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## **Securitising Climate Change: Framing and Implementation in the post-Paris Agreement European Union**

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# Securitising Climate Change

Framing and Implementation in the post-Paris Agreement European Union



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## Abbreviations

ECL – EU Climate Law 2021

EP – European Parliament

EU – European Union

CS – Copenhagen School

## Abstract

How have framings of climate change in European Parliamentary debates been used as a tool for attempted influence over the European Union's long-term climate strategy in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris agreement? This single case study conducts a qualitative content analysis on the debates around, and the content of, the European Climate Law from 2021. The study tests the relevance and applicability of the Copenhagen school of securitisation theory, with the aim to contribute toward a deeper understanding of the European, and global, lack of effort to combat climate change. It can be concluded that framings of climate change in the European Parliamentary debates have been used as tools for attempted influence over the European Climate Law, in that the debates have been characterised by (unsuccessful) securitisation attempts.

**Keywords:** | Copenhagen school | Securitisation | Climate change |

## Introduction

Climate change is a transnational, multi-dimensional problem, in need of rapid action (Fuso Nerini et al., 2019, p. 674). The complex costs of the issue have already become evident, and the consequences are only likely to get more severe with time (International Panel on Climate Change, 2022, p. 11). The heart of the challenge consists of collective action problems where states and individuals are reluctant to pull their weight for the greater good, resulting slow progress across the board on climate issues (Dryzek et al., 2011, p. 10). The fact that the negative consequences of climate change will affect every human on earth makes it the most crucial issue of our time, and that our state-centric system has proven inadequate to tackle the problem makes it all the more important to explore new solutions (Dryzek, et al., 2011, p. 10).

One would expect a problem with such magnitude as climate change, to automatically produce solutions that get around the well-known obstacles of collective action problems and state sovereignty. As has been established, however, this has not yet been the case (Dryzek, et al., 2011, p. 1). It is therefore the aim of this thesis to explore the dynamics influencing the world community's tackling of the climate crisis. How can we explain the fact that climate change has been described as a serious security threat for years, without significant progress being made?

International organisations (IOs) such as the European Union (EU) have generally been seen as better suited than states for the task of handling climate change, due to their transnational and supranational nature (Kukkonen et al., 2018, p. 54). However, problems of IO enforcement and compliance prevail in a world system characterised by the state as the dominating actor (Weikmans & Guptap, 2021 p. 648), and there is no consensus on what message, incentive, or technique might push states and IOs to act on climate change (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010, pp. 22030-22031).

One field of research that has attempted to explain how states and IOs might tackle climate change is the Copenhagen School (CS) of securitisation (Dryzek et al., 2011, p. 11). The CS of securitisation theorizes that securitised speech acts have the power to change the way an issue is dealt with by moving it out of the ordinary political setting, and into a position where extraordinary measures are justified to tackle the problem in question (van Munster, 2012, p. 140).

Whilst some say speech acts in general, and securitised speech acts in particular, constitute one of the most effective techniques to achieve action on urgent issues (Trombetta, 2014, p. 142),

others claim their effect on climate issues is limited (Bo, 2014, p. 95). As there is no consensus on the efficacy of (securitised) speech acts on influencing extraordinary climate action, this thesis aims to contribute to establishing a deeper understanding of the mechanisms enabling, and hindering such measures – by testing the CS theory of securitisation.

This gap in the established literature might be filled by looking at whether framing of climate change in European Parliamentary (EP) debates can be reflected in the acclaimed EU Climate Law (ECL). This will be done by analysing whether securitisation attempts in the form of speech acts have taken place in the EP, and if so, whether this is reflected in the ECL in the form of extraordinary measures – as would be expected based on the classical securitisation theory. For this purpose, the following research question will be explored:

*How have framings of climate change in European Parliamentary debates been used as a tool for attempted influence over the European Union's long-term climate strategy, in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris agreement?*

Firstly, a review of the established literature will be presented, outlining how this thesis might contribute to the understanding of the topic. Thereafter follows an elaboration of the theoretical framework of the CS of securitisation theory, as well as a methodological overview. Then, the results of the analysis will be presented, establishing how the EP has attempted to influence the ECL, along with a discussion of the findings, elaborating on possible explanations for the observed relationship. Finally, some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research will be presented.

## Literature review

Numerous scholars have addressed the many possible avenues states and IOs can go down to curb, fight or adapt to the devastating consequences of climate change. Amongst the questions debated is the extent to which securitisation by means of speech acts is an effective tool to influence climate change related policy and legislation. While some claim the importance and effectiveness of securitised speech acts is limited in a climate setting (Bo, 2014, p. 95), others claim they are some of the most important and effective means by which states and IOs can shape their future climate efforts (Trombetta, 2014, p. 142). The following section will review the existing literature on this academic debate, and show how the current research will contribute toward establishing a consensus on the topic.

On one side of the debate, one can find scholars claiming that future climate change policy and legislation is influenced by securitised speech acts to a limited extent. Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009) illustrate an often used argumentation – that securitised speech acts depend upon a liberal-democratic setting to influence policy or legislation (p. 1172). Their study undertakes the relatively new concept of cyber security, and compares securitisation of cyberspace with the case of climate change (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 1156). However, although stating that the effectiveness of speech acts is limited by their lack of universal applicability might be accurate, it is arguably a weak claim. This thesis will therefore analyse securitised speech acts on their own terms – in a liberal-democratic setting, where their relevance can be tested *ceteris paribus*.

Trombetta (2014) extends beyond the argument made by Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009), by arguing that securitised speech acts might have limited influence over political and legislative climate developments *on their own* (p. 144). She claims that attempts at shaping climate policies are best understood with a combination of speech acts, and more subtle securitisation moves, in mind (Trombetta, 2014, p. 144). The nuance in this claim makes it a slightly stronger argument, and the current research will assess its applicability by applying it to a new context.

Adding to Trombetta (2014), Bo (2016) presents what he describes as a failed case of securitisation, namely the securitisation of climate change in China (p. 95). He highlights that climate change has been dually framed as both a security issue and a development issue, but that it has not reached the status of supreme priority, as it has in other parts of the world (Bo, 2014, p. 98). The most important reason highlighted by Bo (2016) is related to countries' individual feelings of safety. He claims that securitised speech acts might push powerful states to action, but that it is likely to have the opposite effect on weaker states, who can experience global threat and conflict discourses as powerful states justifying interfering in weaker states' domestic affairs (Bo, 2016, p. 110). In other words, securitisation by means of speech acts might not be the most effective tool states have at hand when fighting climate change.

At the same time, McDonald (2012) replies to Bo (2016) by providing an example of a powerful state that also experienced a failed case of climate securitisation –Australia under Prime Minister Rudd. This example shows that climate change has been attempted securitised by means of speech acts, but not successfully securitised in terms of extraordinary measures (McDonald, 2012, p. 590). McDonald (2012) presents a well-known reasoning for the lack of extraordinary measures; that the presence of competing threats reduces the power of the securitised speech act (p. 589).

In other words, when it comes to the most effective way of influencing climate measures, securitising speech acts do not have universal support. On the other side of the debate, several scholars have argued that securitised speech acts are in fact one of the most effective tools with which states and IOs can influence their future climate policies.

Jabber and Jinquan (2013) provide a general explanation of how speech acts are the most important tool for political actors to achieve their goals, particularly emphasising that “speech is a power in itself” (p. 1). They build upon the well-known speech act theory by Searle (1969), by analysing a speech by former U.S. President Barack Obama, explaining how politicians have the power to influence policy and legislation through the power of speech (Jabber & Jinquan, 2013, p. 2).

Franco (2022) elaborates on this point in a climate-specific setting, by analysing how climate scientists best can convey their knowledge to the audience, and thereby stimulating action (p. 1005). He argues that speech acts are effective when the speaker takes into account the audience’s interest in, and knowledge of, climate change (Franco, 2022, p. 1013). Willis (2017) analyses a case where speakers indeed considered the audience’s interest, by showing how politicians’ speech acts on the topic of climate change can be carefully designed to *avoid* taking action to fight the crisis. She illustrates the power of the political speech act, by showing how the absence of securitised speech acts can lead to a lack of extraordinary climate measures (Willis, 2017, p. 216).

Further elaborating on the power of speech acts, Dupont (2019) claims that several aspects of the topic of climate change in fact have become successfully securitised by means of securitised speech acts (p. 370). She illustrates that the EU’s internal and external audiences have been convinced of the severity of the climate threat, and that the union has enacted extraordinary measures to tackle it (Dupont, 2019, p. 383). Paglia (2017) develops a similar argument in his U.S.-focused speech act analysis (p. 115), by emphasising the different aspects of the process of securitisation, concluding that climate change has gained status as being of supreme priority (pp. 97-100). However, since these two pieces do not adequately go into the specific criteria that constitute an “extraordinary measure”, and thus lack some substantiation for their conclusions, this thesis will explore this empirical gap on the topic of the EU’s securitisation of climate change.

Where some scholars have claimed that (securitised) speech acts are not an effective tool politicians, IOs, and states can use to influence climate policy, others disagree. It is clear that



there is no consensus on what the best tool of influence is, and better understanding the avenues available for making progress on climate issues is of great academic and societal importance. Therefore, the current research will contribute to the existing body of literature on this topic by assessing the relevance, applicability and effectiveness of securitised framings and speech acts to tackle climate issues. This thesis will also aim to overcome the main shortcomings of the established literature, as mentioned in the above review.

## Theoretical framework

Securitisation theory has been applied to explain how climate change has evolved as a security threat internationally, and has been used to predict possible future efforts that can be made to tackle the crisis (Dryzek et al., 2011, p. 10).

Classical securitisation theory, the Copenhagen School (CS), developed by Wæver in 1995, explains how securitising speech acts can influence the enactment of extraordinary measures to tackle an issue (Taureck, 2006, p. 55). More specifically, an issue is successfully securitised when an actor (typically an elite politician) performs a securitising move, or a securitised speech act, and the audience to which the speech act is directed accepts the premises of the securitisation (Williams, 2008, p. 4).

Furthermore, several facilitating contextual circumstances may make a securitisation attempt successful. Firstly, the securitising speech act should follow the so-called the grammar of security, focussing on identifying an existential threat, a referent object, and justifying extraordinary measures (Hayes, 2012, p. 66). Secondly, the securitising actor should be of a certain authority, to successfully convince the audience of the significance of the threat, and the justification of the measure (Hayes, 2012, p. 66).

Securitising speech acts can be understood as speech acts where “an actor (1) claims that a referent object is existentially threatened, (2) demands the right to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with the threat, and (3) convinces an audience that rule-breaking behaviour to counter the threat is justified” (van Munster, 2012, p. 140).

To be existentially threatened can be understood as any condition where the referent object is in immediate or future danger of being exterminated, or at immediate or future risk of having one’s way or quality of life significantly worsened from its current status (Sullivan et al., 2012, p. 738).

