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## Climate perceptions in NATO: National or human security concern?

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# Climate perceptions in NATO: National or human security concern?

Bachelor Project: Foreign and Security Policies in International Organisations

International Relations and Organisations

Institute of Political Science

Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences



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## **List of abbreviations**

|        |   |
|--------|---|
| AU     | African Union   |
| ASEAN  | Association of East Asian Nations                     |
| CS     | Copenhagen School                                     |
| EU     | European Union  |
| IGO    | Intergovernmental Organization                        |
| IO     | International Organization                            |
| IPCC   | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change             |
| NATO   | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                    |
| OSCE   | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  |
| PS     | Paris School  |
| UN     | United Nations  |
| UNEP   | United Nations Environmental Programme                |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| UNGA   | United Nations General Assembly                       |
| UNHCR  | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees         |
| UNSC   | United Nations Security Council                       |

## Introduction

Heatwaves, water shortages, cities under water, and the extinction of thousands of animal and plant species. These are some of the dire consequences mentioned by UN Secretary-General António Guterres as a response to the latest findings of the IPCC (United Nations, 2022a). These findings indicate that global warming is expected to reach more than double the target of 1.5 degrees Celsius that was set in the Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2022b). “We are on a fast track to climate disaster” as the Secretary-General puts it (United Nations, 2022a).

The Secretary General’s frame of global warming having a catastrophic effect on life on earth is part of a trend in which both political actors and analysts increasingly frame climate change as a security threat (McDonald, 2013, p. 42). This is in accordance with the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory which implies that non-traditional security issues like climate change can become securitized through the use of securitizing language (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-24).

The ways in which climate change has been framed as a security threat has, however, also increased (McDonald, 2013, p. 42). These frames can range from climate change being framed as a national to a human or even ecological security threat (McDonald, 2013, pp. 44-49). Previous research indicates that IOs such as the UNDP and UNEP foremost perceive climate change as a human security issue (Elliot, 2015, pp. 12-14). This is unsurprising as these IOs are, relatively speaking, more human-oriented instead of state-oriented (Brauch, 2008, pp. 21-22).

Following this line of thought, a highly state-oriented IGO such as the UNSC would then be expected to perceive climate change as a national security threat. Yet, Detraz and Betsill’s (2009, p. 311) discourse analysis indicates that the UNSC also perceives climate change primarily as a human security issue. This is especially noteworthy as the national security communities of the UNSC’s member states are typically referred to as rather conservative and heavily focused on military threats (Detraz & Betsill, 2009, p. 314). The debates in the UNSC would, therefore, be expected to frame non-traditional threats such as climate change as a national instead of a human security threat (*idem*).

Another state-centric intergovernmental organization that consists of the relatively conservative security communities of member states is NATO. In contrast to the UNSC, the existing academic literature has not thoroughly discussed and analyzed how NATO frames climate change as a non-traditional security threat. This is surprising because NATO, as the most powerful

military alliance in the world, has increasingly incorporated climate change into its security agenda since the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept (Causevic, 2017, p. 72). This is relevant as the consequences of global warming such as rising temperatures, rising sea levels, and more extreme weather events can have far-reaching implications on NATO's ability and responsibility to provide security for its member states (Causevic, 2017, p. 60; NASA, n.d.). This thesis, therefore, tries to fill this gap by providing more insights into how NATO perceives climate change as a non-traditional security threat by asking the following research question: How did NATO discourse frame the relationship between climate change and security in 2010-2022?

This thesis is divided into five sections. The first section dives into previous research and identifies a gap in the academic literature. The theoretical background in the second section identifies the relevant theories to this thesis. Additionally, the third section discusses the methodological background of this thesis consisting of case selection, data analysis, and data collection. The analysis with the main findings is discussed in the fourth section. The discussion in the fifth section considers whether the hypotheses have tested positive or negative and embeds the findings into the wider academic debates. Last, the sixth section wraps up the main findings and makes suggestions for future research.

## **1. Literature Review**

The relatively small field of research that is devoted to providing more insights into how intergovernmental organizations have framed the relationship between climate change and security could be categorized into two branches. The first branch of the academic work that analyzes this relationship systematically conducts research via content and discourse analyses. The other branch of academic work does not systematically analyze but discusses this relationship in different settings.

A publication within the first branch of academic work is Detraz and Betsill's (2009, pp. 303-304) paper in which a discourse analysis was conducted on how the UNSC framed the relationship between climate change and security in its first ever debate on climate change in 2007. The primary objective of this discourse analysis is to uncover whether this UNSC debate constituted a discursive shift from the environmental security discourse towards the environmental conflict discourses (*idem*). The difference between these discourses being that the former focuses

primarily on human security while the latter focuses more on national security concerns. The authors conclude that the environmental security remained the most dominant discourse within the UNSC and that a discursive shift towards the environmental conflict discourse had not happened yet.

