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**Beyond Borders: Towards a Security Community between North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Asia Pacific Countries under the Rise of China.- A case study of the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.**

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**Beyond Borders: Towards a Security Community between North Atlantic  
Treaty Organization and Asia Pacific Countries under the Rise of China.  
– A case study of the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.**



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*Dedicate this thesis to my mom, who always believes in me, my dad, who guides me to believe in myself, my little sister, who unconditionally loves me, and my older sister, who lets me be my true self. Had it not for them, I would not have made it this far.*

*Far from my home South Korea.*

## **Abstract**

China has emerged as a new rising power with the largest Navy force and the second biggest economy in the world. A regional collective defense security organization, NATO, has expanded its global partnership to the Asia-Pacific region. This thesis seeks to research the impact of the military rise of China on NATO-led security cooperation among NATO and far yet like-minded countries. Comparative qualitative content analysis is conducted to elaborate on how the security implications of the rise of China engendered NATO to form global initiatives, analyzing two cases, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. Theoretical expectations are based on Regional Security Complex Theory, which is anchored on constructivism: if NATO successfully securitizes China's rise, the ROK and NZ will create bilateral or multilateral security cooperation with NATO. This paper finds out that NATO successfully framed China as an identity and a military threat, and expanded security cooperation with the ROK and NZ based on common liberal norms and values.

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## 1. Introduction

The Secretary General (SG) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Jens Stoltenberg mentioned during an interview in 2019 that “what we see is that the rising power of China is shifting the global balance of power and the rise of China provides some opportunities but also some serious challenges” (Ellyatt, 2019). Following the end of the Cold War, China has burgeoned as a new international hegemony, threatening the dominant great power position of the United States (Allison, 2015, p. 16). China is projecting its potential that can restructure the global security system with its military modernization, which has intensified in reaction to two events: the US victory in the 1991 Gulf War and the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis (Teer et al., 2021, p. 5).

Balance-of-power theorists argue as new great powers emerge, conflicts develop between an existing great power and a newcomer to the international system as they seek security expansion (Christense, 2019, p. 198). Hence, the power transition from the United States to China implies an international change of power distribution can be violent, especially in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region. Thus, the APAC region, under the military reach of both countries, has become geo-strategically essential to international peace and security (Morcos, 2021). In this regard, NATO has responded to the present concerns to international security posed by China by expanding its security partnership to four APAC nations - Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and New Zealand (NZ) – known as the NAC+4. (Ross, 2006, pp. 358-359; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2021).

However, while realist IR academics focus on the material aspects of power balance and alliance creation as a balancing tactic, it does not give an adequate explanation for why NATO developed the NAC+4 partnership outside of the transatlantic region (Shiffrinson, 2018, p. 181). To avoid unnecessary arms races and security dilemmas in and beyond Asia caused by China’s military development, researching changing patterns of military rivalry will be crucial in forecasting how great-power politics restructure the global security system. In this regard, this paper aims to examine the following research question:

*How does the military rise of China impact security cooperation between NATO and two countries in Asia-Pacific – the Republic of Korea and New Zealand between 2019 and 2022?*

In the following chapter, this thesis explores the current IR literature on the rise of China, global security cooperation with NATO, and the expansion of NATO, paying attention to a scholarly literature gap. Then a theoretical framework based on Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) with a constructivist view is presented, followed by the research design. The research conducts a qualitative content analysis with two cases, the ROK and NZ. Lastly, the thesis concludes with final remarks on the analysis with its implications, limitations, and recommendations for further research.

## 2. Literature review

### 2.1 The Military Rise of China and Balance-of-Power

The term, ‘the rise of China’, summarizes the significant growth of China in the diplomatic and military fields attributable to its unprecedented rapid economic reformation (Christense, 2019, p. 196). In the context of the balance of power theory, states check a growing power from gaining power – hegemony – by building up their national forces or aggregating their capabilities with other states in alliances (Art, 2004, p. 215). The purpose of a balancing strategy is to minimize or equalize the capabilities of great powers, implying no single preponderant state and no great power wars (Paul, 2004, p.5).

In this respect, realist scholars interpret a rising China as a feasible cause for destabilization of the international system, assuming that China is willing to “extrude” the United States from the APAC region (Friedberg, 2011, p. 166; Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 382). On the contrary, some contend that while the rise of China is real, it would not bring a violent power transition due to the economic and political situation in Asia where China maintains strong economic ties (Christense, 2019, pp. 199-200). Moreover, other scholars believe China will never fully be equal to the Western military capability (Mastro, 2018, p.25).

Criticisms of the balance of power theory have focused on inaccuracy in anticipating when the balance of power occurs both between great and lower-level powers (Paul, 2004, p.9). In the rise of China case, Shifrinson (2018, p. 185) mentions it is too early to declare the strategy of the Chinese government to engage in the all-out struggle for power dominance. Mearsheimer (2010, pp. 382-385) argues that China cannot advance peacefully, and its military force modernization implies Chinese substantial power projection. He remarks that while Chinese weapons are defensive rather than offensive, because of precipitously changing international politics it is difficult to forecast China’s future conduct (p. 385). However, Mastro (2018, pp. 36-38) provides a pessimistic view that only two indicators out of eight thresholds to contribute to peace during a power transition – economic interdependence and the U.S. defense alliance in Asia – suggest a low likelihood of power transition war; the United States’ alliance obligations in Asia are conditional and defensive in character, they are unlikely to mistakenly spark a conflict.

Changes in a country's military forces continue to be one of the most accurate indicators of how that country perceives its international power. Yet, understanding Chinese military strength objectively is becoming increasingly challenging. As the understanding of "security" has shifted to include the condition to be free from any deliberate human-made violence or threat (Wæver, 1995, pp. 4-6). While China expands its military capabilities, its neighbors fear that this would weaken their own security since there is no assurance that the US will remain the great power in check. (Holslag, 2011, p. 15). These mounting worries will have negative impacts on the regional security including a costly arms race (Holslag, 2011, p. 15). Nevertheless, while IR scholars have been mainly predicting the dynamics between China and the United States during this power transition, they have cast fewer lights on regional implications which reflects the effects of a rising power on the domains of influence of major powers.

## 2.2 Alliances and NATO

Alliance theory, a subbranch of balance-of-power theory, concentrates on the explanation of the formation and endurance of alliances. Alliances are formed in opposition to an established or rising power when it is perceived as a common threat (Beeson, 2015, p. 316; Fordham, 2010, p. 686; Snyder, 2007, p.4). In this regard, Snyder (1990, p. 105; 2007, p.4;) stipulates the difference between "alliance" and "alignment": alignment indicates broader cooperation among states based on mutual expectations while alliances are often considered in a military scope which can be formed bilaterally or multilaterally. States create or join alliances as a means of aggregating military capabilities to achieve primarily a likelihood of being attacked (deterrence), increased strength in the event of an attack (defense), and prevention of the ally's alliance with one's opponent (preclusion) (Christensen & Snyder, 1990, p. 167; Snyder, 1990, p. 111). When the concepts of reciprocity and mutual defense are included in an alliance, it creates a collective defense mechanism, distinguishing amity and enmity (Snyder, 1990, p. 62). NATO is a typical example of a collective defense arrangement established during the Cold War to protect the geographical status quo in Europe and North America by defending Western security against Soviet communism (Emmers, 2014, p. 5).

Walt (1987, p. 4) asserts that alliance formation occurs based on the evaluation of threat which is assessed by power but also by three other critical factors: "aggressive intentions, geographic proximity, and offensive power". However, Emmers (2014, p. 5) contends ideology and regime

type of states can hinder the flexibility of alliance building. Alliance theory is indeed an essential analytical framework for elucidating creating alliances in an anarchic system. However, it mainly emphasizes on alliance behavior of great powers, which falls short of explaining small states motivation behind alliance formation or accession (Bailes et al, 2016, p. 11). In terms of NAC+4, it is NATO, which initiated the security partnership to the APAC countries not the other way around. Hence, Walt's bandwagoning, which means weak states join an asymmetrical coalition with the dominating power rather than against it, does not apply to this new security cooperation between NATO and the APAC countries (Schweller, 1994, p. 80). After all, the United States is highly likely to take a more prominent position in Asia as the foreign policy of China has gotten assertive and aggressive. NATO, of which the United States is one of the founders, will remain an essential venue for security discussion for its member states (Beeson, 2015, p. 316). Therefore, while realist studies of alliance can explain the role of NATO in transatlantic security, this approach alone is insufficient to demystify the expansion of NATO's strategic engagement with the APAC area in the face of a rising China.

### 2.3 NATO Expansion

This part follows with a discussion of understandings on NATO enlargement in the post-Cold War era. First, neorealists focus on causal determinants of behaviors of states shaped by the international system structure (anarchy), characteristics of states (like regime types), and distribution of capabilities, albeit the theoretical focus is on international structural impacts (Dunne & Schmidt, 201, pp. 107-108). They argue the primary independent variables in understanding international politics – war and peace, power balance, and alliance politics – are the relative distribution of power and the grand strategies of great powers (Webber & Hyde-Price, 2016, p. 55). Defensive neorealists, thus, consider power is primarily a means to a goal, which is security, implying states are “security maximizers” rather than “power maximizers” while offensive realists argue the latter (Waltz 1993, p. 47; Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 46). However, neorealism lacks explanatory value when it is applied to changes in international system since it relies on recurrent patterns and overarching trends (Webber & Hyde-Price, 2016, p. 55).

In the case of NATO, neorealism can elucidate the development of NATO after the Cold War in line with the collapse and subsequent re-emergence of Russia, which has enabled NATO to participate in collective milieu shaping in the Balkan countries at the initiative of the United

States (Webber & Hyde-Price, 2016, p. 56). Likewise, the reason why NATO has enlarged its multifaceted alliance with informal Soviet satellite states like Poland can be explained by neorealism under a situation where Russia is a known threat (Salye, 2019, p. 166). Nevertheless, it is not explanatory enough to predict how long a military balance will take as a respond to a dominant power (Webber & Hyde-Price, 2016, p. 5). Furthermore, in multipolar environments, neorealist structural analysis can be indeterminate in terms of predicting behavior and outcomes of state's decision (Wohlforth, 2002, p. 251). Thus, what other nations or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) do before forging military alliances is a significant gap among structural realism theorists (He, 2011, p. 155). However, (neo)realism presents a negative view on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), arguing that IGOs are dysfunctional, and it mainly serves the interests of great powers which aim to maximize material interests (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 708). To sum, the neorealist theory is an essential analytical tool, yet other supplementary theoretical approaches are necessary to analyze NATO's role in building a global collective security community with distant countries in contemporary international politics under which conditions.

Hence, despite an ample amount of (neo)realist IR literature on alliance formation and balance-of-power strategies against a rising great power, it does not provide a framework for analyzing the alliance in a way that enables us to understand the new form of NATO has taken in contemporary international relations. The post-Cold War expansion of NATO's security cooperation with comparably weaker states across the Atlantic against Russia's re-emergence may be examined using contemporary (neo)realist IR theories based on geographical proximity and perception of a collective threat. However, the traditional realism falls short in elucidating the US-led initiative NATO alliance partnerships with far-flung countries in APAC region. The new form of transatlantic security partnership with Asia-Pacific countries has not previously been analyzed and how to operationalize the level of threat in alliance formation remains a controversial topic in political science (He & Feng, 2011, p. 235). This paper, therefore, aims to understand a new cooperative defense relationship between NATO and APAC countries when the new rising power China is perceived as a security threat, examine the following research question:

*How does the military rise of China impact on security cooperation between NATO and two Asia Pacific Countries – the Republic of Korea and New Zealand between 2019 and 2022?*

### 3. Theoretical framework

#### 3.1 Theories

IR articles covered in the literature review present various implications and interpretations yet entail an academic void. The following theoretical approach is based on 1) how norms and values impact regional/global security interdependence and 2) how the rhetoric of a security threat impacts security alignment to examine the military assertiveness of China on NATO security partnership in the APAC region.

To comprehend the impact of norms and values on regional and global security cooperation, it is important to address the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). The purpose of this theory is understanding the new emerging structure of international security within and between regional and global security dynamics (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 40). According to Buzan and Wæver (p. 48), regional security complexes (RSCs) and regions are to be socially constructed in the sense that they are dependent on the security practices of states. Thus, RSCs are considered as “traditional, state-based military-political complex” that are a collection of primary processes of securitization or desecuritization (Kelly, 2007, p. 206; Buzan, 2000, p. 19).

Since they are interdependent, security issues cannot be meaningfully handled separately from one another (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 44). The fundamental nature of RSCs within the anarchy system is characterized by two forms of interactions: relative power relations and patterns of amity and enmity (p. 49). The pattern of amity and enmity enables security analysis to start from the regional level and gradually expand to include global actors on one side and regional powers on the other (p. 47). In this respect, RSCs can range along a continuum from conflict formation like interconnected wars among neighboring countries via the security regime to the security community, albeit institutionally focused RSCs will inevitably be on the security regime end of the spectrum (p. 65). The capacity for internal transformation is studied by examining material conditions for potential changes (or lack thereof) in polarity and discursive conditions for potential changes (or lack thereof) in amity/enmity relations (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 67).

Thus, considering the flexibility of RSCs, Lake (2009, p. 12) agrees that while geographic proximity tends to congregate members of an RSC, it is not a prerequisite to being a member, particularly when it comes to great power. An RSC is defined in this context as a collection of

states or non-state entities that are frequently influenced by one or more security externalities originating from a certain geographic region (Lake, 2009, p. 12). In terms of security externalities, a noteworthy finding of Lake is that the higher the externality, *ceteris paribus*, the more likely states are to adapt their behavior, arranging it either to embrace the positive or minimize the negative influence (2009, p. 52).

RSCs are not permanent patterns, but rather long-lasting patterns: as substructures of the global system, they can mediate security relationships between great powers and local states, as well as relationships between states within regions (Buzan & Wæver, 2009, p. 50). Since in an anarchy system, regional security issues can spill over into international security instability, an RSC might alter and reproduce depending on which subject a group of states securitizes (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p.46). As a result, Buzan and Wæver (2003, p. 53) introduce the three variables of the essential structure of an RSC:

- 1) *boundary that distinguishes the RSC from other neighbors, an anarchic structure which means that the RSC should entail two or more autonomous entities,*
- 2) *polarity which indicates the power distribution among the units,*
- 3) *social construction that differentiates the patterns of amity and enmity.*

An RSC can, thus, evolve in three ways based on its configuration (Buzan & Wæver, 2009, p. 53):

- 1) *maintaining the status quo of a current RSC system,*
- 2) *transforming internally which implies changes in fundamental structure as to the anarchic or (bi, multi-) polarity system due to regional (dis)integration,*
- 3) *transforming externally including alteration of memberships of RSCs and changes of outer boundary.*

Since RSCT incorporates materialistic and constructivist viewpoints, it is worthy to address IR constructivist theoretical arguments on security cooperation formation and expansion. Constructivists differ from realism and liberalism in that realists emphasize material rather than social and ideational components, whereas liberalism explains with a generally stable set of ideas that do not change (Adler & Greve, 2009, p. 64; Flockhart, 2016, p. 142). Constructivism emphasizes that reality is ‘constructed’ under norms, rules, and values which are products of unceasing interactions between structure and agent (Flockhart, 2016, p. 141). Likewise, the

constructivist end of RSCT is grounded on its amity-enmity component which reflects the consequences of a securitization process (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 50). The securitization process indicates that an issue is framed as an existential threat, which requires drastic measures and justifies behaviors beyond normal political practice including the use of force (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 25-26). Securitization, therefore, allows powerful political actors to claim an issue as security that requires unparliamentary means to protect it (Williams & Neumann, 2000, p. 364; Wæver, 1995, p. 6).

According to the Copenhagen School, a security issue is securitized only when the audience acknowledges it as a threat to *a referent object* via the rhetoric of *securitizing actors* (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). Consequently, it is crucial to grasp the securitization procedures involved in developing a shared understanding of what is to be addressed and collectively reacted to as a threat (p. 26). In the military sector, notions such as nonproliferation of specific types of weaponry such as nukes and power distribution can be securitized as existential threats to the military security of a referent object, which in this case is a state (p. 51). Although military securitization is frequently focused on the state level, it can also take place at the institutional level, such as NATO (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 54).

In the upshot, to empirically analyze an RSC as incorporating constructivism and securitization theory into RSCT, the three stages of the pattern of security interconnectedness should be identified (Buzan & Wæver, 2009, p. 73; Guzzini, 2011, p. 331):

- 1) *Has the issue been sufficiently securitized by any actors?*
- 2) *If yes, examine the interactions in this case: how does the security action in this situation affect the security of who, what, and where?*
- 3) *The links can be grouped as a collection of interconnected security concerns.*

By integrating the abovementioned theoretical implications, this paper aims to understand why and how NATO has formed the NAC+4 partnership with the ROK and New Zealand, considering the military hostility of China. Hence, the following hypothesis will be tested:

*As a rising power is securitized as a security threat, an intergovernmental organization (IGO) and like-minded countries form a new multilateral security cooperation.*

### 3.2 Conceptualization

To understand how political challenges get securitized as a threat to a *referent object* “that is threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival,” it is crucial to identify what security and security threat is (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36). In the constructivist view, security is a performative effect of intersubjective communication among actors which is a “speech act” – “that something is done by naming threats and dangers” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26; Guzzini, 2011, p. 330). Therefore, defining security follows a specific discursive form of speech act in which political actors invoke something as a threat to a referent object that is perceived to be a danger to survival; it is the demand for an instant and protective measures (Schlag, 2016, p. 164; Wæver, 1995, p. 55). Since securitization entails a specific form of presenting ‘existential threat’ to a referent object – a state– ‘security treat’ in the military sector should be also conceptualized. Constructivist understanding of security threats is that they can agitate the identity of the actor, implying that it is a “danger that the enemy destabilizes the order, stability, and societal equilibrium of the self” (Gause, 2003, p. 303; Kratochvil, 2004, p. 4). Additionally, a credible security threat should be able to use force during conflicts which indicate that the size of arms and military spending can shape the type of threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 58; Kratochvil, 2004, p. 11). In this regard, the high-threat situations of national security are considered when an external threat proceeds arms buildup or a joint military exercise training (He, 2011, p. 171).

