of these indicators individually, allows for comparisons to be drawn

between civil society's influence on procedural legitimacy (representation and transparency) and output legitimacy (expertise).

Firstly, civil society contributes to input legitimacy – a key component of procedural legitimacy – by making governance more **representative**. Acting as a "social glue" (Yamin, 2002: 162), CSOs have a greater capacity at a local level and therefore better insight into constituents' views, compared to the technocrats that comprise state delegations in international climate negotiations (Hall & Deardoff, 2006: 71). This capacity allows civil society actors to sensitise states to issues that are overlooked by bureaucratic assessments (Raustiala, 1997: 727-728) as well as points of view that are left unheard within the "national systems of interest representation" (Hanegraaff & Poleti, 2018: 377). As such, CSOs are regarded as providing a "complementary channel" for citizen participation within the context of international institutions in which formal representation is lacking (Bexell et al., 2010: 86-87). By advocating in particular for marginalised individuals (Kaldor, 2003: 148) and future generations (Weiss, 1989), CSOs represent the "ideas and voices of stakeholders" (Bexell et al., 2010: 93). Therefore, civil society specifically provides "discursive representation" by gathering information and building consensus around positions (Keck, 2004: 45), which in turn offers state bureaucrats access to competing ideas (Böhmelt, 2012: 57). Overall, where representation is an additional outcome variable, it can be further hypothesised that:

H2: The inclusion of CSOs in national delegations increases public perceptions of the representativeness of global climate governance.

In addition, civil society further contributes to the procedural legitimacy of global governance by enhancing the **transparency** of the decision-making process, bargaining positions, and the motivations behind discarding alternatives. As it is commonplace for unelected bureaucratic agents to be included in the international institutions which are central to global climate governance, state decisionmakers at this level are only indirectly accountable to citizens through the governments they represent (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014: 32). In this context, CSOs can increase citizens' access to governance processes (Schmidt & Wood, 2019: 732) by rectifying information imbalances and urging visibility (Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013: 440). In specific, CSOs encourage "effective transparency" by making information not only available but understandable to all constituents, hence improving the quality of the governance process itself (Scholte, 2004: 218). Put differently, civil society acts as a "transmission belt" between

the domestic population and decisionmakers at the global level (Steffek & Nanz, 2007: 3). This in turn empowers all citizens to equally judge the effectiveness of governance considering that "transparency is a sine qua non of accountability" (Scholte, 2011: 16). Where transparency is an additional outcome variable, it follows that:

H3: The inclusion of civil society in national delegations increases public perceptions of the transparency of global climate governance.

Finally, it can be reasoned that civil society enhances the problem-solving capacity of governance, as CSOs specialise on single issues and bring certain **expertise** to policymaking processes (Finger & Princen, 1994: 35). Considering the scientific and technical characteristic of climate change issues (Hale, 2020: 205), civil society actors have the capacity to provide policymakers with research on the scientific, legal, and economic implications of environmental (in)action (Yamin, 2002: 157). This holds particularly true for knowledge-based institutions, although actors such as business associations can also provide cost-benefit analyses on highly complex challenges, in turn providing negotiators with higher bargaining power (Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013: 440-441). Altogether, fulfilling these functions is central to the output legitimacy of global governance, as they enable policymakers to understand policy alternatives and hence make more informed decisions (Böhmelt, 2012: 57). Therefore, where expertise is a fourth and final outcome variable, it can be hypothesised that:

H4: The inclusion of CSOs in national delegations increases public perceptions of the expertise of global climate governance.

3.3. Types of Civil Society Actors

Building on these core hypotheses, it can also be hypothesised that certain characteristics may influence the expected change in popular legitimacy after civil society's inclusion. Firstly, the effectiveness of global environmental governance depends upon a certain distance being maintained between decision-makers and representatives of the "deliberative public space" (Dryzek & Stevenson, 2011: 1869). Therefore, perceptions of CSO accountability are relevant with regards to the effect that including such actors has on governance legitimacy. Part of the legitimacy of CSOs is derived from their "no-compromise position on environmental issues," particularly surrounding "questions of health or livelihood" (Finger & Princen, 1994: 35). Hence, CSOs that maintain substantial independence from governments – including in terms

of funding – are regarded as more accountable, since they preserve their ability to criticise state (in)action (Omelicheva, 2009: 117).

External funding is particularly paramount to the survival and development of ENGOs which seek financial support from different sources including the public and private sectors. As these external sources are frequently "self-serving," they very often lead quite unconsciously to the political constraint of the organisation receiving funding (Vincent, 2006: 23). As such, limiting the extent of CSO reliance upon such funding streams is likely to pay-off in terms of the extent to which civil society can be seen as a democratising force on global governance. Further to this, it can be argued that, the less CSOs are constrained by considerations of national interest, the more they are able to better represent the welfare of citizens globally, which specifically contributes to the procedural legitimacy of global governance (Finger & Princen, 1994: 36). Consequently, where 'independent CSOs' is an additional independent variable:

H5: The increase in public support for global climate governance when CSOs are included in national delegations is higher when these are independent from government funding compared to when they are government-funded.

In addition, it follows from the arguments presented above, that the independence of CSOs from government funding is a characteristic that enhances the ability of these organisations to democratise governance procedures. Indeed, where "independence is a key element of a CSO's accountability regime," their (financial) freedom affords these organisations the flexibility to represent "societal concerns," while demanding visibility and accountability from decision-makers (Piewitt et al., 2010: 241). In other words, where the financial independence of CSOs from their respective governments safeguards the ability of these organisations to criticise state inaction, this characteristic boosts their capacity to act as "conscience-keepers" (Yamin, 2002: 154). In turn, where the independence of CSOs from government funding is expected to lead to enhancements in the individual perceptions of the transparency and representation of global governance, the independence of CSOs from government funding is expected to be associated with overall improvements in procedural legitimacy. Hence, it can further be hypothesised that:

H6: The increase in legitimacy when CSOs that are independent from government funding are included in national delegations is higher than non-independent CSOs in terms of procedural legitimacy rather than in terms of output legitimacy.

In addition to the influence that CSOs which are independent from government funding have on public support, it is expected that the inclusion of representatives from 'social movements' will also influence popular legitimacy. Further to the discussion of social movements in the previous chapter, these entities are frequently formed by marginalised people and are simultaneously "both local and global" (Koukouzelis, 2017: 753). This enables social movements to remain embedded in local communities, which increases their representativeness in comparison to "elite" NGOs whose proximity to those in power disconnects them from the constituents they seek to represent (Batliwala, 2002: 393, 398). These characteristics in turn provide movements with strong accountability mechanisms (CFFP, n.d.). Simultaneously, social movements frequently have a diverse membership base as well as support within a large part of the population (Vincent, 2006: 26). This arises from their informal approach to advocacy and their broader sets of goals, which garner more popular appeal (Vincent, 2006: 27). Overall, the breadth of their base and their decentralised nature, enables social movements to better embody "transnational citizen activism" which has a powerful democratising influence over international policymaking (Omelicheva, 2009: 109-110). It follows from this discussion, that where 'social movements' is an additional independent variable:

H7: The increase in public support for global climate governance when civil society actors are included in national delegations, is higher when these are representatives of social movements, compared to other civil society organisations.

Finally, it is argued that different civil society actors are better equipped to perform certain roles (Nasiritousi et al., 2014). Therefore, it can be anticipated that certain types of CSOs may influence one type of legitimacy more than another on account of their focus, resources, and skill-sets. Notable in the discussion preceding H7, is the perception of social movements as democratic actors (Vincent, 2006: 27). In specific, their contributions to state accountability and representation of a diverse range of voices, allows them to feed directly into the benchmarks of procedural legitimacy. However, on account of precisely these features, it is unlikely that social movements will be associated with an increase in output legitimacy. In contrast to more traditional CSOs, social movements tend to be decentralised and lack hierarchy, which impedes the speed and quality of their decision making (Vincent, 2006: 26). This is a result of the fact that social movements tend to operate on the margins of official politics and at the same time promote greater "communicative freedom," which prevents the streamlining of organised interests (Koukouzelis, 2017: 749). Indeed, the informal nature of

social movements entails their constant evolution, which not only prevents continuity in policy positions but in turn threatens their sustainability altogether (Vincent, 2006: 26). Such characteristics of social movements therefore risk the contribution that these networks can make to the problem-solving aspects of policymaking, despite their virtues as democratic actors. Hence, it can be hypothesised that:

H8: The increase in legitimacy when social movements are included in national delegations compared to the inclusion of CSOs is higher in terms of procedural legitimacy rather than output legitimacy.

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1. Research Design

As the objective of this thesis is to test the causal effect of civil society inclusion on individual perceptions of legitimacy, online survey experiments were a suitable way to collect primary data for analysis. While surveys are often utilised to examine public opinion, randomised control trials allow for the isolation of causal effects. Such experiments ensure that study conditions remain, on average, equal for all survey respondents and reduce the possibility of omitted variable bias through the random assignment of respondents to different experimental conditions (treatments) (Gallo, 2016). As a result, any difference observed for example in the mean of the dependent variable of interest, between the randomly assigned groups, can be attributed to the levels of the explanatory variable that has been controlled (Lavrakas, 2011: 347). From this, it is possible to draw internally-valid conclusions, with a high degree of confidence, from any causal relationships detected between the independent and dependent variables of interest (Druckman et al., 2011: 3). Despite the identified virtues of survey experiments, their strong internal validity and the establishment of experimental conditions does however come at a cost to the study's external validity, which in turn denotes the extent to which the findings of the research can be generalised from the sample to the population (Kalaian & Kasim, 2011: 255). This weakness will be discussed in greater detail in Part 4.4 which covers the sampling methods of the study.

The study's design is summarised in Table 1. Comparisons were drawn between treatment groups on all four of the outcome variables introduced in the previous chapter. The survey software Qualtrics and its 'randomiser' feature were used to ensure that all of the survey respondents had an equal chance of being confronted with any of the four vignettes. This is

important for the attribution of any effects observed in the data analysis, to the treatments (Knapp, 2011: 675). The four vignettes of this study vary on account of the type of actors included in the national delegation of Germany at a hypothetical international climate negotiation. This thesis is particularly interested in the participation of CSOs in national delegations since this form of inclusion is regarded as having a greater impact on policymaking (Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013: 446). Being part of a national delegation allows non-state actors to participate *inside* the formal venues of international negotiations, which surpasses any observer status (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014: 123-124).

	Control	**Treatment**
Comparison 1	'Government' delegation (**vignette 1**)	Government & 'CSOs' (**vignette 2**)
Comparison 2	Government & 'CSOs' (**vignette 2**)	Government & 'Independent CSOs' (**vignette 3**)
Comparison 3	Government & 'CSOs' (**vignette 2**)	Government & 'Social Movements' (**vignette 4**)

Table 1: Experimental Design

4.2. Case Selection

Existing research has predominantly collected data outside of Europe (e.g. Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013; Bernauer et al., 2016). Therefore, one of the main goals of this research project is to test existing theory in the European context, through the collection of data within the most populated EU Member State, Germany. Germany presents an interesting case study, as it ranks highly on the civil society index (CIVICUS Monitor, 2022), but has repeatedly failed to reach its climate goals (Umweltbundesamt, 2022). According to CIVICUS' State of Civic Space Monitor, Germany ranks in the highest group with an 'open' civil society. This ranking contrasts notably with the 'obstructed' civil society of the US, along with the 'repressed' and 'closed' civil societies of India and China respectively (CIVICUS Monitor, 2022). It is therefore anticipated, that the responses of German individuals could differ significantly from the responses of previous studies, due to the familiarity of German citizens with strong civil society actors.

At the same time, Germany presents an especially relevant case study for this research, due to the hesitance of the German government towards including CSOs in its national delegation at global climate negotiations. This is the case despite other similar states, such as Austria and Canada, having formalised the participation of a diversity of actors including youth delegates and activists from social movements in their national delegations (UNFCCC, 2021). As a result, any relationship identified between civil society's inclusion and the popular legitimacy of global climate governance has the potential for more meaningful policy implications in Germany.

It should be noted that while the unit of observation and analysis in this study is the individual, data from individual German respondents will be aggregated. This allows for analysis at a national level, while also serving as a proxy for understanding the attitudes of individuals living in other democratic, particularly European countries, that have strong civil societies and are similarly (in)active on addressing the issue of climate change.

