Sharing is Caring: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation Model applied to European Union counterterrorism intelligence cooperation

Hage, Noraly

SHARING IS CARING

Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation Model applied to European Union counterterrorism intelligence cooperation

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE

Noraly Hage
S3128911
MSc International Organisation
Leiden University 2022 - 2023
Thesis Seminar International Organisation
Supervisor: Prof. dr. Müge Kinacioglu
Second reader: Dr. H. van Meegdenburg
Word count: 9992
16-01-2023

Abstract

This study examines the extent to which the Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation (MIC) model can account for the increase in intelligence cooperation between European Union Member States (EU MS) in the field of counterterrorism. It is an explanatory deductive study employing qualitative methods, more specifically process-tracing, using data obtained from interviews and analysis of primary and secondary sources. The Madrid 2004 bombings and November 2015 Paris attacks are used as case studies to provide in-depth analysis of the MIC framework. The findings indicate that the driver internal demand contributes significantly to a MS' decision to engage in intelligence exchange. The other two drivers, external pressure and cooperative momentum, are clearly discernible but have a smaller impact. Additionally, this research examines the MIC model's limitations and discusses alternative factors crucial for establishing effective multilateral intelligence cooperation.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

CT	Counterterrorism
CT JLT	Counter terrorism Joint Liaison Teams
ECTC	European Counter Terrorist Centre
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU	European Union
EU MS	European Union Member State(s)
IIC	International intelligence cooperation
IS	Islamic State
MIC	Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation
OC	Organised crime
SIENA	Secure Information Exchange Network Application
SOC	Serious organised crime
TE-SAT	EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report

Introduction

After the infamous terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, Europol Director Jürgen Storbeck was explicit in his demands, *"Simply provide us with what we need for our work: information"* (Fägersten, 2010, p. 505; Occhipinti, 2003, p. 149). Since 2001, the European Union (EU) has adopted substantial laws and regulations to encourage intelligence cooperation (de Vries, 2005). The exponential growth in international intelligence cooperation (IIC), according to Sir Stephen Lander (2004), a former Director General of MI5, is the most important development in the intelligence community. The vast majority of terrorists and terrorist organisations have an increasingly globalised component, compelling intelligence and security agencies to globalise their operations (Aldrich, 2009). The expanding transnational nature of several terrorist organisations illuminates that only a global effort will be able to lead to their detection, interruption, and annihilation (Bilgi, 2016; Lefebvre, 2003, p.527). Despite the growing importance of this transnational threat, EU member states (MS) are still sceptical to exchange intelligence (Bureš, 2016). Nonetheless, the EU is witnessing an overall increase in intelligence cooperation (Tuinier, 2021, p.117). Hence, an increasingly dynamic EU security actor is the result of constant push and pull between states striving to protect their sovereignty while considering their interdependence concerning ongoing security challenges (Ari, 2020). For the abovementioned reasons, the question arises as to what determines the extent to which states engage in IIC.

The Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation (MIC) explanatory model proposed by Fägersten (2010, p. 4) aims to address underlying motives for cooperation as well as variations in the form of cooperation. Considering the aforementioned factors, this thesis will address the following research question: *to what extent does the Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation (MIC) model account for the increase in intelligence cooperation between EU member states in the field of counterterrorism?*

This research has academic as well as societal implications. Academically, it intends to fill the current literature gap and enrich knowledge on IIC. The leading concepts of (neo)realism dominate the debate on IIC. When applying central neorealist concepts- state centrality, cost-benefit analysis, and rational decision-making-, it remains puzzling why IIC occurs, and is rising, in multilateral contexts like the EU (Tuinier, 2021, p.124). A more thorough understanding of IIC will result from developing concepts that are better suited to address intelligence cooperation from a multilevel perspective.

The research question also addresses a broader societal relevance. Studying current-day IIC has a practical value as it offers insights in how intelligence cooperation can best support decision advantage for policymakers (Tuinier, 2021, p.117). The provision of correct and timely intelligence can arm policymakers to make well-informed decisions. Undergoing this study is thus crucial to ensure enhanced intelligence sharing and a decreased risk of terrorist attacks. Assuring greater and specifically more successful cooperation among EU MS will make the Union more cohesive and live up to the adage *"united we stand, divided we fall"* (Novotná, 2017, p.1).

Using qualitative methods, this paper will adapt the MIC model to two terrorist attacks: Madrid 2004 and Paris November 2015. These attacks resulted in killings on a scale that the EU had not witnessed before, underscoring the necessity for further cooperation in the field of CT. Governments today have the never-ending task of attempting to evaluate the threat posed by terrorist groups in the absence of complete information (Acre & Sandler, 2007). By means of these two cases this study will produce a deeper understanding of what drives intelligence-sharing across EU MS, particularly in the context of CT and address how terrorism's momentum encourages cooperation, specifically when unilateral responses have proven to be ineffective (Crenshaw, 2019). The research will, on a more general level, increase knowledge and application of the MIC model, which has primarily been used theoretically. Testing the

framework in light of two specific EU cases will aim to create a deeper understanding of the EU's increased efforts for CT cooperation, from a multilevel and multifactorial perspective, and thereby its implications for the EU agency.

The next chapter of this thesis will present a thorough outline of the academic debate on both international and European intelligence cooperation. It will clarify the current literature gap and how this thesis intends to close it. The second chapter will present the theoretical framework, providing an extensive explanation of the MIC model and other relevant key concepts and theories. Following, the third chapter will focus on the research's methodology and outline the processes used to collect and analyse data. The fourth chapter offers the analysis of the obtained data, placing the findings in a broader context related to the research topic. The last chapter will revise the main take-aways, specify the limitations of this research and provide recommendations for future research.

Part I: Literature Review

After the events of 9/11, the literature on IIC became more prevalent (Crawford, 2010; Tuinier, 2021, p.119), as prior to this it was sparse (Lefebvre, 2003). According to Lander (2004. p.481) IIC can be considered an oxymoron: intelligence merely has value when it is given to the ones who need it, but the more it is given, the greater the risk that it may be compromised, and the less valuable it will be (McGruddy, 2013, p.215 & Taillon, 2002, p.175). Simply put, despite being a crucial tool in fending off today's sophisticated transnational threats, IIC carries numerous risks (Tuinier et al., 2022, p.1-2). Consequently, achieving successful intelligence cooperation does not come easy and necessitates key components such as confidence, trust, common grounds, and perceived benefits to both sides (Lefebvre, 2003, p.528; Walsh, 2006).

1.1 International Intelligence Cooperation (IIC)

This study is placed in the general context of IIC, which has been analysed by various scholars. International intelligence liaison is another term for IIC (Aldrich, 2009). Although it may be argued that each term has a distinct focus, both terms will be used synonymously in this thesis.

Over the years 'intelligence' has enjoyed an increasing amount of attention in academic research. According to Van Puyvelde and Curtis (2016) 'intelligence' is a young but rapidly growing discipline that has already produced a substantial body of knowledge. Nevertheless, Aldrich (2009) argues that because of its secret nature and difficult access to empirical data, IIC is highly concerned with confidentiality, limiting the breadth and depth of current research.

A signification portion of the publications scrutinised in the field of IIC take a neorealist stance, fusing the ideas of state rivalry, self-interest, and the weighing of cost-benefits (Tuinier, 2021, p.122). Lefebvre (2003, p.534), for instance, argues that states primarily operate in favour of their foreign policy goals and in their own self-interest. According to Richelson (1990), intelligence cooperation occurs when the potential benefits are evident, and the costs or risks are well understood. Tuinier (2021, p.122-123) expands on this assertion by stating

that cooperation will solely occur when the perceived costs are clearly outweighed by the self-indulgent benefits. Additionally, Lefebvre (2003), argues that filling in the known-unknowns and lowering operational expenses are two important advantages of IIC, and serve as incentives to engage in it. Taillon (2002) contradicts this by reasoning that a nation's tunnel vision focused on its own policy objectives could restrain intelligence liaison relationships as disparities in threat perception could prevent a coordinated and effective approach.

The (neo)realist view holds that cooperation resembles a zero-sum game in which one state benefits at the expense of the other. Crawford (2010) argues in favour of this by stating that intelligence cooperation "drives up distrust and defensive positioning, even among relatively close allies" (p.2). However, in practice, this is not always the case, demonstrating that the (neo)realist stance fails to incorporate a more relational approach (Tuinier, 2021). The (neo)realist reasoning cannot account for the evolution and increase in scope and depth of today's IIC (Tuinier, 2021, p.123). Richard Aldrich (2002) was one of the first academics to advocate for viewing intelligence institutions as exemplars of (neo)liberalism rather than (neo)realism. Despite this assertion, the leading concepts of (neo)realism continue to hold predominance in the debate (Tuinier, 2021). Overall, this forms a current research gap, where the majority of current literature falls short on explaining the current depth and breadth of international intelligence cooperation, especially in a multilateral setting (Tuinier, 2021, p. 123-124).

1.2 EU intelligence cooperation and European integration

Literature on EU intelligence cooperation, the focus of this thesis, has mainly focused on agreements, frameworks, authority, and institutional growth (Fägersten, 2014; Monar, 2007; Müller-Wille, 2002; van Buuren, 2014; Zimmerman, 2006). The potential of EU intelligence cooperation is presented in a somewhat negative light in current literature. Fägersten (2014) poses the question "why would European governments that have been fighting hard for their

sovereignty be willing to cede it in the security area by coordinating the work of their national security services?" but also acknowledges that "the increasing number of transnational risks resulting from interconnected societies demand effective international collaboration" (p.94). According to Walsh (2006), the EU lacks a sense of mutual trust creating a key barrier to achieving intelligence cooperation. Müller-Wille (2002, 2008) argues that EU cross-border and cross-agency intelligence cooperation is becoming more common, albeit not through EU institutions but through bilateral partnerships. He extends this claim and contends that because of their geographic position, prior knowledge, and established network, MS are better prepared to carry out operational duties, indicating that the EU is unable to generate intelligence of the same calibre as MS (Müller-Wille, 2008). Lastly, Bilgi (2016, p.63) notes that despite EU intelligence cooperation being desirable for all MS and the Union as a whole, EU structures are complex and unclear, and in line with Walsh's (2006) assertion, maintain a lack of trust. Overall, there is widespread agreement among academics regarding the significance of the rising number of transgovernmental networks in the European intelligence domain (Herman, 1996; Fägersten, 2014; van Buuren, 2014).

A well-known theoretical premise that could explain the dynamic nature of enhanced IIC is the theory of European integration (Dinan et al., 2017, p.1). According to Fägersten (2014) a major driving force behind cooperation is internal demand brought about by European integration. Integration through the lens of *intergovernmentalism*, focuses on the creation of political institutions to which member states subscribe (Wiener & Diez, 2009, p.3). According to the theory of intergovernmentalism, states are willing to cede sovereignty to the extent necessary to deliver an efficient and security-enhancing crisis response, particularly in the case of international security threats, such as terrorism (Dinan et al., 2017, p.4). This assertion is consistent with the first driver of the MIC model, *internal demand*, which claims incentive to cooperate will increase in the wake of a crisis, such as a (domestic) terrorist attack.

Current literature has discussed the general difficulties of multilateral intelligence cooperation (see Lefebvre, 2003; Sims, 2006; Walsh, 2007). However, aside from Fägersten's (2010) MIC model, academic research has not yet proposed a new, comprehensive framework to explain the dynamics of IIC. The MIC model has been applied by Pronk and Korteweg (2021) in their Clingendael report on intelligence-sharing. Nonetheless, the authors do not adapt the full model to the EU as they focus on the driver *internal demand*, and apply the two remaining drivers to different cases, such as Asia. Since the models' drivers are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary, the model should be adapted as a whole (Fägersten, 2010). By applying the full framework, this thesis seeks to provide a more thorough understanding of IIC in the field of CT, specifically focused on the EU.

Part II: Theoretical framework

There is no consensus among intelligence scholars on the exact definition of intelligence. Nevertheless, to conduct research one must define the topic at hand. *Intelligence* in this study is hence defined as the gathering and analysis of public and confidential information with the aim of lowering policymakers' level of ambiguity over a security policy issue (Walsh, 2006, p. 626-627; Herman, 1966; Hilsman, 1952, p.5). In other words, intelligence concerns the process in which any kind of information is collected, analysed, evaluated and presented to decision-makers to prevent tactical or strategic surprise (Bilgi, 2016, p.57). It is crucial to collect, analyse, and disseminate timely and accurate information in the field of terrorism in order to prevent attacks and apprehend suspects (de Vries, 2005; Walsh, 2006). Traditionally, intelligence-related operations are considered essential to a state's sovereignty and at the core of national security. According to Lefebvre (2003, p.528) human intelligence must be obtained to better comprehend and counter terrorist organisations.

International intelligence cooperation (IIC) will follow the following definition: "partners from different nationalities working together for mutual benefit in the deliberate collection and enhancing of data and information, aimed at establishing a competitive knowledge advantage in matters of national security" (Richelson, 1990; Tuinier, 2021, p.118). As previously mentioned, multilateral intelligence cooperation arrangements have increased significantly over the past decades, especially in the CT realm (Lefebvre, 2003).

2.1 Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation (MIC) model

The MIC model proposed by Fägersten (2010, 2014) aims to identify which factors sway states towards cooperation. It is based on three drivers: internal demand, external pressure, and cooperative momentum. All three drivers have multiple mechanisms which could push states in the direction of cooperation. *Table 1* summarises the mechanisms and its drivers.

Table 1. Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation Framework

Internal Demand	External Pressure	Cooperative Momentum
- Perceived national functional needs. - Perceived common functional needs. - Specialisation	- Balancing allies - Balancing threats	- Trust building - Institutional dynamics

Based on: Fägersten, 2010, p.15-23

2.1.1. Internal demand

Internal demand implies that the motivation for cooperation lies within the states themselves. These demands may originate from political or public spheres, particularly in the wake of a domestic attack (Fägersten, 2010). The lowering of national costs when bundling intelligence together may also sway EU member states to seek intelligence gains from cooperation (Pronk & Korteweg, 2021). The following mechanisms affect internal demand: perceived national functional needs, perceived common functional needs, and specialisation.

The first mechanism *perceived national functional needs,* argues that the development of intelligence capacity is the solution to MS' domestic problem(s) they are unable or unwilling to address unilaterally. Domestic need could spring from domestic terrorism, a deteriorating internal security situation, or a loss of faith in the nation's intelligence capabilities. In general, if a government believes there is national need, it will seek intelligence benefits through cooperation. The state may engage in cooperation to advance policy goals if the public or the media is the source of the need for cooperation. Thus, perceived national necessity promotes cooperation by expanding the pool of intelligence and policy gains.

Perceived common functional need argues that intelligence cooperation is needed to meet shared demands that have emerged as a result of more widespread changes inside the EU.

It stands to reason that the necessity for "common" information to support common policies on internal and external security has increased. This essentially represents the neo-functional hypothesis, which holds that demands for one political solution will spur calls for another and that functional spill over will direct the integration process (Fägersten, 2010).

The third mechanism, *specialisation,* implies that states believe they can collaborate to find more cost-efficient solutions, such as the reduction of national costs through the pooling of intelligence resources. States might be persuaded to cooperate and gain intelligence if doing so will allow them to cut expenses at national level or compensate for limited capabilities and expertise.

2.1.2 External pressure

The second driver *external pressure* is focused on factors exogenous to the cooperating states (Fägersten, 2010). When analysing state behaviour, traditional realism views external pressure as a key explanatory component. As states in the international system have limited room for manoeuvre, changes in the international system result in changes of state behaviour (Lander, 2004; Pronk & Korteweg, 2021). The mechanisms of external pressure include balancing allies and balancing threats.

A shift of intelligence power in the world system could evoke change according to the first mechanism, *balancing allies.* Intelligence power is the degree of intelligence capabilities at a given actor's disposal and can influence the dynamics of international intelligence power (Fägersten, 2010, p.18). For instance, if actor A develops their intelligence capacity, actor B can feel the need to maintain a healthy balance to prevent intelligence dependency. Hence, actor B may decide to increase its own intelligence capabilities to become a more desirable partner or to achieve a higher level of intelligence autonomy.