In short, securitising moves (if effective) enable the securitising actor to set off an automatic political mechanism, whereby an issue is given status of supreme priority, moved out of the regular realm, and into the realm of the extraordinary (van Munster, 2012, p. 140).

Extraordinary measures can be understood as a measure that is considered as a) being outside the democratic realm (van Munster, 2012, p. 140), or b) challenging and/or “transforming the existing regime of practices” (Balzacq, Leionard, Ruzicka, 2015, p. 518). Being outside the democratic realm can mean that an issue, rather than having specific approval from the general public, is being dealt with by a political/military elite detached from its voters on this issue (Aradau, 2004, p. 392). It can also mean that the method used to deal with the issue breaks with regular democratic processes or norms, such as rule of law, equality, fairness and liberty (Charrett, 2009, p. 15). Finally, challenging or transforming the existing regime of practice can be interpreted as measures that drastically or significantly alter well-established political, legislative, economic, or procedural practices to tackle the specific issue in question (Balzacq et al., 2015, p. 518).

Securitisation theory as a whole has produced several sub-schools, such as the Paris school and the Welsh school, criticising and elaborating on the original CS. These sub-schools focus less on how a securitising move changes the way an issue is dealt with, and more on how ways of dealing with an issue can lead to securitisation (Trombetta, 2014, p. 133). Both schools are context-dependent and rather different from the somewhat state-centric, mechanism-based CS (Bilgin, 2011, p. 400-401), showing the diverse nature of securitisation theory.

Critical sub-school nevertheless, the CS laid the basis for the now complex and multifaceted field (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2020, p. 5), and the approach is still a key theory in security studies (McDonald, 2008, p. 565). It is also present in research on climate change, but the lack of consensus on its applicability and relevance makes it meaningful to apply the theory in new contexts (Ciuta, 2009, p. 325).

Furthermore, the fact that speech acts still play a central role in local and global politics (Dylgjeri, 2017, 2019) makes the CS of securitisation theory a relevant theory to apply to what has been described as the most urgent and complex security issue of our time (Anderson, 2009, 179). Additionally, the need for extraordinary measures can be argued self-evident, as the threat of climate change is rapidly growing (Rice et al., 2014, p. 516). In other words, the centrality of speech acts in today’s political environment, and the relevance of the concept of

extraordinary measures to tackle climate change, makes the CS suitable for the purpose of this research.

There are also practical reasons why re-exploring the classical CS can be of academic and societal interest. In a world where democratic backsliding not only is a threat, but a reality, it is arguably vital to test theories that warn against new avenues for undemocratic developments (Bermeo, 2016, pp. 5-6). The CS is an example of such a theory. Further, in a world where ‘truth’ is an increasingly contested term, where the mass media is fragmented and polarised, and information is consumed faster and less critically than ever, the importance of understanding the effects of discourse and framing cannot be overstated (Piras, 2021, pp. 33-34). Examining the effect of securitising speech acts on climate change measures is one way of studying this topic, and this thesis will do so by testing the CS based securitisation theory. Based on the theory outlined above, the thesis will test the following hypothesis:

*Securitising speech acts in international organisations can influence the enactment of extraordinary measures to tackle climate change.*

Testing this hypothesis has the potential to produce an academically and societally relevant outcome, as it might contribute to our understanding of whether IO securitisation helps mobilising states to action. More generally the research might contribute to our understanding of the power (or lack thereof) of IOs’ political discourse over state action.

## Methodology

### Case selection

This thesis will conduct a single case study on the EU, analysing debates in the EP, and work by the EP and the European Council upon proposal from the European Commission, which is expected to contribute to understanding the effects of, and barriers to, cooperation between states on climate issues. Despite their relative lack of generalisability, single case studies can illustrate relationships in-depth, and provide useful examples for future work, in this case, to fight climate change (Lobo et al., 2018, p. 11).

The EP was chosen due to the large amount of speech material produced through its debates, which enables relevant and high-quality data to be collected. Work by the EP and the European Council (upon proposal by the European Commission), the ECL, will also be subject to analysis, as it is the union’s main legislative product on climate change.

The EU was chosen, in general, because it has been a key driving force in the global efforts to fight climate change (Dodo, 2014, p. 5). As it is clear that the climate crisis requires solutions incorporating both the power of the supranational and the centrality of national forces in world politics, it is interesting to research an IO that has gone further than most when it comes to integration and delegation (Nekvasil & Moldan, 2018, p. 129). It is in other words a good case to study if one wishes to understand the dynamics between states and IOs, which is likely to be a key aspect of future climate negotiations (Abbott, 2015, p. 375). Furthermore, the democratic nature of the EU makes it a meaningful case to study when testing a theory that was developed with such environments in mind (Bilgin, 2011, p. 399). Testing the CS theory in non-democratic contexts is also valuable, but as the purpose of this research is to test its general applicability and relevance, it is more useful to study a case in which the theory should be functional.

The EU has been highly successful at creating and implementing climate policy (Dodo, 2014, p. 13), as shown by examples such as the fact that “gas emissions were reduced by 24% between 1990 and 2019, while the economy grew by around 60%” (European Commission, 2022). However, far more work can still be done by the organisation’s members (Afionis, 2010, p. 342). The progress is not as rapid and comprehensive as many had hoped, although the EU stands as a beacon of hope in a world where real action is urgently needed (Bremberg et al., 2019, p. 633). The EU’s remarkable effort so far makes it a deviant case with the potential to say a lot about what conditions need to be in place for substantial mobilisation in the world of IOs, and what issues might arise when mobilisation does happen. Thus, although deviant cases are slightly less generalisable for larger populations, the EU’s climate progress so far makes it an academically, and societally interesting subject to study.

To summarise, the EU’s exceptional progress on climate issues (Dodo, 2014, p. 13), combined with its potential for achieving more (Afionis, 2010, p. 342), and its usefulness for the purpose of testing the securitisation theory, makes it an interesting case to analyse. Despite the downsides to single case studies, it is expected that this research will yield useful results for future climate efforts in IOs, and on state level.

### Data selection

The data will consist of debate minutes from EP debates, on the topic of the ECL and the European Green Deal. The former debates are relevant as they directly illustrate part of the process of developing the ECL, and the latter debates are relevant because the ECL “writes into law the goal set out in the European Green Deal” (European Commission, 2022). Analysing the EP debates will provide a large amount and spectrum of material, and it gives good insight into

the workings of the EU's decision-making process, which will be useful for understanding the shaping and implementation of its climate policy. Finally, the ECL and the Green Deal debates were selected to analyse how framings of climate change in debates have been used as a tool to influence the ECL.

Further, the data will consist of the ECL – as submitted by the EP and the European Council, in collaboration with the EU Commission, according to the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (European Parliament, 2022). The ECL is an important benchmark in the EU's long-term efforts against climate change (European Climate Foundation, 2021), and it is therefore expected to provide a good indication of the IO's progress on climate action.

### Data analysis

The thesis will conduct a qualitative content analysis, by evaluating the presence, importance, and meanings of sentences and phrases. Content analysis will provide a thorough and systematic understanding of the characteristics of the EP's framings of climate change, and evaluate the presence and effects of the discursive tools that are securitised speech acts. Although content analysis can have issues of reliability, validity, and reductionism, it is a highly effective way of studying written material and framing, which makes it a suitable method for this research (Barkley, 2021).

The analysis will be conducted in two steps. Firstly it will assess how the securitisation theory can be applied to EP debates on climate change, by analysing whether the speeches fulfil the rhetorical criteria of the CS. Secondly, the ECL will be analysed, to evaluate whether extraordinary measures have been enabled.

### Operationalisation

**Securitising speech acts** are identified as phrases where a speaker claims a referent object is existentially threatened. In the case of climate change in the EP debates, referent objects are any person, group, or unit that is existentially threatened by climate change. These might range from specific groups such as “indigenous peoples”, to less defined ones like “humanity”, or unquestionably threatened units such as “the earth”. That the threat is of existential nature will be identified by phrases indicating that the referent object will cease to exist, or have their way of life or regular existence significantly worsened (Sullivan et al., 2012, p. 738) due to the effects of climate change.

**Securitising speech acts also justify the enactment of extraordinary measures**, which are identified as phrases emphasising the need for great alterations in our economic, political, or

legislative system (Balzacq et al., 2015, p. 518), in order to fight climate change. They can also mention a need for less democratic procedures to get around political hindrances for acting on climate change. More generally, justifying extraordinary measures can be characterised by the use of “deontic powers”, referring to “rights, duties, obligations, derogations and permissions” to do something (Balzacq et al., 2015, p. 518).

**Extraordinary measures** will be identified as phrases in the ECL that show that the measures taken to combat climate change are not within the regular democratic realm of politics, for example by being moved “outside of the normal multilateral treaty framework” (Bo, 2016, p. 97) of the EU. They will also be identified as clauses or sentences that show that the measures to combat climate change move in the direction of significantly changing political, legislative, economic, or procedural practices (Balzacq et al., 2015, p. 518).

To assess the fullest possible range of measures, non-extraordinary measures will also be coded in the analysis. **Non-extraordinary measures** will be identified as phrases in the ECL that show that the measures taken to fight climate change maintain and value the regular democratic realm of politics, as described above. They will also be identified, based on the established conceptualisation of extraordinary measures, as clauses or sentences that show that the measures aim to preserve political, legislative, economic, or procedural practices.

Building on this, the following coding scheme will be used (for detailed coding scheme, see Annex 1):

Category	Sub-category	Explanation
Securitising speech acts	Threat claim	Speaker claims a referent object is existentially threatened by climate change.
	Right claim	Speaker claims the right to enact extraordinary measures due to the threat of climate change.
Extraordinary measures	Non-democratic measure	Breaks with established democratic norms and procedures to fight climate change.
	Challenging or transformative measure	Aims to challenge and/or transform the existing form of practice to fight climate change.

Non-extraordinary measures	Democratically focused measure	Focused on maintaining, or follows the established democratic norms and procedures to fight climate change.
	Non-challenging or transformative measure	Aims to maintain the existing form of practice to fight climate change.

## Analysis

### The European Parliament's attempted securitisation of climate change

This analysis will assess how framings of climate change in EP debates have been used as a tool to influence the 2021 ECL, and as a by-product attempt to develop the general understanding of the relevance and applicability of the CS of securitisation. Therefore, the nature of the statements in various debates will first be analysed, by assessing whether attempted securitisation has taken place.

More than 100 statements were categorised as securitising moves across the six debates analysed, many of which drew direct lines between the existential threat of climate change, and the enactment of a climate law. The following speech act is a clear example showing parliamentarians' efforts to identify climate change as a serious threat (translated from French):

... we are talking about life, people's lives, protecting the lives of our own. (...) The next ten years are crucial: storms, drought, threatened glaciers, entire territories plunged into fuel poverty require action proportional to the dangers. (Toussaint, European Parliament, 2020).

