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Frozen Friendship: The search for a political friendship between Urho Kaleva Kekkonen and Nikita Sergeyeovich Khrushchev

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Frozen Friendship

The search for a political friendship between Urho
Kaleva Kekkonen and Nikita Sergeyevich
Khrushchev

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1. Introduction

For a lengthy period, the area which is currently better known as Finland has been under the rule of both the Swedish Kingdom and the Russian Empire. Consequently, this territory functioned merely as part of a larger whole for hundreds of years. Accordingly, the area was dependent on both rulers, which prevented the prospect of an independent Finnish nation-state. Nevertheless, during the period of Russian rule, the Grand Duchy was granted the status of “autonomous territory” in 1809, which increased the area’s sovereignty. In addition to this development, Finnish nationalism took off during the nineteenth century, which resulted in an even greater demand for Finnish independence.¹

However, due to the revolutions in Russia between 1917 and 1923 (October Revolution and February Revolution), the prospect of a Finnish independent state seemed closer than ever. The chaos generated by the revolutions changed the probability of independence substantially. The turmoil caused the perfect opportunity for liberation from the Russian shackles.² The nationalist Per Evind Svinhufvud, the Finnish Senate president of the Grand Duchy of Finland at the time, consequently used the revolution to accomplish his goal.³ When Finland declared its independence on December 6, 1917, the start of the Finno-Russian relationship was marked.⁴

The events that followed the establishment of this relationship resulted in what is widely considered to be a turbulent period. The Finnish Civil War (1918), the Winter War (1939-1940), and the Continuation War (1941-1944) can be mentioned here. Although these events are not the main subjects of this research, they nevertheless will be described in closer detail during this study. This is done to provide historical context regarding the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union, as it provides insight into the factors that played a role in the construction of the foundation of the Finno-Soviet relationship.⁵

During the course of the Finno-Soviet diplomatic relationship, the cooperation between the leaders of both nations has continuously played a crucial role. However, when historians discuss cooperation within the Finno-Soviet relationship, elements of neighborliness are often overshadowed by the claim that the interaction between the leaders was based on Soviet coercion and dominance. It is argued that this came forth from the inferior position of Finland

¹ Fred Singleton, *A Short History of Finland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 61.

² William Trotter, *Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40* (New York: Workman Publishing, 1991), 5.

³ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 61.

⁴ Max Engman, David Kirby, *Finland: People, Nation, State* (London: Hurst & Company, 1989), ix.

⁵ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 108, 119; David Kirby, *A Concise History of Finland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 199.

to the USSR. Consequently, Finland was forced to act in accordance with its eastern neighbor. This Finnish attitude towards the Soviet Union came to be known as “Finlandization”. However, other historians devalue the role of Soviet dominance and the conduction of coercion and thus disagree with the abovementioned premise. In response to both claims, an examination is conducted to put these insinuations to the test.⁶

In order to do this, the Finno-Soviet relationship will be examined from an unaccustomed angle. The period that will be examined concerns the time after the Continuation War took place, between 1956 and 1964. During this period Urho Kaleva Kekkonen (1900-1986) and Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (1894-1971) were the political leaders of their states. Accordingly, these politicians are the research subjects of this study. This period was chosen because it is illustrative of the recently mentioned premises among scholars, as these years are often characterized by Finnish subservience and Soviet dominance.

The bedrock of this relationship will be exposed by researching the existence of a political friendship between these leaders. By uncovering the foundation of this relationship a contribution can be made to the debate among historians regarding coercion in Finno-Soviet relations. The research question that logically arises from this approach is: *To what extent was there a political friendship between Urho Kaleva Kekkonen and Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev?* In order to find a political friendship, political historian Yuri van Hoef’s model regarding political friendship was used. This model identifies the components of a political friendship and provides the structure for this research. To further clarify this model, the following section of this paper is devoted to its explanation and function within this research.

1.1 Theory

In the field of international relations, research regarding the friendship between political actors is a relatively recent phenomenon. Scholars affiliated with the study of friendship are mainly concerned with friendship among states, instead of individuals. However, Dutch political historian Yuri van Hoef argues that the analyses of a relationship between individuals can contribute to a greater understanding of international relations. In Van Hoef’s article *Interpreting Affect Between State Leaders*, Van Hoef provides a new definition for the term “friendship”. The given definition exists out of five key components by which a friendship actually can be recognized. The relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev will be analyzed, utilizing these components. The components and how they will contribute to the

⁶ Efraim Karsh, “Finland: Adaptation and Conflict,” *International Affairs* (1986): 265-66.

structure of this paper will be discussed in closer detail.⁷

The components of friendship cannot be simply made up, therefore the indicators for political friendship have to be based on existing research. The existence or non-existence of a political friendship is difficult to determine and must therefore be grounded in scientific research. Consequently, Van Hoef's model forms the foundation of this study. It does so by providing the specific research topics which have to be examined to find a friendship among political actors. Van Hoef's model also results in a clear structure, making the existence or non-existence of these characteristics visible.⁸

Van Hoef argues that a friendship is a relationship that consists of two equal actors (1) and is a reciprocal bond (2). Concerning the component "equality", Van Hoef refers specifically to the equality of worth between actors.⁹ Correspondingly, the two participating actors within the relationship must consider each other's worth being equal. Additionally, the term "reciprocal" refers to the mutual exchange of energy and support between the two political actors engaging in the relationship.¹⁰ Van Hoef emphasizes that this reciprocal energy and support should not be conducted based on "returning a favor". Therefore, reciprocal actions must be carried out because the action at hand is expected from the concerned actor.¹¹

As a consequence of the existence of equality and reciprocity within a relationship, Van Hoef argues that moral obligations towards each other are developed. This brings us to the third necessary component of friendship; moral obligations (3). Van Hoef states that moral obligations, despite their similarity, differ from reciprocity. The difference between these two lies in the fact that when speaking of moral obligations there is an appeal for a certain action. Consequently, when an ally requests a certain effort from his or her partner, the relationship would be damaged if this partner declined. However, the supplicant for a demanding action can also harm the relationship.¹² Thus, when an unreasonable appeal (a too far-reaching request) is made to a political actor, this can also hurt the bond.¹³

The fourth distinctive which has to be identified in a friendship is "emergent properties" (4). Emergent properties are described as properties that are only held by the relationship as a

⁷ Yuri van Hoef, "Interpreting Affect Between State Leaders: Assessing the Political Friendship Between Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt," *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn* (2017): 51-52.

⁸ Ibidem, 52.

⁹ Yuri van Hoef, "9. Friendship in politics. By Yuri van Hoef," UUHistory, January 28, 2018, educational video, 1:30 to 2:00, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7AWrgoHDBOo>.

¹⁰ Ibidem, 1:57 to 2:30.

¹¹ Van Hoef, "Interpreting Affect Between State Leaders," 55-56.

¹² Van Hoef, "Friendship in politics," 0:00 to 6:46.

¹³ Van Hoef, "Interpreting Affect Between State Leaders," 55.

whole. To clarify this term, one can look at Van Hoef's research regarding the relationship between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill.¹⁴ The emergent property that can be recognized here is the legend that was created by the development of this unique bond. The relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill itself generated a legendary narrative in the field of international relations, a legend that is treasured in this field up until this day.¹⁵

The final characteristic of a political friendship relates to the existence of an ambitious and shared grand project; a great good that both the actors are attempting to achieve. Van Hoef describes this joint operation with the term "grand project" (5). To explain this component, again an example regarding the relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill can be used. The example given is Churchill's and Roosevelt's collective struggle against Nazi Germany at the time of the Second World War.¹⁶ Van Hoef regards joint participation in such a project as a crucial part of a political friendship, therefore it is a subject that must be taken into account when analyzing the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev.¹⁷

1.2 Methodology

The first section of the paper is dedicated to the narrative regarding the period before the emergence of the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship; the Stalinist era. This part will be formed based on important events which took place during this period. The most important matters that will be discussed here are the Finnish Civil War, the Winter War, the Continuation War, and the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The historiography regarding these events is described so that the foundation of the bond between Kekkonen and Khrushchev can be understood before diving into the development of their relationship during the second half of the twentieth century.¹⁸

The main objective of this examination concerns the post-Stalin period. Correspondingly, the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship will be thoroughly researched. Here, the historiography regarding their interconnection and interaction with one another will be described in detail. This part of the research will mainly be based on primary source material, so that insight can be given into the interaction between the two political actors. To maintain a clear overview of the development of the relationship, this part will be divided into three chapters. Appropriately, each chapter represents a different stage in the advancement of the

¹⁴ Van Hoef, "Friendship in politics," 3:25 to 3:55.

¹⁵ Van Hoef, "Interpreting Affect Between State Leaders," 57.

¹⁶ Ibidem, 62.

¹⁷ Ibidem, 52; Van Hoef, "Friendship in politics," 3:25 to 3:55.

¹⁸ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 122-33.

relationship. The chapters are split so that the progress of the relationship can be captured and presented coherently.

Ultimately, the paper's final part is devoted to analyzing the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship. Van Hoef's five components for friendship will be applied to the presented information so that a political friendship might be identified. Thus, in this segment of the research, Van Hoef's components of political friendship are used as a framework to conceivably find the elements of a friendship between two political actors or the lack thereof. Affairs that possibly fall outside the scope of Van Hoef's components will be mentioned and, in addition, their role and importance will be exposed. In this way, a complete outline is made of the matters that impacted the relationship.

1.3 Review of Sources and Literature

A variety of sources are used to conduct this research. For the first part of this research, the majority of sources that are consulted are secondary sources. This source material is mainly concerned with military events throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Naturally, the latest publications regarding these subjects have been implemented in this study so that the most recent information about the subjects at hand would not be lacking. The period covered by these sources concerns the period from the year 1917 to 1948. Through these sources, the historiography during the aforementioned period can be described, so that the origins of the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship can be indicated and understood.

Other used secondary sources are concerned with international relations between Finland and the Soviet Union and the vision of Kekkonen and Khrushchev regarding the development of their relationship. In these publications, the concept of "Finlandization" is frequently mentioned and often given a central position when discussing international relations between 1944 and 1964. Here, the dominant role and the influence of this concept are emphasized by the authors. Additionally, these publications expose recent discoveries regarding this term and its consequences on the Finno-Soviet relationship. Correspondingly, these sources are used to outline the public debate regarding Finno-Soviet relations and help to clarify its relevance.

The secondary sources that have a key role in this research are diverse. An example of an important source is the book *A Concise History of Finland* (2006) written by professor David Kirby.¹⁹ Among other things, Kirby sets out the history of Finland from 1917 to 1948. Thus, this source is used to illustrate the period before the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship. Kirby

¹⁹ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 245-75.

also provides insight into the relationship between these two leaders and exposes events that are not covered in the primary sources but were recently exposed. Another important source, which has a similar role as the one mentioned above, is the book *A History of Finland* (2020) written by Finnish historian Henrik Meinander.²⁰ Additionally, the book *Khrushchev: A Political Life* (1995) by William J. Thompson will be consulted to gather information regarding the turbulent years of the 1960s.²¹ However, these sources are mainly used as reference material to check to what extent the primary sources correspond to the current historiography.²²

Another important source concerns the work of the Finnish political historians Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi. In their article from 2016, *Neutrality as Identity: Finland's Quest for Security in the Cold War*, the subject of Finlandization is frequently mentioned.²³ These historians state that Finland was forced to adopt this foreign policy due to geopolitical circumstances. Both historians argue that Finlandization characterized Finland's foreign policy during the period of the Cold War. A source that offers a similar insight is the article *Finland: Adaptation and Conflict* (1986) by the Israeli-British historian Efraim Karsh.²⁴ Both sources offer insight into the development of Finnish foreign policy and are used to underscore the relevance of this research by underlining the scholars' beliefs regarding the dominance of coercion within Finno-Soviet relations.

For the second part of this research primary sources are conducted to understand the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev. These sources have been made public and were deliberately released to influence public opinion. Among these sources are autobiographies, film material, documented meetings, speeches, broadcasts, and books from the respective leaders during and after the time of their reign. However, the majority of the source material consists of documented encounters, actual meetings, and speeches of both leaders. In these sources, the historiography is further specified and explanations are given regarding various events which occurred during the researched period.

Naturally, the primary sources will be observed critically. As a result, comments will be made regarding its accordance with the latest historiography. In this way, it can be checked to what extent the sources corresponded to reality. The leaders at the center of this investigation were both known for sharing propaganda with the public to achieve their goals. It is therefore

²⁰ Henrik Meinander, *A History of Finland* (London: Hurst & Company, 2020), 213-47.

²¹ William J. Thompson, *Khrushchev: A Political Life* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 174-200, 200-29, 229-57.

²² Ibidem; Meinander, *A History of Finland*, 213-255.

²³ Juhana Aunesluoma, Johanna Rainio-Niemi, "Neutrality as Identity? Finland's Quest for Security in the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* (October 2016): 51-78.

²⁴ Karsh, "Finland: Adaptation and Conflict," 265-78.

of great importance that comments are made regarding the extent that these sources correspond to the currently available information.

It has been shown that both leaders used propaganda and did not hesitate to twist the truth. This is confirmed by Finnish political historians Lotta Lounasmeri and Jukka Kortti. In their paper *Campaigning between East and West* (2018) these scholars argue that from both the Finnish and Soviet sides pro-Soviet propaganda was circulated.²⁵ This propaganda can be found in the film *For The Nation* (1956) and was expressed positively about the Soviet Union in general and underlined the importance of Finland befriending the USSR.²⁶ Additionally, the CIA also investigated a related matter and uncovered that Khrushchev had forced Finland already in 1947 to ban negative propaganda (deemed propaganda by the USSR) about the Soviet Union.²⁷ Thus, only positive statements about the Soviet Union were allowed to be forwarded. This discovery underlines that when using primary sources, there must be room for criticism.

The primary sources related to Kekkonen include radio- and tv broadcasts, speeches, books, documented meetings, and film material. These sources are mainly consulted to clarify Kekkonen's foreign policy and how it influenced his bond with Khrushchev. In the primary sources, events that occurred during the reign of both leaders are discussed intensively. Examples include speeches that have been found on the website "Doria", which provides access to various primary sources.

In these speeches, Kekkonen either addressed the Finnish population, the Finnish government, or Khrushchev. Kekkonen his attitude toward Khrushchev and the USSR can be deduced from the statements made in these sources. His attitude and view can also be deduced from sources such as Kekkonen's books *A President's View* (1982) and *Neutrality: The Finnish Position* (1970).²⁸ As mentioned before, the statements made by Kekkonen will be compared with current historiography to determine the level of correspondence between each other.

Additionally, the sources regarding Khrushchev also include speeches, documented meetings, and books. Among other things, these sources show the contrast between the leadership of Khrushchev and Stalin. An example of a source displaying this divergence is *Khrushchev's Secret Speech* (1956).²⁹ In this speech, Khrushchev lashes out at Stalin and

²⁵ Lotta Lounasmeri, Jukka Kortti, "Campaigning between East and West: Finland and the Cold War in the presidential campaign films of Urho Kekkonen," *Cold War History Journal* (2018): 329-47.

²⁶ "For the Nation Election Film," Yle, accessed October 14, 2022, <https://areena.yle.fi/1-50105728>.

²⁷ "Finlandization in Action: Helsinki's Experience with Moscow," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed October 14, 2022, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/esau-55.pdf>.

²⁸ Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, *A President's View* (London: Heinemann, 1982), 7-195; Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, *Neutrality: The Finnish Position* (London: Heinemann, 1970), 9-233.

²⁹ "Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.," Marxists Internet Archive, accessed October 14, 2022, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm>.

criticizes Stalinist policies.³⁰ Sources that show his manner of conducting diplomacy with Kekkonen include documented meetings and speeches found in books and online archives.

Other primary sources show his outlook on Soviet foreign policy. Examples of these sources include Khrushchev's books *On Peaceful Coexistence* (1959) and *Khrushchev Remembers* (1970).³¹ From these sources can be deduced to what extent his foreign policy corresponded to Kekkonen's and in what way he interacted with him. Another source concerns a selection of important documents, gathered in the book *Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU* (1961).³² This book provides information regarding Khrushchev's opinion on the diplomatic attitude of the Soviet Union towards other nations. In response to the existence of propaganda and portrayal of untruths, especially personal documents such as the aforementioned will be assessed critically.

1.4 Relevance

Throughout Finland's history, its government often had to choose between two options; siding with the West or with the East. This position resulted in the Finnish adaptation of a neutral approach regarding its foreign relations with the Soviet Union. This approach became better known as Finlandization. The term changed over time but is currently widely known as a situation in which "a small nation with a powerful neighboring country adapted itself to the demands of the bigger one."³³

However, among scholars, the issue is raised whether Finland adopted this attitude voluntarily or under Soviet pressure. It is mentioned that "it is a common view among analysts and observers in the West that foreign policy and domestic politics of Finland are no more than an extension of Soviet foreign policy."³⁴ Additionally, the aforementioned historians Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi emphasize Finland's lack of autonomy in this matter in their paper *Neutrality as Identity*. Here, Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi argue that force dominated the issue.³⁵

Nevertheless, in *A Short History of Finland* (2010), Fred Singleton argues that the

³⁰ Marek Fields, *Defending Democracy in Cold War Finland: British and American Propaganda and Cultural Diplomacy in Finland, 1944-1970* (Boston: Brill, 2020), 246.

