



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Think Locally, Act Globally: Giving power to the people in international climate finance

Wel, Annelle van der

Citation

Wel, A. van der. (2023). *Think Locally, Act Globally: Giving power to the people in international climate finance*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master thesis in the Leiden University Student Repository](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3515307>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Think Locally, Act Globally

Giving power to the people in international climate finance

Master's thesis

Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict & Development

MSc Political Science

Leiden University

A.L. (Annelle) van der Wel

S2334771

Dr. V. Tsagkroni

Dr. M.S. Spirova

9973 words

APA Reference Style

January 12, 2023

‘Is it morally acceptable for academics to reap benefits directly from their knowledge of injustice and not to orient their work towards addressing these injustices directly or indirectly?

Personally I think it is not, particularly in light of all of the other privileges that I as a white, middle-class, well-educated woman in North America already benefit from.’

– Sonja Klinsky

Abstract

International climate finance (ICF) is part of a broader climate justice movement, which is concerned with the tension that while the developed states in the Global North pollute the most, the developing states in the Global South have to bear the consequences. ICF not only aims at reducing emissions, but mostly focuses on reducing the vulnerability of populations in developing states, through financial transfers from the Global North to the Global South. Climate justice movements insist on bottom-up policymaking, whereby power is handed back to non-state actors (NSAs) from the Global South. While the role of NSAs in international climate policies has been researched, their role in the specific finance programmes has been largely overlooked up until now. This paper therefore tries to contribute to the field through researching what role NSAs play in the design, implementation and evaluation of ICF programmes. This is done on the basis of content analysis of four of the United Nation's climate financing programmes as part of its Green Climate Fund (GCF). This research concludes that the role of communities is only limited in the design and implementation stage, but much more present in the evaluation stage. The projects still have a very top-down focus and the involvement of the communities is hampered because of cultural and practical reasons. Strict objectives help to formalise the involvement of communities. While models of democratic pluralism and functionalism are already in place, a neocorporatist model could help the GCF to overcome difficulties in involving NSAs and to make their policies more effective and legitimate.

Key words: climate justice, international climate finance, non-state actors, Green Climate Fund, communities, democratic pluralism, neocorporatism, functionalism

Table of contents

List of tables	5
List of abbreviations	5
Introduction	6
Theoretical framework	8
<i>Climate justice and international climate finance</i>	8
<i>International policymaking on ICF</i>	9
<i>Non-state actors in international climate policy</i>	10
<i>Supportive and obstructive factors in the involvement of NSAs</i>	12
Research design.....	14
<i>Case and data selection</i>	14
<i>Method</i>	15
Results	18
Discussion	22
<i>Design</i>	22
<i>Implementation</i>	24
<i>Evaluation</i>	26
Conclusion.....	28
References	30
Appendix: Overview of primary data.....	32

List of tables

Table 1: Meaning of seven categories	16
Table 2: Subcodes 'community' distributed by document type	19
Table 3: Case 1 (Peru) code distribution	19
Table 4: Case 2 (Malawi) code distribution	20
Table 5: Case 3 (Bangladesh) code distribution	20
Table 6: Case 4 (Paraguay) code distribution	21

List of abbreviations

APR	Annual Performance Report
CAQDAS	Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
COP	Conference of the Parties
EU	European Union
FP	Funding Proposal
GCCA	Global Climate Change Agenda
GCF	Green Climate Fund
ICF	International climate finance
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NSA	Non-state actor
PA	Paris Agreement
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Introduction

Climate change is increasingly seen as one of the most urgent global crises of our time. Most scholars agree that human activities are the major drivers of climate change in the last two centuries, resulting in long-term shifts in temperature and weather patterns (UN, 2022). Especially in the so-called developed Global North – consisting of Western Europe, North America, Australia and Japan (Hollington et al., 2015) – the burning of fossil fuels, needed for the industrial revolutions that led to great prosperity, caused this climate change. The effects consist of an increase in floods, food shortages, drought, water shortages, forest fires and deserts, and a decrease of biodiversity and reefs (IPCC, 2021). Through these effects, climate change indirectly leads to an increase in conflict and migration. It is estimated that 50 to 200 million people will be forced from their homes as a result of climate change by 2050 (ZOA, 2012, pp. 7-8; Stern, 2007).

Another problem arising from climate change, is that its effects are disproportionately felt in developing states in the Global South, due to geographical and structural causes (ZOA, 2012, p. 2; Ezrow, Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2016; Alcántara-Ayala, 2002). As opposed to the Global North, the Global South consists of developing states in Latin America, Africa and Asia, including the Middle East (Hollington et al., 2015). There thus exists a tension that while the developed states in the Global North pollute the most, the developing states in the Global South have to bear the consequences. This tension is captured in the term climate justice, meaning the idea ‘that we all share a responsibility to combat the effects of a changing climate that is disproportionately affecting those who have done the least to cause it’ (Aczel, 2022, p. 253). Climate justice movements insist on bottom-up policymaking, whereby power is handed back to non-state actors (NSAs) from the Global South (Tokar, 2014; Tokar, 2019). These civil society movements, private enterprises and research institutes, stemming from the local communities, themselves know best what the effects of climate change are and how they can be solved in their regions (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014; Streck, 2021). They are not only affected, but also have shown to come up with innovative solutions and extensive policy-proposals; bottom-up strategies to reduce natural disasters, mitigate their effects, and adapt to new climate circumstances (Tokar, 2014; Tokar, 2019). Research showed that the implementation of NSAs in international policymaking, especially on climate issues, makes the policies more effective, legitimate, and just (Streck, 2021; Kuyper, Linnér & Schroeder, 2018; Van Asselt, 2016).

One sub-area of climate justice in which the linkage between developed and developing states becomes especially prominent is international climate finance (ICF). ICF not only aims at reducing emissions, but mostly focuses on reducing the vulnerability of populations in developing states, through financial transfers from the Global North to the Global South (Gajevic Sayegh, 2019, p. 153). Developed states have promised 100 billion dollar to developing states, as part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement (PA) of 2015 (Nhamo & Nhamo, 2016). The role of NSAs in international climate policies, such as the UNFCCC and PA, has been researched, and supportive and obstructive factors have been identified. Nevertheless, this role of NSAs has never been researched in the specific context of finance programmes. These programmes largely miss effectivity up until now and the funding gap remains huge (Nhamo & Nhamo, 2016). In attempts to improve this, the role of NSAs can be of importance, just as it is in general international climate policies. Three different models – democratic pluralism, neocorporatism and functionalism – help us to manage and assess the involvement of NSAs in three different stages of the programmes’ processes – design, implementation and evaluation. This paper tries to contribute to this field by answering the question: ‘What role do non-state actors play in the design, implementation and evaluation of international climate finance programmes?’