Security cooperation is defined as collaborative endeavors to achieve their own goals, national survival, relying on resources, intentions, and activities of other states (Müller, 2012, p. 370). Therefore, states which established bilateral or multilateral cooperation can lose the autonomy of action to some extent in responding to their common threat (Müller, 2012, p. 371). This paper conceptualizes security cooperation as a form of ‘cooperative security’ alignment, which “operates through dialogue and seeks to address the climate of international relations rather than tackle specific problems” based on a comprehensive membership (Emmers, 2004, pp.7-8). Cooperative security creates a “dialogue habit” among states and IGOs, building security confidence and preventive diplomacy tactics (Emmers, 2004, p. 7).

## 4. Research Design

### 4.1 Methodology

The research design of the thesis will be outlined in this chapter. To test the hypothesis, this paper will conduct a comparative small-N qualitative content analysis of primary sources with two cases: the ROK and NZ. Qualitative content analysis can identify and expose the (underlying) meaning and motives within the texts, which helps to understand how NATO securitizes the rising of China to its potential security partner states (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p.376). Additionally, an existing theory, RSCT, will be applied to this case study which entails new contexts of the APAC region, meaning the ROK and NZ are representative cases (p. 236). The case study enables comparative analysis of securitization phenomena of NATO with the ROK and NZ with ample textual descriptions (p. 236). Since the small-N carries selection bias due to a limited number of cases, it follows Most Different System Design (MDSD) which enables a greater degree of contextualization from an in-depth analysis than a single case study (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 238). The case selection process will be addressed in the following section 4.2. The independent variable – securitization of the rise of China –, and the dependent variable – multilateral security cooperation – will be operationalized via a coding scheme in section 4.3. A single coder conducted open coding by hand. The development of a coding scheme includes open coding. For the independent and dependent variables, codes are added as necessary. The unit of analysis will be words and sentences.

Since the NAC+4 is a relatively new global security phenomenon, there is a lack of academic literature, which employs RSCT to analyze it. Although Lukasik (2021) undertakes a qualitative analysis of security issues of NATO regarding wars between state and non-state actors via securitization theory, it falls short of providing a conceptual explanation of threat perception in different contexts: the rising of China. This research conducts a qualitative content analysis, not discourse analysis, since discourse analysis mainly focuses on how words are used to convey certain meaning rather than studying which words are used in contextual data (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 387).

### 4.2 Case selection and Data collection

The selection of cases for MDSD should be based on the independent variable, not the dependent variable (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 243). Thus, this research follows the small-N

MDSO criterion of selecting cases: cases should be different from each other in various aspects but are similar on the key independent variable (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 244). NATO is selected as an example of an IGO that enables the securitization process since it is considered a 'collective defense security organization', spreading its liberal norms and values (Webber & Hyde-Price, 2016, 154). This paper chose the ROK and NZ as research cases. When it comes to both countries' similarities, they are APAC partners with NATO, and it leads to the crucial common point which links to the independent variable that they are the audience of securitization of China's rise by NATO (NATO, 2021a). However, both countries convey major differences which makes it a proper case for a comparative study. First, the ROK has 73 US military bases while there is none in NZ (Central Intelligence Agency, 2022a; 2022b). Next, the ROK is in the North APAC region closer to China than NZ, which is in the South APAC region. Lastly, comparing the annual amount of national military spending, NZ spent 10 times less (3011 million US\$) than the ROK did (45735 million US\$), which makes it the 6th largest military spender in the APAC region (Stockholm International Peace Research Institution, 2020). The table of MDSO research design can be found in Appendix 1.

Data for this qualitative content analysis would be collected from the NATO E-library from December 2019 to January 2022. This timeline is set from the 2019 NATO London summit where the SG Jens Stoltenberg officially recognized the rise of China as a priority security issue to the date before the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Connolly, 2020). The primary sources are based on the keynote interviews and speeches of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) of NATO, press briefings of Meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) with the ROK and NZ government representatives, and communiqué from NATO Summits from NATO E-library. Key search words from the given timeline are 'the rise of China', 'Asia-Pacific', 'the Republic of Korea', and 'New Zealand'.

## 4.3 Operationalization

### 4.3.1 Threat Perception

To test the hypothesis, it is essential to investigate how NATO securitized the rise of China as a security threat to its member states, let alone its non-alliance partner countries. The independent variable is phrased as *threat perception*. Threat perceptions are crucial since they serve as a link between the external environment and governmental foreign policy activity. (He, 2011, p. 170). *Threat perception* consists of two exclusive sub-categories: *identity threat and military threat*. They are based on how NATO securitizes the rise of China as a threat that would destabilize two aspects of security that are fundamental pillars of NATO as a collective defense security organization. Thus, *identity threat* measures how NATO voices concerns about the rise of China as a threat that attenuates NATO's collective identity founded on shared values. The fundamental liberal norms and values include the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and individual liberty (NATO, 2021b). Therefore, *identity threat* covers contextual data that mentions Chinese authoritarian aggressive behaviors that undermine the rule-based international orders, and the liberal norms that helped maintain international peace after the second World War including alliance partnership, cooperative security, and democracy (Ikenberry, 2010, p. 512). The other subcategory, *military threat*, focuses on how NATO regards China as a threat capable of deploying weapons or initiating military conflict shortly. Since *the military threat* is pivoted in the securitization of a material aspect of China's growth, it includes indicators such as *modern military capabilities, arms control, assertive behaviors, and military power*.

### 4.3.2 Security Cooperation

To capture how the securitization of the rise of China impacts cooperative security between NATO and the ROK and NZ, the dependent variable *multilateral security cooperation* will be analyzed via three different forms of security alignment, not an alliance. *Ad hoc coalition* theoretically refers to short-term military cooperation to tackle a specific security challenge at a given time and place rather than committing to a longer relationship (Karlsruh & Reykers, 2020, 1518). It is applied to this case to examine whether NATO, the ROK, and NZ established a temporary group to respond to a rising China. Thus, it will be measured by sentences that imply ad hoc coalition such as *interoperability, operations, missions, and personnel training*. Another security alignment is *a security community* established grounded

on “the diffusion not only of democratic values but also of self-restraint subjectivities” (Adler, 2008, p. 198). Unlike *an ad hoc coalition*, *the security community* captures how NATO, the ROK, and NZ align to build long-term peace by eliminating the use of violence within a designated political area and cooperating to forge a common identity via discourses. Its indicators include *dialogue*, *security community*, *mutual common interest*, *confidence building*, and *like-minded*. Lastly, *strategic partnership* indicates security goal-driven institutional collaborations with relatively low commitment costs, which may include non-state private actors and economic considerations (Wilkins, 2012, p. 68). Although NATO itself has released its Strategic Concept in 2019, this research only focuses on a theoretical definition of *strategic partnership* and how it emerges among NATO, the ROK, and NZ bilaterally or multilaterally. Therefore, indicators are *private sectors*, *technology investment*, *logistics*, and *information exchange*.

Table 1: Abstract Coding Scheme

Categories	Subcategories
<i>Security Threat Perception</i> (Independent Variable)	Identity threat, Military threat
<i>Multilateral Security Cooperation</i> (Dependent Variable)	Ad hoc coalition, Security Community, Strategic partnership

## 5. Analysis

In this analysis, this paper has sought to expatiate on how NATO securitized the rise of China to its member states and its global partner potential member states as a military threat and an identity threat. Furthermore, since cooperative security tends to be established in various arrangements the types of security cooperation that NATO formed with the ROK and NZ not hindered by geographies will be analyzed.

### 5.1 Security Threat Perception

#### *Military Threat*

Over the past few years, NATO has changed its ways to address how the rise of China would impact global security, especially the challenges it would bring to the NATO Alliance and its partners. In 2019, NATO (2019) officially recognized growing China's global influence as a challenge for the first time in London, let alone as an opportunity. As entering 2020, the NATO DSG Geană mentioned China as "a major military power", which brings China heavy responsibilities to participate in arms control (NATO, 2020a). NATO delivered that China will eventually shift the global balance of power considering its enormous investment in the modernization of military capacities, which makes China spends "the second-largest defence budget" in the world (NATO, 2020b). In terms of Chinese weapons, NATO showed its concerns over "missiles that can reach all NATO Allied countries", "advanced technologies, which they also use for developing military capacities", and even "disruptive technologies" (NATO, 2020c; 2021a).

However, it is noteworthy to highlight that NATO kept mentioning that "China is not an adversary to NATO" while voicing that China "poses challenges for security for our security" (2020a; 2020c; 2020f; 2021b). Even the SG Stoltenberg said that "NATO does not see China as the new enemy or an adversary" when he directly addressed "the rise of China is fundamentally changing the global balance of power" (NATO, 2020b). Terminologically, 'the rise of China' itself is value-neutral and descriptive. However, NATO uses this term in sentences with "global security challenges" and "challenges to our security", indicating it eventually will bring significant changes in which NATO member states and partners should be ready to respond by strengthening their deterrence and defense capabilities.

In 2021, compared to the previous year, NATO emphasized more on the increased “military expenditure” in the “modernisation of China’s arsenal”, which mirrors “China is matching its military power to its economic power” (2021c; 2021d; 2021m). Lastly, NATO expressed concerns over especially “advanced weapon systems that can carry nuclear weapons” as a consequence of Chinese military modernization (2021m).

### *Identity threat*

NATO, as a collective defense security organization, emphasized the ideological difference between China and NATO member and partner states. In 2019 and 2020, NATO eluded a usage of explicit words that indicate China as an identity threat that would destabilize NATO’s foundational liberal norms: the rule of law, freedom, and democracy (2020f). After the 2019 London summit, the NATO DSG stated that the rise of China is “multiplying the threats to open societies and individual freedoms” and “increasing competition over our values and our way of life” (NATO, 2020a). The SG Stoltenberg criticized that China does not share NATO’s values and “it does not respect fundamental human rights and tries to intimidate other countries” (2020e). NATO further stressed that China “is increasingly engaging in a systemic competition” with its “propaganda and disinformation” that undermines “core values of democracy” and “the international rules-based order” (2020f; 2021b; 2021f). Especially after the break of the Covid 19, NATO urged to take any action against authoritarian propaganda and disinformation that undermine “our societies” (2021q).

Furthermore, recognizing China as “a rise of authoritarianism”, NATO mentioned examples of “violating international or undermining the rules-based order” such as its “assertive move” towards Taiwan and Hong Kong, let alone infringements of human rights of religiously minority groups, the Uighur (2021b; 2021d). Additionally, NATO accused China of misusing new technologies “Artificial Intelligence and facial recognition to monitor and control Chinese citizens”, showing its disrespect for internationally “shared values” (2020c). In this regard, NATO continued to present that it “must protect values that underpin” the Alliance since “democracy and freedom is under heavy pressure” (2021q). Consequentially, worries of increased Chinese authoritarian power embedded in the official speeches and press releases led NATO to “call a global approach” since “threats and challenges” are not bound geographically.

## 5.2 Multilateral Security Cooperation

After negatively framing the rise of China, yet not an enemy, NATO has strengthened its security cooperation with “likeminded global partners” in the three following forms (2020a). In this regard, NATO described cooperation with the ROK, and NZ as “mutually beneficial” (2021i; 2021k).

### *Ad hoc coalition*

When it comes to *ad hoc coalition*, which entails the most militarily tangible cooperation, NATO already launched “the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII)” in 2014, including the ROK and NZ as “selected partners that are active contributions to NATO’s operations” at request (2021i; 2021k). Since this Initiative aims to enhance interoperability, which refers to “the ability to operate together harmonised standards, doctrines, procedures, and equipment”, it includes “future crisis management, including NATO-led operations and missions” and “training security forces” (2021j). Therefore, NATO indicated that partners of PII can contribute “in supporting NATO in achieving its tactical, operational and strategic objectives”, emphasizing “Interoperability Platform” conducts beyond “traditional, geographical frameworks for cooperation” (2021j). In this regard, while NZ has participated in the format and International Security force to carry out operations in Afghanistan and Bosnia, it has not officially embarked on military missions against China (2021i). The ROK is also a partner of the format as enhancing interoperability and capacity building with NATO, yet NATO has not officially planned or conducted any ad hoc military actions against China (2021k). One of the characteristics of *an ad hoc coalition* is partners cooperate without committing to a long-lasting relationship. At present, it is difficult to affirm that securitization of the rise of China as a threat convoked *ad hoc coalition*, which is specially tailored for Chinese provocation. Nevertheless, NATO, the ROK, and NZ may quickly enable a military reaction if China takes militarily provocative action against one of the partners, swiftly mobilizing its “force pool” (2021j).

### *Security community*

In February 2020, the NATO DSG said that NATO should “be more united politically” via “frank discussion and genuine consultation” to adapt to the new normal, the rise of China (2020a). To NATO, the ROK and NZ are key international partners that “expressed a strong will to work more closely with NATO”, providing them a “political platform” (2020a). Therefore, the ROK and NZ are part of “the community of like-minded democracies” since according to the SG Stoltenberg they “have a common interest in defending our shared values”,

and “collective defense” (2020c; 2020f; 2021b). Recognizing growing China would bring negative implications to the security of the NATO Alliance and partner states, NATO announced it “formalized partnerships, strong political dialogue and wide-ranging practical cooperation” with the ROK and NZ (2021d). The stance of NATO can be understood as to “remain as a regional alliance for Europe and North America” yet establish an “extensive network of partnership” with far countries that share democratic values and norms (2021d). Hence, NATO can be a political platform even without “being part of military operations and missions” (2021d; 2021e).

At the 2021 Brussels Summit NATO decided to strengthen “dialogue and practical cooperation” with the four APAC partners as part of the NATO 2030 agenda (2021 h). Accordingly, NATO welcomed stronger cooperation with the ROK, alluding to “China’s rise” as “common security challenges” (2021i). NZ, which joined the global partnership earlier than the ROK, extended its “practical cooperation” on the issue of “the global balance of power and the rise of China” in accordance with the agenda (2021i). Overall, the security community appears to be the most adequate security cooperation that NATO has developed and strengthened with the ROK and NZ, emphasizing “dialogue” and “consultation mechanisms” through NAC+4 meetings on the “political and military level” (2021n).

### *Strategic participation*

Compared to the other security cooperation arrangements, *strategic participation* had relatively less salience. Still, it played a crucial role to help consolidate the *security community* between NATO, the ROK, and NZ by incorporating “civil society, the private sector, and young leaders” (2020a). By emphasizing investment in technology development to “respond to (...) the security consequences of the rise of China”, NATO denoted one of the reasons why it should cooperate with the ROK and NZ is to obtain advanced technology (2021e; 2021m). After the 2021 Brussels Summit, with the increased importance of the role of NATO global partners, the ROK has contributed to the standardization of logistics, “exchanges of civilian and military personnel” and “participation in education” (2021k). On the other hand, NZ has pivoted on the “exchange of information” and “maritime security” (2021i). Although it is too soon to conclude that NATO has developed a concrete issue-driven *strategic participation* relationship, rather than a threat-driven connection, such cooperation enables the functioning of an *ad hoc coalition* and *security community* (2021n).

## 6. Discussion

The analysis of the security cooperation of NATO with the ROK and NZ under the rise of China in the aforementioned documents reflects institutional and political perspectives both in the Euro-Atlantic and APAC region. While presenting China as a “threat” in local terms, NATO has not shied away from discussing it in a larger global context, underlining cooperation with “global partners”: the ROK and NZ (2020b).

However, by the time of the London Summit in 2019, the fundamental issue for NATO was not disagreement over the necessity to focus on China but *how* to handle it (Michaels, 2021). NATO has changed its rhetoric toward China over time. NATO recognized its economic growth as an opportunity then the narrative shifted describing China as a challenge and a threat due to intensified assertive Chinese foreign policy like spreading disinformation during the Covid 19 and military modernization arose (2020c). If a state is regarded as an official adversary of NATO, NATO can take military action to counter a preemptive attack or conduct joint operations according to the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: “Collective defense means that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies” (2022). Nevertheless, pointing out that a considerable amount of Chinese monetary and human capital flew into Europe, the SG drew the line that China is not an imminent “enemy or adversary” (2020c). Keeping this frame, by late 2020 NATO entrenched its perception of China as an identity and military threat, taking a hostile stance towards China and calling for cooperation with the ROK and NZ via political dialogue.

In this regard, such different descriptions of the rise of China can be understood as ‘the strategic ambiguity of NATO which is often used in the US foreign policy towards China. The purpose of strategic ambiguity is to intentionally generate some room for divergent interpretation of a goal among different actors to initiate collective action (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009, p. 221). Considering the inauguration of Biden in January 2021, the narrative of NATO over China had inevitably been impacted by the foreign policy framing of the new US president (Michaels, 2021). NATO publicly shaped the noticeable rhetoric of a rising China as a threat to international liberal values and global security, echoing the notion of “(...) today’s threats are not restrained by geography” (2021p). Moreover, in 2021 NATO used more specific words that indicate the strength of Chinese military forces such as “second-largest defense budget”, “the biggest Navy in the world” and “nuclear arsenal” (2021e; 2021f). Notwithstanding

negative perspectives of China expressed by the SG, DSG, and senior NATO officials, the 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué and the NATO 2030 agenda have adopted a more neutral tone in stressing the implications of China's rise (Michaels, 2021). The Communiqué states that NATO is willing to have “a constructive dialogue with China where possible” yet based on “our interests” (2021f). Additionally, such a balanced attitude can be found on a military cooperation note, and bilateral *ad hoc coalition* between the ROK and NZ since substantive joint action has not been mapped out countering China.