A shift in intelligence power amongst actors could also influence the second mechanism, *balancing threats.* In order to balance out the threat and enhance security position,

an actor may influence another player to do the same by enhancing its own intelligence capabilities. By investing more domestic resources into intelligence, or by looking for intelligence gains through cooperation with other players, intelligence capabilities can be increased. A state may be motivated to pursue intelligence gains through cooperation if a common external threat puts its intelligence capacity at risk (Fägersten, 2010, p. 19). For example, NATO faced the common threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, motivating allies to share large amounts of intelligence on Soviet intentions and capabilities (Lefebvre, 2003, p.529).

2.1.3 Cooperative momentum

Cooperative momentum is the final driver and stems from the notion that cooperation develops naturally during the course of cooperation and is kept in place by institutional design (Fägersten, 2010, p.19-21). Once a cooperative structure is put in place, there will be endogenous mechanisms encouraging and facilitating cooperation.

The first mechanism is *trust-building*. Without trust it is hard to establish cooperation, let alone further advance intelligence cooperation (Walsh, 2006). The two basic techniques for building trust are the inductive method, which involves risk-taking, and the deductive method, which involves getting familiar with and finding common preferences. The first process, risk-taking, is built on the notion that trust-building requires taking risks since every successful action or risk taken on behalf of others builds trust. The second process is getting familiar with the preferences of others, as uncertainty about preferences is an exhaustible source of distrust (Fägersten, 2010, p.21-22). Common preferences consequently result in more trust as the depth and breadth of intelligence exchange depends on common threat perception among actors (Lefebvre, 2003, p.529). Both processes of trust-building develop over time and promote intelligence sharing.

Institutional dynamics is the second driver and relates to the effects of institutional design. It centres on the issue of whether the state's level of cooperation is increased or decreased depending on the cooperative structure that has been adopted. Free-riding and manipulation are two issues that frequently arise in IIC (Fägersten, 2010, p.22). The former describes actors who profit from cooperation without providing any of the necessary resources. The latter is concerned with the risk of one actor purposely providing intelligence only in support of its intended course of action, thus influencing the common good for its own gain. Establishing institutions which foster efficient and equitable cooperation can decrease the risk of free-riding and/or manipulation.

2.2 Intelligence sharing and IR theory

Intelligence cooperation has been analysed through the lens of multiple political perspectives. The school of (neo)realism continues to be the one that academics turn to the most (Crawford, 2010; Lander, 2004; Phythian, 2008; Sims, 2006). Institutionalism has also received academic attention (Aldrich, 2002; Johnson, 2008; Munton, 2009), albeit much less than (neo)realism. Realism rests on two basic assumptions: "the international system is anarchic and based on self-help" (Phythian, 2008; Sims, 2006, p. 196; Tuinier, 2021, p.122). These characteristics, according to Phythian (2008), increase the demand for good intelligence as intelligence is needed to discover "impossible" knowledge, and to provide advance warning of predicted threats. Sims' work (2006) builds on this by concluding that one can anticipate states to cooperate with one another in order to fulfil their self-interest in augmenting power and fending off threats to ensure state survival. Intelligence can hence be seen as the tool utilised by states to maintain or extend their relative advantage (Lander 2004; Phythian, 2008; Tuinier, 2021). Therefore, according to realism, whether intelligence liaison will benefit a state's own interests determines whether a state will participate in intelligence cooperation (den Boer, 2015; Müller-Wille, 2008). Realism emphasises the implications of anarchy but fails to consider international

institutions and the impact they have on states and inter-state cooperation. Liberal institutionalism on the other hand, emphasises this role.

Liberal institutionalism claims that intelligence-sharing is fostering a network of cooperation by encouraging norms and rules that serve to generate certainty and alter actor preferences (Munton, 2009). Institutionalism contends that states strive for cooperation since joint games can only be fully utilised in anarchic international systems. Institutions at the international level thus encourage cooperation. Within institutionalism actors view each other more as partners rather than rivals, contrary to the realist view (Tuinier, 2021), in order to ensure the improved comfort and wellbeing of their own populations (Gierco, 1988). Additionally, institutionalism incorporates humanitarian factors which foster cooperation.

2.2.1 MIC model in IR theory

Up to now scholars have mostly adapted (neo)realism or liberal institutionalism to account for the level of intelligence cooperation. The MIC model, however, combines the two perspectives. The *internal demand* and *external pressure* drivers of the model adhere to realism. The former contends that states will be willing to cooperate if it is perceived to fulfil national needs. In line with the realist reasoning that cooperation has a national tasking and national mandate (Tuinier, 2021). The latter corresponds to the distribution of power in the international system and argues that states will be willing to enhance intelligence capacities or engage in intelligence cooperation when their position is being threatened or to support allies against a common threat. This is in line with the realist argument that states will form and strengthen alliances as common threats increase (Waltz, 2010; Walt, 1987, 2017). The third driver of the MIC model, *cooperative momentum*, incorporates the institutional design of an institution and contends that the presence of trust is essential for successful cooperation, relating back to institutional literature. Realism notes that states can never be certain of other states' intentions as there is a lack of trust between them. The cooperative momentum driver of the MIC model accounts for

this by incorporating the mechanism of trust-building to ensure trust between MS. Overall, intelligence cooperation displays a duality between realism and liberal institutionalism. The MIC model adopts a novel approach by fusing these two widely used political perspectives.

Part III: Methodology

This research is an explanatory deductive study employing qualitative methods, more specifically process-tracing. As this research is largely concerned with testing the MIC model it will use the specific form of theory-testing process-tracing, which "enables inferences to be made about whether a causal mechanism was present in a single case and whether the mechanisms functioned as expected" (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p.15). The study is deductive in the sense that it will examine whether the existing MIC model can account for the increased and dynamic European intelligence cooperation. Although analysis of more than one case is not necessary for process tracing, this study will look at two cases to improve external validity. The two selected case studies detail the largest terrorist attacks to have occurred on European soil since 9/11: Madrid or referred to as '3M' (March 2004) and Paris or referred to as 'Paris attacks' (November 2015). Since there was no comprehensive EU CT strategy in place before 9/11, it is chosen as the starting point representing a critical turning point in EU CT policy (Bureš, 2016; Coolsaet, 2016; Europol, n.d.; Zimmerman, 2006).

3.1 Multiple case study design

According to Yin (2009) a clear advantage of a multiple case study is the ability to analyse data within each situation and across different situations. A multiple case study design is also helpful in analysing the similarities and differences between cases whilst extending a higher degree of reliability as opposed to single-case studies (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Stake, 1995).

3.1.1 Case selection

The terrorist attacks of Madrid in 2004 and Paris in 2015 have been selected through the lens of *most similar systems design* (Anckar, 2008), demonstrating similarities in contextual factors. The similarities between the cases helps reduce the chance of a potentially misleading relationship between the independent and dependent variable (Anckar, 2008). Numerous similarities exist between the attacks in Madrid and Paris. First, the impact of both cases is

almost equal in terms of casualties and both attacks carry a terrorist motive. Additionally, both cases occurred on the soil of an EU MS, with both states being an EU MS prior to the attack. Third, both countries roughly share the same GDP, indicating comparable resources at their disposal. Fourth, both cases have sufficient reports, articles, and other written work available which can be used to analyse. The main critical distinction between the cases is the time period. The Paris attacks case is picked as it is more than ten years after the first (3M) and can therefore be used to trace the steps taken by national governments and the EU in relation to intelligence cooperation to examine whether they differ between 2004 and 2015.

3.2 Data gathering and analysis

The primary ambition of this study is to "*explain a particular outcome through the testing of theorised causal mechanisms*" (Beach and Pederson, 2013, p.70). Data and sources are hence crucial for determining whether the MIC model can account for the dynamics of intelligence cooperation with reference to the two selected cases. To compile information, semi-structured interviews have been conducted alongside extensive analysis by means of processing. The interviews have been held with Europol employees as Europol is the EU's central law enforcement agency and the major EU security actor with a terrorism-focused mission. Using the tool, Atlas.ti and the coding scheme outlined below, the interviews have been coded. For further processing this research conducted a textual analysis of both primary and secondary sources. When events can no longer be observed, documents can offer useful data by providing background knowledge and context (Bowen, 2009). Primary sources include official EU and government documents, such as investigation reports and official statements. Secondary sources involve journal and newspaper articles, reports, books, and other written work authored by third parties. The snowball method has been used to acquire data, which has the benefit of identifying sources and respondents who might otherwise have been difficult to find. Leiden

library and the internet, such as google scholar and official EU websites, have been used to access available written work.

3.2.1 Internal demand

The first driver, *internal demand*, can be identified by its mechanisms; aiming to gain national needs, working towards a common goal, or the cost-benefit analysis of combining resources (Fägersten, 2010, p.16-18). This implies that internal state motivation is the driving force behind international intelligence cooperation (Fägersten, 2010, p.16). After a domestic attack, this driver will likely change as crises can stimulate integration. This driver will be identified through public opinion of and national need for intelligence cooperation. References to public opinion will be acquired through Eurobarometer results, the media, and other written work. For the interviews, the following references will be given the code internal demand:

Table 2: Operationalisation 'internal demand'

1.	References being made to the domestic need for intelligence cooperation.
2.	References being made to the domestic need for cooperation due to serious security challenges.
3.	References being made to the domestic need for cooperation due to EU dependency.
4.	References being made to cost-benefit analysis for intelligence cooperation.
5.	References being made to the bundling of resources as a result of (intelligence) cooperation.

3.2.2 External pressure

External pressure is concentrated on factors exogenous to the cooperating states (Fägersten, 2010, p.18). This driver can be seen in efforts to increase intelligence gathering and cooperation because allies are doing the same, or because common external threats force a state to seek intelligence benefits through cooperation (Fägersten, 2010, p.19). The following references will be coded for the driver external pressure:

Table 3: Operationalisation 'external pressure'

1.	References being made to changes in the international system which fosters cooperation.
2.	References being made to intelligence benefits as a result of increased cooperation.
3.	References being made to the reduction of sovereignty costs as a result of increased cooperation.
4.	References being made to having a common threat (perception).

3.2.3 Cooperative momentum

The last driver, *cooperative momentum*, contends that established cooperative structures facilitate cooperation (Fägersten, 2010, p.19). Its first mechanism, trust-building, involves active efforts to foster greater levels of trust among cooperating MS (Fägersten, 2010, p.20). The second mechanism, institutional dynamics, concerns institutional design and examines whether the chosen form of cooperative structure encourages greater interstate cooperation (Fägersten, 2010, p.21). Operationalisation of this driver is presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Operationalisation 'cooperative momentum'

1.	References being made to the relationship between trust and cooperation, and EU trust-building efforts.
2.	References being made to institutional dynamics and structures which foster cooperation.
3.	References being made to issues of free riding.
4.	References being made to issues of the manipulation of information.

Part IV: Analysis

5.1 Case description

5.1.1. Madrid Bombings March 2004

On the 11th of March 2004, a total of 10 bombs detonated just minutes apart from each other on four commuter trains in the Spanish capital Madrid during morning rush hour (BBC News, 2004b). The trains, on the rail route from Alcala de Henares to Madrid (see figure 1), were full of working-class commuters, students, and schoolchildren (BBC News, 2004a). The blast of the explosives resulted in 191 fatalities and over 1,800 injured, making it go down as the greatest terror attack in Europe since the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 (Burridge, 2014; Segell, 2005). Investigators believe the terrorists planned to detonate the devices simultaneously in order to maximise their force and cause severe damage to the train station (BBC News, 2004a).

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the Spanish government named the Basque separatist group ETA as the main suspect (BBC News, 2004b; Segell, 2005). However, later proof indicated that the attacks were the work of Islamic extremists. Al-Qaeda's military spokesman in Europe acknowledges responsibility of the attack in a video three days later, on March 14th.

Figure 1: Map of Madrid 2004 Attacks
Source: BBC news, n.d.

5.1.2. Paris Attacks November 2015

France was left devastated following the attacks in Paris on the night of November Friday 13th as gunmen and suicide bombers hit a concert hall, a major stadium, restaurants, and bars almost simultaneously (see figure 2; BBC News, 2015). The multiple mode of operation was designed to overwhelm French emergency response capabilities (Chauzal et al., 2015; Europol, 2016; Homeland Security Advisory Council [HSAC], 2016). The attacks resulted in 130 fatalities, 495 injuries and thousands in the state of shock (Eurojust, 2018). President Francois Hollande referred to the attacks as an "act of war" carried out by the extremist organisation Islamic State (IS) (BBC News, 2015). Seven of the assailants were from Belgium and France, and had previously travelled to Syria to support IS. In total, French and Belgian authorities discovered 30 individuals to be involved in the attacks (BBC, 2016; Cragin, 2017).



Figure 2: Map and times of November 2015 Paris attacks
Source: BBC news, 2015.

5.2 Internal demand

The Eurobarometer offers useful insights into how the general public feels about EU issues. The results of the Eurobarometer have been compared of both countries prior to and after the

attack, helping provide a clear picture of the potential shift in public perception regarding (international) terrorism.

5.2.1 Madrid 2004

The outcomes of the Eurobarometer are presented in table 2. Noticeable is the slight increase in public prioritisation of terrorism after the Madrid bombings on both the national agenda as the EU agenda. Also, interesting to note is the decrease in percentage of respondents who would favour a unified foreign policy against terrorism. The Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE) also carried out a barometer amongst the Spanish population. Contradictory to the outcomes of the EU Eurobarometer, the BRIE found 97% of the Spanish respondents to consider cooperation on CT within the EU as 'important', with 91% considering it as 'very important' (Reinares, 2009). In line with existing literature, these results indicate that a crisis, or in this case, domestic terrorist attack, increases the willingness to cooperate (Dinan et al., 2017).

Table 2: Eurobarometer results Spain

	Eurobarometer Spain
National need	
% Of the respondents who consider terrorism to be one of the two most important issues facing Spain	
Eurobarometer Spring 2003	51%
Eurobarometer Spring 2004	58%
Difference	+4%
Common need	
% Of the respondents who consider the fight against terrorism to be a top priority for the EU	
Eurobarometer Spring 2003	93%
Eurobarometer Spring 2004	95%
Difference	+2%
% Of the respondents who tend to trust the EU in the fight against terrorism	
Eurobarometer Spring 2003	54%
Eurobarometer Spring 2004	58%
Difference	+4%
Specialisation	
% Of the respondents who are in favour of a common foreign policy among EU MS in the fight against terrorism	
Eurobarometer Spring 2003	76%
Eurobarometer Spring 2004	69%
Difference	-7%

Source: European Commission, 2003 & European Commission 2004

Hours after the attacks, the Aznar government came under increasing public pressure to provide a convincing justification of what appeared to be an intelligence failure to prevent the attack and identify the perpetrators. Three days after 3M, Spanish voters reversed their apparent course to re-elect the serving Aznar government and elected the socialist Zapatero government (Acre & Sandler, 2007; Reinares 2009). Additionally, an estimated ten million people went out on the streets the day after the attacks clearly showing their dissatisfaction with the former Prime Minister Jose Maria Anzar and his administration (Segell,2005).

After the 3M attacks, the public blamed the government for not having given the fight against global terrorism due priority (Reinares, 2009). The attacks underlined the (public) need for better and increased EU intelligence-sharing (Coolsaet, 2016, p.320). Interviewee 1 stated that *"an extrinsic part of the motivation to cooperate is … the need to display commitment in the public eyes",* thereby stressing the relationship between public perception and internal demand. The Spanish government agreed with the public perception that the transnational threat of terrorism cannot effectively be addressed singularly and acknowledged that intelligence sharing can prove vital for national interests (Bosilca, 2013). These findings demonstrate that crisis, the 3M attack, can spur integration through an increased internal demand. Alarmed by the news that international Jihadist terrorism had now struck the European heartland, the Spanish government, along with the governments of Europe, reaffirmed their ambition to channel more intelligence and support to Europol (Acre & Sandler, 2007; Aldrich, 2004; Fägersten, 2010).