4.3. Operationalisation & Measurement of Concepts

Table 2 provides a codebook which summarises the variables used in this research project. The main response variable in this study is support for climate policy (*overall_support*), which is operationalised as a standard 11-point Likert scale for measuring attitudes and is treated as a continuous variable. As the type of legitimacy affected by civil society's inclusion is of additional interest, there are three other outcome variables which cover perceptions of the delegation's representativeness (*representation*), its transparency (*transparency*), and finally its skills and expertise (*expertise*). These additional outcome variables are likewise operationalised as standard 11-point Likert scales and are also treated as continuous dependent variables.

The primary explanatory variables differ on account of the actors included in the delegation (*delegation_type*). In specific, this includes an all-government delegation (*government*), as well as a mixed delegation of government representatives and civil society organisations (*CSO*), CSOs that are independent from government funding (*independent_CSO*), and finally representatives of social movements (*social_movement*). All four of these independent variables are categorical and binary. The responses of German survey participants regarding their overall support for climate negotiations and their perception of the delegation's

transparency, representation, and expertise, will be compared between 'control' and 'treatment' groups.

Variable	Type	Description & Coding
overall_support (continuous)	Outcome	An additive 11-point Likert scale (0-10). The scale ranges from "no support" to "strong support".
representation (continuous)	Outcome	An additive 11-point Likert scale (0-10). The scale ranges from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".
transparency (continuous)	Outcome	An additive 11-point Likert scale (0-10). The scale ranges from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".
expertise (continuous)	Outcome	An additive 11-point Likert scale (0-10). The scale ranges from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".
delegation_type (ordinal categorical)	Explanatory (total)	Coded 1 for Vignette 1 (the all-government delegation); 2 for Vignette 2 (CSO delegation); 3 for Vignette 3 (independent CSO delegation); and 4 for Vignette 4 (social movement delegation).
government (binary)	Explanatory	Coded 1 if respondent received Vignette 1 (all-government delegation). Otherwise coded 0.
CSO (binary)	Explanatory	Coded 1 if respondent received Vignette 2 (CSO delegation). Otherwise coded 0.
independent_CSO (binary)	Explanatory	Coded 1 if respondent received Vignette 3 (independent CSO delegation). Otherwise coded 0.
social_movement (binary)	Explanatory	Coded 1 if respondent received Vignette 4 (social movement delegation). Otherwise coded 0.
age (binary)	Control	Coded 1 if respondent was 35 years of age or older. Coded 0 if respondent was 18-34 years of age. This variable was recoded from an ordinal categorical variable with seven levels.
gender (ordinal categorical)	Control	Coded 1 if respondent was female. Coded 2 if respondent was male. Coded 3 if respondent was non-binary/third gender.
location (binary)	Control	Coded 1 if respondents were from the "new" states of the former East Germany. Coded 0 for all other states (including Berlin). *(Appendix: Section A*).
education (binary)	Control	Coded 1 if respondent had received tertiary education (Bachelor, Master, or PhD). Coded 0 for primary and/or secondary education. All respondents received some level of education.
political_opinion (ordinal categorical)	Control	Coded 1 for left. Coded 2 for centre. Coded 3 for right.
climate_importance (continuous)	Control	An additive six-point Likert scale (0-5). The scale ranges from "not important at all" to "very important".
climate_action (continuous)	Control	An additive six-point Likert scale (0-5). The scale ranges from "not likely at all" to "highly likely".

Table 2: Codebook

In order to better compare the findings of this study to Bernauer and Gampfer's 2013 research project, the survey largely replicates the structure and content of their second between-group survey experiment. The full survey can be found in the *Appendix: Section B*, which includes a side-by-side translation from German to English considering that the survey was administered in the German language. All survey respondents received the same contextual paragraph highlighting the desire of the international community to negotiate a climate change agreement and the potential costs to Germany and its population associated with such an agreement. Respondents were then informed that, "*Germany will send a delegation to an international conference on climate change which is authorised to negotiate an international agreement on behalf of Germany*." The composition of the delegation depended on the vignette (V) that the respondent received. In all four vignettes, the delegation is "*led by 6 people*" to prevent any disparity in the size of the delegation between treatments from influencing respondents' perceptions. Both the size of the delegation and the type of actors included in the first two vignettes (V1 & V2) were identical to those of Bernauer & Gampfer's 2013 study, including the three CSO organisations: an ENGO, an association of businesses, and a university. The four vignettes read as follows:

V1: "*The delegation will be led by 6 people. All 6 are high-ranking members of the German national government*."

V2: "*The delegation will be led by 6 people. 3 high-ranking members of the German national government and 3 non-government representatives from:*

- *Germany's largest non-governmental environmental organisation;*
- *The largest association of private German businesses;*
- *A top German university."*

V3: "*The delegation will be led by 6 people. 3 high-ranking members of the German national government and 3 non-government representatives from:*

- *Germany's largest non-governmental environmental organisation;*
- *The largest association of private German businesses;*
- *A top German university.*

All of these organisations are independent of government funding."

V4: "*The delegation will be led by 6 people. 3 high-ranking members of the German national government and 3 climate campaigners from social movements including the youth-led 'Fridays for Future' movement.*"

Prior to reading the contextual paragraph and the respective vignette, participants were asked to respond to two subjective questions regarding their perception of the importance of climate change and their willingness to participate in 'climate actions' such as protests. While the former is highly likely to be associated with overall support for global climate governance, the latter is expected to suggest more positive perceptions of civil society's inclusion more generally and the role of social movements in particular. These questions were placed at the start of the survey to prevent respondents' answers from being influenced by the vignettes.

In addition, an attention check question was included in the survey prior to the vignette in order to filter 'careless' responses (Curran, 2016). Meanwhile, a manipulation question followed the questions pertaining to each of the four outcome variables, in order to ensure that participants were attuned to the actors present in the delegation while answering these. The survey concluded with demographic questions relating to age, gender, education, political orientation, and location of residence in Germany, in order to establish the baseline characteristics of respondents.

4.4. Sampling

Since estimates about the population of interest become more precise as the sample size increases, a large sample of 494 observations has been gathered. Responses were collected between 10th-19th April, 2022 through network (convenience) sampling and online subject recruitment through the Prolific crowdsourcing platform. As opposed to convenience sampling, the latter is considered comparable to lab studies in terms of its recruitment standards (Palan & Schitter, 2018: 23). Prolific has the advantage of recruiting a more demographically diverse sample by allowing for 'balancing on gender'.[1] Furthermore, the platform also allows for 'pre-screening,' so that participation could be restricted only to individuals of German nationality, located in Germany, and whose first language was German. 405 out of the total 494 participants in this study were recruited through Prolific, each receiving €0.60 for their

[1] At the time of writing, a "nationally representative sample" was not offered by Prolific for respondents located in Germany.

participation. The remaining sample, which was recruited from my own network, did not receive a monetary reward for their participation.

Convenience sampling is affected most prominently by sampling bias and thus it is recognised that the responses gained through this sampling method cannot be generalised to the entire population (Etikan et al., 2016: 2). Although less afflicted by this bias, responses gained through Prolific also come with limitations. Despite the option of using pre-screening and balancing by gender, Prolific's pool of participants is not representative of the national population of Germany and is generally biased towards higher-educated individuals with left-leaning political views. At the same time, it was expected that the provision of payment for responses could encourage participants to engage in satisficing behaviour by providing answers quickly (Bogner & Landrock, 2016: 1). This motivated the inclusion of an attention and manipulation check in the survey, to limit the impact of this behaviour. As no sample can be considered fully random (O'Muircheartaigh, 2008: 299), the data collected through each sampling method – convenience and Prolific – will be isolated with a modification of the regression specifications, in order to ensure the robustness of the data analysis (Lu & White, 2014: 194).

Overall, after excluding respondents that did not consent to the ethics form or who failed the attention and/or manipulation checks, the final sample taken forward to the data analysis stage was comprised of 476 participants. This final *n*-value falls within the pre-established lower (n=256 in case of the effect size equal to 0.5) and upper bounds (n=704 in case of the effect size equal to 0.3) of the required sample. These bounds were determined through two-tailed t-tests with a significance level of 5% and a statistical power of 80%. The final sample allows for moderate differences to be detected between the treatment groups.

4.5. Data Analysis

The data collected was analysed with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. This is an appropriate method due to the larger size of the dataset, which allows for reliable results to be obtained through OLS. Furthermore, the operationalisation of the response variables as standard 11-point Likert scales and continuous variables is also appropriate for OLS regression analysis. As this thesis seeks to understand how civil society affects climate policy, OLS allows for the quantification of the magnitude of association between the independent and dependent

variables of interest (Braumoeller & Sartori, 2002, 142). The distribution of the total sample between the various treatment groups can be found in Table 3.

Treatments	Occurrence	Percentage
Vignette 1: Government	121	25.4%
Vignette 2: CSOs	122	25.6%
Vignette 3: Independent CSOs	116	24.4%
Vignette 4: Social Movements	117	24.6%
TOTAL	476	100%

Table 3: Distribution of Respondents by Treatment Group

The statistical software 'R' was used to conduct the data analysis, in order to ensure research replicability.[2] After downloading the combined dataset of responses collected through Prolific and convenience sampling from Qualtrics, the dataset was cleaned and the covariates of 'age', 'location', 'education', and 'political orientation' were transformed into binary variables. From Table 4, it can be observed that the total sample (n = 476) is well-balanced between genders. The sample is predictably comprised of fewer participants from 'new states' which are those in former East Germany excluding Berlin. This is relatively well-aligned to the actual distribution of the German population between 'old' and 'new' states considering that the 'old states' which comprise of the original 11 states of the Federal Republic of Germany have a far higher combined population (Statista, 2022). The respondents' perceptions of climate importance are high, but there is nevertheless variation in this covariate with 10 respondents choosing "low" and 5 respondents choosing "very low" when asked about the importance of climate change. In comparison, there is however much more variation in respondents' willingness to participate in climate action and the highest percentage (29% of respondents) selected the option "unlikely".

The majority of participants (72.5%) were aged between 18 and 34. Just over half of the total sample (54.2%) received some form of tertiary education, while the sample is dominated (60.8%) by those who identify politically as "left-wing". These characteristics of the sample are undoubtedly a result of the sampling methods employed by this study. Those reached by network sampling tended to have these aforementioned characteristics, while Prolific's own base of potential survey respondents are regarded as being typically younger and better educated. This issue will be raised again within the discussion of the data analysis (Chapter 6).

[2] R-script available on request.

Variable	Government	CSO	Independent CSO	Social Movement	Total (%)
AGE					
18-34 years	87	89	83	86	345 (72.5%)
35+ years	34	33	33	31	131 (27.5%)
GENDER					
Female	60	61	61	57	239 (50.2%)
Male	59	61	51	59	230 (48.3%)
Non-binary	2	0	4	1	7 (1.5%)
LOCATION					
New states	13	14	18	9	54 (11.3%)
Old states	108	108	98	108	422 (88.7%)
EDUCATION					
Primary & Secondary	58	108	98	108	218 (45.8%)
Tertiary	63	68	63	64	258 (54.2%)
POLITICAL ORIENTATION					
Left	76	75	72	66	289 (60.8%)
Centre	36	40	37	45	158 (33.3%)
Right	9	6	7	6	28 (5.9%)
PERCEPTION OF CLIMATE IMPORTANCE					
Very high	95	78	79	74	326 (68.5%)
High	21	30	26	34	111 (23.3%)
Medium	1	8	8	7	24 (5%)
Low	3	5	1	1	10 (2.1%)
Very low	1	1	2	1	5 (1.1%)
WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN CLIMATE ACTION					
Very likely	6	12	18	6	42 (8.9%)
Likely	30	26	17	26	99 (21%)
Neither likely nor unlikely	29	31	30	28	118 (25%)
Unlikely	37	25	34	42	138 (29.2%)
Very unlikely	18	27	16	14	75 (15.9%)

Table 4: Demographic Characteristics by Treatment Group

The dataset has also been checked for balancing in demographics between treatment groups. Once again, it can be observed from Table 4 that demographic characteristics are well distributed between the four treatment groups. There are two exceptions to this. The first is the over-representation of individuals that attach the highest level of importance to the issue of climate change in the first treatment group (the all-government delegation). The difference in the variable of '*climate_importance*' was consequently found to be statistically significant at the 5% level in the test between 'government' and 'CSOs' (see *Appendix: Section C*). Additionally, non-binary individuals were under-represented in the second treatment group (CSOs) and over-represented in the third treatment group (independent CSOs). The difference

in '*gender*' was therefore found to be statistically significant at the 5% level in the test conducted between 'CSO' and 'Independent CSO' (see *Appendix: Section C*). These differences heighten the importance of controlling for the additional demographic variables in the multiple linear regression models. It should also be noted that when the same statistical tests were run to check the balancing of the sample excluding convenience sampling, the balancing of characteristics between treatment groups improved. In specific, the 'significant differences' in climate importance and gender were no longer significant. As such, a robustness check will be run in which participants recruited via convenience sampling will be excluded.

