Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

From conversion to complexity: Historiographical paradigms of Japanese thought control and tenkō in the 1930s from the early postwar period until contemporary times

Baas, Fabiënne

Citation
Baas, F. (2023). *From conversion to complexity: Historiographical paradigms of Japanese thought control and tenkō in the 1930s from the early postwar period until contemporary times*.

Version:	Not Applicable (or Unknown)
License:	License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master thesis in the Leiden University Student Repository
Downloaded from:	https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3513970

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

From conversion to complexity:

Historiographical paradigms of Japanese thought control and *tenkō* in the 1930s from the early postwar period until contemporary times

Fabiënne Adriana Maria Baas

Student number 3315916

Leiden University (MA Asian Studies, track History, Arts and Culture of Asia)

Supervisor: Dr. E. Mark

24 December 2022

Word count: 13523

Table of contents

Introduction

Based on my own objectives, the meaning of ideological conversion (tenkō) *is obvious. It refers to a change in thinking that took place among intellectuals because they failed to grasp the structure of modern Japanese society as a totalized vision. Therefore, in addition to intellectual compromise, capitulation, and distortion in confronting the inferior conditions of Japanese society, intellectual indifference and capitulation to tradition, which constitutes the totality of dominant inheritance, naturally form an important core at the heart of ideological conversion.*

- Yoshimoto Takaaki, *Tenkōron* (On *tenkō*, or ideological conversion), 1958.[1]

(…) the tenkō *phenomenon inspired postwar intellectuals to consider a new framework for Japan's modern intellectual trajectory, wherein* tenkō *was generalized beyond the specific history of the interwar thought crime phenomenon to signify anytime a major shift occurred in modern Japanese intellectual history.*

- Max Ward, *Thought Crime: Ideology and State Power in Interwar Japan*, 2019.[2]

These two quotes are written by different scholars in different times, but on the same topic: *tenkō,* or ideological conversion. These ideological conversions happened in the 1930s in Japan, and were done by critics of the Japanese state, often communists, socialists and leftist activists or writers, who decided to ideologically convert by either censoring their own works and abandoning political activism, or changing their ideological convictions into one which was in line with the imperial Japanese state.[3] By signing a *tenkōsho,* which was a document that confirmed their rejection of their earlier left-wing criticism, their prison sentence could be significantly decreased.[4] From the 1910s to the end of the Pacific War, the Japanese thought police, or Special Higher Police (*tokubetsu kōtō keitsatsu*) aimed to report and control "dangerous foreign ideologies" such as socialists and communists, keeping a close eye on leftist radicals.[5] With the rise of Japanese militarism and the government officials' fear of criticism and

[1] Yoshimoto Takaaki, "On Tenkō, or Ideological Conversion," *Review of Japanese Culture and Society,* 20 (2008): 100.
[2] Max M. Ward, *Thought Crime: Ideology and State Power in Interwar Japan* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2019), 182.
[3] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 79.
[4] Mark Williams, "Writing the Traumatized Self: Tenkō in the Literature of Shiina Rinzō," in *Imag(in)ing the War in Japan,* ed. Mark Williams and David Stahl (Boston: Brill, 2010), 105.
[5] Richard H. Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 25.

disapproval of the Japanese national polity (*kokutai*), people were ordered to "lessen their social criticism."[6] The 1925 Peace Preservation Law allowed the thought police to arrest those who "organized an association with the objective of altering the kokutai or the form of government (…)."[7] One of the results of this was the 1931 sentence of most of the members of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which was founded in 1922.[8] After receiving a life sentence, two former leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika, wrote a letter in which they decided to support Japan's war actions and the "emperor's pivotal position for the Japanese," ideas which the Japanese Communist Party were against before. This *tenkō* resulted in both a shorter sentence for the former leaders of the JCP, but also a mass *tenkō* of other communists and activists in the 1930s. A 1943 record from the Justice Ministry stated that around 2,440 communists were prosecuted, and from all of these people, only thirty seven were not classified as converted.[9]

Since the early postwar period in Japan, historians and other scholars have held discussions on the causes, effects and definition of *tenkō*, and made analyses of the people who converted (*tenkōsha*) by researching their lives and literary works. Yoshimoto Takaaki, born in 1924, was a Japanese philosopher and literary critic and part of Japan's New Left in the 1950s, and added his own arguments to the already existing debate on *tenkō*. Having experienced the defeat of Japan during the Pacific War in 1945, Yoshimoto wanted to provide a "complete picture" of the understanding of political activists, as his wish was to "exhaustively scrutinize" this understanding based on his own vision of the total structure of Japan."[10] The efforts of a large group of Japanese postwar scholars created a large historiography on *tenkō*, and the interwar period.

Max Ward, historian and Associate Professor at Middlebury College, USA, argues in his 2019 book *Thought Crime* that scholars such as Yoshimoto only used *tenkō* to define the difference between the interwar and postwar period in the context of Japanese society, while Ward adds that *tenkō* was more than ideological conversion. Ward writes that in the discussion of the official policy of *tenkō*, it is essential to include "the material apparatuses that generated the phenomenon and the ritualized forms that defined its practice," as he argues that these

[6] Mitchell, *Thought Control,* 30-1.
[7] Ibid, 62.
[8] Ibid, 108-9.
[9] Ibid, 147.
[10] Yoshimoto, "On Tenkō, 100.

"institutional legacies of the prewar criminal rehabilitation system" are not studied enough in the historiography of *tenkō*.[11]

The debates surrounding *tenkō* since the early postwar period have been held in different disciplines, paradigms and languages. Where historians highlight the historical context of the 1930s and analyze what the cause of the "lack of resistance," aggression of the state and thought rehabilitation system after *tenkō* was, scholars of literary and area studies refer to the accounts of those who committed *tenkō*. Over time, the debate around tenkō has been problematized and complicated: the early postwar scholars in Japan aimed to define *tenkō* in order to define themselves and the changes made after the war, but contemporary scholars are aiming to criticize earlier works, resulting in new theories and debates regarding the experiences of women *tenkōsha,* the effect of thought crime the Japanese colonies during the war, and reasons for or against committing *tenkō*. An overview of these debates, limited to English-language sources and translations, will provide a timeline that will bring to light the changes over time, and the aspects to this issue that are yet to be analyzed.

The arguments of Yoshimoto Takaaki and Max Ward are only two of the many examples which illustrate the change of paradigms concerning *tenkō* over time. Covering the period from the postwar period until the 2020s, this thesis will use the historiography on the tenkō phenomenon as an exercise to inquire how the paradigms have changed over time, and how secondary sources show a timeline of different arguments. With the rise of area studies and an interest in *tenkō* and the larger rehabilitation process regarding thought control, scholarship on this topic and period has become an extensive historiographical archive and with multiple ongoing debates. This historiographical paper aims to answer the following question: which changes have been present in historical discourse on *tenkō* in the 1930s from the postwar until recent times, and how did these historical paradigms develop? This question will be answered in the following chapters.

The first chapter will provide historical context of the 1920s and 1930s in Japan. Thought control was made possible during this time due to the implementation of new laws, such as the 1925 Peace Preservation Law, and this resulted in arrests of the members of the newly established Japanese Communist Party. With the use of the concept of *kokutai* (Japan's national polity), the Japanese government aimed to emphasize the uniqueness of the emperor system, and censor those who did not agree with the system. This chapter explains how thought

[11] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 182.

criminals were treated and had to reintegrate into Japanese society, but also how *tenkō* was used by those who were arrested to avoid a long prison sentence and sometimes even to join governmental organizations that encouraged *tenkō*.

Chapter two discusses the early postwar period in Japan and the scholarship and discussions on *tenkō* at this time. After the end of the Pacific War in 1945, the Peace Preservation Law and reintegration centers for thought criminals were abolished, and those who had experienced suppression of the state during the prewar and war period began to comment on *tenkō*. This chapter will provide an outline of the debates, analyses and interpretations of *tenkō* by early postwar scholars. The work of Japanese historians such as Saburō Ienaga, but also of scholars such as Masao Maruyama reflect how *tenkō* was seen as a "weakness" against the Imperial Japanese state, but also how Japan was unique in comparison to modern European states, as Japan was "spiritual" and its citizens were connected by a national polity (*kokutai*).

Chapter three introduces English language scholarship on *tenkō* from the 1960s, which builds on the research in Japan from the early postwar era. The works of Patricia Steinhoff and Richard H. Mitchell are considered the pioneering framework of English language literature on *tenkō*, as they provide coin new categories for *tenkō* but also emphasize the spiritual power of the Japanese imperial state and national polity. The field of area studies had just emerged, which aimed to analyze contemporary non-Western societies, and the theme of *tenkō* allowed the scholars to define the prewar era of Japan in order to create a better understanding of Japanese society as a whole. This chapter focuses on how new interpretations of *tenkō* differ from the Japanese early postwar era, but also created a base for later scholars to build on, or even criticize.