As predefined in the literature, cooperation will take place if the strategic calculus favours it (Fägersten, 2010). The mechanism *specialisation* states that bundling resources will increase gains. In line with this theoretical approach, interviewee 1 mentioned that:

"A desire for intelligence gains … could theoretically be seen as pragmatic motivation to step towards common – more cost-efficient solutions while minimising costs in terms of loss of autonomy and increased vulnerability." (Interviewee 1)

This line of reasoning was visible in the aftermath of the 3M attacks where interstate and interorganisational cooperation led to the identification of those responsible. Within hours of the attack the prime suspects were directly connected as a result of data collation and analysis of local, Europol, and international databases (Segell, 2005). Furthermore, Belgian police were able to detain fifteen men suspected of planning attacks in Belgium, thanks to the intelligence sharing through Europol, consequently preventing another attack (Segell, 2005). Later research revealed that while Spain, France, German, and Norway had leads on terrorist activities related to 3M, they were all missing some pieces of the puzzle (Aldrich, 2004). This exemplifies the need to group resources to provide an overview. Interviewee 2 mentioned that states are willing to cooperation when *"they see that with Europol … you can identify elements that at the national level you may not have been able to identify"*, stressing the link between internal demand and cost-efficient solutions.

5.2.2 Paris November 2015

The results of the French Eurobarometer are displayed in table 3. Noticeable are the overall lower percentages compared to Spain. A possible explanation for this is France's richer history with terrorism, such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015. Nevertheless, there was a relatively high increase in respondents who consider terrorism to be one of the two most important issues facing France and the EU (+ 12 %). Another distinction from Spain is that in the wake of the assaults more respondents appear to support a common EU foreign policy (+3%). In fact, studies on public threat perception following the Paris attacks show that respondents believe terrorism is primarily a problem for the EU and much less so for their own

nation. This implies a gradual shift of public opinion in Europe toward viewing security as a common good rather than a national one (Streber & Steenberger, 2017)

Table 3: Eurobarometer results France

Eurobarometer France	
National need	
% Of the respondents who consider terrorism to be one of the two most important issues facing France	
Eurobarometer Spring 2015	18%
Eurobarometer Spring 2016	30%
Difference	+12%
Common need	
% Of the respondents who consider terrorism to be one of the two most important issues facing the EU	
Eurobarometer Spring 2015	27%
Eurobarometer Spring 2016	39%
Difference	+12%
% Of the respondents who tend to trust the EU in the fight against terrorism	
Eurobarometer Spring 2015	26%
Eurobarometer Spring 2016	30%
Difference	+4%
Specialisation	
% Of the respondents who are in favour of a common foreign policy among EU MS in the fight against terrorism	
Eurobarometer Spring 2015	77%
Eurobarometer Spring 2016	80%
Difference	+3%

Source: European commission, 2015 & European Commission, 2016

In the wake of the attack French Deputy Georges Fenech remarked that it was important to make progress on cooperation regarding intelligence sharing (Sanderson, 2016). This was also explicitly mentioned in the investigative 400-page Commission report published by the French National Assembly, contributing policy proposal 35 to enhanced cooperation, explicating MS of the EU to increase their participation in Europol (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016, p. 338). In the aftermath of the attacks, information about the suspects was obtained using several instruments of international cooperation. In fact, the creation of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) took cooperation between the judicial systems of France and Belgium a step further. JITs are the result of the Council's framework decision 2002/465/JHA and serve as a mechanism for improved judicial cooperation that is particularly useful in cases that are

complicated and transnational in nature (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016, p.133-135). Interpol had been requested for its experience in the identification of disaster victims, while Europol was primarily mobilised for its criminal analysis capabilities (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016, p.135).

The aftermath of the Paris attacks thus shows increased international cooperation. Nevertheless, a lack of communication and intelligence exchange among authorities remained. To exemplify, the solitary surviving attacker was able to flee to Belgium as Belgian authorities were not informed of his radicalisation when they stopped him at the border and eventually let him go (Chrisafis, 2016). The Commission report concludes that the only way to achieve optimum effectiveness is through the pooling of all forces of resources, stressing the importance of 'specialisation' and communication. The Paris attacks again *"served as a detonator towards greater European cooperation in the field of counterterrorism."* (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016, p.291).

5.2.3 Discussion

Both attacks underline the opportunities provided to terrorists by partial intelligence exchange. Public and governmental attitudes following both attacks underscore the need for more EU cooperation to increase national gains. One must not, however, overlook the other side of the coin. Possession of intelligence reinforces the image of being superior, knowledgeable, and advantaged (Bean, 2010). In this respect, interviewee 1 states that *"intelligence ... has generally been perceived as critical national assets"*. Intelligence reflects the sovereign right of the state, making it difficult to share with others (Bosilca, 2013). After all, article 4 of the Treaty on European Union explicates that "national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State" (Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012). Or as interviewee 2 put it *"the sharing of intelligence and active contributions to CT efforts remains a national choice"*. However, if reluctance to share intelligence contributes to serious security failures, the public will hold resentment towards those who prevented the free flow of

information (Aldrich, 2004). Together, these findings indicate that in the wake of an attack, building on positive experiences of international intelligence cooperation, states will be more willing to cooperate. This finding is supported by interviewee 2 who stated: *"at the beginning, the contributions were limited in quantity and quality. But once you see that there is more to gain from Europol, and especially from outside the French Paris attacks, ECTC collected a lot of data"*. Interviewee 3 added that MS with bigger issues and higher risk tend to provide more information since they benefit significantly from intelligence exchange. This finding is in line with Fägersten's (2010) argument that MS with great internal demand will be the ones pushing for the development of common capability.

5.3 External pressure

5.3.1 Madrid 2004

The ramifications of the Madrid bombings left the EU government speechless, and they demanded a radical overhaul of the intelligence community in order to be able to stop and pre-empt any further terrorist strikes. The European Council issued the 'Declaration on Combating Terrorism,' in which it called for the creation of an EU long-term strategy to combat terrorism and set the goal of ensuring that Europol receives all pertinent intelligence related to terrorism which is available by MS law enforcement authorities (European Council, 2004, p.6). As for the newly elected Spanish government, their top priority after taking office was to broaden and intensify international cooperation (Reinares, 2009).

The inaugural 2007 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TESAT) underlines the necessity for a common threat perception among EU MS and increased information exchange:

> *"Effective counterterrorism in the EU requires increased information exchange, cooperation and coordination between Member States' competent authorities." (Europol, 2007, p.7)*

Despite the willingness to expand cooperation, the desired results did not materialise. In a note to the Council, Europol expressed its open displeasure with the Member States' inadequate security and intelligence support, which hindered its anticipated position as a key node in the CT sphere (Bosilca, 2013). Regardless of repeated requests for improved intelligence collaboration within and through Europol, MS intelligence services proved unwilling to supply Europol with pertinent material (Bosilca, 2013).

5.3.2 Paris November 2015

The Paris attacks seemed to raise awareness in Europe. It underlined the notion that it is illusory to pretend that one can effectively combat well organised and mobile terrorist organisations with just national capabilities (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016). In other words, international cooperation is no longer an option, it is an imperative. Or as interviewee 1 stated *"the EU MS are also aware that non-sharing may lead to failure to develop a common intelligence picture of the security threats the EU may face"*. EU MS expressed an enhanced need for cross-border cooperation between relevant CT authorities, supported by a pro-active EU central information hub at Europol (Europol, 2016, p.5). Nevertheless, Europol still functions as a complementary institution and cannot *"like the "masters" in Brussels, force MS to release their sovereignty in security" (Interviewee 2)* and push for more intelligence sharing.

5.3.3 Discussion

It is undeniable that the intelligence coop of recent decades had altered the international arena, as the world has witnessed the 'internationalisation' and 'globalisation' of intelligence (Van Buuren, 2014; Sims, 2006). This can trace its roots back to the transnationalistion of crime and terrorism, or as expressed by interviewee 1 *"cross-border, transnational organised crime seriously threatens European stability and security, and calls for enhanced intelligence and/or security cooperation between the EU"*.

There are, however, obstacles to cooperation arising from the heterogeneity of national situations. This is demonstrated by the access to the Schengen Information System (SIS) file, whose access rights vary greatly depending on the EU MS, raising issues of trust (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016, p.391-392). In the domain of intelligence, capability and competitiveness are crucial, with big producers controlling the networks and small producers remaining on the periphery (Aldrich, 2004). Capability and competition are thus everything in the world of intelligence, with big producers of intelligence dominating the networks and small producers remaining on the periphery (Aldrich, 2004). Therefore, disparities in the judicial, political, and administrative systems of EU MS are likely to prevent efficient coordination and information exchange (Aldrich, 2004).

5.4 Cooperative momentum

5.4.1 Madrid 2004

Trust is an essential criterion for successful cooperation. Interviewee 3 defined intelligence sharing as *"based on trust and relationship, a give and take relationship"*. The Madrid 2004 attacks demonstrate a lack of trust among MS, which prevented the dissemination of sensitive data (Thieux, 2004). The "EU Guidelines for a Common Approach to Combating Terrorism," which include the Union's continued commitment to prevent and suppress terrorism in a visible and cogent manner, were issued by the European Council in the wake of 3M (European Council, 2004, p.8). Numerous objectives in this document focused on the promotion of cooperation and trust-building among EU MS. To, for instance, enhance the development of the relationship between Europol and intelligence organisations (European Council, 2004, p.10). Furthermore, the document stated that the EU will analyse and evaluate the commitment of countries to combat terrorism on an ongoing basis, monitoring EU MS commitment and pre-empt free riding (European Council, 2004, p.12). Another significant development is Europol's

attempt to reduce MS distrust by creating the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), which was introduced in 2009, and enables quick, secure, and user-friendly communication and intelligence exchange (Bosilca, 2013).

The EU adopted numerous measures in terms of institutional dynamics to promote intelligence cooperation. First, following the bombings, European interior ministers decided to appoint Dutch politician Gijs de Vries as their head of antiterrorism, tasked with the coordination of anti-terrorist activities across the EU. This decision supplements the post-9/11 agreement of EU leaders of a plan of action to combat terrorism (Aldrich, 2004; Segell, 2005; Thieux, 2004). Second, the EU implemented multiple legislative measures to facilitate cooperation such as the Framework Decision on JIT, Decision establishing Eurojust, and the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (European Council, 2004). Third, Europol expanded its CT capacities and reinforced SITCEN (now known as EU INTCEN), enabling the organisation to provide the Council with strategic terrorism threat assessments based on intelligence from national services (Statewatch, 2015). SITCEN was an attempt to overcome the complexity of the European institutional architecture which does not facilitate coordination and exchange of information collected by different national agencies (Thieux, 2004). However, given the still limited intelligence sharing among EU MS, one could argue that the primary goal of SITCEN was political symbolism, ensuring the public that Europe is uniting to confront terrorism, thereby meeting internal demands (Aldrich, 2004; Müller-Wille, 2004). In line with the following statement *"several legal instruments to boost intelligence sharing were developed but left ineffective"* (Interviewee, 1).

To overcome this obstacle and improve the flow of intelligence within the EU, the European Commission proposed a plan in 2005 for the mandatory submission of CT information to Europol (2005/671/JHA). This council decision was subsequently revoked because MS were unable to support it (Bosilca, 2013). States either disobeyed the agreement

or provided Europol with information that was of minimal value and largely obtained from open sources (Fägersten, 2010). Lastly, the 2009 Council decision to establish new legal bases for Europol was a significant turning point for the EU. Europol became a fully-fledged European Union agency in January 2010 (Council of the European Union, 2009).

5.4.2 Paris November 2015

As demonstrated above, the EU took several measures to improve intelligence cooperation after the Madrid bombings. The coordination of the inquiry into the Paris attacks was impacted by the changes made at that time. Interesting to see is the strong mobilisation of Europol in this matter. Mr. Jean-Jacques Colombi underlined this before the Commission:

> *"It is the first time in Europe that a MS confronted with such a trategy has decided to get rid of the part of the investigation falling under criminal analysis and entrust it to the Europol agency." (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016, p.136)*

This is significant as *"Europol, for the first time, was asked to be deployed" (Interviewee, 2)*. Capitalising on this momentous development, Europol introduced the ECTC on 1st January 2016 designed to engender trust and stimulate cooperation among national CT authorities at the EU level (Europol, 2016). The JIT Framework established after the Madrid bombings was used in the wake of the Paris attacks. During the Paris inquiry, Eurojust, which oversees the JIT system, tried to encourage closer and more adaptable interaction between its contracting partners (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016).

In the wake of the attacks in Paris, as for Madrid, questions were raised on why individuals with strong ties to radicalisation and subject to surveillance were not arrested (Holman, 2015). These inquiries, however, presuppose that the information provided by international liaison partners was detailed, specific, and communicated to French authorities. The Paris attacks again, served the EU as a reminder of how challenging international intelligence cooperation can be. A reoccurring barrier to intelligence cooperation is a strong

method to encourage it. There appears to be a trend of continuously encouraging states to increase their participation in Europol without presenting a strong method and providing the EU with political monitoring of the terrorist issue (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016, p.392).

5.4.3 Discussion

The relative successes of European integration made it simpler to develop EU intelligence institutions and foster trust as a result of spill-over and loyalty effects of the integration (Ates & Erkan, 2021). In fact, according to interviewee 3, a MS which does not make active contributions in the intelligence realm, cannot expect other countries to share information with them. It is a two-way street. In practice, however, the EU still encounters high levels of institutional complexity and specifically mistrust when attempting to forge cooperation (Coolsaet, 2016; Monar, 2007; van Buuren, 2014). This line of argument is supported by interviewee 1:

> *"Reluctance to share intelligence ... may remain due to fear of corruption, misuses of power and/or handicapping certain privileged relationships."*

After 3M, EU intelligence capacities were bolstered yet numerous obstacles remained. Europol envisaged itself as the central hub of CT but had to deal with weak support from MS and their intelligence services. Despite the positive aspects of intelligence cooperation efforts after the Paris attacks, the commission report stated that it is *"belated and sluggish"* considering the multiple attacks carried out on European soil since the creation of the agency (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016, p.293).

5.4 Shortcomings MIC framework

Overall, the MIC model tries to incorporate multiple drivers and mechanisms which should sway states to cooperate in intelligence sharing. This research has however, encountered several shortcomings to this framework. These entail factors which could potentially limit the extent to which states are willing and/or capable to share intelligence with other actors. First,

the MIC model does not explicate that security remains the national responsibility of an EU MS, as embedded in Article 4 of the Treaty on EU. MS will most likely prioritise domestic requirements over those of the EU. Consequently, national authorities demonstrate reluctance to exchange important information, despite the EU's desire to strengthen intelligence cooperation. Western secret services place a high premium on protecting their sources and thus tend to resist large-scale data-sharing (Aldrich, 2004). Or as stated by interviewee 2: *"it is a national decision to decide who is a competent authority and who can exchange information"*.

Another vital missing component of the MIC model is the lack of attention given to the importance of bilateral agreements. After both the terrorist attacks of Madrid and Paris, reports pointed out the significance of bilateral intelligence sharing. As Reinares stated (2009, p.379) *"Spanish authorities, like those in other European countries, continue to put more faith in bilateral agreements than any other form of international counterterrorism"*. This was also addressed by interviewee 2: "In the intelligence realm it is also that they exchange information more on a bilateral manner, so they do it through liaison officers". The French report by the Commission concluded that bilateral exchange works well and is effective, but also stressed that bilateral partnership is not enough as the Paris attacks demonstrate how the system falls short when being confronted with the urgency and transnationality of terrorism (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2016, p.392).

Lastly, the framework ignores disparities in capabilities between EU MS and Europol, leading to less effective cooperation. This could involve differences in intelligence gathering capabilities, technological advancements, expertise to deal with intelligence or even human resources. As interviewee 2 expressed, aside from disparities among EU MS there is also a large difference in capabilities of Europol compared to MS:

"No one will impose France, Germany, Spain or other MS to do things in terrorism because they are the most targeted countries … they know how to work with specific topics. So, the EU Commission or Europol cannot compete." (Interviewee 2)

Information technologies are constantly evolving necessitating the need to keep up with technological breakthroughs. According to Sanderson (2016) and Fenech and Pietrasanta (2016), the EU lacks a single safe CT research interface, which facilitates the use of intelligence and its distribution. SIENA has been Europol's best effort; however, intelligence-sharing is limited by level of EU handling codes: *"For the intelligence branch, the level of restriction is higher and cannot send such sensitive information via SIENA" (Interviewee, 2)*, limiting Europol's ability to disseminate information promptly.