What follows is an overview of existing research on climate justice, international climate finance, and the role of NSAs in international climate policy. The research design explains why we select the Green Climate Fund (GCF) of the United Nations, and more specifically four funding programmes in Peru, Malawi, Bangladesh and Paraguay, as our cases. Using in-depth content analysis with a combination of open and closed coding, we find that the role of communities is only limited in the design and implementation stage, but much more present in the evaluation stage. The projects still have a very top-down focus and the involvement of the communities is hampered because of cultural and practical reasons. Strict objectives help to formalise the involvement of communities. While models of democratic pluralism and functionalism are already in place, a neocorporatist model could help the GCF to overcome difficulties in involving NSAs and to make their policies more effective and legitimate. The discussion and concluding section will further elaborate on this and give recommendations for further research and policy implementation, in order to increase the effectiveness of ICF programmes and strive for climate justice.

Theoretical framework

Climate justice and international climate finance

Climate justice is inherently about inequalities. Already in the 1990s, when the fossil fuel industry developed rapidly, NSAs lobbied for more equality in socio-environmental policy (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). The often bottom-up movements focused on the relationship between race and the dumping of toxic waste in some states in the United States, with civil rights at its core. From their creation onwards, these advocates thus fought against structural inequalities in the distribution of environmental risks and governmental protection (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, pp. 360-361; Bullard & Johnson, 2000, p. 556). After the turn of the millennium, at the sixth Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in 2001, the environmentalists broadened their discourse to the effects of global climate change, and to the concept of climate justice (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 362). By climate justice we mean the ambition that policymaking at the international level is concerned with and takes responsibility for the negative effects of climate change in developing states in the Global South. Fighting discrimination and racism remained at the heart of these movements. At the same time, global climate change and the increase in natural disasters lays bare other structural inequalities. Geographically, we see that developing states are located in zones that are more likely to be hit by natural disasters, such as volcanic activity, seismicity and flooding (Ezrow, Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2016, p. 209). Next to that, the infrastructure in developing states often lacks protective measures and thus citizens are more vulnerable to the impacts of natural disasters (Alcántara-Ayala, 2002, p. 108). States in the Global South generally lack the financial resources needed to mitigate these effects. The climate justice movement is thus inherently about inequalities: those within states – discrimination and racism, as well as those between states – geographically and financially.

This last point is addressed through international climate finance (ICF). ICF not only aims at reducing emissions, but mostly focuses on reducing the vulnerability of populations in developing states, through financial transfers from the Global North to the Global South (Gajevic Sayegh, 2019, p. 153). Actors from the Global North are largely responsible for climate change and its effects in the Global South due to its polluting industrialisation (UN, 2022; IPCC, 2021; ZOA, 2021), are the ones largely in charge at the international policymaking level through the EU and UN (Murphy, 2019), and are the ones with the possibilities and resources to support the Global South and mitigate the effects of climate change (Murphy,

2019). In recent years, they have started to pick up this responsibility vis-à-vis the Global South. Normatively, they thus follow the dictum that the allocation of responsibilities should reflect the different outcomes of collective actions (Murphy, 2019, p. 71). Next to that, high numbers of migrants are expected to come to the Global North and conflicts are expected to arise, which are a destabilising threat to the security and welfare of the developed states (ZOA, 2021). It is thus also in the own interest of the Global North and their policymakers at the international level to work on climate justice through ICF. This leads us to the question how this can best be achieved.

International policymaking on ICF

Within international policymaking on climate issues, ICF is an important instrument of climate justice and a signal for effective climate action, as stated above (Gajevic Sayegh, 2019, p. 153). ICF policies are mostly created by international organisations, for example as part of the EU's Global Climate Change Agenda (GCCA) and the UN's Green Climate Fund (GCF). The latter is the most far-reaching and financially loaded institute worldwide to take care of ICF programmes. The idea of the GCF was born at COP15 in 2009, launched at COP17 in 2011 and has been updated ever since, with the current promise of states to invest 100 billion dollars in countering climate change in the developing world (Bracking, 2015, p. 282). This is mostly public funding, while the private sector is increasingly encouraged to jump in on this investment opportunity (p. 283). The GCF is country-driven, meaning that the developing states are in the lead. The funds are equally divided between mitigation and adaptation and are invested in more than 100 states.

Current research on ICF mostly focuses on the normative and moral grounds for ICF and the allocation of its funds, and the unwillingness of developed states in the Global North to stick to the promise of 100 billion dollar of ICF in 2050 (Nhamo & Nhamo, 2016; Pittel & Rübhelke, 2013). This paper instead focuses on power structures in ICF. While the section above already showed that the financial and political support of the Global North is needed to effectively fight for climate justice, the section below will elaborate on why NSAs from the Global South should be included in the process. This paper advocates rethinking power structures and altering them into a more dynamic relationship between state actors from the Global North on the one hand, and NSAs from the Global South on the other.

Importantly, the GCF already makes use of its network of over a 200 partners, including 'international and national commercial banks, multilateral, regional and national development finance institutions, equity funds institutions, United Nations agencies, and civil society

organizations’ (GCF, 2022b). Next to that, the projects are engaged with local and indigenous communities to conduct ‘free, prior and informed consent, meaningful consultation, information disclosure, stakeholder engagement and grievance redress in these communities’ (GCF, 2022a, p. 1). This paper is concerned with the role of these communities in ICF programmes. The following section will elaborate on why this matters and how it can be investigated.

Non-state actors in international climate policy

Zooming out from ICF to international policymaking on climate issues in general, this paper argues that global inequalities arising from climate change are best understood and widely addressed by non-state actors (NSAs), and that therefore their proposals should be implemented at the international policymaking level. In this research, NSAs are bottom-up initiatives, ranging from local communities from the Global South to international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and from private banks to public research institutes, that try to impact policymaking on climate issues – including climate justice – at the international level.

While referring to the involvement of NSAs in international policymaking, scholars often speak of multilevel governance or ‘transnational partnership governance’ (Streck, 2021, p. 493). The most prominent example of this in climate policy, can be found within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC is responsible for the different COP meetings that deal with climate policies, resulting most importantly in the Paris Agreement (PA) in 2015. Streck (2021) reiterates that NSAs have been ‘eager to fill the space opened by the inadequacies of existing intergovernmental cooperation’ (p. 494). Others refer to it as ‘hybrid multilateralism’, focusing on the mutual efforts of states on the one hand, and NSAs on the other to routinely cooperate in international policymaking on climate issues (Kuyper, Linnér & Schroeder, 2018, pp. 2-3). This led COP17 in 2011 to have 70% of delegations including at least one NSA representative. In total, 18% of delegations consisted of non-state representatives (p. 3). One example is the ‘Climate Justice Now!’ movement, which is a network of 750 organisations, mostly grassroots movements from the Global South (Tokar, 2019, p. 13; Tokar, 2014). They propose, among others things, to radically reduce consumption, first and foremost in the Global North, to repay climate debts through financial transfers from North to South and to conserve resources that enforce indigenous rights and sovereignty (Tokar, 2019, pp. 16-17). The strength of those organisations lies in their networks that are historically linked to overcoming inequalities and decreasing emissions (Martinez-Alier, 2015, p. 385). The interrelatedness of the concepts they fight for, namely inclusion, autonomy, transparency,

compensation and sustainability, makes that their implementation in international policymaking on climate issues increases the policies' effectiveness and legitimacy (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 368).