Another example of climate change being framed as a security threat, and the associated need for the ECL, can be seen in the following (translated from Dutch):

(...) climate change poses a major threat. It affects our living environment. This puts pressure on our food production. (...) Globally, we must address this challenge. I am therefore in favour of a climate law at European level (Huitema, European Parliament, 2021).

The speakers evoke distinct feelings of urgent threats, by painting a picture of time running out, and physical damage becoming more likely. They also emphasise how climate change will affect everyone, elevating the sense of severity, clearly framing the issue as a serious threat.

Further, that the second statement connects the fact that climate change poses a great threat, to the necessity of the ECL, shows that the securitising move was intended as a tool to influence the enactment of the law.

For a statement to be categorised as a clear securitising move, however, the mentioned threat also needs to be of existential nature, directed toward a clearly defined referent object. The most common referent object in the EP debates is the somewhat broad group of “future generations”: “It is crucial to stay below 1.5 degrees warming so that future generations will have a planet to live on” (Metz, European Parliament, 2020). This indirect reference to survival underlines the threat dimension the speaker wishes to convey, whilst pointing out the specific referent object of the threat. Another example including future generations as a referent object, that shows the direct link between the speech act and the ECL, can be seen in the following (translated from Danish):

The globe is overheated. (...) We have to act now before it's too late. That is also why we must have an ambitious European climate law. If we do not get it, then we will pass the bill on to future generations, and that is simply not reasonable. (Schaldemose, European Parliament, 2020).

Again, we can see that framing climate change as a security threat has been used as a tool to argue for the enactment of the ECL. Furthermore, as the consequences of climate change will worsen at an accelerating rate, it is natural that future generations are a common referent object in the EP debates. There are, however, also examples of other referent objects, for example those referring to threats towards “humanity”:

There will always be (...) issues that will potentially distract us from this historic responsibility of saving humanity, because that’s what we do with climate policy. But then we have the law to fall back on. We have the law to fall back on that will remain the framework, whatever distractions might occur along the way (Timmermans, European Parliament, 2021).

This referent object brings the threat more to life in a current sense, rather than pushing the issue into the future, as the “future generations” argumentation to some extent does. It is also clear here that the intention behind the attempted securitisation of climate change has been linked directly to the creation and enactment of the ECL.

A third common referent object referred to in the EP’s attempts at securitisation is that of our “planet”, as partially shown above. A general illustration of our planet being the main object at



risk, can be seen in statements such as: “... we only have one planet, one house, and it’s on fire (...) – we are burning this planet. We must take bold steps” (Bloss, European Parliament, 2020). Another example of planet earth as the referent object, more directly linking the speech act to the ECL, can be seen in the statement by Edina Tóth, saying (translated from Hungarian): “I appreciate the development of the European Green Agreement, the first continental plan to protect the future of our planet” (European Parliament, 2019).

It is clear that the EP has emphasised the existential nature of the threat of climate change, and that the members have pointed out several significant referent objects in the process. However, successful securitisation also requires extraordinary measures to be enacted. For extraordinary measures to be enacted, it is first necessary for the securitising actor to justify the use of such measures in their speech act. An example of such justifying moves can be seen in the following:

We have to slash greenhouse gas emissions within a timeframe that gives us some hope of avoiding a total wipe—out of life on our planet. We must set a truly ambitious target that will create the change we need by 2030. The implementation of the Paris Agreement is essential to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 (O’Sullivan, European Parliament, 2020).

This speaker emphasises how climate change will affect all parts of human life on Earth, thus justifying rapid and drastic action from the EU’s member countries, (indirectly) in the shape of the ECL (as the purpose of the ECL is to solidify the goals of the Paris Agreement). This statement illustrates climate change as an issue in need of drastically changed practices, although it does not explicitly argue for it being brought out of the democratic realm. Further, other forms of justification for extraordinary action can be seen, for example, in the statement below (translated from German):

In order to stop the climate crisis, we have to change the economic rules of the game. We all know that our current financial and economic system is increasing resource consumption and exacerbating the climate crisis. That is why we must not measure public budgets solely on the basis of the level of debt. There is no debt on a dead planet (Andresen, European Parliament, 2020)

The focus on drastic change is striking here, clearly emphasising the need for extraordinary measures to tackle the climate crisis. To point out that structural and institutional-level action is warranted places climate change in a position of supreme priority, which clearly shows an attempted securitisation of the issue.

The above examples show how members of the EP have spoken about climate change as an existential threat, with a range of different referent objects in focus. It is also clear that the right to take extraordinary measures to deal with the issue has been claimed. It can therefore be argued that the topic of climate change has been attempted securitised by the members of the EP.

Since attempted securitisation, according to the CS, is tightly connected to efforts to justify and enact extraordinary measures, it is sound to assume that the framings of climate change in the ECL debates in general have been used as a tool to influence the development of the ECL. In addition, since the EP is part of the process of shaping all EU legislation (European Parliament, 2022), one can assume that all statements on the topic of the ECL in the EP are intended to have an influence on the eventual legislation produced by the EU as a whole. Furthermore, as shown above, several statements directly link their attempted securitisation to the ECL – clearly showing the use of framing as a tool to influence climate policies and legislation.

#### [The enactment of extraordinary measures in the EU Climate Law](#)

If, as we now can assume, the securitised EP speech acts had the intention of influencing the ECL, it is interesting to assess whether the law shows proof of extraordinary measures being enacted. The following section will assess the main legislation (changes) of the EU's climate efforts, to gain a deeper understanding of what kind of influence the framings of climate change in EP debates have had.

Firstly, one should analyse whether the issue of climate change has been moved out of the democratic realm, as could be expected following the CS of securitisation. There are few if any examples of undemocratic developments in the ECL, as illustrated in paragraph 19 of the regulation, which clearly outlines the democratic principles inherent in the EU's legislative process (*European Climate Law*, regulation 2021/1119). That the climate measures outlined in the ECL are developed with the regular, well-established democratic procedure of the EU might seem obvious, but it nevertheless stands as a clear picture of the importance the organisation places on democratic values.

Not only is the overall legislative procedure democratic, there ECL also places a striking emphasis specific democratic values. An example is its focus on transparency and accountability: "... the Commission has committed itself to developing a regulatory framework for certification of carbon removals based on robust and transparent carbon accounting to

monitor and verify the authenticity of carbon removals ...” (*European Climate Law*, regulation 2021/1119).

The transparency of political processes, and the accountability of political actors, are cornerstones of the democratic procedure (Hollyer et al., 2011, p. 1192-1194), and seeing such values take centre stage in EU climate legislation makes it difficult to argue that there have been non-democratic developments. Further, democratic concepts like equality and fairness also play a key role in the ECL: “A fixed long-term objective is crucial to contribute to economic and societal transformation, (...) as well as to reach in a just, socially balanced, fair and cost-effective manner the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement” (*European Climate Law*, regulation 2021/1119).

Phrases like these send a clear message; the EU has democratic values at its core, not only in its procedure, but also in the content and goals of its legislation. The final aspect of the ECL that clearly shows the union’s stance on moving climate change out of the regular democratic realm, is the ECL’s unquestionable focus on voluntary participation and contribution:

(...) each Member State is invited to establish a national climate advisory body, responsible for providing expert scientific advice on climate policy to the relevant national authorities as prescribed by the Member State concerned. Where a Member State decides to establish such an advisory body, it shall inform the EEA thereof (*European Climate Law*, regulation 2021/1119).

The use of words like “invited” and “decides” shows a distinct, deliberative emphasis on the fact that the member states are free to do as they choose – as is in line with the democratic principles of the EU (European Parliament, 2022). Another striking example of the mild enforcement and penalisation policy in the ECL, can be seen in the following: “(...) if the Member State concerned decides not to address the recommendations or a substantial part thereof, that Member State shall provide the Commission its reasoning” (*European Climate Law*, regulation 2021/1119).

In other words, climate change has not been subject to securitisation in the sense that the issue has been brought out of the democratic realm, despite the securitised speech acts seen in the EP debates on the topic. It is perhaps intuitive that the EU, an organisation that places democratic values at the core of its very existence, will not go out of its way to move an issue out of the democratic realm. It is nevertheless interesting to observe that the CS’s warnings of undemocratic developments as a product of securitised speech acts have not been realised.

There is, however, a possibility of a second form of extraordinary measures to be enacted according to the CS, other than undemocratic developments: the challenging and/or transformation of the current practice (Balzacq et al., 2015, p. 518). This is of course a far broader understanding of the concept of extraordinary measures, making it inherently less of a clear-cut case of securitisation. When looking at the ECL, there are some examples of climate change being described as challenging the existing practice, such as the establishment of the “European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change”, or the following statement clearly outlining the supreme priority and transformational intention of the law:

The transition to climate neutrality requires changes across the entire policy spectrum and a collective effort of all sectors of the economy and society, as highlighted in the European Green Deal. The European Council, in its conclusions of 12 December 2019, stated that all relevant Union legislation and policies need to be consistent with, and contribute to, the fulfilment of the climate-neutrality objective while respecting a level playing field, and invited the Commission to examine whether this requires an adjustment of the existing rules (*European Climate Law*, regulation 2021/1119).

This strong rhetoric is not necessarily reflected in the rest of the content of the ECL, however. Whilst there are some examples of extraordinary measures in the shape of challenges to or transformations of existing practices, there are far more examples of the opposite. Although the measures and suggestions presented in the law are broad, ambitious, and show clear signs of urgency and high prioritisation, there is at the same time a continuous focus on ensuring economic growth, and using many of the already established mechanisms and practices of the union to foster change: “When proposing the Union 2040 climate target in accordance with paragraph 3, the Commission shall consider the following: (...) cost-effectiveness and economic efficiency” (*European Climate Law*, regulation 2021/1119).

Preserving and taking care of the economy as part of the union’s climate efforts is not problematic in itself, but the clear economic focus of the ECL goes against what the CS would describe as a transformation of existing practices. Statements such as: “The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the Union’s climate policy and constitutes its key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective way” (*European Climate Law*, regulation 2021/1119), are common throughout the regulation, and go to show that even the new innovations from the union’s side continue to be based on the established practice of putting economic growth at the centre of its climate policies.

The above analysis shows that debates on the ECL in the EP have been used as a tool to influence the making of the ECL itself, by attempted securitisation of the issue. The attempted securitisation has not shown itself an effective tool, however, as extraordinary measures have not been enabled in the ECL, and the securitisation attempt must therefore be deemed unsuccessful.

## Discussion

The dominance of securitised speech acts in EP debates indicates that there has been an attempted securitisation of climate change. However, the ECL shows little indication of extraordinary measures being enacted. Thus, one can say that framing climate change as a security threat in EP debates has been used as a tool to influence the EU's long-term climate strategy, but that the attempted influence has not yielded the expected results, according to the CS. The following section will elaborate on the possible reasons behind this relationship, to explore the tools available for states and IOs who wish to influence the global progress on climate action.