The last chapter shows how new perspectives on *tenkō* from the twenty-first century add to the debates from the twentieth century, and aim to create a more complete understanding of *tenkō* as a concept. Issues such as the inclusion of women, the locality of outside the Japanese metropole and the institutional legacies and rehabilitation systems of *tenkō* in the debate provide a new outlook. Also, the emphasis on distinctive experiences add complexity to the previous theories and debates on why *tenkōsha* chose to convert. Scholars such as Max Ward and Mark Williams show that a better understanding of those who committed *tenkō*, and also those who did not, help us to understand the motivations of the Japanese government officials, but also of the thought criminals themselves.

This paper aims to show how the concept of *tenkō* was interpreted and used differently over time and space, what paradigms on *tenkō* have developed and how scholars attempt to create a complete understanding of *tenkō* in contemporary times.

Chapter 1: Imperial Japan and Thought Control During the Interwar Period

After two centuries of government by the Tokugawa shogunate and independent domain lords (*daimyō,* 大名) in a decentralized form, the Meiji restoration of 1868 resulted in a major structural change in Japan.[12] The result of a civil war was the abolition of the *daimyō* domains, and the replacement of the powerful military ruler (s*hōgun,* 将軍) by the emperor. Another change was the so called "opening" of Japan, as Japan had been isolated since the early seventeenth century as result of the Tokugawa policy to limit trade relations (*sakoku*, 鎖国).[13] A new central government was established, and in a short time, the Japanese Tokugawa shogunate was replaced by the Meiji imperial government.[14] Besides political reformation, a reformation on an ideological level was also sought after by those drafting governmental legislation, as historian and Japanologist Carol Gluck writes in her book "Japan's Modern Myths."[15] While there was no group of officials who dedicated their job to the "mythmaking," Gluck writes that there was "an array of people who (…) took, one might say, an "ideological" interest – they would have called it public-spiritedness – most often in matters closely related to their work or position."[16] Not only bureaucrats on a national or governmental level were involved, but also prefectural and local officials.[17] At first, there was a diversity of ideas about "civic edification," and these different ideas created the shared, imperial Meiji ideology: according to Gluck, these ideas overlapped, and instead of a single ideology, they were " in a constant process of mutual adjustment and change." [18]

However diverse, the ideology of the imperial system (*tennosei ideorogii*) was supported by notions of the national polity, or essence (*kokutai,* 国体), also called a "mystical polity" by Gluck.[19] This *kokutai* referred to the system of emperors in Japan, described in article 1 of the Meiji constitution as the "line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal," but also to role of the

[12] Richard Sims, *Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 5.
[13] Sims, *Japanese Political History,* 2.
[14] Ibid, 37.
[15] Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 3.
[16] Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 9.
[17] Ibid, 9.
[18] Ibid, 16.
[19] Ibid, 15

Japanese people as imperial subjects and the emperor as the head of the Japanese empire.[20] It was considered unique to Japan, and distinguished itself from European political systems, but was also used to teach schoolchildren about the "purportedly timeless ethical values mediating the relationship between emperor and subject from time immemorial," based on the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education.[21] The *kokutai* was an essential part of nation-building ideology, as it "was increasingly invoked as the symbolic embodiment of the nation," and a "newly generalized civil morality" was established during the final decade of the nineteenth century and thus taught at schools as well.[22] The *kokutai* could therefore unite the Japanese people in their shared connection to "their national polity" and teach them the ways of Japanese civil morality.[23]

During this time, the Japanese state began to modernize by means of the introduction of Western-influenced institutions, such as railway networks, but also education systems.[24] Intellectuals at the time of the Meiji period considered this step towards "civilization" a sudden transformation: Japan changed from a traditional society to one which was based on the idea of Western modernity.[25] The idea of a sudden change from "feudal" to "civilization" constituted only a "beforeness of change," according to Gluck.[26] It was only the feeling of being modern that created an environment in which Japan was able to modernize. At the same time, Japan began to militarize and wage war with other countries. In order to become a great power, most government leaders agreed that acquiring new land was necessary.[27] After Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and 1895 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and 1905, Japan began to be internationally recognized as a political and military power in Asia, and succeeded in acquiring new land by the annexation of Korea in 1910. [28]

While Japan was actively fighting abroad, it also faced issues domestically.[29] Such changes included the rise of urban migration, a shift from investment and interest in agriculture to business, but also a new perceived threat seen by the conservative bureaucrats of the Meiji

[20] Ward, *Thought Crime*, 23.
[21] Ibid, 23.
[22] Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths,* 102.
[23] Ibid, 117.
[24] Sims, *Japanese Political History,* 2.
[25] Carol Gluck, "The End of Elsewhere: Writing Modernity Now," *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 2011) 679.
[26] Gluck, "The End of Elsewhere," 679.
[27] Ienaga Saburō, *The Pacific War, 1931-1945. A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II,* trans. Frank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 6.
[28] Ienaga, *The Pacific War,* 6.
[29] Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 157.

state: the appearance of the socialists.[30] The socialists were regarded a threat due to their criticism on the war and other facets of the Meiji state, which were suppressed by the government, such as new newspapers of the rising left-wing movement.[31] The government censored the publications by critics, and as part of the Meiji reformation, a new centralized police force, inspired by the French after a trip to Europe. This Meiji inspection team, kept a close eye on political dissenters.[32] New laws and codes regarding political crime were implemented, and the Tokugawa legacy of the suppression of public opinion on the government remained.[33] Political dissidence in the late Meiji period often resulted in a prison sentence. According to Richard H. Mitchell, professor at the history department of the University of Missouri-St. Louis, "moderately harsh," prisoners were receiving inadequate food and falling ill, yet still some managed to still publish leftist newspapers from prison.[34]

The Japan Socialist Party, established in 1906, had criticized the Meiji state for the Russo-Japanese war and condemned Japanese imperialism, to which the Meiji state reacted with suppression of Socialist journals and the abolition of the party itself in 1907.[35] This trend continued in the Taisho era (1912-1926) with the Japan Communist Party (*日本共産党, nihon kyōsan-tō*) which was established in 1922. The JCP criticized the imperial institution, and internal discussions were held about the possibility of abolishing it.[36] The JCP was an underground organization, as they were aware of how dangerous such statements were: for example, documents of the JCP were held at the home of a party member, instead of the university that members were associated with.[37] Twenty-nine suspects were arrested, and the JCP was dissolved in 1924, yet the state remained vigilant about radicalism.[38] In order to form a legal basis to prevent secret societies, like the JCP, from forming, the Peace Preservation Law was implemented in 1925.[39] Those who joined such societies, would be, according to the law, "liable to imprisonment with or without hard labor for a term not exceeding ten years."[40] While the JCP was practically outlawed, members were still active, and those associated with the JCP,

[30] Sims, *Japanese Political History,* 107.
[31] Ibid*,* 108
[32] Richard H. Mitchell, *Janus-Faced Justice: Political Criminals in Imperial Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 3.
[33] Mitchell, *Janus-Faced Justice*, 4.
[34] Ibid, 30.
[35] Sims, *Japanese Political History,* 109.
[36] Mitchell, *Janus-Faced Justice*, 37.
[37] Ibid,, 37.
[38] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 35.
[39] Ibid*,* 45.
[40] Ibid*,* 45.

or those called for the "altering of the *kokutai*" were arrested on the basis of the Peace Preservation law.[41]

The concept of the *kokutai,* as mentioned in the Meiji constitution, referred to the imperial system of Japan, but it was now reinvented in order to justify the criminal law of the 1920s.[42] The Peace Preservation Law mentioned the *kokutai* in order to categorize the Japanese national polity in contrast to the "evil foreign ideology" of communism and other ideologies which opposed the national polity.[43] According to historian Max Ward, "*kokutai* was used to identify the foreign ideological threat, not to clarify the nature of imperial sovereignty."[44] The *kokutai* also "defended the political system, traditional social relationships, and the central symbols of the nation," which allowed the police to arrest all people who challenged such symbols, especially communists, as argued by historian Patricia Steinhoff.[45] The perceived threat of left-wing radicalism and anti-governmental movements, which began after the Russo-Japanese war, was now actively suppressed by the law, executed by the Special Higher Police, also called the Thought Police or Peace Police. Mass roundups in 1928 and 1929, but also one-on-one ambushes by the Thought Police and open trials created a wave of fear, as was intended: "the purpose of carefully staged trial [of communists] was to re-educate those who has slipped into the heresy of communism, and to publicly blacken the image of the Japanese Communist Party."[46]

On June 10th, 1933, two leaders of the JCP, Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika, who had been arrested and sentenced for life under the Peace Preservation Law, revealed that they committed *tenkō* and thus would convert themselves from communism and made it clear that from then on, they "endorsed Japan's imperial mission abroad."[47] They were sentenced for life, but because of their *tenkō*, their sentence was reduced to fifteen years.[48] While the reason for their *tenkō* has been a topic of debate since early postwar scholarship, it was clear that both physical and psychological force was used in prisons where thought criminals were incarcerated. The prisoners were often pressured by the police to write their *tenkō* statements, but force was also used for the gain of information, or "simply as a punishment for those repudiating the

[41] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 58.
[42] Ibid*,* 23.
[43] Ibid*,* 23.
[44] Ibid*,* 23.
[45] Patricia Golden Steinhoff, "Tenkō; Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan" (PhD diss., ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1969), 40.
[46] Mitchell, *Thought Control,* 104.
[47] Mitchell, *Janus-Faced Justice*, 79.
[48] Ibid, 79.