In order to compare the data in the way outlined in Table 1, the data has been divided into comparison subsets. The primary means utilised to understand whether there were differences in the outcome variables between the treatment groups were simple and multiple linear regressions. With regards to the simple linear regressions, the following estimation model is true of all comparisons where α represents the average of the outcome variables in the control group, β is the difference in outcomes between the control and treatment groups, x is the independent variable, and $\hat{y}$ the dependent variable:

$$\hat{y} = \alpha + \beta x_1$$

Each of the multiple regression analyses can be summed up with the following estimation model, where the control variables are added to the prior model:

$$\hat{y} = \alpha + \beta x_1 + \beta x_{2+} \ldots \beta x_8$$

With four experimental groups and four outcome variables, there was significant opportunity for conclusions to be drawn beyond the eight hypotheses outlined in the theoretical framework (chapter 3). As such, linear regressions were also run on the additional comparisons of government versus independent CSOs and government versus social movements.

5. RESULTS

This section presents the results of the simple and multiple OLS regression analyses that test the eight hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. Following Part 5.1, which presents descriptive statistics, Part 5.2 discusses the results of the simple and multiple linear regression analyses. First, Comparison 1 between the all-government delegation and the mixed delegation comprising of government and CSOs is analysed, with the discussion of Hypotheses 1 to 4. Afterwards, Comparison 2 addressing the effect of CSOs' financial independence from

government is analysed relating to H5 and H6, before Comparison 3 between CSOs and social movements will be discussed with regards to H7 and H8. The chapter concludes with two robustness checks. In the first robustness check, presented in Part 5.3, the responses collected via convenience sampling are excluded, before the regression analyses are run once again. In the second robustness check, a series of Mann-Whitney U tests are run on Comparisons 1, 2, and 3. The results of these tests are presented in Part 5.4.

5.1. Descriptive Statistics

Figures 1 through 4 provide an overview of the distribution of results for each of the four outcome variables across all treatment groups. At first sight, it appears that the control group (all-government delegation) could be perceived by individuals as the most legitimate, considering that its median as well as its mean are higher with regards to the overall support of individuals for global climate governance (Figure 1). The greatest variation between treatment groups appears in terms of perceptions of expertise (Figure 4). The highest overall mean across all treatments is that of overall support at 7.1 points on the Likert scale. For comparison, the lowest mean is that of representation at 5.7 points on the Likert scale, followed by expertise at 5.8, and transparency at 6.5. The medians across all treatments lie at 7 for overall support as well as for transparency, and 6 for representation and expertise.



Figure 1: Overall Support



Figure 2: Representation



Figure 3: Transparency



Figure 4: Expertise

The next section of this chapter will present the results of the simple and multiple linear regression analyses. A significance level of 5% was chosen to test the eight hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3. To ensure the robustness of the regression results, all seven of the control variables outlined in the previous chapter will be controlled for in the multiple regression models.

5.2. Results of the OLS Regression Analysis

First and foremost, this thesis is interested in testing the effect of including civil society organisations in Germany's national delegation to international climate negotiations on the support of individuals for global climate governance, as well as their perception of the delegation's representativeness, transparency, and expertise.

5.2.1 Government vs CSOs – Overall Support

With regards to the effect of CSOs on the overall support of global climate governance, Models 1 and 2 (Table 5) demonstrate the effect on public support when CSOs are included in the national delegation, compared to when the delegation is only comprised of government representatives. The negative coefficient for CSO inclusion in Model 1, is suggestive of the

negative relationship between the inclusion of CSOs and overall support for climate governance. The inclusion of CSOs leads to a 0.256-unit decrease on the Likert scale with regards to overall support. Although the coefficient becomes positive when the control variables are added to the baseline model (0.014), CSO inclusion is not shown to be a statistically significant explanatory variable in either model.

In contrast to CSO inclusion, the control variable of climate importance is a statistically significant explanatory variable in Model 2 ($p<0.01$). The positive coefficient suggests that the more importance an individual attaches to the issue of climate change, the more supportive they are of global climate governance. A one-point increase on the Likert scale with regard to climate change importance leads to a 1.375-unit increase in overall support. Although this finding does not directly respond to the research question of this thesis, the fact that it demonstrates an expected relationship confirms the validity of the study.

Overall, there is no evidence to support H1 in Model 1 or 2 and thus this hypothesis cannot be accepted.

5.2.2 Government vs CSOs – Representation

The results of Models 3 and 4 (Table 5) correspond to H2. As expected by the theory underpinning this hypothesis, there is a positive relationship between the inclusion of CSOs and individual perceptions of the delegation's representativeness – the first of two benchmarks of procedural legitimacy. While the inclusion of CSOs is significant at the 0.1 level in the simple linear model, when the control variables are added to the baseline, the coefficient increases and CSO inclusion is demonstrated to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In specific, including CSOs in the national delegation leads to a 0.617-unit increase on the Likert scale in perceptions of representation (Model 4). Once again, climate importance is a statistically significant variable ($p<0.01$) in the multiple linear regression model. Model 4 suggests that a one-point increase in individual perceptions of climate importance leads to a 0.869-unit increase on the Likert scale with regards to individual perceptions of the delegation's representativeness.

Due to the results of Model 3 and 4 differing with regards to the level at which CSO inclusion can be regarded as statistically significant, the robustness of these findings must be tested.

Nevertheless, it is possible to tentatively accept H2, which theorised that the inclusion of CSOs would positively affect individual perceptions of the delegation's representativeness.

Comparison One: Government vs CSOs

	Dependent variable:							
	Support		Representation		Transparency		Expertise	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Inclusion of CSOs	-0.256	0.014	0.489*	0.617**	0.154	0.337	0.965***	0.964***
	(0.258)	(0.226)	(0.277)	(0.267)	(0.288)	(0.285)	(0.321)	(0.318)
Climate Importance		1.375***		0.869***		0.809***		0.407*
		(0.174)		(0.206)		(0.220)		(0.245)
Climate Action		0.175		0.022		-0.205		0.187
		(0.110)		(0.131)		(0.139)		(0.155)
Age: 35+		-0.067		0.273		0.689**		0.239
		(0.261)		(0.309)		(0.329)		(0.367)
Gender: Male		0.460*		0.146		0.669**		0.526
		(0.238)		(0.282)		(0.300)		(0.335)
Gender: Non-binary		-1.111		-0.545		1.329		-1.781
		(1.232)		(1.457)		(1.552)		(1.732)
Location: New States		0.221		-0.527		0.196		-0.141
		(0.354)		(0.419)		(0.446)		(0.498)
Education: Tertiary		-0.204		-0.038		0.203		-0.049
		(0.227)		(0.269)		(0.286)		(0.319)
Political Opinion: Centre		0.218		0.485		0.263		0.450
		(0.264)		(0.312)		(0.333)		(0.371)
Political Opinion: Right		0.474		-1.256*		-0.937		-2.307***
		(0.551)		(0.651)		(0.694)		(0.774)
Constant	7.273***	0.123	5.372***	1.125	6.273***	2.343**	5.256***	2.593**
	(0.183)	(0.840)	(0.196)	(0.994)	(0.204)	(1.058)	(0.227)	(1.181)
Observations	243	240	243	240	243	240	243	240
R^2	0.004	0.308	0.013	0.172	0.001	0.127	0.036	0.150
Adjusted R^2	-0.00004	0.278	0.009	0.136	-0.003	0.089	0.032	0.113
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Government vs CSOs (Models 1-8)

5.2.3 Government vs CSOs – Transparency

The results of Models 5 and 6 (Table 5) demonstrate the effect of CSO inclusion on individual perceptions of the national delegation's transparency. From the positive coefficients in both

models, it can be observed that the relationship between CSO inclusion and perceptions of transparency is positive, which aligns with the theory underpinning H3. Adding the control variables to Model 5 in the multiple regression model, increased the coefficient from 0.154 to 0.337. Nevertheless, in Model 6 as seen in Model 5, CSO inclusion is not a statistically significant explanatory variable. Notably, these findings contrast with those relating to the influence of CSO inclusion on representation (Models 3 and 4) despite both transparency and representation being benchmarks of procedural legitimacy.

In contrast to CSO inclusion, a number of control variables are demonstrated to be statistically significant in Model 6. First and foremost, it can be observed that climate importance is statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with the two previous multiple regression models (Models 2 and 4). Meanwhile, age and gender are shown to be statistically significant explanatory variables at the 0.05 level. On average, respondents 35 years or older observe higher scores of transparency by 0.689 scale points, as compared to those under 35. Meanwhile, male respondents observe higher scores of transparency by 0.669 units as compared to female respondents. As neither of these covariates were anticipated to be statistically significant in the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis, they may present an opportunity for further investigation.

Overall, the results of Model 5 and 6 provide no evidence for H3 and hence the hypothesis that CSO inclusion increases perceptions of transparency cannot be accepted.

5.2.4 Government vs CSOs – Expertise

The results of Models 7 and 8 (Table 5) demonstrate the strong positive effect of CSO inclusion on individual perceptions of the delegation's expertise. Strongly aligning with the expectations of H4, the results of Model 7 demonstrate that the inclusion of CSOs in the national delegation improves individual perceptions of the delegation's expertise by 0.965 units at the 0.01 level. This relationship between CSO inclusion and perceptions of expertise remains remarkably stable when the control variables are added to the baseline model, as the coefficient decreases ever so slightly, but remains significant at the 0.01 level. As expertise is a benchmark for output legitimacy, it can be derived from this finding that the inclusion of CSOs significantly affects the output legitimacy of global climate governance.

Unlike the previous three multiple linear regression models, climate importance is demonstrated to be a statistically significant explanatory variable at the 0.1 level (Model 8). However, it can be observed from Model 8 that political opinion is a statistically significant explanatory variable at the same significance level as CSO inclusion. Lower scores by 2.3 units with regard to expertise, can be observed among respondents that identify themselves on the right-hand side of the political spectrum, as compared to those on the left. This is the first of the models within Comparison 1 to show such a significant relationship between this control variable and the outcome variable of interest. As this was not a relationship identified in the existing literature, it may warrant further research.

Returning to H4 with the consistent findings of Models 7 and 8 in mind, the hypothesis that CSO inclusion increases individual perceptions of the delegation's expertise can be accepted.

5.2.5 CSOs vs Independent CSOs – Support

Aside from the comparison between an all-government delegation and a mixed delegation of government and CSO representatives, this thesis was also interested in testing the effect of civil society actors with different characteristics on the overall support of global climate governance. Firstly, in H5 it was hypothesised that overall support for global climate governance would increase with the inclusion of CSOs that were independent from government funding, compared to those that were not.

The results of Models 9 and 10 (Table 6) do not provide any evidence of such a relationship. The coefficient for 'independent CSOs' was negative in both models. With the control variables added to the baseline model, it can be observed that including independent CSOs in the national delegation, as opposed to CSOs that are not independent, leads to a 0.127-point decrease on the Likert scale (Model 10). However, this decrease in support was not statistically significant in either model. In contrast, climate importance was a statistically significant explanatory variable at the 0.01 level.

On the basis of the simple and multiple linear regression models, it is not possible to accept H5, which stated that when CSOs are independent from government funding,

individual support for global climate governance increases as compared to CSOs that are not independent from government funding.

