



Universiteit  
Leiden  
The Netherlands

## **Maritime piracy at the Horn of Africa: The role of international organizations in global crime governance**

Boenisch, Franziska

### **Citation**

Boenisch, F. (2022). *Maritime piracy at the Horn of Africa: The role of international organizations in global crime governance*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master thesis in the Leiden University Student Repository](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3487382>

**Note:** To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).



Bachelor Thesis:

**Maritime piracy at the Horn of Africa:**

**The role of international organizations in global crime governance**

Franziska Boenisch

S2463229

Leiden University

B.Sc. Political Science: International Relations and Organizations

Bachelor Project: Foreign and Security Policies of International Organizations

Supervisor: Janina Heaphy

Wordcount: 8,000

# Table of Contents

- 0. List of Abbreviations..... 3**
- 1. Introduction ..... 4**
- 2. Literature Review ..... 6**
  - 2.1. IOs and TOC in IR Theory ..... 6*
  - 2.2. Practical functions of IOs in counter-TOC efforts: The nexus of IR and Criminology... 7*
  - 2.3. Piracy: International Law Perspectives ..... 8*
- 3. Theoretical Framework ..... 9**
- 4. Methodology ..... 12**
  - 4.1. Case Selection..... 12*
  - 4.2. Data Collection..... 13*
  - 4.3. Research Design..... 14*
  - 4.4 Data Analysis..... 14*
- 5. Analysis ..... 16**
  - 5.1. Cause: Perceived rise of criminal activity, triggering IO involvement..... 16*
  - 5.2. Step 1: Creation of procedural and substantive norms through IOs ..... 17*
  - 5.3. Step 2a: Creation of anti-crime regulations and prohibition regimes for states to implement..... 18*
  - 5.4. Step 2b: Creation of professional/technical networks..... 20*
  - 5.5. Outcome: Establishment of legitimate and institutionalized global procedures against crime ..... 22*
- 6. Discussion..... 23**
- 7. Conclusion..... 24**
- 8. Bibliography ..... 26**

## **0. List of Abbreviations**

- i. CGPCS: Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
- ii. EEAS: European External Action Service
- iii. EU: European Union
- iv. EUCAP: European Union Maritime Capacity Building Mission
- v. EUNAVFOR: European Union Naval Force for Somalia
- vi. EUTM: European Union Training Mission
- vii. GCG: Global Crime Governance
- viii. ICC: International Chamber of Commerce
- ix. IMO: International Maritime Organization
- x. IO(s): International Organization(s)
- xi. IR: International Relations
- xii. LOS: Law of the Seas
- xiii. NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- xiv. TFG: Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia)
- xv. TOC: Transnational Organized Crime
- xvi. UN: United Nations
- xvii. UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes
- xviii. UNSC: United Nations Security Council
- xix. WFP: World Food Program

## 1. Introduction

Maritime piracy is a phenomenon that has been around for centuries (Bichler, 2019, p. 117), but while it mainly occupied a space in tales and stories for most of the past century, it reemerged as a very real threat to maritime security in the 1990s (Elmi, Affi, Knight, & Mohamend, 2015; Sulisty, Wiranata, & Lestari, 2022; Placek, 2022). The Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Africa, and the Strait of Malacca have been particularly affected by this development (Placek, 2022). Its reemergence is linked to the new post-Cold War wave of globalization, which increased reliance on international maritime trade, making piracy a more lucrative endeavor. It is thus associated with the `dark side of globalization`, a term used by scholars of transnational organized crime (TOC) to stress the expansion of opportunities for criminal activities accompanying globalization (Castle, 1997; Kusumaningrum, 2013; Clarke, 2019; Sulisty et al., 2022).

The increasing occurrence of piracy attacks endangers the personal safety of hundreds of seafarers every year (Shane & Magnuson, 2019). Modern day piracy usually involves pirates boarding foreign vessels and holding crew hostage for an average of five months (Eunavfor, n.d.a) until ransom is paid (Roach, 2010, p. 408). `Piracy` refers to “acts of violence, vessel detention, or depredation by the crew or passengers of a private ship on international waters against another ship, persons, or property” (Bichler, 2019, p. 117).

An area of particular concern is the Horn of Africa, a critical passageway where the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the western Indian Ocean meet, and piracy increasingly affects economic and political security (UNODC, 2010). Its reemergence is attributed to statelessness, poverty, illegal fishing, toxic waste dumping, and crime of opportunity, among others (Elmi et al., 2015, p. 157). Around 20% of the world’s shipments transit through the Gulf of Aden alone (p. 148), making piracy highly profitable in this area. Here, attacks experienced an unprecedented high between 2009 and 2015, with 60% of global cases occurring at the Horn of Africa (in 2009; Bichler, 2019, p. 117). This cost the world economy more than 18 billion US Dollars per year between 2005 and 2012 (Elmi et al., 2015, p. 148).

Given the transnational nature of this crime, long-term solutions must necessarily be coordinated at the international level (Graycar, 2019; Zabyelina, 2019). In pursuit of this, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) formulated resolutions calling for international coordinated actions. Subsequently, to counter piracy at the Horn of Africa, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched their operations *Atalanta*

(2008) and *Ocean Shield* (2009) respectively. Shortly after their initiation, a clear decline in the number of attacks can be observed, from 160 in 2011 to just eight in total between 2016 and 2021 (Placek, 2022). In fact, despite piracy continuing to be a worrying trend globally, in this area with strong international involvement, “[no] incidents were reported (...) in 2020” (IMO, 2020, p. 21). This empirical phenomenon remains theoretically unexplained.

Interestingly, despite being an increasingly concerning security threat, the state of the art on maritime piracy is very limited. Literature to date is predominantly descriptive and focused on legal and definitional discrepancies rather than investigating counter-piracy efforts. The fact that research on this subject lies at the nexus of International Relations (IR) and criminology theories, means that there is little analytical space for the role of International Organizations (IOs) in counter-piracy efforts (Zabyelina, 2009; Sulistyono et al., 2022). While scholars of the overarching field of TOC agree that IOs play a key role in countering these crimes generally, there are few theoretical explanations, and the subcategory of piracy remains unexplored (Zabyelina, 2019). This gap in the literature, paired with the empirical puzzle explained above, lead to the following research question:

*Why did UN, EU, and NATO counter-piracy action between 2008 and 2020 help decrease the number of piracy attacks at the Horn of Africa?*

This study will contribute to the literature on both an empirical and a theoretical level. Empirically, the findings may prove helpful considering surging numbers of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, the Strait of Malacca, and the Americas (International Chamber of Commerce [ICC], 2021). On a theoretical level, this study will test the *Global Crime Governance* (GCG) theory developed by Anja Jakobi (2013, 2020), which provides a novel way of looking at TOC but has yet to be empirically tested.

To investigate this puzzle, this paper will proceed in the following structure: First, an overview of the current literature on TOC and piracy is provided. Subsequently the GCG framework is introduced. Thirdly, the utilized methodology will briefly be explained, followed by an analysis and discussion of the involvement of the United Nations (UN), EU, and NATO in counter-piracy at the Horn of Africa. Lastly, this paper provides implications for the state of the art, limitations, and suggestions for further research.