Different models can be applied to manage and assess the involvement of NSAs in international policymaking. A democratic pluralist model focuses on increased input legitimacy through procedural values, while a neocorporatist model emphasises the inclusion of affected interests, and a functionalist model focuses on output legitimacy in terms of expertise (Nasiritousi, Hjerpe & Bäckstrand, 2016, pp. 920, 925-926; Willetts, 2006). Research into the preferences of COP attendants – either states or NSAs – for reasons to involve NSAs showed that half of the respondents feel they should be included because they represent important stakes, supporting the neocorporatist rationale (Nasiritousi, Hjerpe & Bäckstrand, 2016, pp. 930-931). One-third of the respondents select NSAs' ability to provide information and expertise as the main reason to include them, following functionalism. Only one-sixth thinks they should be included because they represent marginalised voices and perspectives, as is in line with a democratic pluralist model (pp. 930-931).

These three models could also have a chronological indication, reflecting the three standard stages for policy creation: design, implementation and evaluation (Peters, 2015). In the design stage of an ICF programme, the involvement of NSAs for example significantly increases the input legitimacy of the process, following the democratic pluralist model. As Mary Robinson, former UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for Climate Change, stated, we need 'a shift from a discourse on greenhouse gases and melting ice caps into a civil rights movement with the people and communities most vulnerable to climate impacts at its heart' (UN, 2019). We see this becoming reality at the COP meetings, where almost 3000 NSAs have an official observing member status (Tokar, 2019). In the implementation stage, the involvement of NSAs helps to include all affected interests, which follows a model of neocorporatism. These have significant effects, such as the goal to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius in the PA as was fought for effectively by NSAs (Kuyper, Linnér & Schroeder, 2018, p. 10). However, overall we see that the proposals of NSAs, addressed at policymakers in the EU and UN, have proven to be largely unheard in climate policies. For example, even though those 3000 NSAs are present at the COP meetings, their proposals were largely side-lined at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 (Tokar, 2019, p. 19). States, mostly Western-European ones, were unreceptive to the solutions as formulated for example by the 'Climate Justice Now!' movement, and the North-South polarisation grew. At COP19 in Warsaw in 2013, African delegates even walked out of the conference due to structural marginalisation of their states

during meetings. The neocorporatist model could help to let their voices be heard, through formalising all these different interests. In the evaluation stage, the involvement of NSAs increases the output legitimacy through using their expertise, hereby using a functionalist model. The interim evaluations of the PA suggest that NSAs contribute to economic effectiveness, cost effectiveness and environmental effectiveness, but research on this still needs to increase and improve (Kuyper, Linnér & Schroeder, 2018, p. 13).

Reflecting on all this, we see that NSAs can improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of international climate policies. Three different models and three chronological stages are identified that help to manage and assess NSA involvement. These mostly show that NSAs are still largely side-lined in general climate policy. The models will be used to assess these dynamics further in the specific cases of ICF programmes. To investigate this in more detail, specific factors that have proven to support or obstruct the involvement of NSAs in international policymaking will be used. The following section will elaborate on this.

Supportive and obstructive factors in the involvement of NSAs

In international policymaking, institutional arrangements that lead to cooperation between states and NSAs largely miss, especially on climate issues. It remains unclear ‘what NSAs are expected to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the PA, how they are encouraged to do so, whether and how they should be held accountable and, maybe most importantly, how their efforts can complement and strengthen government actions’ (Streck, 2021, p. 495).

Regarding the COPs, the most important obstacle is the fact that states hold the right to close their meetings for NSAs. Their long-term habits of doing precisely so, hamper the NSAs from really impacting policymaking (Kuyper, Linnér & Schroeder, 2018, p. 3). This is an example of the poor execution of the democratic pluralist model in the design stage of the process. Another constraining factor is that the formal avenues for NSA participation in review processes, for example of the PA, remain limited (Van Asselt, 2016, p. 91). These processes consist of the review of implementation, compliance, and effectiveness of climate agreements, and are important to future policymaking processes. This indicates a lack of applying a functionalist rationale in the evaluation stage of the process. Again, the habit of excluding NSAs is self-sustaining and proliferating.

Next to these obstacles, there are also some factors that stimulate and empower NSAs in the international policymaking process on climate issues. First and foremost, states have proven to include NSAs in their formal policymaking structures when they acknowledge that they largely lack means to meet the climate goals. In these cases, they specifically seek to

mobilise and catalyse the efforts of civil society, businesses and research institutes in attributing to those goals, as for example carbon reduction (Kuyper, Linnér & Schroeder, 2018, p. 7). At the UN level, this is consolidated in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action and the Global Climate Action Agenda. This is coherent with the rationales of the functionalist model, namely providing for output legitimacy in terms of expertise. Second, linking NSA participation, accountability and transparency to clear objectives, again at the UN level, encourages states to implementing them (Streck, 2021, p. 504). This is already done in the Global Framework for Climate Action, and can still be enriched and elaborated on (p. 505). This aligns with the neocorporatist model, thereby emphasising the inclusion of affected interests in the implementation stage. Third, when NSAs proactively check the compliance of states to the climate goals, and publish these analyses, their views have proven to be implemented in the follow-up stages of climate agreements (Van Asselt, 2016, p. 105). While this happens initially on an informal basis, their analyses are eventually formalised in review processes and strengthen further agreements, also following neocorporatist thought. When turning this into common practice, it can become self-sustaining and proliferating as well.

Summarising, this paper aims to assess the role of NSAs in ICF programmes. The involvement of NSAs has proven to lack in current international policymaking structures, but has also proven to make international climate policy more effective, legitimate and just. Especially in ICF, their involvement is needed in order to effectively reach climate justice. The three models, the three chronological stages, and the different supportive and obstructive factors, provide us with the tools to identify what role NSAs play in the ICF programmes. The following section will further elaborate on how this research will be executed.