Comparison Two: CSOs vs Independent CSOs

	Dependent variable:							
	Support		Representation		Transparency		Expertise	
	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Independent CSOs	-0.120	-0.127	-0.137	-0.128	-0.030	-0.017	-0.066	0.013
	(0.268)	(0.246)	(0.287)	(0.280)	(0.303)	(0.302)	(0.319)	(0.314)
Climate Importance		1.074***		0.740***		0.571**		0.578**
		(0.187)		(0.213)		(0.230)		(0.239)
Climate Action		0.034		-0.035		-0.101		-0.066
		(0.120)		(0.136)		(0.147)		(0.153)
Age: 35+		0.193		0.423		0.420		0.393
		(0.283)		(0.322)		(0.347)		(0.361)
Gender: Male		-0.063		-0.190		0.345		0.076
		(0.255)		(0.290)		(0.313)		(0.325)
Gender: Non-binary		-1.067		-1.390		0.093		-2.189*
		(0.967)		(1.100)		(1.189)		(1.235)
Location: New States		0.193		0.121		-0.073		0.226
		(0.359)		(0.409)		(0.442)		(0.459)
Education: Tertiary		0.062		-0.151		0.274		0.032
		(0.246)		(0.280)		(0.303)		(0.314)
Political Opinion: Centre		0.106		0.402		0.136		0.426
		(0.298)		(0.340)		(0.367)		(0.381)
Political Opinion: Right		-0.666		-1.265*		-1.750**		-1.955**
		(0.625)		(0.711)		(0.768)		(0.798)
Constant	7.016***	2.012**	5.861***	2.614***	6.426***	3.767***	6.221***	3.576***
	(0.187)	(0.875)	(0.201)	(0.995)	(0.212)	(1.075)	(0.222)	(1.117)
Observations	238	235	238	235	238	235	238	235
R^2	0.001	0.228	0.001	0.137	0.00004	0.092	0.0002	0.113
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.193	-0.003	0.098	-0.004	0.052	-0.004	0.073
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: CSOs vs Independent CSOs (Models 9-16)

5.2.6 CSOs vs Independent CSOs – Procedural vs Output Legitimacy

This thesis also hypothesised that the increase in legitimacy from including CSOs that are independent from government funding, in comparison to those that are not, would be higher in

terms of procedural rather than output legitimacy. However, the results of models 11 to 16 (Table 6) provide no evidence for this hypothesis.

In terms of procedural legitimacy, it can be observed from models 11 to 14 that there is a weak negative relationship between the inclusion of information regarding the independence of CSOs from government funding and perceptions of the delegation's representation and transparency. In terms of representation, the multiple linear regression depicted in Model 12 demonstrates that pointing out the financial-independence of the CSOs to respondents leads to a decrease in perceptions of representation by 0.128 on the Likert scale. Meanwhile, the inclusion of independent CSOs in Germany's national delegation decreased transparency perceptions by an average of 0.017 when a multiple linear regression model was run on the transparency outcome variable (Model 14). Nevertheless, the independence of CSOs from government funding was not demonstrated to be a statistically significant explanatory variable for either representation or transparency. In terms of perceptions of the delegation's expertise (the benchmark for output legitimacy), the coefficient for independent CSOs was negative (-0.066) in the simple linear regression model (Model 15) but turned positive (0.013) when the control variables were added to the baseline (Model 16). Once again, the independence of CSOs from government funding was not a statistically significant explanatory variable in either of these models.

Climate importance was shown to be a good predictor of all three legitimacy benchmarks: representation ($p<0.01$), transparency ($p<0.05$), and expertise ($p<0.05$). Meanwhile, political opinion was shown to be a good predictor of transparency ($p<0.05$) and expertise ($p<0.05$). In specific, the negative coefficients in Models 14 and 16 are indicative of the negative impact of respondents being on the right-hand side of the political spectrum as compared to the left. Respondents who identified themselves on the right of the political spectrum observe, on average, lower scores of transparency by 1.75-units and lower scores of expertise by 1.955-units on the Likert scale. The latter finding is consistent with the results of Model 8 in Comparison 1, further suggesting the importance of investigating this relationship.

Overall, the absence of an effect of CSOs' financial independence from government on expertise (output legitimacy) was anticipated by the theory underpinning H6. However, the lack of statistically significant results regarding the influence of independent CSOs on

procedural legitimacy entails that the study's findings do not reveal a greater influence on procedural as compared to output legitimacy. **Hence, H6 cannot be accepted.**

Comparison Three: CSOs vs Social Movements

	Dependent variable:							
	Support		Representation		Transparency		Expertise	
	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Social Movements	0.069	0.082	-0.168	-0.195	0.480	0.529*	-0.657**	-0.628**
	(0.274)	(0.242)	(0.285)	(0.275)	(0.295)	(0.285)	(0.315)	(0.311)
Climate Importance		1.055***		0.874***		0.736***		0.691***
		(0.183)		(0.209)		(0.216)		(0.235)
Climate Action		0.339***		0.104		0.085		0.189
		(0.125)		(0.142)		(0.147)		(0.160)
Age: 35+		0.389		0.547*		1.007***		0.343
		(0.283)		(0.322)		(0.334)		(0.363)
Gender: Male		0.318		-0.092		0.439		0.199
		(0.256)		(0.292)		(0.302)		(0.329)
Gender: Non-binary		-3.055		-2.326		-4.060*		0.061
		(1.896)		(2.160)		(2.237)		(2.435)
Location: New States		0.164		0.319		0.511		0.591
		(0.408)		(0.465)		(0.482)		(0.525)
Education: Tertiary		-0.194		-0.299		0.312		-0.397
		(0.249)		(0.283)		(0.293)		(0.319)
Political Opinion: Centre		-0.144		0.023		-0.037		-0.228
		(0.281)		(0.321)		(0.332)		(0.362)
Political Opinion: Right		-0.265		-0.058		0.073		-0.814
		(0.612)		(0.697)		(0.722)		(0.786)
Constant	7.016***	1.221	5.861***	1.675*	6.426***	2.185**	6.221***	2.669**
	(0.192)	(0.832)	(0.199)	(0.949)	(0.206)	(0.982)	(0.221)	(1.069)
Observations	239	236	239	236	239	236	239	236
R^2	0.0003	0.278	0.001	0.131	0.011	0.140	0.018	0.117
Adjusted R^2	-0.004	0.246	-0.003	0.092	0.007	0.102	0.014	0.078
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: CSOs vs Social Movements (Models 17-24)

5.2.7 CSOs vs Social Movements – Overall Support

Along with CSOs that are independent of government funding, it is also the ambition of this thesis to determine the effect of including social movement representatives in national delegations, as compared to including CSOs, on the overall support of global climate governance. From Models 17 and 18 (Table 7), it can be observed that including social

movements as compared to CSOs, increases support by 0.069 scale-points in the baseline model and 0.082 scale-points when the control variables are included (Model 18). However, this relationship is not statistically significant in either the simple linear or the multiple linear regression model.

In comparison, climate importance and climate action are demonstrated to be statistically significant explanatory variables at the 0.01 level. The positive relationships between these covariates and the outcome variables were anticipated, hence the inclusion of these subjective questions in the survey. It can be observed that a one-point increase in climate change importance leads to a 1.055-point increase in overall support for global climate governance. Meanwhile, a one-point increase in climate change action, leads to a 0.339-point increase in overall support when social movements are the main explanatory variable of interest.

Overall, there is no evidence to support H7 and so this hypothesis cannot be accepted.

5.2.8 CSOs vs Social Movements – *Procedural vs Output Legitimacy*

Turning to the effect of including social movement representatives, as compared to CSOs, on the three additional indicators of legitimacy, namely representation, transparency, and expertise, the results of Models 19 to 24 (Table 7) provide competing evidence for H8. Firstly, the results of Models 19 and 20, suggest that the inclusion of social movement representatives is negatively related to perceptions of representation. With the addition of the control variables to the baseline model, the inclusion of social movements leads to a decrease in perceptions of representation by 0.195 units (Model 20). It should be noted however, that social movements do not represent a statistically significant explanatory variable in either model. In terms of transparency, the results of Models 21 and 22 align with the theoretical expectations of this thesis. From Model 21, it can be extrapolated that the inclusion of social movements increases perceptions of transparency by an average of 0.48, while social movement inclusion leads to an average increase of 0.529 units in transparency scores when the control variables were added to the baseline in Model 22. Nevertheless, while the coefficient of Model 22 is significant at the 0.1 level, this result does not meet the chosen significance level of 5%.

Turning to output legitimacy, the results of Models 23 and 24 demonstrate a strong negative relationship between the inclusion of social movement representatives as compared to CSOs

and perceptions of the delegation's expertise. The simple linear regression (Model 23), demonstrates that the inclusion of social movement representatives decreases perceptions of expertise by 0.657 units. Although the coefficient shrinks slightly when the control variables are added (Model 24), social movement inclusion still decreases expertise perceptions by 0.628 in the multiple linear regression. Notably, the statistical significance of social movements ($p<0.05$) is upheld in both the simple and multiple regression models. This negative relationship was anticipated by the theoretical expectations underpinning H8, on account of the decentralised and informal characteristic of social movements which was suggested to impede their capacity to contribute expertise.

As for the ability of the covariates to explain the three outcome variables, climate importance proved to be a statistically significant explanatory variable in all three of the aforementioned multiple linear regression models at the 0.01 level. Surprisingly, age was also demonstrated to be a statistically significant explanatory variable in Model 22. Respondents aged 35 years or older, rated the delegation's transparency one scale-point higher as compared to younger respondents ($p<0.01$).

Overall, it was observed that including social movements had a mixed effect on procedural legitimacy, associated with the benchmarks of representation and transparency. As such, although social movements had a negative effect on expertise, as anticipated by the theory underpinning H8, the inclusion of these actors did not have a statistically significant positive influence on procedural legitimacy. This lack of conclusive evidence implies that the theoretical expectations of H8 are not met. **Consequently, H8 cannot be accepted.**

5.2.9 Social Movements & Transparency

Figure 5 compares the means of the various treatment groups with regards to the outcome variable of transparency, in order to further explore the relationship that was detected when comparing the effect of including CSOs versus social movements. The difference in means between Vignette 4, which included the social movement representatives, and the other three types of national delegations is notable, particularly when social movements are compared to the all-government delegation. From Model 25 (see *Appendix: Section D)*, it can be observed that adding social movement representatives to an all-government delegation is a statistically significant explanatory variable for perceptions of transparency, increasing the latter by 0.633-

points on the Likert scale ($p<0.05$). Adding the control variables to the baseline, increases the coefficient to 0.791 and reveals the significance of including social movements at the 0.01 level (Model 26). Although this is surplus to the comparisons included in this thesis, it could provide evidence that social movements have an effect on transparency that is not being detected by the study's sample due to its insufficient statistical power. This will be further discussed in Chapter 6.



Figure 5: Comparison of Means - Transparency

5.3. Robustness Check 1: Exclusion of Convenience Sample

As identified in Chapter 4 of this thesis, convenience sampling is limited most notably by sampling bias. Therefore, to ensure the robustness of the findings thus far identified, the responses gathered via network sampling have been excluded before running the same regression models again. Excluding the responses received through network sampling improved the balancing of the demographic characteristics between treatment groups. In specific, the two statistically significant differences between treatment groups that were identified when balancing checks were carried out on the total (network and Prolific combined) sample, were not upheld when checks were run on the dataset containing only responses gathered on Prolific. It is noteworthy also that, although this thesis is not concerned with achieving a nationally representative sample for Germany, the Prolific-only sample was slightly more representative in terms of age, political opinion, and education.

5.3.1. Government vs CSOs – Overall Support

When Models 1 and 2 were run again with the convenience sample excluded, the inclusion of CSOs was consistently shown *not* to be a statistically significant explanatory variable. As such, although the coefficient for CSO inclusion is positive in Model 2.2 (Table 8), it is still not possible to accept H1 that including CSOs increases overall support for climate governance. Model 2.2 confirms that climate importance is a key predictor of overall support ($p<0.01$). Surprisingly, gender was also found to be a statistically significant explanatory variable ($p<0.05$). In specific, male respondents observe higher overall support for climate governance by 0.608 units on average as compared to female respondents.