Human resources likewise play a significant role in the ability to collect, analyse, and deal with intelligence. The French Commission report stressed that Europol's resources are insufficient for its task of combating terrorism. The inadequate human resources are unable to fulfil the needs of Europol's mandate (Fenech & Pietrasanta, p.391). With this, *"Europol remains somewhat limited in resources and capabilities to compete with national authorities" (Interviewee, 2).*

Conclusion

This research intended to clarify to what extent the MIC model can account for the increase in CT intelligence cooperation between EU MS. In sum, the MIC model rightly identifies crucial factors which sway MS to cooperate, although the relative importance of each driver's function differs as internal demand was significantly more evident in both cases. This research has also shed light on shortcomings of the framework such as the lack of focus on bilateral agreements and disparity in intelligence capabilities among EU MS and Europol.

One main take-away of this research is that MS continue to prioritise their national needs despite persisting call for enhanced international cooperation. In line with the realist assumption, states will cooperate when intelligence liaison serves their own interests or compensates for the limits of their own intelligence means (Lander, 2004; Phythian, 2008; Sims, 2006). *Internal demand* increases in the wake of a terrorist attack, be it by public demand or government calls for increased intelligence cooperation. Both the Madrid 2004 and Paris 2015 cases demonstrated this. Effective structures to facilitate cooperation, or *cooperative momentum*, became more evident in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, as previous structures proved to be ineffective. The establishment of the ECTC in 2016 and its CT JLT are two prime examples of successful evolvement. As for *external pressure*, the main stimulus has proven to be the sharing of a common threat. As is evident in light of the Madrid bombings, where ETA was the main threat to Spain prior to 3M. The attack by Al Qaeda made Spanish authorities realise that Jihadism, a common threat to many EU MS, was also targeting their country.

Currently, Europol facilitates complementary help to EU MS in the fight against terrorism. Information exchange with Europol is de facto voluntary. Thus, EU MS can choose whether they want to share intelligence. Europol, or the EU, can at present day not compete with the intelligence capabilities of several MS, which stagnates their evolvement as

intelligence service. Their primary areas of progress lie with enhancing capabilities, expanding resources, and fostering further trust among EU MS.

This research has made one thing inherently clear; the globalisation of terrorism and enhanced capabilities of terrorist organisations are compelling MS to cooperate in intelligence sharing. Ideally, CT efforts, be it intelligence cooperation or something else, should no longer be handicapped by national jealousies and responsibilities. Nonetheless, a reluctance remains to divulge detailed intelligence in relation to matters affecting state security among EU MS. The outcomes of this research are useful for explaining the drivers and constraints of cooperation in the intelligence realm. MS and the EU can address these obstacles and identify areas for improvement. Future research could focus on how the EU or MS can intensify cooperation and tackle issues such as mistrust.

A main limitation of this research is the restriction level of information relating to intelligence. Finding respondents who were willing and able to discuss intelligence sharing within the EU and their experiences with it, proved to be difficult. Additionally, official government or EU documents on both terrorist attacks remain classified, therefore limiting the number of accessible sources. After all, intelligence services are primarily focused on prevention and counteraction, the material they produce and/or distribute is unlikely to arrive in the public domain.

References

Aldrich, R. J. (2002). Dangerous Liaisons. *Harvard International Review*, *24*(3), 50–54. https://www.iwp.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/20170522_DangerousLiaisons.pdf

Aldrich, R. J. (2004). Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation. *International Affairs*, *80*(4), 731–753. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00413.x

Aldrich, R. J. (2009). Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem. *Intelligence and National Security*, *24*(1), 26–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520902756812

Anckar, C. (2008). On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems Design in Comparative Research. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, *11*(5), 389–401. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645570701401552

Arce, D. G., & Sandler, T. (2007). Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence. *British Journal of Political Science*, *37*(4), 573–586. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123407000324

Ari, M. M. (2020, April 29). Europe as a Security Actor and The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). *Beyond the Horizon ISSG*. Retrieved 14 October 2022, from https://behorizon.org/europe-as-a-security-actor-and-the-common-security-and-defense-policy-csdp/

Ates, A., & Erkan, A. (2021). Governing the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union. *International Journal of Politics and Security*. https://doi.org/10.53451/ijps.900302

Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation for novice researchers. *The Qualitative Report*, *13*(4), 544–559.

BBC News. (n.d.). Madrid train attacks: Attacks. *BBC News*. Retrieved 21 November 2022, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/

BBC News. (2004a, March 12). Madrid attacks timeline. *BBC News*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3504912.stm

BBC News. (2004b, April 28). Timeline: Madrid investigation. *BBC News*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3597885.stm

BBC News. (2015, December 9). Paris attacks: What happened on the night. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994

BBC News. (2016, March 20). Paris attacks: Suspect Salah Abdeslam 'planned further attacks'. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35857388

Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. Amsterdam University Press.

Bean, H. (2010). *No More Secrets: Open-Source Information and the Reshaping of U.S. Intelligence*. Praeger.

Bilgi, E. (2016, January 2). Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union: An Impossible Dream? *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace*, *5*(1), 57–57. https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.167342

Bosilca, R. (2013). Europol and counter terrorism intelligence sharing. *Europolity: Continuity and Change in European Governance*, *7*(1), 7–20. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/eurpol7&div=5&g_sent=1&casa_token=62jEZJiTPWoAAAAA:rmgGnalj8Sa3BwPrGxKFilJELcB90smfk1jncn-WcPvNrfqK6SS89f2Juzw8pHEyWElK1mwD&collection=journals

Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, *9*(2), 27–40. https://doi.org/10.3316/qrj0902027

Bureš, O. (2016). Intelligence Sharing and the Fight against Terrorism in the Eu: Lessons Learned from Europol. *European View*, *15*(1), 57–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-016-0393-7

Burridge, B. T. (2014, March 11). Spain remembers Madrid train bombings 10 years on. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26526704

Chauzal, G., Colijn, K., van Ginkel, B., Paulussen, C., & Zavagli, S. (2015). Paris 11/13/15: Analysis and Policy Options (Policy Brief). *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17487?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

Chrisafis, A. (2016, July 5). Paris attacks inquiry finds multiple failings by French intelligence agencies. *The Guardian*. Retrieved November 28, 2022, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/05/paris-attacks-inquiry-multiple-failings-french-intelligence-agencies

Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. (2012, 26, October). Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

Coolsaet, R. (2016). Counterterrorism and Counter-Radicalisation in Europe: How Much Unity in Diversity? *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge*, 241–260.

Council of the European Union (Ed.). (2009). *Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol)* (37th ed., Vol. 121). https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vi8rm300ohz7

Cragin, R. K. (2017). The November 2015 Paris Attacks: The Impact of Foreign Fighter Returnees. *Orbis*, *61*(2), 212–226. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.02.005

Crawford, T. W. (2010). Intelligence Cooperation. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.404

Crenshaw, M. (2019). *Terrorism and International Cooperation*. Routledge.

De Vries, G. D. (2005). The European Union's Role in the Fight Against Terrorism: [Opening Address - The Role of the EU in the Fight Against Terrorism]. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, *16*(1), 3–9. https://doi.org/10.1353/isia.2005.0000

Den Boer, M. D. (2015). Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis. *Intelligence and National Security*, *30*(2–3), 402–419. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.988444

Dinan, D., Nugent, N., Paterson, W., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2017). Theorising Crisis in European Integration. *The European Union in Crisis*, 316–335. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60427-9_16

Eurojust. (2018, June). *Paris terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015*. https://https/www.eurojust.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2018-06/2015-11_Paris-terrorist-attack.pdf

European Commission. (2003). Standard Eurobarometer 59 - Spring 2003: Public opinion in the European Union. In *Eurobarometer* (333/STD59). Retrieved November 21, 2022, from https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/333

European Commission. (2004). Standard Eurobarometer 61 - Spring 2004: Public opinion in the European Union. In *Eurobarometer* (408/STD61). Retrieved November 21, 2022, from https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/408

European Commission. (2015). Standard Eurobarometer 83 - Spring 2015. In *Eurobarometer* (2099/STD83). Retrieved November 21, 2022, from https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2099

European Commission. (2016). Standard Eurobarometer 85 - Spring 2016. In *Eurobarometer* (2130/STD85). Retrieved November 21, 2022, from https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2130

European Council. (2004). *Declaration on Combating Terrorism*. Retrieved November 23, 2022, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/79637.pdf

Europol. (n.d.). *About*. Europol. Retrieved 11 October 2022, from https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol

Europol. (2007). *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007*. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/tesat2007_1.pdf

Europol. (2016). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016* (ISBN 978-92-95200-68-5). Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/europol_tesat_2016.pdf

Fägersten, B. (2010, August). Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of Europol. *Intelligence and National Security*, *25*(4), 500–520. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.537028

Fägersten, B. (2014). European intelligence cooperation. In *The Future of Intelligence*. Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203071472-8/european-intelligence-cooperation-bj%C3%B6rn-f%C3%A4gersten

Fenech, G., & Pietrasanta, S. (2016). *Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquête relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l'État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015* (N° 3922). Assemblée Nationale. Retrieved November 28, 2022, from https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-enq/r3922-t1.asp

Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. *International Organization*, *42*(3), 485–507. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027715

Herman, M. (1996). *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Hilsman, R. (1952). Intelligence and Policy-making in Foreign Affairs. *World Politics*, *5*(1), 1–45. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009086

Holman, T. (2015, December 14). *Paris: An Intelligence Failure or a Failure to Understand the Limits of Intelligence?* Royal United Services Institute. Retrieved November 28, 2022, from https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/paris-an-intelligence-failure-or-a-failure-to-understand-the-limits-of-intelligence/

Homeland Security Advisory Council. (2016). *The Attacks on Paris: Lessons Learned*. Retrieved November 28, 2022, from https://https:/publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/hsac/content/hsac-paris-lessons-learned_whitepaper.pdf

Johnson, L. K. (2008). Sketches for a theory of strategic intelligence. In *Intelligence Theory*. Routledge.

Lander, S. S. (2004). International intelligence cooperation: an inside perspective. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *17*(3), 481–493. https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000296964

Lefebvre, S. (2003). The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation. *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, *16*(4), 527–542. https://doi.org/10.1080/716100467

McGruddy, J. (2013). Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International Oversight. *Journal of Strategic Security*, *6*(5), 214–220. https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.3s.22

Monar, J. (2007). Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union's Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Problems. *Government and Opposition*, *42*(3), 292–313. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00225.x

Müller-Wille, B. (2002). EU Intelligence Co-operation. A Critical Analysis. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *23*(2), 61–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/713999737

Müller-Wille, B. (2004). *For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU.* European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/occ50.pdf

Müller-Wille, B. (2008). The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-operation. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *46*(1), 49–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00767.x

Munton, D. (2009). Intelligence Cooperation Meets International Studies Theory: Explaining Canadian Operations in Castro's Cuba. *Intelligence and National Security*, *24*(1), 119–138. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520902756960

Novotná, T. (2017). The EU as a Global Actor: United We Stand, Divided We Fall. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *55*, 177–191. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12601

Occhipinti, J. D. (2003). *The Politics of EU Police Cooperation: Toward a European FBI?* Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Phythian, M. (2008). Intelligence theory and theories of international relations: Shared world or separate worlds? In *Intelligence Theory*. Routledge.

Pronk, D., & Korteweg, C. (2021). *Sharing the Burden, Sharing the Secrets: The future of European intelligence cooperation*. Clingendael. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/EU-intelligence-cooperation.pdf

Reinares, F. (2009). After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain. *Studies in Conflict &Amp; Terrorism*, *32*(5), 367–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100902836767

Richelson, J. T. (1990). The calculus of intelligence cooperation. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, *4*(3), 307–323. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850609008435147

Sanderson, S. (2016, May 7). French inquiry reports on terrorism. *Dw.Com*. Retrieved November 28, 2022, from https://www.dw.com/en/french-inquiry-recommends-major-intelligence-overhaul-after-paris-attacks/a-19378346

Segell, G. M. (2005). Intelligence Methodologies Applicable to the Madrid Train Bombings, 2004. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, *18*(2), 221–238. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600590882119

Sims, J. E. (2006). Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, *19*(2), 195–217. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600500483657

Stake, R. E. (1995). *The art of case study research*. Sage publications.

Statewatch. (2015). EU INTCEN Fact Sheet 05/02/2015. In *Statewatch.org*. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2016/may/eu-intcen-factsheet.pdf

Strebel, M. A., & Steenbergen, M. R. (2017). The Impact of the November 2015 Terrorist Attacks in Paris on Public Opinion: A Natural Experiment. *Department of Political Science, University of Zurich*. https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-142971

Taillon, P. J. D. (2002). *Hijacking and Hostages: Government Responses to Terrorism (Praeger Security International)* (1st ed.). Praeger.

Thieux, L. (2004). European Security and Global Terrorism: The Strategic Aftermath of the Madrid Bombings. *Perspectives: Review of International Affairs*, *22*, 59–74.

Tuinier, P. (2021). Explaining the depth and breadth of international intelligence cooperation: towards a comprehensive understanding. *Intelligence and National Security*, *36*(1), 116–138. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1821461

Tuinier, P., Zaalberg, T. B., & Rietjens, S. (2022). The Social Ties that Bind: Unraveling the Role of Trust in International Intelligence Cooperation. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2022.2079161

Van Buuren, J. (2014). Analysing international intelligence cooperation. *The Future of Intelligence*, 80–93. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203071472-7

Van Puyvelde, D., & Curtis, S. (2016). 'Standing on the shoulders of giants': diversity and scholarship in Intelligence Studies. *Intelligence and National Security*, *31*(7), 1040–1054. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2016.1185323

Walsh, J. I. (2006). Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *44*(3), 625–643. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00638.x

Walsh, J. I. (2007). Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing. *Journal of Public Policy*, *27*(2), 151–181. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x07000682

Walt, S. M. (1987). *The Origins of Alliance*. Cornell University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt32b5fc

Walt, S. M. (2017). Realism and Security. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.286

Waltz, K. N. (2010). *Theory of international politics*. Waveland Press.

Wiener, A., & Diez, T. (2009). *European Integration Theory* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: Design and methods* (4th ed.). Sage publications.

Zimmermann, D. (2006). The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal. *Studies in Conflict &Amp; Terrorism*, *29*(2), 123–145. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500522215

Appendix A – Interview questions

Internal demand

1. Perceived national functional needs
    a. Do you think that the extent to which European Union member states are willing to cooperate in intelligence-sharing is driven by national (policy) gains?
    b. If so, in which ways can this be seen?

2. Perceived common functional needs
    a. Do you think that increased internal and external security cooperation within the EU has increased the common functional need for intelligence-sharing?
    b. If so, in which ways can this be seen?

3. Specialisation
    a. From this point of reasoning, do you think EU member states are motivated to share intelligence to reach more cost-sufficient solutions at the national level?
    b. If so, in which ways can this be seen?

4. Overall question
    We have spoken about the internal demand of EU member states to cooperate with intelligence-sharing, driven by perceived national gains, perceived common gains, and perceived cost-efficient solutions, which driver do you think best motivates states at the moment?

External pressure

1. Balancing allies
    This mechanism is based on realist notions. Say if actor A (a friend to actor B) increases intelligence capabilities, actor B may feel the need to balance the relationship to avoid a situation of intelligence dependency. In order to thus become a more attractive partner or to reach a higher degree of intelligence autonomy, actor B may choose to increase its own intelligence capabilities.
    a. Do you agree with this argumentation? That the increasing intelligence power of allies influences a state's preference to do the same?
    b. If so, how can this be seen within the EU?

2. Balancing threats
    The other side of the coin has to do with threats. Say, actor C (who actor B perceives as posing a threat), increases its capabilities, actor B would also increase its intelligence sharing capabilities in order to balance out the threat.
    a. Do you think that external threats challenge a state's intelligence power and thus motivates states to cooperate in the field of intelligence-sharing?
    b. If so, how can this be seen within the EU?