Looking at both the EP debates, and the ECL, it is clear that the EU values maintaining and strengthening its democratic core higher than enacting what the CS would define as extraordinary climate measures. Following the CS logic, the attempted securitisation of climate change failed because the EU puts democratic values higher than the benefits of tackling climate change – in other words; the political price of enacting extraordinary measures to deal with the climate crisis is too high (Bo, 2016, p. 98).

Further applying the CS theory, one might explain the failed case of securitisation as being caused by a lack of audience support after the initial securitising move. The CS is highly dependent on the audience accepting the issue as a security threat, for the extraordinary measures to be justified and enacted (Bo, 2016, p. 97). If the members of the EU do not accept the narrative that climate change poses an existential threat to their survival, full securitisation cannot take place.

This dynamic might be due to the fact that climate change is a highly complex issue, which inherently poses different forms and levels of risk to different states and groups. In other words, it is highly challenging to frame climate change as a universal threat, when the nature of the threat differs across states (Dupont, 2019, pp. 373-374). Thus, following the CS logic, the lack of extraordinary measures in the ECL might also stem from a lack of audience support after the attempted securitisation (Dupont, 2019, pp. 373-374).

One can clearly see the EU's prioritisation of democracy over extraordinary measures, and a possible refusal from the EU member states against categorising climate change as a security threat, in the fact that the EU's member states have not delivered as expected on their climate progress (Climate Change Performance Index, 2021). That several EU member states are far behind the EU wide goals outlined after 2015 (Climate Change Performance Index, 2021) would, following the CS logic, indicate that the securitisation message members of the EP attempted to convey has not convinced the audience of the urgency and threat of the issue. Further, that the EU still has not taken more forceful measures to enforce member states' compliance (Minas, 2020, p. 184) indicates that the EU values the democratic rights of its member states higher than possibly tackling climate change.

The above findings have shown that it is *possible* to apply the CS to the area of EU climate politics, and thereby understand how EP debates have been used as a tool for attempted influence over EU legislation. By identifying securitised speech acts in the EP, and analysing the subsequent (lack of) policy changes, one can conclude, following the CS logic, that climate change has been subject to a failed securitisation attempt in the EU. However, the question of the theory's relevance in the case of the EU's handling of climate change is still open. Is it *useful* to apply the CS to the case of EU climate politics?

As the EU has gone further than most IOs in its efforts to tackle climate change (Dodo, 2014, p. 5), it is worth questioning whether it is fair and accurate to describe climate change as a case of "failed" securitisation. It is clear that the EU's member states in general take climate change more seriously than most other states in the world – an attitude one must assume stems from a certain sense of threat and security risk. In other words, that the CS insists on describing the EU's efforts as a case of failed securitisation can come across as somewhat inconsequential, and some might therefore argue that the CS lacks relevance in the case of EU climate politics.

Other sub-schools of securitisation might be better equipped to explain and predict the EU's climate measures, as the CS's understanding of the situation, based on the current research, seems too simplistic. That is, to explain and predict the developments in EU climate politics, it is more useful to apply a theory that leaves more space for strong measures to be taken within a democratic framework.

Further, according to the CS logic, extraordinary measures have not been enacted in the EU partially because the union places a higher value on democracy than on fighting climate change. That does not explain, however, why non-democratic states are lagging far behind democratic

ones when it comes to contributing to fighting climate change (Zhao et al., 2021, p. 3). An alternative school of securitisation might be better suited for explaining this noteworthy phenomenon.

That being said, the analysis conducted in this research has demonstrated that EP debates have been used as a tool, by means of attempted securitisation, for attempted influence over the development of the EU's long-term climate strategy – findings that are not without value for the academic progress in understanding global climate politics. The current research has shown the importance of applying holistic, cross-disciplinary approaches to understand how states, IOs, and the world community can work together to fight climate change. Testing the CS of securitisation has shown its applicability, but also its insufficiency in the case of EU climate politics, and laid the groundwork for further research into the concept of climate change as a security threat in the EU.

## Conclusion

The aim of this research has been to apply and thereby test the CS theory, to contribute to the understanding of the role of IOs in humanity's fight against climate change. This has been done by exploring the question “How have framings of climate change in European Parliamentary debates been used as a tool for attempted influence over the European Union's long-term climate strategy in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris agreement?” Building on this, the hypothesis “Securitising speech acts in international organisations can influence the enactment of extraordinary measures to tackle climate change” has been tested.

The results show that the EP has attempted to influence the EU's long term climate strategy by means of securitised speech acts on the topic of climate change and the ECL. The results also show that the attempted securitisation was unsuccessful, as the use of securitised speech acts to influence the development of the ECL was not an effective tool. In conclusion, it is not possible to confirm the hypothesis based on the research conducted.

A limitation to this research is that the concept of desecuritisation has not been analysed in depth. To fully understand the power and significance of securitising moves, future research should aim to compare efforts to securitise a topic to efforts to desecuritize the same issue. Such analysis was beyond the scope of this research, but the lack of such an approach in the current academic landscape is noticeable. Future research should also take into account a larger scope of data, as there are several ambitious pieces of legislation worth exploring.

Limitations notwithstanding, this research has contributed to a deeper understanding of the applicability and relevance of the CS of securitisation, whilst exploring the relationship between democracy, climate change, and discursive framings in Europe's political environment. It can therefore be seen as a stable stepping stone for future research into the reasoning behind state behaviour on the topic of climate change, the power and influence of speech acts, and the role of securitisation theory in today's academic landscape.



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## Annex 1

### Coding scheme

Category	Sub-category	Code colour	Explanation	Search words
Securitising speech acts	Threat claim	Yellow	Speaker claims a referent object is existentially threatened by climate change.	Security Safe Threat Danger Risk Vulnerable Existential Survival Indigenous Generations Earth/planet
	Right claim	Green	Speaker claims the right to enact extraordinary measures due to the threat of climate change.	Right Future Action Important Emergency Need
Extraordinary measures	Non-democratic measure	Blue	Measure shows a break with established democratic norms and procedures to fight climate change.	Drastic Authoritative Unprecedented
	Challenging or transformative measure	Red	Measure shows aim of challenge and/or transform the existing form of practice to fight climate change.	Transform/ative Drastic Unprecedented Urgent/cy
Non-extraordinary measures	Democratically focused measure	Pink	Measure is focused on maintaining and/or follows the established democratic norms	Democracy/tic Inclusive/sion Fair

			and procedures to fight climate change.	Participation Hear/heard
	Non-challenging or transformative measure	Turquoise	Measure aims to maintain the existing form of practice to fight climate change.	Consider Choose Voluntary

## Annex 2

### Debate transcripts

European Climate Law 06.10.2020	
Original phrase	Translation
<p>Non, nous parlons de la vie, de la vie des gens, de la vie des nôtres pour les protéger. Nous n'avons plus le temps d'attendre. Les dix prochaines années sont cruciales: les tempêtes, la sécheresse, les glaciers menacés, les territoires entiers plongés dans la précarité énergétique demandent une action à la hauteur des dangers.</p> <p>-Marie Toussaint</p>	<p>No, we are talking about life, people's lives, the lives of our own to protect them. We don't have time to wait anymore. The next ten years are crucial: storms, drought, threatened glaciers, entire territories plunged into energy precarity require action proportionate to the dangers.</p> <p>-Marie Toussaint</p>
<p>No, sorry, we don't have that. A long reparation will actually endanger us more – all of us, all on this planet.</p> <p>-Jytte Gauteland</p>	
<p>We know some lawmakers will refuse to act. They would rather risk climate catastrophe and let the rest of us deal with the fallout. But this is not acceptable for us. We want to make sure that we start acting today and make our societies and our continent future proof.</p> <p>-Miriam Dalli</p>	



<p>We must help households in regions that are at risk of being left behind.</p> <p>-Frans Timmermans</p>	
<p>We have to slash greenhouse gas emissions within a timeframe that gives us some hope of avoiding a total wipe—out of life on our planet. We must set a truly ambitious target that will create the change we need by 2030. The implementation of the Paris Agreement is essential to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. No Paris, no SDGs.</p> <p>-Grace O’Sullivan</p>	
<p>in this Parliament, in 2020, we have an opportunity to do something that we don’t always do, which is to set aside all electoral considerations and do the right thing, and make a down payment for those coming generations against whose credit today’s emissions are being paid.</p> <p>-Barry Andrews</p>	
<p>the provisions for climate adaptation have been strengthened, with increased consideration of vulnerable groups.</p> <p>-Jytte Gauteland</p>	

<p>By 2050, the global population will have reached 9 billion; that's up from 7 billion today. And those 2 billion new citizens will not live in the EU or in developed countries; they will live in developing countries. They will live in parts of developing countries that are vulnerable to environmental shocks: on hillsides, in river deltas. So, what we need to do is to acknowledge that <b>these new citizens will live with the greatest vulnerabilities associated with climate change</b>, having contributed the least, and that is the essence of climate justice based on human rights.</p> <p>-Barry Andrews</p>	
<p><b>Consider extrem de important să efectuăm tranziția către neutralitatea climatică, bazându-ne pe studiul amplu de impact efectuat de către Comisia Europeană</b> în ultimele luni, într-un mod responsabil, progresiv și sigur, protejând și economia Uniunii Europene, generând locuri de muncă și nu distrugându-le, fără a impune taxe suplimentare cetățenilor.</p> <p>-Dan-Ștefan Motreanu</p>	<p><b>I consider it extremely important to make the transition to climate neutrality, based on the comprehensive impact study carried out by the European Commission</b> in recent months, in a responsible, progressive and safe way, also protecting the European Union economy, generating jobs and not destroying them, without imposing additional taxes on citizens.</p> <p>-Dan-Ștefan Motreanu</p>
<p><b>We must guide our societies</b> to a cleaner and healthier future, one that our children can embrace with hope, not fear.</p> <p>-Frans Timmermans</p>	

<p>This is crucial to stay below 1.5 degrees warming so that future generations will have a planet to live on. For that, Parliament needs to send a strong signal today and vote for the most ambitious, science—based targets.</p> <p>-Tilly Metz</p>	
<p>People’s lives like the life of Sanna Vanar. She is from the Saami culture from Sweden and the culture is based on the cultivation of reindeer, but the reindeer are on the verge of getting extinct due to the climate crisis. Sanna says: ‘if we lose the reindeer, we lose the Saami culture too.’</p> <p>We are here in the European Parliament; we are here to represent them and we can do something about their future.</p> <p>-Michael Bloss</p>	
<p>Dear colleagues, we are not voting on numbers here today. We are voting on the future of Vlad Petru, of Sanna Vanar and of many others lives. I will become a father in December. We are also voting today on the future of my children and on the future of our children.</p> <p>-Michael Bloss</p>	
<p>We only have one planet, one house, and it’s on fire – in Portugal, in California, in Siberia we are burning this planet. We must take bold steps.</p>	