Another publication which is relatively similar in some respects to Detraz and Betsill's paper is the discourse analysis by Kurtz (2012). This discourse analysis researches how the UNSC and the UNGA frame climate change as a security threat and whether the organizations have securitized climate change (Kurtz, 2012, p. 669). For the UNSC, the author analyzes the 2007 debate on climate security initiated by the British delegacy (Kurtz, 2012, p. 674). A draft resolution on addressing climate change introduced by the Small Island Developing States is analyzed for the UNGA (Kurtz, 2012, p. 676). Overall, Kurtz (2012, pp. 680-681) identifies that the UNSC debate tried to include the possibility of increased climate change induced violence and conflict in the future, while the by the Small Island Developing States dominated UNGA debate stressed the human security aspects of climate change. Unlike Detraz and Betsill's paper, Kurtz (2012, pp. 680-681) does not specify whether the UNSC's focus on environmental conflict represents a discursive shift.

Moreover, Gersl and Helmke (2012, pp. 138-140) analyzed ASEAN's view of climate change through a discourse analysis of several declarations, resolutions, and agreements originating from the political leaders of the member states. The authors find that member states of ASEAN were skeptical of climate change as a security threat for a relatively long period of time (Gersl & Helmke, 2012, p. 138). However, since 2005 ASEAN has made some progress in recognizing as a potential security threat for, among others, regime stability (*idem*). Regime stability is threatened by climate change as global warming has the potential to negatively impact economic stability which, in turn, undermines much needed output legitimacy (*idem*). In general, the organization fails in adequately fostering cooperative efforts among its member states for tackling climate change as it locates the primary responsibility for tackling climate change with its member states (*idem*). Last, the authors conclude that ASEAN predominantly frames climate change as a depoliticized human security issue which, in accordance with the so called 'the ASEAN Way', is used for regime legitimacy (Gertsal & Helmke, 2012, pp. 151-152).

Overall, the available academic literature that systematically analyzes how IGOs frame the relationship between climate change and security is rather limited. There are several studies

devoted to analyzing how the UNSC and the UNGA frame the relationship between climate change and security. The academic literature on how non-Western, with the notable exception of ASEAN, or traditionally military organizations have framed climate change as a security threat is scarce. This is interesting as these IGOs typically have not fully incorporated climate change in their 'modus operandi'.

Instead of systematically analyzing through content or discourse analyses, the second branch of academic literature discusses how IGOs frame the relationship between security and climate change. One of the publications that discusses this relationship is Floyd's (2015, p. 121) article on climate security discourses. Floyd (2015, pp. 132-133) discusses how several influential actors involved in security governance perceive climate change as a security threat. One influential actor that is discussed is the EU. For almost two decades climate change has (in)directly been on the EU's security agenda mostly due to advocacy efforts by an epistemic community centered around climate security (Bremberg et al., 2018, p. 624; Zwolski & Kauners, 2011, pp. 37-38). Floyd (2015, pp. 132-133) identifies that the EU's discourse on climate security is to a large extent focused on traditional security concerns including, but not limited to, climate induced conflict. In addition, the EU perceives climate change as a threat to its territorial integrity and as a threat multiplier.

Another actor in security governance that is discussed in Floyd's (2015, pp. 131-132) article on climate security discourses is the OSCE. Climate change has been on the OSCE's security agenda since the Maastricht Treaty in 2003 (Floyd, 2015, p. 131). The OSCE primarily views climate change as a potential driver of conflict and instability in the OSCE region (idem). Unsurprisingly, as the OSCE is an organization that centers around the prevention of conflict and crisis management, it strongly focuses on the preventative strategies as a response to climate change (idem). Last, Floyd (2015, p. 131) argues that the OSCE has little enforcement mechanisms and, therefore, heavily relies on the political will of the OSCE's member states.

Moreover, Causevic (2017, pp. 72-79) discusses how NATO perceives climate change as a non-traditional security threat based on the organization's engagement, policy frameworks, and operations associated with tackling climate change. The author mentions that NATO has been concerned with climate change since the late 1960s (idem). The incorporation of climate change as a security issue, however, only commenced with the development of the Strategic Concept of the Defense and Security of the Members of NATO in 2010 (idem). Currently, the threat of climate

change does not fit well into NATO's *modus operandi* compared to other security threats, and NATO locates the primary responsibility for combatting climate change with its member states (*idem*). In general, NATO perceives climate change mostly as a non-traditional security threat multiplier that could challenge its operations and ability to provide international security (*idem*).

Overall, the available academic literature that describes how IGOs frame the relationship between climate change and security is comparatively more extensive than the literature that uses systematic research methods. Additionally, there is more academic work available that discusses how traditionally military IGOs perceive climate change as a security threat in the second rather than the first branch of academic literature. As mentioned earlier, systematically researching the perceptions on climate security of traditionally military IGOs is relevant as climate change fits comparatively worse in their '*modus operandi*' than, for example, the UNGA (Causevic, 2017, pp. 72-79). Non-Western IGOs such as the African Union and ASEAN remain skeptical of climate change and frequently do not even mention climate change as a potential security issue in their security strategies (Floyd, 2015, p. 135).