Robustness Check of Comparison One: Government vs CSOs

	Dependent variable:							
	Support		Representation		Transparency		Expertise	
	1.2	2.2	3.2	4.2	5.2	6.2	7.2	8.2
Inclusion of CSOs	-0.078	0.176	0.528*	0.739**	0.064	0.284	1.099***	1.155***
	(0.279)	(0.235)	(0.304)	(0.288)	(0.307)	(0.296)	(0.353)	(0.347)
Climate Importance		1.456***		0.994***		0.987***		0.435*
		(0.174)		(0.213)		(0.220)		(0.257)
Climate Action		0.099		0.011		-0.246*		0.230
		(0.115)		(0.141)		(0.145)		(0.170)
Age: 35+		-0.279		0.106		0.367		0.275
		(0.269)		(0.330)		(0.339)		(0.398)
Gender: Male		0.608**		0.068		0.533*		0.330
		(0.246)		(0.302)		(0.311)		(0.365)
Gender: Non-binary		-0.923		-0.624		1.129		-1.762
		(1.177)		(1.445)		(1.487)		(1.743)
Location: New States		0.129		-0.479		0.343		-0.215
		(0.362)		(0.444)		(0.457)		(0.535)
Education: Tertiary		-0.093		-0.011		0.500*		-0.095
		(0.234)		(0.287)		(0.295)		(0.346)
Political Opinion: Centre		0.338		0.322		0.183		0.396
		(0.278)		(0.341)		(0.351)		(0.412)
Political Opinion: Right		0.284		-0.892		-0.620		-2.020**
		(0.557)		(0.683)		(0.703)		(0.824)
Constant	7.127***	-0.202	5.314***	0.612	6.451***	1.796*	5.049***	2.282*
	(0.197)	(0.855)	(0.215)	(1.050)	(0.216)	(1.080)	(0.249)	(1.266)
Observations	203	203	203	203	203	203	203	203
R^2	0.0004	0.361	0.015	0.200	0.0002	0.156	0.046	0.163
Adjusted R^2	-0.005	0.328	0.010	0.158	-0.005	0.112	0.041	0.120
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Robustness Check – Government vs CSOs (Models 1.2-8.2)

5.3.2. Government vs CSOs – Representation

As observed in the results of Model 4.2 (Table 8), CSO inclusion remains a statistically significant explanatory variable in the multiple linear regression model at the 0.05 level. The inclusion of CSOs leads to an average 0.739-point increase in perceptions of representation. This result is also shown graphically in the *Appendix: Section E*. Considering that CSO inclusion is only significant at the 0.1 level in the simple linear regression (Model 3.2), it is still only possible to tentatively accept H2. Yet, climate importance is confirmed as a key predictor of perceptions of representation in Model 4.2 ($p<0.01$).

5.3.3. Government vs CSOs – Transparency

The results of Models 5.2 and 6.2 confirm the previous findings that CSO inclusion has no effect on perceptions of a delegation's transparency. In contrast, Model 6.2 confirms that climate importance is a key predictor of transparency perceptions ($p<0.01$). In specific, a one-point increase in individual perceptions of climate importance leads to a 0.987-point increase in perceptions of transparency.

5.3.4. Government vs CSOs – Expertise

In Models 7 and 8, it was revealed that CSO inclusion was a key predictor of individual perceptions of expertise ($p<0.01$). The previously identified relationship between CSO inclusion and expertise remained statistically significant when the dataset was restricted to respondents gathered only through Prolific. From Model 8.2 (Table 8), it can be observed that the inclusion of CSOs leads to a 1.155-point increase in perceptions of expertise ($p<0.01$). This result is also shown graphically in the *Appendix: Section E*. Interestingly, political opinion remains a statistically significant explanatory variable in Model 8.2 ($p<0.05$). Respondents who identify themselves on the right-hand side of the political spectrum observe lower scores of expertise by an average of 2 units, as compared to individuals on the left. Overall, running the simple and multiple linear models again confirms the robustness of the finding that H4 can indeed be accepted.

5.3.5. CSOs vs Independent CSOs – All Outcome Variables

Table 9 contains the results of the regressions related to Comparison 2. Running the simple and multiple regression models again. with the convenience sample excluded, confirmed that the independence of CSOs from government funding is not a statistically significant explanatory

variable of overall support, representation, transparency, or expertise. One minor difference in running these models again, is that the effect of CSOs' financial independence from the government is demonstrated to be positive in terms of expertise by the coefficients of Models 15.2 and 16.2, although this relationship is not statistically significant.

Robustness Check of Comparison Two: CSOs vs Independent CSOs

	Dependent variable:							
	Support		Representation		Transparency		Expertise	
	9.2	10.2	11.2	12.2	13.2	14.2	15.2	16.2
Independent CSOs	-0.090	-0.180	-0.165	-0.188	-0.060	-0.050	0.114	0.130
	(0.288)	(0.254)	(0.314)	(0.302)	(0.319)	(0.312)	(0.345)	(0.336)
Climate Importance		1.185***		0.750***		0.589**		0.599**
		(0.188)		(0.223)		(0.231)		(0.249)
Climate Action		0.074		-0.096		-0.121		0.059
		(0.129)		(0.153)		(0.158)		(0.170)
Age: 35+		-0.153		0.187		0.324		0.262
		(0.295)		(0.350)		(0.362)		(0.390)
Gender: Male		-0.042		-0.315		0.236		-0.032
		(0.266)		(0.316)		(0.326)		(0.352)
Gender: Non-binary		-1.035		-1.446		-0.034		-2.436**
		(0.921)		(1.093)		(1.130)		(1.217)
Location: New States		0.048		0.123		-0.166		0.160
		(0.350)		(0.416)		(0.430)		(0.463)
Education: Tertiary		0.122		0.071		0.656**		0.127
		(0.252)		(0.299)		(0.309)		(0.333)
Political Opinion: Centre		0.465		0.121		0.003		0.575
		(0.317)		(0.376)		(0.389)		(0.418)
Political Opinion: Right		-0.359		-1.544**		-1.921**		-1.694**
		(0.629)		(0.747)		(0.772)		(0.832)
Constant	7.050***	1.448	5.842***	2.873***	6.515***	3.795***	6.149***	3.113***
	(0.202)	(0.905)	(0.221)	(1.074)	(0.225)	(1.110)	(0.243)	(1.196)
Observations	200	199	200	199	200	199	200	199
R^2	0.0005	0.288	0.001	0.160	0.0002	0.132	0.001	0.137
Adjusted R^2	-0.005	0.250	-0.004	0.115	-0.005	0.086	-0.004	0.091
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: Robustness Check – CSOs vs Independent CSOs (Models 9.2-16.2)

Interestingly, the relationship between some of the control and outcome variables have changed with the exclusion of the convenience sample, although climate importance remained a key predictor of all outcome variables. Firstly, gender was demonstrated to be a significant explanatory variable of expertise in Model 16.2. On average, non-binary respondents observed

lower scores of expertise by 2.436 points on the Likert scale as compared to female respondents ($p<0.05$). In contrast, respondents with tertiary education observed higher scores of transparency by 0.656 points on the Likert scale as compared to individuals with only primary and/or secondary education ($p<0.05$). Consistent with previous findings, there is a negative change in some of the outcome variables if the respondent is on the right-hand side of the political spectrum as compared to the left. On average, lower scores were observed among right-leaning individuals in terms of: representation by 1.544 units (Model 12.2), transparency by 1.921 units (Model 14.2), and expertise by 1.694 units (Model 16.2). In all cases, this variable was significant at the 5% level. Overall, Models 9.2 to 16.2 confirm that it is not possible to accept H5 or H6.

5.3.6. CSOs vs Social Movements – All Outcome Variables

As with the other two overarching comparisons, the models relevant to the comparison between CSOs and social movements (Comparison 3) were also run again, after excluding the convenience sample. With regards to overall support, the inclusion of social movements was not demonstrated to be statistically significant (Models 17.2 and 18.2 of Table 10), although the coefficients were negative in contrast to Models 17 and 18. Further to this, social movements' inclusion was not shown to be a statistically significant explanatory variable of either representation (Models 19.2 and 20.2) or transparency (Models 21.2 and 22.2). Notably though, the positive relationship between social movements' inclusion and perceptions of transparency were upheld when the convenience sample was excluded from the dataset. Turning to output legitimacy, it can be seen that the statistically significant (negative) relationship between social movement's inclusion and perceptions of expertise, was no longer significant at the 0.05 level, when the convenience sample was excluded and the simple linear regression was run again (Model 23.2). However, when the covariates were added to the baseline, the coefficient was greater in Model 24.2 than in Model 24 (convenience and Prolific sample) and again significant at the 0.05 level. In specific, it was demonstrated that the inclusion of social movements leads to a 0.698-unit decrease in individual perceptions of expertise.

Moving on to the covariates, climate importance maintained its significance ($p<0.01$) as a key explanatory variable of overall support and all three of the legitimacy benchmarks of representation, transparency, and expertise. Moreover, climate action predictably remained a

significant explanatory variable of overall support ($p<0.05$). In contrast with previous findings, the only other covariate with statistical significance was education. In specific, from Model 22.2 it can be observed that respondents with a tertiary education, had on average higher scores for transparency by 0.655-points on the Likert scale as compared to respondents with only primary and/or secondary education. Overall, the results of this robustness check have confirmed that it is not possible to accept H7 nor H8.

Robustness Check of Comparison Three: CSOs vs Social Movements

	Dependent variable:							
	Support		Representation		Transparency		Expertise	
	17.2	18.2	19.2	20.2	21.2	22.2	23.2	24.2
Social Movements	-0.089	-0.131	-0.386	-0.403	0.307	0.361	-0.663*	-0.698**
	(0.300)	(0.262)	(0.302)	(0.284)	(0.316)	(0.300)	(0.347)	(0.333)
Climate Importance		1.046***		0.842***		0.840***		0.700***
		(0.192)		(0.208)		(0.220)		(0.244)
Climate Action		0.308**		0.085		0.023		0.180
		(0.135)		(0.146)		(0.155)		(0.172)
Age: 35+		0.149		0.097		0.648*		-0.145
		(0.312)		(0.338)		(0.357)		(0.397)
Gender: Male		0.263		-0.081		0.325		-0.014
		(0.277)		(0.300)		(0.317)		(0.352)
Gender: Non-binary		-2.885		-1.971		-4.054*		0.332
		(1.903)		(2.062)		(2.179)		(2.419)
Location: New States		0.115		0.366		0.429		0.631
		(0.413)		(0.448)		(0.473)		(0.525)
Education: Tertiary		-0.091		-0.290		0.655**		-0.267
		(0.265)		(0.287)		(0.303)		(0.337)
Political Opinion: Centre		-0.051		-0.289		-0.122		-0.268
		(0.308)		(0.333)		(0.352)		(0.391)
Political Opinion: Right		-0.565		-0.823		-0.106		-1.296
		(0.676)		(0.732)		(0.773)		(0.859)
Constant	7.050***	1.464	5.842***	2.114**	6.515***	2.006*	6.149***	2.797**
	(0.212)	(0.889)	(0.213)	(0.962)	(0.223)	(1.017)	(0.245)	(1.129)
Observations	202	202	202	202	202	202	202	202
R^2	0.0004	0.286	0.008	0.180	0.005	0.161	0.018	0.154
Adjusted R^2	-0.005	0.249	0.003	0.137	-0.0003	0.117	0.013	0.109
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: Robustness Check – CSOs vs Social Movements (Models 17.2-24.2)

5.4. Robustness Check 2: Mann-Whitney U Tests

To further increase the stability of the study, a second robustness check has been conducted. In specific, non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests, also referred to as Wilcoxon tests, have been performed on each of the three overarching comparisons. This is an appropriate test due to the abnormal distribution of the data, which was revealed by Shapiro-Wilk tests performed on each of the comparisons. As the Mann-Whitney U test compares differences in medians between treatment groups, it is complementary to the simple and multiple linear regressions which have thus far dominated the data analysis. If the same conclusions can be drawn from the simple and multiple linear regressions, as well as the Mann Whitney test, then the results can be regarded as robust to different model specifications. The Mann-Whitney U tests have been performed on the dataset that excluded responses collected via network (convenience) sampling in order to ensure the provision of the most robust findings.

5.4.1. Government vs CSOs

The results of the Wilcoxon tests run on Comparison 1 can be found in Table 11. Firstly, the Wilcoxon rank sum test revealed no significant difference in the overall support of individuals that received either Vignette 1 (all-government delegation) or Vignette 2 (mixed government-CSO delegation). As the *p*-value is high at 0.638, this confirms the findings of the simple and multiple linear regression models (both including and excluding network sampling). Hence, there is indeed no evidence in support of H1.