<p>-Michael Bloss</p>	
<p>Esta Ley climática marca una hoja de ruta clara y ambiciosa, un marco jurídico estable y previsible para los agentes económicos, certidumbre, <b>y también el reconocimiento del derecho de nuestros ciudadanos a un planeta sano y habitable.</b></p> <p>-María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos</p>	<p>This Climate Law marks a clear and ambitious roadmap, a stable and predictable legal framework for economic agents, certainty, and <b>also the recognition of the right of our citizens to a healthy and habitable planet.</b></p> <p>-María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos</p>
<p>Pero hoy también lanzamos un mensaje al mundo: que queremos, como europeos, el liderazgo en lo que será la carrera en el viaje a la Luna del siglo XXI. Esta vez no vamos a viajar a ningún planeta, <b>vamos a tener que salvar nuestro planeta.</b></p> <p>-Javi López</p>	<p>But today we are also launching a message to the world: that we want, as Europeans, leadership in what will be the race to the Moon in the 21st century. This time we are not going to travel to any planet, <b>we are going to have to save our planet.</b></p> <p>-Javi López</p>
<p><b>Poštovana predsjedavajuća, naš planet nije dobro. On je bolestan. Mladi, a i svi odgovorni ljudi su u strahu, svjesni da je budućnost neizvjesna.</b></p> <p>-Valter Flego</p>	<p><b>Dear President, our planet is not well. He is sick. Young people, and all responsible people, are in fear, aware that the future is uncertain.</b></p> <p>-Valter Flego</p>
<p>I would like to paint a picture of a house that's on fire. <b>This planet is on fire.</b></p> <p>-Jytte Gauteland</p>	

<p>The European Parliament has, alongside several countries, local authorities and scientists, declared that <b>our planet is facing a climate and environment emergency.</b></p> <p>-Rovana Plumb</p>	
<p>To tylko niektóre ze skutków kryzysu klimatycznego. Dekady bezlitosnej eksploatacji zasobów planety doprowadziły <b>nas na skraj przepaści.</b> Wielu strat nie uda nam się już <b>odwrócić,</b> ale nadal możemy i jesteśmy <b>zobowiązani</b> podjąć kroki, które uchronią <b>Ziemię i jej mieszkańców i mieszkanki przed katastrofą.</b></p> <p>-Sylwia Spurek</p>	<p>These are just some of the effects of the climate crisis. Decades of ruthless exploitation of the planet's resources have brought us to <b>the brink of the abyss.</b> <b>We will not be able to reverse many of the losses,</b> but we can and are still obliged to <b>take steps to protect the Earth and its inhabitants from catastrophe.</b></p> <p>-Sylwia Spurek</p>
<p>We are the first generation to <b>suffer</b> from the climate crisis, but we are also the last generation to stop it. So let's start listening to science, let's give hope to the younger generation, and let's stop this climate crisis.</p> <p>-Michael Bloss</p>	
<p><b>Kloden er overophedet. Europa har et medansvar for denne situation, og derfor skal vi også være med til at tage ansvar for at løse den.</b> Vi bliver nødt til at handle nu, inden det er for sent. <b>Det er også derfor, vi skal have en ambitiøs europæisk klimalov.</b> <b>Hvis ikke vi får det, så skubber vi regningen videre til</b></p>	<p><b>The globe is overheated. Europe has a shared responsibility for this situation, which is why we must also take responsibility for resolving it.</b> We have to act now before it's too late. <b>That is also why we must have an ambitious European climate law.</b> <b>If we do not get it, then we will</b></p>

<p>fremtidens generationer, og det går simpelthen ikke.</p> <p>-Christel Schaldemose</p>	<p>pass the bill on to future generations, and that is simply not reasonable.</p> <p>-Christel Schaldemose</p>
<p>Mit den Maßnahmen müssen wir dann ohnehin noch folgen. Unterstützen Sie unseren Antrag auf 65 % Einsparungen oder zumindest den Kompromiss auf 60 %, dem wir möglicherweise zustimmen könnten! Für die nächsten Generationen, für unsere Natur, die hart unter Druck ist – bereits durch die Erwärmungen –, aber auch für unsere Wirtschaft.</p> <p>-Thomas Waitz</p>	<p>We still have to follow with the measures anyway. Support our proposal for 65% savings or at least the 60% compromise we could possibly agree to! For the next generations, for our nature, which is under great pressure - already due to global warming - but also for our economy.</p> <p>-Thomas Waitz</p>
<p>We must have official, international, legally—binding commitments that see every single decision we make as individuals and as nations benchmarked against the goal of climate neutrality. Our survival depends upon this.</p> <p>-Grace O’Sullivan</p>	

<p>So we shouldn't hide the fact that this is going to be, as I said, bloody difficult to do – but just imagine for one second the cost of non-action.</p> <p>-Frans Timmermans</p>	
<p>J'aimerais bien que celles et ceux qui refusent d'écouter les scientifiques viennent expliquer aux habitantes et aux habitants de ma région que la vie de leurs proches ne compte pas, que la destruction de leur maison ne compte pas, que vous préférez sacrifier leur vie plutôt que quelques points de croissance. La loi climat doit être compatible avec l'objectif de l'accord de Paris de limiter le réchauffement global à 1,5 degrés, c'est une question de survie. La loi climat est la première pierre du pacte vert européen.</p> <p>-Caroline Roose</p>	<p>I would like those who refuse to listen to scientists to come and explain to the inhabitants of my region that the lives of their loved ones do not count, that the destruction of their homes does not count, that you prefer to sacrifice their lives rather than a few growth points. The climate law must be compatible with the objective of the Paris agreement to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees, it is a question of survival. The climate law is the cornerstone of the European green pact.</p> <p>-Caroline Roose</p>

<p>Pani Przewodnicząca! <b>Dzisiaj musimy wziąć odpowiedzialność za naszą wspólną przyszłość, przyszłość naszych</b> dzieci, a decyzję tę musimy podjąć w szczególnie trudnym dla Europy czasie bezprecedensowego kryzysu ekonomicznego i pandemii zagrażającej naszemu zdrowiu i życiu. O działanie apelują do nas młodzi ludzie – ci, do których będzie należała przyszłość – <b>i my jesteśmy im to działanie winni.</b></p> <p>-Adam Jarubas</p>	<p>Madam President! <b>Today we must take responsibility for our common future, the future of our children,</b> and we must take this decision in a particularly difficult time for Europe, an unprecedented economic crisis and a pandemic threatening our health and life. Young people - those to whom the future will belong - appeal to us for action, and <b>we owe them this action.</b></p> <p>-Adam Jarubas</p>
<p>Je veux faire ici entendre sa voix parce qu'il est, pour moi, le symbole de toutes celles et tous <b>ceux qui voient leur vie très fortement affectée par le dérèglement climatique, celles qui voient leur vie menacée par les catastrophes naturelles engendrées par notre modèle de développement</b></p> <p>-Marie Toussaint</p>	<p>I want to make his voice heard here because he is, for me, the symbol of all those who <b>see their lives very strongly affected by climate change, those who see their lives threatened by the natural disasters generated by our model of development.</b></p> <p>-Marie Toussaint</p>



<p>Tisztelt Elnök asszony, az éghajlatváltozás és a környezet károsodása komoly veszélyt jelent Európa és az egész világ számára. Ezért is fontos, hogy ambiciózusak legyünk, és Európa legyen a világ első klímasegleges kontinense.</p> <p>-Edina Tóth</p>	<p>Madam President, climate change and environmental damage are a serious threat to Europe and the world. That is why it is important for us to be ambitious and for Europe to be the world's first climate-neutral continent.</p> <p>-Edina Tóth</p>
<p>setting a 55% net target for 2030 is climate change denial. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has said that in the gap between 1.5 and 2 degrees, hundreds of millions of lives are at stake.</p> <p>-Mick Wallace</p>	
<p>China ha anunciado la voluntad de tener neutralidad climática en el año 2060, esperamos que los Estados Unidos vuelvan a esta carrera después de noviembre. No estamos solos. Y después toda la humanidad, porque es la humanidad lo que está en juego y hoy damos un paso en esa defensa.</p> <p>-Javi López</p>	<p>China has announced the will to be climate neutral by 2060, we hope that the United States will return to this race after November. We are not alone. And then all of humanity, because it is humanity that is at stake and today we take a step in that defense.</p> <p>-Javi López</p>

<p>Nem nézhetjük tétlenül, ahogy a szemünk láttára megy tönkre a környezetünk.</p> <p>-Sándor Rónai</p>	<p>We cannot stand idly by as our environment is ruined before our eyes.</p> <p>-Sándor Rónai</p>
<p>Είναι χρέος μας σήμερα να δώσουμε στους Ευρωπαίους πολίτες και την παγκόσμια κοινότητα ένα σύγχρονο, ρεαλιστικό, αναπτυξιακό νομοθετικό πλαίσιο για το κλίμα.</p> <p>-Μαρία Σπυράκη</p>	<p>It is our duty today to give European citizens and the world community a modern, realistic, developmental climate legal framework.</p> <p>-Μαρία Σπυράκη</p>
<p>Daarom spugen ze graag op de jongeren die op straat komen voor een leefbare planeet.</p> <p>-Marc Botenga</p>	<p>That is why they like to spit on the young people who take to the streets for a liveable planet.</p> <p>-Marc Botenga</p>
<p>Dat we dan een heel ander productiemodel nodig hebben, want dat het kapitalisme geen toekomst biedt voor onze planeet</p> <p>-Marc Botenga</p>	<p>That we then need a completely different production model, because that capitalism offers no future for our planet</p> <p>-Marc Botenga</p>

European Climate Law 24.06.2021	
Original	Translation

<p>Therefore, the German constitutional court tells us that <b>it is our duty</b> to limit global temperature rise to 1.5° because <b>the climate crisis will infringe on our future human rights.</b></p> <p>-Michael Bloss</p>	
<p>We are ready because the people are ready – ready <b>to save the climate</b> and to create a better world for all.</p> <p>-Michael Bloss</p>	
<p><b>Wenn wir nicht handeln, erreichen wir gefährliche Kipppunkte im Klimasystem, und unsere Kinder und Enkelkinder werden es nicht mehr schaffen, einen sehr gefährlichen Klimawandel zu verhindern.</b></p> <p>-Peter Liese</p>	<p><b>If we don't act, we will reach dangerous tipping points in the climate system</b> and our children and grandchildren will no longer be able to prevent <b>very dangerous climate change.</b></p> <p>-Peter Liese</p>
<p><b>We are voting on people's lives, on our own lives, on huge consequences for nature on this planet. A leak from the IPCC yesterday says that already 2° exposes 420 million more people to extreme deadly heatwaves. Heatwaves like in 2018 killed in Europe thousands of people.</b></p> <p>-Michael Bloss</p>	