In contrast, NATO, as a military organization, has recognized climate change as a security threat and incorporated this in its security agenda. Although there is academic literature available that describes how NATO perceives climate change as a security threat, NATO discourse has not been systematically analyzed through research methods such as content or discourse analysis. This is relevant as (1) climate change does not fit well in NATO's '*modus operandi*', (2) global warming is prospected to increase which can have serious implications of NATO's ability to provide security, and (3) NATO relevance as a major player on the global stage has arguably increased over the last couple of years (Causevic, 2017, pp. 72-79; Meaney, 2022; BBC, 2021). This thesis tries to fill this gap by systematically analyzing how NATO frames climate change as a security threat with the following research question: How did the NATO discourse frame the relationship between climate change and security in 2010-2022?

## **2. Theoretical Background**

### **2.1 Securitization Theory**

As the research question is premised on the notion that non-traditional security issues, e.g. climate change, can be securitized, this section will outline two competing theories of

securitization: the Copenhagen School and the Paris School of securitization. Originally developed by Buzan and Weaver, the CS's securitization theory is a constructivist framework of analysis for differentiating the process of securitization from the process of politicization (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 7).

The CS asserts that securitization is a form of extreme politicization in which an issue is presented as threatening to a referent object (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-36). In case of securitization, the referent object, usually the state, is existentially threatened by this issue (idem). The referent object therefore tries to seek legitimacy by a target audience to take extraordinary measures outside the realm of 'normal' politics (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-24; Kurtz, 2012, p. 670). The CS is a constructivist framework as it asserts that this attempt at securitizing an existential issue, i.e. the securitization move, happens through securitizing language that recalls a traditional understanding of security (idem). The usage of this type of securitizing language is also called the speech act (idem). Important to mention, however, is that the securitization move only achieves full securitization when the public accepts it as such (idem). In other words, a substantial part of the public must resonate with the securitization move for it to become legitimate (idem).

Whether an issue is securitized or accepted as a securitizing move is according to the CS's securitization theory foremost a political decision (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29). In addition, the legitimized measures outside the realm of normal politics, due to a successful securitization, for combatting an existential threat can have problematic consequences, i.e. it legitimizes overriding binding rules, undermines democratic decision-making processes, and triggers governance by decrees (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26; Trombetta, 2008, p. 588).

Another approach to securitization and one that challenges the CS's securitization theory is the sociological approach, i.e. the Paris School (Trombetta, 2014, p. 137). The PS challenges the CS by moving away from the CS's narrow focus on speech acts and the almost automatic reaction of dealing with threats outside the realm of normal politics (idem). Instead, the PS asserts that the everyday acts of actors that are involved in implementing policies contribute to the securitization of issues by categorizing these issues into a specific domain of security (idem). Examples of these everyday acts that can lead to securitization are the collection of information and the categorization of people.

In other words, there are three relevant aspects for determining whether securitization occurs according to the Paris School (idem). First, securitization occurs when the governance of a

certain issue is associated and categorized with the traditional security field and security experts (idem). Second, securitization depends on technical and professional skill of experts as they identify certain practices and measures that govern a certain issue which, in turn, reinforces a specific judgement of an issue as a security issue (Trombetta, 2014, p 138). Third, different degrees of institutionalization of the governance of a certain issue affect the speech acts and, thus, the securitization of certain issues (idem). When the governance of a certain issue is highly institutionalized, the process of securitization of that issue is more obscure (idem).

Although the critique of the PS on the CS's narrow focus on speech acts is well-founded, this thesis builds on the CS's securitization theory for three reasons. First, as the research question concentrates on how NATO frames the relationship between climate change and security, CS's explicit focus on speech acts for securitization builds a relatively strong foundation for analyzing NATO's frame on this relationship. Second, the CS's securitization theory has been highly prominent in academic and political debates and specifically discusses environmental problems (Trombetta, 2008, p. 588). Third, the PS has been heavily criticized by, among others, Floyd (2006, p. 23) for the School's association with the misleading and unscientific ideas and concepts of Michel Foucault.

## **2.2 Discourses of Climate Security**

According to the CS's securitization theory, there exists several ways in which the securitizing actors can security issues that existentially threaten the referent object, e.g. climate change threatening the territorial integrity of the state (Kurtz, 2012, pp. 673-674). These are different discourse coalitions that conceive the relationship between security and its relations to climate change differently. There exists wide discrepancy among scholars on what the main discourse coalitions regarding climate change are (Kurtz, 2012, pp. 673-674; McDonald, 2013, pp. 44-49). Two discourse coalitions, however, have been frequently used by scholars to distinguish the ways in which the securitizing actors securitize climate change as an existential threat, i.e. the national security and the human security discourse (McDonald, 2013, p. 44). This section outlines these discourses and provides conceptualizations for the concepts of national and human security.