³¹ Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, *On Peaceful Co-existence* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 1-254; Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little Brown Company, 1970), 389-559, 608.

³² Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, *Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961), 5-191.

³³ Marjo Uutela, "'The End of Finlandization': Finland's Foreign Policy in the Eyes of the Two German States 1985-1990," *The International History Review* (2020): 411.

³⁴ Karsh, "Adaptation and Conflict," 265.

³⁵ Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi, "Neutrality as Identity," 51.

concept of Finlandization is completely misunderstood. Additionally, he argues that Finlandization has unrightfully become a “code word for subservience” to the USSR.³⁶ Finnish scholar Marjo Uutela partially confirms the statements made by Singleton. In her work, *The End of Finlandization* (2020), she emphasizes the substantial amount of autonomy that Finland was able to retain.³⁷ In conclusion, it can be argued that the concept of Finlandization can be considered a controversy among historians which needs clarification.

Researching the Kekkonen-Khrushchev interconnection provides an opportunity to investigate this controversy. By analyzing this relationship, using Van Hoef’s components of political friendship, the actual motivation behind their bond can be uncovered. In this manner, it can be checked whether the discussed premises hold. Concluding, analyzing the bond between Kekkonen and Khrushchev from an angle of political friendship can contribute to the academic debate regarding the Finnish foreign policy of Finlandization and the subsequent diplomacy with its eastern neighbor during the latter half of the twentieth century.³⁸

The relevance of this controversy increased after the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian war, resulting in the Russian invasion of the Donbas region in Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The Russian offensive has put Finland in the metaphoric spotlight, the matter is raised of whether this nation will be “next in line”. Accordingly, Finland feels threatened by Russia and has sought security from the West by joining NATO on July 5, 2022.³⁹ As a result of this accession, tension increased and worsened the Finno-Russian relationship. The applicability of this subject continues to grow now Russia has refused to supply gas to Finland and has threatened the nation with the conduction of retaliatory actions. Once again, Finland's complicated geographical position is underlined and the debate regarding how it should “deal” with its powerful eastern neighbor boils up once again.⁴⁰

³⁶ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 138.

³⁷ Marjo Uutela, “The End of Finlandization,” 410.

³⁸ Van Hoef, “Interpreting Affect Between State Leaders,” 51-62.

³⁹ “Finland and Sweden complete NATO accession talks,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed October 17, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197737.htm.

⁴⁰ “Missiles rain down around Ukraine,” Reuters, accessed October 17, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukraine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/>.

2. The Stalin Era

2.1 The Finnish Civil War (1918)

The October Revolution commenced in Russia on November 7th, 1917. Now Russia was weakened by this revolution, the Finns saw the ultimate opportunity to declare their independence. Consequently, Finnish independence was declared on December the 6th, 1917. The declaration of independence resulted in a civil war between the communist “Reds” and the conservative “Whites” and can be considered a consequence of the power vacuum which was left behind in Finland, now the Russian Empire was on the brink of collapse. During the civil war, both sides were supported by European powers.⁴¹ Accordingly, the communists were aided by Soviet Russia while the conservatives were backed by the German Empire.⁴²

Supported by military aid from Russia and under the leadership of Kullervo Akilles Manner, the commander-in-chief of the Red Guards, the first attack was carried out in February 1918. On the night of February 27, the communist Red Guards took control over Helsinki. Consequently, the communists installed a revolutionary government. This government was called the *Kansanvaltuuskunta* (The Peoples’ Commission) and was led by Manner. The installation of this government resulted in a true division of the country. Finland was now divided into two different parts: The area in the south was controlled by the communists while the area in the north was considered the territory of the conservatives.⁴³

The border that divided the two zones was drawn north of the cities of Pori, Tampere, Lahti, Lappeenranta, and Viipuri; these urban areas, along with the city of Turku and Helsinki were now officially part of the red zone. The north was under the control of Svinhufvud, who was aided by Carl Gustaf Mannerheim’s White Guards. Although the communists now controlled important cities, a victory over the conservatives was not self-evident. Singleton argues that the conservatives were considerably better equipped, overall better organized, and were a more unified group. Additionally, on February 25, the conservatives’ morale gained a supplemental boost as the Finnish Jäger Battalion arrived to join their ranks.⁴⁴

Subsequently, the conservatives were able to amass a substantial grip on the conflict due to the arrival of the German Navy on the Åland Islands in March and the landing of General Rüdiger von der Goltz at Hanko in April. Additionally, the deployment of 2,500 German

⁴¹ Engman and Kirby, *People, Nation, State*, ix-x.

⁴² Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 158-59; Tuomas Tepora, Aapo Roselius, *The Finnish Civil War 1918* (Boston: Brill, 2014), 48.

⁴³ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 108-109.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, 109-110.

soldiers who landed at the city of Loviisa, increased that grip substantially. At the same time, Mannerheim had managed to overrun the communist resistance in Tampere and had taken over the city. The conservatives had victory in their grasp and were able to finish off their enemy as the city of Helsinki fell to Von der Goltz on April 13, which consequently ended the Finnish Civil War on May 15, 1918.⁴⁵

2.2 The Interwar Period (1918-1939)

During the following decade, various parties participated in the Finnish government. The government was ruled by coalitions, with the Progressives, the Agrarians, or the Conservatives, in turn, taking the premiership. During this period the rise of the Finnish Socialist Labour Party can be observed. The party was formed in 1920 and started publishing its newspaper, the *Suomen Työmies* (the Finnish Worker). Thus, despite the Communist Party being banned in Finland, the Soviets tried to establish a communist order in Finland. The Soviets used Arvo Tuominen and made him secretary of the Socialist Labour Party and vice-chairman of the Trade Union Federation. However, in 1922, Tuominen got arrested for his public displays of pro-Soviet sentiment and was therefore silenced.⁴⁶

Conflict with the Soviets almost resurfaced when local Finnish insurgents demanded the return of Karelia to Finland. The struggle for Karelia, an old eastern province of Finland, remained a problem as Finnish irredentists reclaimed this area as the rightful property of Finland. This conflict resulted in the East Karelian Revolt of November 6, 1922. The revolt escalated and turned into a violent uprising, aimed at reconquering the territory of Karelia from Soviet Russia. The rebels anticipated support from the Finnish government, but the request for their backing was declined and ended the uprising on March 21, 1922. As a result of the de-escalation of the situation, a conflict with the Soviets could be avoided.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, the trend of communist expansion increased in the years that followed. In 1922 the communist front organization won 128,000 votes and consequently gained 27 seats in parliament. Communism appeared to gain popularity and in 1929 it received a similar amount of votes once again. However, resistance to communism gained a foothold within Finland and eventually gave rise to the Lapua Movement in 1929. The Lapua Movement consisted of farmers, clergymen, academicians, industrialists military leaders, and territorial expansionists who united in defiance against communism.⁴⁸ Its authoritative figures supposedly had fascist

⁴⁵ Ibidem, 110; Tepora, Roselius, *Civil War*, 105-106.

⁴⁶ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 116.

⁴⁷ Meinander, *A History of Finland*, 180-81.

⁴⁸ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 116-17.

aspirations which were focused on the “extinction of communism in Finland”. Subsequently, after the elections of 1930, the government led by the Agrarian Kyösti Kallio was dissolved; a more right-wing administration was installed under the guidance of Svinhufvud.⁴⁹

After the installment of the Svinhufvud administration, anti-communism kept rising. This administration approved the conduction of far-right laws which were aimed at controlling communist gatherings. Among other things, the imposed legislation forbade the right of assembly of communists and gave the government power to stamp out public portrayal of anti-democratic sentiment. Additionally, the Lapua movement changed its name and submerged into the *Isänmaallinen kansanliike* (Peoples Patriotic League).⁵⁰ This league had an ultra-nationalist character and published newspapers that applauded the military accomplishments of the Axis powers like Germany and Italy.⁵¹

However, the government under Svinhufvud did not last for very long and was replaced in 1936 by a collaboration between the Agrarians and Social Democrats; a government that would last until 1939.⁵² Governmental reforms that passed in the 1930s eventually led Finland toward a state of political and economic stability. However, at the end of the 1930s, this stability was threatened as tensions in Europe ran high. The balance of power in Europe was changing, into one where Nazi Germany and the USSR occupied a dominant position.⁵³

The USSR regarded Finland as an actor that could undermine its position. One reason was the proximity of the Finnish border to Leningrad. It was argued that Leningrad (located approximately 32 kilometers from the Finnish border) would be an easy target for artillery fire in case of a Finnish invasion. Stalin considered Leningrad of great importance, as emphasized in one of his speeches: “Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country. Breaking through to Leningrad, occupying it and forming there, say, a bourgeois government, a White Guard one, means providing a fairly serious basis for a civil war within the country against Soviet power.”⁵⁴ Singleton argues that Joseph Stalin became obsessed with a “great power” that would use

⁴⁹ Ibidem, 117.

⁵⁰ Ibidem, 118.

⁵¹ Ibidem.

⁵² Ibidem, 117-18.

⁵³ Ibidem, 118-19.

⁵⁴ “About The War with Finland,” Petroleks, accessed 14 October 2022, <https://petroleks.ru/stalin/14-18.php>.

Finland as a base from which Soviet territory could be attacked. Thus, Finland remained an “eyesore” if war tension with them and the USSR would increase once again.⁵⁵

2.3 The Winter War (1939-1940)

During the late 1930s, Finland hoped to stay out of problems by adopting a neutral stance regarding international relations. However, Finland's pro-German sentiment was apparent and did not help the accomplishment of this aspiration. The amicable attitude towards the Germans dominated the higher ranks of the Finnish Defense Forces. For example, one of its most important soldiers, field marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, was a renowned anti-communist.⁵⁶ The situation only worsened when the Anti-Comintern Pact, aimed at eliminating international communism, was signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1936. Consequently, the USSR continued to feel threatened by the surrounding anti-communist forces that were strengthening their position.⁵⁷

The apprehension of the USSR was expressed when an official of the Soviet embassy in Helsinki raised the issue concerning the likelihood of a German invasion. He argued that Soviet military support could be arranged, should such a situation occur. However, the Finns rejected this idea and consequently ended the matter. The USSR made comparable efforts in the Baltic states and additionally urged both Great Britain and France that a German invasion through the Baltic was looming. Despite the intensive effort of the Soviet Union, these negotiations did not catch on and were, to the dismay of the Soviet Union, discarded.⁵⁸

Due to the reluctance of the aforementioned nations, the USSR began looking at Nazi Germany to strengthen its position. This was done through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed on August 24, 1939. By signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Germany proved willing to support the Soviet Union in case of a military conflict with Finland.⁵⁹ Additionally, Germany allowed the USSR to intervene in Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and parts of Poland. Subsequently, the USSR started negotiations with the Baltic states and enforced the allowance of Soviet military bases within their borders. This seemed to have been the first step towards the assimilation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Lithuania and a part of Poland were absorbed into the USSR in 1939, and Estonia and Latvia followed in 1940.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 122-23.

⁵⁶ Trotter, *Frozen Hell*, 23-29.

⁵⁷ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 122.

⁵⁸ Ibidem, 123.

⁵⁹ Michael Jonas, “The Politics of an Alliance: Finland in Nazi Foreign Policy and War Strategy,” in *Finland in World War II*, Vol. 69 (Boston: Brill, 2012), 94-95.

⁶⁰ Ibidem, 123-24; Ibidem, 93-138.

As a reaction to Finland, negotiations were started regarding the takeover of Finnish territory. On October the 14th 1939, a Finnish delegation went to Moscow to hear the demands of the Soviet Union. The delegation was overwhelmed by Stalin, foreign minister Molotov, and foreign commissioner Potyomkin and their claims on Finnish territory. Finland would have to hand over the fortified island of Koivisto, the Petsamo area in the Arctic, and the Hanko peninsula.⁶¹ Despite the differing opinions in the higher ranks of the Finnish army regarding this situation, it was finally decided not to give in to the demands made by the Soviet Union. Consequently, Finland declined the demands, resulting in the negotiations ending on November 9, 1939. The USSR was convinced that further negotiations with Finland were pointless and decided to enforce Finnish cooperation through military action.⁶²

On November the 26th 1939, the USSR assembled a *casus belli* by which it could invade Finland. Through this action, the Soviet Union violated the non-aggression pact it had with Finland that had come about in 1932; war had become inevitable. Consequently, the Winter War started on November 30, 1939. However, led by Mannerheim, the Finns were able to avert the Soviet invasion. Aided by the cold, the densely forested areas, and the lack of proper Soviet military leadership the Finnish forces were able to keep the Soviet troops at bay for a long time.⁶³ The “scorched earth” method and guerrilla tactics of the Finns proved to be a particularly effective means by which the Soviets could be repelled.⁶⁴

Nevertheless, the situation was about to change drastically as Soviet commanders learned from their past mistakes. The Soviet commanders started to apply a different strategy, a strategy developed to be able to cope with the guerilla tactics of their adversary. Subsequently, the Soviets employed fresh troops, which were better prepared for the cold winters and dense Finnish forests. Additionally, they orchestrated more concentrated attacks and focused on the cooperation of land units, air units, and artillery. The Soviet invasion would now be less spread out, allowing concentrated attacks against the Finnish defensive lines which effectuated dents in the Finnish bulwarks. Thus, the new approach turned out to be more efficient. Since its application, the Finns were increasingly pushed back and victory over them came into sight, resulting in the ceasefire (the Peace of Moscow) of March 13, 1940.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Engman and Kirby, *People, Nation, State*, 133.

⁶² Jonas, “The Politics of an Alliance,” 124.

⁶³ Trotter, *Frozen Hell*, 36-37, 60-65, 70-71.

⁶⁴ Jonas, “The Politics of an Alliance,” 124, 127.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, 126.

2.4 The Continuation War (1941-1944)

However, the Peace of Moscow could not repress the unrest in Europe for a long time. When in June 1941, the Germans invaded Soviet territory, Finland followed its example. On June 22 of the same year, Finland officially declared war on the USSR and gave rise to the Continuation War. During the Continuation War, Finland's main ambition was to regain the territories that were lost during the course of the Winter War. However, this aspiration did not come without disapproval from the political world stage. Finland was reprimanded by Great Britain and was specifically warned not to invade Soviet territory. Mannerheim reacted by underlining the lack of ambition regarding the appropriation of Leningrad and argued that the Germans who invaded Leningrad did not come from Finland but from Estonia and other Baltic republics.⁶⁶

Finland continued the war, but as it progressed the Finnish government came to the understanding that they were on the losing side of the Second World War. As a result, Finland wanted to secede from the conflict. However, the Finnish government realized that the Germans would not allow the Finnish secession without any reprisals. Thus, this action was temporarily postponed until the Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad on February 3, 1943, and fled from the Soviets. Now, the Finnish government started conducting a different strategy regarding Finland's separation from its alliance with Nazi Germany.⁶⁷

As a member of the Finnish Agrarian party, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, stepped in to withdraw Finland from the war. Kekkonen gave a speech in Stockholm in which he emphasized the importance of "good neighborliness" between Finland and the USSR. Kekkonen argued that Finland's independence could exclusively be protected if this stance was adopted.⁶⁸ Kekkonen gained popularity in Finland and managed to bring about a change in the Finnish government: In accordance with his view, the representatives of the nationalist Peoples Patriotic League were withdrawn from their positions, and the more "peace-ensuing" Edwin Linkomies, was appointed as Prime Minister.⁶⁹

The following month was dedicated to reaching an agreement with the USSR. Juho Kusti Paasikivi, a politician known for his disapproval of cooperation with Nazi Germany, was appointed as a negotiator and sent to Moscow. The Soviet demand consisted of a \$600 million compensation and the Finnish promise to expel German troops from Finnish territory. This was a demand the Linkomies administration could not accept and was therefore declined. However,

⁶⁶ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 199; Singleton, *History of Finland*, 130-31.

⁶⁷ Ibidem, 131.

⁶⁸ Kekkonen, *A President's View*, 42.

⁶⁹ Ibidem, 131-32.

when the USSR carried out another attack on the Karelia region, which Finnish forces could not resist for a long time, things changed substantially.⁷⁰

President Ryti resigned and Mannerheim took over his position, which helped negotiations progress considerably. Swedish Historian Stig Jägerskiöld argues that Mannerheim now aimed at consolidating a stable relationship with the USSR: “But one of Mannerheim’s most complex tasks presented itself in the last years of World War II, when he extricated Finland from its alliance with Germany and war with Russia and helped it move toward a new period of peaceful relations with the U.S.S.R.”⁷¹

Both states were able to agree to the proposed terms and signed the Moscow Armistice on 19 September 1944. The terms, in return for the ceasefire, included that Finland had to relinquish territory to the Soviet Union, a war indemnity of \$300 million had to be paid to the USSR, German troops on Finnish soil had to be driven out, and Finland’s army was restricted in size and use of advanced weaponry (nuclear weapons).⁷²

Following the signing of the Moscow Armistice of 1944, the Finns were now forced to expel the remaining German troops from Finnish territory. Although the Finns were initially unwilling to carry out this part of the Armistice, they were made aware of their obligations by the Soviet Union now the armistice was signed. The Finnish troops started their mission on September 28, 1944, which resulted in a new conflict which was called the Lapland War. The Finnish troops, bound by the Moscow Armistice, carried out their obligation, and “by the end of the year, Lapland had been almost entirely cleared, though not before considerable destruction had been wrought by the retreating Germans.”⁷³

2.5 The Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (1948)

Now Mannerheim was in the position of president he emphasized the complicated situation that Finland found itself in. Accordingly, Mannerheim followed Kekkonen’s idea regarding the necessity of the consolidation of good neighborliness between the Soviet Union and Finland. Mannerheim realized that an anti-Soviet attitude was no longer tenable, which is underlined by Singleton: “Mannerheim realized that Finland could no longer pose as a bastion of Christian civilization against the barbarian hordes of bolshevism”.⁷⁴ Mannerheim halted Finland’s

⁷⁰ Ibidem, 132.