NATO firmly believes that it should remain as a regional organization, emphasizing the Alliance pivoted in North America and Europe (2021b). Simultaneously, it accentuates the “global approach” to deal with the rise of China, diffusing a sentiment of the necessity of collective security cooperation through “political dialogue” with APAC “countries that share our values and interests”(2021d). Therefore, NATO has not formed a formal Alliance relationship with the ROK and NZ but it has shown the willing to be a forum of political consultation. Political discussions such as NAC+4 meetings facilitate cooperation between Euro-Atlantic and APAC regions on an inter-governmental level by increasing “mutual situational awareness on security developments” in both regions (2021h).

The ROK and NZ started contributing to international peace as global partners in the early 2000s, but it was not until 2021 that they decided to take steps toward a *security community* when NATO intensified the negative security implications of China's military and economic growth. Since an inter-state military concentrated cooperation is more infrequent and complicated than arranging a political discussion, the ROK decided to consolidate its partnership with NATO in 2021 after 16 years of engagement as a global partner. NZ also agreed to deepen dialogue and cooperation to discuss the rise of China at the 2021 Brussels Summit. NATO is mindful that, unlike Russia, China has not provoked any of the Allies militarily. Although China has modernized its military capabilities, NATO must respond differently than it has in the past to Russia's hostile activities, considering the second largest economy in the world and advanced technologies. Therefore, NATO and APAC countries should recognize their multifaceted relationship with China and not simply take a dichotomous – friend or foe – stance toward China. In this regard, convening bilateral or multilateral political consultations, as well as capacity and interoperability-building initiatives, would assist NATO and its global allies in being prepared in the event that China tries to be coercive and aggressive.

Traditionally, when NATO mentions “regional security” it mostly alludes to Euro-Atlantic security. However, due to the divergence NATO expects “partners across the globe” to “promote regional security and cooperation” (2021n). NATO stated that it has developed “30+n” groups of partners as a “flexible means of cooperation” (2021n). NATO’s regional frameworks, therefore, have expanded its implication where several regions can work closely based on shared principles, mutual benefits, and respect: forming a regional security complex regardless of geographical proximity with the APAC countries (2021n). The hypothesis has, therefore, confirmed:

*As a rising power is securitized as a security threat, an intergovernmental organization (IGO) and like-minded countries form a new multilateral security cooperation.*

## 7. Conclusion

This thesis has sought to answer how the military rise of China influenced security cooperation between NATO and APAC countries – the ROK and NZ – between 2019 and 2022. The results of the qualitative content analysis show NATO succeeded to securitize China's rise as a military and identity threat, leading to the consolidation of an existing global partnership with the ROK and NZ, and the formation of regular NAC+4 meetings. However, prioritizing preparedness for consequential security implications of the rise of China, NATO exhibited changes of tone from perceiving China as a potential eligible partner to an authoritarian government that builds up arms aggressively and undermines democracies, human rights, and the rule of law. Since NATO defines itself as a political and military alliance, it did take into account the substantial economic growth of China along with its military growth which resulted in a balanced view in official NATO commissioned official documents such as the 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué, leaving strategical ambiguity. Applying the RSCT, China enhancing its military capabilities has been securitized by NATO, which engendered bilateral security cooperation between like-minded countries the ROK and NZ, and this security link can be considered as a collection of *interconnected security concerns*, the rise of China. The ROK and NZ have decided to actively engage with NATO under the rise of China despite fundamental differences such as the U.S. military bases, substantive gap in the national defense budget, and most importantly geographic location within the APAC region.

As stated in the literature review, this paper sheds light on the importance of studying securitization theory incorporating constructivism in the case of NATO expansion and endurance not limited only by realist IR views. Although the balance of power is still a necessary research tool to understand why states are willing to form security cooperation even if they need to give up some extent of national authority and pay sunk costs. Unlike what realist scholars expected that NATO will dissolve after the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO rather has broadened its partnerships even in the APAC region as a new rising power, China, emerges. As the NATO SG mentioned “the world is changing”, and so does the identities and priorities of NATO (2021a). Therefore, this thesis presents strengths in identifying the unpresidential formalization of security partnerships outside of the transatlantic region, primarily based on common values and interests, employing a constructive theoretical tool.

This paper, however, entails several limitations. First, since the data analysis only covers contextual data released from NATO, it was difficult to capture how the ROK and NZ governments perceive the rise of China separately. Second, although the timeline of research was set when the topic was getting salient within NATO, it is a short amount of time to address long-term and systematic effects and changes in security cooperation among its global partners. Lastly, the research followed a coding scheme, yet faced difficulties with NATO's equivocal use of words towards China. Therefore, for future research discourse analysis with a lengthy period of observation would be beneficial to pinpoint how and why IGOs and states in different regions not only form security cooperation but also enlarge it. NATO is indeed comprised of various forms of security partnerships that require a different level of commitment. As a result, future IR research must apply institutionalism with constructivism to comprehend the dynamics of NATO's organizational behavior in the interaction and management of interests of different actors within its security framework.

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## Appendix 1

Table 3: Abbreviations

Asia-Pacific	APAC
Secretary General	SG
Deputy Secretary General	DSG
Intergovernmental Organizations	IGOs
Partnership Interoperability Initiative	PII
Regional Security Complex Theory	R SCT
Regional Security Complexes	RSCs
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO
New Zealand	NZ
North Atlantic Council and Asia-Pacific Partners	NAC+4
The Republic of Korea	the ROK

Table 4: Most Different System Design

	<b>The Republic of Korea</b>	<b>New Zealand</b>
The US military base	73 bases	0 base
Military spending	45735 million US\$ - 6 <sup>th</sup> largest military spender in the Asia-Pacific region	3011 million US\$

Geographical location	North Asia-Pacific Region	South Asia-Pacific Region
The audience of securitization of the rise of China by NATO	Yes	Yes
NAC+4 partners	Yes	Yes

## Appendix 2

Table 5: Coding Framework for Independent and Dependent Variable

Categories	Subcategories	Color	Description	Indicators
<i>Security Threat Perception</i>	Identity threat	IT	Securitization of the rise of China by NATO as an identity threat to rule-based international orders.	Mentions of Chinese authoritarian powers, propaganda, transparency, democracy, international order, collective identity, and similar words or sentences that present the rise of China as an identity threat.
	Military threat	MT	Securitization of the rise of China by NATO as a military threat to the Alliance and partner countries.	Mentions of Chinese defense budget, military power, modern military capabilities, arms control, weapons, assertive behaviors, competition, and similar words or sentences that imply the rise of China as a military threat.

<i>Multilateral Security Cooperation</i>	Ad hoc coalition	CO	The indication of developing a group of like-minded states or IGOs to act militarily on a certain issue at a particular time without commitment to a long-term relationship.	Mentions of interoperability, operations, missions, exercises, personnel training, and similar words or sentences that imply alignments between NATO, the ROK, and NZ.
	Security community	SC	The indication of cooperating as a community among states and IGOs within a designated space to achieve long-term peace via discursive integration.	Mentions of cooperation, mutual interests, collective defense, and like-minded, dialogue, politics, and similar words or sentences that imply alignments between NATO, the ROK, and NZ.
	Strategic partnership	SP	The indication of structure collaboration between states and IGOs based on general security goals, which also can include non-state actors and economic resources.	Mentions of private sectors, technology investment, civic participation, information exchange, and logistics, and similar words or sentences that imply alignment between NATO, ROK, and NZ.

## Appendix 3

Table 6: Color coding per sources in chronological order

Source	Code	Text
NATO 04-12- 2019	IT	6. To stay secure, we must look to the future together. We are addressing the breadth and scale of new technologies to maintain our technological edge, while preserving our values and norms. We will continue to increase the resilience of our societies, as well as of our critical infrastructure and our energy security. NATO and Allies, within their respective authority, are committed to ensuring the security of our communications, including 5G, recognising the need to rely on secure and resilient systems. We have declared space an operational domain for NATO, recognising its importance in keeping us safe and tackling security challenges, while upholding international law. We are increasing our tools to respond to cyber attacks, and strengthening our ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid tactics that seek to undermine our security and societies. We are stepping up NATO's role in human security. We recognise that China's growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.
NATO 08-02- 2020	MT	<p><b>MIRCEA GEOANĂ [Deputy Secretary General of NATO]:</b></p> <p>Linked to this technological change is also geopolitical change. The rise of China is a case in point. For the past 40 years, China's economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions of people from poverty. This is true. It is a potentially vast market for all companies. This is also true. But it also presents challenges, not only opportunities. This is also true. Such as its growing political influence in the world and the development of new technologies, including 5G. It is important that we fully understand these and we develop our relationship with China in the years ahead.</p> <p>Yes, China has come a very long way. It is both the second largest economy in the world and the second biggest defence spender in the world. China already has hundreds of missiles that would have been prohibited by the INF Treaty and recently displayed an advanced intercontinental nuclear missile, able to reach the United States and Europe. China is not violating any arms control treaty, because it's not part of those treaties. But as a major military power, it also has major responsibilities. You cannot ask for global status without assuming also responsibilities for world order. And this is why we believe that China . . . it's high time for China to participate in arms control, alongside Russia and United States. So, it might happen today or tomorrow, but this is an indispensable part for a world that</p>

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	<p>will stay at peace. And we need to encourage China to embark in this kind of global arrangements. [...]</p>
NATO 08-06- 2020	<p>Good afternoon from Brussels. And good morning to Karen and Fred in Washington. And welcome to all who are following us online. Last December, NATO Leaders asked me to make our strong Alliance even stronger. By making sure we are as effective politically as we are militarily. And that we remain ready today to tackle the challenges of tomorrow. This is an opportunity to reflect on where we see our Alliance ten years from now. And how it will continue to keep us safe in a more uncertain world. So today, I am happy to launch my reflection on NATO 2030. COVID-19 has changed our lives in ways we could barely imagine. And it has magnified existing trends and tensions when it comes to our security. Russia continues its military activities unabated. ISIL and other terrorist groups are emboldened. Both state and non-state actors promote disinformation and propaganda.</p>
MT	<p>And the rise of China is fundamentally shifting the global balance of power. Heating up the race for economic and technological supremacy. Multiplying the threats to open societies and individual freedoms. And increasing the competition over our values and our way of life.</p>
IT	<p>NATO 2030 is about how we adapt to this new normal. And to do this we must: Stay strong militarily. Be more united politically. And take a broader approach globally.</p>
SC	<p>So first, we need a strong military Alliance. To protect our democracies. And to continue to compete in a more competitive world. Threats to our security have not gone away while we are focusing on the pandemic. Just the opposite. As we look to 2030, we must continue to invest in our armed forces and modern military capabilities. They have kept us safe for over 70 years, as they continue to do today. Security is the foundation for our prosperity. Now and in the future.</p>

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- SC            **But military strength is only part of the answer.**  
**We also need to use NATO more politically.**  
This means bringing all the issues that affect our security to NATO's table.  
So that we can forge stronger consensus sooner and more systematically.  
From conflicts in the wider Middle East region, to global arms control, and the security consequences of climate change.  
Using NATO more politically also means using a broader range of tools.  
Military and non-military.  
Economic and diplomatic.  
This is especially important as we work together, to strengthen the resilience of our societies and our economies.  
And to ensure that we do not import vulnerabilities, into our critical infrastructure, industries, and supply chains.
- SC            NATO may not always be on the front line to act.  
**But it must always be the forum for frank discussion and genuine consultation.**  
In fact, NATO is the only place that brings Europe and North America together, every day.  
We have the structures and the institutions in place.  
What we need is the political will to use NATO.  
To decide - and where necessary - to act for our shared security.  
Finally, **in a world of greater global competition, where we see**
- MT            **China coming closer to us** from the Arctic to cyber space,  
NATO needs a more global approach.  
This is not about a global presence, but about a global approach.  
NATO brings together 30 Allies. On both sides of the Atlantic.  
Almost one billion people.  
Half of the world's military and economic might.  
And a network of global partners.  
**As we look to 2030, we need to work even more closely with like-minded countries.**
- SC            **Like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea.**  
**To defend the global rules and institutions that have kept us safe for decades.**  
**To set norms and standards.**  
In space and in cyber space.  
On new technologies and global arms control.  
And ultimately, to stand up for a world built on freedom and democracy.  
Not on bullying and coercion.  
The challenges that we face over the next decade are greater than any of us can tackle alone.  
Neither Europe alone. Nor America alone.  
So we must resist the temptation of national solutions.
- SC            **And we must live up to our values.**  
**Freedom, democracy and the rule of law.**
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These values are what define us.

They are what make us strong.

As nations. And as an Alliance.

As we continue to compete in a more competitive world, we must keep our democracies strong.

My vision for NATO 2030 is not about reinventing NATO. It is about making our strong Alliance even stronger.

Strong militarily. Stronger politically. And more global.

To help us get there, I have asked a group of experts to provide new ideas.

SP

I will continue to consult actively with Allies. And I will reach out to civil society, the private sector and young leaders.

As we are doing here today.

My recommendations will inform the direction NATO Leaders set out when we meet next year.

Together we can look to NATO 2030 with confidence.

Together we will keep our people safe in a more uncertain world.

**Dr Nad'a Kovalcikova [Program Manager at the Alliance for Securing Democracy [ASD], the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) – Brussels Office]:** Thank you very much, Secretary General, for your insightful remarks and for sharing with us your vision and reflection for NATO 2030. It's my great pleasure to be leading the conversation with you today. And now we will turn back to Washington, D.C. for the first two questions. Karen, the floor is yours.

**Dr Karen Donfried:** Thanks, Nad'a. And Mr Secretary General, what a terrific set of framing remarks. And you mentioned that your goal in this reflection process is not about reinventing NATO, but about making NATO stronger and more global. And I want to draw you out on what that means in terms of NATO's relationship with China. We've seen a stark deterioration, certainly in the US-China relationship. From where you sit in Brussels, does NATO see China as the new enemy? Thank you.

MT

**Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]:** No, NATO does not see China as the new enemy or an adversary. But what we see is that the rise of China is fundamentally changing the global balance of power and the NATO leaders, heads of state and government, when they met in London in December, they, for the first time in NATO's history, agreed that NATO has to address the consequences, the security consequences, of the rise of China.

MT

There are some opportunities, because the economic growth of China has fuelled economic growth in our part of the world, and it has helped to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. But at the same time, we see that the fact that China soon will have the biggest economy in the world, they will have . . . they already have the second largest defence budget. They are investing heavily in modern military capabilities.

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SC

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including missiles that can reach all NATO Allied countries.

They're coming closer to us in cyberspace. We see them in the Arctic, in Africa. We see them investing in our critical infrastructure. And they are working more and more together with Russia. All of this has a security consequence for NATO Allies. And therefore, we need to be able to respond to that, to address that. And we need to do that by forging NATO as a stronger political Alliance. We need to do that, we're working together with partners, not least in the Asia Pacific, including Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, which are very close and like-minded partners to NATO.

So this was in a message coming from the leaders last December. And now we are following up on that when we now address NATO 2030 and the reflection process.

And I think that COVID-19 has demonstrated clearly the importance of addressing also non-military challenges and threats and the role NATO can play in helping the civilian society in dealing with that.

[...]

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NATO  
30-06-  
2020

Thank you so much, Amrita.

And good morning from Brussels. It's great to be together with you all today.

A few weeks ago I launched NATO 2030.

To reflect on where we see our Alliance ten years from now. And how it will continue to keep us all safe.

One of my main messages is that NATO must become more global. So today I will focus my remarks on three examples of why NATO needs a global approach. COVID-19, terrorism, and the rise of China.

First, COVID-19. A global crisis that shows how something that started on the other side of the world can have huge consequences for us all. Also in NATO.

NATO's main task during the pandemic is to make sure the health crisis does not become a security crisis.

And throughout, we have remained ready, vigilant and prepared to respond to any threat. We have done what is necessary to keep our forces safe. To maintain our operational readiness.

And sustain our missions and operations. From the battlegroups in the Baltics to countering terrorism in Afghanistan.

Beyond that, we have also been able to provide support to civilian efforts to cope with COVID-19.

Across NATO, we have seen the vital role that our armed forces have played to help save lives.

So far, some 350 flights have delivered hundreds of tons of critical supplies around the world. Across the Alliance, almost half a million troops have supported the civilian response.

Constructing almost 100 field hospitals. Securing borders and helping with testing.

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For instance, the Bundeswehr airlifted ten million face masks through a strategic airlift arrangement enabled by NATO. And Germany has helped other Allies by providing medical supplies and transportation of patients.

NATO is currently preparing for a possible second wave of the coronavirus. We have agreed on a new operation plan to provide support to our Allies and partners.

A new stockpile of medical equipment and supplies. And a new fund to enable us to quickly acquire further supplies and services. Many Allies have already offered to donate to the stockpile. And contribute to the fund. In a clear sign of Alliance unity and solidarity.

But the virus has exposed weaknesses in our resilience.

For example, we have relied far too much on global supply chains for essential medical equipment. And so allies recently took decisions to strengthen requirements for national resilience. Taking greater account for cyber threats. The security of our supply chains. And the consequences of foreign ownership and control of critical infrastructure. Such as transport hubs and energy.

IT The pandemic has also led to an increase in disinformation and propaganda. Aiming to undermine our democracies and deepen divisions. Even insinuating that NATO Allies are responsible for the virus. And that authoritarian regimes are better than democracies at keeping their people safe.