Turning to representation, the Wilcoxon test provided conflicting evidence as to the findings of the multiple linear regression analyses (Model 4 and 4.2) which identified CSO inclusion as a statistically significant explanatory variable at the 0.05 level. As the *p*-value is 0.092, the difference between the treatment groups is significant at the 0.1 level. However, as this does not meet the selected significance level of 5%, it is not possible to accept H2. Rather, the result further suggests the need for additional research due to the lack of consistency in the results of the regression analyses as compared to the Wilcoxon test.

Thirdly, no significant difference in perceptions of transparency was identified between individuals receiving Vignette 1 compared to Vignette 2 when a Wilcoxon test was run. This can be observed from the high *p*-value of 0.741, which confirms all previous evidence suggesting that H3 cannot be accepted.

Finally, a statistically significant difference in perceptions of expertise was identified by the Wilcoxon test. In specific, it can be observed from Table 11 that there is a one scale-point difference in the location of the median between the all-government delegation and the delegation in which CSOs were included ($p<0.01$). This provides additional evidence that H4 can be accepted, which further demonstrates the robustness of this finding.

Dependent Variable	*W*-Value	*p*-Value
Overall Support	5345.5	0.6377
Representation	4454.5	0.0920
Transparency	5014	0.7410
Expertise	3753	0.0008

Table 11: Wilcoxon Test Results – Government vs CSOs

5.4.2. CSOs vs Independent CSOs

Turning to the differences in the medians of the outcome variables between Vignette 2 (CSOs) and Vignette 3 (Independent CSOs), the results of the Wilcoxon tests confirm the lack of statistical significance. From Table 12, it can be observed that the *p*-values were high for each of the outcome variables: overall support ($p = 0.958$); representation ($p = 0.69$); transparency ($p = 0.842$); and expertise ($p = 0.969$). As such, the finding that there is no statistically significant difference between the inclusion of CSOs that are independent from government funding compared to those that are, can be regarded as robust to different model specifications. Hence, the outcomes of the Wilcoxon tests performed on the treatment groups of Comparison 2 provide no further evidence in favour of H5 or H6.

Dependent Variable	*W*-Value	*p*-Value
Overall Support	5021	0.9584
Representation	5161.5	0.6895
Transparency	5081	0.8415
Expertise	4983	0.9685

Table 12: Wilcoxon Test Results – CSOs vs Independent CSOs

5.4.3. CSOs vs Social Movements

Likewise, it can be observed from Table 13, that there is no statistically significant difference between Vignette 2 (CSOs) and Vignette 4 (social movements) in terms of overall support ($p = 0.731$) as well as individual perceptions of representation ($p = 0.268$), and transparency ($p =$

0.314). Additionally, the results of the Wilcoxon test confirm the finding that the inclusion of social movements in comparison to CSOs, leads to worse perceptions of the delegation's expertise (p = 0.028). It can be extrapolated from the results of the Wilcoxon test that the difference in the medians between these two treatment groups on the outcome variable of expertise is one scale-point. These findings are consistent with the decision to not accept H7 or H8.

Dependent Variable	*W*-Value	*p*-Value
Overall Support	4959.5	0.7308
Representation	5555	0.2678
Transparency	4685.5	0.3135
Expertise	6003.5	0.0284

Table 13: Wilcoxon Test Results – Independent CSOs vs Social Movements

6. DISCUSSION

6.1. Main Findings

6.1.1. Government vs CSOs

The principal finding of this thesis is that including CSOs in the national delegation present at international climate negotiations enhances individual perceptions of the output legitimacy of global climate governance. In the previous chapter, the inclusion of CSOs was determined to be a statistically significant explanatory variable ($p<0.01$) of perceptions of expertise, through simple and multiple linear regression models which were run to determine the differences in means between the government-only and the mixed government-CSO delegation. From Models 1 and 2 it was observed that CSO inclusion translates respectively to a 0.965-point and 0.964-point increase on the Likert scale for expertise. This finding was subsequently maintained through two robustness checks. In the first, the dataset was limited to Prolific-recruited respondents, before the regression models were run again. In the second robustness check, Mann-Whitney U tests were performed to compare the differences in medians. As CSO inclusion was consistently observed to be significant at the 0.01 level, the results of these tests – which can be found in Table 8 and Table 11 respectively – provided robust evidence for the theory outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. In specific, the expectations of functionalist theory were supported, which argues that civil society improves the problem-solving capacity of national delegations, bringing negotiating parties closer to an agreement.

The importance of this principal finding cannot be understated, considering the strong internal validity of the survey experiments. In addition, the wording of Vignettes 1 and 2 were almost identical to the phrasing used by Bernauer and Gampfer in their 2013 study, including most notably the types of CSOs (an ENGO, university, and business association) that comprised the mixed government-CSO delegation. In contrast to the findings of this study, the authors were only able to detect statistically significant differences within-groups rather than between-groups, when they altered the delegation's composition mid-survey (Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013: 445). As such, the finding of this thesis, that CSO inclusion does in fact influence the output legitimacy of global climate governance, has important policy implications. This is particularly the case where civil society's inclusion remains largely ad-hoc (Albin, 1999: 372).

The results of this study present an encouraging situation for governments, particularly with regard to the domestic implementation of a legally-binding agreement on climate change negotiated at the global level (Lövbrand et al., 2017: 581). In demonstrating the positive effect of CSO inclusion on the popular legitimacy of international climate negotiations, this thesis suggests that if states include CSOs such as ENGOs and knowledge institutions in their delegations, they could improve public perceptions of climate governance. In turn, where enhanced popular legitimacy reduces the potential for public resistance (Zürn 2004: 262), CSO inclusion allows for the negotiation of an international agreement that can actually be implemented at a national level.

Beyond the decisions of individual states to include civil society actors, the findings of this thesis suggest that there is a need for multilateral institutions to call for the more meaningful inclusion of CSOs in international climate negotiations. Despite some interest from states in allowing civil society representatives to be part of national delegations, non-state actor participation is still largely restricted to observer-status (UNFCCC, 2021). Although this status is well-developed within the environmental field in comparison to many other issue areas, this form of inclusion keeps non-state actors on the periphery of the 'actual' negotiations (Nasiritousi & Linnér, 2014). As such, in order to exert a stronger influence on the popular legitimacy of global climate governance, the findings of this thesis suggest that there needs to be a broader shift away from observer status in order for global climate governance to benefit from the prospective legitimacy-gains. More specifically, CSO participation in national delegations needs to become the norm within the UN's climate change bodies, similar to the

participation of non-state actors in the associations of the International Labour Organisation (Biermann & Gupta, 2011: 1862). Considering that the results of this thesis provide support for the theoretical arguments of functionalism, a shift towards the institutionalisation of CSO participation in national delegations could also facilitate the work of the UNFCCC due to the expanded expertise provided by CSOs. In turn, such inclusion could help to fill existing gaps with regard to the problem-solving capacity of this body.

In addition to the key finding regarding output legitimacy, the results of this study provided mixed evidence as to the effect of CSO inclusion on the procedural legitimacy of global climate governance. CSO inclusion was not identified to be a statistically significant explanatory variable of individual perceptions of transparency – a benchmark of procedural legitimacy – in any of the tests that were run. This finding was confirmed by all simple and multiple linear regression models, as well as the results of the Mann-Whitney U test. As such, the thesis did not manage to find any evidence in support of the theory presented by democratic pluralism, which suggests that CSOs correct power imbalances by giving citizens access to information about governance processes, thereby closing the gap between decision-makers and citizens (Schmidt & Wood, 2019: 732).

Nevertheless, despite the surprising lack of evidence as to the effect of CSO inclusion on transparency, the inclusion of CSOs was shown to be a statistically significant explanatory variable of representation perceptions in all simple and multiple linear regression models. This is particularly important considering that both representation and transparency are regarded as indicators of procedural legitimacy. While CSO inclusion was significant at the 0.1 level in both simple regression models (Model 3 and 3.2), it was significant at the 0.05 level in the multiple linear regression models (Model 4 and 4.2). The results of Model 4, for example, indicate that the inclusion of CSOs leads to a 0.617-point increase on the Likert scale ($p<0.05$). Importantly, these findings were not supported by the results of the Mann-Whitney U test, from which a statistically significant difference in the medians of the government-only and mixed government-CSO delegation could not be observed. This inconsistency in the results implied that H2 could not after all be accepted, although the proximity to a statistically significant result undoubtedly points towards the need for further research into the democratising role of CSOs.

Turning to overall support, one of the most surprising results of the study was the lack of a statistically significant relationship between the inclusion of CSOs and support for international climate negotiations. As a result of this, the thesis was unable to provide support for the theoretical expectations of H1, in which it was hypothesised that the inclusion of CSOs would increase the overall support of individuals for global climate governance. It is of particular interest, that the positive effect of CSO inclusion on the benchmarks of legitimacy, did not translate into higher overall support. In the existing literature, the concepts of popular legitimacy and public support have been used quite interchangeably (e.g. Bernauer & Gampfer, 2013). Hence, one is left to question whether individuals can perceive their national delegations to be more legitimate with the inclusion of civil society and yet not increase their overall support for global climate governance. More specifically, considering the particular improvement in individual perceptions of expertise when CSOs are included in national delegations, it can be understood that improvements in output legitimacy do not translate into more support for international climate agreements. Where this result could alternatively be an issue of construct validity, in which the survey question regarding the overall support of individuals was not attuned to the outcome it was intended to measure (Mathison, 2005: 81), further research is needed to confirm these speculations.

6.1.2. CSOs vs Independent CSOs

Beyond the participation of 'traditional' CSOs, this thesis was also interested in identifying the effects of certain characteristics on the influence of civil society actors included in the national delegations present at international climate negotiations. Reviewing the findings relating to Comparison 2 (Tables 6, 9, and 12), the lack of any significant relationship between including information about the CSO's independence from government funding and all four outcome variables of interest was unexpected. One potential reason for this result could be that the participants who read Vignette 2, which did not contain information regarding the independence of the CSOs from government funding, assumed that the CSOs included were nevertheless independent. In other words, it is possible that the vignettes were not able to convey the differences in CSO characteristics between treatment groups. This would explain the lack of variation in the responses of those reading Vignette 2 (CSOs) as compared to those reading Vignette 3 (independent CSOs). It should be noted however, that Vignette 2 did not include a reminder of the potential reliance of the CSOs on external (government) sources of

funding in order to stay as close as possible to the original utilised by Bernauer and Gampfer (2013).

6.1.3. CSOs vs Social Movements

Turning to Comparison 3, the results of this thesis provide an important contribution to the under-researched protest-policy nexus. First and foremost, the main finding of this comparison was the negative relationship between the inclusion of social movement representatives in Germany's national delegation as compared to CSOs and individual perceptions of expertise. Model 24, demonstrates that the inclusion of social movements leads to a decrease in expertise perceptions by 0.628 points ($p<0.05$). Although Robustness Check 1 did not provide consistent evidence for this finding, as social movements were demonstrated to be a significant explanatory variable at the 0.05 level in Model 24.2 but only at the 0.1 level in Model 23.2, Robustness Check 2 provided strong support. In specific, the Mann-Whitney U test revealed a statistically significant decrease of one scale-point in expertise of the delegation that included social movements, as compared to the delegation including CSOs (Table 13). This provides evidence for the argument in Chapter 3 that the decentralised and informal nature of social movements hinders the contribution of these actors to problem-solving. Relatedly, the results of the various models could reveal that social movements are regarded by the public as activists, rather than experts in climate policymaking, in turn providing an important takeaway for social movements such as Fridays for Future. Indeed, where these social movements have sought to bridge the gap between protest and policymaking, the findings of this study reveal the transition that they must go through in order to be considered 'experts' in the field of climate policymaking.

In contrast, the effect of including social movements in national delegations on procedural legitimacy was demonstrated to be more varied. The inclusion of social movements was found to be a statistically significant explanatory variable of transparency in Model 22 at the 0.1 level. As this result was not confirmed by any of the other tests run in the study and a statistically significant relationship was not found between social movements' inclusion and representation, H8 could not be accepted. Similarly, H7 could not be accepted as social movements were not demonstrated to be a key predictor of overall support for climate governance. It could be suggested that the study was limited by its insufficient statistical power, which meant that only moderate differences between treatment groups could be identified. This

argument could also be applied to the lack of statistically significant results observed with regards to Comparison 2. As such, expanding the current study could offer a solution to this issue. More broadly, considering the lack of empirical studies researching the influence of social movements as participants *in* climate negotiations at the global level, the results of this study are suggestive of the need for academic literature to consider social movements as viable contributors to policymaking. This is particularly the case where these actors are gaining prominence with the rise of the climate justice movement (CFFP, n.d.).