3. Combination question
   Looking at the two lines of reasoning, cooperating due to the balancing of allies or the balancing of threats, which one do you believe is most applicable to the European Union?

Cooperative momentum

1. Trust building
   Trust building drives cooperation by increasing the levels of risk that actors are willing to take in a specific cooperation due to higher levels of trust.
   a. Do you believe that the level of trust, be it based on risks, influences an EU member states' willingness to participate in intelligence-sharing?
   b. If so, in which way can this be seen?

2. Institutional dynamics
   a. Do you believe that institutional actors to whom power have been delegated, such as Europol, drive cooperation in a pro integrative direction by creating intelligence gains for the involved actors?
   b. How do institutional structures within the EU, or Europol, facilitate or foster cooperation through the mechanism of trust-building?
   c. If so, in which way(s) can this be seen?

Appendix B – Interview transcript

Transcript: Interviewee 1

Internal demand
The following questions will address three individual drivers of the internal demand for intelligence-sharing cooperation. Internal demand implies that the reason for cooperation can be found within cooperating states. These demands may originate from political or public spheres, particularly in the wake of a domestic attack or a breakdown in national intelligence.

1. Perceived national functional needs
   This mechanism argues the development of intelligence capacity is the solution to one or more member's states' domestic problems they are unable or unwilling to address unilaterally. Such domestic need could spring from domestic terrorism, a deteriorating internal security situation, or a loss of faith in the nation's intelligence capabilities.
   a. *Do you think that the extent to which European Union member states are willing to cooperate in intelligence-sharing is driven by national (policy) gains?*
   b. *If so, in which ways can this be seen?*

Interviewee 1: Intelligence, its methodology and capabilities collection has generally been perceived as critical national assets. Perceived as a national security risk, sharing, or exchanging national intelligence has been a matter of urgency and/or necessity rather than general policy. A current surge of intelligence sharing facilitated by the EU political will at the highest level, aimed at addressing a serious contemporary security challenge in the Ukrainian territory, can be named as an example. Some reluctance to share intelligence, particularly with non-traditional/non-EU partners, may remain due to fear of corruption, misuse of power and/or handicapping certain privileged relationships with non-EU (strategic) significant partners (similar to the pre-Brexit UK scenario with the US intelligence, etc). Still, the EU MS are also aware that non-sharing may lead to failure to develop a common intelligence picture of the security threats the EU may face. Accurate intelligence is the basis for any rational decision-making process; thus, the pragmatic, unified and centralised approach towards intelligence collection and sharing should prevail.

2. Perceived common functional needs
   The second mechanism contends that intelligence cooperation has been developed to cater for common need due to increased interdependence and cooperation within the EU. Thus, to say, common EU policies on internal and external security has accentuated the need of "common" information to underpin these policies.
   a. *Do you think that increased internal and external security cooperation within the EU has increased the common functional need for intelligence-sharing?*
   b. *If so, in which ways can this be seen?*

Interviewee 1: The EU promised its citizens to enjoy security, democracy, and prosperity. Yet today, terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change and/or current alarming economic volatility and energy insecurity highly associated with the ongoing war situations in Ukraine endanger the EU society and territory. An increased level of security ambition and a call for a common strategic intelligence-sharing approach is an expected, desired, and inevitable result of an agreed and established, more integrated and better-coordinated approach to

conflicts and crises through a coherent use of all security-related tools and policies at the EU's disposal. A NATO statement of June 2021[1] to continue implementing a coherent and balanced package of measures, including support, and strengthening arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and enhancement of strategic awareness, including intelligence sharing, could be seen as one of an example of the progressing call for the common functional need for intelligence-sharing.

3. Specialisation

The last mechanism argues that states could perceive to be able to reach more cost-efficient solutions together. An example of this is when states pool intelligence resources and thus save costs at the national level.

a. *From this point of reasoning, do you think EU member states are motivated to share intelligence to reach more cost-sufficient solutions at the national level?*
b. *If so, in which ways can this be seen?*

Interviewee 1: A desire for intelligence gains such as access to currently unavailable sources, methods, technologies, and information versus associated non-equally calibrated national budgets could theoretically be seen as pragmatic motivation to step towards common – more cost-sufficient solutions while minimising costs in terms of loss of autonomy and increased vulnerability. In this line, the EU has already established several intelligence-related entities which collect and analyse intelligence; produce security reports; monitor SOC/terrorism-related threats, social unrest, etc., such as EUMS INT, IntCen, and SatCen. SatCen supports EU operations as part of the CSDP, FRONTEX, NATO, UN or OSCE, displaying effective high intelligence collection and exchange engagement at the EU level. Additionally, the SIAC was created in 2007 to combine intelligence analysis. Although none of the mentioned entities can be classified as an EU intelligence service per se, it may reflect a long-term needed (and agreed) pragmatic – centralised acceptable solution at the EU level rather than the national one.

4. Overall question

We have spoken about the internal demand of EU member states to cooperate with intelligence-sharing, driven by perceived national gains, perceived common gains, and perceived cost-efficient solutions, which driver do you think best motivates states at the moment?

Interviewee 1: Motivation plays an important role in intelligence-sharing, and indeed, it cannot be obligatory but should result from a basic intrinsic attitude to share. As mentioned earlier, the motivation to share intelligence in the EU context responds to the need for an integrated and better-coordinated approach to conflicts and crises to secure EU security and safety. Given the element of obligatory versus sensible voluntarily driven intelligence sharing, the power of constructively supported national security self-determination and recognition of (still) associated national security specifics (such as autonomy, relatedness, competence, etc) may vital wise encourage cooperation in a specific instance, or at a specific point in time and/or even long-term strengthen horizontal intelligence sharing within the EU.

[1] Brussels summit communique NATO OF 14/06/2021;

External pressure

We now move on to the second driver of cooperation, external pressure. External pressure aims to reason the willingness for cooperation by looking at mechanisms exogenous to the cooperating states.

1. Balancing allies

   This mechanism is based on realist notions. Say if actor A (a friend to actor B) increases intelligence capabilities, actor B may feel the need to balance the relationship to avoid a situation of intelligence dependency. In order to thus become a more attractive partner or to reach a higher degree of intelligence autonomy, actor B may choose to increase its own intelligence capability.

   a. *Do you agree with this argumentation? That the increasing intelligence power of allies influences a state's preference to do the same?*
   b. *If so, how can this be seen within the EU?*

Interviewee 1: The functioning of intelligence services is based on human factors, thus naturally copying the human behaviour affected mainly by socio-political dynamics. It distinguishes three motivational systems while functioning. An intrinsic one based on national security interests involving engaging in intelligence handling/sharing without considering potential external rewards. On the other hand, an extrinsic is reinforced by certain rewards, such as prestige/status, power, active engagement, etc. The last is a (non-desired) "amotivational" system with features of lack of control over a national intelligence entity's behaviour, etc.. As for an intrinsic element, there is a relationship between relationship needs within the intelligence community and intrinsic motivation. Suppose an activity enables supplying a national intelligence entity/agency with the relationship's needs (such as intelligence-related benefits of cooperation, etc). In that case, it will also lead to the intrinsically motivated behaviour of a national intelligence entity. An extrinsic part – the subject of question might be associated with the political motives for cooperation, such as the strengthening legitimacy, the political relationships, or the need to display commitment in the public eyes as these, if maximised through intelligence cooperation. Indeed, it might be held back due to the risk of increased dependency on external sources of information and/or possible disclosure of knowledge level, methods, sources, etc.

2. Balancing threats

   The other side of the coin has to do with threats. Say, actor C (who actor B perceives as posing a threat), increases its intelligence capabilities, actor B would also increase its intelligence sharing capabilities in order to balance out the threat.

   a. *Do you think that external threats challenge a state's intelligence power and thus motivates states to cooperate in the field of intelligence-sharing?*
   b. *If so, how can this be seen within the EU?*

Interviewee 1: The external security challenges posed have set the three strategic priorities for the EU: to respond to external conflicts and crises, to support partners to provide security for their population (Lisbon – TEU reasoning), and to protect the Union and its citizens. Moreover, cross-border, transnational organised crime seriously threatens European stability and security and calls for enhanced intelligence and/or security cooperation between the EU and the external partners concerned. The EU (or its centralised dedicated entity such as EUROPOL, INTCEN, FRONTEX, etc.) cannot play a direct role in particularly sensitive areas of intelligence work, such as large-scale technical surveillance,

the management of human sources, or the execution of covert operations, etc. but facilitate. The mandate of EUROPOL is based on prevention and/or a cause-effect operational causality. Therefore, a major part of its successful functioning strongly depends on its stakeholders' willingness to share their intelligence. Meanwhile, in the development of intelligence capabilities for the internal and external security of the EU, the EU relies also on EEAS services (and capabilities) while embedded in the non-EU national environment.

3. Combination question

   Looking at the two lines of reasoning, cooperating to balance allies or balance threats, which one do you believe is most applicable to the European Union?

Cooperative momentum

So far, the questions have been about cooperation that is generated by factors either outside of, or within, the involved states. Cooperative momentum takes a different perspective. It contends that cooperation originates from the cooperative process itself. Thus, as soon as a cooperative structure is established, there will be mechanisms that drive the cooperation further. Institutions, such as Europol, are both an effect and a cause of cooperation.

1. Trust building

   Trust building drives cooperation by increasing the levels of risk that actors are willing to take in a specific cooperation due to higher levels of trust.

   a. *Do you believe that the level of trust, be it based on risks, influences an EU member states' willingness to participate in intelligence-sharing?*
   b. *If so, in which way can this be seen?*

Interviewee 1: Comparing the intelligence community's activities when handling intelligence exchange concerning alleged preparations for the assassination of one of the EU candidate MS VIPs in Jan 2022 versus intelligence streaming in the Ukrainian conflict, the involved intelligence entities have been acting highly actively and cooperatively in both scenarios. Similarly, they continuously considered the security of their sources, thus security failures that could lead to potentially extreme violence and associated human causalities. The assassination case with a lower scale of either a potential breach of national security, therefore risk or a threat to sovereignty but a significantly high level of trust, credit and/or power of involved intelligence entities accelerated the speed and the quality of information/intelligence exchange tremendously. On the other hand, the ongoing highly dynamic, EU-wise intelligence exchange associated with the Ukrainian conflict resembles the same effect. Indeed, without touching on facilitating elements of mutual interests, dependency, hierarchy, governmental will, culture and trust, in two risk/threat perceptions and security-wise different cases, the trust factor played the dominant role of quality-wise intelligence exchange facilitator.

2. Institutional dynamics

   The second and last mechanism concerns institutional design and addresses the question whether the chosen form of cooperative structure drives states to cooperate more or less. This is focused on how the institution is controlled. In most cases, such as the EU, states will be more inclined to empower a secretary general or a supranational institution to reach a better cooperative outcome.

   a. *Do you believe that institutional actors to whom power have been delegated, such as Europol, drive cooperation in a pro integrative direction by creating intelligence gains for the involved actors?*

b. If so, in which way(s) can this be seen?

Interviewee 1: The EU has established and developed several institutions to facilitate intelligence sharing between its member states, such as EUROPOL. The EU agency creates and facilitates mechanisms for collecting, analysing, and operationalising intelligence between and among national authorities, given key security threats considered in line with the established mandate and corresponding operational framework. Given intelligence exchange/sharing, EUROPOL keeps facing major obstacles that can stand between ambitions and actual outcomes and obstruct cooperation even in cases where governments favour it. Perhaps the most striking is an example of the role of EUROPOL in counterterrorism. The EU states have repeatedly invited its national security agencies to provide increased intelligence support to EUROPOL. Furthermore, several legal instruments to boost intelligence sharing was developed but left inactive. Finally, similarly to other JHA institutions, it could be that EUROPOL may have never been able to gain the solid trust of the EU MS that would encourage intelligence sharing.

Transcript: Interviewee 2

INTERVIEWER: Okay, I'll first tell a little bit about my research. I'm currently studying the Master International Organisation at Leiden University and writing my master thesis. I am very interested in security within the EU, intelligence, and counterterrorism. So, I wanted to research something that has to do with that. I did another master in Crisis and Security Management and I found that to be really interesting, so I wanted to focus this master more on the security side and I'm fascinated by the EU. So, I decided to do my research on intelligence cooperation within the EU and I've established a framework which should help explain what fosters cooperation but also the obstacles to cooperation. I have based them on three drivers, which are: internal demand, so that has more to do with the motivations of a state to share intelligence, external pressure, which has to do with facing external threats, and then cooperative momentum, which is more about how cooperation is facilitated, so for example Europol within the EU, and EU INTCEN and all those kind of either council decisions or frameworks that foster cooperation, or do not. I have already done a case analysis on the Madrid 2004 bombings and also the Paris 2015 November attacks, to see whether there is a large discrepancy between how cooperation was fostered between the two events, so within 2004 and 2015, what changed, has trust grown within EU Ms? What did intelligence services do? Was there a kind of wake-up call after the attacks? So that is what I have been looking into, and with this interview I want to get more insights into your perspective and how you view this, how you see the cooperation?

INTERVIEWEE 2: Can you tell me what is the difference between 2004 and 2015?

INTERVIEWER: Yes. Up to now, after 2004 there were a lot of changes within the EU. Off course you have the Lisbon treaty, which was initiated, but there was also the establishment of the ECTC, you have the Council decision of JIT. So, a lot of frameworks which have been put in place but the thing I have encountered is that there is still a lot of mistrust within the EU MS to share intelligence. And that countries still view intelligence as a national asset. So, exposing that to other countries kind of limits operations.

INTERVIEWEE 2: That is article 4 of the treaty of the Functioning of the European Union; security is the sole responsibility of the member states. Intelligence Services is really saying that this is the founding principle between countries, not with a third party such as multinational organisation, and that is still the idea of many MS. It has evolved but in parallel, the intelligence community organises itself to better cooperate between themselves. So, Europol is still outside the intelligence community. Europol is, for many intelligence communities, doing law enforcement police cooperation, it is a law enforcement cooperation Agency, not intelligence. And they don't believe Europol should be in the intelligence realm. Europol should support criminal investigation, but do not deal with intelligence. And that is why they organise themselves in a way that I cannot explain to you because it is confidential, but they are also in another setting somewhere with the intelligence services, and they exchange information directly, between the trusted partners and the limited number of countries.

INTERVIEWER: So, at this point, Europol is more facilitating investigations but not directly analysing, producing, intelligence?

INTERVIEWEE 2: So, this also comes down to terminology. So, it depends on what you mean for intelligence. For some people intelligence is the kind of information exchanged

between intelligence services, exchange of classified and very restrictive information. Europol is supporting MS competent authorities in their criminal investigations, in the post attack or in the preventative investigations. Competent authorities can be like judicial units. Like in Germany, the BKA, the federal police, is a judicial unit, it is not an intelligence service. The BfV and the BND, the foreign intelligence are intelligence services. BfV and BND are not competent authorities with Europol, so they cannot exchange information with Europol. In other countries, like in Sweden, SAPO, is an intelligence service, however, it is a competent authority, and they exchange information with Europol. So, some hybrid services, they have the competency of judicial investigations, also within the intelligence realm. Some intelligence services cooperate with Europol, other do not or exchange more limited information. In France, there is the DGSI, which has two components. The judicial branch and the intelligence branch. The judicial branch can exchange information via our secure network, SIENA. But the other one, does not have access to SIENA. Because for the intelligence branch, the level of restriction is higher and cannot send such sensitive information via SIENA.

INTERVIEWER: Oh right. Because SIENA is the EU system that facilitates secure transmission, right? But what you are saying is that the other French authority cannot send information through SIENA.