IT NATO has been countering with concrete actions of solidarity. With clear facts and myth-busting. And also by cooperating with other international actors – such as the European Union, the G7 and the United Nations.

These disinformation efforts target all of us, and the rules-based international order.

And we all have a stake in telling the truth, and upholding our values through global solidarity.

The second reason why NATO needs a global approach is the instability and terrorism beyond our borders. One of the lessons from our experience in Afghanistan, where Germany has a leading role,

has been the importance of training local forces. So they can better stabilise their own countries.

Of course, NATO must be able to intervene with large numbers of combat forces when we need to. But prevention is always better than intervention. By focussing on training and building local capacity, by being a training alliance, we can reduce the likelihood that we will ever have to intervene.

Look at ISIS. In recent years, the international community has made great progress. ISIS no longer controls territory in Iraq or Syria. But it remains a threat. We must do all we can to support our partners.

So that it can never return.

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That is why we are training local forces in Iraq. So they can better fight ISIS. Without the need for a large scale NATO presence.

We are also working with other partners, such as Tunisia and Jordan. To increase stability and security. For them, and for us all.

And a third reason why NATO needs to take a more global approach is the rise of China. China will soon be the largest economy in the world. It is a global leader in new technologies. And it also has the world's second largest defence budget.

China's rise presents opportunities, especially for our economies and our trade.

So it is important to continue to engage with China. China is not an adversary to NATO.

But we must fully understand what its rise means for us – and for our security.

It is clear that China does not share our values. Democracy, freedom, and the rule of law.

We see this in Hong Kong, where the new security law undermines its autonomy. And the liberty of its citizens. With the imprisonment of tens of thousands of Uighurs in so-called 're-education camps'.

With the use of Artificial Intelligence and facial recognition to monitor and control Chinese citizens.

And just last month, we saw it when China imposed economic sanctions on Australia after it led calls for an independent enquiry into the origins of COVID-19.

I remember when I was Prime Minister, and the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. The Chinese government froze political relations and imposed sanctions in retaliation.

So there is a clear pattern of authoritarian behaviour at home and increased assertiveness and bullying abroad.

The best way to face each of these global challenges, to keep our societies secure and our people safe, is for Europe and North America to continue to stand together. And for us to take a more global approach.

Working even more closely with our international partners to defend our values in a more competitive world. Partners near and far - like Finland and Sweden. But also Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

The aim of 'NATO 2030' is an Alliance that is strong militarily. Stronger politically. And more global.

To support me with this, I have nominated a group, co-chaired by former German Defence Minister, Thomas de Maizière.

This is part of a consultation process that will inform my recommendations to NATO leaders when they meet next year.

We do not need to reinvent NATO. But we do need to ask how we can make our Alliance stronger and more effective.

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Germany has an important role. As the largest economy in Europe, with the biggest defence budget in the European Union, the leader of a battlegroup in Lithuania, a contributor to operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and from tomorrow, the holder of the EU Presidency.

Germany has a key responsibility to help strengthen NATO for the next decade. Those next ten years will be challenging for us all. But when Europe and North America stand together, we are strong and we are safe.

The NATO Alliance is 30 democracies. Each with their own politics, history and geography. We will always have our differences. But NATO remains the cornerstone of our collective security.

And through NATO, we can continue to live in peace and freedom.

Thank you so much.

[...]

**PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR:**

And a third question coming from Ambika Vishwanath a former Munich Security Conference Young Leader and now working in really interesting areas, including water security, asks: the SG spoke about the importance of NATO's role in the current health pandemic and their role in building resilience in certain areas – health, energy – for member states. Does he see a role for NATO in other non-traditional security spaces such as climate change, water security, for example?

**JENS STOLTENBERG:** Okay, thank you . . . thank you again for very relevant questions. It's hard to be brief, but I will try.

First, what does it mean to be a global alliance and how do NATO Allies deal with the rise of China? Well, the thing is that the process we have launched with NATO 2030, what we have said clearly is that this is also about a more global NATO, reflecting the fact that we are faced with more and more global security challenges, including the rise of China. We, of course,

MT

don't have all the answers. We have actually . . . we have started now a process, we're going to reach out to Allies, to partners, to civil society, to academia, to think tankers and then listen to their advice. And then, based on that, I will put forward my recommendations to the leaders, heads of state and government, when they meet next year. So this is part of a discussion, part of a process where we try to have an open mind and have as much input as possible. Actually, GIGA, this event, is also part of that possibility for us to reach out, to listen and to have discussions with others.

SP

But if I should mention some elements in what I think will be part of the response, and which is already to some extent there, is, of course, for NATO to work with global partners. And especially those who are, you know, in Asia or Asia-Pacific. So parties like Japan, South Korea - I visited both of them not so long time ago. They are eager to step up. They're working the

SC

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partnership with NATO. But also Australia and New Zealand, I also visited them recently. They are also ready to work more closely with NATO.

So these four Asia-Pacific partners, to work more closely with them, I am certain will be part of the outcome of NATO . . . I am quite confident that it will be part of the outcome of NATO 2030.

SP

Then technology, the importance of NATO working with industry, with science research institutions to make sure that we maintain the technological edge, which has always been the advantage of NATO and NATO Allies. That becomes even more important when we see how heavily China is investing in

MT

new, advanced technologies, which they also use for developing military capabilities.

MT

And then, of course, the unity of the Alliance, because the reality is that China is not an adversary. China is totally different from the Soviet Union. It's not the same in any way. We're not in a Cold War. It's totally different. But if you just compare the size, of course, China population-wise, is much bigger than the Soviet Union ever was. China's economy is much bigger than the economy of the Soviet Union or Russia ever was. Because the Soviet Union peaked, their economy peaked at 60 per cent of US GDP. China's GDP is, in purchasing terms, already bigger than the US economy. So, and of course, technologically, China is much more advanced, compared to NATO Allies than the Soviet Union ever was.

So just the size China makes it important that Europe and North America stands together. And I tell the Americans that very often: that if they are concerned about the rise of China, they should make sure that they keep their friends and Allies very close. Because the Chinese economy is bigger than the US economy. But, of course, if US and Europe stand together, if North America and US stand together, then we are 50 per cent of world GDP and 50 per cent of world military might.

So if anything, the rise of China makes NATO even more important, even more important that North America and Europe stands together.

[...]

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NATO  
22-11-  
2020

**Robin Shepherd [Vice President of the Halifax**

**International Security Forum]:** Secretary General, thank you so much for joining us at HFX2020. There are a number of issues to discuss. One of them, of course, has been in the news this week. And this, of course, is the Administration has been talking about a drawdown in Afghanistan. I mean, not altogether surprising, not altogether difficult to understand after we've been there for 20 years. But you've expressed some concerns about drawing down too fast and, you know, a potential rise of Islamic State and associated terror groups.

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Have you been able to get further clarification from the White House in the last couple of days on that?

**Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]:** The US position is clear; they are going to reduce their presence in Afghanistan from roughly 4,500 to around 2,500 troops. No NATO Ally would like to stay in Afghanistan longer than necessary. At the same time, if we leave too early, if we leave too hasty, we may risk to lose all the gains we have made; and that's a risky project.

So what is clear now is that the US is going to reduce, but they are not going to leave. The US will continue to provide support to the other NATO Allies. We have to remember that more than half of the troops in Afghanistan now are non-US – they are European Allies and also partner nations. We are in Afghanistan to make sure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for international terrorists, a platform where terrorists can plan, organise, finance, launch terrorist attacks against our countries.

But at the same time, we strongly support the peace talks, which are taking place between Taliban and the government. And part of the agreement between the US and Taliban is that all international troops should be out by 1st May next year. So early next year, we need to make a very hard decision. That's: whether we leave and risk to lose the gains we are made, but then at least we can be out of Afghanistan; or whether we stay and then continue to be involved in the very challenging and demanding military operation in Afghanistan.

My message is that we need to assess whether the conditions for leaving are met, together. We need to make these decisions together. And as we have said many times in NATO: we went into Afghanistan together, we should make decisions on adjustments of a presence there together, and when the time is right we should leave together, but then in a coordinated and orderly way.

**Robin Shepherd:** As ever, in anything to do with Afghanistan, there are a lot of moving parts. One of those moving parts, of course, is a transfer of power here in the United States. Have you been in touch with President-elect Biden and/or his team?

**Jens Stoltenberg:** I have congratulated President-elect Joe Biden. I also congratulated the Vice President-elect, Kamala Harris. And I know Joe Biden as a strong supporter of NATO, of the transatlantic bond, the cooperation between North America and Europe. I have had the privilege of working with him in his previous

behemoth in China. But unless we actually stand together, then China is going to essentially assert its will over . . . over individual nations. I mean, to what extent is there unity within NATO about China?

**Jens Stoltenberg:** So, we have just launched a project which we call NATO 2030, which is about the future of NATO. And

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that project will, of course, address many different issues. But one of the issues we have to address is the consequences of the rise of China. And I strongly believe that, if anything, the rise of China just makes NATO more important and unity amongst NATO Allies more important. And this is not only about, you know, the military challenges, but also about cyber. It's about the resilience of our infrastructure telecommunication, where we see China is investing heavily. And it's also about standing together, when we stand up for our values. And I think we all have some lessons to learn.

SC I was Prime Minister at that time in Norway when China tried to force us to give in, we were able to stand up against that pressure. But it is hard, and it's hard when China picks one by one. So therefore, if anything, I believe that NATO should become an even stronger political platform for uniting Allies, but also partners, to stand up when China tries to coerce, to force upon them a policy, or force them to do something which is against their interests. And therefore, we are also working more and more closely with our partners in the Asia-Pacific. I recently visited Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, all partners of NATO, and they all expressed a strong will to work more closely with NATO and we are ready to do so.

SC

[...]

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NATO  
30-11-  
2020

Good afternoon.  
NATO Foreign Ministers will meet over the next two days to address key issues.  
We will discuss the NATO 2030 project and the continued adaptation of our Alliance.  
As well as Russia's military build-up.  
The rise of China.  
And our mission in Afghanistan.  
We went into Afghanistan to support the United States after the 9/11 attacks.  
And to ensure that the country is never again a platform for international terrorists to attack our homelands.  
We have been there for almost two decades.  
And the country has come a long way.  
We now see an historic opportunity for peace.  
It is fragile, but it must be seized.  
As part of the peace process, we have adjusted our presence.  
The United States has recently decided to further reduce its troop numbers.  
But NATO's training mission continues, with over half of the forces from European Allies and partner nations.  
No one wants to stay in Afghanistan longer than necessary.  
In the months ahead, we will continue to assess our presence based on conditions on the ground.  
We face a difficult dilemma.

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Whether to leave, and risk that Afghanistan becomes once again a safe haven for international terrorists.

Or stay, and risk a longer mission, with renewed violence.

Whatever path we choose, it is important that we do so together, in a coordinated and deliberate way.

Ministers will also address Russia's military build-up around the Alliance.

Russia is modernising its nuclear arsenal and fielding new missiles.

It is deploying more forces in our neighbourhood, from the High North to Syria and Libya.

We also see an increased Russian presence as a result of the crises in Belarus and Nagorno-Karabakh.

So, Ministers will discuss what more we should do to respond to Russia's growing military activity.

And to maintain the arms control regime. Including limitations on nuclear warheads, as the New START treaty is due to expire next February.

We will also be joined by the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and Ukraine in a separate session.

To address the security situation in the Black Sea region.

And our support for these two valued partners.

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NATO foreign ministers will also assess the global shift in the balance of power with the rise of China.

SC

We will be joined by our Asia-Pacific partners: Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

And also by Finland and Sweden, and the European Union High Representative.

China is not our adversary.

Its rise presents an important opportunity for our economies and trade.

We need to engage with China on issues such as arms control and climate change.

MT

But there are also important challenges to our security.

China is investing massively in new weapons.

It is coming closer to us, from the Arctic to Africa.

And by investing in our infrastructure.

China does not share our values.

IT

It does not respect fundamental human rights and tries to intimidate other countries.

We must address this together, both as NATO Allies, and as a community of like-minded countries.

SC

We should, therefore, continue to consult closely, and cooperate where possible.

SC

To bolster the resilience of our societies and to protect the values and norms we share.

So as we face new global challenges, we will discuss how we can make our strong Alliance even stronger.

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Earlier this year, I appointed a group of experts to support my work on NATO's continued adaptation – the NATO 2030 project.

The group will brief Ministers on their findings.

Their report is one input into NATO 2030.

SP I will continue to consult with civil society, young leaders, parliamentarians, the private sector, and of course with Allies.

Based on all of this, I will put forward my recommendations to NATO Leaders, when they meet next year.

And with that, I am ready to take your questions.

[...]

**JENS STOLTENBERG:** As the report will be discussed by foreign ministers tomorrow, I think I will wait until that discussion before I go more into details about the report.

SP What I can say is that I appointed this group to support me in my work on NATO 2030, because I will, based on the input from the report, but also based on input and guidance from parliamentarians, from academia, from private sector, and also, of course, consulting closely with all 30 Allies, I will then develop my proposals for the heads of state and government when they meet next year. And I'm looking forward to that because NATO has proven to be a very agile Alliance.

We have, just over the last years, implemented the biggest adaptation of this Alliance in a generation, with the deployment of new battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance, stepping up in the fight against terrorism, increased defence investments, setting up new commands also for cyber. We are setting up a new Atlantic command in Norfolk. So, NATO is actually doing a lot, but we need to continue to adapt. And that's the reason why I will then put forward my proposals for heads of state and government when they meet next year.

**JACQUES HUBERT-RODIER [Les Echos]:** Yes, Jacques Hubert-Rodier from Les Echos. Thank you, Secretary General. I have a question about: do you expect a real improvement in the transatlantic link between the US and the European Allies? And I was thinking especially to Germany, between the Americans and Germany, we had a very tense period. What do you expect with the next American administration?

**JENS STOLTENBERG:** President-elect Joe Biden is a strong supporter of NATO and he is not only a strong supporter, but he knows NATO well. And I think that's a good thing for all of us. And I have known him for many years. I met him in my former capacity as Prime Minister of Norway, then he was Vice-President in the United States. And then his experience also as the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the US Senate, also has given him unique insights in the importance of NATO.

So I expect that, in the coming years, we will be able to further strengthen the transatlantic bond. A strong NATO is important for Europe. We are dependent on the security guarantees of the

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MT	<p>United States, and, of course, both Canada and the United States being important for European security, with troops, with exercises, with military presence in Europe. That is important for our security. But, at the same time, a strong NATO is also important for the United States. Not least when we now see that the global balance of power is shifting, with the rise of China. And sometimes when I go to the United States, I hear people being concerned about the size of China, the size of their economy, the size of their defence budget, the many advances they are making within different areas of technology. But then my message to the United States is that, well, if they are concerned about the size of China, then it's even more important to keep friends and Allies in NATO close, because together NATO Allies represent 50 per cent of the world's GDP and the world's military might. So, as long as we stand together, we are safe. And that's the strength of this Alliance.” [...]</p>
NATO 02-12- 2020	<p>Good evening, We have just finished two productive meetings. Both of them with valued partners on strategic issues that affect our shared security.</p>
SP	<p>We discussed the shift in the global balance of power and the rise of China with our Asia-Pacific partners – Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. As well as Finland and Sweden, and European Union High Representative. China is not an adversary to NATO. It is clear that China's rise can provide new opportunities. For instance on trade, and engagement on global issues, such as arms control and climate change. But there are also challenges.</p>
MT	<p>China has the second biggest defence budget in the world and is investing heavily in new capabilities.</p>
IT	<p>And China does not share our values.</p>
IT	<p>It undermines human rights.</p>
IT	<p>It bullies other countries.</p>
IT	<p>And is increasingly engaging in a systemic competition with us.</p>
SC	<p>So the community of like-minded democracies must work together.</p>
	<p>Because we have a common interest in defending our shared values.</p>
	<p>Bolstering the resilience of our societies, economies and institutions.</p>
	<p>And upholding the rules-based order.</p>
	<p>At this ministerial, we agreed a comprehensive report on China. It assesses China's military development, its growing activity in our neighbourhood, and the implications for NATO resilience.</p>

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Including when it comes to emerging technologies and our critical infrastructure.

Today, we also discussed what more NATO can do with our partners.

Such as sharing information and insights; promoting common approaches, including in cyberspace; and strengthening global rules and norms, for instance on arms control.

Over the past year, we have seen a significant shift in our understanding of China.

And an increasing convergence of views, both within NATO, and with our partners.

SC

The challenge posed to our security by the rise of China is also a major reason why NATO must take a more global approach.

And this is a critical part of my NATO 2030 project to further strengthen our Alliance for the future.

We remain prepared to engage with China, as we are actually already doing.

But, as a rising power, China must respect the international rules based order.

In our second session today, we were joined by the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and Ukraine.

We addressed the security situation in the Black Sea region, which is of strategic importance.

Russia continues to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine.

It continues its military build-up in Crimea.

And increasingly deploys forces in the Black sea region.

NATO is responding by strengthening our presence on land, at sea and in the air.

Just last week, NATO aircraft trained together with the US navy destroyer – the USS Donald Cook – in the Black Sea.

Ministers also discussed developments in Belarus and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Both Minsk and Moscow must respect the right of the people of Belarus to determine their own future.

Through an inclusive political dialogue.

We welcome the cessation of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The full resolution of this conflict must be found through political and diplomatic ways.

Georgia and Ukraine are valued NATO partners.

Who make important contributions to our missions.

Today, we restated our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and Ukraine.

We discussed their reform programmes.

And we are stepping up our practical support.