⁷¹ Stig Jägerskiöld, *Mannerheim, Marshal of Finland* (Minneapolis: C. Hurst & Co, 1986) 1-4.

⁷² Singleton, *History of Finland*, 133; Simo, Mikkonen, “Interference or friendly gestures? Soviet cultural diplomacy and Finnish elections,” *Cold War History*, Vol. 20 (2020): 349.

⁷³ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 233.

⁷⁴ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 134.

struggle against Bolshevism for the sake of survival and preserving independence.⁷⁵

Paasikivi took over Mannerheim's position as president in March 1946 and continued to carry out the same ideas regarding Finnish international relations with the USSR. However, the situation became tenser when the Soviet Union attempted to extend its sphere of influence to Romania and Hungary. A fear developed among the Finnish population that Finland, similarly to Romania and Hungary, would become a satellite state of the Soviet Union. The USSR proposed an agreement to Finland in April 1948, a treaty feared to be similar to the ones which were proposed to Romania and Hungary and would turn Finland into a puppet state. This much-dreaded agreement was known as the *Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* (FCMA).⁷⁶

The FCMA stated that Finland had the right to remain outside the conflicting interests of the "great powers" (East and West). Scholar Kimmi Rentola underscores the importance of the treaty and argues that, due to this treaty, Finland could escape from becoming a "people's democracy".⁷⁷ Additionally, Singleton states that both nations were bound to protect each other when attacked by a foreign threat, neither country was allowed to join an alliance against the partner, both were obliged to refrain from interfering in each other's domestic affairs, and both were obligated to equally contribute towards the development of their relationship.⁷⁸

The Soviet Union often imposed far-reaching treaties on its neighbors, which made the mildness of the FCMA all the more exceptional.⁷⁹ Historian Juha-Matti Ritvanen emphasized the influence of the treaty and underlined the difficulty of the Finnish position: "The difficult combination of a military treaty in which co-operative elements in military fields were to be avoided together with the Finnish policy of neutrality, to create trust in the Soviet Union while not getting too close, created a political setting which made the Finnish position different from those of the other Nordic countries."⁸⁰

The agreement was associated with a new foreign policy, a policy that became known as Finlandization.⁸¹ During a speech on the 7th of April 1948, Stalin emphasized the treaty's importance for the consolidation of a stable Finno-Soviet relationship: "It is necessary that the

⁷⁵ Ibidem, 134-35.

⁷⁶ Ibidem, 137-38.

⁷⁷ Kimmi Rentola, "From Half-Adversary to Half-Ally: Finland in Soviet Policy, 1953-58," *Cold War History*, Vol. 1 (2000): 75.

⁷⁸ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 139.

⁷⁹ Uutela, *The End of Finlandization*, 410-13.

⁸⁰ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 138-39; Juha Matti Ritvanen, "The change in Finnish Baltic policy as a turning point in Finnish-Soviet relations. Finland, Baltic independence and the end of the Soviet Union 1988-1991," *Journal of History* (2020): 280-81.

⁸¹ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 138.

conclusion of this treaty breaks this distrust and builds a new basis for relations between our peoples and that it signifies a great change in the relations between our countries. Towards trust and friendship.”⁸²

3. The Kekkonen-Khrushchev Period

*“It is self-evident that in pursuing our policy of friendship towards the Soviet Union we must remain good Finnish patriots who, without offending the Soviet Union, hold fast to our own country’s interests”*⁸³ – Urho Kaleva Kekkonen

Historian David Kirby argues that Finland, during the second half of the twentieth century, was concerned with two central aspirations. These endeavors were Finland’s transition from an agrarian to a post-industrial society and the improvement of international relations in general but mainly with the USSR. Accordingly, Kekkonen became captivated by improving the bond between Finland and the Soviet Union.⁸⁴ Kirby attributes the ascendance of this approach mainly to the events that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century and refers to the importance of the Second World War for the recognition of the new Finnish vision: “The immediate legacy of the 1940s is also important. The War and its outcome forces Finland to embark upon a new and different relationship with its eastern neighbor and former ruler.”⁸⁵

Although the attitude, which became better known as Finlandization, was used fairly leniently at first, the policy became dominant in Finnish international relations in the period between 1956 and 1960. During this period, if Finnish political parties even wanted to have the slightest chance of being chosen, they had to hold this doctrine very highly. Thus, it becomes clear that Finlandization had a central position during the second half of the twentieth century. The occurrence of this phenomenon is described concretely for the first time in the book *A Nation on its Stomach*.⁸⁶ In this book, the concept of Finlandization is explained and the Finnish subordination regarding diplomatic relations with the USSR is underlined: This book caused great controversy among historians and gave rise to the concept of Finlandization.⁸⁷

The beforementioned controversy arose because Finland's “subordination” got

⁸² “Speech given at the dinner in honour of the Finnish Government Delegation,” Marxist Internet Archive, accessed October 13, 2022, <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1948/04/07.htm>.

⁸³ Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, *A President’s View* (London 1982), 54.

⁸⁴ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 246.

⁸⁵ Ibidem, 245; Jorma Selovuori, *Power and Bureaucracy in Finland 1809-1998* (Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office and Edita, 1999), 38.

⁸⁶ David Arter, “Kekkonen and the ‘Dark Age’ of Finlandised Politics?,” *Irish Studies and International Affairs* (1998), 39-49.

⁸⁷ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 245-246, 267.

worldwide attention as a precursor to Finland becoming a Soviet satellite state. However, historians differ in the manner that they interpret the Finnish conformity towards the USSR during the second half of the twentieth century. For example, Singleton minifies the dominance of the USSR and dismisses the subservient character of Finland. His argument becomes clear when he discussed the FCMA treaty: “It [treaty] is short, consisting of only eight articles and it appears on the face of it to be a simple and straightforward document. Yet it has given rise to much misinterpretation and has been used as a basis for the misconception known as ‘Finlandization’ which certain western politicians and journalists have used as a code word for subservience to the Soviet Union.”⁸⁸

In addition, Finnish scholar Marjo Uutela partly confirms Singleton’s statement but does identify the leverage the Soviet Union had over Finland. Uutela refers in particular to the fact that Finland was indeed under the influence of Soviet demands, but was not forced to become an actual satellite state. Accordingly, Uutela mentions the following: “The Soviet leadership used this pact [FCMA] as a tool to influence on Finland’s foreign policy, but unlike Soviet satellites, Finland was never drawn to a full-scale military alliance with its Eastern neighbor.”⁸⁹

In contrast to these historians are academics who reject the beliefs of Singleton and Uutela. For example, the historian Efraim Karsh underlines the proportionality of the extent to which Finland was being manipulated and forced to become a military ally. For example, Karsh mentions the following in his book *Finland: Adaptation and Conflict*: “...this Treaty [FCMA], which laid the foundation of Finnish-Soviet postwar relations, constitutes the best proof of Finland’s integration within the Soviet defence system... Treaty gave the Soviet Union some genuine leverage over Finland... thus providing the Soviet Union with a useful instrument for applying political pressure.”⁹⁰ This shows Karsh’s belief that Finland was under the influence of Soviet political pressure and consequently integrated into the Soviet defense system and therefore an ally of the Soviet Union.⁹¹

Concluding, it can be argued that opinions regarding the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship and the concept of Finlandization differ among scholars.⁹² One historian considers the related role of Kekkonen to be an accommodating subordinate position, while the other

⁸⁸ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 138.

⁸⁹ Marjo Uutela, “ ‘The End of Finlandization’ . Finland’s Foreign Policy in the Eyes of the Two German States 1985-1990,” *The International History Review* (May 2019): 410.

⁹⁰ Karsh, “Adaptation and Conflict,” 277.

⁹¹ Ibidem, 267-277.

⁹² Ibidem, 277.

argues that the new foreign policy was limited and merely a means by which Finland could maintain its autonomy.⁹³

3.1 The Inauguration of New Leadership

Following Kekkonen's ongoing efforts regarding the Finnish Civil War, the Winter War, and his attempts to improve Finno-Soviet relations, he was elected Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1954.⁹⁴ It was evident that Kekkonen continued the spirit of previous president Paasikivi (regarding neighborliness with the Soviet Union) which was considered beneficial for the USSR. In his book *Neutrality: The Finnish Position*, Kekkonen underscores the importance of Paasikivi's work: "Paasikivi laid the foundation of the new foreign policy of Finland, the cornerstone of which is understanding, co-operation and lasting friendship between two neighboring countries, Finland and the Soviet Union."⁹⁵ Consequently, the new leader of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, was pleased with Kekkonen.⁹⁶

Already during a broadcast in October 1945, Kekkonen spoke of the prominence of Finno-Soviet relations and underlined the outdated necessity of opposing the USSR: "The aim of Finnish policy in the 1920s and 30s was to protect the independence of the country by acting and preparing to act against the USSR. This was no isolated phenomenon in European politics."⁹⁷ However, Kekkonen resumed and emphasized the importance of changing this attitude: "The war now ended has given a new content and new tasks to Finnish policy. The country's independence must be built up and this can be done through an understanding with the USSR. The establishment of good relations with the USSR, creating and strengthening her trust in the seriousness and sincerity of our policy aiming at this end -- in this lies the great task of Finnish politics."⁹⁸

During the same broadcast, Kekkonen underlined the existence of the new powerhouses within Europe and recognized that the balance of power had changed. Additionally, Kekkonen stated that past Finno-Soviet disputes should be buried to establish friendship with the USSR: "The time in which we live demands a great sense of responsibility from every citizen over issues that affect the country's position. Personal views and their utterance are not important, not even permissible if they harm the national interest. At the present time it is the duty of all citizens who desire the best for their country to support and promote the work of the

⁹³ Singleton, *History of Finland*, 138; Karsh, "Adaptation and Conflict," 267-277.

⁹⁴ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 245-48.

⁹⁵ Kekkonen, *Neutrality*, 66.

⁹⁶ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 249-50.

⁹⁷ "Public Responsibility for the Position of the Nation," Doria, accessed October 14, 2022, <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/9239/TMP.objres.1443.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

⁹⁸ Ibidem.

Government to establish lasting conditions for a policy of good neighbourliness between independent Finland and the USSR.”⁹⁹

Khrushchev's and Kekkonen's ideas regarding foreign politics were largely in agreement with one another. This stemmed mainly from the fact that Khrushchev had different prospects than Stalin, which caused a change in the Soviet's direction concerning domestic and foreign affairs. As a fervent Leninist, Khrushchev argued that Stalin had deviated greatly from Lenin's view and had forced the USSR in the wrong direction.¹⁰⁰ His opinion regarding Stalin becomes clear in a speech from 1956: “The negative characteristics of Stalin, which, in Lenin's time, were only incipient, transformed themselves during the last years into a grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party.”¹⁰¹ Additionally, Khrushchev criticized Stalin's purges and mass murders, underlined that the power of the state had to be reduced greatly, spoke of peaceful coexistence with other nations, and was consequently open to improving Finno-Soviet relations.¹⁰²

While Kekkonen spoke of good neighborliness with the USSR, Khrushchev spoke of “peaceful coexistence” with Finland.¹⁰³ In his book *Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU* Khrushchev explains the term peaceful coexistence as something more than merely the absence of war. Khrushchev argued that the term entails a “coexistence of two opposed social existence, based on a mutual renunciation of war as means of settling disputes between states.”¹⁰⁴ In a report of 1959, Khrushchev acknowledges his difference with democratic Finland but argues that “we shall never renounce our views and have no illusions about our class opponents changing theirs. But this does not mean we should go to war over our divergent views.”¹⁰⁵

In his book *On Peaceful Co-existence* Khrushchev emphasized the consistency of the Soviet Union's adoption of this policy: “It has been alleged that the Soviet Union advances the principle of peaceful coexistence purely out of tactical considerations, considerations of expediency. Yet it is common knowledge that we always, from the early years of Soviet power, stood with equal steadfastness for peaceful coexistence. So it's not a tactical move, but a

⁹⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁰ Israelyan, Victor. *On the Battlefields of the Cold War* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2003), 49.

¹⁰¹ “Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.,” Marxists Internet Archive, accessed October 13, 2022, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm>.

¹⁰² Ibidem.

¹⁰³ Israelyan, *On the Battlefields of the Cold War*, 67.

¹⁰⁴ Khrushchev, *Documents*, 46.

¹⁰⁵ Khrushchev, *Peaceful Co-existence*, 56.

fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy.”¹⁰⁶ Thus, Khrushchev argues that this peaceful attitude towards other countries is inherent to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

However, one could argue that this statement is questionable when observing the historiography of the first half of the twentieth century; a period in which Soviet aggression against Finland, the Baltic States, and other (Eastern) European countries was not shunned.¹⁰⁷ The mentioned statement is also undermined by Khrushchev himself, in his book *Khrushchev Remembers*. Here, Khrushchev indicates that he merely supported a limited form of peaceful coexistence: “We Communists, we Marxists-Leninists, believe that progress is on our side and victory will inevitably be ours. Yet the capitalists won't give an inch and still swear to fight to the bitter end. Therefore how can we talk of peaceful coexistence with capitalist ideology' Peaceful coexistence among different systems of government is possible, but peaceful coexistence among different ideologies is not.”¹⁰⁸

Nevertheless, Khrushchev continued his speech and mentioned the reluctance of the Soviet Union to engage in any sort of war. He argues that now the Second World War had ended, the Soviet Union had no benefit whatsoever from war and therefore wanted peace: “Why then should we want war? We do not want it, as a matter of principle we renounce any policy that might lead to millions of people being plunged into war for the sake of the selfish interests of a handful of multi-millionaires.”¹⁰⁹ Additionally, Khrushchev elaborates on this subject, pointing out the sufficient amount of raw materials the Soviet Union has, trying to convey that the Soviet Union has no interest in the riches of other nations.¹¹⁰

Consequently, due to Kekkonen's aforementioned positive outlook on improving Finno-Soviet relations, it became apparent that Khrushchev endorsed Kekkonen's candidature for the Finnish presidency. Subsequently, Khrushchev made attempts to get Kekkonen into office, he used persuasion regarding giving back the Porkkala military base to Finland. This was done to put Kekkonen in a favorable position for the elections of 1956. Eventually, the naval base was given back to Finland in January 1956 which helped consolidate Khrushchev's wish: Kekkonen became the new President of Finland on March 1, 1956.¹¹¹

Now that Kekkonen was put in charge with help from the east, the future between Kekkonen and Khrushchev looked bright: “Now more than ever we need confidence in our future and a

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem, 5.

¹⁰⁷ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 232, 242.

¹⁰⁸ Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1970), 562-63.

¹⁰⁹ Khrushchev, *Peaceful Co-existence*, 6.

¹¹⁰ Ibidem, 248.

¹¹¹ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 250-51.

hopeful spirit of construction. This will come only if we inwardly embrace the idea that we must perform a realignment of our policy and establish new relations with our Eastern neighbour country.”¹¹² Observing the words of Kekkonen and Khrushchev, it seems they attempted to herald a new era, an era in which Finno-Soviet rapprochement looked possible. Both leaders insinuated that the way was now cleared for the positive development of Finno-Soviet diplomatic relations.¹¹³ However, whether their message was true and has brought forth a political friendship is a question that will be answered further on in this paper.¹¹⁴

3.2 The Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship, 1956-1960

In June 1957, Kekkonen and Khrushchev met each other at a banquet honoring the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers. Here, Khrushchev opened the reception in honor of the former Finnish president Paasikivi, underscoring the friendliness between Finland and the Soviet Union. Kekkonen then responded to Khrushchev's opening speech: “We greatly appreciate this beautiful gesture of yours. We see it as an acknowledgment of the work that President Paasikivi did on the eve of his long life in leading his people -- to use his own words -- from the bottom of a deep ravine up to open vistas.”¹¹⁵ Thus, this suggests that Khrushchev wanted to underscore his interest in the new Finnish foreign policy and simultaneously propagated the friendliness regarding the Finno-Soviet relationship to the congregation.¹¹⁶

However, the underlined neighborliness of the Finnish government towards the Soviet Union was not in accordance with the actual situation at the time. The first term of Kekkonen's presidency appeared to be problematic due to this exact issue. The main reason was that most parties within the Finnish government could not be persuaded to accept Kekkonen's foreign policy regarding the USSR. Khrushchev expressed his concern about the formation of activities by right-wing socialists in Finland, who according to him had taken a hostile attitude towards the USSR. One year later, in 1957, the Finnish government seemed to be completely divided. However, tensions started to soar when in 1957 the prospect of an anti-communist coalition led by Tanner seemed apparent. The discontentment was mainly expressed by the Finnish left and the USSR itself. Consequently, Khrushchev froze plans regarding establishing trade with Finland as a means of sanctioning.¹¹⁷

Despite these developments, the existence of a friendly understanding between

¹¹² “Public Responsibility for the Position of the Nation.”