INTERVIEWEE 2: SIENA is a system used by Europol to transfer and receive strategic and operational information, in particular personal data. Regarding DGSI, the Direction Generale de la Securite Interieure, DSGI, possess both an intelligence branch and a judicial branch. The latter is cross-checking, exchanging information with Europol, and, DSGI as a whole is a competent authority, they can only exchange information via SIENA to a certain level of confidentiality. But the other one, the level Secret, cannot be exchanged via SIENA. And it is also the case of some intelligence services, some changed the way of acting in certain (Eastern) European countries, everything was over classified and at some point, could not exchange. So competent authorities could not exchange with Europol, because of the level of classification. Everything was classified, so nothing could be sent officially via SIENA. In fact, we can receive everything, but normally we cannot use it. So, it is the question on the level of classification of the information. It is a question of the sensitivity of the information. Even if we receive information which is very relevant and useful, Europol cannot insert it in its databases if they receive it. If countries put a level of restriction that is too sensitive, we cannot use it, we cannot store it in our database. And we cannot cross-check it.

INTERVIEWER: Because as I read it in documents, in government documents, and EU documents, SIENA is kind of put forward as the system which guarantees safe transmission. But you are saying that there is even a higher level of confidentiality through which intelligence cannot be shared via SIENA.

INTERVIEWEE 2: The level of classification can be up to EU top secret and even higher for a limited number of persons. The Prime Minister of your country can see some documents and it depends on the level of clearance. I have a high level of clearance, I could see and discuss with a colleague of another country, but I cannot process information, such information in our database. For instance, the Dutch Intelligence Service, the AIVD, has a certain level of classification, so the AIVD cannot send information to Europol. But Dutch CT units can send it. It depends on the level of classification, and it is a question of competent authorities. So, it is a national decision to decide who is a competent authority and who can exchange information. And then we have the level of classification of information.

And the basic level, then EU restricted, then confidential, then secret, top secret, and the other one has a name I cannot mention. That cannot be exchanged. You need to have a secure information exchange network and facilities, for instance, when we move to confidential, we have to remove the possibility to have USB keys in our computers. So, you need to have a secure information, secure location, clearance, extra oversight of the people, so people who have the security clearance. It takes much more time; it is more control to be sure that you are not at risk. So, in the intelligence realm it is also common practice that they exchange information on a more bilateral manner, and they have a way to do it with liaison officers in countries who have secure information communication. So often you see that they need to go to the embassy with an encrypted laptop or computer, to retrieve information, it cannot be sent via another way.

INTERVIEWER: But that is more done bilaterally then?

INTERVIEWEE 2: It is done bilaterally, or multilaterally.

INTERVIEWER: I did an internship at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I was within the Cyber Security Unit. And they also explained to me the levels of classification which FA has. And at a certain point you need to go to special rooms and you need to leave all your devices outside of the room. But I was wondering, do countries have a uniform way in how they handle this? It is not an EU decided upon thing, right?

INTERVIEWEE 2: No, it is a national decision, how they handle and protect information. Not everyone has access to the same level of information. The question is the vulnerability of the information. If the information to say reached the open, and it can damage domestically, that is a level of classification. If the information will go to the public, the damage for the information source, or the country, is limited, it can be classified at a low level. If it is so dangerous that if it out in the open, so for example the plan of which weapons are sent to Ukraine and the targets, is so very important, that if it goes in the open it will jeopardise the interests of the nation, then you put the level of classification very high. Because it damages the reputation but also human lives, undercover sources, foreign military. That is why you put this level of classification on it. It can be on phone numbers, on locations, on targets, it can be on whatever you think. But to come back to what is interesting. I think from the London attack or the Madrid attack, nothing much evolved.

INTERVIEWER: No really?

INTERVIEWEE 2: Indeed, now yes. Following these events, the position of EU CTC was created. It was an EU MS decision, that is why the EU CTC office is located in the Council of the EU in Brussels. So, he works for the EU MS. So, it is not working for the EU. It is an initiative of EU MS, not the EU. That is very important.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, and can you explain the main difference then?

INTERVIEWEE 2: You only work for the countries, and you facilitate the work on counterterrorism for the countries, not for the EU as a kind of supranational organisation. So, it is not like the “masters” in Brussels who force MS to release their sovereignty in security. It belongs exclusively to the MS. The EU CTC is appointed by the MS. And it facilitates the evolution, the proposal, the recommendations for the benefit of all EU MS and obviously discussing with the Commission and the Parliament, and many other institutions. But it has a

very important role in the cooperation with third countries. He is proposing recommendations on various aspects touching CT, such as algorithms, algorithm application, but also drones, what is important for MS to make the evolution of the legislation, to collectively better fight terrorism. The Commissions' ideas and the MS ideas are two separate things. And this leads to very back and forth negotiations because the EU commission has an idea of what is good, and has impact on the MS. For MS it is so important to work on terrorism, that they do not want for instance someone from another country decide what is good for example the Netherlands, of for any other country. What is good for a country is decided by the national government. What is good at the EU level, that will be voted, at the EU level by the Commission, through negotiations. No one will impose France, Germany, Spain or other MS to do things in terrorism because they are the most targeted country. They already organise their way, at national level. Countries have people from the foreign military intelligence and military deployed overseas in Iraq, Syria and others, exchanging. So, they know how to work with specific topics. So, the EU Commission or Europol cannot compete. The question is not the competition. The question is how to complement the activity of the CT services. And this is how Europol has been created, how the Europol ECTC has been created, following the Paris attacks. How ECTC could complement the French and Belgium authorities, to work on this unprecedented investigation, what was seen coming from Syria with an attack in Europe, different locations, different modus operandi? And obviously it was not the end of an operation because additional attacks followed. There was the Belgium attack linked, and multiple other attacks that happened afterwards, like the Christmas market in Berlin. There were multiple attacks in Stockholm, in Barcelona. Sometimes you have lone actors who have attacked, in spite of what was happening abroad, or on the online dimension, convincing people to act. So, the question is how to work collectively, in order to identify the potential people addressed by messages and also how to fight against people who are not in Europe. And that is where intelligence is working better.

INTERVIEWER: So, national authorities, such as France, are better equipped to deal with terrorist threats?

INTERVIEWEE 2: They evolved. The same for the UK, the same for Spain. Following the attack in Atocha train station, Spain at that time was working mostly in the Basque-ETA terrorist organisation. Spanish CT units also have units dealing with Islamic terrorism. But the main enemy for the Spanish authorities, enemy is not the term, but the threat, was originating from the Basque-led group, the ETA. When the attack of a group inspired by Al Qaeda took place, then the authorities realised that the Spanish country was also targeted by Jihadism, and they prioritised the fight against ETA but also against Jihadism. For the UK, it was the same. There was the attack in London, but they also have additional attacks, like in one year there were 7 attacks. This was mainly after 2012, as before this there was not much happening. But since 2014 and 2015 and after, things changed, and the Caliphate convinced people living in Western countries to act. So, countries developed their capabilities. France developed a huge capability in fighting terrorism. France prevented an attack from happening in France at the same time as the one in 9/11, against a U.S. embassy. So, France developed good practices in the fight against terrorism. But 2015 changed the belief that France was immune and could prevent actions against their territory. Every year France prevented terrorist attacks by groups, individuals, and we arrested them. So, no attacks happened except for 2012 with Mohammed Merah. But 2015 changed the idea, and also because France collected and received intelligence from abroad, for instance the battlefield areas in Iraq and Syria, that targeted France and the France knew it. France therefore increased its capabilities. The same with The Netherlands, Germany, and other countries. So, countries organised

themselves at the national level to better fight the threats who are targeting each and every country. Not all of the countries are targeted in the same way. So, every country has a different way of acting. In Sweden, the police do not have a CT unit, but it is only the intelligence, SAPO, who was doing counterterrorism activities. So, the intelligence units in the Nordic countries, like in Denmark, were tasked to identify the terrorist threat, then they contact the prosecutor and say, "okay now the intelligence investigation needs to go to the judicial investigation", so the prosecutor, takes the case and nominates an investigative unit from the police, which is not specialised per se in terrorism. They used to work on for instance on drugs cases, much less specialised in terrorism. Because the terrorism in some countries is not the main topic of interest. They are not targeted as France was, Italy and others.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, so, do you think that because there is a difference how much capabilities, and how much time and energy EU MS put into counter-terrorism efforts, do you think this also forms an obstacle for, for example France, to share their intelligence.

INTERVIEWEE 2: They have information, they have much more information than Europol. They work collectively with the U.S., with the U.K. and others, at the intelligence level, internal and external; they have information. They are closer to reality. But Europol is not. Europol is a supra-national organisation, supporting MS, now we are an EU agency, which was not the case before. We were an inter-state agency, but now we are an EU agency. We are trying to support investigations of MS. We are developing our capacities. Because at the time, like I told you, the counter-terrorism unit at Europol before it was called the ECTC (European Counter Terrorism Centre), had almost no manpower and no technical expertise, not much information either. So, they created the EU IRU, European Union Internet Referral Unit, within the CT department on the 1st of June 2015. In 2015 there was the terrorist attack of Charlie Hebdo, on the 7th of January 2015. There was also the attack in the Jewish supermarket, the 9th of January 2015. CT units and intelligence services knew what was happening in Syria and the Islamic State, and regarding the actions and intentions of the foreign branch of the Islamic State, and they decided that it was important to create a technical unit, dealing with the internet, to better address the issue. The EU IRU was created, with more staff, and with an extended mandate; to work on Jihadism propaganda online. Then, the Paris attacks happened in November 2015. But you have many other things that had happened before. There are a lot of suspects which have been arrested. Sid Ahmed Ghlam wanted to do a terrorist action against churches in the South of Paris, Reda Hame, who went to Syria and did a very fast training of 12 days, and came back into France, via a certain route and in August 2015 wanted to target specific locations. And then there were other suspects who have been arrested in the airport of Istanbul, another was arrested in Poland, coming back from Syria to Turkey and Poland and was coming back into Europe. So, we have a lot of suspects who were coming back from the battlefield, the conflict area, to go to Europe, mostly France, via different routes, to perform terrorist actions. Then there was November 2015, the Paris terrorist attack. Europol, for the first time was asked to be deployed. There was also someone from the EU IRU deployed there. So, two analysts, and one specialist from the EU-IRU, Arabic speaking were deployed to France. Then we worked with French CT unit for thirteen days, side by side. And Europol found elements in its database, which was significant. So, this convinced many to trust Europol of supporting the investigation. Then Europol, increased its staff because there was a will of the EU and MS, to have more staff to be able to support more investigations, and to have a more active role. Because at the beginning we found elements, and this was considered an added value to the investigations. And it is only in this way that you can build trust, not an "European

technocrat", but providing added value and finding investigative leads, in a very sensitive case, means that you have an added value. And this is what we proved at the beginning. We identified crucial investigative leads.

INTERVIEWER: So actually, proving that the involvement of Europol gains benefits for national authorities, motivated them their cooperation?

INTERVIEWEE 2: Yes, so the level of exchange evolved. At the beginning, the contributions were limited in quantity and quality. But once you see that there is more to gain from Europol, and especially from the outside of the French, Paris attacks, ECTC collected a lot of data. So then, when you cross-check information, if you cross-check with very limited information setting, a data set, you will not find anything. You can be lucky, but it is more unlikely. But more and more we collected very interesting contributions from MS, and we found investigative leads. We also developed capabilities. For instance, in facial recognition. This was not a tool widespread across CT units, or even countries. So, we developed this technical support. Because with the Paris attacks, we identified a need, a specific aspect of the investigation, and so we developed a tool of that, and it proved to be efficient. And we identified many investigative leads, not only for the Paris attacks but all other cases. So, because we found a need and then convinced people, we developed a lot of operational support to other countries. Europol used tools that convinced countries to contribute, such as the Terrorism Financing Tracking Programme, TFTP. So, then countries in the CT realm, said "I have a case, I have suspects, that are connected to the battlefield, I have videos, are there any links with Europol databases?". So, they send a picture of the suspect, they send videos, and we identify the suspects.

INTERVIEWER: So, it is mainly complementary?

INTERVIEWEE 2: Yes. Then we identify in the video, the suspect is connected to this person, and to this country, and this country. The problem is, I think something very important. Traditionally, CT Units exchange what they think is important to develop their investigation. Generally, you will send German phone numbers to Germany, you will send Spanish phone numbers to Spain, but you will not send French phone numbers to Spain and Germany. The investigation is much more complicated but better collected if you do wiretapping or look at a telephone mast, or you investigate the online dimension of the case. You have Facebook possibly, or LinkedIn, or Snapchat, or Telegram. So, you have a lot of social media. So, the way of communicating is different, and you have a lot of contacts. You contribute any username. Then with the username, you can find a picture, often you have a telephone or email associated with your accounts. And then the connection between the cases is more complex. Because in my Facebook I can have maybe 600 people. Are they all terrorists? That is very complex. In bulk data investigation, you cannot send everything to for instance the Dutch authorities. If you send it one time, on a very important case of a terrorist plot in the Netherlands, if you send it to my country, I will send everything. It will trigger a lot of work for the Dutch authorities. A lot of work to cross-check, assess, process information. It will take the CT unit weeks to cross-check and identify the connections. They will do that once, but you cannot take everything in a single go. That is what is important and relevant in the exchange with multilevel organisations. At Europol we receive from everyone, so 27 EU MS, and almost 15 third countries, with whom we need to have an operational agreement in order to be able to share operational data. So, we collect a lot of information, and we can make the information searchable. Then you can identify a connection between a Lithuanian phone number, a Spanish case, and a Polish case, or a Dutch case, which is not

natural. And that is when you find investigative leads. You need to assess data and try to see which constants are seen in the data send to you, and then with other contributions, you can identify, and operationalise. If you believe it is relevant, you try to, depending on the handling code, the level of protection, to make it available to the countries and you can identify information in connection to terrorism offences directly or to parallel offences, other criminal areas. It can be the financing of the terrorism act, it can be immigration, the travel of terrorist, which can use the immigration network, knowing the identity of the suspects. It can be whatever, as long as it has not been identified by MS prior to this, then the MS can see it as something of interest. They see that with Europol or with intelligence organisations, you can identify elements, that at the national level you may not have been able to identify. Will it be critical to a case? It can happen.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, thank you. At this point Europol and also the EU, still complements national authorities. As you said, French capabilities are much higher than Europol ones.

INTERVIEWEE 2: the EU does not complement, but Europol does, because Europol works on operations, on the policy level it is another topic.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, so do you see in the future, that there would be cooperation multilaterally or do you think that in the end countries will still focus on national assets and national capabilities?

INTERVIEWEE 2: So, it is a two-way process, I think. First, countries need to develop their own assets, depending on the threats. If you have a country which is targeted, then you need to develop your capacities and increase your information exchange with foreign entities. What happened in Syria and the targeting of the European Union, made the countries in the intelligence community increase the level of cooperation at a very high level. So, Member State cooperate very well together. Do they see everything? I am not sure, no one can see everything. But the importance is that there is better communication between foreign intelligence, international intelligence, judicial authorities. For example, what was happening in Syria, to be translated from the military battlefield information to the intelligence services and to be sanitised, to what foreign fighters were doing abroad, information collected from the military, to put it in a judicial file is complex, but countries even develop their capabilities in making this information available to judicial authorities. Not everyone, and every country succeeded, some are still on the way to develop the capacity. But some countries have succeeded, not everything is going to the judicial file, it is evaluated by the intelligence, once the information is sure and evaluated, then they decide what can be disseminated. Because it is important to continue the investigation, in particular when your suspects are not in your territory. If your suspects are in your territory, it is important to know what was happening outside. Because say they are arrested, they can be the membership of a terrorist organisation, if they have performed some actions abroad and you have pictures of them in the file/fight of IS, or videos of them killing someone, it is important for this information to be translated to the judicial authorities, to pursue the person not for simple membership, because in some countries the penalty is very low. But if you kill someone abroad, some countries will prosecute you for 10 or 20 years. So, it is important to translate and secure the evidence, whatever is happening abroad and what can be used to pursue at the national level. This concerns the national level.
For the second level, Europol, I think cooperation evolves in a way that in general it is some 16 MS decided to appoint to Europol, some dedicated liaison officers in CT. So, France sends two, other countries send one or two. We have the Counter Terrorism Joint Liaison Team

(CTJLT). The CTJLT is a kind of setting of CT liaison officers specifically appointed to Europol, which was not the case before, and they have direct contact with their own agencies.

INTERVIEWER: And this was after the Paris attacks?