I am pleased that Allies and Georgia approved the updated Substantial NATO-Georgia Package.

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Stepping up our political support.

And Ministers agreed further steps to improve our situational awareness in the region and strengthen our dialogue with both partners.

With that, I'm ready to take your questions.

[...]

**JACQUES HUBERT-RODIER:** Thank you to take my question and good evening. Well, my question is about Australia and it's not about the wine of Australia, that I suspect is very good, but I was wondering what NATO will do in front of a very aggressive attitude of China toward Australia? And I had the feeling that the fake photo, the fake image, of an Australian soldier in Afghanistan was an indirect attack against all the Allies. What was your reactions to that?

SP

**JENS STOLTENBERG:** I would like to say that in general, we appreciate very much the close partnership with Australia and just the fact that we had this meeting today is an example of how NATO Allies work more and more closely together with also Asia-Pacific partners. This meeting was, you know, with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, but also with European partners, Finland and Sweden and the High Representative, Josep Borrell of the European Union. And I think that for NATO, it is of increasing importance, also when we address the consequences of the rise of China, to work even more closely with a partner like Australia. And they appreciate that, we appreciate that. And I also had the privilege of visiting Australia and we're looking into how we can do more together.

IT

Then, on the specific issue you mentioned, the issue of Chinese propaganda and disinformation was raised during the meeting. At the same time, we are all aware of these very serious allegations, but I am absolutely confident that the Australian authorities will make sure that those who are responsible will be held accountable.

[...]

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NATO  
09-03-  
2021

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Second, NATO has always had a role to make sure that the Allies can operate together – interoperability. This has been a basic task for NATO. Up till it has been, you know, about fuel standards, so we can fuel each other's planes and ships and whatever it is; spare parts that the different nations can use, so basic standards. This is even more important when we have extremely advanced systems, because we must avoid a kind of technological gap where Allies are not able to operate together, where we have planes or ships or whatever or soldiers' communications systems that cannot communicate, they have to be connected and NATO has to help to set those standards to make sure that 30 Allies can operate together, also with new, disruptive technologies.

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SP And thirdly, I think that NATO has an important role to play when it comes to addressing some of the serious and difficult ethical questions related to these new technologies: arms control issues – and Rose, you could help us there – how do we do arms control in cyberspace? And then when it comes to Silicon Valley, I strongly believe that we need to work with the private sector. We need to engage with them. We are looking into new, innovative ways of finding funding and also working with start-ups. And I think that for NATO it is extremely important what is going on in Silicon Valley. Traditionally, it was, you know, government programmes that was driving technological change: nuclear, GPS, the Internet is actually a result of government technological development. Now, we are more dependent on the private sector and we need to work with them. And therefore, part of the NATO 2030 agenda is also about technology, working with the private sector, innovative ways of building partnerships with the private sector.

SP **ROSE GOTTEMOELLER:** Well, thank you. As Mike McFaul and I said at the outset, we really do hope that we'll soon be able to invite you in person to come and visit and certainly to also spend some time visiting some of the companies out here and talking to them. I'm going to open up now to our very good questions that have been coming in. And I'm going to start with an old colleague and friend, Ambassador Fatih Ceylan, who you'll remember very well, former ambassador of Turkey to NATO. And he asks, 'Mr Secretary General, a new Strategic Concept or an updated Strategic Concept? What is the intention with President Biden at the helm of the United States?' For those of you who aren't familiar with NATO, we have, for decades, had Strategic Concepts that are a kind of overarching concept for the operations of the Alliance and the one we currently have dates from a decade ago. So it's an issue to be looked at. But, Mr Secretary General, how are you thinking about this matter today?

**JENS STOLTENBERG:** So I, strongly – first of all, it's great to hear from Fatih Ceylan again, and my best regard to you. Then, on the Strategic Concept, I think the time has come to update, renew, NATO's Strategic Concept. The current Strategic Concept has served us well for more than a decade, actually. It was agreed at our NATO summit in Lisbon in Portugal in 2010. And a lot of what is there today, I think should be also part of a new Strategic Concept. But some things also have to be changed. And the most important, the reason for update, develop a new Strategic Concept, is the fact that the world has changed. And that is not fully reflected, of course, in the in the Concept we agreed in 2010. For instance, in the current Concept, we refer to Russia, where we say that we are aspiring for a strategic partnership with Russia. That was before Ukraine, before Crimea and before the much more assertive

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behaviour of aggressive actions by Russia over the last years and especially since 2014.

Climate change is, as I just mentioned just briefly, and hardly mentioned at all. And climate change, I think, it really impacts our security environment, so it should be addressed in a new Strategic Concept. China is not mentioned.

And I think that the rise of China really is defining for the transatlantic relationship and NATO has to address the rise of China. We don't regard China as an adversary, but of course,

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the fact that they are now the second largest defence spender in the world, soon the biggest economy, the challenge China represents to the rules-based order, to our core values of democracy, that we have a big power, China, not sharing our values, all of that makes it necessary for NATO to remain a regional alliance, but to respond to the global challenge that the rise of China represents. So I hope that when the NATO leaders meet at the Brussels NATO summit later this year, they will agree to task me to start to develop a new Strategic Concept. And then they can agree a new Strategic Concept at the following summit in 2022.

**ROSE GOTTEMOELLER:** Very good. Thank you very much for that, that's very interesting to hear of how your thinking is evolving on that. Now, you raised China right at the end, and several questions in the chat get at the NATO-China relationship. I will mention my Hoover colleague, Elizabeth Economy, who's also at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. She said, 'I appreciated Secretary General Stoltenberg's expressions of concern about some troubling behaviour by China. Could he say a few words about how he envisions NATO's future engagement in Asia?'

So, beyond China, but primarily, I suppose the gist of the question is focussed on that pivot to Asia that President Obama first announced some years ago and the fact that the United States is going to be spending more time and attention focussed in the Pacific Basin, rather – or we say now the Indo-Pacific region – rather than all in Europe. So that is Elizabeth's question. And as I said, there are several excellent questions about China here in the chat.

Daniel Gough also asks, 'What are the opportunities and limitations of NATO when it comes to engaging states such as China to tackle global challenges such as climate change or the pandemic?' So lots of food for a response, Mr Secretary General, and back over to you.

**JENS STOLTENBERG:** So, first of all, it is absolutely correct to say that the rise of China also represents opportunities. And we have seen that over many years. The rise of China has helped to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. And it has represented big economic opportunities for our economies, for our markets, for our exports. So, of course, the rise of China has also been important for all NATO Allies,

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IT especially when it comes to economy and trade. But at the same time, there are some serious challenges. I strongly believe that NATO should remain a regional alliance. NATO should remain an alliance for North America and Europe. But being a regional alliance, we need to take into account that the challenges we are facing are more and more global. Traditionally, we faced one big challenge, and that was the Soviet Union in Europe. Now the world is very different. So we need to have a global approach, while we remain a regional alliance. And then, of course, the rise of China is one of those global challenges. I mentioned that they don't share our values and we see that they crack down on Democratic protests in Hong Kong. We see how they persecute minorities, the Uyghurs, violating basic human rights. We see also how they expand their influence in the South China Sea, how they are threatening Taiwan and how they also bully countries all over the world. Australia, when Australia asked for an independent investigation into the origins of the coronavirus; or Canada, where they actually just arrested some Canadian citizens. And I have seen it myself, as a Norwegian politician. I was Prime Minister when the Norwegian Peace Prize Committee awarded the Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident. And then immediately China just blocked everything with Norway: economic sanctions, no political interaction and so on. So this behaviour is a great challenge to all of those who believe in a rules-based order – an order we have developed over decades together. / NATO should respond in many different ways. Partly, we should work more closely with our partners in the Asia-Pacific: Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and potentially also others. And because we should help to form a community of like-minded democracies and NATO is therefore stepping up the cooperation or the partnership with these countries. But we need also to respond at home.

SP

SC

MT One of the reasons why we need to invest and make sure that we keep the technological edge is the rise of China and their heavy investments in new, modern capabilities and the use of new, disruptive technologies. Thirdly, we see that China . . . it's not about NATO going into the Asia-Pacific, but it's about the fact that China is coming closer to us: in cyberspace, and we see them in Africa, in the Arctic, and investing in our own critical infrastructure in Europe. We have seen the discussion about 5G and I welcome very much a convergence of views among Allies on that issue.

And for NATO to address China is something quite new. The first time we actually had a decision on China, language on China, was at the NATO summit in London in 2019. But since then, a lot has happened and it proves that NATO can change and adapt when the world is changing. And we will, of course, also continue to engage with China. We have some military contacts, but I also, for instance, met with the Chinese Foreign

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Minister. And we are open to further strengthening our engagement with China.

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NATO  
11-03-  
2021

Thank you so much Jim,  
It's really great to see you again.  
And many thanks for your strong commitment to our transatlantic Alliance, to NATO.  
And also many thanks to the Council on Foreign Relations for inviting me to address such a distinguished audience today.  
This year, CFR celebrates its centennial.  
That is an impressive milestone, congratulations!  
Foreign Affairs magazine has been with me from my young age.  
My parents would get a copy delivered at our house in Oslo.  
And I loved flipping through the pages.  
It gave me the impression that the big, wide world out there was coming straight into our home in Oslo!  
Over the decades, much has been said and written about the importance of adapting the NATO Alliance.  
Including by you Jim. And others in this audience.  
After the Cold War, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and again following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the rise of ISIS.  
Now, we are at another pivotal moment in transatlantic history.  
A moment to reinforce the unity between Europe and North America.

MT

Because we are facing many great challenges; the rise of China, sophisticated cyber-attacks, disruptive technologies, climate change, Russia's destabilising behaviour.  
And the continuing threat of terrorism.  
No country or continent can tackle these challenges alone.  
Not Europe alone.  
Nor America alone.  
So Europe and North America must work together, in strategic solidarity.  
So therefore, I very much welcome President Biden's clear message on rebuilding alliances and strengthening NATO.  
Making our strong Alliance even stronger and more future-proof, is at the heart of NATO 2030, the NATO 2030 initiative.  
And it will be at the heart of the NATO Summit later this year.  
Together we have the opportunity to set an ambitious and forward-looking agenda for the future of the Alliance.  
Let me briefly set out what I see as the main priorities going forward.

SC

We must strengthen our commitment to collective defence.  
2021 will be the seventh consecutive year of increased defence spending by European Allies and Canada.  
Since 2014, they have contributed a cumulative extra of 190 billion dollars.

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So the trend is up and it must continue to go up.  
We should also increase common funding for our deterrence and defence activities.

This would boost our ability to defend and deter.

Demonstrate our solidarity and political resolve.

And contribute to a fairer burden sharing within the Alliance.

We must also strengthen our transatlantic consultations on security and defence issues.

NATO is the unique platform that brings Europe and North America together to discuss and decide every day.

And together, we need to continue to broaden our agenda to tackle existing and new challenges to our security.

For example, we need to do more on climate change.

NATO should aim to become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding, adapting and mitigating the impact of climate change on our security.

We should also raise our level of ambition when it comes to resilience and innovation.

We need strong militaries.

But also strong, resilient societies, to address the full spectrum of threats.

NATO should aim to guarantee a minimum standard of resilience among Allies.

And we need more investment in innovation, to maintain our technological edge and remain competitive in a more competitive world.

IT

Lastly, we must stand up for the international rules-based order, which is being challenged by authoritarian powers, including China.

MT& IT

The rise of China offers opportunities, for instance for our economies, but it also poses challenges for our security and way of life.

SC

That is why we should deepen our partnerships with countries like Australia and Japan.

And reach out to other like-minded countries around the world.

I also believe this is the time to develop a new Strategic Concept for NATO.

The last one dates back to 2010, and our strategic environment has significantly changed since then.

We need to chart a common course going forward, agree on how to prioritise and tackle existing and emerging challenges.

And recommit to our fundamental values.

This year is a crucial year.

With an important Summit coming up, we have a unique opportunity to open a new chapter in the transatlantic relations.

We must all seize it.

So let me stop there, and I look forward to our discussion, thank you so much Jim.

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**JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]:** Thank you so much, Jim, and congratulations on your new book. The rise of China is, it will be defining for the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead. And we need to understand that when we look at China from NATO, we have seen an enormous change.

It was actually at our summit in 2019, in London, in December – that was the first time we as an Alliance, made common decisions, had agreed language on how to address the rise of China.

MT And at that time that was seen as a kind of radical step, an important change of how NATO addressed the security implications of the rise of China.

Since then we have seen convergence of views, among Allies. Allies recognize of course that there are opportunities but also challenges related to the rise of China.

IT I strongly believe that NATO should remain a regional Alliance, North America and Europe together.

But at the same time we need to take into account that the threats and challenges we are facing in this region, North America and Europe, they are global, and they are impacted by the rise of China. So we need what we call a global approach. And this is partly about standing up for our values.

MT & IT China would soon have the biggest economy in the world, the second largest defense budget they already have and they don't share our values. And therefore just to stand up for our values, work with like-minded countries, for instance in Asia-Pacific: Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan and potentially others, is part of our response.

SC Fundamentally, the way to prevent war is always to send a clear message to any potential adversary, that if one Ally is attacked, the whole Alliance will respond. That message, our collective defense security guarantees - Article 5, that has preserved peace for more than 70 years.

Because as long as there is no misunderstanding, no room for miscalculation, an attack on one Ally will never happen because it will trigger the response from the whole Alliance. This is important for Europe. But it's also important for the United States, because the United States is of course big; big military, big economy. But compared to China, I meet many in the United States who are actually concerned a bit about the size.

Then for the United States, it is a great and big advantage to have 29 friends and allies, as the United States has in NATO. And together, all of us, we represent 50% of the world's GDP and 50% of the world's military might.

MT So, NATO has always been important, but if you are concerned about the security consequences of the rise of China, and the size of China, then actually NATO is more important than ever. Because together we will be able to prevent war, prevent

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conflict, by just sending a very clear message of unity and the collective defense commitment within the Alliance.

Then, whether we can be participating in freedom of navigation patrols or activities. There is no such proposal on the table, and I will be very careful starting to speculate because that will only create uncertainty and potential misunderstandings.

So I will just limit myself to saying that NATO Allies, as individual Allies, are already present in the South China Sea. Germany sent some naval ship there recently. United States, UK, France, others have operated there. We have a close partnership with Australia. I visited Australia a couple of years ago. And one of the things that were of course very much concerned about was freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. So, no concrete proposal on the table. But we are consulting, working closely with partners, and with Allies which are operating in the South China Sea.

[...]

**JENS STOLTENBERG:** Thank you, Ivo. I will again try to be telegraphic. Arms control has been, and still is, extremely important for NATO. NATO has been on the forefront of efforts on arms control for decades. Therefore, we are also extremely concerned that we have seen that not all, but much of the arms control architecture that has been developed over decades has now unraveled.

You mentioned some of the examples, especially the demise of the INF Treaty. Therefore, I also strongly welcome the recent decision by the United States and Russia to extend the New START, which is actually the only remaining arms control agreement, limiting the number of nuclear warheads in the world. The extension of the New START should not be the end, it should be the beginning of a renewed effort on arms control. And I think there are at least a couple of things that are important.

First, we need to extend arms control to more weapon system than the strategic weapons which are covered by New START. Especially Russia has a high number of intermediate range systems and non-strategic or tactical systems, and they are not covered by New START. So we need some kind of agreement, whether it's another agreement or just expanded START agreement that covers all these other systems.

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Second, we need to address the importance of getting China on board. **China is becoming more and more global military power.** And with global strength also comes global responsibilities. And China should be part of the future arms control.

And thirdly, new disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, autonomous systems, facial recognition are now in the process of changing the nature of warfare, as fundamentally as the Industrial Revolution. And again, we don't have the final answers, but this should also

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impact the way we do arms control. There are some serious ethical questions and some arms control issues related to new disruptive technologies that I think NATO should be a platform to address.  
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NATO  
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[...]  
And again, I welcome the UK leadership also in the process of adjusting the way in which we make defence planning across the Alliance. That is a massive piece of work. This is where we need all of us, we also need the triple helix of public, private sector, and our academia, we still have this competitive edge. And I strongly believe as someone in that comes from a former communist country and now a proud member of NATO, Romania, is my home country, that open societies, free societies will always be more conducive for innovation, because free people, and the freedom to innovate, to think, to speak up your mind is always better for innovation, then, whatever fusion between government and private sector that some of our competitors might be looking into this. So that's the third very important proposition of NATO 2030. I'll also mention something that is important, and I hope will be also a bridge towards the distinguished panelists, and our dear colleagues will be saying right after that. In the NATO 2030 proposal by the Secretary General, and we hope that our leaders will endorse that, It's also a new level of ambition on the partnerships of NATO. I mentioned this earlier, we all know that we'll be needing to invest far more wisely and ambitiously, in working with our partners, the immediate partners of NATO to our east, to our South, but also our global partners. This is something that we need to do. This is something that we need to work upon, because if we say, and we do, to protect the international rules based order, we'll need to join forces with like-minded nations around the world, and like-minded organisations from around the world. This is in a nutshell, the level of ambition that we are, you know, proposing to the allies in the future. The rise of China is not a small thing. It's a massive transformation of geopolitics, probably the most transformative geopolitical shift in decades or even centuries. This is why we need our allies and our partners from Asia Pacific from the Indo Pacific. We need our allies, to the south, we need our allies to east, we need our allies, even Latin America, Colombia is one of our partners into this. And by the way, I will be looking forward to receiving Ghana, the first Sub-Saharan potential new partner we are contemplating this together. I was very pleased to see how leadership of Ghana come to us one year ago, one and a half years ago, saying we are so concerned about the risk of spillover from the Sahel of terrorism. We want to embrace the gold standard that NATO represents. For all of us.