Research design

This research thus seeks to investigate what role NSAs play in the design, implementation and evaluation of ICF programmes. To this aim, we will carry out a comparative case study of several financing programmes within the UN. The greatest advantage of a relatively small-N comparative research is that it allows for in-depth analysis of the cases and greater scope for contextualisation at the same time (Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 218). The former is needed since we are interested in three different stages of ICF; therefore it is crucial to analyse the cases thoroughly. As the theoretical framework showed, the latter matters since the context in which these programmes are rolled out, such as institutional features and UN objectives, matters as well for the role NSAs get to play. Since it is explorative research, we need to compare multiple cases to be able to generalise findings.

Case and data selection

As stated, the GCF is the UN's most important institute in this regard. They coordinate and execute ICF programmes in eight different result areas, such as transport or energy generation and access. Following a Most Different Systems Design, we will select four cases from four different result areas and four different continents. The only characteristic the cases share is that they receive ICF through the UN. Since the programs differ in content, goal and geography, but resemble each other in receiving ICF funding, we are able to generalise the findings from this study as much as possible to other ICF programmes worldwide (Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 221). Since the programmes that have only been initiated in the past one, two or three years lack good coverage in documentation, programmes with a current duration of at least three years have been selected. The cases that fit these criteria are:

- Peru (Forests and land use). This project, which was approved in 2015, aims to enhance the climate resilience and livelihoods of the indigenous wetlands communities of Datem del Marañón in the Amazon basin, while reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation. There have been 2.6 million tonnes of emissions avoided up until now. The project is worth 7.3 million dollars, has a lifespan of 10 years and has 20.413 direct beneficiaries.
- Malawi (Livelihoods of people and communities). This second project, also approved in 2015, strives to protect lives and livelihoods in Malawi from climate-related disasters by providing early warning weather and climate information systems and improving the resilience of vulnerable communities. The project is supposed to be completed in 2023,

has a total value of 16.3 million dollars, and has 2.1 million beneficiaries, of whom 1.4 million direct and 700.000 indirect ones.

- Bangladesh (Infrastructure and built environment). This project, again active since 2015, aims to provide cyclone shelters and safeguard critical road access to protect lives in a rural coastal region of Bangladesh, develop urban infrastructure and safeguard vulnerable city-dwellers from climate risk, and establish a national centre of excellence for climate resilience infrastructure, to inform and guide future infrastructure development throughout the country. It has a total project value of 81.0 million dollars, making it the biggest project within our cases, and 10.5 million beneficiaries, of whom 134.350 direct beneficiaries.
- Paraguay (Buildings, cities, industries, and appliances). This project was approved in 2018 and has a lifespan of 10 years. It aims at reducing reliance on fuelwood and other fossil fuel energy sources by Paraguayan SMEs, increasing their energy efficiency and shifting energy use to renewable hydropower. There have been 4.0 million tonnes of emissions avoided up until now and the total project value is 43.0 million dollars.

ICF programmes within the GCF are well documented. In the Funding Proposal and the Annual Performance Reports an abundance of information can be found on the design, implementation and (interim) evaluation of the programmes. Therefore, these documents are the primary source of data. The four cases together consist of seventeen documents: four Funding Proposals and thirteen Annual Performance Reports. The four Funding Proposals are the source of data to assess the design stage, since these provide us with information on the run-up to the projects' commencement. The Annual Performance Reports provide us with information on the implementation as well as the (interim) evaluation stage, whereby the feedback from these reports is used in the projects' subsequent years. The different supportive and obstructive factors will help us to evaluate those effectively, as will be elaborated on below.

Method

Building on the theoretical framework, we have seen that NSAs differ in their effectiveness in affecting international policymaking on climate issues, including ICF. Some factors strengthen their position, being states' incompetence to meet climate goals, UN objectives on NSA involvement, and NSAs' own proactive stance in checking states' compliance with the climate goals. Other factors hamper their impact, most importantly the lack of institutional and formal structures for NSA implementation. This paper searches to identify these factors in the three

different stages of the ICF programmes – design, implementation and evaluation. The combination of these factors and stages shows us to what extent the three different models mentioned before – democratic pluralism, neocorporatism and functionalism – are applied, and how their use can be enhanced in order to involve NSAs more effectively.

To do this in a valid and reliable way, this research uses content analysis through computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), using ATLAS.ti. This allows us to assess a larger amount of data on the four highly different cases, while reducing subjective biases (Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 346). The coding protocol is a combination of open and closed coding (pp. 349-350). The pre-formulated codes consist of the four above-mentioned factors. Next to that, codes will be created during the research process. This is consistent with the explorative nature of this study. Since the role of NSAs in ICF programmes has never been researched, and it most likely will not fully resemble their role in general climate policy, the data will likely shed light on elements we could not have distinguished beforehand. Therefore codes will be added and re-grouped along the way. After the coding process, the results will be extracted from the coding protocol through identifying frequent themes and relationships, and linking this back to the research question.

Code (+ abbreviation)	Meaning
Con: culture and accessibility (C: CA)	Issues such as geographical remoteness
Con: lack of structure (C: LS)	Absence of formalised NSA involvement
Con: top-down (C: T)	The GCF’s tendency to sense Western superiority
Pro: climate goals (P: CG)	Need to involve NSAs in order to reach targets and empowering them for the future
Pro: NSA objective (P: NO)	Official NSA targets and empowering them for the future in other areas than climate
Pro: proactive (P: P)	NSA’s own initiatives to be in charge
Undecided (UDC)	E.g. facts on names and numbers

Table 1: Meaning of seven categories

During the process, it showed that there are two other factors that affect the role of NSAs. These are the very top-down focus of the GCF in designing, implementing and evaluating their programmes, and culture and accessibility issues that hamper the communities

from being involved. The obstructive factors were coded ‘con: culture and accessibility’, ‘con: lack of structure’ and ‘con: top-down’. The supportive factors were coded ‘pro: climate goals’, ‘pro: NSA objective’ and ‘pro: proactive’. The hits that did not fit in any of the six categories were left under the code ‘undecided’, which leaves us with seven categories in total (see Table 1).

To effectively discuss the results, we divide them in the three stages mentioned before: design, implementation and evaluation of the ICF programmes. Those stages will be reviewed using the three models for NSA involvement: democratic pluralism, neocorporatism and functionalism. Some codes explicitly link to one of these models. For example, states’ habits of closing the COP meetings for NSAs, which hampers the latter’s impact (code: con: lack of structure), aligns with a poor execution of the democratic pluralist model in the design stage. On the other hand, clear objectives on NSA involvement (code: pro: NSA objective) in order to include all affected interests, aligns with a neocorporatist model in the implementation stage. When states recognise that they are incapable to reach the climate goals themselves and need NSAs to that aim (code: pro: climate goals), this follows the functionalist model. The following sections will use all this in presenting and discussing the results.