INTERVIEWEE 2: This was after the Paris attacks. This was in January 2016. The liaison officers are not members of Europol, but at Europol it is important, because I forgot to say, we have the Europol staff, and we have the liaison officers. The liaison officers belong to the MS. So, we have a Dutch desk, a German desk, a desk of all nationalities. There is a certain number of officers from police customs or Gendarmerie, who work for the MS and facilitate information exchange of organised crime, cybercrime, and terrorism. But following the Paris attacks you have specific countries who decided to appoint specific CT liaison officers who are directly in contact with the MS and see what is happening in the MS and convince countries to contribute specific information. They know Europol, because in the CT units, or intelligence services, they do not really know what we are doing. What are the capabilities of Europol? For instance, facial recognition, is it important for me to send information? Is it important to send, for example, if someone has been arrested, is it important to send the digital evidence of the forensic image of the telephone. The phone is maybe one terabyte of data, between the 1,000 pictures and the 300 videos, all the social media, it is a lot of data, and all the geolocation with the connection to Wi-Fi. Within the pictures, you can have metadata, so you can have a lot of information. Is it important for the MS to send the data of the phone, or the laptop, or the USB? That is the role of the CT JLT, sometimes to explain, what Europol can do, because the national authorities will not see the need and exchange. The CT JLT is thus very important. If I need to send data like two German numbers because in my investigation I found two German phone numbers, who are the users? The numbers have been purchased by a user, where are they located? Are they located in Germany or are they moving in Syria, using German phone numbers. For the French investigators or others, it may be important. So, everything connected to the suspects is important. All the Lithuanian numbers, we will not ask Germany (too much work). But Europol can have the Lithuanian number contributed to a suspicious transaction, because there was a money transfer reported by a country, identified, they have a number of suspicious transactions, and they asked Europol to cross-check it. Mostly, it should be organised crime, but we found this phone number and suspicious transactions, in the CT space. Then it triggers a bell “why does this phone number appear in a CT case?”, and this contribution from a specific country.

INTERVIEWER: So, as I understand correctly, by sending information, national states inherently increase the chance of links being found between other investigations in other countries.

INTERVIEWEE 2: Yes, and this data can remain for a specific amount of time. It can remain stored during six months or more. MS do with their contribution what they want to do. If you want it to be cross-checked, it will only be cross-checked and then deleted, so not stored in the Europol database. Or it can be cross-checked and stored for six months, or three years. It depends on why you contribute information. Often you contribute information, when the case is closed, which is useless, but it is a tradition. They want to protect the case and then they send the information. And then you find these links, and then it becomes more critic because you need to inform the investigative judge, and contact the other country, and the case is almost closed, so you need to reopen the investigation and then it becomes complicated. This is a way of the conservatism of countries, how they work.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, I understand, then, at this point, what do you believe to be the main obstacle, for countries to share intelligence. Does it concern the security and how they send information?

INTERVIEWEE 2: We have ways to send information. If there is too much information, we can collect it and bring it with a hard drive with a protected encryption and store it at Europol. But then you need to trace all the pieces of information to the contributor. We have a very strong data protection framework, that is very important. We are not here to dump data. It is data to support criminal investigation, in relation to terrorism. It can be intelligence, it can be investigation, but it is an investigation on the intelligence realm or in the judicial file, for us, we do not really see the difference, it is just an investigation on terrorism against suspects, their contacts, that is what we are focussing on. We are not going to work on data to keep it, like all the telephone masts of the Netherlands, it makes no sense, because it is mostly people who have nothing to do with an offence, and then they could be contributed to a CT file. So, we need to know what the data subject category of every piece of information is, which is very complicated. On my phone I have 600 people. If I was under investigation of CT, the CT investigator will not be able to say that 600 people contact of a terrorist have a role in the crime. They are the contact of a terrorist, but they are not the subject of terrorism. So, it is important to see, I am preparing a terrorist attack, so because I was preparing a terrorist attack, something very important, all my contacts deserve specific attention. If at some point, another kind of contact appears in another CT case, it can still be a contact of someone else, it depends in which framework a person is evolving, but you go to Rotterdam, you may go to the same McDonalds, or you have some friends in common with someone else, that does not mean that your friends are a suspect. It needs to be assessed whether it is relevant. It needs to be evaluated, discussed, with the CT units, to see if the contact needs to be disregarded and removed from the database. But it should deserve to stay in the database for a bit more time, because you are the contact of a main suspect, who prepared terrorist action, or already did a terrorist action. So, then it is a level of strong data protection framework; what you keep and for how long you keep it. So, you have the 2016 Directive on Data Protection of Law Enforcement, and you have specific principles, data transmission, data purpose, data limitation. To see how long you keep it and for what you keep it and for what reason. CT units, have to better increase cooperation with services of intelligence, to provide a better added value in investigations, to enrich information. For Europol, a huge benefit is that we have databases in CT and serious organised crime. So cyber and the serious organised crime, and the facilitation of illegal immigration at a higher level, organised crime groups, or suspicious transactions, or drugs, or weapon trafficking, that is serious organised crime area, criminal offences. Terrorism has another database. Two different databases at Europol, but we can cross-check information between them. Often, countries have only access to the CT database, their national CT database, but they ignore the potential links with organised crime, with drug trafficking, with immigration. So, it is a national decision, and sometimes you can miss some investigative opportunities because you ignore even at national level, that you have a link with for instance drug trafficking, or weapon trafficking. For Rotterdam, weapon trafficking, CT investigation in Amsterdam, they purchased weapons, maybe it is the same organisation, but you ignore because you are investigating drug trafficking and you don't know the context of your suspects. They may be radicalised, they are terrorists, but sometimes they can do their business in a specific objective. And then we can find the connections, for example, forgery of documents, fake IDs, contributing to organised crime. But the pictures, like in the Paris attacks, appear as suspects. We have facial recognition, so we can identify pictured when we have a fake ID. With a fake ID you can find links to suspicious transactions, for a specific purpose, criminal. And that is really beneficial.

And some countries do not have this organised at the national level and can have some national links identified, thanks to Europol. Some countries do not cross-check between separate cases. But sometimes we take the two cases and see natural links that no-one should really report because we should not report national leads, but we know how things are working at the national level, and so sometimes we know that this unit may not cross-check all information. They will mostly cross-check telephony but not the rest. Because telephony is often exchanged but not the rest. The names and the Wi-Fi location data is not exchanged, because it is a lot of data. So, it is not something that is traditionally exchanged. So, Europol and ECTCT can identify national leads, and then we discuss it with the CT liaison officer and say: "here is what we found, we think it is maybe important". Then the country can identify it at the national level. Then it is up to the MS themselves to see what they do with it and if they hand it over to judicial authorities or cross-check the information between the cases, to dive deeper into the material and see if there are more investigative links to be found between the two cases, to see if they are connected or if it was more by chance and maybe not relevant.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, great, thank you so much. These were actually my questions. I am just going to sum up what you have said to me. The main getaway for me was the fact that up to now Europol is functioning as a complementary element to EU MS and supporting them in investigations. Their involvement grew after the Paris attacks as a portion of the investigation was delegated to Europol. So, steps have been made. However, the sharing of intelligence and active contributions to CT efforts remains a national choice. Also, Europol remains somewhat limited in resources and capabilities to compete with national authorities, such as France, who have extensive history and experience with terrorism. Then there is also the whole aspect of safe transfer of information. For which I thought SIENA ws the solution to safe transmission, I have learned that there is even a higher level of confidentiality through which information cannot be shared by SIENA. Also, not all intelligence services are competent enough to share intelligence with Europol. Such as the BfV and BND. Does this about sum it up?

INTERVIEWEE 2: Yes, I think it does.

INTERVIEWER: Great, thank you so much for all of your contributions. I will stop the recording now.

Transcript: Interviewee 3

INTERVIEWER: Great so I'm writing my master thesis at the moment. And I'm doing research into cooperation between EU Member States in the field of counter terrorism and specifically intelligence cooperation. I am trying to explain what fosters states to motive or to share intelligence and what the obstacles are to it? And I'm using a framework of three of drivers or mechanisms that should help me explain why there is intelligence sharing, but at this point there is also a sort of limitation to what sates share. Those 3 drivers are internal demand, external pressure, and cooperative momentum. But I'll dive into them a bit more later on. The aim of the interview is to get your view on what you see in the real world within intelligence sharing, as to what limit states, but also what motivates them? So, I have a few questions regarding each driver. And the first one is internal demand which really looks at the motivations of the states. And what I found during my research is that states are inherently motivated because intelligence sharing would mean benefits for the state themselves. So, they would get policy gains, or they would advance their security situation, or they'll be able to receive intelligence which they are not capable of retrieving. So, the first question is that do you think that intelligence sharing is motivated by national gains or national policy gains as a main driving motivation?

INTERVIEWEE 3: Yes, I would say, intelligence sharing in the area of terrorism is more to be seen to be contributing to the overall picture and to provide information that they're allowed to provide, that they have permission to provide, in order to contribute to the terrorism issues that play in the time and current issues and emerging trends and emerging threats in in terrorism. That said, I think that, especially in terrorism, as opposed to maybe other types of crime, there is a resistance to share detailed intelligence in relation to matters affecting state security. People can be very nervous about what's going to happen with that information. Even with handling codes, which you know, do you know about handling codes?

INTERVIEWER: No, no.

INTERVIEWEE 3: So, when we share information through your Europol, we assign it a handling code. So, handling code 0 means that that's the basic protection level, and that information could be shared, and that there's nothing sensitive in that information. Handling Code H One means that it can be used, it can be shared, it can be used for the prevention and section of crime, but you can't use it in court without permission of the of the country that provided it. And then there's handling code two which means that you can use it for the prevention section of crime, you cannot use it in court, but you also can't share with it with another country without those permissions. So, the sharing of intelligence is, we're lucky that we have handling codes which gives Member States some confidence in sharing their information, because they know that they can set those specific handling codes, and they can be sure that the other country is going to abide by those handling codes. But yes, I would say that that most countries are very willing to provide even an overall general contribution in particular, in relation to particular threats to contribute to the wider picture. Yeah, to arm like you said, the policymakers with the with the right information, so that they can put barriers in place or protections in place.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. And do you think that when making the decision, whether or not to potentially share intelligence with other EU Member States, or even third parties, or third

world countries, do you think that the rational cost-benefit decision is the main driving force between choosing to share or not to share?

INTERVIEWEE 3: No, no, I would be in agreement with that. I would say it's a case of if you don't share information, if you don't contribute, you're not going to get contributions, and you're not going to get information shared with you. So, I suppose it's based on trust and relationship, a give and take relationship. So, are there other motivations? No, I wouldn't say there is, and there's motivations in that. It's more on relationship basis, that's to build trust between countries to share this information. Like I think, we're all police officers, and we are motivated by prevention and detection of crime, and we've done that since we joined our organisations, and our motivation is preventing crime. And I suppose there is a certain amount of putting yourself in that other police officer's shoes. So, when I was in this situation, is this information that I would like to know that I would need to know? Or do you understand what I'm trying to?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. There's also then kind of a human factor involved in it as well.

INTERVIEWEE 3: Yes, very much.

INTERVIEWER: So off course you have the rational choice; is me giving out information, going to provide me with benefits. But then there's also the humanitarian factor; how can this information help either my country or people prevent crime or prevent terrorism, when it could also be in favour of a different country, not necessarily your own.

INTERVIEWEE 3: Sorry one. Sorry I stole my colleague's office because it was empty. My office is full at the moment. Can you ask me that again?

INTERVIEWER: Oh, no, I was just kind of summarising what you were saying.

INTERVIEWEE 3: Yes, well I suppose the country on its own. So, Ireland on its own, wouldn't think to it, the police organisation, wouldn't say we need to share this information with Europol. That probably wouldn't come into their mindset. So, it's me and my colleagues in Europol, who are seeing the benefits of sharing, and us going back to our country and saying “Is there something that we contribute? Is there something that would be a benefit to the world, to Europe, to other countries? But also, is there information in this case that we can, say it's a specific case as opposed to a trend, is there information that is held in another country? Is, there benefits for me sending this out to another country and say, this has happened in Ireland, this is something we're seeing, is there anything you have there that you can provide? Have you dealt with a case similar? What have you found? Or are any of our suspects featuring in other countries? What type of crime are they engaging in in other countries? Who are they associated with? So, a lot of the time we're sending out this information. But it's also with the with the request, with a request to say, well, is there anything you can do to assist us with this. So, it's very much give and take. While we are providing this information, we're saying this is something we see, this is something we've come across, we're also asking for feedback on that. So, it's like I say, it's a very give and take relationship there.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. And I think you mentioned trust to be an important factor earlier on. That's also what I found within my research, that in order to even have cooperation, be it in the intelligence field or a different field, you need trust otherwise there's not going to be any

cooperation and even intelligence sharing. Do you believe that to be true? I do think you do. But what are your views on this matter?

INTERVIEWEE 3: Yes, one hundred percent. Information is sensitive information. This information goes to the core of state security of civilisation, really keeping our countries running and keeping the country safe for assistance. And in Ireland we saw it more than a lot of countries because we had a lot of domestic terrorism. Historically, over the last 100 years, in particular in the last 100 years. So, it goes to the core of that. So, it is very sensitive information, we want to know, we want to be sure that if we give this information, like a lot of the police in Ireland don't share the information with each other, because it's so sensitive, so we want to know that when we give this information to somebody that they're going to treat it as sensitively as we.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. And how do you see that the EU or Europol tries to guarantee this trust. I mean, you have the SIENNA system, in order to be able to transmit information in a secure way, and off course there's a lot of framework decisions and institutions put in place to foster this cooperation. But how do you see Europol trying to build this trust between Member States?

INTERVIEWEE 3: For me it comes down to personal trust with people. So, you know, about the system of liaison officers and me being able to go next door to Spain and talk to somebody in Spain about something, and it comes down to one on one. If I trust the person I'm working with, and the person in the next office, and I know them on a personal level, and I've had conversations with them, and I've gone to them when I've needed information, and they've been able to assist me or I've gone to them with advice, and they've come to me with advice, and we've built that relationship of trust already. Then I feel safe sharing information with them because I know that that information, and they feel safe sharing that information with me, because we have a mutual trust. Because I don't deal with the country, I deal with a person. And yes, that person is representing the country, but I suppose that's what makes it important to choose the right people from your country and places like Europol. Because you need to send somebody that can build those relationships.

INTERVIEWER: So, it's also more focused on personal level necessarily than the organisational level?

INTERVIEWEE 3: Well, we're individuals. Yes, we're representing our organisation, but we are individuals. I suppose that's how the trust is built. The trust is built. You can't build trust with an organisation unless that organisation has built up a history of providing people who are trustable and we trust already, and easy to get on with. I think that's what Europol does very well. It fosters relationships. But with that said, there is some information that, like we, we also provide intelligence to Europol. We don't just provide intelligence with our Member States. We provide intelligence to Europol which helps them draft their policy documents. Like you know, about the TESAT?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, yeah, the TESAT report.

INTERVIEWEE 3: For Ireland at the moment, we're compiling our response for the TESAT report, and that is deemed as really important, like that information has to be perfect, has to be correct because we know it's going into an international stage. And like, I said, it feeds policy decisions.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, okay, thank you. You mentioned that, off course, Dublin or Ireland has a lot of history with terrorism. I mean, I think you are referring to the IRA, right?

INTERVIEWEE 3: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: There's also a huge theory behind the fact that crises, or the wake of a terrorist attack, or history with terrorism, stimulates states to enhance their intelligence cooperation, as they see the bigger picture of what it could actually bring one in order to prevent a terrorist attack. Do you do you agree with this theory? Do you think that this history has fostered Irelands motivation to share intelligence?

INTERVIEWEE 3: It's a difficult one, because historically ours is domestic. So, it's very Irish-centric. So, it hasn't been an issue whereby we have people coming from other countries to commit terrorism in Ireland that hasn't been that hasn't been an issue. We're don't deal with a lot of immigration where there is massive risk to terrorism. We're an island as well, so we have been very kind of Irish-centric and very closed like that. So, we do see the benefits of sharing intelligence and sharing information, but I wouldn't say it was necessarily due to our history. I think it's probably far more modern than that. It's only in the last year that we probably realised the benefits. And probably, I mentioned immigration, probably with the increase in immigration we've had in the last 20 years.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, yeah. That it's interesting, because if you compare this to say France, off course it's a whole different story, because their history of terrorism has a lot to do with foreign fighters or lone actors traveling to France to commit act of terrorism. Yet for Ireland, off course, it's domestic, yeah. interesting.