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The gold standard of NATO is what we are. The gold standard of NATO is what we must preserve. The gold standard of NATO is something that we have to invest for the next decades for our great Alliance. So that's basically if you want the thrust and the political drive, which is motivating us here.

**MIRCEA GEOANĂ [NATO Deputy Secretary**

**General]:** Listen, at NATO, we have the language and the decisions of our leaders in London when they last met in December 2019. And there, we basically describe, and our leaders, and that's policy at NATO, that we see China both as a challenge and also as an opportunity. So we're not seeing, at NATO, China as an adversary, but we are seeing not NATO going towards the geography of the Indo-Pacific, but China coming closer to our geographies. If we speak of geography, Africa, many other investments, including in dual-use infrastructures, in ports, in airports, we see a fantastic competition for new technologies, innovation, sometimes in licit, sometimes in illicit ways.

We see the lessons learnt from the pandemic in terms of supply chain.

IT **We see the lessons learnt of the pandemic when it comes to disinformation, fake news, on hybrid.**

We're also seeing, in NATO, of ever more intense competition also in space. This is why also in London, our leaders decided to add to the already four operational domains of NATO land, sea and air and cyber, now space is an operational domain in NATO. So, when we engage with China, we also say something coming also to arms control.

MT Today, **China has the second largest defence budget in the world after the US. Today, China has the largest fleet in the world. Today, we see a modernisation of China's arsenal, in many directions, that is complex and important and creates, you know, repercussions.** So what we also say, with the status of great power that China already possesses, also it comes responsibilities.

So when there are discussions about arms control, we have to convince China to be part of those conversations.

So the China work at NATO continues.

As I mentioned, we are seeing this is a challenge, we also see it as an opportunity. And I'm convinced that our leaders at the next summit will discuss again, of the many fronts, including on China.

And by the way, Ben, Secretary Wallace, we are looking forward with great anticipation to the release of the Integrated Review next week. And I'm convinced that, you know, in-depth, like always, briefing and distillation of this important piece of strategic work will be done with Allies, like you always do, in every single important opportunity and occasion.

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NATO

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**Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg**

Today, NATO continues to adapt.  
To ensure that we continue to keep our people safe and free.  
Because we live in a more unpredictable world.  
Where the security challenges we face are more global.  
From cyber-attacks,  
to brutal terrorism,  
disruptive technologies,  
nuclear proliferation,  
and climate change.  
But also mounting authoritarianism.  
Growing competition.  
The rise of China is a defining global issue,  
which has implications for all of us.  
And which NATO cannot ignore.  
There are opportunities that come with China's rise.  
China has lifted millions out of poverty.  
Brought economic growth and prosperity.  
And it is an important trade and investment partner to many  
NATO countries.  
China will soon have the biggest economy in the world.  
It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council.  
So it is instrumental in dealing with issues of our time.  
From global governance,  
to international trade and climate change.  
That is why at NATO, we engage with China.  
In the past, we have cooperated in fighting piracy off the coast  
of Somalia.  
And there are areas where China can play a constructive role to  
our mutual benefit.  
From peace and stability in Afghanistan,  
to negotiating arms control arrangements.  
But we must be clear-headed about the challenges that come  
with China's rise.

MT China is matching its military power to its economic power.  
It has tripled its military expenditure over the last decade.  
It now has the world's second largest defense budget.  
And it continues to invest massively in military modernisation.

IT At the same time, China does not share our values.  
It persecutes ethnic and religious minorities, such as the  
Uighurs.  
Suppresses human rights in Hong Kong.  
And it is using new and advanced technology to monitor and  
control its own people,  
creating state surveillance without precedent.

IT We have also seen more assertive moves by Beijing,  
to challenge the rules-based international order.  
It is openly threatening Taiwan.  
Coercing neighbours in the region.  
And hampering freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

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China is also investing heavily across Europe and... around the world.  
Acquiring, building and managing critical infrastructure and strategic resources, to create dependencies.

MT So **China's rise has real implications on our security,** including at home.  
NATO is, and will remain, a regional alliance for Europe and North America.  
But China is coming closer to us.  
And this requires our collective attention and action.  
NATO is a key platform to forge convergence on responding to the security implications of a rising China.  
This is one of the reasons why we are addressing how to further strengthen the resilience of our societies and our infrastructure.  
So that we can reduce vulnerabilities stemming from foreign ownership, coercion or manipulation.

SC We are also investing in emerging and disruptive technologies.  
**And we want to engage even more closely with our friends and partners around the world.**  
**Because that is the best way to protect the rules-based international order.**

SP **Secure our societies.**

SP **And ring-fence our democracies.**  
We already have an extensive network of **partnerships,** including in the **Asia-Pacific region.**

SC We have **formalized partnerships, strong political dialogue and wide-ranging practical cooperation,** with countries such as **Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.**  
**And I see real potential in stepping up our dialogue with other countries that share our values and interests.**  
Including India.  
You are at the forefront of many of our shared security challenges.  
From Afghanistan, international terrorism, to maritime security.  
And you are the world's biggest democracy.  
Committed to upholding the rules-based order.

So we can do more together.  
Consult.  
Coordinate.  
And take concerted action.  
To address global challenges that are far greater than any country or continent can tackle alone.  
But also to safeguard our values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law.  
And protect our way of life.

**Dr. Saran**  
Mr. Secretary General, you know, we have spent a lot of time at

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this dialogue this year to engage with some of the most important threats we believe the international order faces.

One is the threat to democracy. One is the menace of disinformation, fake news. Synthetic truth, and how it's manipulating social cleavages and disturbances. Bio threats, the pandemic tells us a story that maybe this might just be an accident but in the future, we need to prepare a new framework and a robust response mechanism to bio threat.

What do you believe is going to be the role of your organization, in helping us defend democracy against misinformation, protecting us from health and bio terrorism, and perhaps also in the future, emerging new technologies that might challenge some of our assumptions around liberalism itself.

**Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg**

So NATO has an important role to play, addressing all those challenges. And I think we all have to realize or to understand something which has been going on for some time now, but which I expect to be even more important and accelerate as we look into the future, and that is that we are faced with many different threats, and also that there is a more blurred line between peace and conflict.

In old times, the only thing we were afraid of was in a way, regular military armed attack. Now we see many more different kinds of threats. We see cyber, we see hybrid, we see that economic coercion, disinformation, and all them together, and the combination of military and non-military means of aggression, all of that together, blurs the line between peace and war, but also means that we have to defend ourselves, protect our members, Allies, and the rules based order against much more multifaceted and complex security threats.

So therefore, for instance NATO has significantly stepped up what we do in cyber, in the cyber domain, with a new Cyber Command, and also stating that cyber can trigger Article Five of the collective defense clause of the Alliance.

The pandemic demonstrates in one way, what kind of potential threat we also can face in the future. As this is not a man-made pandemic but it illustrates a type of threats that could also be something we have to be prepared for in the future.

Regarding the COVID 19 pandemic, of course, NATO's main task has been and still is to prevent the health crisis, the pandemic, from becoming a security crisis. So for us it has been extremely important to make sure that our missions and operations are up and running. That the readiness of our forces is intact. And we have been able to do that.

At the same time, I also welcome the fact that NATO, our militaries across the Alliance, also partly coordinated by NATO structures, have been able to provide support to the civilian efforts to cope with the pandemic. Across NATO, but also across the whole world, we have seen military forces setting up

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field hospitals, transporting patients, equipment, helping to control borders, and now also supporting the rollout of the vaccine.

So, it demonstrates again that the role of NATO and our militaries and our armed forces, they have to address many challenges and need to work more closely together in managing all these different challenges in a more complex security environment.

**Dr. Saran**

In your address to all of us today you mentioned China a few times. You also invoked the Indo-Pacific.

And I want to pose a question to you around both of these invocations. The first of course is that, how does an Atlantic alliance ready itself, and make itself prepared to be an actor in the Indo-Pacific age? If global politics is going to be implicated by what happens in the Indo-Pacific region, how is NATO going to be an actor in that distant geography? How are you preparing yourself to play a role?

And the second follow up question on China and the Indo-Pacific. Perhaps your assessment of the Chinese opportunity as well as a threat, leads me to ask you this question. That because of the deep integration of Europe and America with the Chinese economy, are you going to find it more difficult to prepare yourself to face up to China as a threat? Does that complicate the texture of the relationship? Is that what is different between the Soviet Union, as the adversary, versus the China, as the most dominant actor in this particular century?

**Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg**

First of all, I think it's important to highlight that we will not change our mission, our core task, our responsibility. NATO is a North Atlantic Alliance in North America and Europe. We will remain a regional alliance for North America and Europe. And our responsibility is to protect Allies, to defend our values and our Allies.

At the same time as a regional alliance, we face more global challenges. So therefore we need a global outlook, we need a global approach. We have seen this for some time. We have, for instance, faced international terrorism for decades. And that brought NATO to Afghanistan. Not because NATO is an alliance covering the whole world, or Asia, or Central Asia and Afghanistan, but because to make sure that we are able to protect ourselves. Protect our countries against new attacks. Like we saw in 9/11, we had to operate in Afghanistan, we have been there for many years and the main purpose is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for international terrorists, planning attacks on many countries but including also, of course, NATO allied countries.

So, there is no contradiction between remaining a regional alliance, but having a global approach to, for instance, address international terrorism or cyber and other global challenges.

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Then, since the Indo-Pacific is becoming more and more important, of course, we also see the value of strengthening our partnership and cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. We already have formalized strong partnerships with like-minded democracies in the region, including South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

But we also strongly believe that we can work more closely with countries like India, a like-minded democracy, sharing the same values and standing up for the rules based order.

Regarding China, I think it is very different from what we have seen before and therefore I'm always a bit afraid of... I think, I will not compare that with what we did during the Cold War because we don't regard China as an adversary. And we also see real opportunities in the rise of China. Economic opportunities and also the need to engage with China, addressing many global challenges and issues.

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But then we need to combine that understanding with the fact that we see a more assertive China, violating international or undermining the rules based order, threatening neighbors, and, of course, China is a country that doesn't share our values. They don't believe in the same democratic values as we do. And this is not only something I say but as stated clearly themselves.

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And we have seen the way they oppress minorities, democratic forces, and therefore we need to stand up for our values, and again, we do that as 30 Allies, but we also welcome when we work together with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, and also welcome the fact that several NATO Allies, the United States, United Kingdom, France, they have a presence in the region, and they have developed and strengthened their strategies when it comes to the Indo-Pacific region. Recently also, the Netherlands and Germany, presented strategies for the Indo-Pacific. For instance, Germany has also announced that they are planning to send some naval forces to the region. So, again, we will remain a regional alliance, responsible for protecting the members, but we need a global approach, because our region is, of course, infected or is impacted by the possibilities but also the challenges we see emanating from the Indo-Pacific region.

[...]

**Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg**

So first of all it's never too late to deepen dialogue and to work more closely with India and to strengthen the cooperation between India and NATO.

And you asked me whether I believe in that and I believe in that. I think that absolutely makes sense and therefore we should look into how we can consult more, have more dialogue, also coordinate, and sometimes also act together.

And one start of this dialogue is the fact that you invited me for the first time, and the Secretary General of NATO for the first time attends the Raisina Dialogue.

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That also sends a message about, at least from my part, an interest in sitting down with India and consult and discuss and deepen the dialogue.

I say this also because India is really a major player, not only in the region but on the global scene.

A growing economy.

An important voice.

And India is a country which believe in the same values: freedom, democracy, the rule of law.

And India is a country that stands for the rules based order.

These are the same values that NATO believes in, the same values that NATO has enshrined in our founding treaty. So therefore, it just makes it even more important that we sit down and see how we can work together, consult, deepen our dialogue.

IT Not least because we see that these values are now threatened.

We see a rise of authoritarianism, countries that are not sharing our values, China, Russia, also, to some extent working

together, undermine the rules-based order, which has served us well for so many decades. And therefore, we believe, and also

as part of the NATO 2030 project, that we should strengthen dialogue with partnerships, with cooperation, with also

SC countries in like-minded democracies, including of course like-minded democracies in the Indo-Pacific region.

NATO is of course, NATO is both a military and a political alliance. And especially in a time where we see that there is more and more blurred lines between military threats and non-military threats, and means of aggression, I think it's important to understand that, of course, NATO, we work with partners,

SC we have political dialogue, political cooperation, without being part of military operations and missions.

Sometimes we had to deploy troops and forces to military operations and missions, like we did in the Balkans to help end the ethnic wars in the 1990s.

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**Laura Saligman:**

Turning now to China. As you know, the United States has increasingly focused on Beijing as its number one long-term security challenge, not just in the military realm, but also in areas like cyberattacks and telecommunications. So, in what ways do the NATO Allies share this perception of China, and in where do these views diverge?

**Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg:**

The rise of China matters for all NATO Allies, and at our Summit in 2019, we actually made a statement, all the Heads of State and Government, that the rise of China poses some opportunities because there's trade, and there are other opportunities related to China. We need to engage with China

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		<p>on issues like arms control or climate change. And therefore, China is not an adversary.</p> <p>Having said that, NATO Allies also see the fact that China will soon have the biggest economy in the world. They already have the second largest defense budget, they are investing heavily in new modern capabilities, they have the biggest Navy in the world. And they don't share our values. European Allies and of course Canada have again expressed deep concerns about the crackdown on democratic voices in Hong Kong, the persecution of minorities in China, and the fact that they're using, you know, facial recognition, new disruptive technologies to conduct surveillance of their own population, in a way we've never seen before. And then, intimidating neighbors, undermining freedom of navigation. And all of this. So we, NATO, realize that the rise of China matters for our security. And the NATO 2030 agenda covers many different areas, but many of them are highly relevant for the consequences of the rise of China. So NATO is a platform for political considerations, reaching out to our Asia-Pacific partners, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea. But also for instance, taking into account the fact that they are investing heavily, or trying to control, critical infrastructure in our countries. So we are, as part of the NATO 2030 agenda, working on how can we develop stronger guidelines for our resilience, telecommunications, undersea cables, energy grids, critical infrastructure. And also investing in and working more on technology, sharpening our technological edge. So NATO Allies are responding, and the NATO 2030 agenda is about how we can respond to a more competitive world, and that includes also the security consequences of the rise of China.</p> <p><b>Laura Saligman:</b></p> <p>So just a question here, following up on the use of cyber capabilities by China and Russia- this is a question from the audience- China and Russia's use of offensive cyber capabilities continues to disrupt both the public and private sector. What is NATO doing today to deter these cyber attacks, and how can it coordinate its efforts effectively?</p> <p><b>Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg:</b></p> <p>So we see more frequent and we see more sophisticated cyberattacks against NATO Allies, also the United States. This has led to a significant strengthening of our cyber defenses, and how we work together on cyber. We have actually decided that a cyberattack can trigger Article Five, can trigger our collective defence clause. We an operational domain, alongside air, land, sea, we now also that affects our security.</p> <p>[...]</p>
NATO 12-06- 2021	IT	55. China's stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security. We are concerned by those coercive policies which stand in contrast to

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MT the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad. It is opaque in implementing its military modernisation and its publicly declared military-civil fusion strategy. It is also cooperating militarily with Russia, including through participation in Russian exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain concerned with China's frequent lack of transparency and use of disinformation. We call on China to uphold its international commitments and to act responsibly in the international system, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains, in keeping with its role as a major power.

56. NATO maintains a constructive dialogue with China where possible. Based on our interests, we welcome opportunities to engage with China on areas of relevance to the Alliance and on common challenges such as climate change. There is value in information exchange on respective policies and activities, to enhance awareness and discuss potential disagreements. Allies urge China to engage meaningfully in dialogue, confidence-building, and transparency measures regarding its nuclear capabilities and doctrine. Reciprocal transparency and understanding would benefit both NATO and China.

73. We will work more closely with all our Western European partners to share expertise, address emerging security challenges, and continue our cooperation on operations, missions, and other initiatives. We will also seek to further develop relations with our partners across the globe. We are enhancing political dialogue and practical cooperation with our long-standing Asia-Pacific partners – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea – to promote cooperative security and support the rules-based international order. We will discuss common approaches to global security challenges where NATO's interests are affected, share perspectives through deeper political engagement, and seek concrete areas for cooperation to address shared concerns. We are intensifying our interaction with Colombia, NATO's partner in Latin America, on good governance, military training, interoperability, demining, and maritime security. We remain open to deepening our political dialogue and intensifying our practical cooperation with our partners in Central Asia, taking into account the regional situation. We welcome the interest of other global actors to work with NATO in addressing our shared security concerns and stand ready to explore further engagement on a case-by-case basis.

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NATO 14-06-2021 IT [...] When it comes to upholding the rules-based international order, countries like Russia and China do not share the Alliance's

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	IT	values. They are at the forefront of a pushback against that order. This has implications for the security, values and democratic way of life of Allied countries.
	SC	To remain successful and ensure the defence and security of the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO should play a greater role in preserving and shaping the rules-based international order in areas that are important to Allied security. This includes by speaking with one voice in defence of shared values and interests. As part of NATO 2030, Allies will also take decisions to deepen NATO's relationships with like-minded countries and international organisations near and far, including in the Asia-Pacific. [...]
NATO 08-07- 2021	SP	NATO is developing closer relations with its four Asia-Pacific partners, namely Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.
	SC	In today's complex security environment, relations with like-minded partners across the globe are increasingly important to address cross-cutting security issues and global challenges, as well as to defend the rules-based international order.
		Ensuring NATO adopts a global approach is central to the NATO 2030 agenda. NATO's relations with the four Asia-Pacific partners have a key role to play in this.
	SC	NATO regularly meets with the Asia-Pacific partners to discuss security topics of mutual interest. In December 2020, the four Asia-Pacific partners participated for the first time in a NATO Foreign Ministerial Meeting. At this milestone event, NATO
	SC	Foreign Ministers discussed the shift in the global balance of power and the rise of China with the four Asia-Pacific partners, as well as with Finland, Sweden and European Union High Representative/ Vice President of the European Commission.
	SC	Regular meetings take place with Ambassadors in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) – the so-called “NAC+4” meetings – as well as at other political and military levels. In 2020,
		addressing the security implications of the COVID-19 pandemic took centre stage but, in recent years, topics
	SC	addressed in the “NAC+4” meetings have also included the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and maritime security. At the NATO Brussels Summit in June 2021, Allies
	SC	agreed to increase dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO and existing partners, including the four partners in the Asia-Pacific region.
	SP	Political dialogue ensures NATO and its four Asia-Pacific partners can enhance their mutual situational awareness on security developments in the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions. It also sees to it that the partners can contribute their unique perspective to NATO policy discussions on common security challenges, in particular those that are no longer bound by geography, such as cyberspace, space and climate change.