¹¹³ Khrushchev, *Peaceful Co-existence*, 49.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem; Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 250-51.

¹¹⁵ “Our Policy of Neutrality,” Doria, accessed October 13, 2022, <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/11835/TMP.objres.1450.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

¹¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹¹⁷ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 251-52.

Kekkonen and Khrushchev was constantly being propagated by both sides. This happened, even though the situation at the time was not amicable. Additionally, it was claimed by both that there were outside forces that corrupted the friendship between the two leaders and their nations. This belief is mentioned by Khrushchev during a speech in 1958: “Let us resist those who wish to cool and poison the atmosphere of our good relations with Finland.”¹¹⁸ Thus, underlying disputes and ideological differences between Finland and the Soviet Union were simply blamed on the select group of politicians in the Finnish government who were in disagreement with Kekkonen’s foreign policy.¹¹⁹

Political historians Lotta Lounasmeria and Jukka Kortti argue that propaganda was not limited to the Soviet Union, it was carried out by democratic Finland as well. For example, in the film *For the Nation* Kekkonen was depicted as a “sovereign and a stylish head of state, as well as an athlete and a strong fellow man”.¹²⁰ Likewise, the propagation of the necessity of Kekkonen’s foreign policy was emphasized. Both historians argue that “in Finnish political culture, necessity and the so-called TINA (‘there is no alternative’) argumentation has traditionally had a strong foothold.”¹²¹ In the film, the Finnish population was depicted as the original pioneers of the land “who must find their way through the marshlands and hills, since ‘there are no wide roads for us’.”¹²² Thus, the image that Finland had no choice but to consolidate a friendly bond with the USSR was spread among the population.¹²³

It is argued that the film was aimed at people who were in disagreement with Kekkonen’s foreign policy “so that they would not stir up disagreement or desperation”.¹²⁴ Lounasmeria and Kortti additionally mentioned how Finnish citizens were simply deemed extremist when they questioned Kekkonen’s foreign policy: “During Kekkonen’s tenure, if one criticised him, one might very easily be labeled as opposing the Soviet Union and official foreign politics. Opponents started being labeled as ‘extreme right’ and were characterized as opposing ‘the people’, much in the same way as Soviets would talk about enemies of the people, and the Nazis would speak about Bolsheviks.”¹²⁵ Thus, the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev was allegedly “good” and anything opposing Kekkonen’s emphasis on Finland’s

¹¹⁸ Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, *For Victory in The Peaceful Competition with Capitalism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), 392-93.

¹¹⁹ Ibidem, 390-93.

¹²⁰ Lounasmeri, Kortti, “Campaigning between East and West,” 333.

¹²¹ Ibidem, 338.

¹²² Ibidem.

¹²³ Ibidem.

¹²⁴ Ibidem.

¹²⁵ Ibidem, 337.

foreign policy with the USSR was suppressed.¹²⁶

Nonetheless, after the brief reign of a government composed of a non-party administration, the communists finally won the elections in 1958. Because the Communist Party had little chance of forming a coalition, they were tied to cooperating with the Social Democrats and the Agrarian Party. During this coalition formation, Khrushchev underlined that the USSR would regard the inclusion of conservatives and rightists as an unfriendly action toward the Soviet government.¹²⁷ Kekkonen was aware of Khrushchev's dissatisfaction and warned the Finnish government. Nonetheless, the formators ignored Kekkonen's statement and established a formation without the Communist Party under Karl-August Fagerholm. To the dismay of Khrushchev and in addition to the exclusion of the Communist Party, did Fagerholm maintain close relations with the United States of America.¹²⁸

This formation resulted in a culmination of negative reactions from the USSR. As a result, Khrushchev had his ambassador in Helsinki leave the country and once again froze all trade negotiations with Finland. The USSR also threatened to activate an FCMA clause, requiring Finland to participate in a possible war against a German-Danish alliance. Kekkonen was in a complicated position and made attempts to change the arrangement of the Finnish government and convince the Danes to stop military collaboration with the Germans. Nevertheless, both attempts were unsuccessful as the Danes could not be persuaded and the Finnish government seemed unwilling to reassess the administration's composition.¹²⁹

The forming of the government under Kekkonen's leadership continued to cause problems. For example, the Agrarian Party overthrew the existing coalition and replaced it with a center-right party. In the end, the parties that disagreed with Kekkonen's foreign policy were replaced by politicians who were more positive about it. However, in the parties within the coalition, cooperation was crumbling and there was more and more fragmentation. Additionally, to the apprehension of Khrushchev, the Communist Party was still banned from Kekkonen's coalition. This resulted in a formation that did not fully cooperate with Kekkonen, as there was a lot of dissatisfaction with Kekkonen's foreign policy in relation to the USSR.¹³⁰

In May 1958, Kekkonen left for the Soviet Union to meet with Khrushchev. During this meeting, Khrushchev emphasized the importance of Kekkonen's adoption of the Paasikivi doctrine: "It is a pleasure for us to note that the policy pursued by the late President Paasikivi

¹²⁶ Ibidem, 337-38.

¹²⁷ Kirby, *Concise History of Finland*, 252-53.

¹²⁸ Ibidem.

¹²⁹ Ibidem, 252.

¹³⁰ Ibidem, 253.

was completely in line with our common interests and that in the implementation of that policy a prominent role was played by the then Prime Minister of Finland who is now our dear guest, the President of the Finnish Republic, Dr. Kekkonen.”¹³¹ Khrushchev continued his monologue and additionally emphasized the problems of the present Finnish government and stated that the Finno-Soviet relationship is blemished by them: “Unfortunately, there are still people who enjoy raking in the dustbin of history to find something to spoil our relations.”¹³²

During the same meeting, Khrushchev stated that the USSR was willing to help develop the Finnish economy. However, directly after his offer, he stated that Kekkonen should oppose the politicians within the government that do not support the conduction of the Paasikivi doctrine: “We shall struggle against such people at home, while you [Kekkonen] could undertake a moral obligation to struggle in your country against the forces who wish to poison the atmosphere of friendship with the Soviet Union and who are hindering the strengthening of friendly relations between our states.”¹³³ Thus, it appears that Khrushchev would not tolerate any contradiction from Finland. Only if this condition was met, could the Finno-Soviet bond develop positively, and would Khrushchev allow improving the Finnish economy.¹³⁴

The turbulence regarding the formation that followed did not go unnoticed by Khrushchev. Khrushchev expressed his agitation with the situation, which eventually led to the emergence of the “Yöpakkaskriisi” (Night Frost Crisis) of November 1958.¹³⁵ Despite Soviet disapproval, the plan in Finland was to form a third government under the right-wing Prime Minister Karl-August Fagerholm. To refrain Khrushchev from becoming even more agitated, Kekkonen plotted to replace Fagerholm and other politicians who still did not want to be loyal to him. Accordingly, these were replaced by trustworthy politicians who were loyal to Kekkonen. This act had the purpose of further eroding the right-wing and more conservative parties and finally consolidating a pro-Soviet government.¹³⁶

Nevertheless, pressure from Khrushchev on Kekkonen increased. The pressure unfolded as Soviet economic sanctions on Finland.¹³⁷ The tensions between Khrushchev and Kekkonen kept building up and eventually reached international recognition.¹³⁸ However, Kekkonen and Khrushchev met each other (supposedly accidentally) in Leningrad, which led to consultation

¹³¹ Khrushchev, *Peaceful Competition*, 389.

¹³² Ibidem, 390.

¹³³ Ibidem, 393.

¹³⁴ Ibidem.

¹³⁵ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 253-54; Singleton, *History of Finland*, 138.

¹³⁶ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 253-55.

¹³⁷ Ibidem, 254-55.

¹³⁸ Ibidem, 257-60.

during lunch in January 1959. Kekkonen elaborated on this encounter with Khrushchev: “Since Soviet-Finnish relations in the course of the autumn had come regrettably cool, I hope I would have a chance during my private visit for political discussions, and this was considered possible.”¹³⁹

Additionally, Kekkonen continued and emphasized the unplanned character of his encounter with Khrushchev: “The people of Leningrad, who are well known for their hospitality, had provided my wife and myself with seeing their beautiful city. The programme had to be changed, however, when on Thursday morning it became known that the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, N.S. Khrushchev, with his wife and daughter had arrived in Leningrad.”¹⁴⁰

Thus, to the public, the message was sent that this meeting between Kekkonen and Khrushchev was completely unplanned and came spontaneously into being. However, research has shown that this encounter was indeed planned and was aimed at soothing the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev and consolidating Kekkonen’s authority. This discovered phenomenon is mentioned by Kirby: “His [Kekkonen’s] ‘surprise’ meeting with Khrushchev in Leningrad in the immediate aftermath of the crisis was in fact secretly prearranged, the first major initiative along the path of personal diplomacy that President Kekkonen was to use with great effect to boost his status and authority at home and abroad.”¹⁴¹

During the meeting, it was made clear to Kekkonen that Khrushchev would deem any Finnish anti-Soviet government unacceptable. Khrushchev had stated that Finland acted against the interests of the Soviet Union and was consequently directed to follow the terms of the FCMA of 1948: “I [Kekkonen] met with Mr. Khrushchev twice, and our talks lasted altogether more than three hours. We had thorough and frank discussions on Finnish-Soviet relations. We also touched upon some international questions. In his long speech at a luncheon on Friday, Mr. Khrushchev defined the Soviet attitude to Finland. Our social system, he said, was our own concern. What was important for the Soviet Union was that its neighbour Finland should adhere to the policy laid down in our Peace Treaty and in the 1948 Agreement on Friendship and Mutual Assistance.”¹⁴²

Khrushchev argued that the exclusion of the Communist Party was in conflict with the FCMA treaty and was consequently considered an insult to the Soviet Union. Finally, on

¹³⁹ Kekkonen, *Neutrality*, 79.

¹⁴⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁴¹ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 254.

¹⁴² Kekkonen, *Neutrality*, 80.

February 3, 1959, the ties were strengthened and the Finno-Soviet relationship was stabilized once again. However, Kirby underlines that this meeting was not merely carried out on behalf of Kekkonen's reputation, who would have appeared "to have saved the day". The meeting was also useful for Khrushchev, who considered peaceful coexistence a top priority now West Germany had joined NATO in 1955 and was rearming itself.¹⁴³

Now that historians recognize that the encounter of 1959 was a fabrication, the authenticity of the Night Frost Crisis itself has also been questioned. It was argued that the positive results for Kekkonen and Khrushchev generated by the crisis might have been just a bit too coincidental, so shortly before the Finnish elections would take place. Kirby does not rule out that this crisis was fabricated, but points out that it was not solely created by Kekkonen: "It is unlikely, however, that the crisis was simply conjured up by Kekkonen to enhance his own power, not least because it patently did not do this. It was as important for Khrushchev to ensure that a central element in his policy of peaceful coexistence stayed on track, especially in the light of German rearmament and admission to NATO."¹⁴⁴

At the end of a broadcast on 25 January 1959, Kekkonen concluded his discussion with Khrushchev in the following way: "I am convinced that all reasonable Finns will join me in saying that we cannot afford to have more spells of cold. I am sure that the Finnish people will receive the news from Leningrad with relief and deep satisfaction. The ice has been broken, normal and friendly relations can continue for the benefit of our peoples."¹⁴⁵ Now tension between the two leaders had supposedly eased, the focus was once again shifted towards reinforcing the Finno-Soviet bond. Now, Kekkonen and Khrushchev's main instrument for strengthening the bond was the establishment of trade between Finland and the USSR.¹⁴⁶

Khrushchev argued that the consolidation of trade with Finland was considered a means of accomplishing lasting peace. This is mentioned by Khrushchev in his book *On Peaceful Coexistence*: "Our trade relations are developing satisfactorily with Great Britain, Italy, Finland, West Germany and other European countries. The Soviet Union is now trading with more than seventy countries. We hope to continue developing our economic contacts in the firm belief that trade between the different countries serves their economic interests and is a sure way of securing a lasting peace."¹⁴⁷ Additionally, Khrushchev emphasized once more that the

¹⁴³ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 254.

¹⁴⁴ Ibidem, 216, 254-57.

¹⁴⁵ "The End of Cool Relations," Doria, accessed October 13, 2022, <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/8591/TMP.objres.1452.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

¹⁴⁶ Singleton, *A Short History of Finland*, 145.

¹⁴⁷ Khrushchev, *Peaceful Co-existence*, 227.

USSR had truly adopted the attitude of peaceful coexistence.¹⁴⁸

However, it appeared that Khrushchev was the one that determined when “a certain line was crossed” for this peaceful coexistence to exist. Karsh underscores Kekkonen's understanding of this phenomenon following the Night Frost Crisis: “The ‘Night Frost Crisis’ strengthened Kekkonen’s belief that foreign policy should be put before domestic policy and led him to the conclusion that ‘to assist the Soviet Union’ to keep faith in the Paasikivi line Finland had to remove potential domestic sources of friction with the Soviet Union.”¹⁴⁹ Thus, Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence could only be reached if his conditions regarding Finnish domestic issues were met by Kekkonen.¹⁵⁰

Furthermore, it becomes apparent that Kekkonen’s foreign policy was restricted too. This becomes clear when Finland attempted to engage in trade with the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co-operation) countries in 1960. There existed a fear among the Soviet administration that the Finnish desire to engage in post-war trade integration would worsen the Finno-Soviet relationship. The main idea behind this Soviet mistrust is best described by a statement made by Kirby: “The Soviet Union was deeply suspicious of any coming together of western European nations, fearing that political motives lay behind such moves; but it was also jealous of its own rights as a trading nation, and this gave the Finns a slender opportunity to manoeuvre and thus keep in contact with western markets.”¹⁵¹ Consequently, Khrushchev denied Finnish trade with these nations for fear of Finnish accession to the West.¹⁵²

Concluding, it can be argued that during the period between 1956 and 1960 the foundation of the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev was formed. This period is characterized by political dispersion within the Finnish government and disunity regarding Kekkonen’s attitude toward Khrushchev and the Soviet Union. Consequently, it can be observed that both leaders have tried to eliminate the existing opposition in various ways. From their speeches and the meetings between the two, it can be deduced that Khrushchev made his outlook unmistakably clear. Khrushchev argued not to tolerate opposition and appointed Kekkonen to suppress the opposition. It becomes evident that foremost Khrushchev’s aspirations needed to be carried out. First, the interests of Khrushchev must be achieved, followed by the interests of Kekkonen.

¹⁴⁸ Khrushchev, *Peaceful Competition*, 655.

¹⁴⁹ Karsh, “Adaptation and Conflict,” 267-277.

¹⁵⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁵¹ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 254.

¹⁵² Ibidem.

3.3 The Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship, 1960-1964

The years after the occurrence of the Night Frost Crisis were mainly dominated by increased Soviet fear of Finnish accession to the West. This increase in fear stemmed in particular from the fact that Finland now concluded trade agreements with Western countries in Europe.¹⁵³ When the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) also allowed non-ECC member states to participate in its organization in 1959, Finland became interested in participating. The main reason for the Finnish eagerness stemmed from the fact that Great Britain, one of Finland's largest trading partners, was part of this association. However, Khrushchev was not exactly contented with this development and consequently reprimanded Kekkonen.¹⁵⁴

Accordingly, Khrushchev pointed out Finland's participation in the FCMA treaty to which the country was bound. However, Kekkonen did not stop and used alternative methods to achieve this participation. Kekkonen had his colleague, Ahti Karjalainen, investigate possibilities on which accession would still be possible. In the end, the EFTA agreed to Karjalainen's negotiations and Finland was able to join as far as they were concerned. However, Khrushchev disapproved of Finland's participation and forced Kekkonen to freeze the negotiations. Despite Kekkonen's attempts to secure participation in the EFTA, for the time being, Kekkonen did not receive permission to join.¹⁵⁵

When Khrushchev arrived in Helsinki in September 1960 to participate in the celebration of Kekkonen's birthday, plans were started to assure Kekkonen's re-election: "the Soviet ambassador to Helsinki was instructed to investigate the possibilities of assisting the re-election of the incumbent [Kekkonen]".¹⁵⁶ Kekkonen opened the celebration by thanking Khrushchev for his attendance and underlined the importance of their friendship. Khrushchev responded, hinting at Finland's entry into EFTA, and stated the following: "Birthdays come and go, but countries and peoples remain. We must therefore devote constant attention to finding a favourable solution to the problems of international relations -- not only with a view to today but to the years, decades, centuries to come. Let us solve these problems now and in the future by peaceful methods alone. This is what both common-sense and the heart demand."¹⁵⁷

Additionally, the topic of communist influence by the USSR on Finland was discussed by Kekkonen: "The Soviet Union has not coerced us, and does not coerce us, to adopt its own

¹⁵³ Ibidem, 255.

¹⁵⁴ Singleton, *A Short History of Finland*, 145.

¹⁵⁵ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 255.

¹⁵⁶ Ibidem, 256.