The national security discourse depicts climate change as an issue that could pose a security risk to the nation-state (McDonald, 2013, p. 44). It centers around how climate change could threaten the sovereignty and national integrity of the nation-state by emphasizing how

environmental and resource pressures, as a consequence of climate change, enhances the risk of political instability, destabilizing mass migration, and conflict over resources (idem). The national security discourse aims attention at adaption rather than mitigation strategies to deal with climate change as it encourages the defense departments of states to become more aware of the possibility of climate-induced conflict, and to establish new strategies to secure the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state (idem). This is in line with the discourse's primary focus on the role of the military in providing security against threat of climate change (Floyd, 2015, p. 124).

This thesis conceptualizes national security as “the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state as well as its core political and cultural values, against military threats from without disruptive elements from within” (Chandra & Bhonsle, 2015, p. 337). This conceptualization of national security is characterized by its narrow view of security and is frequently used in the academic literature by realist scholars. This conceptualization is useful for this study as both realism and the national security discourse emphasize the insecurity of states as the foremost problem in international relations (Walt, 2010, p. 1).

In contrast, the human security discourse mainly focuses on how climate change has implications for overall human-wellbeing (Detraz & Betsill, 2009, p. 306; McDonald, 2013, pp. 45-47). The human security discourse originates from two criticisms of the state-centric national security discourse (McDonald, 2013, pp. 45-47). First, states are unreliable in providing security for their citizens and sometimes deliberately undermine the wellbeing of their citizens (idem). Second, the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity are no longer focal points for contemporary security challenges (idem).

In addition, the human security discourse centers around the dangers of environmental degradation caused by climate change on human wellbeing (Floyd, 2015, pp. 124-125). Examples of these dangers are food insecurity, water insecurity, and decline of health (Floyd, 2015, pp. 124-125). Although there are many different conceptualizations of human security, this thesis chooses to conceptualize human security as “first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (Floyd, 2008, p. 57). Compared to other definitions, this conceptualization is relatively concise which is needed to ensure that the conceptualizations of human and national security are not overlapping.

Based on the brief discussion of securitization theory and of the two discourses outlined above, we can establish two distinct hypotheses. As this thesis focuses on IGO discourse, it should be mentioned that the national security discourse focuses on the ‘national’ security of the IGO instead of the nation-state.

H1: IGO discourse frames the relationship between security and climate change as a security threat that negatively affects national security.

H2: IGO discourse frames the relationship between security and climate change as a security threat that negatively affects human security.

### **3. Methodological Background**

#### **3.1 Case Selection**

To answer the research question, this thesis will be using a single-N study design. In other words, this thesis will be a (single) case study with NATO as its only case. Case studies are widely used in political science to research an extensive range of political phenomena, and the main advantage of using this design for political research is that, in comparison to other methods of political research, it allows for a thorough examination of a single case (Halperin & Heath, 2020, pp. 231-240). According to Halperin and Heath (2020, pp. 234-237), successful case studies possess two characteristics, i.e. (1) case studies should shed light on something substantial about the case that is being studied (internal validity), and (2) case studies should engage with the wider academic debates (external validity).

At the same time, however, the single-N study design has also been criticized. Scholars that criticize the use of case studies frequently mention disorganization and the lack of systemic procedures on the part of the investigator while conducting research (Yin, 2013, pp. 51-54). Another common argument among scholars is the limited scientific generalizability and, therefore, the weak external validity of case studies (idem). The last argument can, however, be refuted as the goal of case studies is analytical generalization rather than statistical generalization, i.e. case studies are primarily concerned with expanding and generalizing theories rather than enumerating frequencies (idem). While recognizing these criticisms, this thesis uses a single-N study design

because overall the advantages using this design outweigh the disadvantages and as it provides an opportunity to study NATO in depth (Halperin & Heath, 2020, pp. 231-234).

Additionally, this thesis attempts to fulfill Halperin and Heath's (2020, pp. 234-237) requirements of a successful case study by using NATO as its only case. This study sheds light on how NATO frames the relationship between climate change and security which is relevant as (1) previous literature has not systematically analyzed NATO's discourse on climate security, (2) climate change undermines NATO's ability to provide security to its member states, and (3) NATO's relevance as a security provider has increased over the last couple of years, exemplified by Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Causevic, 2017, pp. 72-79; Meaney, 2022; BBC, 2021).

Moreover, researching NATO's discourse on the relationship between security and climate change does not only contribute to the academic literature, it is also relevant for gaining new insights into how other security organizations and IGOs frame this relationship. This research tries to contribute to the wider academic debates which, in turn, contributes to the external validity of this case study.