6.1.4. *Control Variables*

Finally, in terms of control variables, several of the covariates were demonstrated to be key predictors of at least one of the outcome variables. First and foremost, climate importance was observed to be a key predictor of support for climate governance, as well as the three indicators of legitimacy, across various models. As this relationship was expected, this finding is important inasmuch as it demonstrates the validity of the data exercise. Further to this, climate action was also a key predictor of support for those receiving Vignette 4 (social movements), as was anticipated by this study.

More surprising, was the consistent evidence of the negative impact on perceptions of the delegation's legitimacy of individuals identifying themselves on the right-hand side of the political spectrum, compared to the those on the left. Less consistently, age, gender, and education were also observed to be statistically significant explanatory variables in at least one of the models presented in the previous chapter. As the objective of this thesis has been only to control for demographic characteristics, speculation as to the relationships between covariates and dependent variables discovered by the findings, is superfluous. Further to this, where it is possible that these relationships occurred by chance, also due to the demographic characteristics of the total sample which included younger, left-leaning respondents, it is left to future research to engage with the potential effect of these covariates.

6.2. *Opportunities for Further Research*

First and foremost, when considering opportunities for future research, it is beneficial to consider the limitations of the study that was conducted by this thesis. The most prominent limitation faced by the research project was the size of the dataset utilised for analysis. While the total sample was well within the pre-established bounds derived in the process of power

analysis, its statistical power may have been insufficient to detect small differences between treatment groups. This is indicated by the close proximity to – or indeed the lack of – statistically significant relationships that were expected by the theoretical framework underpinning the research.

Additionally, it is possible that the study was also limited by the effects of sampling bias which reduced the external validity of the research. The effect of this bias was assessed with the inclusion of demographic control variables in the multiple linear regression models of Chapter 5. Moreover, data gathered through network (convenience) sampling was excluded in Robustness Checks 1 and 2 in order to further mitigate these biases. It is noteworthy, however, that the Prolific sample, as well as the total sample, presented some bias towards younger, better-educated individuals who identified as left-wing. Indeed, although there was a good balance across other demographics, namely gender and location, the biases previously mentioned prevented the study from being nationally representative. This reduces the extent to which the findings can be generalised both to the total German population, as well as to other similar populations. Although studies should ideally possess both causality and generalisability, it is rare that these standards are fully met by researchers (Knapp, 2011: 675). As such, the identified limitations of the study should not negate from the contribution the findings have for the literature on the popular legitimacy of global governance.

Nevertheless, with these limitations in mind, the findings of this thesis have identified several possibilities for further research into the influence of civil society on the popular legitimacy of global climate governance. First and foremost, it is suggested that the existing study be expanded in the German context with a larger sample size and preferably one that even more closely represents the characteristics of the German population. To achieve this would require the use of alternative sampling methods, considering the bias of both network (convenience) sampling and recruitment through Prolific, towards younger and higher-educated individuals with left-leaning political views. A larger dataset, closer to the upper bound identified by a priori power analysis (n=704 in case of the effect size of 0.3), could detect smaller variations between treatment groups. As such, an expanded study would help to determine the robustness of this thesis' findings, particularly those relationships that were close to the chosen significance level of 5%.

Furthermore, considering the surprising effect of some of the covariates on the dependent variables of interest, a larger sample that is more representative of the German population could allow future researchers to determine whether these relationships were a result of the bias in the sample outlined previously. To my knowledge, no existing study has yet explicitly engaged with these demographics in relation to civil society and the popular legitimacy of global governance. More broadly, considering that this study's findings notably surpass those of Bernauer and Gampfer's (2013) research, there is a need to validate its results. While an expanded survey in Germany would assist with this, it is also recommended that the current study is replicated in different contexts to see whether the results transfer to other European, as well as non-European, contexts. This in turn would be particularly helpful for ascertaining the speculations of this chapter regarding the disconnect between perceptions of (output) legitimacy and overall public support for international climate negotiations.

Furthermore, this study by no means exhausts the options for engaging with non-state participation in international climate policymaking. The research presented in this thesis has only considered the inclusion of civil society actors in the national delegations present at international climate negotiations. While this form of inclusion is regarded as offering civil society actors the highest chance of influencing climate policy (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014: 123-124), the inclusion of non-state actors in alternative ways, outside of national delegations, could reveal different conclusions to those drawn from this study. In addition, as the results of this study suggest that CSOs are regarded as 'experts' in climate policymaking, while social movements are perceived to have stronger accountability mechanisms (in terms of transparency), future research might also consider the influence of a delegation comprised of both CSOs *and* social movement representatives.

Finally, noting the relative dearth of literature engaging with the *popular legitimacy* of global governance beyond the topic of climate change, this study could be replicated in other policy areas both within and outside of the environment field. Indeed, considering the broader issue of governance legitimacy and the increasing call for more participatory approaches to international policymaking (Steffek & Ferretti, 2009: 39), this study has highlighted the importance, within both academia and practice, of engaging with civil society representatives as important players in the realm of global governance.

7. CONCLUSION

Environmental governance is becoming increasingly denationalised as solutions to the world's most pressing global challenges are urgently sought by the international community. Despite the virtues of cooperative action at the international level, the adverse effect of this trend is the widening gap between decision-makers and the constituents whose lives are increasingly affected by policy decisions made outside of the realm of democratic accountability (Zürn, 2004: 260-262). It was against this backdrop of the so-called 'legitimacy-deficit' of global governance, that this thesis utilised survey experiments to empirically test the causal relationship between the inclusion of civil society in international climate negotiations and public support for global climate governance. In specific, the research sought to answer the research question: "*How does the inclusion of civil society affect the popular legitimacy of global climate governance*?"

Utilising the case study of Germany, the EU's most populated Member State with a strong civil society and a track record of missing its climate goals, this thesis subsequently found that including civil society organisations in national delegations significantly increases the output legitimacy of international climate negotiations. Further to this, the study also found some encouraging evidence as to the positive effect of CSO inclusion on the procedural legitimacy of global climate governance. Considering the difficulty of reaching a legally-binding international agreement on climate change, as well as implementing such an agreement 'at home', the observation that individuals *do* look more favourably on international policymaking processes that are inclusive of CSOs has important policy implications. In specific, the contribution of CSOs, as 'experts' in the climate field, to problem-solving could provide a much-needed intervention, in order to overcome the deadlock of agreeing on a treaty. Indeed, where legitimacy is regarded as central to the effectiveness of environmental policy (Patt & Weber, 2014), improvements in popular legitimacy, on account of civil society inclusion, could offer an underutilised pathway to solving collective issues such as climate change (Tallberg et al., 2018: 3). With this in mind, this thesis has not only made a timely contribution to the existing academic literature on global governance legitimacy, but also offers important insights for states and multilateral institutions into the influence of CSO inclusion.

In addition, while the results of this study indicate that the dependency of CSOs on government funding does not have a statistically significant influence on individual perceptions of

legitimacy, the findings regarding the influence of social movements on popular legitimacy provide an important contribution to the limited literature on the protest-policy nexus. In particular, the negative effect of social movements' inclusion on expertise, which is a benchmark of output legitimacy, was demonstrative of the perceived inequality in the skills and policy experience of these networks when compared to more 'traditional' CSOs. As such, it is suggestive of the transition that social movements such as 'Fridays for Future' still have to go through, if they are to assert themselves as 'experts' in the arena of climate change policymaking. Beyond this, noting the ongoing shift in the prominence of social movements that are active on climate issues, as well as the evidence of their positive influence on the accountability of governance, the results of this study encourage the future engagement of social movements as conceivable players in global climate policymaking. This applies to both academic literature and practice.

More generally, it is recommended that the study presented here is expanded within, as well as outside of, Germany. Although the study managed to collect close to 500 responses, its statistical power entailed that only moderate effects could be detected between the treatment groups. As such, the (close proximity to) statistically significant relationships identified by the results of this thesis suggest that further research into the effect of CSO inclusion on the popular legitimacy of global governance is warranted. Indeed, if civil society representatives are, as suggested by this thesis, valued by the public as a democratising force and even more so as 'experts' in the field of climate change, then the inclusion of these actors could provide an important contribution towards the pursuit of more ambitious climate policy. Considering the paramount importance of reaching a legally-binding climate agreement, the legitimacy of global climate governance and the contribution of civil society to this, should be taken seriously by governments and multilateral institutions alike.

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APPENDIX

Section A: Map of Germany showing East ('new') vs West ('old') states (StepMap, n.d.).



Section B: Survey

Coloured text corresponds to the sections taken from Bernauer & Gampfer's 2013 study.

	English Survey	German Survey
Consent Form	Welcome! Your consent is required to participate in this study. Please review the information below. By selecting "I consent", you indicate that you have read, understood, and consented to the following conditions. This survey is being conducted for research contributing to a Master's in International Relations and Diplomacy at Leiden University. The purpose of this research is to learn about your	Willkommen! Für die Teilnahme an dieser Studie ist Ihr Einverständnis erforderlich. Bitte lesen Sie die nachstehenden Informationen. Indem Sie "Ich stimme zu" wählen, geben Sie an, dass Sie die folgenden Bedingungen gelesen und verstanden haben und damit einverstanden sind. Diese Umfrage wird für Forschungszwecke im Rahmen des Masterstudiengangs in Internationale

	preferences regarding Germany's participation at a hypothetical international climate negotiation. The data collected in this study will be confidential and all answers are anonymous. No identifying information will be included in the data collected. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may withdraw from the study at any point by closing your browser window. There are no foreseeable risks of participating and your participation should take around 5 minutes. This research is being carried out by Ms. Caitlan Read. If you have any questions or research-related concerns regarding the study you can contact her at c.g.read@umail.leidenuniv.nl. ♦ *I consent*.	Beziehungen und Diplomatie an der Universität Leiden durchgeführt. Ziel dieser Untersuchung ist es, Ihre Präferenzen in Bezug auf die Teilnahme Deutschlands bei einer hypothetischen internationalen Klimaverhandlung zu erfahren. Die in dieser Studie gesammelten Daten werden vertraulich behandelt und alle Antworten sind anonym. Es werden keine identifizierenden Informationen in den gesammelten Daten enthalten sein. Ihre Teilnahme an dieser Studie ist freiwillig. Sie können jederzeit aus der Studie aussteigen, indem Sie Ihr Browserfenster schließen. Die Teilnahme an der Studie birgt keine vorhersehbaren Risiken und Ihre Teilnahme sollte etwa 5 Minuten dauern. Diese Studie wird von Frau Caitlan Read durchgeführt. Wenn Sie Fragen oder forschungsbezogene Bedenken bezüglich der Studie haben, können Sie sie unter c.g.read@umail.leidenuniv.nl kontaktieren. ♦ Ich stimme zu.
Climate interest questions (subjective)	1. How serious do you consider the issue of climate change where 1 is not serious at all and 5 is very serious? *Scale from 1 to 5*. 2. How likely are you to join a collective action demonstration such a march or protest for climate action where 1 is not likely at all and 5 is very likely? *Scale from 1 to 5*.	1. Auf einer Skala von 1 (überhaupt nicht ernst) bis 5 (sehr ernst), für wie ernst halten Sie das Problem des Klimawandels? *Skala von 1 bis 5*. 2. Auf einer Skala von 1 (überhaupt nicht wahrscheinlich) bis 5 (sehr wahrscheinlich), für wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass Sie an einer kollektiven Aktion wie einer Demonstration oder an einem Protest für den Klimaschutz teilnehmen? *Skala von 1 bis 5*.
Attention check	**Please move the slider to number 5.** *Scale from 1-5*.	**Bitte bewegen Sie den Schieberegler auf Nummer 5.** *Skala von 1-5*.
Context for all respondents	Please read the following text and answer the corresponding questions on the next page.	Bitte lesen Sie den folgenden Text und beantworten Sie die entsprechenden Fragen auf der nächsten Seite.