¹⁵⁷ "Finland Sticks to Her Traditional Democracy," Doria, accessed October 13, 2022, <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/9587/TMP.objres.1453.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

system, although I admit that many in the Soviet Union -- and there are some in Finland too - - presumably believe that it would be good for Finland.”¹⁵⁸ Indeed, recent sources show that Khrushchev did not directly force Finland to appropriate the communist system directly. However, as could be seen earlier, Khrushchev did everything in his power to keep Finland out of the influences of the capitalist West.¹⁵⁹

For example, during the same year, Khrushchev prevented Finland from joining the EFTA and expressed his disapproval regarding the ban on the Communist Party and the participation of conservative and right-wing parties within the Finnish government.¹⁶⁰ And, years earlier, critique of the Soviet Union, deemed propaganda (by the USSR), was banned in Finland. A CIA report from 1972 confirmed this and mentioned that “the Finns were not to tolerate the existence of any organization conducting propaganda hostile to the USSR, giving the Soviets a potential pretext for intervention.”¹⁶¹ Subsequently, Kekkonen's foreign policy went so far that the Finnish media “was also a part of this new pro-Soviet consensus.”¹⁶²

However, when elections for the Finnish presidency flared up in 1960, Kekkonen took advantage of the negotiations with Khrushchev for accession to the EFTA as a means of promoting his presidency. Although, Khrushchev remained suspicious of any power bloc that Finland wanted to join and thus remained critical regarding these developments. Eventually, Khrushchev gave Kekkonen permission to join the EFTA, provided that accession would not hinder any conditions of the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947. This helped consolidate Kekkonen's re-election now Finland was able to make more trade agreements with the Soviet Union. For example, it was ensured that Finland could make use of the canal that led to the Saimaa Lake System (a route important for European trade). This led to bilateral customs agreements between Finland and the USSR, which improved the Finno-Soviet trade substantially.¹⁶³

Following these events, it can be observed that there came a counter-reaction from the West, in which there was fear that Finland would become a vassal state of the Soviet Union. Great Britain expressed its skepticism about the possibility of secret Finno-Soviet negotiations which led to improvements in trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. Finland's neighbor to the west, Sweden, shared the British opinion regarding this matter. Sweden acted in unison

¹⁵⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁵⁹ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 249.

¹⁶⁰ Singleton, *A Short History of Finland*, 136, 145.

¹⁶¹ Edward Dutton, Finland's Cold War Legacy, *The Contemporary Review*, Vol. 290 (2008): 306; “Finlandization in Action: Helsinki's Experience with Moscow.”

¹⁶² Antti Ainamo, Janne Tienari and Eero Vaara. “Between West and East: A social history of business journalism in Cold War Finland.” *Human Relations*, Vol. 59(5) (2006): 626.

¹⁶³ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 256.

with Britain and tried to consolidate Finland's accession to the EFTA. The reaction from the West had an influence and resulted in Finland joining the EFTA in March 1961.¹⁶⁴

In the period that followed, the tension between Kekkonen and Khrushchev rose again through the occurrence of the “Noottikriisi” (Note Crisis) of 30 October 1961. This crisis was caused by a warning letter from Khrushchev to Kekkonen. In this letter, it was stated that a military mobilization from West Germany was on the move which would be a threat to the security of the Soviet Union: “It detailed the threat of German militarism and revanchism in general and in particular in northern Europe and the Baltic, and concluded by proposing consultations on measures to secure the defences of both countries against the threat of an attack by West Germany and its allies, as provided for in Article Two of the FCMA treaty.”¹⁶⁵

Consequently, Khrushchev pointed to Finnish aid by requesting military involvement in this conflict. Kekkonen was urgently requested to assist the Soviet Union in a possible conflict with West German troops. Accordingly, Khrushchev deemed Finnish intervention necessary for the defense of both countries.¹⁶⁶ However, Kekkonen did not see this as a direct reprimand to Finland but more as a personal attack on himself. Kekkonen took this as a reprimand for the way he dealt with the press: “Although Kekkonen was at pains to show that the note was not directed against Finland as such, it did nonetheless contain a veiled criticism of his ability to control the Finnish press, which, the note claimed, acted as the mouthpiece of ‘certain circles’, actively supporting NATO warmongering and thereby violating the terms of the peace treaty of 1947 and the 1948 FCMA treaty.”¹⁶⁷ Thus, it seemed that Khrushchev accused Kekkonen of not keeping the Finnish press in check.¹⁶⁸

Kekkonen publicly reacted to the note on 19 November 1961, during a speech in the city of Jyväskylä, Finland: “We are now in the position where we must give an answer to the note sent by the Soviet Union on October 30, 1961, in which, on the grounds of increasing international tension, it was proposed that in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance we enter into negotiations on measures to safeguard the frontiers of both countries.”¹⁶⁹ What is striking is that during the speech Kekkonen did not mention anything about the actual reason behind the crisis: Kekkonen's inability to keep the Finnish press in check. In reality, the note was a warning to Kekkonen to

¹⁶⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁵ Ibidem, 257.

¹⁶⁶ Singleton, *A Short History of Finland*, 139-40.

¹⁶⁷ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 258.

¹⁶⁸ Ibidem, 257-58.

¹⁶⁹ “The Impending ‘Note’ Talks in the Soviet Union,” Doria, accessed October 14, 2022, <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/11710/TMP.objres.1456.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

curb pro-NATO sentiment in Finland.¹⁷⁰

Additionally, from a broadcast on November 26, 1961, it can again be concluded that Kekkonen masked the true intentions behind the note. Accordingly, Kekkonen did not share the possibility of a deeper underlying political character of the note with the public: "The concern the Soviet Union feels because of the accelerated rearmament of West Germany is a fact and it is genuine -- and in the light of history it is understandable. This dictates Soviet moves. The security of the Soviet Union in North Europe is guaranteed, apart from her own strength, by the policy of Finland which, to quote Paasikivi, must never go against the Soviet Union, by the possibilities afforded the Soviet Union by the Pact of Friendship, and furthermore, by the non-alignment of Sweden".¹⁷¹ Kekkonen once again underscores Khrushchev's acute fear of a West German invasion and refrains from stating the actual reason.¹⁷²

However, the Note Crisis escalated when it became clear that a large number of anti-Soviet groups in Finland were becoming active. The ambassador of the Soviet Union stated that Kekkonen's reaction to the note showed his indifferent attitude towards anti-Soviet forces. Kekkonen then heightened the tension by threatening to end his presidency; a development that would not benefit Khrushchev. Subsequently, Karjalainen was sent to Moscow to defend the Finnish case and attempt to de-escalate the Note Crisis. Karjalainen stated that Finland, because of its current position within Europe, did not want to actively participate in a military discussion with the Soviet Union concerning its Western enemies.¹⁷³

At this stage of the crisis, the Finnish elections were in full swing. Olavi Honka had been pushed forward by the Honka Alliance and attempted to win the presidency from Kekkonen. However, things changed on November 24, 1961, when Kekkonen was urgently requested by the USSR to open dialogue with Khrushchev. Consequently, Kekkonen left for Novosibirsk and entered into talks with Khrushchev to de-escalate the current crisis. During this conversation, Khrushchev's confidence in Kekkonen was confirmed, and his foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union occupied a central position. Khrushchev also stated that talks regarding military action could now be postponed. As the conversation between Kekkonen and Khrushchev progressed, Honka withdrew from the race for the Finnish presidency.¹⁷⁴

In his book, *Khrushchev in Power*, Sergei Khrushchev writes in detail about his father's

¹⁷⁰ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 254; "The Impending 'Note' Talks."

¹⁷¹ "The Results of the 'Note Crisis'," Doria, accessed October 14, 2022, <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/11047/TMP.objres.1457.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

¹⁷² "Results of the 'Note Crisis'."

¹⁷³ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 260.

¹⁷⁴ Ibidem.

meeting with Kekkonen in 1961: “From Tselinograd, Father [Nikita Khrushchev] went to Novosibirsk. There, on November 23–24, he met with Urho Kekkonen, president of Finland. In those years the two were well disposed toward one another, not only as statesmen but also on a purely human basis. I would even say they became friends, if the term “friendship” can be applied to relations among politicians.”¹⁷⁵ This statement seems to underscore the friendliness between the leaders. However, it can be argued that Kekkonen’s reelection was an advantage for Khrushchev, while Kekkonen now started to suffer from negative consequences. This recent analysis among historians suggests that the encounter in Novosibirsk did not necessarily underline the existence of a friendship. It underscored the likelihood of Khrushchev purely safeguarding the tense situation during the beginning of the 1960s within Europe; the erection of the Berlin Wall (August 1961) and the occurrence of the Second Berlin Crisis (June 1961).¹⁷⁶

Now Honka had been “eliminated” and was no longer competing for the presidency, Kekkonen’s position improved. Although, several historians such as Singleton consider the entire course of circumstances regarding the Note Crisis a sort of conspiracy constructed because of the approaching Finnish elections.¹⁷⁷ This phenomenon was also observed by the U.S. Department of State which found that “some persons have contended that main initial purpose Soviet action initiated by October 30 note was to insure re-election Kekkonen.”¹⁷⁸ However, this matter is not widely agreed upon. For example, Kirby argues the following: “The unfolding of the note crisis in the autumn of 1961 undoubtedly reinforced Kekkonen’s position. To suggest, however, that this was an elaborate plot to ensure the re-election of the president overlooks the background of international tension over issues relating to Germany, and ignores the political undercurrents in Moscow, and Khrushchev’s own motives.”¹⁷⁹

Additionally, it is argued that the Note Crisis had not been completely helpful for Kekkonen. Although, indeed, Kekkonen was now known to the Finnish public as a politician who had solved a high-profile problem with the Soviet Union: Kekkonen was now considered the man who had brought about peace, respect, and trust between Finland and the USSR. However, what supports the argument is the fact that Kekkonen’s reputation vis-à-vis western countries had been significantly damaged.¹⁸⁰ In the West, Kekkonen was now widely

¹⁷⁵ Sergei Krushchev, *Khrushchev in Power: Unfinished Reforms, 1961-1964* (London 2014), 80-81.

¹⁷⁶ Meinander, *A History of Finland*, 220-21.

¹⁷⁷ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 260.

¹⁷⁸ “246, November 16, Midnight,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, accessed October 15, 2022, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/070/JFKNSF-070-003>.

¹⁷⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁸⁰ Ibidem; “246, November 16.”

considered to be a “watchdog” of Khrushchev and Finland a satellite state of the USSR.¹⁸¹ Historian Henrik Meinander confirms this and argues that “it was inevitable, too, that this oft-suspected far-reaching cosy relationship with Moscow tarnished Finland’s reputation in the West.”¹⁸²

The Note Crisis did additionally damage Finland's relationship with its Nordic neighbors. Following the outcome of the Note Crisis, the Nordic countries seemed to turn against Finland. The main reason for this phenomenon stemmed from the fact that Kekkonen seemed to cooperate more and more with Khrushchev and his Soviet Union. Thus, the Finno-Soviet relationship was at the expense of the “brotherhood” between the Nordic nations.¹⁸³

The extent to which the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship influenced Finnish relations with Scandinavian countries is also apparent from a speech in January 1962. During this speech, the matter of Finnish accession to the Nordic Council is discussed: “Finland has been asked to join the Nordic Council, but Finland has not accepted the invitation. Not because she feels that there are no practical possibilities in it, but because she has not wished to disturb the good relations between the Soviet Union and Finland.”¹⁸⁴ Thus, it appears that Kekkonen’s friendly attitude towards Khrushchev was at the expense of Finnish relations with neighboring countries. In the speech Kekkonen underlined that “it is important for us [Finland] that we proceed in this matter in such a way as to avoid any misunderstanding between Finland and the USSR.”¹⁸⁵

However, it can be stated that Kekkonen did make use of the Note Crisis to secure his presidency. This is also confirmed in a telegram, stating the following: “He [Kekkonen] had apparently already decided before Soviet note do some such thing and grasped at this already prepared as possibly beneficial in situation by the note”.¹⁸⁶ Khrushchev wanted to keep Kekkonen as president and acted in Kekkonen's interest when his presidency was put to the test by Honka. Thus, it can be argued that a complete fabrication of the Note Crisis seems unlikely, but has been used to support Kekkonen during the Finnish presidential elections of 1961.¹⁸⁷

Nevertheless, even after Kekkonen's re-election as president of Finland in 1961, did the Finnish government remain unstable due to disunity. For example, there were internal problems

¹⁸¹ Ibidem.

¹⁸² Meinander, *History of Finland*. 221.

¹⁸³ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 261.

¹⁸⁴ “The Nordic Council,” Doria, accessed October 13, 2022, <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/7770/TMP.objres.1459.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

¹⁸⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁸⁶ “248, November 17, 3 p.m.,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, accessed October 15, 2022, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/070/JFKNSF-070-003>.

¹⁸⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁸⁷ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 260.

within the Social Democratic Party and rising unrest about the ban on the participation of the communists within the government. The “Kokoomus party” (the Conservative Party) started its participation in government and caused turmoil due to its opposition to the Soviet Union and communism in general. This party flared up old disputes by opposing Kekkonen's foreign policy.¹⁸⁸ The years that followed were characterized by an increased rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. This rivalry was reflected in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.¹⁸⁹

Nonetheless, Kekkonen was hardly involved in this escalation between the two powerhouses, and little changed in the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev.¹⁹⁰ However, a year later another dispute came to the fore and the leaders discussed permission for the placement of atomic weapons in the north of Europe. The speech on this development was opened by Kekkonen, who endorsed the ban on nuclear weapons as “one of the greatest achievements of the year.”¹⁹¹ Kekkonen thanked Khrushchev for his efforts and stated that “the world must thank to a great extent the purposeful work done by you, Nikita Sergeyevitch.”¹⁹² During this speech, Kekkonen points out that Scandinavian nations are questioning the entwined interests of the Soviet Union that were involved in this dispute.¹⁹³

However, Kekkonen denied the Scandinavian statements, arguing that the policy chosen was in line with Finland's national interests: “How many times is it necessary to say that if Finland pursues a policy which concurs with its own national interests it has not been pressed upon us either by the East or by the West?”¹⁹⁴ Nevertheless, it has been made clear several times that Kekkonen saw good relations with the Soviet Union as the main national interest of Finland. Thus, compliance with Khrushchev's interests was always in Finland's national interest. Subsequently, it is difficult to determine whether Kekkonen was really trying to represent the Finnish interest or merely defending his relationship with Khrushchev.¹⁹⁵

However, from 1964 onwards many changes were made within the Finnish government. Accordingly, the government continued to become more left-wing and got the Social Democrat Rafael Paasio as their new leader. The new government was more in line with Kekkonen's foreign policy and ushered in a period of increased stability between Finland and the Soviet

¹⁸⁸ Ibidem, 262.

¹⁸⁹ Michael Cotey Morgan, *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 21-22; Thompson, *A Political Life*, 227-28.

¹⁹⁰ Cotey Morgan, *The Final Act*, 261-63.

¹⁹¹ “Why Finland is in Favour of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone,” Doria, accessed October 14, 2022, <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/11883/TMP.objres.1466.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

¹⁹² Ibidem.

¹⁹³ Ibidem.

¹⁹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁹⁵ Ibidem.

Union.¹⁹⁶ On October 14, 1964, Khrushchev resigned as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and was followed up by Leonid Brezhnev. This officially ended the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev as a bond between leaders of the two states. Nevertheless, a stable relationship with the Soviet Union could be maintained until 20 August 1968 when, due to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, things changed for the worse.¹⁹⁷

4. Analysis Kekkonen-Khrushchev Relationship

4.1 Equality and Reciprocity

Van Hoef's model of political friendship shows that the existence of five key factors determine whether there is a political friendship between two political actors. First of all, the relationship has to be made up of two equal actors. As has already been indicated earlier on in this paper, Van Hoef refers here to equality of worth. Thus, both leaders must occupy positions of equal value. Likewise, the relationship between the actors must be reciprocal. The non-conditionality of the relationship is of great importance here. This means that the reciprocity within the relationship is not carried out based on what Van Hoef calls "returning the favor", but because it is expected from the other actor.¹⁹⁸

In terms of economic and military power, it can be deduced that the Soviet Union was many times more powerful than Finland. Accordingly, Kekkonen emphasized that Finland did fear the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union did not fear Finland.¹⁹⁹ This superior position had a major influence on the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship and has therefore been associated with the concept of "Finlandization". As stated before, the main characteristic of Finlandization concerns the dominance of one actor within the diplomatic relationship. Finlandization is a controversial concept, with one scholar classifying it as Finnish subordination and another as a successful collaboration. Nevertheless, evidence has shown that Kekkonen displayed a subordinate role during the course of this relationship. Consequently, it can be argued that there was no equality of worth between the two leaders.

The subordinate position of Kekkonen is frequently expressed in the encounters between the two leaders and is visible in the behavior of Khrushchev toward Kekkonen. For example, it can be observed that Kekkonen's interests were frequently subordinated to those of Khrushchev. Kekkonen's aspirations were pushed aside to consolidate Khrushchev's interests.

¹⁹⁶ Heikki Paloheimo, "The Rising Power of the Prime Minister in Finland," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 3 (August 2003): 223.

¹⁹⁷ Kirby, *History of Finland*, 262-63.

¹⁹⁸ Van Hoef, "Interpreting Affect Between State Leaders," 51-55.

¹⁹⁹ Kekkonen, *Neutrality*, 10, 29,70; Kekkonen, *A President's View*, 47.