INTERVIEWEE 3: No, no definitely, you are right in relation to and France and England and the UK. I think, because there are countries that have colonised or have a lot of immigration, and then they have terrorism issues surrounding that. Whereas historically our terrorists lived down the road essentially.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah definitely. We've talked about the concept of trust within intelligence sharing relations. But off course there's, I think, do you see that there's a lot of difference between the extent to which Member States actively engage in intelligence sharing. So, for example, Ireland, as you mentioned, takes the TESAT very seriously, and ensures their contribution is of high quality and also of quantity. But is there a large disparity between Member States in doing this?

INTERVIEWEE 3: No, I think everybody would take the TESAT extremely seriously, and they make sure that any contribution they gave was correct. And yes, some countries use the SIENNA system for sharing intelligence less than others, yes, and is that because they may have a lot less to share than others? Probably. But not every country has the same level of risk. And our level of risk today is a lot less than it was even 10 years ago. And so I think the countries that have the biggest issue share the most. But I suppose they have the most to share.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, yeah, I agree. It could also be a difference in even intelligence capabilities, right, so to say to what extent the country has the capabilities and assets to produce and analyse intelligence?

INTERVIEWEE 3: That was my next line. The bigger the risk, the more resources they have, and so the more capabilities they have for gathering intelligence and even in the sharing of intelligence they have more resources to do that. Yeah, yeah, no, it's obviously I totally agree that way.

INTERVIEWER: Actually, that were all my questions. So, thank you so much for your contribution. I will stop the recording now.

Appendix C – Code scheme

	Europol employees interview coding scheme				
No.	**Interviewee**	**Quotation**	**Internal demand**	**External pressure**	**Cooperative momentum**
1	1	"Intelligence, its methodology, and capabilities collection has generally been perceived as critical national assets."	x		
2	1	"Some reluctance to share intelligence, particularly with non-traditional/non-EU partners, may remain due to fear of corruption, misuse of power and/or handicapping certain privileged relationships with non-EU (strategic) significant partners (similar to the pre-Brexit UK scenario with the US intelligence, etc.)			x
3	1	"Still, the EU MS are also aware that non-sharing may lead to failure to develop a common intelligence picture of the security threats the EU may face."	x	x	
4	1	"Accurate intelligence is the basis for any rational decision-making process."	x		
5	1	"An increased level of security ambition and a call for a common strategic intelligence-sharing approach is an expected, desired, and inevitable result of an agreed and established, more integrated and better-coordinated approach to conflicts and crises through a coherent use of all security-related tools and policies at the EU's disposal."		x	
6	1	"A NATO statement of June 2021 to continue implementing a coherent and balanced package of measures, including support, and strengthening arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and enhancement of strategic awareness, including intelligence sharing, could be seen as one of an example of the progressing call for the common functional need for intelligence-sharing."	x	x	
7	1	"The progressing call for the common functional need for intelligence-sharing."	x		
8	1	"A desire for intelligence gains such as access to currently unavailable sources, methods, technologies, and information versus associated non-equally calibrated national budgets could theoretically be seen as pragmatic motivation to step towards	x		

		common – more cost-efficient solutions while minimising costs in terms of loss of autonomy and increased vulnerability."			
9	1	"The EU has already established several intelligence-related entities which collect and analyse intelligence; produce security reports; monitor SOC/terrorism-related threats, social unrest, etc., such as EUMS INT, IntCen, and SatCen. SatCen supports EU operations as part of the CSDP, FRONTEX, NATO, UN or OSCE, displaying effective high intelligence collection and exchange engagement at the EU level."			x
10	1	"Although none of the mentioned entities can be classified as an EU intelligence service per se, it may reflect a long-term needed (and agreed) pragmatic – centralised acceptable solution at the EU level rather than the national one."			x
11	1	"The power of constructively supported national security self-determination and recognition of (still) associated national security specifics (such as autonomy, relatedness, competence, etc) may vital wise encourage cooperation in a specific instance."	x		
12	1	"The functioning of intelligence services is based on human factors, thus naturally copying the human behaviour affected mainly by socio-political dynamics"		x	
13	1	"An intrinsic one based on national security interests involving engaging in intelligence handling/sharing without considering potential external rewards."	x		
14	1	"On the other hand, an extrinsic is reinforced by certain rewards, such as prestige/status, power, active engagement, etc."	x		
15	1	"An extrinsic part – the subject of question might be associated with the political motives for cooperation, such as the strengthening legitimacy, the political relationships."		x	
16	1	"An extrinsic part – the subject of question might be associated with … the need to display commitment in the public eyes."	x		
17	1	"It might be held back due to the risk of increased dependency on external sources of information and/or possible disclosure of knowledge level, methods, sources, etc."		x	
18	1	"Cross-border, transnational organised crime seriously threatens European stability and security and calls for enhanced intelligence and/or security cooperation between the EU and the external partners concerned."		x	

19	1	"The EU (or its centralised dedicated entity such as EUROPOL, INTCEN, FRONTEX, etc.) cannot play a direct role in particularly sensitive areas of intelligence work, such as large-scale technical surveillance, the management of human sources, or the execution of covert operations, etc. but facilitate."		x	x
20	1	"Therefore, a major part of its successful functioning strongly depends on its stakeholders' willingness to share their intelligence."	x		x
21	1	"The EU relies also on EEAS services (and capabilities) while embedded in the non-EU national environment."			x
22	1	"Indeed, without touching on facilitating elements of mutual interests, dependency, hierarchy, governmental will, culture and trust, in two risk/threat perceptions and security-wise different cases, the trust factor played the dominant role of quality-wise intelligence exchange facilitator."			x
23	1	"The EU agency creates and facilitates mechanisms for collecting, analysing, and operationalising intelligence between and among national authorities, given key security threats considered in line with the established mandate and corresponding operational framework."			x
24	1	"EUROPOL keeps facing major obstacles that can stand between ambitions and actual outcomes and obstruct cooperation even in cases where governments favour it."			x
25	1	"Furthermore, several legal instruments to boost intelligence sharing was developed, but left inactive."			x
26	1	"It could be that EUROPOL may have never been able to gain the solid trust of the EU MS that would encourage intelligence sharing."			x
27	2	"That is article 4 of the treaty of the Functioning of the EU; security is the sole responsibility of the member states."	x		
28	2	"Intelligence Services is really saying that that this is the founding between countries, not with a third party such as multinational organisation, and that is still the idea of many MS."	x		x
29	2	"So, Europol is still outside the intelligence community … and they do not believe Europol should be in the intelligence realm."		x	x
30	2	"So, at this point, Europol is more facilitating investigations but not directly analysing, producing, intelligence."			x

31	2	"Europol is supporting MS in their criminal investigations, in the post attack or in the preventative investigations."			x
32	2	"BfV and BND are not competent authorities with Europol, so they cannot exchange information with Europol."			x
33	2	"Some intelligence services cooperate with Europol, other do not or exchange more limited information."			x
34	2	"So, it is a national decision to decide who is a competent authority and who can exchange information."	x		
35	2	"No, it is a national decision, how they handle and protect information."	x		
36	2	"I think from the London attack or the Madrid attack, nothing much evolved."	x		
37	2	"Indeed, now yes. Following these events, the position of EU CTC was created, it was an EU MS decision."	x		
38	2	"So, it is not like the "masters" in Brussels who force MS to release their sovereignty in security."		x	x
39	2	"And this leads to very back and forth negotiations because the EU commission has an idea of what is good, and has impact on the MS."	x	x	x
40	2	"For MS it is so important to work on terrorism, that they do not want for instance someone from another country decide what is good for example the Netherlands, or any other country."	x		
41	2	"What is good for a country is decided by the national government."	x		
42	2	"No one will impose France, Germany, Spain or other MS to do things in terrorism because they are the most targeted country."	x		
43	2	"No one will impose France, Germany, Spain or other MS to do things in terrorism because they are the most targeted country. They already organise their way, at national level. Countries have people from the foreign military intelligence and military deployed overseas in Iraq, Syria and others, exchanging. So, they know how to work with specific topics. So, the EU Commission or Europol cannot compete."	x		
44	2	"The question is how to complement the activity of the CT services."			x
45	2	"And this is how Europol has been created, how the Europol ECTC has been created, following the Paris attacks."	x		x

46	2	"How ECTC could complement the French and Belgium authorities, to work on this unprecedented investigation, what was seen coming from Syria with an attack in Europe, different locations, different modus operandi?"		x	
47	2	"They evolved. The same for the UK, the same for Spain."	x		
48	2	"But the main enemy for the Spanish authorities, enemy is not the term, but the threat, was originating from the Basque-led group, the ETA. When the attack of a group inspired by Al Qaeda took place, then the authorities realised that the Spanish country was also targeted by Jihadism, and they prioritised the fight against ETA but also against Jihadism."	x	x	
49	2	"So, countries developed their capabilities."	x		
50	2	"So, countries organised themselves at the national level to better fight the threats who are targeting each and every country."		x	
51	2	"They have information, they have much more information than Europol."	x		
52	2	"Because at the time, like I told you, the counter-terrorism unit at Europol before it was called the ECTC (European Counter Terrorism Centre), had almost no manpower and no technical expertise, not much information either."			x
53	2	"So, they created the EU IRU, European Union Internet Referral Unit, within the CT department on the 1st of June 2015."			x
54	2	"The EU IRU was created, with more staff, and with an extended mandate; to work on Jihadism propaganda online."			x
55	2	"So, we have a lot of suspects who were coming back from the battlefield, the conflict area, to go to Europe, mostly France, via different routes, to perform terrorist actions."		x	
56	2	"And Europol found elements in our database, which was significant. So, this convinced many to trust Europol of supporting the investigation."	x		x
57	2	"Then Europol, increased its staff because there was a will of the EU and MS, to have more staff to be able to support more investigations, and to have a more active role."	x		
58	2	"And it is only in this way that you can build trust, not an "European technocrat", but providing added value and finding investigative leads, in a very sensitive case, means that you have an added value. And this is what we proved at the beginning. We identified crucial investigative leads."			x

59	2	"At the beginning, the contributions were limited in quantity and quality. But once you see that there is more to gain from Europol, and especially from the outside of the French, Paris attacks, ECTC collected a lot of data."	x		
60	2	"Because with the Paris attacks, we found a need, a specific aspect of the investigation, and so we developed a tool of that, and it proved to be efficient."	x		
61	2	"So, because we found a need and then convinced people, we developed a lot of operational support to other countries. Europol uses tools that convinced countries to contribute, such as the Terrorism Financing Tracking Programme, TFTP."	x	x	
62	2	"They see that with Europol … you can identify elements, that at the national level you may not have been able to identify."	x		
63	2	"The EU does not complement, but Europol does, because Europol works on operations, on the policy level it is another topic."			x
64	2	"First, countries need to develop their own assets, depending on the threats."	x		
65	2	"If you have a country which is targeted, then you need to develop your capacities and increase your information exchange with foreign entities."	x	x	
66	2	"What happened in Syria and the targeting of the European Union, made the countries in the intelligence community increase the level of cooperation at a very high level."		x	
67	2	"Because it is important to continue the investigation, in particular when your suspects are not in your territory."	x	x	
68	2	"So, it is important to translate and secure the evidence, whatever is happening abroad and what can be used to pursue at the national level. This concerns the national level."	x	x	
69	2	"But following the Paris attacks you have specific countries who decided to appoint specific CT category liaison officers who are directly in contact with the MS and see what is happening in the MS and convince countries to contribute specific information."			x
70	2	"That is the role of the CT JLT, sometimes to explain, what Europol can do, because the national authorities will not see the need and exchange."	x		x
71	2	"By sending information, national states inherently increase the chance of links being found between other investigations in other countries."	x		
72	2	"We have a very strong data protection framework, that is very important."			x

73	2	"For Europol, a huge benefit is that we have databases in CT and serious organised crime."			x
74	2	"Europol is functioning as a complementary element to EU MS and supporting them in investigations."			x
75	2	"Their involvement grew after the Paris attacks as a portion of the investigation was delegated to Europol."	x		
76	2	"However, the sharing of intelligence and active contributions to CT efforts remains a national choice."	x		
77	3	"We're lucky that we have handling codes which gives Member States some confidence in sharing their information, because they know that they can set those specific handling codes, and they can be sure that the other country is going to abide by those handling codes."			x
78	3	"I would say that that most countries are very willing to provide even an overall general contribution in particular, in relation to particular threats to contribute to the wider picture."		x	
79	3	"To arm like you said, the policymakers with the with the right information, so that they can put barriers in place or protections in place."	x		
80	3	"I would say it's a case of if you don't share information, if you don't contribute, you're not going to get contributions, and you're not going to get information shared with you."	x		
81	3	"So, I suppose it's based on trust and relationship, a give and take relationship."			x
82	3	"It's more on relationship basis, that's to build trust between countries to share this information."			x
83	3	"So, Ireland on its own, wouldn't think to it, the police organisation, wouldn't say we need to share this information with Europol."	x		
84	3	"Is there something that would be a benefit to the world, to Europe, to other countries?"	x	x	
85	3	"Are there benefits for me sending this out to another country and say, this has happened in Ireland, this is something we're seeing, is there anything you have there that you can provide?"	x		
86	3	"So, it is very sensitive information, we want to know, we want to be sure that if we give this information, like a lot of the police in Ireland don't share the information			x

		with each other, because it's so sensitive, so we want to know that when we give this information to somebody that they're going to treat it as sensitively as we."			
87	3	"For me it comes down to personal trust with people."			x
88	3	"I feel safe sharing information with them, because I know that that information, and they feel safe sharing that information with me, because we have a mutual trust."			x
89	3	"Because you need to send somebody that can build those relationships."			x
90	3	"You can't build trust with an organisation unless that organisation has built up a history of providing people who are trustable and we trust already, and easy to get on with."			x
91	3	"I think that's what Europol does very well. It fosters relationships."	x		
92	3	"So, we do see the benefits of sharing intelligence and sharing information, but I wouldn't say it was necessarily due to our history."	x		
93	3	"I think, because there are countries that have colonised or have a lot of immigration, and then they have terrorism issues surrounding that. Whereas historically our terrorists lived down the road essentially."	x	x	
94	3	"Some countries use the SIENA system for sharing intelligence less than others, yes, and that is because they may have a lot less to share than others."	x		
95	3	"And so, I think the countries that have the biggest issue share the most. But I suppose they have the most to share."	x		
96	3	"The bigger the risk, the more resources they have, and so the more capabilities they have for gathering intelligence and even in the sharing of intelligence they have more resources to do that."	x		
Quotes which address shortcomings MIC model					
1	2	"Because for the intelligence branch, the level of restriction is higher and cannot be sent via SIENA."			
2	2	"But the other one, the level Secret, cannot be exchanged via SIENA."			
3	2	"And at some point, could not exchange, so competent authorities could not exchange with Europol, but the level of classification, everything was classified, so nothing could be sent officially via SIENA."			
4	2	"So, in the intelligence realm, it is also that they exchange information on a bilateral manner, and they have a way to do it with liaison officers who have secure information communication."			
5	2	"Because at the time, like I told you, the counterterrorism unit at Europol before it was called the EU CTC, had almost no manpower and no technical expertise."			

6	2	“A lot of work to cross-check, assess, process information. It will take the CT unit weeks. To cross-check and identify the connections.”
7	2	“CT units, have to better increase cooperation with services of intelligence, to provide a better added value in investigations, to enrich information.”
8	2	“Also, Europol remains somewhat limited in resources and capabilities to compete with national authorities, such as France, who have extensive history and experience with terrorism.”
9	2	“For which I thought SIENA was the solution to safe transmission, I have learned that there is even a higher level of confidentiality through which information cannot be shared by SIENA. Also, not all intelligence services are competent enough to share intelligence with Europol. Such as the BfV and BND.”