kokutai."[49] Physical violence was not uncommon either, as the policemen in the prisons felt free to act in the name of the emperor, and wanted prove their support to the emperor and protect the *kokutai* as a whole.[50]

After joining the JCP in 1928 and his arrest in the same year, Kobayashi Morito committed *tenkō* in 1931.[51] He was one of the few hundred people who, after their *tenkō*, decided to work at the Imperial Renovation Society, which was responsible for the reintegration of thought criminals.[52] As the head of the Imperial Renovation Society's Thought Section and an advocate for *tenkō*, Kobayashi was working on the reforms and the system of the renovation society, but he also took part in the creation of a large body of work, compiling the apostacies written by *tenkōsha.*[53] In these written apostacies, the *tenkōsha,* those who were arrested and chose to convert explained why they decided to leave their criticism or communist ideology behind them. His 1933 work "*tenkōsha* memoirs" (*tenkōsha no shuki)* followed Kobayashi's own biography of his experience with *tenkō,* written a year earlier, and together with the Sano and Nabeyama letter, these were the first pieces of *tenkō* literature (*tenkō bungaku*). These accounts, including Kobayashi's, became a "manual on how to convert."[54] Kobayashi also wrote an article called "How We Must Reform Thought Criminals: Based on the Experiments in the Renovation Society," which set the basis for the system of conversion and "re-education."[55]

In 1936, a new law was introduced, called the "Thought Criminals' Protection and Supervision Law," which covered the legal process of *tenkō*: this law would isolate thought criminals and reintegrate them back into Japanese society.[56] With 58,000 thought criminals arrested from 1928 to 1935, there was a fear that they would fall back into their own patterns of thought crime, and thus, a new law was necessary, according to the government, to guide these people.[57] They were divided into three groups: those who converted and had renounced all revolutionary ideology, those who were still doubting *tenkō* or in the process of conversion, and those who did not convert, called *hitenkōsha*.[58] The thought police saw *hitenkōsha* as the main priority to arrest, and those who refused to apostatize were imprisoned.[59] *Hitenkōsha* and

[49] Mitchell, *Janus-Faced Justice*, 117.
[50] Ibid, 137.
[51] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 90-1.
[52] Ibid*,* 93.
[53] Ibid*,* 90.
[54] Ibid*,* 105.
[55] Ibid*,* 100.
[56] Mitchell, *Thought Control,* 134.
[57] Ibid, 134.
[58] Ibid, 136.
[59] Ienaga, *The Pacific War,* 217.

those who were still doubting *tenkō* needed the most guidance, according to the new law, and needed to fully convert, not only by discarding revolutionary thought, but also by pledging allegiance to the emperor, and seeing him as a god, and "awakening their feelings of nationalism."[60] New legislation on *tenkō* also resulted in a network of protection and supervision centers: twenty-two centers were established in Japan.[61] In these centers, ex-communists and other thought criminals who had to be observed according to the new law had to correct themselves to a "true Japanese spirit."[62] One of the most important aspects of this spirit was that, according to the Protection Division Head Moriyama Takeichirō, "Japan was one great family," and that this was the path that they, as Japanese people, were meant to be on.[63]

During the late 1930s, Japan was still actively involved in conflicts abroad and in constant semi-war conditions. The government suppressed anti-war arguments, and censored those who did not provide "correct data."[64] Another policy from the government was the mobilization for war, which also took place within the rehabilitation process of thought criminals. After the 1937 China incident, when the Japanese imperial army invaded China, the departments within the imperial state used *tenkō* to strengthen the national spirit, and find support for the war.[65] Those who had already converted and had completely adapted to the *kokutai* became the example of what was possible with conversion and "spiritual awakening."[66] The rehabilitation process proved to be more than only rehabilitation of thought criminals: they had learned to "grasp the Japanese spirit" and became puppets used for the mobilization for the Japanese "holy war."[67] Here, we can see how the government's approach to *tenkō* changed from one which wanted to prevent illicit political thought from spreading, to full-fledged reintegration centers where rehabilitated thought criminals were used as examples of model citizens for the mobilization of the war.

[60] Mitchell, *Janus-Faced Justice*, 136.
[61] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 149.
[62] Ibid*,* 145.
[63] Mitchell, *Janus-Faced Justice*, 107.
[64] Mitchell, *Thought Control,* 162.
[65] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 160.
[66] Ibid*,* 172.
[67] Ibid*,* 178.

Chapter 2: Early Postwar Paradigms on *Tenkō*

On the sixteenth of August, 1945, Japan surrendered and the Pacific War came to an end. Japan became occupied by American forces, which had the goal of demilitarizing and democratizing Japan.[68] The imperial sovereignty was replaced by a new popular sovereignty, and the Japanese government was no longer able, nor allowed by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), to suppress political freedom.[69] Thought criminals and other political criminals who were imprisoned and held in the Protection and Supervision Centers during the 1930s and early 1940s were released, including the previous members of the JCP, and the Japanese thought police was abolished.[70] Later in 1945, the General Headquarters (GHQ), as the SCAP was referred to in Japan, ordered the closing of the Protection and Supervision Centers, the repeal of the Peace Preservation Law and also that of the Thought Criminals' Protection and Supervision Law.[71] These circumstances created a new space for the communists who were arrested, to "(…) resume a revolutionary process that had been interrupted by war and intense police suppression," but also for Japanese intellectuals and scholars to discuss what happened during the war, and what the meaning and purpose of *tenkō* was.[72]

As most intellectuals and scholars in the early postwar period had experienced the hardships of the war, and most of the times also the censorship and suppression due to their ideologies, their works and perspectives in the postwar period were often inspired by these experiences. A multitude of themes were discussed, such as resistance, fascism, modernism of the prewar state, but also Marxist issues such as class consciousness, nationalism and democracy.[73] One of the most influential thinkers of this time was Maruyama Masao, political theorist and historian and born in 1914. Maruyama saw the postwar as a "second chance," which meant that Japan could still right their wrongs by recognizing their war crimes and mistakes made during the prewar era.[74] Instead of the communist idea to "alter the kokutai," Maruyama argues that "(…) it has now been made our task to accomplish what the Meiji restoration was

[68] Ienaga, *The Pacific War,* 241.
[69] Ibid 241.
[70] Victor J. Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 3.
[71] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 180.
[72] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity,* 3.
[73] Ibid, 4.
[74] Harry Harootunian, "Constitutive Ambiguities: The Persistence of Modernism and Fascism in Japan's Modern History," in *The Culture of Japanese Fascism,* ed. Alan Tansman (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009), 89.

unable to carry through: that of completing the democratic revolution," reflecting on the Meiji effort to "enlighten" Japan, and carrying it over the faults of the Second World war and Pacific war.[75] In his 1946 essay "Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," he compares imperial Japan to Europe, and argues that the Japanese state was more of a moral and spiritual entity, based on the idea of the *kokutai,* than a Western national power that was "based on formal, external sovereignty."[76] According to him, this spiritual national policy, "the nature of Japanese society," was the reason why the Japanese could never be totally free until the national polity "lost its absolute quality" and "became free subjects."[77] Maruyama's argument was that Japan's economic but also modern cultural "backwardness" resulted in a society which could not fully achieve what the West or Europe at that time had achieved: individual subjectivity.[78] This idea of a lack of subjectivity of the Japanese people before the end of the war was an often discussed topic in the early postwar era.

From 1945 to the 1950s, a group of Japanese literary critics and historians took part in what were called the "subjectivity debates." The concept of subjectivity (*shutaisei*) in relation to democratic revolution was an important part of the larger debates in reaction to the surrender of Japan, as "Japan was at the state of completing its bourgeois-democratic revolution."[79] Subjectivity was the "subject's normative criterion" to lead the revolution.[80] The debates took place in the intellectual sphere, including the magazine of Modern Literature (*Kindai Bungaku*), which was founded by Haniya Yutaka, who himself went to prison during the 1930s, a consequence of his leadership of the JCP after the other leaders were arrested, including Sano Manabu.[81] The magazine was very influential in the period of the early postwar in Japan, and the "subjectivity debates" and other discussions aimed to contribute to the democratic revolution, where subjectivity was the role of the individual self, especially in literature. [82]The *Kindai Bungaku* did not only include subjectivity as a debate, but also "the literary issues related to ideological conversion (*tenkō*)". Maruyama Masao was also involved in these debates, as he participated in a roundtable called Materialism and Subjectivity in 1948 in the *Sekai* magazine

[75] Andrew Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: the Marxian and Modernist Traditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004): 221.
[76] Masao Maruyama, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics,* trans. Ivan Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 5.
[77] Maruyama, *Thought and Behaviour,* 21.
[78] Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Grassroot Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People,* trans. Ethan Mark (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 4-5.
[79] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity,* 1.
[80] Ibid*,* 2.
[81] Tsurumi Shunsuke, *An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan 1931-1945* (London: KPI, 1986), 64.
[82] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity,* 41.

and other debates, in which Maruyama's conception of *shutaisei* was that "political subjectivity and the state reflect and require each other in response to the demands of liberal-democratic government," which opposed the call for democratic revolution of the subjective individual by the postwar Marxists and historical-materialists.[83]