Results

The GCF's guidelines on NSA involvement make clear that in their projects, they inherently include 'a focus on private sector, sub-national governments, civil society organisations and indigenous peoples organizations' (GCF, 2022a, p. 1). A first search into the term 'non-state actors' did not lead to any hits, while the seventeen documents together contained the word 'stakeholder(s)' 325 times, 'partner(s)' 164 times and 'private (actors/companies)' 201 times. The guidelines on NSA involvement also make clear that 'integrating the voices of communities and individuals into project and subproject design and implementation is an essential component of internationally recognised safeguard policies, norms and practices' (GCF, 2022a, p. 1). It makes clear that they are mostly concerned with 'marginalised populations, groups, and individuals, with a particular focus on women and girls; indigenous peoples; local communities' (p. 1). After scanning the documents on the differences between these codes – populations, individuals, indigenous groups, communities – 'community' turned out to be the most common one; mentioned up to 1333 times. The paragraphs about the role of communities focus on a broad range of different aspects and most essentially explain how power is given to the people in these ICF programmes. This code stands central to the data analysis and is our focus within the broad range of different NSAs. The seven categories (see Table 1) are placed as subcodes under the central code 'community'.

After analysing all seventeen documents with its 1333 hits on 'community', a quite clear distribution of the subcodes showed up, which can be found in Table 2. The hits are divided by document type, either the total found in the four Funding Proposals (FP) or thirteen Annual Performance Reports (APR). The first number is the total number of hits found in that category. The second number (in italics) implies the percentage, whereby the total of 1333 hits is taken as 100%.

Although the Annual Performance Reports outnumber the Funding Proposals in document quantity, they do not consistently outnumber them in code quantity. For example, while the subcode 'pro: NSA objective' showed up 140 times in the four Funding Proposals, it showed up only 110 times in the thirteen Annual Performance Reports. Nevertheless, the code 'con: top-down' showed up 133 times in the Funding Proposals and up to 227 times in the Annual Performance Reports, indeed reflecting the document quantity. The percentages differ from 1% – 'con: lack of structure' in the FPs as well as APRs, to 17% – 'con: top-down' in the ARPs. The totals show us that the 'pro' codes outnumber the 'con' codes, while 20% is undecided.

Subcodes of code 'community'	FP	FP %	APR	APR %	Totals	Totals %
Con: culture and accessibility	42	3	25	2	67	5
Con: lack of structure	12	1	18	1	30	2
Con: top-down	133	10	227	17	360	27
Pro: climate goals	84	6	201	15	285	21
Pro: NSA objective	140	11	110	8	250	19
Pro: proactive	53	4	31	2	84	6
Undecided	141	11	116	9	257	20
Total	605	45	728	55	1333	100

Table 2: Subcodes 'community' distributed by document type

To analyse these differences in more detail, we split the distribution of the codes per case and document, hereby creating a timeline on the involvement of communities in the GCF financing processes. This will in turn help us to make statements on the different roles the communities play in the design, implementation and evaluation stages.

The first case of Peru (Table 3) gives us some important insights. The first one is that the code 'pro: NSA objective' – with 29% the most frequently occurring code – has 108 hits in the Funding Proposals, then less hits in the following years, and again up to 50 hits in the last Annual Performance Report of 2021. The other two 'pro' codes also have the most hits in the Funding Proposal, and later are largely absent. The code 'con: top-down' is nevertheless more evenly distributed, with the most hits in the latest Annual Performance Report.

	FP	APR	APR	APR	APR	APR	Totals	Totals %
		2017	2018	2019	2020	2021		
C: CA	29	-	3	-	8	5	45	7
C: LS	11	1	-	2	3	10	27	4
C: T	34	3	11	35	19	52	154	23
P: CG	41	5	2	19	31	23	121	18
P: NO	108	9	9	8	7	50	191	29
P: P	34	4	4	4	3	6	55	8
UDC	16	-	4	6	4	45	75	11

Table 3: Case 1 (Peru) code distribution

In the case of Malawi (Table 4), we see that both ‘pro: NSA objective’ and ‘pro: proactive’ are mostly used in the Funding Proposals. The codes ‘con: top-down’ and ‘pro: climate goals’ are more evenly divided, with the most hits in the middle Annual Performance Reports of 2018 and 2019 – whereby the totals consist of respectively 31% and 25%. The code ‘con: lack of structure’ is almost absent, having only two hits in the latest report of 2020.

	FP	APR 2017	APR 2018	APR 2019	APR 2020	Totals	Totals %
C: CA	11	-	1	1	7	20	3
C: LS	-	-	-	-	2	2	-
C: T	87	10	48	43	6	194	31
P: CG	38	8	33	51	29	159	25
P: NO	25	5	3	9	8	50	8
P: P	17	1	2	3	4	27	4
UDC	120	9	16	12	18	175	28

Table 4: Case 2 (Malawi) code distribution

The other two cases of Bangladesh and Paraguay (Tables 5 and 6) provide us with significantly different results. In these cases, communities only play a very limited role, as showed by the total amount of respectively 12 and 26 hits. In the case of Bangladesh, communities are not mentioned at all in the Annual Performance Reports, and are evenly distributed in the Funding Proposal. In the case of Paraguay, the code ‘con: top-down’ is most common, but it also limited to only 10 hits.

	FP	APR 2019	APR 2020	Totals	Totals %
C: CA	2	-	-	2	17
C: LS	1	-	-	1	8
C: T	2	-	-	2	17
P: CG	3	-	-	3	25
P: NO	2	-	-	2	17
P: P	-	-	-	-	-
UDC	2	-	-	2	17

Table 5: Case 3 (Bangladesh) code distribution

	FP	APR 2019	APR 2020	Totals	Totals %
C: CA	-	-	-	-	-
C: LS	-	-	-	-	-
C: T	10	-	-	10	38
P: CG	2	-	-	2	8
P: NO	5	1	1	7	27
P: P	2	-	-	2	8
UDC	3	1	1	5	19

Table 6: Case 4 (Paraguay) code distribution

To interpret these results, we need quotations from the different codes to give context. This also provides us with the details needed to make an analysis, apply our theory and answer the central research question. The following section will elaborate hereon.

Discussion

As shown above, the code distribution strongly differs per case and document type. The following section will discuss these results per stage – design, implementation and evaluation – thereby applying and assessing the three different models for NSA involvement – democratic pluralism, neocorporatism and functionalism. While referring to the different documents, in-text reference names are used. Their meanings can be found in the Appendix.