This study finds that the impact of IOs in counter-piracy efforts at the Horn of Africa, can largely be explained using the GCG framework by Jakobi (2013, 2020). The IOs ‘rationalize’ pre-existing norms condemning piracy, by creating procedural and substantive norms, establishing regulations and prohibition regimes for states to institutionalize, as well as professional and technical networks to counter the threat at hand. This way, legitimate and institutionalized global procedures against piracy are created.

## **2. Literature Review**

### *2.1. IOs and TOC in IR Theory*

The theoretical debates at the intersection of IR, IOs, and TOC are very difficult to place and combine. This makes the analysis of the nexus of IOs and TOC from a traditional IR perspective extremely complex. Within the field of IR there is extensive discussion about the role of IOs in the international political arena. (Simmons & Martin, 2013). However, it is inconclusive; Abbot and Snidal (1998) argue that IOs do not fit into the core assumptions of realism, namely state-centrism, anarchy, and self-interest, and their existence is solely qualified by the self-interested states that utilize IOs as tools to maximize their own power. Meanwhile, (social) constructivists argue that IOs can channel power that is autonomous from their member states. Barnett and Finnemore (1999) assert that they do this by creating social knowledge and rules, e.g., by collecting data and developing technical expertise (pp. 699, 710), which grant IOs rational-legal authority. Thus, in contrast to realist arguments, constructivists view IOs not only as tools for states, but also as independent actors.

Different from the debate on IOs in IR, which is extensive but not conclusive, the literature on TOC in IR is very limited, but there is an overarching consensus that “TOC has never occupied a central place in IR literature” (Zabyelina, 2009, p. 14). TOC is the overarching field of study in which this research is embedded and refers to ‘crimes’, i.e., offenses against international and national law that are ‘transnational’ in nature, meaning that they are executed and, or planned in two or more countries (Kusumaningrum, 2013, p. 95). They are thus different from international crime in that international crimes offend the global normative order and usually involve large-scale violence, such as crimes against humanity and genocide, rather than being organized crime (Jakobi, 2020). It is also different from terrorism, as the former is primarily economically motivated, while the latter follows a political agenda (Jakobi, 2013, p. 8).

Zabyelina (2009) finds that traditional IR theories are unfit to analyze TOC because these interconnected networks that operate across state borders do not match the major thematic foci of IR. Such an approach would thus require significant theory-bending.

Conclusively, the lack of comprehensive literature on this nexus significantly inhibits the understanding of the state of the art and may complicate analyses unnecessarily. Consequently, most of the literature stays away from IR theory labels and instead zooms in on IO activities against TOC in a more empirical and descriptive fashion.

## *2.2. Practical functions of IOs in counter-TOC efforts: The nexus of IR and Criminology*

Although a variety of functions that IOs may fulfill are described in the literature, there is little consensus on the exact position they occupy in the international arena and hence in international efforts to combat TOC. This part of the literature lies at the nexus of IR and criminology, where authors describe various roles that IOs take in specific case studies without establishing a greater explanatory theory or interacting with each other. Current findings are still relatively broad and neither distinguish between different types of IOs, nor between different types of TOC.

From this descriptive work, four main functions of IOs can be identified. Firstly, IOs can act as providers of operational support (Graycar, 2019; 2019; Russo & Stambol, 2021). This includes financial and technical assistance, such as provided by the International Monetary Fund (Zabyelina, 2019, p. 306), as well as research and data analysis, as conducted e.g., by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (p. 307). Secondly, they may act as norm-setters, by creating legal definitions as well as norms and principles that promote coordinated responses to TOC (Obokata, 2019; Nadelman, 1990). Thirdly, some scholars have found IOs to act as facilitators of cooperation mechanisms (Zabyelina, 2019; Graycar, 2019). They argue that sovereignty concerns and mistrust between states necessitate IOs' actions as 'neutral' facilitators (Seilkhanova, 2019, p. 905). Lastly, IOs function as fora for information and intelligence sharing (Shelley, 1995; Obokata, 2019; Russo & Stambol, 2021).

While these authors showcase that some IOs may fulfill these functions in some circumstances, there is little explanation offered in the literature giving reasons why or under which circumstances this is the case. Additionally, because there is little differentiation between different types of IOs and their mandates, it appears as if any IO can take on any role. Overall,

this part of the literature thus provides an assortment of roles that IOs may take on in counter-TOC efforts. However, the state of the literature is an accumulation of potential functions, rather than a comprehensive overview. The descriptive nature of these studies makes it difficult to apply findings to other cases in a meaningful way, or to deduct an overarching theory.


### *2.3. Piracy: International Law Perspectives*

When looking at the literature on piracy more specifically, rather than TOC, one finds that it largely centers around the limitations of international law to justify action against pirates and to establish frameworks for their prosecution (Roach, 2010; Shane & Magnuson, 2019). As Bichler (2019) clearly elucidates, “[law] enforcement on the world’s waterways is a challenging endeavor for all coast guard fleets” (p. 115) because of its “interjurisdictional complexity” (Shane & Magnuson, 2019, p. 123). For instance, jurisdiction depends on (a) the nationality of the vessel, (b) the location of a vessel (i.e., territorial seas of a state or international waters), and (c) the status of the vessel (e.g., suspected to be engaged in crimes or not) (Bichler, 2019, p. 118). Additionally, the “scope of punishable actions, and the rights and duties of states” (Roach, 2010, p. 397) are insufficiently defined in the Law of the Seas (LOS).

It becomes clear that, although there is a “critical need for multinational, cooperative law enforcement efforts” (Bichler, 2010, p. 118), the current literature is still focused on clarifying the juridical complexities and legal limitations first. This is necessary for the international community to effectively counter piracy without violating states’ sovereignty (Roach, 2010, p. 397). However, it also means that this part of the literature is also insufficient to answer the research question posed above.

Although a basic understanding of the issue of counter-piracy and counter-TOC can be gained from these theoretical, empirical, and legalistic perspectives, they are insufficient to conduct explanatory research on their basis. The existing theoretical perspectives cannot sufficiently account for the types of actors involved, empirical studies are too descriptive and case-specific, and legalistic debates, though important, cannot explain IOs’ involvement in counter-piracy, but rather debate the legal framework in which they may act. Thus, the intersection of the fields

of IR, international law, and criminology, as well as the lack of research on piracy as a subcategory of TOC, necessitate this study (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1:** *The theoretical landscape of international counter-piracy*

### 3. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical foundation of this study is the *Global Crime Governance* framework, as developed by key author Jakobi (2013, 2020). It combines two strands of sociological institutionalism, namely world society theory and organizational studies (Jakobi, 2013). Sociological institutionalism is an approach to IR that usually centers around the emergence and dissemination of norms, their impact on state and non-state actors, and legitimacy (p. 14; Finnemore, 1996). The world society perspective enlarges the traditional state-centric focus to include IOs and other non-state actors (Jakobi, 2013, p. 32). Thus, GCG aims to “govern crime not only via national regulations, but the successive establishment of worldwide regulations targeted at the criminalization, prosecution, and punishment of specific activities.” (p. 2). This focus on global and regional institutions involved in the governance of global issues and their impact on the establishment of norms and regulations is Jakobi’s key contribution to the literature. Importantly, the theory looks at global crime in general, and does not differentiate between different types, such as human trafficking or piracy.