As the *Kindai Bungaku* became very influential in the early postwar era, it was tied to the analysis of *tenkō*: some of the critics themselves, such as Haniya Yutaka, went through the imprisonment and rehabilitation, so it was important for personal reasons to analyze what took place, but also how this was reflected in literature. The analysis of *tenkō* literature (*tenkō shoshetsu*) and the concept of *tenkō* was for postwar critics used to illustrate what took place in the interwar and war period, and "became a lens through which many intellectuals, writers and activists theorized and debated over ethics, (…) political practice" but also the subjectivity debate. [84] *Tenkō* literature, including Sano and Nabeyama's *tenkō* letter but also autobiographical novels, became an important primary source for postwar scholars. Tsurumi Shunsuke, member of the *Shisō no Kagaku Kenkyukai* (Science of Thought) research association, gathered "roughly three dozen individual biographies" written by *tenkōsha,* and established a new framework of records that were gathered like the "*tenkōsha* memoirs," but without the Imperial Renovation Society's Thought Section looking over the author's shoulder, and including their war and postwar trajectories.[85]

Tenkō literature was also written in the early postwar as a reflection on how and why they committed *tenkō*. Many accounts, but also fictional works: these were often I-novels, which had been a popular genre since the 1910s, and were read as fictional autobiographies, as the stories often overlapped with the personal life of the author.[86] The 1946 novel "Onna sakusha" (Woman Writer) by Sata Ineko describes how the character chose her individual identities over political identities, which was similar to the reason for the *tenkō* of the author.[87] In works like these, authors expressed their shame for committing *tenkō.*[88] Postwar *tenkō* literature provided a way in which *tenkōsha* could look back at what happened but also why they committed *tenkō*, and became incorporated in the larger *tenkō* literature genre of the prewar period.[89]

[83] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity,* 192.
[84] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 84.
[85] Ibid, 85.
[86] Jennifer Cullen, "A Comparative Study of Tenkō: Sata Ineko and Miyamoto Yuriko," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 36, no. 1 (Winter 2010), 68.
[87] Cullen, "A Comparative Study of Tenkō," 93.
[88] Ibid, 93.
[89] Williams, "Writing the Traumatized Self," 105.

Literary critic Honda Shūgo studied *tenkō* authors, who were, according to him, categorized as those who wrote before or during the war, and "whose subsequent literary lifeblood can be seen as directly drawn from this act."[90] As one of Haniya Yutaka's fellow founders of the *Kindai Bungaku,* Honda, who wrote his 1957 work *A Study of Tenkō Literature,* sparked debates on the definition of *tenkō*, especially regarding *tenkō* authors.[91] One of Honda's main critics was Yoshimoto Takaaki, who continued the debate on *tenkō* literature and the definition of tenkō in the early postwar era. He, too, used his criticism on tenkō as he wrote that his "motive is rooted in the desire to elucidate [his] own version of the total social structure of Japan."[92] Here, we can see that *tenkō* was used as an illustration of the prewar situation of Japan,

While Honda argues that *tenkō* is simply a result of state pressure, Yoshimoto writes in his 1958 essay *Tenkōron* (On *tenkō*, or ideological conversion), that it was not repressive coercion, but because of internal conviction: "I do not believe that compulsory force and oppression by the authorities were the most significant elements among the external conditions of Japanese ideological conversion." [93] Yoshimoto agreed with Maruyama that "in addition to intellectual compromise, capitulation, and distortion in confronting the inferior conditions of society, intellectual indifference and capitulation in tradition, which constitutes the totality of dominant inheritance, naturally form an important core at the heart of ideological conversion."[94] He argues that *tenkō* was the product of Japan's underdevelopment: Japanese society combines feudal legacy with modern elements, and this structure was closely connected to conversion.[95] The dominance of this Japanese feudalism is also, according to Yoshimoto, what Sano and Nabeyama converted to.[96] Here we can see the link to the paradigm of the postwar modernity: the same criticism that Maruyama had, the underdeveloped sense of modernity in Japan in the prewar era compared to the West which resulted in a weak defense to oppression, is shared by other critics during the postwar era.

Japanese historian Ienaga Saburō's work also fits within this paradigm. In his work on resistance before and during the Pacific War, he writes that the Japanese people "automatically came to support the government position" due to suppression by the government, initiated by

[90] Williams, "Writing the Traumatized Self," 105.
[91] Yoshimoto, "On Tenkō," 116.
[92] Ibid, 100.
[93] Ibid, 100.
[94] Ibid, 100.
[95] Ibid, 112.
[96] Ibid, 112.

laws such as the Peace Preservation Law and executed by the thought police.[97] This was, according to Ienaga, only one of the reasons for the lack of resistance: he concludes that "the failure to throw off fascism and fight for freedom – the lack of popular autonomy – was a crucial debilitating factor in the postwar democratization."[98] Similar to Maruyama, Ienaga compares European resistance to Japanese resistance, and concludes that it was weak: "the absence of organized resistance in Japan contrasts starkly with the experience of other countries where fascist dictatorships were imposed on the populace." [99] Ienaga also includes a personal perspective in his work: "The latter part of 1932 was the turning point in my own intellectual and spiritual growth. To escape the snares of my "education," I rejected most of what I had been taught in the public schools. It still took another twenty years to overcome the handicap of that early indoctrination and be able to grapple with fundamental questions." [100] This quote illustrates the personal struggle that Japanese postwar scholars had to deal with, which was not only reflected in fictional literature, but also reflected in scholarly work.

While Ienaga and Maruyama's idea of the "weakness" of the Japanese people against the state is likely influenced by their personal experiences, it is a far reach to compare this to European resistance, which they consider a stronger resistance. Those who did not commit *tenkō*, or even those who did but only to protect themselves from imprisonment and torture, did not "automatically" support the government position: it was much more complex than this. As we can read from the postwar *tenkō* literature, many continued their criticism, but also expressed their shame for committing *tenkō*. While there were also those who committed *tenkō* that did come to support the government position, such as Kobayashi Morito, the paradigm that the result of state pressure was that everyone agreed with the state is proved too simple by postwar *tenkō* literature.

After the defeat of Japan during the Pacific War and the end of imperial Japan, scholars immediately began to discuss the issues of the prewar era, which they were not able to do during the war due to police suppression. The question of *tenkō* was used within the postwar paradigm as something that they could distance themselves from, as many leftist scholars began to criticize the *kokutai* once more, yet they were also closely connected to it, and still trying to define what *tenkō* was and what the different reasons for political apostacy were. This was reflected in intellectual literature, such as historical debates on subjectivity, but also in the I-

[97] Ienaga, *The Pacific War,* 15.
[98] Ibid*,* 223.
[99] Ibid*,* 223.
[100] Ibid*,* 31.

novels. The postwar allowed leftist scholars to find "new critical possibilities," and contrast the prewar context to a postwar context in which the state was no longer inherently connected to the *kokutai.*

Chapter 3: Late Twentieth Century Paradigms of *Tenkō*

In studying tenkō *I venture into a field thus far skirted by American scholars of modern Japan, but of enormous interest to the Japanese. Some American scholars regard* tenkō *either as very simply explained and therefore not interesting, or as a product solely of Japanese war guilt and therefore not a problem worthy of study. I hope to dispel both views.*

- Patricia Steinhoff, *Tenkō: Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan,* 1969 [101]

As the scholarly debate in Japan on *tenkō* continued in the 1960s, scholars from outside Japan also began to take interest in the question of *tenkō*. Deemed a pioneering study and a canonical text by those who researched *tenkō* in the late twentieth century, Sociologist Patricia Steinhoff's 1969 PhD thesis on *tenkō* is one of the first non-Japanese studies that focuses on this topic.[102] During this period, interdisciplinary foreign area studies in the United States were a means to gather more knowledge about the non-Western world, supported by government agencies, in order to maintain "American hegemony" in a time of decolonization and the Cold War.[103] Orientalism, the nineteenth century discourse of Western scholarship on the non-West influenced by colonialism and defined by Edward Said in 1978, was taken over by area studies as a response to decolonization and Orientalism was considered redundant in the late twentieth century.[104] A new, pragmatic approach aimed to understand contemporary issues in the non-West, which included thought control and *tenkō* in pre-war Japan. However, the discursive techniques of Orientalism, namely the separation of "us," the West, and "them," the non-West, were still present.[105] According to Said, this distinction created an oversimplification of a large group of people of the East, and "a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient."[106]

Steinhoff's PhD dissertation *Tenkō; Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan,* was published in 1969, and published as a book in 1991. According to her, *tenkō* is not just ideological conversion. This is why *tenkō* should be left untranslated in English language

[101] Steinhoff, "Tenkō," 8.
[102] For example, see Mark Williams, "Writing the Traumatized Self: Tenkō in the Literature of Shiina Rinzō," in Imag(in)ing the War in Japan (2010), Yukiko Shigeto, "Tenkō and Writing: The Case of Nakano Shigeharu," (2014) and Max Ward, *Thought Crime: Ideology and State Power in Interwar Japan* (2019).
[103] Biray Kolluoglu-Kirli, "From Orientalism to Area Studies," *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3, no. 3 (2003): 97.
[104] Kolluoglu-Kirli, "From Orientalism to Area Studies," 108.
[105] Ibid, 107.
[106] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Modern Classics: 2003), 3.

scholarship: translations of the term in English ("change of direction," or "change of heart" and also "conversion" or "defection") are always lacking, and limit the meaning of the phrase.[107] In her research, she applies Durkheim's theory of crime and rehabilitation to analyze the punishment of thought crime in Japan.[108] According to Steinhoff, the "continuing motive" of thought crime made rehabilitation difficult, but it was the only solution, as the government officials did not want to use "the harshest preventive punishment" due to their "common Japanese-ness."[109] This problem and the problem of conversion itself "provided a unique form for the identification and expression of the integration of the individual into Japanese society."[110] Steinhoff coined a specific category of *tenkō*, namely spiritual *tenkō*: the reason for spiritual *tenkō* is life being more important than Communism.[111] This category builds on the categories that were used by the rehabilitation organization of Kobayashi Morito.[112] While Steinhoff's categorization is useful as a discursive device, it takes the original categorization out of its prewar context and an overlap of the previously established categories.