<p>Now starts the journey forward, where we need to go from word to action. <b>We need to do more in one decade than we have done in the previous three decades together.</b> Under the Green Deal, <b>we must begin the socially inclusive and just transition to a sustainable economy.</b></p> <p>Jytte Gauteland</p>	
<p>Then, politics is politics. There will always be, as we've seen with the pandemic, issues that will potentially distract us from this historic responsibility of <b>saving humanity</b>, because that's what we do with climate policy. But then we have the law to fall back on. We have the law to fall back on that will remain the framework, whatever distractions might occur along the way.</p> <p>-Frans Timmermans</p>	
<p>We do not do this for ourselves; <b>we do this for our children and grandchildren. This is our prime responsibility.</b></p> <p>-Frans Timmermans</p>	

<p>Il y a quelques mois, notre Parlement votait l'objectif de 60 %. Aujourd'hui, on nous propose de voter pour une réduction de moins 53 %. Comment s'en satisfaire? Aujourd'hui, ce sont quelques points qui peuvent vous sembler dérisoires, demain, ce sera plus d'inondations, plus de sécheresses, plus d'insécurité alimentaire, plus de vies humaines perdues.</p> <p>-Caroline Roose</p>	<p>A few months ago, our Parliament voted for the 60% target. Today, we are being asked to vote for a reduction of minus 53%. How to be satisfied? Today, these are a few points that may seem trivial to you, tomorrow it will be more floods, more droughts, more food insecurity, more human lives lost.</p> <p>-Caroline Roose</p>
<p>Nie sztuka wszystko zamknąć i zniszczyć, niszcząc ludzkie życie, powodując bezrobocie.</p> <p>-Anna Zalewska</p>	<p>It is not difficult to close and destroy everything, destroying human life, causing unemployment.</p> <p>-Anna Zalewska</p>
<p>Si incumplimos nuestros compromisos con la naturaleza, ella reaccionará siguiendo sus leyes implacables. Y las consecuencias —lo sabemos— para los sistemas naturales y humanos pueden ser devastadoras.</p> <p>-Antoni Comín i Oliveres</p>	<p>If our commitments with nature are broken, it will react relentlessly. And the consequences — we know — for natural and human systems can be devastating.</p> <p>-Antoni Comín i Oliveres</p>
<p>Vi har satt det målet för att vi vet att klimatet är en av våra viktigaste frågor i vår tid.</p> <p>Men för att klara det krävs ett omfattande arbete med att ställa om den europeiska ekonomin. Den nya klimatlag som vi röstar om i dag utgör själva hjärtat i det arbetet.</p> <p>-Jessica Polfjärd</p>	<p>We have set that goal because we know that the climate is one of our most important issues of our time.</p> <p>But to cope with this, extensive work is needed to restructure the European economy. The new climate law that we are voting on today is the very heart of that work.</p>

	-Jessica Polfjärd
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The European Green Deal 11.12.2019	
Original	Translation
<p>we have to prevent the tremendous cost of non-actions. We know we don't have any other options and we do need to invest now. We have dual ambitions: the safeguard of our planet and the safeguard of our labour market.</p> <p>-Ignazio Corrao</p>	
<p>It is widely known that factory farming is an unsustainable method of raising animals – and one that is not compatible with the safe and wholesome food supply that the European Green Deal promised. Limiting the over-consumption of meat and dairy products is also essential to ward off climate crisis. Therefore, the absence of policies to stop industrial farming or to promote a shift towards plant-based diets is alarming.</p> <p>-Sylwia Spurek</p>	

<p>the next years are the time window we have to plan out the <b>new economic model</b> that we want to adopt, and the European Green Deal can be <b>the industrial revolution that puts at its core social rights, workers' rights, sustainability and our industry's competitiveness.</b></p> <p>-Miriam Dalli</p>	
<p><b>Fossil fuel subsidies should be phased out and stopped. We need policies that direct investments to cleaner technologies across the board and in all sectors. We require innovative ways to generate new money for these investments</b></p> <p>-Miriam Dalli</p>	
<p><b>In Europe, poor air quality kills half a million people every year. We want to phase out fossil fuels, promote renewables and improve people's health and save the planet.</b></p> <p>- Ciarán Cuffe</p>	
<p>We are determined to succeed, <b>for the sake of this planet and life on it.</b></p> <p>- Ursula von der Leyen</p>	
<p>Across the world we are mobilising in our millions <b>to protect our planet</b>, led often by young people themselves.</p> <p>- Alexandra Louise Rosenfield Phillips</p>	

<p>Alors, face à l'urgence, l'Europe a besoin d'un véritable pacte vert pour l'Europe, social et écologique, d'une ampleur inédite depuis l'après-guerre.</p> <p>-Manon Aubry</p>	<p>So, faced with the emergency, Europe needs a real green pact for Europe, social and ecological, on a scale unprecedented since the post-war period.</p> <p>-Manon Aubry</p>
<p>EGD stresses the importance of making infrastructure climate-resilient and it recognises the challenges and opportunities that lay ahead for sectors, cities, communities and regions in this transition and of creating decent work and quality jobs.</p> <p>-Rovana Plumb</p>	
<p>We welcome the change in production procedures. If companies invest in clean technologies, if they respect our environment, it can't be that they face unfair competition from heavy polluters, and that's when we will apply a carbon border adjustment mechanism with full compliance with WTO rules.</p> <p>-Ursula von der Leyen</p>	



<p>Look at what's happening in Greenland. Look at what's happening globally with our climate. Look at the desertification. Look at the erratic weather. Look at the people suffering because of this erratic weather across Europe. Look at what's happening to our biodiversity as we speak. We do not have the luxury to ignore this any more.</p> <p>-Frans Timmermans</p>	
<p>We want to protect our planet.</p> <p>-Ursula von der Leyen</p>	
<p>pendant que s'épuisent les ressources et que s'effondre la biodiversité.</p> <p>-Philippe Lamberts</p>	<p>while resources are depleted and biodiversity collapses</p> <p>-Philippe Lamberts</p>
<p>le débat d'aujourd'hui n'est pas un débat comme les autres, nous parlons d'un enjeu fondamental qui dépasse les clivages partisans: la survie de la civilisation humaine telle que nous la connaissons.</p> <p>-Manon Aubry</p>	<p>today's debate is not a debate like any other, we are talking about a fundamental issue that transcends partisan divisions: the survival of human civilization as that we know her.</p> <p>-Manon Aubry</p>
<p>Les demi-mesures menacent notre avenir.</p> <p>-Marie Toussaint</p>	<p>Half measures threaten our future.</p> <p>-Marie Toussaint</p>
<p>Un vrai pacte vert pour l'Europe demande d'adapter notre économie et notre cadre</p>	<p>A real green deal for Europe requires adapting our economy and our legal</p>

<p>juridique à l'urgence environnementale. Il faut des mesures fortes, des mesures contraignantes, un véritable devoir de vigilance pour que les États et les entreprises respectent enfin leurs obligations climatiques. Nous avons besoin d'un nouveau contrat social et environnemental, et nous n'avons pas le droit d'échouer.</p> <p>-Marie Toussaint</p>	<p>framework to the environmental emergency. We need strong measures, binding measures, a real duty of vigilance so that States and companies finally respect their climate obligations. We need a new social and environmental contract, and we have no right to fail.</p> <p>-Marie Toussaint</p>
<p>να εξασφαλίσει τη ζωή και την υγεία του πληθυσμού, καθώς και την προστασία του περιβάλλοντος.</p> <p>-Λευτέρης Νικολάου-Αλαβάνος</p>	<p>to ensure the life and health of the population, as well as the protection of the environment.</p> <p>-Λευτέρης Νικολάου-Αλαβάνος</p>
<p>we can ensure that real climate action does not fall hostage to power politics and backdoor compromises and that we can fulfil the promise of a safe and sustainable future for all.</p> <p>-Katalin Cseh</p>	
<p>you cannot put a price on a planet that is healthy and safe for our children.</p> <p>-Ciarán Cuffe</p>	
<p>Nagyra értékelem az európai zöld megállapodás kidolgozását, amely az első kontinensméretű terv Földünk jövőjének védelme érdekében.</p>	<p>I appreciate the development of the European Green Agreement, the first continental plan to protect the future of our planet.</p>

- Edina Tóth	- Edina Tóth
Zakazy używania plastikowych słomek nam już nie pomogą – <b>potrzebna jest pełna transformacja naszego systemu gospodarczego.</b> -Robert Biedroń	Bans on the use of plastic straws will no longer help us - <b>we need a complete transformation of our economic system.</b> -Robert Biedroń

The European Green Deal 15.01.2020	
Original	Translation
Europe's new Green Deal promises prevention of environmental damage that <b>harms us now and endangers our children's future.</b> <b>We cannot go on destroying nature. We can use new technology to make a greener, cleaner future.</b> -Antony Hook	
the climate and environmental emergency is one of the most important challenges facing humanity, and <b>all states and players worldwide must do their utmost to fight it.</b> -Jackie Jones	

<p>Madam President, today we have voted on perhaps the most important action the European Union will ever take. <b>The European Green Deal marks a necessary effort to stop climate change and protect biodiversity for good.</b></p> <p>-Antony Hook</p>	
<p>Níl a lán ama fágtha <b>chun an pláinéad a shábháil.</b> Ba cheart eagla an domhain a bheith ar gach duine sa seomra seo mar gheall ar na tinte uafásacha san Astráil.</p> <p>-Billy Kelleher</p>	<p>There is not much time left <b>to save the planet.</b> Everyone in this room should be terrified of the terrible fires in Australia.</p> <p>-Billy Kelleher</p>
<p>Madame la Présidente, nous tenons à rappeler ici à quel point nous sommes résolument engagés pour que nos nations soient à l'avant-garde du combat pour l'environnement. <b>Cela est vital pour l'homme et la biodiversité.</b></p> <p>-Joëlle Mélin</p>	<p>Madam President, we would like to recall here how resolutely we are committed to ensuring that our nations are at the forefront of the fight for the environment. <b>This is vital for humans and biodiversity.</b></p> <p>-Joëlle Mélin</p>

<p>Sustainable Europe Investment Plan - How to finance the Green Deal 12.11.2020</p>	
<p>Original</p>	<p>Translation</p>
<p>Madam President, let me remind you that one month ago this House took a giant step towards <b>securing the future of our planet.</b></p>	

<p>-Paul Tang</p>	
<p>That is why all EU spending, including the Next Generation EU, including through the EIB, should adhere to the important principle of do no significant harm. Environmental and social progress need to go hand—in—hand.</p> <p>-Paul Tang</p>	
<p>Wir müssen klimaschädliche Investitionen stoppen. Flughäfen, Autobahnen, große fossile Infrastrukturprojekte oder aber auch die klimaschädliche Landwirtschaft – alles gehört auf den Prüfstand. (...) Wir können es uns nicht leisten, für kommende Generationen weiter fossile Energie wie Kohle oder Gas zu fördern.</p> <p>-Rasmus Andresen</p>	<p>We must stop climate-damaging investments. Airports, motorways, large fossil infrastructure projects or even climate-damaging agriculture - everything needs to be put to the test. (...) We cannot afford to continue to mine fossil fuels such as coal or gas for generations to come.</p> <p>-Rasmus Andresen</p>
<p>nós temos a obrigação, o dever, de combater as alterações climáticas, de proteger, de defender a biodiversidade, de, em simultâneo, promover um crescimento sustentável, defender a coesão territorial, económica, social e a inclusão.</p> <p>-José Manuel Fernandes</p>	<p>we have an obligation, a duty, to fight climate change, to protect, to defend biodiversity, at the same time to promote sustainable growth, to defend territorial, economic, society and inclusion.</p> <p>-José Manuel Fernandes</p>