A central component of this theory is its emphasis on ‘rationalization’. It is a key world cultural value, defined as “the creation of cultural schemes defining means-ends relationships and standardizing systems of control over activities and actors” (Scott et al., 1994, as cited in Jakobi, 2013, p. 43). In other words, it is about organizing the societal order by defining licit and illicit activities, constructing crime-related standards, procedures, and regulations, and monitoring their implementation (p. 6). Jakobi (2013) argues that the process of rationalization drives GCG, as it aims to “make the world more transparent, understandable, and accountable” (p. 2).

Additionally, related fundamental values and principles, such as justice, organization, and progress are based on rationalization (p. 46). Accordingly, policies based on rationalization are more likely to be institutionalized than those solely based on norms (pp. 53-54). Jakobi further qualifies that, even if it is not always the most effective way to deal with crime, it is the most legitimate (p. 45). It becomes clear that the reduced occurrence of the crime is rather an ‘observable manifestation’ of GCG, whereas the main goal is the establishment of justice systems and governance mechanisms to ‘gain control’ over the crime.

Given this focus on international regimes and regulations, IOs are central players as they can trigger policy changes on the national level (Jakobi, 2013, p. 33). World society theory stresses the interrelation between the national and global level, in which states, IOs, and non-state actors impact each other (pp. 30, 32). Additionally, organizational theories emphasize ‘institutional entrepreneurs’, i.e., specific actors that bring about change regarding norms and policies (p. 35). Consequently, in GCG theory the importance of IOs as global institutional entrepreneurs is stressed. They provide the framework within which multilateral cooperation most commonly takes place (p. 63) and coordinate a variety of state and non-state actors and activities to “[develop] and [implement] substantive and procedural norms against crime” (Jakobi, 2021, p. 3).

Furthermore, to make coordinated international action successful, it is essential to overcome barriers of cooperation. Following the GCG framework, global norms are established first to create common understandings of and action against these crimes (Jakobi, 2013, pp. 57-58). They must “bridge a diverse set of actors” (p. 62). While “[substantive] norms determine what a crime is, (...) procedural norms stipulate how cooperation should work” (Jakobi, 2021, p. 4). In the process of rationalization, these norms must subsequently be translated into the more managerial and technical sphere.

From this theory, the following causal mechanism is deduced (see Table 1): Firstly, GCG action is triggered by a perceived rise in criminal activity (Jakobi, 2013, p. 8). This then leads to the integration of world society through the formulation of common procedural and substantive norms. It is the start of the rationalization process. Although global norms against piracy have existed since the 18th century, only with their translation into procedural and substantive norms are they likely to be turned into institutionalized policies. This is manifested through a “rise of global structures and activities related to crime government” (p. 230), where institutional entrepreneurs create new organizations or enlarge the mandate of existing ones.

Secondly, global prohibition regimes and anti-crime regulations are created that are to be implemented by states (pp. 231, 236). These are the outcome of political negotiations, and can be influenced by IOs through setting standards, coordinating policy developments, and providing financial and technical assistance (p. 33). While IOs can set up rules and regulations, and can support and monitor their implementation, the prohibition and prosecution of crimes ultimately depends on state actors (Jakobi, 2021, p. 38).

Importantly, establishing institutionalized procedures against crime is a process which may take years of concerted efforts. Thus, current symptoms of crime, i.e., piracy attacks, must simultaneously already be countered by other means so as not to exacerbate the situation. To gain control of the situation and support states' efforts, while respecting sovereignty rights, highly technical and presumably 'non-political' action is taken by specialized agencies of IOs in the form of technical and professional networks (Jakobi, 2013, p. 236). This also allows for cooperation even between states with large political divergence (Jakobi, 2021, pp. 47, 54). Lastly, these concerted efforts should culminate in the creation of legitimate and institutionalized global procedures against crime.

**Table 1:** *Causal Mechanism of GCG*

Cause	Step 1:	Step 2a:	Outcome:
Perceived rise of criminal activity, triggering IO involvement	Creation of procedural and substantive norms through IOs	Creation of anti-crime regulations and prohibition regimes for states to implement	Establishment of legitimate and institutionalized global procedures against crime
		<b>Step 2b:</b> Creation of professional and technical networks	

*Limitations*

This theoretical approach does not specifically engage in fundamental debates about powers of IOs. Instead, it assumes that IOs can act both by the means of their autonomous power as well as being utilized as tools by states. It thus diverges from traditional IR debates. Additionally, the theory is still comparatively young and is situated in the niche that is the nexus of IR and criminology. Jakobi herself has predominantly employed it to analyze the USA and developed

it through research around human and drug trafficking. Hence it has not been tested extensively.

Despite these limitations of the theory, it will be useful for the purposes of this study, as it presents one of the first comprehensive theoretical frameworks to analyze global efforts against TOC. It allows for the analysis of various types of actors, including IOs, and does not treat norm-creation and procedural countermeasures as mutually exclusive goals in the way that previous theories have. The strength of this theory lies in its broad approach and the variety of functions that it assigns to various actors involved in global crime governance, thereby representing the complex nature of GCG.

## **4. Methodology**

### *4.1. Case Selection*

The following research is a qualitative single case study of IO involvement in counter-piracy efforts at the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is the easternmost tip of the African continent, most notably the Somali peninsula. This region is selected because it has been a hotspot of piracy for decades (Bichler, 2019), where multiple international counter-piracy initiatives have taken place and empirically shown results of reduced attacks (Roach, 2010; Jakobi, 2013). The impact of IOs on global counter-piracy efforts is well established which allows for thorough analysis, thus making this case a good fit to answer the research question. Although different sources divide the region up differently, this study will treat the (waters at the) Horn of Africa in its entirety and interpret data accordingly.

The IOs chosen for this study are the UN, EU, and NATO, and their associated agencies, as these organizations and their involvement in the region are explicitly mentioned in the literature (Roach, 2010; Elmi et al., 2015; Jakobi, 2020). Additionally, then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon specifically requested IOs like NATO and the EU in September 2008 to get involved in international efforts by escorting WFP vessels and patrolling the waters at the Horn of Africa (NATO, n.d.a). Lastly, these IOs specifically provide open access to data about their actions in English. Importantly, to distinctly focus on the role of IOs and due to the limited scope of this study, GCG is analyzed only from the global perspective even though it also takes place on the regional, national, and local level (Jakobi, 2013, p. 72).