In 1976, Richard H. Mitchell published his work "Thought Control in Pre-war Japan" with the purpose of investigating the "largely untouched" subject of legal and administrative thought control techniques in Japan.[113] In this book, Mitchell argues that *tenkō* was the result of pressure from the police, and that most thought criminals were easily converted, according to Mitchell, because "young people, who were caught up in the communist current because it was new and exciting, gave it up with few qualms when pressure was applied. Only few were really dedicated Marxists ready to die for the cause."[114] What this analysis suggests is once again the weakness of resistance: there was some resistance, and people who resisted *tenkō*, yet most were easily converted. In this context, he mentions two main reasons for tenkō: difficult physical and mental conditions and anxiety about an isolated life in jail.[115] This reasoning for *tenkō* fits within the category of spiritual *tenkō*. These reasons were the result of police pressure and the Peace Preservation Law, in which the *kokutai* was the "symbol that few could resist."[116] He also argues that thought control in Japan was unique because of this: a "softer approach" was used

[107] Steinhoff, "Tenkō," 5.
[108] Ibid, 64.
[109] Ibid, 70.
[110] Ibid, 256.
[111] Ibid, 187.
[112] Ibid, 245.
[113] Mitchell, *Thought Control,* 11.
[114] Ibid, 143.
[115] Ibid, 143.
[116] Ibid, 184.

in Japan than in Europe around this time, and this was because "all Japanese were brothers under the emperor."[117] In his later work from 1992, *Janus-Faced Justice,* he writes that "The actual working of the system of handling communist offenders, (…) might accurately be termed a "Janus-faced" approach: *tenkō* was but one face, the opposite side was characterized by harsh policy of strict punishment for those against the emperor and *kokutai*.[118] The weakness against the strength of the thought police and the symbolic meaning of the *kokutai*, and the reason for *tenkō* being "spiritual," created an early area studies paradigm in which *tenkō* was unique and Japanese, especially compared to Europe in the 1930s.

In Japan, scholars such as Tsurumi Shunsuke continued to conduct research on *tenkō* in the 1970s. After his efforts for the Science of Thought research association and collecting *tenkō* literature in the early postwar, he published a work called *Tenkō kenkyū* (Tenkō research) in 1976 and a collection of his lectures in 1982, named "An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan, 1931-1945." In the chapter "concerning *tenkō*," Tsurumi writes that instead of the event of the *tenkō* of Sano and Nabeyama, which has often been described as the first *tenkō* and the case study most often referred to when explaining the phenomenon of *tenkō*, an article from a Meiji socialist called Yamakawa Hitoshi, in 1922 coined the phrase of *tenkō.* The word *hōkōtenkan* (reform) was abbreviated to *tenkō*, and meant at this time "the act of understanding one's own thought processes and giving them a new direction in accordance with one's own beliefs."[119] From this first paradigm of *tenkō*, the phrase became popular in the 1930s after the mass *tenkō* of the communists that followed Sano and Nabeyama, and included not only conversion, but also a legislative system surrounding the process of *tenkō.*

Tsurumi also adds a new aspect to the debate, namely that of women who committed *tenkō*. In earlier research on the JCP and thought crime, scholars have mentioned the arrest of women and that they were members of the JCP, but not as case studies or mentioned as examples of tenkōsha, except in primary sources such as the *tenkōsha memoirs*. Tsurumi notes in his 1991 work *Tsurumi Shunsuke shū 4: Tenkō kenkyū* (*tenkō* research) that "(…) it is a failing that we have done almost no research on women. For women, *tenkō* took a feminine course, involving problems unique to women. To be a history of the people's thought, *tenkō* research must of course consider female *tenkō*, not as something done under the direct compulsion of the state authorities but as a process within the confrontation of various domestic

[117] Mitchell, *Thought Control*, 191.
[118] Mitchell, *Janus-Faced Justice*, 70.
[119] Tsurumi, *An Intellectual History,* 10.

forces."[120] This is the first time that an author mentions the lack of inclusion of women in scholarship on *tenkō*. While this new perspective is necessary to create a more complete understanding of *tenkō*, he also implicates that women should be analyzed differently than men, as their *tenkō* is "not done under direct compulsion of state authorities." However, this was the first step towards the inclusion of women in the debate, which continued in the decades following Tsurumi's work.

After decades of research, Tsurumi's own definition is "a change in the way of thinking of individuals or groups which is brought about by state compulsion."[121] This definition encompasses most interpretations of the concept, and, as Tsurumi writes, "in analyzing a particular example, we can examine the character of the state power, the means of compulsion used, and the changes in the way of thinking of the individual in response to compulsion."[122] While this definition leaves much room for details, it allows us to not be limited by certain case studies: these new additions and complexities added to the historiography of *tenkō* do not have to change the paradigm, but can make the understanding of it more complete.

The pioneering studies of non-Japanese scholars such as Steinhoff and Mitchell since the 1960s have provided new perspectives to the discussions on *tenkō*. Where in the early postwar in Japan, the debate was intertwined with the scholars' own experiences and analysis of the experiences of others, the works of non-Japanese historians aim to re-categorize the experiences and reasons for *tenkō*. We also see that this paradigm includes the "spiritual" side of thought crime and the connection of the Japanese people to the national polity (*kokutai*). The involvement of non-Japanese scholars on the historiography of *tenkō* only grew in the twenty-first century, together with the aim to expand the perspectives, including those on women in the *tenkō* debates.

[120] Translated by Jennifer Cullen "A Comparative Study of Tenkō: Sata Ineko and Miyamoto Yuriko," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 36, no. 1 (Winter 2010), 67. Quote from Tsurumi Shunsuke, *Tsurumi Shunsuke shū 4: Tenkō kenkyū* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1991), 39.
[121] Tsurumi, *An Intellectual History,* 120.
[122] Ibid, 120.

Chapter 4: Scholarship on *tenkō* in the twenty-first century

As the interest in thought crime and *tenkō* in prewar Japan increased in the Japanese and non-Japanese academic world, more aspects of *tenkō* have been included in the debate. Aspects that had not been included in scholarly literature from the twentieth century, such as female *tenkō*, as emphasized by Tsurumi, were now researched by historians, but also literary scholars, in order to create a more complete understanding of *tenkō*. Besides gender, the issue of location and *tenkō* was challenged by historians such as Max Ward. One of the main arguments of his 2013 work *Thought Crime: Ideology and State Power in Prewar Japan* shows that the conversion policy in the colonies of the Japanese Empire, such as Korea, was different from the conversion policy in the metropole.[123] Ward's discussion of *tenkō* outside the metropole is an example of scholarship of the transnational turn: where scholars of the early postwar period and late twentieth century were often concerned with *tenkō* in the Japanese nation-state, a new focus on transnational history and history outside of the metropole was used by scholars of the last decades. Adding to this, an increasing number of translations from Japanese to English also allows English-language scholars to access more primary and secondary sources. This research is not limited to historical scholarship, but also to that of literary studies, which includes literary genres such as the "après guerre" into the debate, resulting in a broader perspective on the concept of *tenkō* itself. These efforts have resulted in more accessibility of *tenkō* research and literature, but also new conclusions which create a more complete overview of the *tenkō* debate in recent times.

While their numbers were small, women were already participating in socialist organizations in the 1910s.[124] In the late 1920s, they also had a role in the proletarian culture movement, and organizations such as the "Bluestocking Society" and "Women's Suffrage League" stood up for an improvement of the position of the woman in Japanese society.[125] However, in the 1930s, such movements were abolished due to its radical connotation, and the organizations either disappeared or had to disappear for some time, similar to the JCP. The state showed a fear of radicalism, which resulted in the murders of social labor activists and

[123] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 155.
[124] Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 169.
[125] Young, *Japan's Total Empire,* 169.

feminist activists, such as Ito Noe.[126] Where the position of the woman seemed to be improving in the 1910s and 1920s due to the efforts of the feminists and socialists, these efforts were taken down at the same time as the communist and socialist efforts.