<p>Um die Klimakrise zu stoppen, müssen wir die ökonomischen Spielregeln verändern. Wir alle wissen, dass unser jetziges Finanz— und Wirtschaftssystem den Ressourcenverbrauch steigert und die Klimakrise verschärft. Deshalb dürfen wir öffentliche Haushalte nicht einzig und allein über den Schuldenstand messen. Auf einem toten Planeten gibt es keine Schulden.</p> <p>-Rasmus Andresen</p>	<p>In order to stop the climate crisis, we have to change the economic rules of the game. We all know that our current financial and economic system is increasing resource consumption and exacerbating the climate crisis. That is why we must not measure public budgets solely on the basis of the level of debt. There is no debt on a dead planet.</p> <p>-Rasmus Andresen</p>
<p>Ce 29 octobre, l'ONU publiait un rapport alarmant sur la biodiversité, qui affirmait qu'à moins d'une transformation radicale de nos modes de vie, les pandémies comme la COVID—19 allaient se multiplier et faire plus de morts.</p> <p>-Pierre Larrourou</p>	<p>On October 29, the UN published an alarming report on biodiversity, which stated that unless our lifestyles were radically transformed, pandemics like COVID-19 would multiply and cause more deaths.</p> <p>-Pierre Larrourou</p>
<p>Vous le voyez, à la question: «qui a les moyens?», finalement, il est assez facile de répondre. Mais je m'en pose une autre. Qu'allez-vous dire à vos enfants? «Désolés, nous avons préféré sacrifier votre avenir pour satisfaire les lobbies et les multinationales»??</p> <p>-Manon Aubry</p>	<p>You see, to the question: "who has the means?", finally, it is quite easy to answer. But I have another question. What are you going to tell your children? "Sorry, we preferred to sacrifice your future to satisfy lobbies and multinationals"??</p> <p>-Manon Aubry</p>

<p><b>Den europeiska ekonomin behöver ställa om.</b></p> <p>Med rätt utformad politik kan vi möjliggöra och finansiera den gröna omställningen.</p> <p>-Jessica Polfjärd</p>	<p><b>The European economy needs to change.</b></p> <p>With the right policy, we can enable and finance the green transition.</p> <p>-Jessica Polfjärd</p>
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<p>European Climate Law (continuation of debate) 24.06.2021</p>	
<p>Original</p>	<p>Translation</p>
<p>Τέτοιοι κανονισμοί ξεπλένουν περιβαλλοντικά εγκλήματα με την έγκριση όλων των κυβερνήσεων, όπως ιμπεριαλιστικοί πόλεμοι, παράδοση γης, δασών, σε πράσινους καπιταλιστές, ΧΥΤΑ τύπου Φυλής, καύση σκουπιδιών για ηλεκτρενέργεια — καταστρέφοντας το περιβάλλον και επιβαρύνοντας τη δημόσια υγεία.</p> <p>-Λευτέρης Νικολάου-Αλαβάνος</p>	<p>Such regulations wash away environmental crimes with the approval of all governments, such as imperialist wars, the surrender of land, forests, green capitalists, Tribal landfills, incineration of garbage for electricity - <b>damaging the environment and endangering public health.</b></p> <p>-Λευτέρης Νικολάου-Αλαβάνος</p>
<p>Madame la Présidente, mes chers collègues, <b>cette loi européenne sur le climat, nous la devons à nos enfants, à la nouvelle génération</b> qui, plus encore que nous, <b>verra son quotidien bouleversé par le dérèglement climatique.</b></p> <p>-Agnès Evren</p>	<p>Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, <b>we owe this European law on the climate to our children, to the new generation</b> who, even more than us, <b>will see their daily lives turned upside down by climate change.</b></p> <p>-Agnès Evren</p>

<p>Esta neutralidad climática que buscamos implica una revolución industrial. Implica muchos cambios en nuestra vida, en nuestra alimentación, en nuestra forma de movernos, en nuestra forma de relacionarnos con el planeta. Y no va a ser fácil, no va a ser fácil. Faltan menos de nueve años para el primer objetivo. Va a ser muy difícil de realizar, pero puede hacerse.</p> <p>-Nicolás González Casares</p>	<p>This climate neutrality that we seek implies an industrial revolution. It involves many changes in our lives, in our diet, in our way of moving, in our way of relating to the planet. And it's not going to be easy, it's not going to be easy. Less than nine years to go until the first goal. It will be very difficult to do, but it can be done.</p> <p>-Nicolás González Casares</p>
<p>Llamo a todos a actuar juntos contra la emergencia climática de una manera sólida para salvar nuestro planeta.</p> <p>-Nicolás González Casares</p>	<p>I call on everyone to act together against the climate emergency in a strong way to save our planet.</p> <p>-Nicolás González Casares</p>
<p>De doelen schieten tekort, de aanpak is te vrijblijvend en met deze wet houden we de opwarming van de aarde niet onder anderhalve graad. En dat zal desastreuze gevolgen hebben.</p> <p>-Anja Hazekamp</p>	<p>The goals fall short, the approach is too non-committal and with this law we will not keep global warming below one and a half degrees. And that will have disastrous consequences.</p> <p>-Anja Hazekamp</p>
<p>Az éghajlatváltozás elleni küzdelem döntő fontosságú Európa és a világ jövője szempontjából.</p> <p>-Edina Tóth</p>	<p>Combating climate change is crucial for the future of Europe and the world.</p> <p>-Edina Tóth</p>



<p>... i de forløbne 30 år har vi igen og igen vist, at vi ikke kan, eller vil, eller tør gøre, hvad der skal til for at</p> <p>redde vores skønne planet.</p> <p>-Margrete Auken</p>	<p>... In the past 30 years, we have repeatedly shown that we can not, or will not, or dare to do what it takes to</p> <p>save our beautiful planet.</p> <p>-Margrete Auken</p>
<p>Vážená pani predsedajúca, projekt ekologicky čistej a zelenej Európy snáď musí podporiť každý rozumne uvažujúci človek. Je to otázka života a zdravia budúcich generácií.</p> <p>-Miroslav Radačovský</p>	<p>Madam President, the ecologically clean and green Europe project must perhaps be supported by every reasonable person. It is a question of life and health for future generations.</p> <p>-Miroslav Radačovský</p>
<p>Je conclus en disant qu'il est urgent d'agir. Ici aussi l'Europe doit se doter d'une loi de protection des océans, du contraignant, avec le monde pour terrain d'action.</p> <p>-Frédérique Ries</p>	<p>I conclude by saying that it is urgent to act. Here too, Europe must adopt a law to protect the oceans, something binding, with the world as its field of action.</p> <p>-Frédérique Ries</p>
<p>In questo mondo capovolto possiamo però ancora scegliere: scegliere quale risposta dare ai nipoti che ci chiederanno dove eravamo quando abbiamo distrutto il pianeta ricevuto in prestito per loro.</p> <p>-Eleonora Evi</p>	<p>In this upside-down world, however, we can still choose: choose which answer to give to the grandchildren who will ask us where we were when we destroyed the planet we borrowed for them.</p> <p>-Eleonora Evi</p>

<p>Dieses Klimaschutzgesetz schützt das Klima nicht – es ist eine Mogelpackung. Und lassen Sie uns stattdessen lieber für wirklich entschlossene Ziele kämpfen: für den radikalen Ausbau der Erneuerbaren, für eine Verkehrswende und für eine Wirtschaft, die Mut zur Veränderung hat. Tun wir das nicht nur für uns, sondern auch für die kommende Generation!</p> <p>-Cornelia Ernst</p>	<p>This climate protection law does not protect the climate - it is a sham. And instead, let's fight for really decisive goals: for the radical expansion of renewables, for a turnaround in transport and for an economy that has the courage to change. Let's not only do this for ourselves, but also for the coming generation!</p> <p>-Cornelia Ernst</p>
<p>we also need to ensure that we don't sacrifice biodiversity in the name of protecting the climate, because without nature, we cannot live – just as much as without climate.</p> <p>-Martin Hojsík</p>	
<p>Estamos ante una carrera contrarreloj frente a la emergencia climática, que va a requerir de un cambio sistémico y de medidas urgentes y ambiciosas.</p> <p>-Javi López</p>	<p>We are facing a race against time in the face of the climate emergency, which will require systemic change and urgent and ambitious measures.</p> <p>-Javi López</p>
<p>Überleben der Menschheit, der Gattung <i>Homo sapiens</i>, ernsthaft gefährdet ist.</p> <p>-Jutta Paulus</p>	<p>The survival of humanity, the genus <i>Homo sapiens</i>, is seriously threatened.</p> <p>-Jutta Paulus</p>

<p>Statt nun verantwortungsbewusst zu agieren und alles möglich zu machen, um sowohl unserer historischen Verantwortung gerecht zu werden als auch unseren Kindern und Enkeln einen bewohnbaren Planeten zu hinterlassen, beschließen wir heute ein Gesetz, mit dem die Zwei-Grad-Marke klar verfehlt wird – von 1,5 Grad ganz zu schweigen.</p> <p>-Jutta Paulus</p>	<p>Instead of acting responsibly and doing everything possible to meet our historical responsibility and leave our children and grandchildren a habitable planet, we are passing a law today that clearly falls short of the two-degree mark</p> <p>will - not to mention 1.5 degrees.</p> <p>-Jutta Paulus</p>
<p>klimaatverandering vormt een grote bedreiging. Die tast onze leefomgeving aan. Die zet onze voedselproductie onder druk. Die zorgt voor meer migratie en is ook slecht voor onze natuur. Wereldwijd moeten we deze uitdaging aanpakken.</p> <p>Ik ben er dan ook voorstander van dat we een klimaatwet krijgen op Europees niveau.</p> <p>-Jan Huitema</p>	<p>climate change poses a major threat. It affects our living environment. This puts pressure on our food production. This causes more migration and is also bad for our nature. Globally, we must address this challenge.</p> <p>I am therefore in favor of a climate law at European level.</p> <p>-Jan Huitema</p>
<p>Meidän Euroopassa on otettava ilmastokriisin torjuminen ja sen rinnalla kulkeva lajikadon torjuminen keskeiseksi poliittiseksi tehtäväksemme tämän sukupolven aikana.</p> <p>-Ville Niinistö</p>	<p>We in Europe must take the fight against the climate crisis and the accompanying fight against species extinction as our central political task during this generation.</p> <p>-Ville Niinistö</p>