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		<p>Alongside the “NAC+4” format, NATO has individual partnership cooperation programmes with each of the four Asia-Pacific partners, with cooperative activities focusing on topics of mutual interest including cyber defence, non-proliferation, civil preparedness and Women, Peace and Security.</p>
NATO 11-07- 2021	CO	<p>New Zealand’s cooperation with NATO is mutually beneficial and includes:</p> <p><b>Building capabilities and interoperability</b>            Since 2014 under the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, New Zealand participates in the Interoperability Platform, which brings Allies together with selected partners that are active contributors to NATO’s operations.</p>
	CO	<p>An important focus of cooperation is to develop capability between NATO and New Zealand and to project stability and build capacity in other countries. This includes participation in</p>
	SP	<p>operations, exercises, training, exchanges of information, personnel and lessons learned, as well as involvement in</p>
	CO	<p>development of standards and science and technology cooperation.</p> <p><b>Support for NATO-led operations and missions</b>            New Zealand made a significant contribution to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which completed its mission in December 2014. It led a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyán Province. From 2015 until spring 2021, New Zealand contributed to the Resolute Support Mission to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces and institutions.</p> <p>In the last decades,            New Zealand contributed twice to NATO’s past maritime counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa, Ocean Shield. It also contributed to Operation Active Endeavour. Several New Zealand officers served in the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p>
	SC	<p><b>Wider cooperation</b>            In the framework of NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme, cooperation with New Zealand has addressed the topics of counter-terrorism and small states’ responses to salient security challenges.</p>
	SC	<p>For the first time, in December 2020, New Zealand participated in a NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, together with Australia, Finland, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden and the European Union High Representative/ Vice President of the European Commission, to discuss the shift in the global balance of power and the rise of China. This was only one of the latest and more visible political exchanges NATO has had with New Zealand at various levels in recent years. The NATO Secretary General travelled to New Zealand in August 2019.</p>

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	SC	At the NATO Brussels Summit in June 2021, Allies agreed to increase dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO and existing partners, including New Zealand as one of the partners in the Asia-Pacific region.
	SC	NATO and New Zealand have been engaged in dialogue and cooperation since 2001. New Zealand is one of a range of countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, often referred to as “partners across the globe”.
	CO	Since 2012, work is being taken forward through an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme.
	SP	New Zealand provided support for NATO-led defence capacity-building efforts in Afghanistan until spring 2021 and also seeks to continue cooperation in the maritime security sphere.
	CO	NATO and New Zealand are interested in cooperating in areas of common interest, including science and technology, maritime security, cyber defence, Women, Peace and Security, and climate security.
NATO 13-07- 2021	CO	The Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) was launched at the Wales Summit in 2014 to ensure that the deep connections built up between NATO and partner forces over years of operations will be maintained and deepened. In this way, partners can contribute to future crisis management, including NATO-led operations and, where applicable, to the NATO Response Force.
	CO	<b>A focus on interoperability</b> Partners can contribute to NATO-led operations and missions – whether through supporting peace by training security forces in the Western Balkans, or monitoring maritime activity in the Mediterranean Sea or off the Horn of Africa – as well as NATO exercises. To be able to contribute effectively, partners need to be interoperable with NATO.
	CO&SC	Interoperability is the ability to operate together using harmonised standards, doctrines, procedures and equipment. It is essential to the work of an alliance of multiple countries with national defence forces, and is equally important for working together with partners that wish to contribute in supporting NATO in achieving its tactical, operational and strategic objectives. Much of day-to-day cooperation in NATO – including with partners – is focused on achieving this interoperability.
	CO	<i>The Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII)</i> In 2014, Allied leaders responded to the need to maintain and enhance interoperability built up with partners during years of operations (including in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans), recognising the importance of maintaining interoperability with partners for future crisis management. NATO launched the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII), which aims to:
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- re-emphasise the importance of developing interoperability with and for all partners, and of ensuring that all existing partnership interoperability programmes are used to their full potential;
- CO enhance support for those partners that wish to maintain and enhance their interoperability, including through deeper cooperation and dialogue;
- offer enhanced opportunities for cooperation to those partners that provide sustained and significant force, capability or other contributions to the Alliance;
- SC underline that interoperability also needs to be a priority for NATO's relations with other international organisations with a role in international crisis management.
- CO
- More tailor-made cooperation: "Enhanced Opportunities Partners"**
- The PII recognised that deeper interoperability underpins and complements closer relations between NATO and partners. As partner nations' contributions to NATO missions and operations as well as force pools became more ambitious and complex, they would benefit from a more tailor-made relationship to help sustain such contributions, based on specific "enhanced opportunities" for cooperation, including: regular, political consultations on security matters, including possibly at ministerial level;
- enhanced access to interoperability programmes and exercises;
- sharing information, including on lessons learned;
- CO closer association of such partners in times of crisis and the preparation of operations.
- Shortly after the 2014 Wales Summit, five partners were granted these "enhanced opportunities": Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden. Since then, each "Enhanced Opportunities Partner" (EOP) has taken forward this programme of cooperation with NATO in a tailor-made manner, in areas of mutual interest for NATO and the partner concerned. Ukraine was recognised as a sixth EOP in June 2020.
- CO
- A standing format for cooperation on interoperability issues: the Interoperability Platform**
- Interoperability for current and future military cooperation to tackle security challenges is a key focus of day-to-day work at NATO, including in a broad range of committees, working groups and expert communities. The PII recognised that if partners are to be interoperable to manage crises with NATO tomorrow, they need to work with NATO on interoperability issues today – and be part of those discussions.
- SP
- CO This is why the PII launched a standing format for NATO-partner cooperation on interoperability and related issues: the Interoperability Platform (IP). The format cuts across traditional, geographical frameworks for cooperation, and brings together all partners that have contributed to NATO
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operations or have taken concrete steps to deepen their interoperability with NATO. Participation in these programmes and activities changes, so the North Atlantic Council – the Alliance's highest political decision-making body – adjusts participation every year. As of June 2017, 23 partners are members of the IP.

In this format, Allies and partners discuss projects and issues that affect interoperability for future crisis management, such as command and control systems, education and training, exercises or logistics.

Recognising the breadth and depth of work needed on interoperability, any NATO committee or body can meet in IP format, at different levels. It was launched by a meeting of defence ministers in IP format at the Wales Summit, and since then has met in a number of configurations at NATO Headquarters, including at the level of the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee, the Operations Policy Committee, and technical groups such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the Command, Control and Consultation Board, the Civil Emergency Planning Committee and others. At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, the defence ministers of the IP nations will meet with their NATO counterparts to review progress since Wales.

The following 23 partners are part of the IP as of June 2017: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates.

NATO 21-07- 2021	CO	The Republic of Korea's cooperation with NATO is mutually beneficial and includes:
	CO	<b>Building capabilities and interoperability</b> Since 2014, under the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, the Republic of Korea has been participating in the Interoperability Platform that brings Allies together with selected partners that are active contributors to NATO's operations.
	CO & SP	The Republic of Korea is interested in improving mutual understanding and interoperability through exchanges of civilian and military personnel, participation in education, joint training and exercises, and cooperation in the field of standardization and logistics.
	SP	<b>Support for NATO-led operations and missions</b> From 2010 to 2013, as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, the Republic of Korea led an integrated civilian-military Provincial Reconstruction Team of some 470 personnel in Parwan Province, which helped build the capacity of the provincial government in the areas of health,

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- SC education, rural development and governance. The Republic of Korea also contributed to the NATO-run Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund a total of USD 319 million. In 2020, the Republic of Korea served as the ANA Trust Fund's co-chair.
- SC **Cooperating with NATO** in countering the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the naval forces of the Republic of Korea have provided escorts to merchant vessels passing through the waters off the Horn of Africa.
- Wider cooperation**  
NATO and the Republic of Korea continue to cooperate in the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Allies fully support the goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. At the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, they welcomed the recent meetings and declarations between the leaders of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and between the leaders of the United States and the DPRK, as a contribution towards reaching the final fully verified denuclearisation of the DPRK in a peaceful manner. Allies have repeatedly expressed their strong condemnation of the DPRK's provocative rhetoric and actions, which pose a serious threat to regional and international peace, security and stability. The Republic of Korea has been participating regularly at NATO's Annual Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the last one of which was held in September 2021.
- Current practical cooperation under the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme is focusing on activities in the fields of advanced technologies, counter-terrorism, and defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents. Scientists in the Republic of Korea are participating in the key flagship Detection of Explosives and Firearms to Counter Terrorism (DEXTER) Programme, which brings together a multinational consortium of 11 laboratories and research institutes in four NATO member countries and four partner countries. DEXTER will develop an integrated and affordable sensor-fusion system able to detect explosives and firearms in public places without disrupting the flow of pedestrians. Through other ongoing SPS multi-year projects, experts from the Republic of Korea are developing highly sensitive sensors for the detection of pathogens and nerve agents, and are working on the creation of passive bio-inspired atmospheric floating vehicles (used in swarm), to be used for the characterization of hazardous emissions from man-made or natural catastrophes.
- For the first time, in December 2020, the Republic of Korea participated in a NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting, together with Australia, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and the EU HR/VP, to discuss the shift in the global balance of power
- 
- SC

SC	<p>and the rise of China. This was only one of the latest and more visible political exchanges NATO has had with the Republic of Korea at various levels in recent years. At the NATO Brussels Summit in June 2021, Allies agreed to increase dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO and existing partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Republic of Korea. NATO and the Republic of Korea have been engaged in dialogue and cooperation since 2005. It is one of a number of countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic area – often referred to as “partners across the globe” – with which NATO is developing relations.</p>
SC	<p>Since 2012, work has been taken forward through an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme. This was renewed in November 2019.</p>
SC	<p>Political dialogue and practical cooperation are being developed across priority areas, including non-proliferation, cyber defence, counter-terrorism, security-related civil science projects, interoperability, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence, as well as civil preparedness, resilience and disaster relief.</p>
CO	
NATO 22-07- 2021	<p>NATO officials welcomed Mr. Kyung-Hyup Kim, Chairman of the Intelligence Committee of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, to NATO Headquarters on Thursday (22 July 2021) for talks on common security challenges and NATO’s partnership with Seoul.</p> <p>Stian Jenssen, Director of the Private Office of the Secretary General, praised the Republic of Korea’s long-standing political and practical support for Afghanistan. He noted that NATO will continue to support Afghanistan by providing training and financial support for the Afghan security forces, a continued civilian presence in Kabul and funding to ensure the continued functioning of the international airport.</p>
SC	<p>The talks also addressed the situation on the Korean peninsula, China’s rise, as well as opportunities for stronger cooperation between NATO and the Republic of Korea, including in the areas of cyber defence and arms control.</p>
SC	<p>NATO is committed to working with partners to build and preserve international peace. As part of the NATO 2030 agenda, Allied leaders agreed at the Brussels Summit to strengthen NATO’s global cooperation with like-minded partners, including in the Asia-Pacific, to defend the rules-based international order.</p>
NATO 25-08- 2021	<p>The Allies seek to contribute to the efforts of the international community in projecting stability and strengthening security outside NATO territory. One of the means to do so is through cooperation and partnerships. Over more than 25 years, the Alliance has developed a network of partnerships with non-member countries from the Euro-Atlantic area, the</p>

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SC	<p>Mediterranean and the Gulf region, and other partners across the globe. NATO pursues dialogue and practical cooperation with these nations on a wide range of political and security-related issues. NATO's partnerships are beneficial to all involved and contribute to improved security for the broader international community.</p>
SC	<p><b><u>A flexible network of partnerships with non-member countries</u></b></p> <p>Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhance international security, to defend the values on which the Alliance is based, to NATO's operations, and to prepare interested nations for membership.</p>
SC	<p>In both regional frameworks and on a bilateral level, NATO develops relations based on common values, reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.</p>
SC	<p>In the Euro-Atlantic area, the 30 Allies engage in relations with 20 partner countries through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace – a major programme of bilateral cooperation with individual Euro-Atlantic partners. Among these partners, NATO has developed specific structures for its relationships with Russia<sup>1</sup>, Ukraine and Georgia. NATO also cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these regional partnership frameworks. Referred to as “partners across the globe”, they include Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. NATO has also developed flexible means of cooperation with partners, across different regions. NATO can work with so-called “30+n” groups of partners, where partners are chosen based on a common interest or theme. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO introduced the possibility of “enhanced opportunities” for certain partners to build a deeper, more tailor-made bilateral relationship with NATO. At the same time, Allied leaders launched the “Interoperability Platform”, a permanent format for cooperation with partners on the interoperability needed for future crisis management and operations.</p> <p>Key objectives of NATO's Partnership</p> <p>Under NATO's partnership policies, the strategic objectives of NATO's partner relations are to:</p> <p>Enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security, peace and stability;</p>
SC	<p>Promote regional security and cooperation;</p> <p>Facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest, including international efforts to meet emerging security challenges;</p>
CO	<p>Prepare interested eligible nations for NATO membership;</p> <p>Promote democratic values and institutional reforms, especially in the defence and security sector;</p> <p>Enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions;</p>

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SC	<p>Enhance awareness of security developments including through early warning, with a view to preventing crises; <b>Build confidence and achieve better mutual understanding, including about NATO's role and activities, in particular through enhanced public diplomacy.</b></p>
	<p>That said, each partner determines – with NATO – the pace, scope, intensity and focus of their partnership with NATO, as well as individual objectives. This is often captured in a document setting goals for the relationship, which is to be regularly reviewed. However, many of NATO's partnership activities involve more than one partner at a time.</p>
	<p>Partnership in Practice</p>
SC	<p>In practice, NATO's partnership objectives are taken forward through a broad variety of means. Broadly speaking, NATO opens up parts of its processes, procedures and structures to the participation of partners, allowing partners to make concrete contributions through these. In some cases, special programmes have been created to assist and engage partners on their specific needs. Key areas for cooperation are set out below:</p>
SP & SC	<p><b>Consultation</b> is key to the work of NATO as an alliance and is central to partnerships. Political consultations can help understand security developments, including regional issues, and shape common approaches to preventing crises or tackling a security challenge. NATO's many committees and bodies often meet in formations with partners to shape cooperation in specific areas. NATO Allies meet with partners (individually or in groups) on a broad variety of subjects and at a variety of levels every day.</p>
CO	<p><b>Partners contribute to NATO-led operations and missions</b>, whether through supporting peace by training security forces in the Western Balkans or monitoring maritime activity in the Mediterranean Sea or off the Horn of Africa. As contributors to those missions, partners are invited to shape policy and decisions that affect those missions, alongside Allies. A number of tools have been created to assist partners in developing their ability to participate in NATO-led operations, and be interoperable with Allies' forces.</p>
CO	<p>For many years, <b>NATO has worked with partners on defence reform, institution and capacity-building</b>. As part of its work to project stability, NATO Allies have agreed that long-term and lasting stability is linked to improved governance of defence and security sector and institutions. Viable, effective and resilient defence institutions are essential to the long-term success of efforts to strengthen partner capacity. In 2004, NATO Allies and partners adopted the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building, setting basic benchmarks for defence institutions. In a NATO context, such work can go from strategic objective setting and joint reviews, to expert assistance and advice, as well as targeted education and</p>
SP	<p><b>training</b>. Defence advice and reform is provided through</p>

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CO & SC	<p>bilateral partnership cooperation programmes, as well as through expert advisory programmes targeting specific aspects of Defence Institution Building, like the Defence Education Enhancement Programme or Building Integrity. In 2014, at the Wales Summit, NATO adopted the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative (<i>see more below</i>). The Initiative builds on NATO's extensive track record and expertise in supporting, advising, assisting, training and mentoring countries requiring capacity-building support of the Alliance, and allows for the development of targeted, tailor-made packages of defence capacity-building support for countries, upon request and with Allied consent.</p> <p>NATO also engages with partners in a broad variety of other areas where it has developed expertise and programmes. These include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Counter-terrorism;</li><li>Counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;</li><li>Emerging security challenges, such as those related to cyber defence, energy security and maritime security, including counter-piracy;</li></ul>
SP	<p><b>Civil emergency planning.</b></p> <p>Towards more flexibility: evolutions in NATO's partnerships Reflecting the significant evolutions in NATO's partnerships policy, in line with the new Strategic Concept adopted in 2010, a focused effort to reform NATO's partnerships policy was launched at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to make dialogue and cooperation more inclusive, flexible, meaningful and strategically oriented. This resulted in a new partnership policy, which was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011.</p>
CO	<p>The new policy aimed to reinforce existing partnerships by strengthening consultation mechanisms and by facilitating more substance-driven cooperation. In addition, the new policy outlined a "toolbox" of mechanisms and activities for cooperation with partners.</p>
SC	<p>In line with the Strategic Concept, NATO is offering its partners <i>"more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led operations to which they contribute"</i>. The Political-Military Framework, which governs the way NATO involves partners in</p>
CO&SC	<p>political consultation and the decision-making process for operations and missions to which they contribute, was updated, giving contributing partners decision-shaping authority but not the same decision-making authority as member countries.</p> <p>The Berlin policy decisions opened up the possibility for new forms of political dialogue with partners, including through more flexible "30+n" formats (thematic or event-driven), and are used, on a case-by-case basis, to enhance consultation on security issues of common concern and cooperation in priority</p>

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policy areas, such as counter-piracy and cyber defence. The 2011 policy also opened up the possibility of developing deeper relations with partners across the globe as well as key global actors and other new interlocutors across the globe which share the Allies' interest in peaceful international relations but have no individual programme of cooperation with NATO. A number of partners across the globe have since joined NATO's partnerships community; most recently, Colombia became a partner in 2017.