The role of the woman since the Meiji period had been that of the good wife and the wise mother (*ryosai kenbo*). While societies such as the Bluestocking Society had challenged this role, there was still, even within the proletarian literature movement, a clear idea that the woman should not be independent and let her ideas about freedom and equality distract her from caring for her children and husband.[127] In her 2010 article "A Comparative Study of Tenkō: Sata Ineko and Miyamoto Yuriko" Jennifer Cullen, lecturer in Asian Languages and Cultures, highlights the fact that female *tenkōsha* "are often dismissed as responses to practical and emotional considerations, with little, if any, attention to the ideological issues at play."[128] Both writers of *tenkō* literature, Sata Ineko and Miyamoto Yuriko are used as case studies by Cullen, as she analyses their works and "attempted to go beyond explanations that rely solely on the differences between their personal lives and material conditions." [129] She begins her paper by criticizing authors such as Tsurumi Shunsuke, who writes that women *tenkōsha* always act for reasons that are inherently female and domestic problems, such as not being able to fulfill their role as the wife, by going against the actions of their husband, or the role as the mother, by not being able to feed their children anymore if they continue to criticize the state, or if they are arrested.[130] Her analysis of the literary works of Sata and Miyamoto results in the conclusion that their reasons for either choosing *tenkō* or not, is not related to their issues as a woman or domestic issues, but rather identity issues of class and the public and private sphere.[131] From Cullen's work, we can see that women activists are often dismissed to be struggling with domestic issues or issues regarding what it means to be a woman, but that instead of categorizing them differently, they should be included in the same category as men, and analyzed in the same way.

In *Thought Crime,* Max Ward argues that Kobayashi Morito's 1933 collection of "*tenkōsha memoirs,*" which also included the contribution of women, was used as "part of the state's larger effort to encourage and expand conversion among the population of contained

[126] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 36.
[127] Cullen, "A Comparative Study," 80.
[128] Ibid, 66.
[129] Ibid, 95.
[130] Ibid, 67.
[131] Ibid, 68.

communists."[132] Where the accounts of the men described how they could "fulfill his (…) imperial duties as laborer, farmer, or intellectual," women wrote about their imperial duty as the wife.[133] Kojima Yuki's memoir reflected on her past with interests in communism and the women's liberation movement, yet she often refers to her womanhood and youth in the essay. She first began to question the Meiji "good wife, wise mother" ideology because she supported the women's liberation movement, and was "contemplating the inequality and contradictions of modern society," resulting in an interest in sociologist literature.[134] However, she wrote that she considered her ideas back then as the "ignorance of youth," and that she had now "returned to [her] position as an ordinary woman."[135] While Ward leaves it at a political analysis and does not look at it from a gender studies perspective such as Cullen, the original text "*tenkōsha memoirs*" account can possibly bring about new perspectives on how women were expected to take on their role in society: namely that of an "ordinary woman" and mother. Another interesting point which he adds is that chaplain Fujii Esho's 1935 untranslated work "*Shisōhan shakuhōsha no hogo hōhō*" (The method of the protection of ideological thought criminals) mentions that the Imperial Renovation Society had a women's section, "in order to restore the morals of those women who, by joining the JCP, had "lost the traditional Japanese ideal of chastity.""[136] Women were thus seen as a different category of rehabilitation and conversion, and were approached differently from men, which confirmed the standards of Japanese society at that time, and the "traditional ideal of chastity." This aspect of *tenkō* is not often analyzed in scholarly literature on *tenkō*, and thus creates a new opportunity to create a more complete understanding of the system surrounding *tenkō*.

Research on *tenkō* and thought crime outside the metropole emphasizes the complexity of *tenkō*: the concept of the *kokutai* and dedication of the imperial subject to the Japanese imperial state was not limited to Japan, but was also applied in the colonies. In colonial Korea, around sixteen thousand people were arrested, and 2137 of those committed *tenkō*, which shows that the suppression of the imperial subjects was also not limited to Japan, and shows that the transnational aspects is important to include debate, in order to have a complete idea of what *tenkō* meant.[137] Ward aims to bring this aspect to the debate in the English language by

[132] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 109.
[133] Ibid, 107.
[134] Ibid, 107.
[135] Ibid, 108.
[136] Ibid, 236.
[137] Ibid, 137.

including translations and an analysis of Hong Joon-wook's 2011 work on converts in Korea. The difference between *tenkō* in colonial Korea and Japan was that, first of all, the Korean *tenkōsha* were also motivated by the possibility of national liberation and saw conversion as an opportunity for this, and second of all, the institutionalization of *tenkō* only happened in Korea in 1937, whereas in Japan *tenkō* was already an established policy.[138] However, these complexities of *tenkō* also show that within the Japanese empire, the same techniques of mobilization were used for the imperial state in Japan itself as in the colonies.

The complexity of *tenkō* in colonial Korea is also emphasized in John Treat, who is Professor Emeritus of East Asian Languages and Literatures at Yale University. His 2012 article, "Choosing to Collaborate: Yi Kwang-su and the Moral Subject in Colonial Korea," shows that Yi Kwang-su, a pro-Japanese Korean writer, collaborated with the Japanese, and was "damned by postwar history for making such outrageous statements."[139] Treat writes that a possible "attitude of collaboration" with Japan by Koreans was the equivalent of "fake" *tenkō* in Japan: instead of actually collaborating with the Japanese, Koreans could pretend to do this, and come back to this after the war, similar to how intellectuals in Japan joined the JCP once again in the postwar period after committing *tenkō*.[140] Here, we can see how in a colonial context, *tenkō* is more like collaborating: in Japan, *tenkō* meant standing on the side of the imperial state of your own nation, while in Korea, it meant showing sympathy to the colonizer.

Besides his criticism on the lack on *tenkō* outside the metropole, Ward also criticizes the early postwar paradigm of *tenkō* in Japan, and writes that "the ghosts that animated the Peace Preservation Law apparatus (…) that continued to haunt the postwar in a different register, now as the search for a form of subjectivity adequate to (postwar) modernity."[141] These "ghosts" refer to the imperial state and the imperial sovereign, which had power over the "loyal imperial subject."[142] Max Ward combines Mitchell's work and Michel Foucault's theory of *Discipline and Punish,* a work written after *Thought Control in Japan*. According to Ward, Mitchell explains that the *kokutai* is connected to an excess of the spiritual, and that this is opposed to Western rationality.[143] Ward writes that this approach was common for other writers from "an earlier area studies paradigm," and argues that the problem is not spirituality, but

[138] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 155.
[139] John Treat, "Choosing to Collaborate: Yi Kwang-Su and the Moral Subject in Colonial Korea," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 71, no. 1 (2012): 89.
[140] Treat, "Choosing to Collaborate," 98.
[141] Ward, *Thought Crime*, 182.
[142] Ibid, 75.
[143] Ibid, 24-5.

sovereignty.[144] Debates in the 1920s on imperial sovereignty eventually resulted in the final Peace Preservation Law bill, and in the establishment of the "criminal apparatus" of the legislative fight against thought crime and the involvement of *tenkō*.[145] Here, Ward uses Foucault's theory of power and the distinction between sovereign and disciplinary power to show that these two powers were "irreducible" to each other in the Peace Preservation Law. On one hand, the criminal was subjected to the judicial power, where the law itself which was violated, but also the disciplinary reform, where thought criminals had to reform into an imperial subject: these two discourses often pointed to each other, making it almost impossible to separate them.[146] In this argument, Ward critiques earlier scholarship on *tenkō* and the Peace Preservation Law, and argues that Mitchells' idea of the policy of *tenkō* and rehabilitation as "humane" and "reflected Japanese traditional values" creates an idea that the Peace Preservation Law is "a kind of schizophrenic apparatus, moving randomly between humaneness and cruelty depending on which ministry was dealing with the detainee," while, to Ward, these two aspects were always connected.[147]

Ward's analysis of *tenkō* focuses on what is, according to him, "the least studied area of transwar Japanese history in English-language scholarship," namely institutional legacies of the prewar criminal rehabilitation system.[148] For example, he considers Steinhoff's work, while it was the first step in English literature on *tenkō*, too simplistic, missing the "institutional complexities," as Ward phrases it.[149] Ward's argument and interpretation is that the Peace Preservation Law transformed into a "Repressive State Apparatus," which consisted of multiple involved actors, not only the police, but also prison networks and colonial administrations, "in order to more intensely protect the (…) imperial sovereign."[150] By engaging with Louis Althusser's work on apparatuses and ritualized processes, Ward argues that there is a whole series of rituals that influence a person to convert.[151] With this paradigm on *tenkō*, Ward provides a new outlook and argument to the debate, and broadens the perspectives within the larger historiography of *tenkō*.

Another example of thinking beyond the "simplistic" definition of *tenkō* is Yukiko

[144] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 24.
[145] Ibid, 48.
[146] Ibid, 56
[147] Ibid, 52.
[148] Ibid, 182.
[149] Ibid, 52.
[150] Ibid, 50.
[151] Ibid, 88.