	CO2 emissions from industry, households, and other sources are leading to higher global temperatures. These could have severe consequences for people and the environment. Therefore, countries around the world have been negotiating for several years to reach a legally binding international agreement that could help to mitigate these consequences. If such an agreement on climate change is reached and Germany joins this agreement, it would have to reduce its CO_2 emissions which could have important socio-economic consequences for Germany.	CO2-Emissionen aus der Industrie, von Haushalten und anderen Quellen führen zu höheren globalen Temperaturen. Dies könnte schwerwiegende Folgen für Mensch und Umwelt haben. Daher verhandeln Länder aus der ganzen Welt seit vielen Jahren über ein rechtsverbindliches internationales Abkommen, das dazu beitragen könnte diese Folgen abzumildern. Wenn solch ein Abkommen über den Klimawandel zustande kommt und Deutschland diesem beitritt, müsste es seine CO2-Emissionen reduzieren, was erhebliche sozioökonomische Folgen für Deutschland haben könnte.
Vignette 1	Germany will send a delegation to an international conference on climate change which is authorised to negotiate an international agreement on behalf of Germany. The delegation will be led by 6 people. All 6 are high-ranking members of the German national government.	Deutschland wird eine Delegation zu einer internationalen Klimawandelkonferenz entsenden, welche bevollmächtigt ist im Namen Deutschlands ein internationales Abkommen auszuhandeln. Die Delegation wird von 6 Personen geleitet. Alle 6 sind hochrangige Mitglieder der deutschen Bundesregierung.
Vignette 2	Germany will send a delegation to an international conference on climate change which is authorised to negotiate an international agreement on behalf of Germany. The delegation will be led by 6 people. 3 high-ranking members of the German national government and 3 non-government representatives from: ♦ Germany's largest non-governmental environmental organisation; ♦ The largest association of private German businesses; ♦ A top German university.	Deutschland wird eine Delegation zu einer internationalen Klimawandelkonferenz entsenden, welche bevollmächtigt ist im Namen Deutschlands ein internationales Abkommen auszuhandeln. Die Delegation wird von sechs Personen geleitet. Davon sind 3 hochrangige Mitglieder der deutschen Bundesregierung und 3 NichtregierungsvertreterInnen von: • der größten deutschen Umwelt-Nichtregierungsorganisation; • dem größten Verband der deutschen Privatwirtschaft; • einer deutschen Spitzenuniversität.
Vignette 3	Germany will send a delegation to an international conference on climate change which is authorised to negotiate an international agreement on behalf of Germany. The delegation will be led by 6 people. 3 high-ranking members of the German national government and 3 non-government representatives from:	Deutschland wird eine Delegation zu einer internationalen Klimawandelkonferenz entsenden, welche bevollmächtigt ist im Namen Deutschlands ein internationales Abkommen auszuhandeln. Die Delegation wird von sechs Personen geleitet. Davon sind 3 hochrangige

	♦ Germany's largest non-governmental environmental organisation; ♦ The largest association of private German businesses; ♦ A top German university. All of these organisations are independent of government funding.	Mitglieder der deutschen Bundesregierung und 3 NichtregierungsvertreterInnen von: • der größten deutschen Umwelt-Nichtregierungsorganisation; • dem größten Verband der deutschen Privatwirtschaft; • einer deutschen Spitzenuniversität. Alle diese Organisationen sind unabhängig von staatlicher Finazierung.
Vignette 4	Germany will send a delegation to an international conference on climate change which is authorised to negotiate an international agreement on behalf of Germany. The delegation will be led by 6 people. 3 high-ranking members of the German national government and 3 climate campaigners from social movements including the youth-led 'Fridays for Future' movement.	Deutschland wird eine Delegation zu einer internationalen Klimawandelkonferenz entsenden, welche bevollmächtigt ist im Namen Deutschlands ein internationales Abkommen auszuhandeln. Die Delegation wird von sechs Personen geleitet. Davon sind 3 hochrangige Mitglieder der deutschen Bundesregierung und 3 KlimaschützerInnen aus sozialen Bewegungen, darunter ein Mitglied der von Jugendlichen geführten "Fridays for Future" Bewegung.
Question regarding support	To what extent would you support an international climate agreement negotiated by the proposed German delegation? *11 point scale ranging from 0 (no support) to 10 (strong support).*	Inwieweit würden Sie ein internationales Klimaabkommen unterstützen, das von der vorgeschlagenen deutschen Delegation verhandelt wird? *11-Punkte-Skala von 0 (keine Unterstützung) bis 10 (starke Unterstützung).*
Questions regarding legitimacy	**Legitimacy question #1 : Representation** "I think the delegation will **represent different political opinions** in Germany in a balanced and fair manner at the international climate negotiations." To what extent do you agree with this statement? *11 point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).* **Legitimacy question #2 : Transparency** "I think the delegation will provide **accurate information** on the	**Legitimitätsfrage #1 : Repräsentation** "Ich denke, dass die Delegation bei den internationalen Klimaverhandlungen unterschiedliche politische Meinungen in Deutschland ausgewogen und fair vertreten wird." In welchem Maße stimmen Sie dieser Aussage zu? *11-Punkte-Skala von 0 (stimme überhaupt nicht zu) bis 10 (stimme voll und ganz zu).* **Legitimitätsfrage #2 : Transparenz**

	international climate negotiations and their outcome to German citizens." To what extent do you agree with this statement? *11 point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).* **Legitimacy question #3 : Knowledge & expertise** "I think the delegation will have **sufficient knowledge and expertise** to contribute to an international agreement that deals effectively with climate change." To what extent do you agree with this statement? *11 point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).*	"Ich denke, dass die Delegation die deutschen Bürgerinnen und Bürger genau über die internationalen Klimaverhandlungen und deren Ergebnisse informieren wird." In welchem Maße stimmen Sie dieser Aussage zu? *11-Punkte-Skala von 0 (stimme überhaupt nicht zu) bis 10 (stimme voll und ganz zu).* **Legitimätsfrage #3 : Wissen und Kompetenz** "Ich glaube, dass die Delegation über ausreichende Kenntnisse und Fachwissen verfügt, um zu einem internationalen Abkommen beizutragen, das den Klimawandel wirksam bekämpft." In welchem Maße stimmen Sie dieser Aussage zu? *11-Punkte-Skala von 0 (stimme überhaupt nicht zu) bis 10 (stimme voll und ganz zu).*
Manipulation question	From the text you read previously, who led the German delegation? Please select one of the options below. ♦ *6 members of the national government* ♦ *3 members of the national government and 3 non-government representatives*	In dem Text den Sie zuvor gelesen haben, wer leitete die deutsche Delegation? Bitte wählen Sie eine der folgenden Optionen aus. ♦ 6 hochrangige Mitglieder der deutschen Bundesregierung ♦ 3 hochrangige Mitglieder der deutschen Bundesregierung und 3 NichtregierundsvertreterInnen.
Demographic Questions (objective)	**1. What is your age?** ♦ *18-24* ♦ *25-34* ♦ *35-44* ♦ *45-54* ♦ *55-64* ♦ *65 & over* **2. What is your gender?** ♦ *Female* ♦ *Male* ♦ *Non-binary/third* ♦ *Prefer not to say*	**1. Was ist Ihr Alter?** ♦ *18-24* ♦ *25-34* ♦ *35-44* ♦ *45-54* ♦ *55-64* ♦ *65 & älter* **2. Was ist Ihr Geschlecht?** ♦ *Weiblich* ♦ *Männlich* ♦ *Nicht-binär/drittes Geschlecht* ♦ *Möchte ich nicht sagen*

	3. **Where is your current place of residence?** ♦ *Baden-Wurttenburg* ♦ *Bavaria* ♦ *Berlin* ♦ *Brandenburg* ♦ *Bremen* ♦ *Hamburg* ♦ *Hesse* ♦ *Lower Saxony* ♦ *Mecklenburg-Vorpommern* ♦ *North Rhine-Westphalia* ♦ *Rhineland-Palatinate* ♦ *Saarland* ♦ *Saxony* ♦ *Saxony-Anhalt* ♦ *Schleswig-Holstein* ♦ *Thuringia* **4. What is your highest level of education?** ♦ No degree ♦ Elementary/high school diploma ♦ Secondary education ♦ A-levels ♦ Vocational training ♦ University of Applied Science ♦ Bachelor degree ♦ Master degree ♦ Promotion/PhD **5. Where would you situate yourself on the political spectrum where 1 is furthest left and 5 is furthest right?** *5-point scale from 1 (far left) to 5 (far right).*	**3. Wo ist Ihr derzeitiger Wohnsitz?** ♦ *Baden-Württemberg* ♦ *Bayern* ♦ *Berlin* ♦ *Brandenburg* ♦ *Bremen* ♦ *Hamburg* ♦ *Hessen* ♦ *Mecklenburg-Vorpommern* ♦ *Niedersachsen* ♦ *Nordrhein-Westfalen* ♦ *Rheinland-Pfalz* ♦ *Saarland* ♦ *Sachsen* ♦ *Sachsen-Anhalt* ♦ *Schleswig-Holstein* ♦ *Thüringen* **4. Was ist Ihr höchster Bildungsabschluss?** ♦ Kein Schulabschluss ♦ Grund-/Hauptschulabschluss ♦ Realschule - Mittlere Reife ♦ Gymnasium - Abitur ♦ Abgeschlossene Ausbildung ♦ Fachhochschulabschluss ♦ Hochschule - Diplom/Bachelor ♦ Hochschule - Magister/Master ♦ Hochschule - Promotion/PhD **5. Wo würden Sie sich auf dem politischen Spektrum einordnen, wobei 1 für am weitesten links und 5 für am weitesten rechts steht?** *5-Punkte-Skala von 1 (ganz links) bis 5 (ganz rechts).*
Debriefing	Thank you for your participation in this survey. Your response has been recorded. The aim of this survey has been to learn about your preferences regarding the German national delegation in a hypothetical international climate negotiation. You may contact Ms. Caitlan Read at c.g.read@umail.leidenuniv.nl if you have any questions or research-related concerns.	Vielen Dank, dass Sie an der Umfrage teilgenommen haben. Ihre Antwort wurde erfasst. Ziel dieser Umfrage war es, Ihre Präferenzen in Bezug auf die deutsche nationale Delegation in einer hypothetischen internationalen Klimaverhandlung zu erfahren. Sie können sich an Frau Caitlan Read unter c.g.read@umail.leidenuniv.nl wenden, wenn Sie Fragen oder forschungsbezogene Anliegen haben.

Section C: Balance Checks

Government vs CSOs: Distribution of Climate Importance

	Dependent variable:
	Distribution between Treatment Groups a
Climate Importance	-0.096**
	(0.041)
Constant	0.942***
	(0.189)
Observations	243
R^2	0.023
Adjusted R^2	0.019
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

CSOs vs Independent CSOs: Distribution of Gender

	Dependent variable:
	Distribution between Treatment Groups b
Gender: Male	-0.045
	(0.065)
Gender: Non-binary	0.500**
	(0.253)
Constant	0.500***
	(0.045)
Observations	238
R^2	0.020
Adjusted R^2	0.012
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Section D: Government vs Social Movements - Transparency

Government vs Social Movements: Transparency

	Dependent variable:	
	Transparency	
	25	26
Social Movements	0.633**	0.791***
	(0.281)	(0.277)
Climate Importance		0.841***
		(0.226)
Climate Action		-0.123
		(0.145)
Age: 35+		0.466
		(0.329)
Gender: Male		0.512*
		(0.294)
Gender: Non-binary		-0.719
		(1.233)
Location: New States		-0.026
		(0.476)
Education: Tertiary		0.328
		(0.284)
Political Opinion: Centre		-0.239
		(0.318)
Political Opinion: Right		-1.070*
		(0.646)
Constant	6.273***	2.261**
	(0.197)	(1.087)
Observations	238	236
R^2	0.021	0.123
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.084
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Robustness Check of Government vs Social Movements: Transparency

	Dependent variable:	
	Transparency	
	25.2	26.2
Social Movements	0.371	0.509*
	(0.312)	(0.307)
Climate Importance		0.856***
		(0.239)
Climate Action		-0.094
		(0.159)
Age: 35+		0.310
		(0.353)
Gender: Male		0.411
		(0.323)
Gender: Non-binary		-0.835
		(1.262)
Location: New States		0.154
		(0.525)
Education: Tertiary		0.475
		(0.311)
Political Opinion: Centre		-0.247
		(0.349)
Political Opinion: Right		-1.178
		(0.741)
Constant	6.451***	2.323**
	(0.220)	(1.153)
Observations	203	203
R^2	0.007	0.121
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.075
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Section E: Robustness Check 1 - Government vs CSOs