Design

The Funding Proposals show us the role of communities in the design stage of the GCF's financing programmes. As shown in the above paragraph, the codes 'con: top-down' and 'pro: NSA objective' were most commonly used. The top-down focus becomes immediately apparent in the projects' goal to achieve 'increased resilience and enhance livelihoods of the most vulnerable people, communities and regions' (C1D1, p. 60). In the case of Malawi, scaling up the use of modernised early warning systems and climate information is intended to 'enhance lives and livelihoods in vulnerable communities' (C2D1, pp. 12-13). Communities are not only perceived as vulnerable, but also as needy, longing to 'receive training, technical assistance, and logistical and financial support' (C1D1, p. 15). Communities are not in the lead, but are rather described as the 'target' of the project (C2D1, pp. 5, 9, 16). The projects ensure that 'health and safety conditions will apply to communities' (C1D1, p. 88), but 'the main risk for the community' (C3D1, p. 40) will also occur during construction. The fact that indigenous communities 'will most likely lose their natural and cultural heritage' (C4D1, p. 45) as a result of the project, is only briefly mentioned. None of the three models for NSA involvement can be applied to this type of project leading by the GCF. They seem to be reluctant to ideas of increasing input or output legitimacy, or including all affected interests.

While these policy measures are top-down and the ownership of the communities themselves is neglected, the aim is of course to indeed improve the lives of the indigenous peoples. The projects also seek to invest in 'empowering the communities in preparedness and response to climate related disasters' (C2D1, p. 5). The need to involve communities in the process becomes apparent in simple statements such as 'all the proposed activities are community-based' (C1D1, p. 2). Consultations are an important part of the design stage of these projects. In the case of Paraguay, 'inclusive roundtable discussions' are organised with 'local stakeholders from national authorities, private sector actors and the relevant NGO community working on fuel wood markets' (C4D1, p. 61). As regards Peru, during consultations 'more

than 80 communities, represented by nearly 500 people and 21 organisations participated' (C1D1, p. 37). The involvement of local peoples ranges from budget for visits outside the country by delegations of community representatives (C1D1, p. 3), to communicating through local radio, tv and papers (C1D1, p. 67) and structural dialogues with 'farmers, communities, schools, women, and church groups' (C2D1, p. 16). In the case of Malawi, it is even stated that 'local stakeholders and community members have a key role in the implementation and monitoring of the project' (C2D1, p. 24). Opposed to the patronising statement that 'local communities and stakeholders may be involved in simple supervision tasks' (C3D1, p. 28) in the case of Bangladesh, the Proposal to the project in Malawi states that 'where available, local people will be employed to undertake maintenance, thereby providing a social benefit to the community' (C2D1, p. 49). This most overtly follows a model of democratic pluralism, whereby NSAs are included in the designing processes, more because of procedural precautions than that their content-related interests matters to the GCF, as would be the case in a neocorporatist model.

The Proposals suggest that a lack of community participation mostly happens because of community hesitation. It for example states that 'it is hoped that after several similar participatory processes, community leaders, public officials and leaders from the private sector will learn that such an approach is valid and worth the additional initial transaction costs, and that reaching agreements is an effective means of managing relationships with other societal actors' (C1D1, p. 29). This shines a different light on the above-mentioned top-down policy proposals. Several reasons are given in the Proposals itself for this hesitation. One of them is that there exists a 'long history of unbalanced agreements between communities and settlers' which has created an environment of mistrust (C1D1, p. 13). Other reasons include language barriers, mostly for women who only speak the native language (C1D1, p. 52), sensitivity within communities to share data on socioeconomic status (C1D1, pp. 26, 68; C4D1, p. 43), the geographical remoteness of targeted areas (C1D1, p. 13), or limited organisation structures at local level (C2D1, p. 39).

Lastly, the Proposal of Malawi states that 'the first response to a disaster always comes from the community itself' (C2D1, p. 19). Nevertheless, there is not much space for communities to proactively participate. Their observations are used to 'confirm conclusions reached by scientists' (C1D1, p. 12), demand for 'money to participate in economic transactions' (C1D1, p. 24) or ask for assemblies to be held once the project is approved 'in order to inform the community' (C1D1, p. 37), but these are all indirect means rather than direct ones. This is a marginalised version of the functionalist model, whereby the GCF provides for

more output legitimacy through implementing the communities' observations, but only in a very limited way.

Concluding, we see that the design stage of the GCF's ICF programmes is still largely a top-down process, whereby the role the communities get to play is very limited. This is not only because of cultural or practical reasons, but also because local communities and indigenous peoples are still perceived as vulnerable and needy. When communities do get the opportunity to participate, this is mostly because of protocols of the GCF on involving NSAs. The communities are not included because of their own proactive stance in climate policy. The inherent value and local knowledge communities can bring to the table is only partly recognised. While the GCF slightly follows the democratic pluralist and functionalist models, they could apply neocorporatism a lot more. Reflecting all NSAs' interests would help to make the programmes more legitimate and effective.

Implementation

Other than the Funding Proposals, the Annual Performance Reports provide us with insights about the implementation of the different GCF projects. The top-down focus in the stage of implementation resembles the process in the design stage. The projects for example undertake training of 'community members, extension workers and relevant stakeholders' (C2D2, p. 5) such as 'farmers and fishers and flood prone communities (C2D2, p. 8). The code 'con: top-down' again had the most hits, followed by 'pro: climate goals', that had only a limited amount of hits in the Funding Proposals. The latter entails to what extend communities are needed in order to reach climate targets, and how they are empowered for the future in the area of climate objectives. A simple example of this is seen in the first Annual Performance Report on Peru, stating the goal to organise 'community-level groups to collect information on indigenous knowledge about climate observations' (C1D2, p. 6), which is remarkably different than the Funding Proposal. This reflects functionalist thought, whereby local expertise is used to reach the climate goals, thereby providing for output legitimacy. Two Reports later, they write that 'the implementation of community climate monitoring systems with community participation will be carried out respecting the organizational and communication systems of each of the seven indigenous peoples involved in the project' (C1D4, p. 8). In the case of Malawi, the second Report mentions that 'weather/climate needs assessment for small-holder farmers, fishermen and flood prone communities have been completed' (C2D3, p. 4). Next to that, lead farmers are appointed that disseminate the information to over 160.000 small-holder farmers in their communities 'for making farm decisions based on the projected seasonal weather forecast

for their area' (C2D4, p. 13). This reflects a democratic pluralist model, whereby the ideas, habits and systems of local communities are included in the procedure.