The study is a typical case because of its similarities to other hotspots of piracy, but it deviates from other cases in the unusually high amount of international attention it has received. Piracy at the Horn of Africa resembles piracy in other regions of the world in the way it is executed, e.g., using small, motorized boats, attackers being armed, the location of attacks at globally important shipping routes, and the proximity of weak states in which the pirate networks are based. The deviance in international attention of this case compared to other cases, may increase the relevance of this study for drawing conclusions about the effect international counter-piracy efforts could have in other regions experiencing rising numbers of piracy attacks, such as the Gulf of Guinea (ICC, 2021).

The time frame is set from 2008 until 2020. This is due to the two main counter-piracy operations analyzed here, namely the EU's Operation *Atalanta* and NATO's Operation *Ocean Shield*, having been launched in 2008 and 2009 respectively, and with them a variety of other initiatives. It is then expected to take a few months, if not years, until cooperation mechanisms and the like are sufficiently established and first effects from these operations will become apparent, with institutionalization on the national level taking even longer. The cutoff point is set at 2020 because with the onset of the covid-19 pandemic, economic patterns that evolved with increased globalization were put on hold, which may affect piracy action.

#### 4.2. Data Collection

The data utilized in the following analysis is primary data from openly available documents of the EU, NATO, and UN and their affiliated agencies, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). These accounts include resolutions, annual reports on the state of piracy and maritime crime, factsheets and brochures on IOs' counter-piracy operations, press releases, and international treaties. Additionally, some secondary sources, such as official reports by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), are taken into consideration, to supplement the primary data available and for the purpose of triangulation, to validate the accuracy of data provided by IOs within the scope of this study (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 128). These reports condense information from a variety of sources, including those with limited public access. This is valuable as data collection in this field is difficult due to limited intelligence clearance, lacking validation of data, and underreporting of attacks by shipping companies (Bichler, 2019, p. 117). Based on this data, the causal mechanism deduced from the GCG theory can be tested critically.

### *4.3. Research Design*

The analysis will follow theory-testing process-tracing, examining the applicability of the GCG approach to the case of piracy at the Horn of Africa. Different from correlation analyses, process-tracing allows for the step-by-step analysis of causal mechanisms (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 3; Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 237). Based on the GCG theory (see 3.), mechanistic evidence is established for every step of the causal mechanism (see 4.4). This evidence allows the tracing of a pathway of causal relations. The analysis then investigates the data, looking for this mechanistic evidence, to puzzle together an account of why IO involvement led to reduced numbers of attacks. This way it tests the applicability of the causal mechanism deduced from the theory. Consequently, not only a simple correlation between their involvement and a reduction in incidents can be proven, but strong within-case inferences can be made (p. 2). Furthermore, the theory-centric approach allows generalizing beyond this specific case because it will (in)validate the applicability of the GCG theory to TOC more generally (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 69-70).

Importantly, steps 2a and 2b (see Table 1) may take place simultaneously ('cumulatively') (Heupel, Heaphy, & Heaphy, 2022, p. 45), as the former mechanism may "only become significant after being in action for a while" (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 82). Meanwhile, the latter serves the immediate treatment of the symptoms of the crime, which is necessary to give the institutionalized procedures time to develop and consequently culminate in the desired outcome long-term (Mahoney, 2012, p. 582).

### *4.4 Data Analysis*

Following the causal mechanism developed above this section establishes the mechanistic evidence that will guide the analysis to test the GCG framework (see Table 2). Firstly, skyrocketing numbers of piracy attacks must alarm the international community to spring into action. Piracy gaining salience on the international agenda is likely to underscore the perceived rise in criminal activity (Jakobi, 2013, p. 8). This may be observable from reports and warnings given by international monitoring agencies, or similar alarming signals, that trigger IO involvement. Secondly, the formulation of procedural and substantive norms manifests itself in

a “rise of global structures and activities related to crime government” (p. 230). This may be observable in the creation of new organizations or enlarged mandates of existing IOs to counter piracy, as well as efforts to clarify definitions of piracy and establishing common rules of prosecution.

Thirdly, the creation of anti-crime regulations and prohibition regimes are manifested in international agreements that are to be implemented by states. These conventions are likely to contain cooperation and transparency agreements, as well as criminalization requirements by states, since IOs themselves cannot introduce criminal laws (Jakobi, 2020, p. 2). IOs do, however, have the power to monitor, technically and financially support, and thereby incentivize states to implement rules and regulations. Thus, mechanistic evidence for this step may take the form of international agreements between states and IOs, that establishes what requirements states are to fulfil and what IOs will offer in return to support this common effort.

Concurrently, professional and technical networks may be established to take actions that states cannot or will not fulfill. This would, for instance, be observable in (specialized agencies of) IOs creating multinational task forces to patrol the seas or creating an international court to adjudicate piracy incidents. These actions also indirectly support states’ efforts in the region financially and technically. Thus, they may overlap slightly with those supporting states’ implementation of regulations and prohibition regimes. However, they are analytically distinct as the latter is a symptomatic effort to reduce the immediate threat of piracy, whereas the former aims to establish long-term measures to facilitate legitimate and institutionalized procedures to deal with piracy. This is also the ultimate outcome that, if GCG holds true, should be observed e.g., through national courts adjudicating on coordinated (regional) standards, mutual legal assistance, and the existence of long-term cooperation frameworks.

**Table 2: Mechanistic Evidence guiding the analysis**

Cause	Step 1:	Step 2a:	Outcome:
Signals alarming the international community, e.g., reports and warnings issued by international monitoring agencies	Procedural norms: Rise of global structures for crime governance, e.g., new organizations/agencies or enlarged mandates; Substantive norms: clarifying of definitions regarding the crime, establishment of common rules of prosecution	International agreements between states and IOs (cooperation); Likely to include criminalization requirements; May include incentives by IOs	Coordinated (regional) standards of adjudication, mutual legal assistance, long-term frameworks of counter-crime cooperation
		<b>Step 2b:</b> Creation of highly technical agencies, e.g., multinational task forces, or a specialized international court	

**5. Analysis**

*5.1. Cause: Perceived rise of criminal activity, triggering IO involvement*

Following the causal mechanism elaborated above, the cause, i.e., the involvement of IOs because of the perceived rise of criminal activity must first be investigated. This was predominantly triggered by the continuous rise in piracy attacks since 2005, reported by the IMO which monitors maritime security, as well as symbolically important attacks on vessels of the World Food Program (WFP). These were transporting humanitarian aid products to war-torn regions at the Horn of Africa (TOCTA, 2009, p. 196), and thus an attack on them was a symbolic attack on the international community itself. In response, the UNSC issued Resolution 1816 in 2008, expressing its concern about piracy and armed robbery at the Horn of Africa (UNSC, 2008a). While in 2000, 4.7% of all global piracy attacks were reported from that region, this share quickly rose to 17.2% in 2005, and 53% in 2009 (TOCTA Report, 2010).