One example of this phenomenon is the meeting on January 1959, during the aftermath of the Night Frost Crisis. What could be observed is that Khrushchev showed his willingness to make concessions for the sake of compensating the Finnish economy, provided that Kekkonen carried out Khrushchev's order first (the removal of opposition in the Finnish government).

Another example of this phenomenon is the meeting of November 1961, when the leaders came together during the course of the Note Crisis. Kekkonen was urgently requested to participate in this meeting, through which the Finno-Soviet relationship could be stabilized. Their bond was stabilized but eventually caused damage to Kekkonen's reputation, from the viewpoint of the West. Khrushchev's interests went above all else, this allowed him to do as he pleased even though it harmed Kekkonen's reputation and Finnish diplomatic relations with the West in general.

Yet another example is Finland's attempt to join the trade network of the OEEC countries. During this event, it could be observed that, despite advocating for peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev set the rules for the Finno-Soviet relationship. Naturally, Kekkonen's attempt was rejected by Khrushchev. Khrushchev was fearful of any Western influence on Finland and thus did not want Finland to join this network. This substantially restricted Finland's freedom concerning its international relations. Kekkonen also realized that domestic policies had to be aligned with Khrushchev's wishes, further curtailing Finland's freedom. These are evident examples of the fact that Khrushchev's interests were put above Kekkonen's.

Thus, historiography shows that the interests of Khrushchev overshadowed those of Kekkonen. Additionally, when Kekkonen's domestic or foreign policy was deemed "not fully in line with the interests of the Soviet Union" Khrushchev reprimanded Kekkonen and reacted with sanctions. Sanctions varied but regularly related to curtailment of trade relations with Finland or threats to involve Finland in the Cold War. The Treaty of Friendship of 1948 is an important part of this, as it was frequently used to correct Kekkonen and remind him of his obligations. These rebukes were not reciprocal and also demonstrate the disparity in value. Thus, Khrushchev's interests outweighed those of Kekkonen and Khrushchev could reprimand Kekkonen but not vice versa. Concluding, it can be argued that Khrushchev's position was dominant and considered of greater importance than Kekkonen's.

This brings us back to the feature regarding reciprocity, in which non-conditionality plays the leading role. It can be deduced from the stated examples that this relationship was indeed conditional. Constantly, an event (fabricated or real) arose during which Kekkonen had to look after Khrushchev's interests to limit further escalation. An example of this is the aforementioned meeting of January 1959, when economic support would only be given if

Khrushchev's demands would be carried out by Kekkonen. This example underscores the existence of conditionality within the relationship and therefore underlines the lack of reciprocity.

4.2 Moral Obligations

The subsequent characteristic that must be recognizable within a political friendship is the notion of "moral obligations". Van Hoef argues that moral obligations mean carrying out a certain action to prevent any harm to the relationship at hand. Accordingly, there is a correct diplomatic response that has to be chosen to keep the interconnection satisfactory. During the course of the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship, this feature could be detected frequently. Correspondingly, Kekkonen did all he could to appease Khrushchev, even though this attitude was not mutual.

During the course of the relationship, it can continuously be observed that Kekkonen did everything in his power to keep the Finno-Soviet relationship stable.²⁰⁰ Examples include Kekkonen's appeasing reactions to the Night Frost Crisis of 1958 and the Note Crisis of 1960. Kekkonen's appeasing attitude can be traced back to a broadcast in October from the year 1945. This broadcast contains Kekkonen's opinion regarding his stance against international relations with the Soviet Union. Here, Kekkonen underlines that Finland can only remain an independent nation if the relationship with the Soviet Union is favorable. Accordingly, Historian Kirby pointed to Kekkonen's "obsession" with improving his relationship with Khrushchev and the Finno-Soviet bond in general.

However, the observed obligations do exist but are relatively one-sided, as Kekkonen's attempts to appease Khrushchev were far more numerous than vice versa. This is also underlined by Finnish economist Pekka Sutela, who states that this one-sidedness was also visible in Finnish-Soviet trade.²⁰¹ It can be argued that Khrushchev merely gave in to Kekkonen when it benefited the USSR. An example of this is the return of the Porkkala naval base in 1956, to help consolidate Kekkonen's election as president of Finland.

Based on the inequality of moral obligations, it can be argued that Van Hoef's model falls short. As indicated, moral obligations were present but largely one-sided. To what extent this characteristic for political friendship is fulfilled is therefore unclear and cannot unambiguously be answered. The model merely offers space for the presence or absence of this characteristic, it does not allow space for the balance of this aspect during the course of a

²⁰⁰ Ibidem, 50.

²⁰¹ Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, *Gaps in the Iron Curtain: Economic Relation between Neutral and Socialist Countries in Cold War Europe* (Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press, 2009), 83.

relationship.

Nonetheless, what can be observed is that Khrushchev frequently created problems and reprimanded Kekkonen when he did not operate in line with the Soviet Union's interests. Thus, it can be stated that Khrushchev did the opposite of Kekkonen. Khrushchev often created a situation that was potentially damaging to the Finno-Soviet relationship, and Kekkonen had to soothe friction once again by choosing the right counter-reaction to prevent further escalation. Examples of this include Khrushchev's expression of dissatisfaction with the Finnish parliament during the Night Frost Crisis.

Another phenomenon disproving the presence of moral obligations within the relationship is the existence of too far-reaching requests by Khrushchev. An example of this includes Khrushchev's demand for Finnish military support during the Note Crisis of 1961. Here, Kekkonen was urgently requested to provide military aid to the Soviet Union due to the existing fear of an attack by West German forces. This significant demand forced Kekkonen to openly take a stance against the West. This was a too far-reaching request since the survival of Finnish independence and autonomy depended on the policy of neutrality.

4.3 Emergent Properties

As mentioned earlier, emergent properties are elements that are only held by the relationship as a whole. The emergent property regarding the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship relates to the particularity of its fundament. The peculiarity of the relationship stemmed from the emphasis on the aforementioned concept of Finlandization. The relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev revealed several details about how the Soviet Union conducted politics with its neighbors. In the case of Finland, this was accompanied by Finlandization; a term now widely used to describe similar situations between countries/leaders all over the globe. Although this term can be attributed to various situations, the origin of the term can only be attributed to the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship and is therefore its emergent property. Their bond remains a textbook example of this phenomenon within international relations and continues to be one.²⁰²

4.4 Grand Project

The final component of a political friendship concerns the existence of a grand project. Van Hoef argues that this component is a mission that both actors worked collectively on to achieve.

²⁰² George Quester, "Finlandization as a Problem or an Opportunity?," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 512 (1990): 34-35.

During the course of the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev, one project can constantly be recognized on which both actors are constantly working cooperatively. The ambition of both leaders was to strengthen the Finno-Soviet bond. Correspondingly, Kekkonen continuously spoke of “good neighborliness” while Khrushchev referred to “peaceful coexistence”. Kekkonen saw friendship with the Soviet Union as Finland’s only resort while Khrushchev valued good relations with Finland, provided that it acted in line with the interests of the USSR.

Their collective mission was frequently discussed in the primary sources of both leaders. For example, Khrushchev referred to a clear split from Stalin's earlier policy and underlined non-hostility with other nations in his book *On Peaceful Coexistence*. Additionally, Kekkonen constantly underscored the necessity of befriending the Soviet Union for the sake of Finland’s survival during broadcasts, meetings, and speeches.

Both leaders had an outspoken desire to retain the independence of their nations. It is important to mention here that among both leaders there was a great fear to lose sovereignty due to external forces. Both leaders assumed that the establishment of good relations with each other was an important measure to secure the survival of their nations. Khrushchev feared Western intervention in countries neighboring the Soviet Union such as Finland.

Accordingly, Khrushchev was wary of Finnish integration into the West in any way possible. What can be observed, however, is that Kekkonen took Khrushchev's fear of Western influence into account for the sake of the Finno-Soviet relationship. Initially, for Soviet satisfaction, influence by the West is rejected for the sake of the stability of the Finno-Soviet relationship. Examples include Kekkonen’s reluctance to join the Nordic Council in 1962 and his resistance against the deployment of nuclear weapons in Northern Europe in 1963.

However, there is inequality to the extent that these leaders tried to realize their grand projects. Kekkonen saw the realization of a friendly and stable relationship with the Soviet Union as the top priority: The only means to protect Finnish independence. Nevertheless, Khrushchev’s desire for peaceful coexistence with Finland had lesser priority. While both valued the achievement of the project, it becomes clear that Kekkonen wanted to achieve this goal at all costs while Khrushchev dared to set conditions and risk failing the goal.

Once again, it can be noted that Van Hoef’s model falls short. The model does not allow for a degree of dedication to grand projects. While the ambition to achieve the goal was certainly visible among both politicians, the level of dedication was certainly not equal. Thus, according to Van Hoef’s model, it can be argued that this element of political friendship is met.

Nevertheless, the model does not take into consideration the inequality of dedication and can therefore present an incomplete depiction of the relationship at hand.

4.5 Existence of a Political Friendship

During the analyses of the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship, it could be recognized that the first characteristic of political friendship could not be observed. Thus, Kekkonen and Khrushchev could not be regarded as political actors that were “equal in worth”. This stemmed from the subordinate position of Kekkonen during the course of this relationship. The military and economic dominance of the Soviet Union was emphasized here; an inequality that resulted in the appeasing attitude of Finlandization. The disparity between the two leaders could be detected in the manner they interacted with each other. Consistently, Khrushchev put his interests ahead of Kekkonen's and reprimanded him when he disagreed with a certain action.

Secondly, the “reciprocity” between the two leaders was examined. Here, the focus was on the existence of non-conditional actions and acts which were based on “returning a favor”. It could be observed that the relationship was almost entirely based on conditions. Khrushchev exclusively acted in favor of Kekkonen if Soviet interests were achieved first (or if it benefited Soviet ambitions in general). Although it could frequently be observed that both leaders tried to help each other achieve their respective goals, there always was self-interest involved on both sides. Thus, it can be argued that the bond was conditional, which results in a lack of reciprocity within the relationship.

Thirdly, the existence of “moral obligations” was analyzed. Here, it was concluded that moral obligations did exist. However, it could be observed that moral obligations were almost merely carried out by Kekkonen alone. It became clear that Khrushchev, unlike Kekkonen, was not doing everything in his power to keep the relationship stable. On the contrary, Khrushchev often created friction within the relationship if Finnish domestic or foreign policies were not in line with the aspirations of the Soviet Union. Thus, Khrushchev often put stress and urgency on the relationship, forcing Kekkonen to react immediately to resolve the matter.

Furthermore, the focus shifted towards the existence of “emergent properties” that were merely held by the relationship as a whole. It could be observed that the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship contributed greatly to the field of international relations. Here, reference was made to the origin of the term “Finlandization”. Kekkonen's attitude towards Khrushchev became a deeply studied phenomenon that received and still receives a lot of attention within international relations. Since Kekkonen and Khrushchev are both at the root of the emergence of this concept, it could be argued that this is the emergent property of their relationship.

Finally, the aim shifted to the existence of a “grand project” on which both leaders had worked jointly. It was established that this project indeed existed during the course of their relationship. Their mutual recognition of the importance of stable relations with other countries was mentioned here. Both wanted to improve their ties with each other. Kekkonen spoke of good neighborliness while Khrushchev spoke of peaceful coexistence. Consequently, it could be concluded that during the course of this relationship, there was a large project which connected the leaders. However, it was mentioned that the dedication to the project was not equal. Accordingly, Kekkonen did everything to achieve the end goal of the project while Khrushchev dared to risk the goal for the sake of other interests.

The analysis shows that not all the characteristics of a political friendship could be detected during the course of the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship. The dominating issues stem from one-sidedness and inequality. Here it could be detected that the actions performed by Khrushchev were mainly conducted on a conditional basis. Thus, responses to demands or questions were merely consenting if Khrushchev's interests were not hindered. It can be noted that Khrushchev allowed situations to escalate to force an appeasing reaction from Kekkonen. Subsequently, Kekkonen constantly tried to stabilize the relationship, while Khrushchev often used escalation as a means to achieve the political, economic, or military goals of the USSR.

Due to the absence of the aforementioned elements, it can be concluded that there was no political friendship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev. It could be observed, however, that the bond showed signs of a partnership. A partnership can be characterized as a relationship in which both actors act jointly in the interests of one another and work together on a large project. Accordingly, it could be observed that there was a large project on which both leaders worked. Despite the disparity regarding dedication to this undertaking and giving in to the other's interests, they both could be observed.

In this partnership, the concept of Realpolitik dominated the tone. This means that foreign policy is made in the interest of the nation, through the means of a cost-benefit assessment.²⁰³ Ideological convictions play no role in this and the political actors are simply inspired by the interests of the state. It could be continuously observed that both had a grand project which was secured through a cost-benefit assessment. Kekkonen frequently succumbed to the desires of Khrushchev, to protect Finnish independence. Kekkonen could not afford to make big demands because the Soviet Union was, after all, more powerful than Finland. Additionally, Khrushchev also acted purely in the interest of the state but had the luxury of

²⁰³ Douglas Johnston, *Faith-Based Diplomacy Trumping Realpolitik* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), xi-xiv.

making greater demands due to the Soviet Union's ascendancy.²⁰⁴

The concessions of Kekkonen are visible in his reluctance to trade with the West, his fight against anti-Soviet sentiment in Finland, and his attempts to rid the Finnish parliament of conservatives and right-wing politicians. By yielding to Khrushchev's interests, the great project (the consolidation of a stable Finno-Soviet relationship) could be realized. Khrushchev put the national interests of the Soviet Union first but made concessions if it ultimately proved beneficial for the USSR. Accordingly, Khrushchev tried to keep Kekkonen (a supporter of the Paasikivi doctrine) as the president of Finland. Khrushchev saw Kekkonen's presidency as beneficial for the Finno-Soviet relation and consequently made concessions. Examples include his permission for Finnish accession to EFTA, the return of the Porkkala naval base, and his reluctance to officially drag Finland into the Cold War.

5. Conclusion

During this research, an attempt has been made to provide insight into the elements of friendship in the relationship between Urho Kaleva Kekkonen and Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. The relevance of this topic was underlined by addressing a controversy. Accordingly, it was argued that some historians assume that cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union during the second half of the twentieth century was mainly based on coercion. These historians exclude cooperation based on a political friendship but base it on external pressure. However, it was also indicated that other scholars devalue the role of Soviet pressure and thus deny the aforementioned statement.

To test these premises and expose the underlying factors of this relationship it was investigated to what extent there was a friendship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev. To answer this question and better understand the relationship between these two leaders, it was decided to conduct this research by using political historian Yuri van Hoef's model of political friendship. The reasoning behind this stemmed from the fact that this approach is relatively new and provided a "fresh" outlook on the subject. It was established that when international relations are examined, the focus is often on nations rather than individuals. However, Van Hoef argues that when the scope of research is shifted toward the leading actors within a political relationship new insights can be obtained.

In his paper, *Interpreting Among State Leaders* Van Hoef provides a new definition of political friendship. Van Hoef argues that a political friendship has to consist of a variety of

²⁰⁴ Ibidem.

elements. Van Hoef states that all these characteristics must be discovered within a relationship to call the relationship at hand a political friendship. It is argued that there are five characteristics. These characteristics concern being equal partners (1) having a reciprocal bond (2), having strong moral obligations (3), having emergent properties that have a foundation within the relationship as a whole (4), and having a grand project (5). Consequently, the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship was analyzed based on these components.

To clarify the characteristics of political friendship, the terms have been explained at the beginning of this paper. First, it was indicated that by the term “equal partners” equality of worth was meant. The “reciprocity” in the relationship meant acting from one's initiative and not in return for a certain deed. The term “moral obligations” concerns acting to safeguard the stability of the relationship. Additionally, the “emergent properties” were discussed and have been explained as matters that merely exist and are based on the political relationship as a whole. Thereafter, the term “grand project” referred to the presence of a large project that is jointly worked on by the two actors.

Nonetheless, to understand the foundation of the relationship, the history between Finland and the Soviet Union during the first part of the twentieth century has been described. This period concerned the years from 1917 to 1948. During this period several events have taken place which created the fundament of the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship. These events have been highlighted and explained. The most important events included the Finnish Civil War, the Winter War, the Continuation War, and the consolidation of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Together, these events have effectuated change in Finnish foreign policy regarding its eastern neighbor.

Furthermore, the era of Kekkonen's and Khrushchev's reigns was discussed in detail. The research period covered the years from 1956 to 1964. This period was chosen because it is illustrative of the addressed controversy regarding Finlandization; Finlandization was widely practiced by Kekkonen and gained worldwide recognition. These years were then divided into three different parts. First, background information regarding the leaders was presented, focusing on their ideas regarding foreign policies. Here, it was described that Kekkonen and Khrushchev were largely in accordance with one another. It was argued that this stemmed from the fact that Khrushchev had split from Stalinism and charted a new course for the USSR which included peaceful coexistence with Finland.

It appeared that Kekkonen was a follower of the Paasikivi-doctrine, which was known for its positive attitude towards the Soviet Union. Kekkonen continued this doctrine and became preoccupied with maintaining a stable relationship with Khrushchev. It could be uncovered that,

during Kekkonen's presidency, Kekkonen had the belief that the relationship with the Soviet Union was vital to the survival of independent Finland. Thus, the Finnish government established a pro-Soviet attitude which influenced Finland's foreign policy with the Soviet Union and Kekkonen's relationship with Khrushchev.