In the implementation stage, the projects encountered the same issues as the design stage in the area of cultural differences, geographical remoteness and a lack of structured policymaking in the indigenous communities. One Annual Performance Report in the case of Peru for example mentions challenges 'associated with the ability to attend to communities with the speed that the interaction process demands' (C1D2, p. 3). 'High transport costs or the lack of electricity' prevent an orderly and beneficial use for the communities and the conservation of ecosystems (C1D6, p. 48) and visiting the communities is only an option 'as far as access to the territory is possible' (C1D5, p. 37). The Covid-19 pandemic created extra difficulties, because of isolation and a low vaccination rate 'due to the mistrust of vaccines by the indigenous communities' (C1D6, p. 3). It nevertheless also created some incentives to hand power back to the people, since the permission to enter the indigenous territory again after Covid-19 was given by the indigenous leaders and local authorities (C1D5, p. 62). Evaluating these programmes on the basis of the neocorporatist model could help the GCF to see the added value of involving communities in the implementation stage of their programmes. When the inclusion of all affected interests pays off in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy, this creates incentives for the GCF to work on overcoming cultural, geographical or structural difficulties.

As stated in the Results section, the role of communities in the Annual Performance Reports of Bangladesh and Paraguay is almost absent. In the case of Bangladesh, 'stakeholders' are mentioned rather than communities, which is a broader term which also encompasses private companies or educational institutions. Everything that has been written about these stakeholders is with a very top-down focus. In the case of Paraguay, private investments are analysed and the sole focus is on these private institutions. Local communities and indigenous peoples are left out of the process, again creating a very top-down implementation process. Again, applying the neocorporatist model would be helpful in practices of NSA involvement.

Concluding, we see that while there is more focus on the involvement of communities in the implementation stage as opposed to the design stage – as showed in the projects' attempts to partly give project ownership to the local peoples – it still remains a top-down process. All four cases sketch this same picture. It seems as though the will to involve them is there, more than in the design stage, but cultural and practical considerations still prohibit an inclusive and bottom-up process. Neocorporatist and democratic pluralist thought could help the GCF to include NSAs in the process and to make their policies more effective and legitimate.

Evaluation

The Annual Performance Reports also give insights into the (interim) evaluation of the different projects. There are multiple ways in which the communities give input to or even completely take care of these evaluation processes. Consolidating information ‘based on communities’ observations’ (C1D2, p. 5) is always a goal in the projects. One specific example in the case of Peru entails that ‘information gathering sheets were designed to collect the communities’ perceptions of forest loss and climate change, productive activities, as well as socio-economic and demographic information’ (C1D4, p. 8). Next to that, each project has a ‘grievance redress mechanism’, in which communities can voice their thoughts and complaints. Also in the case of Peru, a situation is brought up in which the local community considered that only the local leader and his immediate family were benefiting from the project. The local community ‘feels left out of the project and has commented on the possibility of closing the doors until we deliver an amount of money or give them some kind of benefit’ (C1D6, p. 89). The Report then mentions what benefit is given to the community. Communities also request extra reviews (C1D6, p. 35) and express their concerns with incapable project leaders (C1D5, p. 76). It is described that ‘there is a lot of interest from the indigenous communities in participating in the activities of the projects’ and that they ‘demand greater speed and action’ in the execution of the activities (C1D2, p. 24). We also see an increase in ownership, since ‘conservation mechanisms and strategies managed by the indigenous communities’ were analysed in the fourth Annual Performance Report on Peru (C1D5, p. 11). Similarly, in the case of Malawi, lead farmers have reported ‘enhanced social standing’ in their communities for being able to ‘provide weather advisories to fellow farmers in their communities’ (C2D4, p. 8). This is partly due to the projects’ ongoing efforts in structuring and professionalising local governance. In the case of Peru, in 2021, the project has formalised more than ten boards of directors of community associations that allow access to local markets, ‘as well as a better negotiation and placement of Amazonian products’ (C1D6, p. 10). These review mechanisms are an excellent example of the functionalist model, whereby output legitimacy is increased through the use of local expertise.

The obstructive factors are more limited in this stage, but still exist. One example of top-down management concerns the projects’ intent to ‘conduct studies to analyse changes in communities due to project activities’ (C1D2, p. 21). In this regard, communities are a research topic, rather than an empowered actor. Next to that, the accessibility conditions and lack of knowledge of the different cultural patterns of indigenous communities ‘have been key elements for the low participation of consultants in the calls and some cancellations’ (C1D3, p. 3).

Communication issues also arose, because since ‘their main form of communication is oral’, the recording of information by these populations is hard (C1D3, p. 9). Lastly, their occurred social problems in the communities ‘inherent in their social dynamics that delayed activities’ (C1D3, p. 11).

Concluding, we see that the role of communities in the evaluation process is much more omnipresent than in the design and implementation stage. The feedback mechanisms are designed to put the communities in the lead and their comments and complaints are effectively processed – in the cases of Peru and Malawi. Again, communities largely lack in the Annual Performance Reports of Bangladesh and Paraguay, because of the abovementioned reasons. Cultural and practical issues still arose, but were more limited than in the two earlier stages. The functionalist model is very well applied in this last stage of the GCF’s ICF programmes.

Conclusion

This research tried to contribute to academia and society through answering the question: ‘What role do non-state actors play in the design, implementation and evaluation of international climate finance programmes?’ Involving NSAs in international policymaking on climate issues helps to make policies more effective, legitimate and just. Nevertheless, they have shown to be largely side-lined in these international policymaking procedures. Three different models help to manage and assess the involvement of NSAs herein: democratic pluralism, with its focus on increased input legitimacy through procedural values, neocorporatism, which emphasises the inclusion of affected interests, and functionalism, that focuses on output legitimacy in terms of expertise. We carried out a qualitative content analysis of four ICF programmes as part of the UN’s Green Climate Fund using these models to see what the role of NSAs looks like in the design, implementation and evaluation stages of the programmes. Based on literature, we also distinguished some factors that could support NSA involvement, namely states’ incompetence to meet climate goals, formal objectives on NSA implementation and NSAs’ own proactive stance in checking states’ compliance with the climate goals. We also distinguished an obstructive factor, being the lack of institutional and formal structures for NSA implementation.

The analysis showed that the role local communities play in these programmes differs from stage to stage. While the design stage is still largely a top-down process, in the implementation stage it is already a more inclusive process. In the evaluation stage, the communities play an important role since their comments and complaints are leading the subsequent undertakings of the programme. The first two supportive factors – states’ incompetence to meet climate goals and formalised objectives – were indeed the most important reasons for the GCF to include communities in their programmes. The latter one turned out to have only a very limited impact. The obstructive factor – lack of institutional and formal structures – did show up in the analysis, but two other factors turned out to be much more obstructive: the top-down focus of the GCF on the one hand, and cultural and practical obstacles on the other. Where communities are included, their role mostly reflects a model of democratic pluralism, in order to increase input legitimacy through procedural values. In the evaluation stage, the functionalist model is almost perfectly reflected in the different feedback and grievance redress mechanisms. The neocorporatist model only barely showed up in the analysis of the four cases. This model could help the GCF to see the added value of including all affected interests and providing incentives to overcome other difficulties in involving NSAs – such as cultural, geographical or structural obstacles – in order to increase their policies’ effectiveness

and legitimacy. Generalising, this study suggests that combining the democratic pluralist, functionalist and neocorporatist model, with a particular focus on the latter, could help the Global North and Global South to effectively work together on climate justice and international climate policy.