Shigeto's problematization of *tenkō* as turning from one position to another. Shigeto, associate professor of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies at Whitman College, argues in her paper "Tenkô and Writing: The Case of Nakano Shigeharu" that the *tenkō* of Nakano Shigeharu, proletarian writer and member of the JCP in the 1930s, does not fit the definition of the concept.[152] Her analysis of Nakano's works suggest that he "turned to a groundless position," as he did not adopt an alternate ideological position.[153] This adds to the argument of the twenty-first century historiography on *tenkō* that simply "ideological conversion" as a definition of *tenkō* is lacking: while *tenkōsha* did all sign the *tenkōsho* document, their reasoning, positions and degrees of dedication to the national polity were all different, which is highlighted by the analysis of case studies such as that of Nakano Shigeharu.

New English translations of original works of *tenkōsha*, but also *hitenkōsha* show the complexities of *tenkō* in relation to criticism on the Japanese state. An example of this is the 2013 English translation and edited book by Ken C. Kawashima, Fabian Schäfer and Robert Scholtz. According to the editors, Tosaka's *hitenkō* meant "that he possessed potentially tremendous moral authority in the chaos and possibilities of the immediate postwar moment."[154] The nuance of his *hitenkō* is not discussed in this book, as it focuses on the analysis of his works on Japanese fascism, but Tosaka's *hitenkō* is interesting to research as an exception to the rule, as the aggressive force of the thought police and the attractive force of the Japanese national polity did not always result in *tenkō*. We know that *hitenkōsha* were treated differently, and harsher, than those who committed *tenkō*, but the analysis of *hitenkō* literature is much less common than *tenkō* literature, for example. Tosaka, however, did not write any reflections on his *hitenkō* in the postwar period, nor was he part of the debate, because he was arrested for his critique on the Japanese state in the 1930s, and eventually passed away in prison before the war ended.[155]

Whereas new, less studied aspects of *tenkō* are now included in the debate, scholars, often literary scholars, also take a closer look at literary primary sources from the early postwar period in Japan. Mark Williams, professor of Japanese Studies at the University of Leeds, argues

[152] Yukiko Shigeto, "Tenkō and Writing: The Case of Nakano Shigeharu," *Positions: Asia Critique* vol. 22, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 519.
[153] Shigeto, "Tenkō and Writing," 519.
[154] Ken Kawashima, Fabian Schäfer and Robert Stolz, "Preface," in *Tosaka Jun: a Critical Reader*, ed. Ken Kawashima, Fabian Schäfer and Robert Stolz (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2013), ix.
[155] Harry Harootunian, "Introduction: The Darkness ," in *Tosaka Jun: a Critical Reader*, ed. Ken Kawashima, Fabian Schäfer and Robert Stolz (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2013), xvii.

that the postwar literary phenomenon called the "après guerre" has often been ignored by Japanese postwar scholars as a genre which has been influenced by *tenkō*. In his chapter "Writing the Traumatized Self: Tenkō in the Literature of Shiina Rinzo," Williams argues that where *tenkō* authors such as Takeda Rintarō, and Hayashi Fusao are often included in the category of those "for whom personal experience of tenkō clearly remained a defining moment of their art," as Honda Shūgo defined this category, there are also those who wrote after the war and whose work was not dependent on their experience of *tenkō*.[156] Williams argues with the use of the work of Shiina Rinzō's "literature of trauma" that these "après guerre" authors should be included in the often discussed category of tenkō authors, because their work was, in fact, very much influenced by their experience of *tenkō*.

The use of the I-novel, which became popular in Japan in the prewar period, made confessional writing a medium for traumatic experiences, such as imprisonment and the process of *tenkō*.[157] Shiina Rinzō's 1947 novel "The Diary of Fukao Shōji" (Fukao Shōji no shuki) deals with the situation of the immediate prewar period, yet the fact that Shiina's tenkō was an ongoing process, it was very much influenced by his own experience of tenkō, as argued by not only Williams but also Seiji M. Lippit, who culminates this debate in his chapter on "Temporalities of Ruin: Shiina Rinzō and the subject of Tenkō."[158] These debates, which are still going on in the current decade, as Lippit's chapter was written in 2018, make clear that within literary studies, there is a demand for clarification on the influence of *tenkō* in literature not only during the prewar period, but also in the postwar period. However, such literary research, which was one of the main approaches in discussions on *tenkō,* only focused on the experiences of these people and what it meant to be a *tenkōsha*, and research on the criminal rehabilitation system was much less common. Ward argues that these theories were absent of ideology: he emphasizes that the question of state coercion was of an ideological nature or, "merely an external force that acted upon the ideological disposition of the individual," as Tsurumi wrote, still remained unanswered.[159]

In conclusion, scholarly literature of the last decades is still adding complexity and perspectives to the debates on *tenkō*, especially regarding the categories, definitions and larger

[156] Williams, "Writing the Traumatizes Self," 105-6.
[157] Ibid, 106.
[158] Seiji M. Lippit, " Temporalities of Ruin: Shiina Rinzō and the subject of Tenkō," in *Literature Among the Ruins, 1945-1955: Postwar Japanese Literary Criticism,* ed. Ueda Atsuko, Michael K. Bourdaghs, Sakakibara Richi, and Toeda Hirokazu (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2018), 139.
[159] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 86.

implications of the institutional and rehabilitation apparatus connected to *tenkō*. Continuous efforts are made to look beyond earlier theories in order to complicate them, and prove that case studies often do not fit the categories such as "spiritual *tenkō*". When looking at the broader meaning of *tenkō*, Ward's explanation of the process of *tenkō* shows that the state was involved from the inspiration for *tenkō*, to the reintegration of *tenkōsha.* However, state compulsion was only a part of this process, as the different motivations for *tenkō*, and also *hitenkōsha*, changed also the experience of *tenkōsha* in the early postwar period. Continuous efforts can also be observed from the upcoming book *Tenkō: Cultures of Political Conversion in Transwar Japan.* According to the book description, this work will "prove a valuable resource to students (..) of Japanese and East Asian history, literature and politics." Its chapters by authors such as Max Ward, Hong Jong-Wook and Mark Williams on *tenkō* in Korea, *tenkō* literature and analyses of new case studies are promising and will continue to add new perspectives to the existing historiography.[160]

[160] This book is available from 18 December 2022, as noted on this website: https://www.routledge.com/Tenko-Cultures-of-Political-Conversion-in-Transwar-Japan/Hayter-Sipos-Williams/p/book/9780367770365. Full citation: Hayter, Irena, George T Sipos, and Mark Williams. Tenkō: Cultures of Political Conversion in Transwar Japan. Abingdon, Oxon: Taylor and Francis, 2021. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429280559.

Conclusion

W*hen I think about it now, I have come to consider it as the ignorance of youth. Drunk with the brilliance of revolutionary theory and the beauty of the label of 'militant,' I had lost sight of my true self. Now, I have returned to my position as an ordinary woman* [heibon na ichijosei] *and decided I need to start over again from this basis.*

- Kojima Yuki, *Tenkōsha memoirs,* 1933 [161]

It is not that I had no hesitations . . . but in the end, I drowned in the atmosphere surrounding me. The unhappiness of the war visited my neighbors, and I began to harbor a certain inferiority.
In my case, the negotiations with the police, when I opposed them of my own will, were not "difficult." What was difficult during the war was the gaze of my neighbors, who bore the unhappiness of the war. . . . Going to the battlegrounds was not really awful or difficult for me. In fact, mixing in with the spirit of the times was the easy path."

- Sata Ineko, *Sata Ineko zenshū,* 1978 [162]

These two accounts are excerpts from memoirs written by two Japanese women who, during the 1930s in Japan, changed from their proletarian and activist criticism and ideas, to those which were in line with the Japanese state at this time, and accepted by the thought police. Kojima Yuki, an activist involved in the women's liberation movement, and Sata Ineko, a proletarian writer, wrote the statements in different contexts and different times. Kojima's account was published in the 1933 work *Tenkōsha memoirs,* edited by officials of the Japanese state who also set up the rehabilitation apparatus for those who apostatized, and this work was censored and used to convince others who criticized the state of political apostacy.[163] Sata, whose account was written in 1978, reflects on the difficulties she had with her decisions, and why she chose to quit her critical commentary: in her account, she writes that she "mixed in with the spirit of the times" because the pressure of the state and the social context of the time, and not her own convictions, contrary to Kojima's text. This political apostacy, also defined as *tenkō,* was much more complex than it might seem, as writers who violated the Peace Preservation Law, which included a clause where those who criticize the emperor system, could

[161] Translated by Max Ward in *Thought Crime: Ideology and State Power in Interwar Japan* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2019), 107.
[162] Translated by Jennifer Cullen in "A Comparative Study of Tenkō: Sata Ineko and Miyamoto Yuriko," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 36, no. 1 (Winter 2010), 82.
[163] Ward, *Thought Crime,* 105.

be arrested and imprisoned, and therefore, it was a risk to continue to write critical commentary.

Kojima and Sata's experiences of *tenkō* show that, while they both signed a *tenkōsho* and both were women, their experiences are anything but similar. The memoir of Kojima Yuki is also not just a memoir. It was included in a larger collection of memoirs which all had the same goal: convincing others who sympathized with the JCP or leftist ideology that they were also "drunk with the brilliance of revolutionary theory," and should join the others in their effort to sympathize with the "spirituality" of the national polity instead. Kojima's account is possibly written under censorship of those who edited the memoirs, and therefore it is difficult to say if this was the truth, yet the difference between the two memoirs reflect how women dealt with the pressure to change from being an activist or critic, to self-censorship and apostacy of communist or proletarian beliefs.