Subsequently, the UNODC got involved, collecting additional data, and issuing reports that established the multidimensionality of the security threat. In its 2009 TOC Report it found that the Gulf of Aden had not only experienced the largest increase and share of piracy attacks globally, but that almost all of them were armed attacks, including violent kidnapping of seafarers for ransom (TOCTA Report, 2010, p. 196). In addition to threatening the personal safety of seafarers, the estimated profits of at least \$50-100 million USD for the pirates further

jeopardized the political security of the war-torn region, as it gave pirates more purchasing power and influence than local governments (p. 196). Furthermore, attacks were occurring increasingly far from the Somali coast (compare 50 nautical miles in 2006 to 1,000 NM in 2009), leading to rising costs for shipping companies because of longer routes to avoid dangerous regions, and insurance premiums increasing as much as seven-fold (TOCTA Report, 2010, p. 196). Piracy was thus established as a threat to personal, political, and economic security.

In reaction to these alarming reports, more IOs sprang into action and created programs to support global counter-piracy efforts at the Horn of Africa (UNODC, 2011). This further supported the issue gaining salience on the international agenda. Organizations of states with an interest in maintaining political and economic security in the region realized the severity of the threat that piracy poses. Within months of the reports and resolutions being issued, piracy at the Horn of Africa appeared as a central point on the agendas of the EU and NATO (Eunavfor, n.d.a; NATO, n.d.c).

### *5.2. Step 1: Creation of procedural and substantive norms through IOs*

Moral condemnations of piracy and the encouragement of creating global structures and activities related to counter-piracy can most clearly be found in UNSC resolutions. Action against piracy at the Horn of Africa was first authorized in Resolution 1816 (June 2008; UNSC, 2008a). It also encouraged states to cooperate with each other and with IOs, while stressing the importance to respect international human rights law in all counter-piracy efforts. Considering the increasing frequency of attacks, resolution 1838 (October 2008) called for the intensification of actions against piracy (UNSC, 2008b), and reaffirmed the counter-piracy provisions of the LOS. Anti-piracy authorizations were expanded further to include operations on land and urged collaboration between states and the shipping and insurance industries in Resolution 1851 (December 2008; UNSC, 2008c). The frequency of resolutions and the quick expansion of authorizations reflects the urgency with which norms, such as adherence to international human rights law, counter-piracy action, and international cooperation, were created and to be translated into immediate action by the according actors.

A second wave of resolutions followed in 2011, further specifying procedures and actions. Resolution 1976 explicitly called on states, UN agencies, and regional organizations to support the TFG of Somalia to establish a government system, rule of law, police control, strengthen

coastguard capacities, and “provide all necessary technical and financial support” (UNSC, 2011a, p. 3). Additionally, it urged the international shipping community to support judicial and detention related projects through the *Trust Fund Supporting the Initiatives of States Countering piracy off the coast of Somalia* (p. 6). Lastly, Resolution 2015 (October 2011; UNSC, 2011b) stressed the need to establish specialized anti-piracy courts and national provisions criminalizing piracy to allow for effective prosecution.

After this point no further resolutions were issued that created additional substantive and procedural norms. Instead, the following resolutions concerning piracy, renewed authorizations of the established anti-piracy measures (Resolutions 2020, 2077, 2125, 2383, 2500, 2608; UNSC Report, n.d.). This suggests that while counter-piracy action was still actively needed, the norms on which action was based, were sufficiently established by late 2011.

Lastly, the UNODC established the norm that “prisoners should, wherever possible and subject to human rights considerations, serve their prison sentence in their own country” (UNODC, 2011, p. 11). Consequently, it is argued that building up the weak institutions in Somalia is crucial to “rebuild a more just and stable society for all its citizens” (p. 3)

The analysis shows that evidence for norm-creation is predominantly found in the UN and its agencies, making them the major institutional entrepreneurs in counter-piracy efforts at the Horn of Africa. In particular, the UNSC resolutions set out clear frameworks of operations and authorize international action. The key substantive norms formulated are the legal provisions of the LOS, adherence to (human rights) law, serving prison sentences in home countries. The key procedural norms are the authorizations of actions by international actors, international cooperation between states, IOs, and industries, and the provision of financial and technical support to states in the region both at land and sea.

### *5.3. Step 2a: Creation of anti-crime regulations and prohibition regimes for states to implement*

A key international agreement between states and IOs to facilitate anti-crime regulations and prohibition regimes in accordance with the UNSC resolutions, is the *Djibouti Code of Conduct*, created by the IMO and adopted in January 2009. The signatory states declare their intentions to cooperate against piracy in accordance with international law in investigating, arresting, and prosecuting suspected pirates, and the rescue of ships, persons, and property (European External

Action Service [EEAS], 2012, p. 1). Additionally, signatory states are required to review their national legislations to ensure the existence of laws criminalizing piracy (IMO, n.d.). This is assessed by the IMO and UNODC, which also assist states to empower their law-enforcement capabilities. Furthermore, states must create fair and efficient piracy trials, efforts which the EU and UNODC's counter-piracy programs support (EEAS, n.d., p. 17).

IOs created a variety of mechanisms and 'support-programs' to support states accomplish the commitments made in the Djibouti Code of Conduct, and to implement the norms elaborated above. Most notably, NATO started two temporary anti-piracy military Operations, *Allied Provider* (2008) and *Allied Protector* (2009), to escort WFP vessels and patrol the waters around the Somali coast (NATO, n.d.a, n.d.b). Subsequently the longer-term Operation *Ocean Shield* was established (2009-2016) to combat piracy in the region (NATO, n.d.c). Similarly, in 2008 the EU established the Naval Force for Somalia (NAVFOR). Its Operation *Atalanta* serves as a multinational marine mission to counter piracy and protect humanitarian aid deliveries. It was later extended as part of the EU's 'Integrated Approach' to counter both symptoms and root causes of piracy at the Horn of Africa. In 2010 the Training Mission (EUTM) for Somali armed forces and in 2012 the capacity-building program for Somali maritime civilian law enforcement (EUCAP) were created (Eunavfor, n.d.a). IOs thus played a key role in turning the norms set out by the institutional entrepreneurs into actionable regulations and prohibition regimes. This can roughly be categorized into (1) coordination and cooperation, (2) financial support, and (3) capacity-building.

Firstly, to increase transparency and coordination between the actors involved in counter-piracy action, a variety of cooperation mechanisms were created. In 2009 the CGPCS was formed as a contact point among affected states, IOs, and industries (EEAS, 2012, p. 1; CGPCS, 2018, p. 1). It facilitates plenary sessions and working groups on military coordination, legal aspects, and self-protection measures, among others (Eunavfor, n.d.a). Relatedly, in 2011 the IMO created information-sharing mechanisms including information-sharing centers in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen (IMO, n.d.). Similarly, the EU has supported the creation of a Regional Maritime Information Sharing center. Additionally, the UNODC served as a forum for talks between the Seychelles and Somalia's TFG, Puntland, and Somaliland, to repatriate convicted Somali pirates to prisons in Somalia (UNODC, 2011, p. 9). Lastly, high levels of inter-organizational cooperation are reflected in the joint operations between the EU and UNODC, and the EU and NATO (further elaborated in 5.4.).