This research's limitations lie in the limited scope of the analysis. Since it is explorative research, a broader range of cases needs to be analysed to be able to make a strong claim about the involvement of NSAs. These should also include funding programmes outside of the UN, for example as part of the EU. Next to that, not only local communities and indigenous peoples, but other NSAs, such as private actors or educational institutions, should be assessed as well to be able to make a more general claim. Also, the newly found factors that play a role, namely a top-down focus and cultural and practical obstacles, still need further research. Cultural context should also be taken into account more, since that affects the behaviour of local communities. After completing the picture of NSA involvement in ICF programmes, we will be able to research their effect on reaching the climate targets, and thus to what extent and in what ways they increase the effectiveness of ICF programmes. This way, we can inclusively and effectively fight for climate justice and reduce unnecessary global inequalities.

References

- Aczel, M. (2022). Confronting climate injustice. *Science*, 376(6590), 253.
- Alcántara-Ayala, I. (2002). Geomorphology, natural hazards, vulnerability and prevention of natural disasters in developing countries. *Geomorphology*, 47(2), 107-124.
- Bracking, S. (2015). The Anti-Politics of Climate Finance: The Creation and Performativity of the Green Climate Fund. *Antipode*, 47(2), 281-302.
- Bullard, R.D., & Johnson, G.S. (2000). Environmental Justice: Grassroots Activism and Its Impact on Public Policy Decision Making. *Journal of Social Issues*, 56(3), 555-578.
- Ezrow, N., Frantz, E., & Kendall-Taylor, A. (2016). *Development and the State in the 21st Century. Tackling the Challenges Facing the Developing World*. London: Palgrave.
- Gajevic Sayegh, A. (2019). Climate finance: moral theory and political practice. In T. Jafry (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice* (pp. 153-164). Oxon: Routledge.
- GCF (2022a). *Sustainability Guidance Note: Designing and ensuring meaningful stakeholder engagement on GCF-financed activities*. Green Climate Fund.
- GCF (2022b, December 11). *Key features*. Green Climate Fund.
<https://www.greenclimate.fund/about#key-features>
- Halperin, S., & Heath, O. (2017). *Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hollington, A., Salverda, T., Schwarz, T., & Tappe, O. (2015). *Concepts of the Global South*. Cologne, Germany: Global South Studies Center Cologne.
- IPCC (2021). *Mitigation of Climate Change*. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
- Klinsky, S. (2019). Beyond the academy: reflecting on public scholarship about climate justice. In T. Jafry (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice* (pp. 467-478). Oxon: Routledge.
- Kuyper, J.W., Linnér, B., & Schroeder, H. (2018). Non-state actors in hybrid global climate governance: justice, legitimacy, and effectiveness in a post-Paris era. *Climate change*, 9(1), 1-18.
- Martinez-Alier, J. (2015). Climate Justice: Review Essay. *Development and change*, 46(2), 381-386.
- Murphy, S.P. (2019). Global political processes and the Paris Agreement. In T. Jafry (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice* (pp. 71-82). Oxon: Routledge.
- Nasiritousi, N., Hjerpe, M., & Bäckstrand, K. (2016). Normative arguments for non-state actor

- participation in international policymaking processes: Functionalism, neocorporatism or democratic pluralism? *European Journal of International Relations*, 22(4), 920-943.
- Nhamo, G., & Nhamo, S. (2016). Paris (COP21) Agreement: loss and damage, adaptation and climate finance issues. *International journal of African renaissance studies*, 11(2), 118-138.
- Peters, B.G. (2015). *Advanced Introduction to Public Policy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Pittel, K., & Rübhelke, D. (2013). International Climate Finance and Its Influence on Fairness and Policy. *World economy*, 36(4), 419-436.
- Schlosberg, D., & Collins, L.B. (2014). From environmental to climate justice: climate change and the discourse of environmental justice. *Climate change*, 5(3), 359-374.
- Stern, N. (2007). *The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Streck, C. (2021). Strengthening the Paris Agreement by Holding Non-State Actors Accountable: Establishing Normative Links between Transnational Partnerships and Treaty Implementation. *Transnational environmental law*, 10(3), 493-515.
- Tokar, B. (2014). *Toward Climate Justice: Perspectives on the Climate Crisis and Social Change*. Porsgrunn, Norway: New Compass.
- Tokar, B. (2019). On the evolution and continuing development of the climate justice movement. In T. Jafry (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice* (pp. 13-25). Oxon: Routledge.
- UN (2019, May 31). Climate justice. *United Nations*.
<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/climate-justice/>
- UN (2022, December 11). What is Climate Change? *United Nations*.
<https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/what-is-climate-change>
- Van Asselt, H. (2016). The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance under the Paris Agreement. *Climate law*, 6(1-2), 91-108.
- Willetts, P. (2006). The Cardoso Report on the UN and civil society: Functionalism, global corporatism, or global democracy? *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 12(3), 305-324.
- ZOA (2012). *Klimaatverandering, van schaarste tot conflict*. Apeldoorn, Netherlands: ZOA.

Appendix: Overview of primary data

In-text reference	Document type	Case	Title and result area
C1D1	Funding Proposal	Peru	Building the Resilience of Wetlands in the Province of Datem del Marañón (Forests and land use)
C1D2	Annual Performance Report 2017		
C1D3	Annual Performance Report 2018		
C1D4	Annual Performance Report 2019		
C1D5	Annual Performance Report 2020		
C1D6	Annual Performance Report 2021		
C2D1	Funding Proposal	Malawi	Scaling up the use of Modernized Climate information and Early Warning Systems (Livelihoods of people and communities)
C2D2	Annual Performance Report 2017		
C2D3	Annual Performance Report 2018		
C2D4	Annual Performance Report 2019		
C2D5	Annual Performance Report 2020		
C3D1	Funding Proposal	Bangladesh	Climate Resilient Infrastructure Mainstreaming (Infrastructure and built environment)
C3D2	Annual Performance Report 2019		
C3D3	Annual Performance Report 2020		
C4D1	Funding Proposal	Paraguay	Promoting private sector investments in energy efficiency in the industrial sector (Buildings, cities, industries, and appliances)
C4D2	Annual Performance Report 2019		
C4D3	Annual Performance Report 2020		