During the second part of this chapter, the years between 1956 and 1960 were discussed. Here, it was shown through primary sources that during this period the foundation of the Kekkonen- Khrushchev bond was formed. It was argued that political dispersion within the Finnish government and disunity regarding Kekkonen's attitude toward Khrushchev and the Soviet Union dominated this period. From primary sources could be deduced that Khrushchev did not tolerate opposition from the Finnish government. Additionally, it could be noted that Khrushchev's interests were paramount to those of Kekkonen during disputes. An example of this was the Night Frost Crisis of November 1958, through which Kekkonen was forced by Khrushchev to eliminate anti-Soviet sentiment in parliament to prevent further escalation.

The focus then shifted to the period between the years 1960 and 1964. During this period it could be observed that Finland made more rapprochement with the West. This was reflected in Kekkonen's rapprochement with the European Free Trade Association. Khrushchev's reactions to these developments build up and resulted in tension. Eventually, this resulted in the Note Crisis of October 1961. Khrushchev was dissatisfied with the increasing level of anti-Soviet sentiment in Finland and reprimanded Kekkonen to solve the matter. After this, it could be noted that Kekkonen was reluctant to approach the West. For example, he rejected rapprochement with the Nordic Council and opposed the placement of nuclear weapons in Northern Europe.

Concluding, it could be uncovered that during the course of these years Khrushchev's interests were paramount to those of Kekkonen. Sources regarding these events have shown that Kekkonen continuously had to act in favor of Khrushchev's interests to prevent the escalation of disputes. These sanctions were often economic and curtailed Finland's trade. Additionally, Khrushchev used the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of 1948 as a "trump card" by which he pressured Kekkonen with Finnish involvement into the Cold War.

In the final part of the research, the aforementioned elements of political friendship were applied to the gathered information. It could be observed that the conduction of the elements of political friendship was often one-sided. Kekkonen often complied with the features of friendship, while Khrushchev often "neglected his part". Consequently, it could be noted that this partnership was not completely equal. The reason, as stated earlier, was that the interests

of Khrushchev outweighed those of Kekkonen. Thus, while both acted based on mutual interests, Kekkonen's interests often got discarded if they conflicted with Khrushchev's.

Additionally, it was found that Van Hoef's model falls short on several fronts. For example, it was discovered that the model does not allow for the degree of reciprocity regarding acting in the interest of moral obligations. It could be observed that the moral obligations were visible, but merely expressed by Kekkonen. Therefore, a comment has been made to address this incompleteness. Additionally could be observed that the model does not allow for the degree of commitment toward a joint project. It could be detected that there was indeed a joint project on which both leaders worked together. However, Kekkonen was more committed to achieving this goal than Khrushchev was. Thus, a caveat has been made entailing that by failing to accommodate the degree of dedication, this model may provide an incomplete overview of the relationship at hand.

Finally, it could be established that the relationship was not an authentic friendship but rather a partnership. This partnership was influenced by Realpolitik, in which national interests occupy a central position and are continuously safeguarded. Khrushchev's interests were predominant and Khrushchev did not shy away from coercion to enforce them. Concluding, the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev was not a political friendship but a partnership based on safeguarding national interests.

It has been shown that Kekkonen's appeasing attitude towards his stronger neighbor put him into a subservient position, involving the obligation to accommodate Khrushchev's interests. Therefore, contributing to the debate among historians, it can be argued that Finlandization is not a misinterpretation and could (more often than not) be observed during the course of the researched period. Additionally, it indeed involved a large amount of pressure from Khrushchev, forced Kekkonen into a subservient position, and had a profound impact on Finnish autonomy regarding both domestic and foreign affairs.

Bibliography

1. Secondary sources: Theory

Johnston, Douglas. *Faith-Based Diplomacy Trumping Realpolitik*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

In his book *Faith-Based Diplomacy Trumping Realpolitik* from 2008, scholar Douglas Johnston describes an alternative to Realpolitik. However, this source is mainly used to gain insight into the definition of Realpolitik that he provides in this book. As it turned out, the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev was not so much a friendship, but could rather be labeled as a partnership in which Realpolitik dominated. This book exposes the characteristics of Realpolitik which were necessary to arrive at the abovementioned conclusion of this study. In conclusion, this source was used to clarify the Realpolitik concept and contributed to the conclusion of this research.

Van Hoef, Yuri. "Interpreting Affect Between State Leaders: Assessing the Political Friendship Between Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt." *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn* (2017): 51-62.

In Yuri van Hoef's abovementioned article, he researched the existence of a political friendship between Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. In his paper, Van Hoef provides a new definition of political friendship and gives a number of elements that a relationship must meet in order to be labeled as political friendship. These characteristics of political friendship were central in the research on the friendship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev. The structure of this research could be explained by means of Van Hoef's elements, in which all elements were discussed one by one. Van Hoef's model made it possible to look at this relationship in a new way. After all, international relations mainly concern the relations between states and not between individuals.

Van Hoef, Yuri, "9. Friendship in politics. By Yuri van Hoef." UUHistory. January 28, 2018. Educational video, 0:00 to 6:46. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7AWrgoHDBOo>.

This source is an educational YouTube video made by the University of Utrecht and was published on January 28, 2018. In this video, political historian Yuri van Hoef closely explains his model of political friendship. This video gives the definition of the elements of political friendship. Matters that were not completely explained in the aforementioned article by Van

Hoef are addressed and described in this video. Logically, this source was used to better and more concretely describe Van Hoef's model. In addition, Van Hoef underlines the new perspective that his model provides. Accordingly, it is argued that the field of international relations is usually concerned with the study of a relationship between nations instead of individuals.

2. Secondary sources: History of Finland and the Soviet Union

Engman, Max and David Kirby. *Finland: People, Nation, State*. London: Hurst & Company, 1989.

The book *Finland: People, Nation, State* (1989) by historians Max Engman and David Kirby provides information regarding the history of Finland. Here the period from the colonization of Finland until the occurrence of the Cold War is explained in detail. The source has mainly been used for its described outlook on the history of Finland during the twentieth century. This source has been used to gain insight into Finland's attitude during the Cold War. In this source, the Finnish relationship with both the West and the Soviet Union is described in detail. Additionally, it is clarified how Finland could remain independent between two superpowers; the East and West.

Jägerskiöld, Stig. *Mannerheim, Marshal of Finland*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.

This book is a biography of the Finnish Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim. In particular, the book provides insight into Mannerheim's role during the Finnish Civil War (1917) and Winter War (1939-1940). This source showed that Mannerheim changed his attitude towards the Soviet Union at the end of the conflicts that occurred during the Second World War. Accordingly, it was mentioned by Jägerskiöld that Mannerheim's efforts improved relations with the USSR substantially. Consequently, Jägerskiöld insinuates that Mannerheim contributed to the change in Finland's course vis-à-vis the USSR, which can be observed during the course of the Cold War. Thus, this book shows a clear discontinuity of the Finno-Soviet history. Finland first waged war with the Soviet Union and reconsiders its strategies for the sake of retaining Finnish independence.

Kirby, David. *A Concise History of Finland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

David Kirby's book *A Concise History of Finland* has been used to uncover the history of the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union during the course of the twentieth century. The source has been consulted, among other things, to be able to describe the developments during the Finnish Civil War. Additionally, this source has been used extensively in the chapter regarding the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev during the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, the book provided information regarding the formation of Kekkonen as president of Finland. This source was also used as reference material with which the veracity of the primary sources could be checked.

Meinander, Henrik, *A History of Finland*. London: Hurst & Company, 2011.

The book *A History of Finland* written by the Finnish historian Henrik Meinander explains the whole course of Finland's history. Meinander provides information from the years of the first inhabitants of Finland up to the Finnish accession to the European Union in 1995. For this research, the periods during the Cold War were mainly. These were conducted in order to clearly identify the historiography of this period in time. Additionally, this book has been used as reference material during the use of primary sources. In this way, deviations between what the leaders said and did could be detected. Consequently, the reliability of the relevant primary source could be tested.

Singleton, Fred. *A Short History of Finland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

In Fred Singleton's book, *A Short History of Finland*, he provided information covering the period from the Finnish Civil War to the end of World War II. Accordingly, the information in this book has been used to outline the period between these two conflicts. However, the book also provides information regarding the difficulties which occurred during the reign of Kekkonen. In this part of the book, Singleton elaborates on the disputes within the Finnish government which were caused due to Kekkonen's attitude towards Khrushchev and the Soviet Union. Additionally, the book was used as reference material and subsequently compared with claims made in primary sources. This was done to test the reliability of the primary sources.

Trotter, William. *Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40*. New York: Workman Publishing, 1991.

Historian William Trotter's book chronicles the events that took place during the Winter War of 1939. Due to the information in this book, the events leading up to the Kekkonen-Khrushchev

relationship could be described in more detail. Through this source details regarding the war could be discussed. Some examples of this are the strategies that were carried out by both sides and the reasons why Finland was able to repel the attack from the Soviet side in the first place. In contrast with the other sources regarding the period between 1939 and 1945, this source focuses on the military details of the conflicts at hand.

3. Secondary sources: Finno-Soviet relationship

Ainamo, Antti Janne Tienari and Eero Vaara. "Between West and East: A social history of business journalism in Cold War Finland." *Human Relations*, Vol. 59(5) (2006): 626.

This source provides information regarding the degree of Soviet censorship within the Finnish press during the course of the Cold War. Through this source, it could be argued that during a later stadium of Kekkonen's presidency, the Finnish media went fully along with the foreign policy known as "Finlandization". Consequently, the media became very pro-Soviet. With this information, it could be argued that Khrushchev's influence on Finland was substantial. It has turned out that it could influence not merely influence the Finnish government but also the Finnish media. Concluding, due to this article it could be argued that despite that Khrushchev never officially obliged Finland to become communist, he actively suppressed anti-Soviet and pro-Western sentiment in Finland.

Aunesluoma, Juhana and Johanna Rainio-Niemi. "Neutrality as Identity?: Finland's Quest for Security in the Cold War." *Journal of Cold War Studies* (October 2016): 51-78.

In their article, Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi provide insight into the Finnish policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The arguments regarding Finlandization of these authors have been used to further describe the controversy which was addressed at the beginning of this paper. Accordingly, these authors argue that Finland's submissive attitude towards the Soviet Union mainly stemmed from the superiority of the USSR. Consequently, Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi argue that this foreign policy was not adopted voluntarily but was strictly a necessary measure for the survival of Finland. This source was used as an example of scholars who argue that the Finno-Soviet relation was built on Soviet superiority and coercion.

Arter, David. "Kekkonen and the 'Dark Age' of Finlandised Politics?." *Irish Studies and International Affairs* (1998), 39-49.

In his article from the year 1998, the scholar David Arter describes the concept of Finlandization in more detail. In addition, Arter mentions that this phenomenon was for the first time mentioned in concrete terms in the book *A Nation on its Stomach*. Logically, this source has been consulted to clarify the definition of Finlandization. Additionally, the source has provided information regarding the emergence of this term in general which has been used at the beginning of the chapter concerning the bond between Kekkonen and Khrushchev. Accordingly, this article has contributed to clarifying the debate among academics, which is centered on the subject of Finlandization.

Enderle-Burcel, Gertrude. *Gaps in the Iron Curtain: Economic Relation between Neutral and Socialist Countries in Cold War Europe*. Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press, 2009.

This source (2009) exposes the trade relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Naturally, this source was consulted in particular for its information on trade relations between Finland and the USSR. From this source, it could be concluded that during the period of the Cold War the trade between the two nations was mainly maintained by Finland. Accordingly, this source reflected Khrushchev's attitude towards Kekkonen from a perspective apart from diplomacy. The initiative to accommodate Khrushchev constantly came from Kekkonen, not vice versa. This source makes it clear that this same phenomenon could be detected in their trade relations. Concluding, this source helped confirm the aforementioned regarding the attitude of Kekkonen towards Khrushchev.

Fields, Marek. *Defending Democracy in Cold War Finland: British and American Propaganda and Cultural Diplomacy in Finland, 1944-1970*. Boston: Brill, 2020.

In Marek Fields' book *Defending Democracy in Cold War Finland* (2020), he shows to what extent the United States of America and Great Britain influenced Finland with Western/capitalist propaganda. Fields describes how these Western nations fought communist sentiment in Finland and attempted to contain communism in Finland. His book has been used to underline Finland's complicated geographical position between the two superpowers on the world stage; The West and the East. Fields states that there was a lot of interest in Finland

among the Western powers. He argues that this was due to the amount of communist influence on the country coming from the Soviet Union.

Israelyan, Victor. *On the Battlefields of the Cold War*. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2003.

In this book (2003), Nikita Khrushchev's manner of conducting diplomacy is described in more detail. The author Victor Israelyan states that the death of Joseph Stalin brought about a clear discontinuity with regard to Soviet relations with foreign countries. In addition to this, Khrushchev's concept of "peaceful coexistence" vis-à-vis other countries is explained. Israelyan explains that Khrushchev was a fervent Leninist and consequently had a new course for the USSR in mind. It is argued that Khrushchev clearly deviated from Stalin in this respect and also criticized him for his detrimental policies. This source has been consulted to demonstrate that Khrushchev's new policies have helped pave the way for a better relationship with Finland.

Jonas, Michael. "The Politics of an Alliance: Finland in Nazi Foreign Policy and War Strategy." in *Finland in World War II*, edited by Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki, 93-138. Boston: Brill, 2012.

This abovementioned source is the chapter of the book *Finland in World War II* (2012) and provides insight into the developments which occurred during the course of the Winter War. In this chapter, Michael Jonas looks closely at the alliance between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany at the start of the Winter War. However, the main focus of this chapter is on the alliance between Finland and Nazi Germany. Here, Jonas underscores the presence of German aid during the Winter War and argues that the independence of Finland was completely dependent on German support during the Winter War. Logically, this source has been used to demonstrate the relationship between Finland and Nazi Germany and to further describe the conflicts during the Winter War.

Juntunen, Tapio. "Helsinki Syndrome: The Parachronistic Renaissance of Finlandization in International Politics." *Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations* (2017): 56-83.

This article by Tapio Juntunen (2017) describes Finland's foreign policy during the Cold War. However, this source also shows that the relationship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev has consolidated this term within international relations. Additionally, this article demonstrates the relevance of this research by addressing the conflict between Russia and Ukraine which officially started in 2014. Accordingly, this source is mainly used to demonstrate the emergent properties which are visible within the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship. This relationship has given prominence to the term Finlandization and has made it a widely researched topic. Because the origin of this term can only be linked to the relationship between these two leaders as a whole, it could be concluded that this is the emergent property of their relationship.

Karsh, Efraim. "Finland: Adaptation and Conflict." *International Affairs* (March 1986): 265-78.

The article *Finland: Adaptation and Conflict* (1985) by British-Israeli Efraim Karsh has helped address the controversy regarding the Finno-Soviet relationship which is highlighted in the introduction of this study. The arguments which are by Karsh have been in order to underline that some historians assume that dominance and coercion dominated the Finno-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. In his article, Karsh explains that Finland was forced in various ways to participate as a kind of ally of the Soviet Union. For example, Karsh argues that the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance functioned (1948) to a large extent as an instrument with which Khrushchev could exert pressure.

Khrushchev, Sergei. *Khrushchev in Power: Unfinished Reforms*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014.

The book *Khrushchev in Power: Unfinished Reforms* (2014) is a biography of Nikita Khrushchev written by his son Sergei Khrushchev. In this book, the relationship between Khrushchev and Urho Kekkonen is frequently mentioned. Important events at the time of their reign are discussed in detail, examples include meetings between Khrushchev and Kekkonen during the course of the Note Crisis. Khrushchev also frequently emphasizes the friendship between Kekkonen and Khrushchev. However, primary sources have shown that this

assumption is too oversimplified. In conclusion, it could be argued that the act that Khrushchev ascribes as friendly can rather be attributed to acting from the perspective of Realpolitik.

Lounasmeri, Kortti. "Campaigning between East and West: Finland and the Cold War in the presidential campaign films of Urho Kekkonen." *Cold War Journal* (2018): 329-47.

Lotta Lounasmeri and Jukka Kortti's article is from the year 2018 and is concerned with the use of propaganda during the Cold War. In this source, Lounasmeri shows that both Finland and Soviet propaganda was being spread during the course of the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship. This source also mentioned the movie *For the Nation*. This movie functioned as an example of the use of Finnish propaganda in support of Kekkonen's presidency. Through this source, it could be shown that both leaders regularly twisted the truth in order to achieve their interests. For example, this article showed that propaganda depicted that Finland had no choice but to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union, which influenced public opinion.

Mikkonen, Simo. "Interference or friendly gestures? Soviet cultural diplomacy and Finnish elections." *Cold War History*, Vol. 20 (2020): 349-64.

The article *Interference or friendly gestures? Soviet cultural diplomacy and Finnish elections* (2020) by Finnish scholar Simo Mikkonen has been consulted to further describe the last years of Finnish participation in the Second World War. This source shows what steps have been undertaken to bring about peace between Finland and the Soviet Union. The Moscow Armistice which was signed on September 19, 1944, was mentioned as an example. In addition, the conditions that Finland had to meet in order to be able to sign this document could be described with the information that was found within this source.