### **3.2 Data Analysis**

To research how NATO frames the relationship between climate change and security this case study makes use of a qualitative content analysis. A content analysis is a form of textual analysis that systematically analyzes textual information through an unobtrusive means of data collection (Halperin & Heath, 2020, pp. 373-377). There are a number of advantages and disadvantages of using a content analysis for research. Some frequently mentioned disadvantages of conducting a content analysis are that it is extremely time-consuming, difficult to computerize, and prone to personal error the higher the degree of personal interpretation (Columbia Public Health, n.d.). At the same time, however, scholars frequently praise a content analysis as it allows for a systematic qualitative or quantitative analysis of communication which, if done right, is widely considered a relatively precise method of conducting research (*idem*). This case study uses a content analysis because it is widely considered to be a systematic and scientifically rigorous approach of conducting research (*idem*). Additionally, this approach allows for examining communication via texts which is necessary for answering the research question. This case study makes use of a qualitative content analysis rather than a quantitative content analysis as the frames of NATO texts on climate security are not always easily observable as the topic of climate change

does not traditionally fit well into NATO's modus operandi (Halperin & Heath, 2020, pp. 373-377; Causevic, 2017, pp. 72-79).

Moreover, the recording unit this analysis uses is a theme. Halperin and Heath (2020, p. 378) state that "The boundary of a theme delineates a single idea. This might be the recording unit in research on propaganda, values, or attitudes and beliefs." As this research is concerned with the ways in which NATO frames the relationship between climate change and security, the recording unit of a theme is more applicable in this research than a sentence or a single word.

In addition, the coding framework that is used for the qualitative content analysis consists of two categories, i.e. human security, and national security. These categories are based on the hypotheses of this research. In turn, there are five subcategories that fall under the human security category, i.e. (1) livelihood, (2) food security, (3) health, (4) human lives, and (5) water security. These subcategories are concept-driven and based on the findings of the discourse analysis on climate perceptions in the UNSC (Detraz & Betsill, 2009, pp. 311-312). Detraz and Betsill's (2009, pp. 311) discourse analysis of the 2007 UNSC debate on climate security revealed that most speakers in this debate established a link between these five categories and climate change. This analysis, therefore, includes these five subcategories in the coding framework.

The four subcategories that fall under the national security category are (1) armed conflict, (2) military readiness, (3) migration, and (4) instability. These subcategories are also concept-driven and based on the McDonald's (2013, pp. 45-46) and Floyd's (2015, p. 124) discussion of the national security discourse. McDonald's (2013, p. 45) discussion identifies that mass migration flows could destabilize and threaten the national security of the state. Similarly, it identifies that climate change could increase the risk of (resource) conflict which, in turn, negatively affects national security. McDonald (2013, p. 45) also mentions that climate change could undermine national security by increasing instability in already fragile states. Moreover, Floyd (2015, p. 124) discussion identifies that climate change could undermine military readiness which, in turn, threatens national security.

Last, the coding framework in the annex specifies when a segment of text falls under one of the nine subcategories.

### **3.3 Data Collection**

The type of data this case study analyzes is primary data consisting of NATO speeches and official texts in which a segment of the text specifically mentions climate change in relation to security. The main advantage of using primary data in this context is that it gives a more accurate view of how NATO frames the relationship between climate change and security (Heath & Halperin, 2020, p. 275). Moreover, the data will be collected through internet searches via NATO's official E-Library and Google Advanced Search. This is necessary as there is not enough data available that links climate change with security within NATO's E-Library only.

Last, the gathering of data for this analysis is based on the period that NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept was in place. The Strategic Concept is an important document that generally is updated every ten years (NATO, n.d.). It outlines the security environment NATO is operating in, NATO's purpose and nature, NATO's fundamental security tasks, and the security challenges NATO is facing (*idem*). By focusing only on the period in which the 2010 Strategic Concept is in place, this study tries to produce a more accurate picture of how NATO discourse frames the relationship between climate change and security. The 2010 Strategic Concept was adopted in November 2010, and it is still in place at the time of writing (NATO, 2010). Therefore, to incorporate the 2010 Strategic Concept the fullest, this study gathers data from November 2010 till March 2022.

## **4. Analysis**

For this analysis twenty-nine NATO documents consisting of speeches and official texts that link climate change to security have been analyzed to uncover how NATO discourse frames the relationship between climate change and security. In these documents, there are 58 segments of text that framed climate change as negatively affecting or threatening the national security. In contrast, there are 27 segments of text that framed climate change as negatively affecting or threatening human security. However, focusing on these numbers only does not give an accurate account of how NATO discourse frames climate security as this analysis is concerned with latent content, and as the segments of text differ in length. This makes comparison more difficult and, therefore, a deeper discussion of the main findings is needed.

As mentioned before, for the purpose of this analysis data was gathered from November 2010 till March 2022. There are, however, more documents that linked climate change and security closer to the end of this timeframe. In comparison, 25 documents that linked climate change and security were analyzed from 2018-2022, and only 4 were analyzed that linked climate change and security from 2010-2017.