Secondly, in response to Resolution 1976, IOs provided financial support to enable states to implement all necessary measures. For instance, the EU provided hundreds of millions of euros to support Somali governance, security, economic development and to promote the rule of law (EEAS, 2012, p. 5). Similarly, a joint EU-UNODC program provided financial support to neighboring states, namely Kenya (1.75 million €), the Seychelles (0.87 million €), and Mauritius (1.08 million €), to support the enhancement of their justice systems (EEAS, 2012, p. 2). Lastly, the IMO created the *Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund*, a multi-donor voluntary fund, to support counter-piracy capacity-building. The shipping industry has been encouraged to contribute to this last effort in particular (IMO, n.d.).

Thirdly, IOs have made significant capacity-building efforts to enable states in the region to implement the established norms of successful and fair prosecutions, imprisonment under humane conditions, and increasing states' policing and prevention capabilities. Capacity-building efforts have been conducted by all three analyzed IOs (UNODC, 2011, p. 10; EEAS, 2012, p. 3; NATO, 2014, pp. 1-2), as well as the commonly established Global Maritime Crime Programme, which was initiated in 2014 (UNODC, 2016, p. 19). For instance, since 2010, the IMO, under the auspices of the Djibouti Regional Training Center, has conducted 60 training courses with trainees from the region (IMO, n.d.). Additionally, the UNODC has focused on increasing prison capacities across the region, which, due to lacking finances and resources, had not been upgraded in up to 120 years. It created the Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme in cooperation with the EU (UNODC, 2011, p. 10). Similarly, in 2012, EUCAP launched, focusing on strengthening maritime capacities, coastal police forces and guard training, as well as providing expert advice on legal matters (EEAS, 2012, p. 3).

#### *5.4. Step 2b: Creation of professional and technical networks*

In parallel to supporting states' efforts, IOs developed their own capabilities, agencies, and operations to counter piracy at the Horn of Africa. In fact, both EUNAVFOR's Operation Atalanta and NATO's Operation Ocean Shield's original mandates are "at-sea counter-piracy activities" to deter, prevent and repress piracy (NATO, 2022). They for instance, provide naval escorts to vessels from the WFP, patrol the waters at the Horn of Africa, and rescue vessels under attack (NATO, 2016; Eunavfor, n.d.b; NATO, n.d.c). NATO's activities are conducted by "a multinational, integrated maritime force made up of vessels from various Allied countries", as well as aircrafts (EEAS, n.d.) and helicopter surveillance to trace and identify

ships (NATO, 2022). In doing so, they actively counter the symptoms of the crime by protecting vessels from being attacked and creating a deterrent effect on pirates (NATO, 2009).

In accordance with the expansion of authorizations through the UNSC resolutions, both NATO and the EU expanded the mandates of their operations, to include on-land capacity-building activities, and expanded the scope of their missions at sea. In doing so, NATO's Operation developed its response to new piracy tactics, e.g., by disabling support bases and logistics of pirates and "allowing the use of force to disable or destroy suspected pirate or armed robber vessels" (NATO, 2022). Relatedly, EUNAVFOR units can arrest, detain, and transfer suspects of piracy, seize suspicious vessels, and prosecute suspects in EU member states or agreed upon third states (Eunavfor, n.d.a). It provides coordinated group transits for vessels passing the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, as well as providing Interpol with information on Somali-based piracy (EEAS, n.d.). It also activated Europol in 2012, to develop transnational cooperation among police and prosecutors of the countries concerned (EEAS, 2012, p. 3), and gathers data through engagement with local seafarers and intelligence-led operations.

Lastly, a significant effort of IOs is devoted to the creation of networks of information exchange and technical support to the shipping industry for immediate security improvement. Different to information-sharing fora mentioned in 5.3., these networks facilitate cooperation between IOs and the industries, rather than between states. For instance, EUNAVFOR established the Maritime Security Center - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) in cooperation with the shipping industry, so that monitoring vessels are transiting the Gulf of Aden 24-hours per day (EEAS, n.d., p. 14). Furthermore, NATO, along with its partners, "worked with the maritime community to ensure that both merchant ships and crews were aware of Best Management Practices" (NATO, n.d.c) to better protect vessels against piracy.

IOs thus play a significant role in the establishment of technical and professional networks. They collect and analyze (surveillance) information and facilitate the sharing thereof, protect and escort vessels, rescue ships under attack, and give advice to the shipping industry on self-protection measures.

### *5.5. Outcome: Establishment of legitimate and institutionalized global procedures against crime*

The concerted global efforts to counter piracy elucidated above have significantly improved the criminal justice sectors of states in the region and successful prosecutions and convictions of suspects (UNODC, 2011, 2020). This includes new courtrooms, reviewed legal frameworks, and prosecutors and police training (p. 5). Additionally, prison capacities and their conditions have been improved in Somalia, to allow for imprisonment in the home country (UNODC, 2011) and EUNAVFOR was able to transfer 171 pirates to competent authorities thus far (Eunavfor, n.d.a). These improved legal procedures and capabilities create transparent and just frameworks whereby piracy can be tackled on an ongoing basis.

Furthermore, the accountability and capabilities of states' coast guard operations and patrols have been increased and IOs have maintained naval presence in the waters at the Horn of Africa to deter and react to attacks on vessels (TOCTA Report, 2010, p. 200). This includes maritime surveillance activities, border controls, environmental protection, and law enforcement (UNODC, 2016, p. 22). Further, EUNAVFOR and NATO, have effectively been preventing attacks, with numbers decreasing from 212 attacks recorded in 2011 to one attack in 2019 (EEAS, n.d., p. 18). In fact, the effectiveness of responses to attempted attacks and the deterrence effect of international naval forces was so successful, that NATO terminated its Operation Ocean Shield in December 2016, after not having seen any successful piracy attacks since 2012 (NATO, 2022). However, it is maintaining maritime situational awareness and continues cooperation with partners in the region, as of now.

Despite these successes, it is also clear that because many measures, such as maritime patrols, only act as remedies for the symptoms of piracy, the phenomenon is likely to reappear if efforts are minimized unless the root causes of piracy, i.e., poverty and civil conflict in the region, are tackled. This is evident in the flareup of piracy in 2017, shortly after the termination of Operation Ocean Shield (CGPCS, 2018), though this could quickly be brought under control (IMO, 2021). Although procedures to deal with piracy have been institutionalized slowly, the source of the problem is ongoing poverty, droughts, and war in the region. Under these circumstances the threat of piracy cannot be eradicated, but rather its symptoms can only be suppressed and brought under control through the legitimate judicial procedures that have been established (One Earth Future, 2020, p. 1).

Overall, crime rates have been successfully and significantly reduced thanks to the establishment and enlargement of the capacities of procedures against piracy. Related institutions were expanded in affected countries, and symptomatic remedies have been found to suppress piracy until the root cause can be tackled, an effort which must take place on land.