<p>Dacă nu acționăm azi, până în următorii 10 ani, viața în Europa se va schimba ireversibil.</p> <p>-Nicolae Ștefănuță</p>	<p>If we do not act today, within the next 10 years, life in Europe will change irreversibly.</p> <p>-Nicolae Ștefănuță</p>
<p>Chciałbym wyrazić się jasno: zmiany klimatyczne są faktem, wszyscy za nie płacimy. Nie ryzykujemy zdrowia naszych dzieci.</p> <p>-Marek Paweł Balt</p>	<p>Let me be clear: climate change is a fact, we are all paying for it. Let us not risk our children's health.</p> <p>-Marek Paweł Balt</p>
<p>Fru talman! I dag ska vi fatta ett historiskt beslut som påverkar frihet och välfärd för människor över hela världen i generationer framöver. Ett beslut som är avgörande för själva livet på den här planeten.</p> <p>-Karin Karlsbro</p>	<p>Madam President! Today, we must make a historic decision that affects the freedom and welfare of people around the world for generations to come. A decision that is crucial to life on this planet.</p> <p>-Karin Karlsbro</p>
<p>We cannot any longer deny that there are significant challenges and problems across the entire planet: displacement of people, desertification and other huge changes in how we live and the upheavals of various countries in terms of the problems of climate change itself.</p> <p>-Billy Kelleher</p>	
<p>Klimatická zmena je extrémne reálna. Už poznáme citlivé regióny, ktoré klimatická zmena zásadne destabilizuje: Sahel, Sýria, Stredomorie, Arktída. Miesta, ktoré sa nás bytostne dotýkajú.</p>	<p>Climate change is extremely real. We already know the sensitive regions that climate change is fundamentally destabilizing: the Sahel, Syria, the</p>

<p>-Michal Wiezik</p>	<p>Mediterranean, the Arctic. Places that touch us essentially.</p> <p>-Michal Wiezik</p>
<p>Nejde o nič menej ako o prežitie a prosperitu našich detí a ďalších generácií.</p> <p>-Michal Wiezik</p>	<p>It is nothing less than the survival and prosperity of our children and future generations.</p> <p>-Michal Wiezik</p>
<p>S plnou vážnosťou to považujem za kritický predpoklad nášho prežitia a najdôležitejší historický míľnik ľudstva.</p> <p>-Michal Wiezik</p>	<p>I take this as a critical prerequisite for our survival and the most important historical milestone of humanity.</p> <p>-Michal Wiezik</p>
<p>Европейските граждани, хората в Европа да бъдат лидери в образованието, в технологиите, в научните проби, които ще направят възможна успешна пазарна икономика, която да съхранява природата, да съхранява жизнената среда за развитие и оцеляване на обществата ни.</p> <p>-Радан Кънев</p>	<p>European citizens, the people of Europe to be leaders in education, in technology, in scientific breakthroughs that will make possible a successful market economy that preserves nature, preserves the living environment for the development and survival of our societies.</p> <p>-Радан Кънев</p>

## The European Climate Law

Phrase	ARTICLE 1, paragraph number
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, Having regard to the opinions of the European Economic and Social Committee <sup>1</sup> , Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions <sup>2</sup> , Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure <sup>3</sup> ,	N/A (page 1)
The existential threat posed by climate change requires enhanced ambition and increased climate action by the Union and the Member States.	1
with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy, where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use.	2
this transition must be just and inclusive, leaving no one behind	2
That report confirms that greenhouse gas emissions need to be urgently reduced	3
to reach in a just, socially balanced, fair and cost-effective manner the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement	4
it is possible to decouple economic growth from greenhouse gas emissions.	7
all sectors of the economy - including energy, industry, transport, heating and cooling and buildings, agriculture, waste and land use,	7

land-use change and forestry, irrespective of whether those sectors are covered by the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union ('EU ETS') - should play a role in contributing to the achievement of climate neutrality within the Union by 2050.	
bringing together key stakeholders in an inclusive and representative manner, so as to encourage sectors themselves to draw up indicative voluntary roadmaps and to plan their transition towards achieving the Union's climate-neutrality objective by 2050.	7
Such roadmaps could also complement existing initiatives.	7
in pursuit of the objectives of the Paris Agreement, and to maximise prosperity within the planetary boundaries	9
The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the Union's climate policy and constitutes its key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective way.	13
a vision for achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions in the Union by 2050 through a socially-fair and cost-efficient transition.	14
raise global ambition and to strengthen the global response to climate change, using all tools at its disposal, including climate diplomacy.	16
it is necessary to put in place an enabling framework that benefits all Member States	19

to ensure a <b>cost-efficient, just, as well as socially balanced and fair transition,</b>	19
its nationally determined contribution, to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), following <b>their approval by the Council.</b>	19
<b>Member States collectively, and Member States, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission</b> should take the necessary measures	20
the Commission will promote a <b>new green business model</b>	22
<b>‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan for a cleaner and more competitive Europe’</b>	22
a <b>regulatory framework for certification of carbon removals based on robust and transparent carbon accounting to monitor and verify the authenticity of carbon removals,</b>	22
information on climate change that is both factual and <b>transparent, are imperative and need to underpin the Union’s climate action and efforts to reach climate neutrality by 2050.</b> A European <b>Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change</b> (the ‘Advisory Board’) should be established	24
by virtue of its <b>independence</b> and scientific and technical expertise	24
<b>Member States that have not already done so are invited to establish a national climate advisory body.</b>	24
The transition to climate neutrality requires changes <b>across the entire policy spectrum and</b>	25



<p>a collective effort of all sectors of the economy and society, as highlighted in the European Green Deal. The European Council, in its conclusions of 12 December 2019, stated that all relevant Union legislation and policies need to be consistent with, and contribute to, the fulfilment of the climate-neutrality objective while respecting a level playing field, and invited the Commission to examine whether this requires an adjustment of the existing rules.</p>	
<p>In view of this, the Commission has announced a revision of the relevant climate and energy legislation</p>	26
<p>in view of the international commitments under the Paris Agreement, continued efforts are necessary to ensure the phasing out of energy subsidies which are incompatible with that objective</p>	29
<p>As a tool to increase the transparency and accountability of the Union's climate policies</p>	30
<p>the Union should enhance their adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change</p>	31
<p>the Commission should, inter alia, take into account: the contribution of the transition to climate neutrality to public health, the quality of the environment, the well-being of citizens, the prosperity of society, employment and the competitiveness of the economy; the energy transition, strengthened</p>	34

energy security and the tackling of energy poverty;	
the need to make the transition just and socially fair	34
and progression over time in environmental integrity and level of ambition.	34
an objective to deliver a 90 % reduction in emissions from the transport sector by 2050.	35
the Commission should regularly assess progress	36
the Commission should take the necessary measures in accordance with the Treaties. The Commission should also regularly assess relevant national measures, and issue recommendations where it finds that a Member State's measures are inconsistent with the climate-neutrality objective	36
The Commission should ensure a robust and objective assessment	37
The Commission should therefore engage with all parts of society	38
Commission's commitment to the principles on Better Law-Making	39
Since the objective of this Regulation, namely to achieve climate neutrality in the Union by 2050, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not	40

go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective,	
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Phrase	ARTICLE 2, paragraph number
The existential threat posed by climate change requires enhanced ambition and increased climate action by the Union and the Member States.	1
with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy,	2
where economic growth is decoupled from resource use	2
At the same time, this transition must be just and inclusive, leaving no one behind.	2
greenhouse gas emissions need to be urgently reduced	3
to reach in a just, socially balanced, fair and cost-effective manner the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.	4

Phrase	ARTICLE 2, paragraph number
In the context of enhancing the role of science in the field of climate policy, each Member State is invited to establish a national climate advisory body, responsible for providing expert scientific advice on climate policy to the relevant national authorities as prescribed by the Member State concerned. Where a Member State decides to establish such an advisory body, it shall inform the EEA thereof.	4

Phrase	ARTICLE 4, paragraph number
the <b>binding</b> Union 2030 climate target shall be a domestic reduction of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) by <b>at least 55 %</b> compared to 1990 levels by 2030.	1
<b>consider</b> taking the necessary measures	2
<b>From the adoption of the legislative proposals by the Commission, it shall monitor the legislative procedures for the different proposals and may report to the European Parliament and to the Council on whether the foreseen outcome of those legislative procedures, considered together, would achieve the target set out in paragraph</b>	2
<b>the need to ensure a just and socially fair transition for all;</b>	5
<b>cost-effectiveness and economic efficiency;</b>  <b>competitiveness of the Union's economy,</b> in particular small and medium-sized enterprises	5
<b>fairness and solidarity</b> between and within Member States;	5

Phrase	ARTICLE 5, paragraph number
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The relevant Union institutions and the Member States shall ensure continuous progress in enhancing adaptive capacity	1
work towards better integration of adaptation to climate change in a consistent manner in all policy areas	3
identify shortcomings in this regard in consultation with civil society.	3
Member States shall adopt and implement national adaptation strategies and plans, taking into consideration the Union strategy	4
Member States shall take into account the particular vulnerability of the relevant sectors	4
update the strategies and include the related updated information in the reports to be submitted	4

Phrase	ARTICLE 6, paragraph number
it shall take the necessary measures in accordance with the Treaties.	3
In any case of non-alignment, the Commission shall provide the reasons	4

Phrase	ARTICLE 7, paragraph number
it may issue recommendations to that Member State. The Commission shall make such recommendations publicly available.	2
if the Member State concerned decides not to address the recommendations or a substantial part thereof, that Member State shall provide	3

the Commission its reasoning:	
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Phrase	ARTICLE 9, paragraph number
The Commission shall engage with all parts of society to enable and empower them to take action towards a just and socially fair transition to a climate-neutral and climate-resilient society. The Commission shall facilitate an inclusive and accessible process at all levels, including at national, regional and local level and with social partners, academia, the business community, citizens and civil society	1
Commission may also draw on the public consultations and on the multilevel climate and energy dialogues	1
information about climate change and its social and gender equality aspects	1

Phrase	ARTICLE 10, paragraph number
Union that choose to prepare indicative voluntary roadmaps towards achieving the climate-neutrality objective set out in Article 2(1). The Commission shall monitor the development of such roadmaps. Its engagement shall involve the facilitation of dialogue at Union level, and the sharing of best practice among relevant stakeholders.	n/a

Phrase	ARTICLE 12, paragraph number
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following an open, fair and transparent selection procedure.	3
as well as gender and geographical balance.	3

Phrase	AMENDMENT, to paragraph number
Each Member State shall establish a multilevel climate and energy dialogue pursuant to national rules, in which local authorities, civil society organisations, business community, investors and other relevant stakeholders and the general public are able actively to engage and discuss the achievement of the Union's climate-neutrality objective	11
reporting on the phasing out of energy subsidies, in particular for fossil fuels	4
The Commission shall report to the European Parliament and to the Council	45