When looking at the main results of this analysis, it becomes apparent that, relatively speaking, more segments of text frame the relationship between climate change and security in a way that falls under national security than human security. As said earlier, only 25 segments of text framed climate change as threatening human security compared to 58 segments of text that framed climate change as threatening national security. Moreover, the segments that frame climate change as negatively affecting national security tend to be relatively long with sometimes even a couple of paragraphs that fall under a subcategory of the national security category. For example, the following segment consists of multiple sentences and falls under the subcategory ‘Military Readiness’: “Windier, wetter and wilder weather matters for everything our armed forces do. So this will impact our exercises, our capabilities and we are integrating this into our military planning and our capability development. So climate change matters for NATO because it matters for our security, and NATO is now addressing these challenges” (NATO, 2021n, p. 1). In comparison, the segments that frame climate change as threatening human security are generally relatively short. These segments sometimes consist only of a couple of words or a part of a sentence. A typical example of a segment that addresses a subcategory of ‘Human Security’ is: “the consequences of climate change include ... health effects on northern populations” (NATO, 2021a, p. 19).

Most of the segments of text that fall under ‘National Security’ frame the relationship between climate change and security as increasing conflict, increasing migration, and undermining military readiness. The frame that climate change increases state instability and state fragility is less used. In addition, out of the four subcategories that fall under ‘National Security’, most segments of text frame climate change as having the potential to negatively impact the military’s readiness and ability to provide security. These segments tend to be longer than the segments of text that fall under the other subcategories. Typical examples of segments of text that link climate change as undermining the military’s readiness are:

“Climate change makes it harder for militaries to carry out their tasks. Greater temperature extremes, sea level rise, rapid changes in precipitation patterns, and an increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events test the resilience of our military installations and critical infrastructure, impair the effectiveness of our capabilities, and may create harsher conditions for our military operations and missions” (NATO, 2021m, p. 1).

“Climate change also makes it harder for NATO troops to keep people safe. Our soldiers work in some of the most difficult environments on earth. For example, NATO’s training mission in Iraq where, this summer, temperatures regularly exceeded 50 degrees. Imagine being in that heat, let alone coming under fire while wearing full combat gear” (NATO, 2020b, p. 2).

Moreover, several segments of text link climate change as fueling or causing an increase of (armed) conflict. These segments frequently link climate change with resource scarcities which, in turn, lead to an increase of armed conflict over natural resources. An example of a segment that captures this relationship between climate change, resource scarcities, and armed conflict is:

“A lot of the conflicts and fight over resources, water, food, arable land is, more or less, directly linked to climate change, global warming and it will be more so in the future” (NATO, 2021f).

And another:

“More extreme weather, global warming, rising sea levels ... will increase competition about scarce resources like water, land and all of that will exacerbate crisis, conflict” (NATO, 2021j, p. 10).

Although the segments of text that link climate change as fueling conflict tend to be focused on resource scarcities, there are some instances in which climate-induced migration is framed as fueling conflict. For example:

“climate change can fuel conflict, can force many people to move and that can create conflicts” (NATO, 2019a).

This segment portrays how national security might be threatened by mass migration flows. Although this segment falls under the ‘Conflict’ subcategory due to its emphasis on conflict, it is closely related to the ‘Migration’ subcategory. Similar to ‘Conflict’ and ‘Military Readiness’, there are relatively a large number of segments of text that fall under the ‘Migration’ subcategory. These segments often do not directly mention how migration affects national security, and they tend to be relatively small compared to the ‘Conflict’ and ‘Military Readiness’ segments. Some examples of these segments:

“It [climate change] may force people to move, so of course there are security consequences of climate change” (NATO, 2019c).

“And we have to expect ... more migration caused by climate change” (NATO, 2021f).

“climate change is important for our security, meaning that climate change will most likely lead to that people will start to move” (NATO, 2018a).

As mentioned earlier, compared to the other subcategories that fall under ‘National Security’, there are less segments of text that explicitly link climate change as increasing state instability and fragility. One segment of text that captures how climate change might increase NATO instability and fragility is:

“It [climate change] also shapes the geopolitical environment, leading to instability and geostrategic competition and creating conditions that can be exploited by state and non-state actors that threaten or challenge the Alliance. Increasing surface temperatures, thawing permafrost, desertification, loss of sea ice and glaciers, and the opening up of shipping lanes may cause volatility in the security environment. As such, the High North is one of the epicenters of climate change” (NATO, 2021o).

The other category ‘Human Security’ consists of five subcategories, i.e. ‘Livelihood’, ‘Food Security’, ‘Human Health’, ‘Human Lives’, and ‘Water Security’. Out of these five subcategories, most segments that fall under ‘Human Security’ frame climate change as threatening food and water security, followed by segments that frame climate change as

threatening livelihood, human lives, and human health. Segments of text that link climate change as threatening food security tend to frame climate change as adding additional pressure on food production. Some examples of these segments are:

“Drought, floods and other extremes of weather are making life increasingly more difficult for people around the world. ... [they are] adding pressure on natural resource like food” (NATO, 2020c).