## **6. Discussion**

These empirical findings demonstrate the applicability of the causal mechanism deduced from the GCG theory by Jakobi. Official reports by the IMO, amplified by the attention they got from the UNSC, as well as symbolic attacks on WFP vessels, first triggered international action. They increased the salience of the topic on the international agenda and the threat it poses. The UNSC in particular took on the role of institutional entrepreneur, by issuing a number of resolutions setting out moral foundations of counter-piracy action and authorizing international action. As suggested by Jakobi (2013, pp. 32-33), they disseminated ideas reflecting world cultural values, such as fair prosecution and respect of international human rights law.

Furthermore, as explained by Jakobi (2013), a process of rationalization took place in which IOs created coordination mechanisms and frameworks for states, IOs, and specialized agencies to work in. The EU and UNODC played a particularly prominent role in this. Standardized control mechanisms and standards of prosecution lead to institutionalized policies that are compatible across national borders. Additionally, IOs provided technical and financial assistance to support states' efforts to establish institutions and procedures of justice based on the previously set out norms.

In a simultaneous step of rationalization, more specialized agencies, such as NATO, Interpol, and EUNAVFOR became involved, filling the 'gaps' that states could not (yet) fill, e.g., because of limited capacities, slow change, or the transnational nature of crimes limiting the scope of their powers. This was necessary due to the complexity of building national institutions for long-term crime governance while at the same time countering the transnational threat at hand. It is another step of rationalization because the involvement of such professional and technical networks reflects moving from the moral sphere into the technical and regulatory sphere.

As suggested by GCG theory, this process of rationalization culminated in the creation of legitimate and institutionalized ways to deal with the crime through cooperation between all actors involved. In this case it means the ‘catching’ of pirates with states’ trained coast guards and international naval forces, handing them over to local authorities that possess improved capacities to prosecute, with programs in place to transfer pirates to their home state to serve their sentence in improved and enlarged prisons. It is empirically notable, though not necessitated by theory, that this was accompanied by decreased incidence of attacks.

Nevertheless, the analysis of this case has also shown that deterrence effects and the affected industries played a more important role in practice, than the theory suggests. IOs were directly involved with the shipping industry to develop best management and self-protection measures, to cooperate on surveillance and safety corridors, coordinate escorted transits of dangerous waters, and provide financial support e.g., through the *Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund*. With regards to the effect of deterrence, the findings suggest that the presence of international naval forces significantly contributed to the decline in attacks, but that their termination may result in a reemergence of the phenomenon unless national forces have the capacity to take over their roles. Despite this, the GCG theory overall holds up and can accurately account for the causal mechanisms at play in this case study.

It must also be noted that although the applicability of the GCG causal mechanism was validated, the analysis also demonstrates shortcomings of the theory regarding the depth of its explanatory power. By following the GCG framework this analysis largely focused on international efforts to treat the symptoms of piracy, i.e., reducing the number of attacks through patrols and interventions, capacity-building of policing forces, and facilitating prosecution. However, as stated in the introduction, the larger problem driving people into the ‘business’ of piracy is the lack of alternatives on land. True long-term solutions must therefore focus on establishing economic and political stability in the region (Elmi et al., 2015).

## **7. Conclusion**

This study has shown empirically why and through which mechanism counter-piracy actions by the EU, UN, and NATO between 2008 and 2020 contributed to the significant decrease in attacks at the Horn of Africa. They formulated procedural and substantive norms and rationalized them by turning them into action in a more technical sphere, i.e., regulations and

prohibition regimes, as well as professional and technical networks. It provides insights that may become useful to counter piracy in other hotspots, such as the Gulf of Guinea or the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, in which the threat of piracy remains very high (One Earth Future, 2020; ICC, 2021). It has also affirmed the usefulness of Jakobi's GCG framework, and thus its value to the literature on counter-TOC theory, as well as some shortcomings of the theory.

However, it must also be addressed that due to the limited scope of this study only three IOs could be taken into consideration, and these were all Euro-/Western-centric. This may bias the results, as the inclusion of more, particularly non-Western IOs, such as the African Union or ECOWAS may have contributed even more or different ways in which IOs support counter-piracy efforts. Hence, future research should investigate these IOs to broaden the findings of this study and to test the GCG theory's applicability to non-Western contexts.

An additional shortcoming of this study is the availability of primary sources being limited to official reports and statements from the respective IOs' websites. To test the true effects of IOs' efforts beyond their self-representation, ethnographic work, including interviews with convicted pirates, police, or field officers should be conducted in the future. This will require significantly more time, resources, and local language skills than were available for this study.

## 8. Bibliography

- Abbot, K., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42, 3-32.
- Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organizations*, 53(4), 699-732.
- Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). *Process-tracing methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. Ann Arbor, USA: University of Michigan Press.
- Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2019). *Process-tracing methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. Ann Arbor, USA: University of Michigan Press.
- Bichler, G. (2019). Maritime Crimes. In Natarajan, M. (Ed.), *International and Transnational Crime and Justice* (pp. 114-119). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Castle, A. (1997). *Transnational organized crime and international security*. (Working Paper). The University of British Columbia, Canada.
- Clarke, R. V. (2019). Crime prevention in international context. In Natarajan, M. (Ed.), *International and Transnational Crime and Justice* (pp. 311-316). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (2018, July). *Contact Group: Global approach to combat maritime piracy and thoughts on underpinning this international forum*. Retrieved from [<http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2018/07/Press-Release-CGPCS-21st-plenary.pdf>]
- Elmi, A. A., Affi, L., Knight, W. A., & Mohamed, S. (2015). Piracy in the Horn of Africa Waters: Definitions, history, and Modern Causes. *African Security*, 8(3), 147-165.
- Eucap-som.eu (n.d.). *European Union capacity building mission in Somalia: Our 2021-2022 Mandate*. Retrieved from [<https://www.eucap-som.eu/fact-sheet/>]
- Eunavfor.eu (n.d.a). *Forces of operation ATALANTA*. Retrieved from [<https://Eunavfor.eu/>]
- Eunavfor.eu (n.d.b). *Mission*. Retrieved from [<https://Eunavfor.eu/mission>]

- European External Action Service (n.d.). *European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta*. Retrieved from [[https://EEAS.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-navfor-somalia/pdf/Eunavfor\\_brochure\\_en.pdf](https://EEAS.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-navfor-somalia/pdf/Eunavfor_brochure_en.pdf)]
- European External Action Service (2012). *The EU fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa*. Retrieved from [[https://EEAS.europa.eu/archives/docs/agenda/2012/200212\\_factsheet\\_piracy.pdf](https://EEAS.europa.eu/archives/docs/agenda/2012/200212_factsheet_piracy.pdf)]
- Finnemore, M. (1996). Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's institutionalism. *International Organization*, 50(2), 325-347.
- Graycar, A. (2019). International cooperation to combat money laundering. In Natarajan, M. (Ed.), *International and Transnational Crime and Justice* (pp. 299-304). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Halperin, S., & Heath, O. (2020). *Political research: Methods and practical skills*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Heupel, M., Heaphy, C., & Heaphy, J. (2022). *US counterterrorism and the human rights of foreigners abroad: Putting the gloves back on?* New York, USA: Routledge.
- International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (2021, April 14). *Gulf of Guinea remains world's piracy hotspot in 2021, according to IMB's latest figures*. Retrieved from [<https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/gulf-of-guinea-remains-worlds-piracy-hotspot-in-2021-according-to-imbs-latest-figures/>]
- IMO (n.d.). *Djibouti Code of Conduct*. Retrieved from [<https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/DCoC.aspx>]
- International Maritime Organization (2009, March 19). *Reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships: Annual report - 2008*. Retrieved from [<https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/133-Annual2008.pdf>]
- International Maritime Organization (2016, April 7). *Annex 1 List of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships and attempted attacks*. Retrieved from [[https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/232\\_Annua1\\_2015.pdf](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/232_Annua1_2015.pdf)]