CO & SP	At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO leaders endorsed two important initiatives to reinforce the Alliance's commitment to <b>the core task of cooperative security: the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, and the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative.</b> The first
CO	initiative was designed to reinforce NATO's ability to <b>provide security <i>with</i> partners in future, through interoperability;</b> while the second was more focused on helping countries, upon request, to provide for their own security, by strengthening their defence and related security institutions and capacity.
CO	The Partnership Interoperability Initiative provides measures designed to ensure that the deep connections built between NATO and partner forces over years of operations will be maintained and deepened so that partners can contribute to future NATO-led operations and, where applicable, to the NATO Response Force. <b>The Partnership Interoperability Initiative</b> has introduced a number of innovations, including the possibility of granting specific partners <b>enhanced opportunities</b> for deeper cooperation. Six partners (Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden and Ukraine) currently have access to this enhanced cooperation, which includes easing the process for these nations to participate in exercises and enabling regular consultation on security matters.
CO & SP	Another innovation concerns the establishment of the <b>Interoperability Platform</b> , a standing forum for meetings with selected partners that have contributed to NATO operations or have taken concrete steps to deepen their interoperability with NATO. In this format, Allies and partners discuss projects and issues that affect interoperability, such as education, training, exercises, evaluation, capability development, command and control systems, and logistics. <b>The Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative</b> builds on NATO's extensive track record and expertise in supporting, advising, assisting, training and mentoring countries requiring <b>capacity-building support of the Alliance.</b> It aims to reinforce NATO's commitment to partner nations and help the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as part of the Alliance's overall contribution to international security, stability and conflict prevention. The programme is extended to countries upon their request, and with Allied consent. Allies have offered DCB
CO	

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packages to Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, the Republic of Moldova and Tunisia, following their requests.

At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Allies underlined that they seek to contribute more to the efforts of the international community in projecting stability and strengthening security outside NATO territory.

At the Brussels Summit in 2018, Allies committed to further strengthening NATO's role in this regard, helping partners, upon request, to build stronger defence institutions, improve good governance, enhance resilience, provide for their own security, and more effectively contribute to the fight against terrorism. The investments in partners' security contribute to Alliance security overall and partnerships continue to be essential to the way NATO works in addressing security challenges.

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NATO  
11-10-  
2021

[...]

At NATO, I have launched a thorough assessment of our engagement in Afghanistan.

To learn the lessons.

Because by learning we adapt.

It is too early to conclude the outcome of this process, but one thing is clear:

the crisis in Afghanistan does not change the need for Europe and North America to stand together in NATO.

In fact, the need for transatlantic unity is bigger now than it has been at any time since the end of the Cold War.

Because the challenges we face are far greater than any country, or continent, can tackle alone.

Russia is responsible for aggressive actions against its neighbours.

A massive military build-up from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean.

And attempts to interfere in our democracies.

China is assertively using its might to coerce other countries and control its own people.

And China is coming closer to us.

In Africa, in the Arctic and in cyber-space.

And by investing in our own critical infrastructure, from 5G networks to ports and airports.

And other threats are emerging.

Including cyber-attacks, disruptive technologies, nuclear proliferation and climate change.

Brutal terrorism continues to exist as a real threat.

So, we must strengthen NATO.

That is exactly what our leaders decided to do at the Summit in June.

They agreed NATO 2030 – an ambitious agenda for our future security.

This includes increasing national resilience, to make our societies, infrastructure and supply chains less

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IT &MT

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vulnerable to attacks.

Boosting our cyber defences.

Investing in the latest technologies,

and addressing the impact of climate change on our security.

SC

Together, we will continue to tackle instability, fight terrorism,

and safeguard the rules-based international order,

by stepping up training and capacity-building for partners.

SP

And deepening our relations with other countries, international organisations, the private sector and academic institutions.

One partner is of particular importance for our Alliance and we are cooperating ever more closely with the European Union.

And I am glad to be working with President Ursula von der Leyen and President Charles Michel on a new Joint Statement, to further strengthen NATO-EU relations,

to be ready before the end of this year.

I strongly welcome the EU's increased efforts on defence.

NATO has been calling on European Allies to invest more and provide more high-end capabilities for many years.

But these efforts should not duplicate NATO.

Our nations have finite resources, and only one set of forces.

And we need to use them in the best possible way.

Delivering on the NATO 2030 decisions requires proper funding.

We are on the right track, with seven consecutive years of increased defence spending by European Allies and Canada.

Including by Portugal, as all other European Allies.

It is essential to keep up this mo

Thank you and then I'm ready for all your questions. Thank you.

**Linda Sanchez, head of US delegation:**

Thank you Mr. President and Mr. Secretary General. Thank you so much for sharing your time with us this morning.

IT

NATO is a political, military Alliance built on a foundation of the democratic principles that are enshrined in NATO's founding treaty.

But as I'm sure you're aware we're facing growing competition from authoritarian regimes that explicitly challenged these principles.

And we, in the Assembly think that it's vital that the Alliance take steps to bolster our own commitment to democracy, individual liberty and rule of law.

And as we sadly learned on January 6th, nobody is immune from these challenges. The Assembly has proposed the creation of a Center for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters to monitor the health of our democracies, and to provide support to allies who seek to strengthen democratic institutions.

My question for you is what is your view of the assembly's proposal? And how can Member States put this on the agenda of the new Strategic Concept, given that it is in line with the principles of the Brussels 2021 Communiqué. Thank you.

**Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General:**

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IT	“But of course, we see a China which, which is behaving in a more coercive way against the neighbors. We see what they do in the South China Sea. Also, undermining the freedom of navigation and, and we see also China and Russia operating more and more closely together. So all this matters for NATO.
SP	And that's reason why we need to invest more in technology that's reason why we had to work more closely with our Asia Pacific partners as we also decided at the Summit, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. And that's the reason why we need to for instance invest more in our resilience over societies. So, we are doing a lot, which is about how to adapt to a world well, where the global balance of power is shifting and China is rising. I'm certain that we'll continue to step up. [...]
<hr/>	
NATO 20-10- 2021	[...] We must keep our technological edge. Future conflicts will be fought not just with bullets and bombs, but also with bytes and big data. IT We see authoritarian regimes racing to develop new technologies, from artificial intelligence to autonomous systems. So we are taking further steps to future-proof our Alliance. This week, allies will launch the NATO Innovation Fund. I expect this multinational fund to invest one billion euros. The fund will support the development of dual-use emerging and disruptive technologies, in key areas for Allied security. At our summit in Brussels last June, we took the decision to establish a Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic – or DIANA. We are making good progress. It will have headquarters in both Europe and North America, with a network of test centres and accelerator sites to harness civilian innovation for our security. Many Allies have made offers to host these facilities and some of them will be in place next year. We will also agree our first-ever strategy on artificial intelligence. In order to integrate it in areas such as data analysis, imagery, and cyber defence. And to set out the principles of safe and responsible use, in accordance with international law. Earlier this week, Russia announced the closure of its mission to NATO, and of our offices in Moscow. We regret this decision, which does not promote dialogue and mutual understanding. But NATO’s policy remains consistent, and we remain open to dialogue, including through the NATO Russia Council.

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At the same time, we will continue to assess how we can further strengthen our deterrence and defence.

We will ensure we have the right plans, capabilities and forces in place to protect our nations.

We will also review progress in our response to the challenge from Russia's nuclear capable missile systems.

In 2018, NATO Allies determined that Russia had developed and deployed missiles in breach of the INF Treaty, which led to the demise of the treaty.

And since then, Russia has further increased its arsenal of missiles,

and is developing hypersonic systems. These missiles pose a real threat to security in the Euro Atlantic area.

We will not mirror Russia's actions.

But we will maintain strong deterrence and defence.

Ministers will also meet in the Nuclear Planning Group format.

They will consult on how to keep our nuclear deterrent safe, secure and effective, while remaining committed to arms control.

NATO's goal is a world without nuclear weapons.

But we do not believe in unilateral disarmament.

A world where Russia, China, and other countries like North Korea, have nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is simply not a safer world.

Tomorrow, we will discuss Afghanistan, and how we can ensure terrorists cannot use Afghanistan as a safe haven.

Allies have the capabilities to strike from far away against terrorist threats.

We will also hold the Taliban accountable for their commitments on terrorism, human rights and safe passage.

And the international community has economic and diplomatic leverage over the Taliban.

It is important that we reflect on our efforts in Afghanistan over the years.

We have launched a thorough and clear-eyed assessment.

And tomorrow, ministers will also have a first opportunity to engage on the lessons learned process.

Looking ahead, we must continue to stand together in the fight against international terrorism.

And in the margins of this ministerial, we will hold a meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh.

On Friday, our partners Finland and Sweden, and the European Union, will join us.

We have already taken cooperation between NATO and the European Union to unprecedented levels.

And we will take stock of our progress.

We share the same values and face the same challenges.

So we will discuss what more we can do together in an age of global competition.

With that, I am ready to take your questions.

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[...]

**NATO Secretary General:** [...] On the AUKUS deal, well, I understand that France is disappointed. At the same time, I think it's important to underline that this is not a deal directed against NATO or Europe. And I'm confident that the Allies involved, they will find a way forward. And our responsibilities to prevent this issue, becoming a rift between NATO Allies, between North America and Europe. And NATO Allies also agreed in June, that we need to work more closely with our Asia Pacific partners – New Zealand, Australia, Japan and South Korea. We have started to work with them on cyber, there are other issues of maritime security and many other areas we should work more closely with these partners. AUKUS, the disagreements or differences, opinions about AUKUS within the Alliance, and Afghanistan, does not change the fundamental need, a message that Europe and North America has to stand together because we face a more competitive world, we face more state-to-state rivalry, and then it's even more important to stand together, as the 30 Allies, in NATO.

[...]

**Ansgar Haase (dpa):** Secretary General, on the same issue, China has denied reports that it tested nuclear capable hypersonic missile in August, I would like to know what NATO's assessment is. Do you think that this test had nothing to do with military capabilities? And do you think that this issue will pop up at the discussions at the ministerial meeting in the coming two days. Thank you.

**NATO Secretary General:** What we have seen over the last years is significant modernization of China's military capabilities. I cannot comment on precise intelligence, but what I can say is that we have seen this strong efforts by China to strengthen their military capabilities, including nuclear capabilities and missile systems. This is about new missiles, it's about long range missiles, it's about dual-capable missiles, and it's also about building a new silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines, air launch missiles, sea based and air launch missile including ground launched missiles. So in totality, this is a significant modernization of the Chinese armed forces, including a lot of very advanced weapon systems that can carry nuclear weapons.

[...]

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NATO  
30-11-  
2021

Minister Rinkēvičs,  
Dear Edgars,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen.  
It is really great to be back in Riga, back in Latvia, for many reasons.  
You are a staunch Ally,  
You contribute to NATO missions and operations in many

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ways.

And you meet the 2% guideline.

And you host NATO battlegroup, here in Latvia.

It is really good to be here.

Not least because we have some real snow.

There are many nice things to say about Brussels but they don't have the same kind of high-quality snow as we find here in Latvia.

So that's a good thing.

And let me also thank the organisers of this event today.

The Institute of International Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for hosting us and organising this event.

I am looking forward to delivering my speech because this gives me an opportunity to share with you some ideas on how to develop the next Strategic Concept of NATO.

Next to the Washington Treaty, the Strategic Concept is NATO's most important guiding document.

The last one dates back to 2010.

Since then our security has changed beyond recognition.

Today we live in an age of systemic competition.

IT Russia and China are undermining the rules based international order.

The balance of power is shifting

Democracy and freedom is under heavy pressure.

The next strategic concept is an opportunity to set out how NATO will deal with this new reality.

Five elements are critical.

Protecting our values.

Reinforcing our military power.

Strengthening our societies.

Taking a global outlook.

And building NATO as the institutional link between Europe and North America.

Let me go through each of these in more detail.

IT First, we must protect the values that underpin our Alliance.

NATO was created to defend democracy, freedom, and the rule of law.

These values define who we are.

They are not optional.

And they must continue to guide us in a more complex world.

These values are under pressure.

Both from outside our Alliance and from within our own nations.

IT Authoritarian regimes are pushing back on the international rules-based order.

They promote alternative models of governance.

IT They use propaganda and disinformation to undermine our societies.

And malicious cyber tools to interfere in our elections.

At the same time, there are extremists and political groups

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within our own countries that do not respect our democratic values.

We saw a stark example of this on 6 January when US Congress was attacked with the aim to impede a peaceful transition of power.

Worldwide democracy is in decline.

And there is less trust in democratic institutions.

So more than ever, we need to demonstrate the strength of our democratic model.

And protect our values.

Abroad and at home.

Second, we must reinforce our military power.

The 2010 Strategic Concept stated that “the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace”.

But today, we can no longer take our peace and security for granted.

The Russian regime is aggressive abroad and oppressive at home.

Its military build-up on Ukraine’s borders is of concern.

IT

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party is using its economic and military might to coerce other countries and control its own people.

Expanding its global footprint from Africa to the Arctic, in space and in cyber-space.

In addition, cyber-attacks are becoming more frequent and sophisticated.

Terrorist threats persist.

Nuclear weapons are proliferating.

And climate change is driving instability and fuelling crises.

To keep our people safe in today’s unpredictable world we must continue to strengthen and modernise our deterrence and defence.

We need to ensure our militaries are ready and prepared for any threat.

With the right equipment.

The right training.

And the right skills.

SC

But to ensure our security it is not enough to have strong militaries.

We also need strong societies.

And this brings me to my third point.

Societal disruption can be quick and easy.

It only takes a click of a button to shut down our networks.

A social media message to disinform citizens.

And a pandemic to paralyse our societies.

In today’s interconnected and digital world,

our nations may be more prosperous.

But they are also more interdependent and more vulnerable.

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Our competitors or potential adversaries are exploiting this.  
They are investing heavily in our critical infrastructure as a way to interfere in our societies.  
And using our dependence on essential supplies to further their interests.  
In Europe, we need the gas to flow from Russia to keep warm.  
And prevent an energy crisis.  
And we need the rare earth supplies from China to use our smartphones and computers.  
To make our societies stronger,  
our people and our institutions must be able to better resist and bounce back from attacks.

SP      Our infrastructure must be more resilient.  
And our supply chains more diverse and secure.  
This must be a collective effort.  
All Allies have a part to play.  
Because we are only as strong as our weakest link.  
Fourth, a global outlook.  
NATO is, and will remain, an alliance of Europe and North America.  
But our region faces global security challenges.  
They require global awareness and global reach.  
We cannot confine security to specific regions.  
What happens far away, matters for us right here.  
In fact, many of today's threats are not restrained by geography, or lines on a map.  
Cyber and terrorist attacks,  
aggressive actions in space,  
the use of hypersonic glide vehicles and intercontinental ballistic missiles,  
and climate change,  
are truly global challenges.

SC      Dealing with them requires working closely with like-minded partner countries around the world.  
This is not just 'nice to do'.  
It is an absolute necessity.

SC      We should intensify our cooperation with NATO's partners in the Asia-Pacific.  
Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.  
We should engage more also with other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin-America.  
And we should further strengthen our cooperation with the European Union.  
And all our partners in Europe.  
We cannot ensure our security without working with others.  
But together, we can shape the strategic landscape for the better.  
Compete in a more competitive world.  
And defend the rules-based international order against those that seek to undermine it.

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SC Fifth, we need to build NATO as a strong institution.  
NATO is a powerful idea.  
Nations across Europe and North America coming together to defend one another.  
And ensure our freedom and security.  
'One for all, all for one'.  
But NATO is more than an idea.  
It is an idea nested in a strong institution.  
**This creates patterns of cooperation.**  
Cultural and personal links.  
Integration on a scale that is hard to undo.  
It has kept us all safe for over seven decades.  
Never have so many people been so secure and so prosperous for so long.  
We cannot predict the future, but we will learn the lessons from the past;  
A strong alliance between Europe and North America is indispensable to our security, freedom and prosperity.  
So we must continue to invest in NATO.  
Politically, militarily, and financially.  
To make it even stronger.  
So it can continue to withstand any crisis, and any changes in political weather.  
Today, I look forward to also hearing your ideas for the next Strategic Concept.  
And what you think should be NATO's priorities going forward.  
Thank you so much for your attention.  
**"JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]:** Cyber attacks are global. So, when we say that also the rise of China is a global challenge, it's not fundamentally anything new for NATO. So it is this . . . we will not become a global Alliance, meaning having members from all over the world, from Asia or Asia-Pacific or Africa, and then extend, in a way, the reach of Article 5.  
SC But **yes, we will be an Alliance that has to address global challenges and have a global approach, meaning also working with Allies far away: New Zealand, Australia, Japan, South Korea** and many other, Colombia is a supporter of NATO in Latin America."  

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