Morgan, Michael Cotey. *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

In the book *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War* by Michael Cotey (2018), the period after the Second World War is described in more detail. This book provides insight into the turbulent years of the 1960s. Accordingly, events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis are mentioned. Eventually, this led to the conclusion that tensions between the East and West increased during this period, which affected the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship substantially.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Finland and Sweden complete NATO accession talks." Accessed October 17, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197737.htm.

This source is a news item published on the website of NATO. This news article concerns the participation of Finland and Sweden in NATO on July 5, 2022. This source was used to demonstrate the relevance of this research. The renewed tension between Russia and Ukraine has shed light on the countries neighboring Russia's border. Consequently, this underlined Finland's complicated geographic position once again. Accordingly, the subject of Finlandization has gained worldwide attention.

Paloheimo, Heikki. "The Rising Power of the Prime Minister in Finland." *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 3 (August 2003): 219-41.

The article *The Rising Power of the Prime Minister in Finland* (2003) by the Finnish scholar Heikki Paloheimo provides information about the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union during the 1960s. Paloheimo states that in the period between 1960 and 1964 the relations between Kekkonen and Khrushchev stabilized. This was due to the fact that the Finnish government during this period was more pro-Soviet than the previous ones. This source has thus given insight into the last period of the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship.

Quester, George. "Finlandization as a Problem or an Opportunity?." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 512 (1990): 33-45.

George Quester's article *Finlandization as a Problem or an Opportunity?* From 1990 focuses on whether Finlandization was actually a problem or an opportunity for consolidating autonomy. This article clearly explains the concept and additionally and provides insight into the diplomatic situation between Finland and the Soviet Union during the course of the Cold War. Subsequently, this article provides insight into the debate regarding Finlandization by highlighting the issues within this debate.

Ritvanen, Juha Matti. "The change in Finnish Baltic policy as a turning point in Finnish-Soviet relations. Finland, Baltic independence and the end of the Soviet Union 1988-1991." *Journal of History* (2020): 280-81.

In this article, the Finnish scholar Juha Matti Ritvanen explains the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. However, the focus of the article is mainly on the final years of the Cold War (1988-1991). Nevertheless, this source was mainly consulted in order to be able to describe the complicated geographical position of Finland during the Cold War. In his article, Ritvanen

shows that Finland's geographic position, combined with the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of 1948 forced Finland into a complicated diplomatic position; between East and West.

Reuters. "Missiles rain down around Ukraine. " Accessed October 17, 2022.

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukraine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/>.

The abovementioned source is a news item from the international news service called Reuters. The news item announces the Russian invasion of Ukraine which occurred on February 24, 2022. The Russian invasion of Ukraine once again demonstrates the complex situation of the nations which border Russia. As a result of this invasion, Finland chose to join NATO. Tensions between Finland and Russia increased and renewed academic interest in the Finno-Russian relationship. The diplomatic attitude towards Finland is central to this debate among scholars. This source has been consulted to demonstrate the relevance of the research.

Rentola, Kimmi. "From Half-Adversary to Half-Ally: Finland in Soviet Policy, 1953-58." *Cold War History*, Vol. 1 (2000): 75-96.

The article *From Half-Adversary to Half-Ally: Finland in Soviet Policy, 1953-58* (2000) written by Finnish scholar Kimmi Rentola explains the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union during the period from 1953 to 1958. With the help of the information found in this source, it could be argued that the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance had a great influence on the relationship between Urho Kekkonen and Nikita Khrushchev. In addition, it underlined by Rentola that this treaty was the main reason that Finland could remain an independent nation during the course of the Cold War.

Selovuori, Jorma. *Power and Bureaucracy in Finland 1809-1998*. Helsinki, Prime Minister's Office and Edita, 1999.

Jorma Selovuori's book *Power and Bureaucracy in Finland 1809-1998* (1999) provides insight into the balance of power in Finland from the year 1809 until 1998. Selovuori's book was mainly consulted in order to gather information regarding the Finnish political situation during the period from 1956 until the year 1960. Accordingly, the developments that have led to increased stability within the Finno-Soviet relationship are discussed. Here, specific attention is paid to Kekkonen's foreign policy of Finlandization, and its importance is emphasized. With

the help of this source, the historiography of Finland during the Cold War could be discussed in more detail.

Tepora, Tuomas, and Aapo Roselius. *The Finnish Civil War 1918*. Boston: Brill, 2014.

As can be deduced from the title of this book, scholar Tuomas Tepora's book is a description of the events during the period of the Finnish Civil War. With the help of this book, the developments during the civil war could be described in chronological order. In this way, insight could be gained into the events that led to an increase in the stability of the Finno-Soviet relationship from 1956 onward.

Tompson, William. *Khrushchev: A Political Life*. New York. St. Martin's Press, 1995.

Scholar William Tompson's book *Khrushchev: A Political Life* describes Nikita Khrushchev's political career during the course of the Cold War. Tompson gives Khrushchev's acquisition of power a central position within this book. In addition, his book provides insight into the period between the years of 1956 and 1964. For this reason, this book has been used as reference material in order to detect inconsistencies in statements made found in primary sources.

Uutela, Marjo. "'The End of Finlandization'. Finland's Foreign Policy in the Eyes of the Two German States 1985-1990." *The International History Review* (May 2019): 410.

The article by Finnish scholar Marjo Uutela describes how other states in Europe experienced the concept of Finlandization during the end of the Cold War. Uutela also provides information regarding the concept itself, which could be used for the description of this term in this study. Likewise, Uutela's argument has been used to demonstrate the academic debate on Finlandization. Uutela believes that Khrushchev did exercise influence over Kekkonen, but provides nuance and argues that they did leave room for autonomy.

4. Primary sources

Central Intelligence Agency. "Finlandization in Action: Helsinki's Experience with Moscow." Accessed October 14, 2022. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/esau-55.pdf>

This primary source is a document of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This document presents how the Soviet Union exerted pressure on Finland during the reign of Kekkonen. In this document, it is stated that anti-Soviet propaganda was banned in Finland by Nikita Khrushchev. Consequently, this document showed that while Khrushchev did not directly force

Finland to become communist, he did everything he could to eliminate anti-Soviet and pro-Western sentiment. This attitude is also apparent from other conducted sources. Consequently, his source has been used to reinforce this argument.

Doria. "Public Responsibility for the Position of the Nation." Accessed October 14, 2022. <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/9239/TMP.objres.1443.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

This source is a speech given by Kekkonen on October 9, 1945. This source shows Kekkonen his opinion on the Finnish relationship with the Soviet Union. During this speech, Kekkonen states that maintaining a stable relationship with the USSR is of great importance for the survival of Finnish independence. Kekkonen also points out that although Finland was fighting the Soviets during World War I, it is now time to work on the Finno-Soviet band. From this speech, it could be concluded that Kekkonen argued that in 1945 the way was clear for a good relationship with the Soviet Union. Secondary sources indicate that after the major military conflicts were over, Finland's attitude could transform into one that was pro-Soviet.

Doria. "Our Policy of Neutrality." Accessed October 13, 2022. <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/11835/TMP.objres.1450.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

This source is a speech given by Kekkonen on June 7, 1957. This speech was given during a banquet that took place in Helsinki where Khrushchev was also present. From this source, it appears that Khrushchev underlined the importance of Finlandization and wanted to urge Kekkonen to continue this line. In this speech, Kekkonen underlines the importance of this foreign policy and argues that this attitude has the most positive consequences for Finland. The importance of the Agreement for Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance is also mentioned. It is stated that this is irrevocably linked to the good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union.

Doria. "The End of Cool Relations." Accessed October 13, 2022.

<https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/8591/TMP.objres.1452.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

The source is a broadcast from Kekkonen that took place on January 25, 1959, in the Finnish capital of Helsinki. During this broadcast, Kekkonen spoke publicly about the developments following the occurrence of the Night Frost Crisis. The events are discussed and Khrushchev's opinion on the Finno-Soviet relationship was stated by him. From this source, it could be concluded that Kekkonen expressed to the public that his meeting with Khrushchev in Leningrad came about completely organically. However, secondary sources have shown that this was not the case. Accordingly, the case was made that this meeting was completely set up and was beforehand aimed at stabilizing the relationship between one another.

Doria. "Finland Sticks to Her Traditional Democracy." Accessed October 13, 2022.

<https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/9587/TMP.objres.1453.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

During this meeting on September 4, 1960, between Urho Kekkonen and Nikita Khrushchev on the occasion of Kekkonen's birthday, both leaders give a speech regarding their relations with one another. Kekkonen expresses his gratitude for Khrushchev's presence during this celebration and underlines the friendship between the two leaders. This source was mainly used to demonstrate the response to the Night Frost Crisis. From this source, it could be concluded that Kekkonen is being urged to act in the interest of Khrushchev during the course of the abovementioned crisis.

Doria. "The Impending 'Note' Talks in the Soviet Union." Accessed October 14, 2022.

<https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/11710/TMP.objres.1456.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

This speech concerns Urho Kekkonen's reaction to receiving the letter from the Soviet Union. The speech was given on November 19, 1961, in the city of Jyväskylä. In this speech, Kekkonen outlines to the public that the letter was a direct response to Khrushchev's fear of the possibility of an attack from the West. This speech showed that Kekkonen was not completely transparent

toward those present. In doing so, the real reason for the letter, Kekkonen's problems with curbing anti-Soviet sentiment in Finland, was avoided.

Doria. "The Results of the 'Note Crisis'." Doria, Accessed October 14, 2022.

<https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/11047/TMP.objres.1457.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

This source concerns a broadcast on November 26 1961 in Helsinki. In this broadcast, Kekkonen describes the developments during the course of the Note Crisis. In this Kekkonen, Kekkonen once again emphasizes that this crisis came about as a result of Khrushchev's fear of an attack from the West. Thus, this source could be used to demonstrate once again that Kekkonen does not share the real cause with the Finnish population.

Doria. "The Nordic Council," Accessed October 13, 2022.

<https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/7770/TMP.objres.1459.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

This source is a speech given by Kekkonen on January 4, 1962. In this source, Kekkonen responds to the invitation for Finland to join the Nordic Council. In this speech, Kekkonen states that Finland declined the invitation because of a stable relationship with the Soviet Union. This source made it possible to argue that Kekkonen frequently had to give in to Khrushchev's wishes in order to keep the Finno-Soviet relationship stable.

Doria. "Why Finland is in Favour of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone." Accessed October 14, 2022.<https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/11883/TMP.objres.1466.html?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

During this speech by Kekkonen, given in Moscow on December 3, 1963, the placement of nuclear weapons is mentioned. Kekkonen states in this speech that Finland is against the placement of these weapons in the north of Europe. Again, by Kekkonen the argument is made that the placement of these weapons would negatively affect relations with the Soviet Union. Consequently, Kekkonen argued that the Finnish government did not agree with the placement of these weapons.

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. "246, November 16, Midnight." Accessed October 15, 2022. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/070/JFKNSF-070-003>.

This letter from the Finnish to the US government makes it clear that the main reason for sending the letter was the re-election of Kekkonen. This document has thus influenced the debate that exists among academics who question the authenticity of the origin of the Note Crisis. Likewise, this source has been cited to demonstrate the collaboration between Kekkonen and Khrushchev. This showed that Khrushchev only acted in the interest of Kekkonen if it also benefited him.

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. "248, November 17, 3 p.m.." Accessed October 15, 2022. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/070/JFKNSF-070-003>.

The abovementioned source concerns a letter from the Finnish government to the US government. In this letter, it is stated that Urho Kekkonen took advantage of the Note Crisis to advance his own interests. This document specifically states that Kekkonen used the note to secure his re-election. Consequently, this document demonstrates that although historians argue that there was no plot with Khrushchev regarding his reelection, Kekkonen did use the crisis for his own gain.

Kekkonen, Urho Kaleva. *Neutrality: The Finnish Position*. London: Heinemann, 1970.

Neutrality: The Finnish Position is a book written by Kekkonen himself. The book was published in the year 1970 and provides insight into how Kekkonen thought about Finland's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union during the course of the Cold War. This book contains several speeches given by Kekkonen during the course of his presidency. This source made it possible to describe how Kekkonen thought about his foreign policy. This information has been used as reference material to demonstrate inconsistency with Kekkonen's other primary sources.

Kekkonen, Urho Kaleva. *A President's View*. London: Heinemann, 1982.

In his book *A President's View*, published in 1982, Kekkonen provides insight into several events that occurred during the Cold War. From this source, Kekkonen's views on Finnish foreign policy could be demonstrated. In addition, in his book, it is shown that Kekkonen connected great importance to his foreign policy. Accordingly, he argues that the attitude towards the Soviet Union is strictly necessary for the protection of Finnish independence. This source has been compared with recent secondary sources in order to expose inconsistencies regarding the ideas and statements that Kekkonen made in his book.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich. *On Peaceful Co-existence*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961.

In the book *On Peaceful Coexistence*, published in 1961, Nikita Khrushchev states his views on the importance of stable relations with foreign countries. In this book, Khrushchev shows that he clearly deviates from Stalin's policy. In his book, he gives a definition of the term Peaceful coexistence. The above information has helped to provide insight into this term and Khrushchev's view of this policy. Khrushchev's views on these topics have been subjected to secondary sources regarding the historiography in order to detect falsehoods and inconsistencies.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich. *Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU*. New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961.

The book *Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU* from 1961 is a collection consisting of various documents of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). From these documents, Nikita Khrushchev's general opinion regarding the USSR's relations with other nations could be deduced. This book has been used in order to provide Khrushchev's vision regarding this subject. In addition, secondary sources have been compared with this book to detect untruths in the statements made by Khrushchev.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich. *For Victory in The Peaceful Competition with Capitalism*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959.

In his book *For Victory in The Peaceful Competition with Capitalism* (1959), Nikita Khrushchev argues how the Soviet Union should deal with the West during the course of the Cold War. This book contains several speeches given by Khrushchev during his reign. From this source, it could be deduced, among other things, that instability in the Finno-Soviet relationship was blamed on anti-Soviet politicians or anti-Soviet sentiment in Finland in general. This source has consequently contributed to the analysis regarding the Kekkonen-Khrushchev. Because of its function as reference material, falsehoods within the source could be demonstrated when compared with secondary sources.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich. *Krushchev Remembers*. Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1970.

The book *Krushchev Remembers* from the year 1970 concerns Khrushchev's memoirs. In this source, Khrushchev explains the entire history of his career. In this book, he goes into more detail about the complicated events that took place during his reign. He describes various events in the Communist Party, the Soviet Union's attitude towards other countries, and the turbulent 1960s. This source was therefore consulted in order to clarify Khrushchev's views on the Cold War and his relationship with Kekkonen. Due to the possible unreliability of this source, it has been compared with recent sources in order to demonstrate inconsistencies or untruths.

Marxists Internet Archive. "Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.." Accessed October 14, 2022. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm>.

This concerns a speech by Nikita Khrushchev from 1956 that took place shortly after the death of Joseph Stalin. This source confirms the fact that Khrushchev split from Stalin's policies and clearly wanted to steer the Soviet Union in a different direction. During this speech, Khrushchev criticized Stalin's policy on the purges and also argued that the government of the Soviet Union should have less power. This source has been used at the beginning of this paper and has been consulted in order to present the foundation beneath the Kekkonen-Khrushchev relationship. Several other sources have shown that Khrushchev indeed clearly deviated from Stalin.

Marxist Internet Archive. "Speech given at the dinner in honour of the Finnish Government Delegation." Accessed October 13, 2022.

<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1948/04/07.htm>.

In this speech, by Joseph Stalin in 1948, he states that the Soviet Union must improve its ties with Finland. In addition, Stalin underscores the importance of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance for achieving this goal. This source has been used to show that after the conflicts that took place during World War II, both Finland and the Soviet Union started to focus on good relations with each other. A quote from this speech is used to demonstrate this. Although Stalin was not known for his truthfulness, current historians show that he spoke the truth during this speech and accordingly took steps to improve the Finno-Soviet relationship.

Petroleks. "About The War with Finland." Accessed 14 October, 2022.

<https://petroleks.ru/stalin/14-18.php>.

This source is a speech given by Joseph Stalin in the year 1940. In this speech, Stalin focuses on the importance and value of the city of Leningrad. During this speech, Stalin argues that Finland poses a threat due to its proximity to Leningrad. In addition, Stalin refers to the strategic and economic significance of the city and underlines the fragility of this goal and the drastic consequences for the Soviet Union. The information in this source has exposed one of the main reasons for the conflicts between Finland and the Soviet Union during the early 1940s has been tried to demonstrate. Stalin's claim has also been confirmed by other sources.

Yle. "For the Nation Election Film." Accessed October 14, 2022. <https://areena.yle.fi/1-50105728>.

This source concerns the website of the main media platform in Finland called "Yle". The link refers to the propaganda film *For The Nation*. This film is an example of propaganda carried out by the Finnish government for the sake of Kekkonen's presidency. In this film, it is indicated that Finland has no other option than fraternization with the Soviet Union. This film is mentioned in Kortti Lounasmeri's article *Campaigning between East and West* in which the actual reason behind this film is stated. In this article, it was confirmed that the film was used as a propaganda tool that was aimed at positively influencing the campaign of Urho Kekkonen.

Through this source, it could be shown that Kekkonen did not shy away from twisting the truth in his favor.