“changes in climate around the world could ass further pressure to food production” (NATO, 2011).

“As the planet heats up, our weather becomes wilder, warmer, windier and wetter, putting communities under pressure as sources of food ... are threatened” (NATO, 2020b).

Similar to ‘Food Security’, there are, compared to the other ‘Human Security’ subcategories, a large number of segments of text that link climate change as negatively affecting water security. These segments tend to focus on how climate change contributes to water scarcity and additional pressure on water resources. Some examples of segments that frame climate change as negatively affecting water security are:

“Climate change causes complications for fresh water management and water scarcity” (NATO, 2021o).

“Drought, floods and other extremes of weather are making life increasingly difficult for people around the world. ... [they are] adding pressure on natural resources like ... water” (NATO, 2020c).

“As the planet heats up, our weather becomes wilder, warmer, windier and wetter, putting communities under pressure as sources of ... fresh water ... are threatened” (NATO, 2020b).

In addition, there are some segments of text that link climate change as having a negative impact on the livelihoods of people and/or communities. These segments tend not to elaborate on how the livelihoods of people and/or communities is affected by climate change.

“These [drought, soil erosion and marine environmental degradation] can lead to loss of ... livelihood” (NATO, 2021m).

“Rising sea levels, warmer weather, more extreme weather, more flooding, more wildfires, will directly affect the livelihood of people all over the world” (NATO, 2021c).

As mentioned earlier, there are less segments of text that frame climate change as threatening human health or lives compared to the other subcategories that fall under ‘Human Security’. While segments that fall within the ‘Human Lives’ subcategory do not directly assert that human lives will be lost as a consequence of climate change in the future, the segments do state that the consequences of climate change will severely affect human lives. Two examples of segments of text that fall under the ‘Human Lives’ subcategory are:

“Floods and forest fires, droughts ... devastate communities” (NATO, 2021k).

“When that [glaciers] melts, it will contribute to rising sea levels with enormous consequences ... but also for millions of people all over the world living close to the sea where our armed forces are increasingly called upon to rescue people from floods or wild fires” (NATO, 2022c).

Moreover, some examples of segments of text that link climate change as negatively human health are:

“As permafrost recedes, contagious diseases, including anthrax and bubonic plague, will also pose problems for inhabited areas” (NATO, 2021a).

“The consequences of Arctic climate change include ... health effects on norther populations” (NATO, 2021a).

In summary, twenty-nine documents have been analyzed to uncover how NATO discourse frames the relationship between climate change and security. The first main finding of this analysis is that the segments of text link climate change more with national security rather than human security concerns. In the analyzed documents there are 58 segments of text that frame climate change as negatively affecting national security. In comparison, there are 27 segments of text that frame climate change as negatively affecting human security.

In addition, for this analysis official NATO texts and speeches that link climate change and security were gathered from November 2010 till March 2022. There are, however, more official texts and speeches that link climate change and security available closer to the end of this timeframe.

Moreover, the segments of text that link climate change with national security mostly frame climate change as threatening military readiness and operations, increasing migration, and increasing conflict. In contrast, the subcategory ‘Instability’ is relatively less used in these segments. The segments of text that frame climate change as having implications on human security mostly frame climate change as negatively affecting water security, food security and human livelihood. In comparison, there are only a few segments that frame climate change as negatively affecting human lives and health.

## **5. Discussion**

The purpose of this study was to uncover how NATO discourse framed the relationship between climate change and security in 2010-2022. To answer the research question, this thesis conducted a qualitative content analysis on NATO speeches and texts. The results of this analysis indicate that NATO discourse predominantly frames climate change as negatively affecting national security. In addition, the segments of text that frame climate change as negatively affecting national security mostly frame climate change as threatening military readiness and operations, increasing migration, and increasing conflict. In contrast, the segments of text that link climate change as negatively affecting human security predominantly frame climate change as negatively affecting water security, food security, and human livelihood.

Overall, the main findings of the analysis are more in line with the first than the second hypothesis. The results of the analysis substantiate this claim as it revealed that in the NATO documents there are 58 segments of text that frame climate change as negatively affecting national security. In contrast, there are 27 segments of text that frame climate change as negatively affecting human security. Additionally, the segments of text that link climate change with national security concerns tend to be longer and more elaborate than those that link climate change with human security concerns. Nevertheless, as there is also substantial evidence that NATO discourse frames climate change as negatively affecting human security, this thesis only partially confirms the first

hypothesis. Moreover, this thesis does not accept or reject the second hypothesis as there are segments of text in the analyzed documents that link climate change with human security concerns. As previously mentioned, there are, however, fewer segments of text that link climate change with human security concerns than national security concerns.