- International Maritime Organization (2021, April 29). *Reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships: Annual Report - 2020*. Retrieved from [https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/MSC.4\_Circ.265%20Annual%20Report%202020.pdf]
- Jakobi, A. P. (2013). *Common goods and evils? The formation of global crime governance*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Jakobi, A. P. (2020). *Crime, security and global politics: An introduction to Global crime governance*. London, United Kingdom: Red Globe Press.
- Kusumaningrum, A. (2013). The ASEAN political-security community: ASEAN security cooperation on combating transnational crimes and transboundary challenges. *Indonesian Journal of International Law*, 11(1), 89-105.
- Mahoney, J. (2012). The logic of process tracing tests in the social sciences. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 41(4), 570-597.
- Nadelmann, E. A. (1990). Global prohibition regimes: The evolution of norms in international society. In Khagram, S., & Levitt, P. (Eds.), *The transnational studies reader: Intersections & Innovations* (pp. 531-539). New York & London: Routledge.
- NATO (n.d.a). *Operation Allied Protector*. Retrieved from [https://shape.nato.int/page13974522]
- NATO (n.d.b) *Operation Allied Provider*. Retrieved from [https://shape.nato.int/page13984631]
- NATO (n.d.c). *Operation Ocean Shield*. Retrieved from [https://mc.nato.int/missions/operation-ocean-shield]
- NATO (2014). *Operation Ocean Shield*. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/nato\_static\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\_topics/141202a-Factsheet-OceanShield-en.pdf]
- NATO (2022). *Counter-piracy operations (2008-2016)*. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\_48815.htm]

- Obokata, T. (2019). Combating Transnational organised crime through international human rights law. *International Human Rights Law Review*, 8, 1-37.
- One Earth Future (2020). The state of maritime piracy: 2019. Retrieved from [https://www.stableseas.org/post/state-of-maritime-piracy-2019]
- One Earth Future (2021). The state of maritime piracy: 2020. Retrieved from [https://www.stableseas.org/post/state-of-maritime-piracy-2020]
- Placek, M. (2022). *Pirate attacks - statistics & facts*. Retrieved from [https://www.statista.com/topics/1290/pirate-attacks/#topicHeader\_\_wrapper]
- Roach, J. A. (2010). AGORA: Piracy prosecutions: Countering piracy in Somalia: International law and international institutions. *The American Journal of International Law*, 104(397), 397-416.
- Russo, A., & Stambol, E. M. (2021). The external dimension of the EU's fight against transnational crime: Transferring political rationalities of crime control. *Review of International Studies*, 48(2), 32-345.
- Sadik, G., & Ispir, A. Y. (2021). Comparative analysis of counter-terrorism efforts of NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Information & Security*, 48, 1-20.
- Seilkhanova, S., Shegebayeva, A., Otarbayeva, A., & Abilezov, Y. (2019). Criminal Procedure Aspects of the International Cooperation of States in the Field of Combating Transnational Organized Crime. *Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics (JARLE)*, 10(3), 903-909.
- Shane, J. M., & Magnuson, S. (2019). Worldwide maritime piracy and the implications for situational crime prevention. In Natarajan, M. (Ed.), *International and Transnational Crime and Justice* (pp. 120-125). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Shelley, L. (1995). Transnational organized crime: An imminent threat to the nation-state? (Transcending National Boundaries). In Khagram, S., & Levitt, P. (Eds.), *The transnational studies reader: Intersections & Innovations* (pp. 540-554). New York & London: Routledge.

- Simmons, B. A., & Martin, L. L. (2013). International organizations and institutions. *Handbook of international relations*, 326-351.
- Sulistyo, I., Wiranata, I. J., & Lestari, S. I. (2022). A review towards theories, concepts, methods in International Relations, and related international legal instruments for conducting research on transnational organized crime. *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research*, 628, 43-51.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010). *Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (TOCTA Report)*. Retrieved from [[https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/9.Maritime\\_piracy.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/9.Maritime_piracy.pdf)]
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2011). *Counter-piracy programme: Support to the trial and related treatment of piracy suspects*. Retrieved from [[https://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/UNODC\\_Brochure\\_Issue\\_6\\_WV.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_6_WV.pdf)]
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2016). *Global Maritime Crime Programme: Annual Report 2015*. Retrieved from [[https://www.unodc.org/res/piracy/index\\_html/2015\\_Global\\_Maritime\\_Crime\\_report.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/res/piracy/index_html/2015_Global_Maritime_Crime_report.pdf)]
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2020). *Global Maritime Crime Programme: Annual report 2019*. Retrieved from [[https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime\\_crime/Annual\\_Report\\_2019-Web.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/Annual_Report_2019-Web.pdf)]
- United Nations Security Council (2008a, June 2). *Resolution 1816 (2008)*. Retrieved from [<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%201816.pdf>]
- United Nations Security Council (2008b, October 7). *Resolution 1838 (2008)*. Retrieved from [<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20S%20RES%201838.pdf>]
- United Nations Security Council (2008c, December 16). *Resolution 1851 (2008)*. Retrieved from [<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%201851.pdf>]

United Nations Security Council (2010, April 27). *Resolution 1918 (2010)*. Retrieved from [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%201918.pdf]

United Nations Security Council (2011a, April 11). *Resolution 1976 (2011)*. Retrieved from [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%201976.pdf]

United Nations Security Council (2011b, October 24). *Resolution 2015 (2011)*. Retrieved from [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%202015.pdf]

United Nations Security Council (2011c, October 31). *Resolution 2018 (2011)*. Retrieved from [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNOWA%20S%20RES%202018.pdf]

United Nations Security Council Report (n.d.). *UN documents for piracy: Security Council Resolutions*. Retrieved from [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un\_documents\_type/security-council-resolutions/?ctype=Piracy&cbtype=piracy]

Zabyelina, Y. (2009). Transnational organized crime in International Relations. *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, 3(1), 11-22.

Zabyelina, Y. (2019). The role of major intergovernmental organizations and international agencies in combating transnational crime. In Natarajan, M. (Ed.), *International and Transnational Crime and Justice* (pp. 305-310). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.