From this paper, we can conclude that the paradigm regarding the concept and debates surrounding *tenkō* have changed over time, from the immediate reaction in the early postwar period, to recent scholarship. *Tenkō* was, for early postwar scholars, still present in the lives of the scholars who themselves had committed *tenkō* and had to censor themselves during the 1930s and 1940s in order to keep safe, and avoid a prison sentence. These scholars also felt the need to define a period of authoritarianism, state pressure and *tenkō* in contrast to a new historical period of political freedom and democratization. For literary scholars and proletarian writers, *tenkō* became a tool which illustrated the situation in the 1930s, and something which they could distance themselves from in the new, modern postwar period. They wrote literature (*tenkō* literature) in which the influences of the experience of tenkō could clearly be recognized, according to literary critics such as Honda Shūgo. These works of literature have also become a topic of research for historians of the late twentieth century.

Tenkō has also been explained as a result of the "backwardness" of Japan compared to other "modern" European nations in the 1930s. Maruyama Masao's argument was that Japan's economic but also modern cultural "backwardness" did not result in individual subjectivity during the prewar and war period, as Japanese were never completely free under the "spiritual," moral imperial state until the war was over. He and his fellow scholars in the early postwar period saw this period as a "second chance," and the lack of individual subjectivity during the interwar period, which *tenkō* was an illustration of because it showed the "lack of resistance" against state pressure, was a stark contrast to this. Here, we can see that scholars from the postwar period were still personally connected to the prewar period and used *tenkō* to define themselves and even distance themselves from this as well.

Historians and other scholars who have researched *tenkō* have built a large scholarly collection over the years. The topic of *tenkō* was never ignored, by Japanese scholars nor scholars who have written in English, and as a result of scholars' attempt to constantly question the different parts of the *tenkō* process and the causes and effects of it, the collection has become multifaceted and analyzed from multiple perspectives. One of these perspectives which has changed the paradigm is gender: while in the 1970s, the Japanese philosopher, sociologist and historian Tsurumi Shunsuke mentioned women who committed *tenkō*, he approached it from a traditional perspective. This perspective was one which was dominant regarding the role of women since the early twentieth century in Japan: the woman had to be a good wife, and a wise mother, and not involve herself in political criticism and activism to begin with, and if they did and this resulted in *tenkō*, the reason for this was that they were confronted with "domestic forces."[164] Jennifer Cullen's analysis of Sata Ineko's texts show that these "domestic forces" did not motivate Sata's *tenkō*, but simply followed the easy path, and joined the others who also committed *tenkō*. Cullen's article is one of the works which clearly aims to show a new perspective, inspired by gender studies, by using certain case studies that challenge the narrative, or paradigm, which was dominated by male critics and intellectuals.

Following the transnational turn in academic scholarship, Max Ward emphasizes that *tenkō* was not the same outside the metropole as inside the metropole of Japan. While there are records that thousands of Koreans committed *tenkō*, the context was completely different from that in the metropole. The inclusion of the Japanese colonies in the *tenkō* debate is essential, as Japan was, in the 1930s and 1940s, actively at war and trying to expand its territory into a "Greater East-Asia". This imperialist context is not often included in the debate. Where Ward's work on the Korean aspect does not create a completely new paradigm, it does add to a more complete understanding of what *tenkō* meant as a part of Japan's mobilization efforts, and more on this aspect is included in an even more recent discussion: the upcoming book *Tenkō: Cultures of Political Conversion in Transwar Japan.*

As this thesis has tried to provide an overview of the multitude of perspectives and definitions of *tenkō*, aspects which have not been or included a limited amount in the overall debate also came to the surface. Firstly, the inclusion of case studies on female *tenkō* is still relatively small compared to those of men. While this might be due to the fact that there was a

[164] Translated by Jennifer Cullen "A Comparative Study of Tenkō: Sata Ineko and Miyamoto Yuriko," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 36, no. 1 (Winter 2010), 67. Quote from Tsurumi Shunsuke, *Tsurumi Shunsuke shū 4: Tenkō kenkyū* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1991), 39.

larger amount of *tenkōsha* who were men, there are also women such as Kojima Yuki of whom the analysis of her *tenkōsha* memoirs might be of great value for the debate. Also, research on women who were a threat because they continued their efforts for the suffragette movement but eventually had to censor their work, or even commit *tenkō* to a certain extent, could be very fruitful. As the women's movement was suppressed during the interwar and war time, it is interesting to see how women responded to this, as *tenkō* did not only include a change from communism, but also from other ideologies which were deemed "criminal." The perspective of gender studies might prove to be valuable in the analysis of primary sources, or even *tenkō* literature, of these women. Secondly, the research on those who did not commit *tenkō*, or *hitenkōsha*, is also limited. The research on *hitenkōsha* could add to the comparison between those who did or did not commit *tenkō*, and what this resulted in. An example of this is the recent translation of Tosaka Jun's work, which was partly censored, as a result of his continued efforts of criticism on the Japanese state. While many *tenkōsha* have been researched, the amount of research on *hitenkōsha* is still relatively small. Finally, translations of Japanese primary sources, but also secondary sources is necessary to continue English language research. As this thesis was limited to translations of Japanese texts or secondary sources written in English, it would be helpful if books such as Honda Shugo's 1957 work "On the literature of ideological conversion," Tsurumi Shunsuke's 2001 work "Tenkō sairon" and Hideto Tsuboi's 2020 article "Converters Tell Their Stories: Kobayashi Morito and His Networks" had been available in the English language. These translations are much work, but the lack of access to these works can limit English language literature.

In conclusion, the changes that have been present in historical discourse on *tenkō* can be seen in both changes in paradigms, such as *tenkō* as an action to *tenkō* as a process, including rehabilitation and legislation, but also in the attempts to create a spectrum of interpretations with the use of distinctive experiences of *tenkōsha*. In the early postwar era, scholars were concerned with the effects of *tenkō* in this period, as many of the scholars themselves also committed *tenkō*. Historians of the late twentieth century tried to create categories and theories of *tenkō*. Finally, scholars in contemporary times aim to complicate these theories by including exceptions to these theories, definitions and categories, and include new perspective to show that *tenkō* was much more than an "ideological conversion."

Bibliography

Barshay, Andrew E. *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: the Marxian and Modernist Traditions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Cullen, Jennifer. "A Comparative Study of Tenkō: Sata Ineko and Miyamoto Yuriko." *The Journal of Japanese Studies.* 36, no 1. (Winter 2010): 65-96.

Gluck, Carol. *Japan's Modern Myths : Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.

Gluck, Carol. "The End of Elsewhere: Writing Modernity Now." *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 2011): 676–687.

Ienaga, Saburō. *The Pacific War, 1931-1945. A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II*. Translated by Frank Baldwin. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Kawashima, Ken C, Schäfer, Fabian, and Stolz, Robert. *Tosaka Jun : a Critical Reader*. Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2013.

Kolluoglu-Kirli, Biray. "From Orientalism to Area Studies." *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3, no. 3 (2003): 93-111. doi:10.1353/ncr.2004.0007.

Koschmann, J. Victor. Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan. Chicago, [Ill. etc.]: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Maruyama, Masao. Translated and edited by Ivan Morris. *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Mitchell, Richard H. *Janus-Faced Justice: Political Criminals in Imperial Japan*. Honululu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992.

Mitchell, Richard H. *Thought Control in Prewar Japan.* Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1976.

Said, Edward W. *Orientalism.* London: Penguin Modern Classics, 2003.

Shigeto, Yukiko. "Tenkō and Writing: The Case of Nakano Shigeharu." *Positions: Asia Critique* vol. 22, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 517-540.

Sims, Richard. *Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation.* New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Steinhoff, Patricia Golden. "*TENKO; IDEOLOGY AND SOCIETAL INTEGRATION IN PREWAR JAPAN.*" ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1969.

Tansman, Alan M. *The Culture of Japanese Fascism*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009.

Treat, John Whittier. "Choosing to Collaborate: Yi Kwang-Su and the Moral Subject in Colonial Korea." *The Journal of Asian Studies 71*, no. 1 (2012): 81–102. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911811002956.

Tsurumi, Shunsuke. *An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan 1931-1945*. London: KPI, 1986.

Ueda, Atsuko, Bourdaghs, Michael K., Sakakibara, Richi, and Toeda, Hirokazu, ed. *Literature Among the Ruins, 1945-1955 : Postwar Japanese Literary Criticism* Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2018.

Ward, Max M. *Thought Crime: Ideology and State Power in Interwar Japan*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2019.

Williams, Mark, and David Stahl, ed. *Imag(in)ing the War in Japan.* Boston: Brill, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004182981.i-362.

Yoshimi, Yoshiaki. Translated by Ethan Mark. *Grassroots Fascism : the War Experience of the Japanese People.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.

Yoshimoto, Takaaki, and Hisaaki Wake. "On Tenkō, or Ideological Conversion." *Review of Japanese Culture and Society*, 20 (2008): 99-119.

Young, Louise. *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998.