In addition, considering that the strand of academic research on climate security is relatively small, the findings of this analysis contribute to a clearer understanding of how IGOs, and especially how more military-oriented IGOs, perceive climate change as a security threat. The findings of this analysis also build on previous research by Causevic (2017) and Floyd (2015). These scholars already identified that NATO is primarily concerned about how climate change could increase climate-induced conflict and threaten the Alliance's military readiness (Causevic, 2017, pp. 72-79; Floyd, 2015, pp. 129-130). Moreover, NATO's focus on migration as a security issue is in line with previous research that has pointed NATO's role in legitimizing the war on migrants during the Mediterranean refugee crisis (Garelli, & Tazzioli, 2017, p. 25). Last, the finding that more official texts and speeches were available closer to the end of the timeframe of this analysis might be explained by the change of Secretary-General in 2014. Jens Stoltenberg, a former UN Special Envoy on climate change, then became NATO's new Secretary-General. More research is, however, needed to determine whether this is actually the case.

The major strength of this thesis is that, unlike previous research that addressed NATO perceptions on climate security, it systematically analyzed how NATO discourse frames the relationship between climate change and security through a qualitative content analysis. This contributes to the external validity of this study as the findings are more generalizable to other contexts (Halperin & Heath, 2020, pp. 234-237). In addition, this thesis sheds light on an underdiscussed topic in the academic literature, i.e. climate perceptions of military oriented intergovernmental organizations.

At the same time, however, the validity of this study is also limited by the national security and human security discourse. The human security discourse is relatively broad as it is interested in the negative impacts of climate change for all human beings (Detraz & Betsill, 2009, p. 306). Consequently, the explicit boundaries between the national security and human security can become unclear at times which, in turn, negatively affects the accuracy and validity of this analysis.

## 6. Conclusion

In conclusion, this research aimed to uncover how NATO discourse frames the relationship between climate change and security. Based on a qualitative content analysis of NATO speeches and official texts, it can be concluded that NATO discourse predominantly frames climate change as negatively affecting national security. The results indicate that more segments of text link climate change as negatively affecting national security than human security. In addition, the segments that link climate change as negatively affecting national security predominantly frame climate change as threatening NATO's military readiness, increasing migration, and increasing conflict. These findings reinforce previous research by Floyd and Causevic who also identified that NATO is primarily concerned about how climate change could increase conflict and threaten the Alliance's readiness.

Based on the discussion and the conclusion, this thesis recommends two pathways for future research. First, future research should analyze how the different ways of categorizing and conceptualizing human and national security for content analysis impacts the general findings of studies that analyze climate perceptions of IGOs. This is necessary as there exist many different conceptualizations of these concepts in the academic literature on climate security, and as this would shed light on the possible implications of the results of this study. Second, future research should analyze how the change in Secretary-General in 2014 has influenced NATO's perception of climate change as a security threat. This is necessary to confirm the impression that the change in Secretary-General in 2014 contributed to NATO increasingly perceiving climate change as a security threat.

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**Annex**

**Table 1:**

*Coding framework*

| Category Name  | Subcategory Name | Code | Color | Indicators  | Description   | Examples   |
|----------------|------------------|------|-------|---|---|--|
| Human Security | Livelihood       | L    |       | Livelihood, employment, income, subsistence, substenance, living            | A unit of coding belongs to this subcategory when a segment of text links climate change as negatively affecting the livelihoods of people and/or communities. In this context, livelihood is defined as “means of support or subsistence” indicating the money people need to have to buy necessities, e.g. food, clothing, a place to live (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). | <p>“drought, soil erosion, and marine environmental degradation ... can lead to ... loss of livelihood” (NATO, 2021k, p. 1).</p> <p>“As the world warms, the primary environmental concerns in the Artic include ... risks to the security of ... livelihoods” (NATO, 2021a, p. 19).</p> |
|                | Food Security    | FS   |       | Food security, food, food access, food pressure, famine, hunger, starvation | A unit of coding belongs to this category when a segment of text links climate change as negatively affecting food security. In this context, food security refers to a situation “when all people, at all times, have physical and economical access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food                                | <p>“drought, soil erosion, and marine environmental degradation ... can lead to famine” (NATO, 2021k, p. 1).</p> <p>“changes in climate around the world could have could add to further food pressure” (NATO, 2011, p. 2).</p>  |

|  |                |    |  |   |  |   |
|--|----------------|----|--|---|--|---|
|  |                |    |  |   | preferences for an active and healthy life” (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2006, p. 1).   |   |
|  | Human Health   | H  |  | Health, human health, health effects, health issues, disease, condition, epidemic | A unit of coding belongs to this category when a segment of text links climate change as negatively affecting human health. In this context, human health is defined as “the complete state of physical, social, and mental well-being” (Adegoke & Wright, 2013, pp. 1-2).   | <p>“climate change causes implications for ... health issues” (NATO, 2021o, p. 7).</p> <p>“The consequences of Arctic climate change include ... health effects on northern populations” (NATO, 2021a, p. 19).</p>  |
|  | Human Lives    | HL |  | Human lives, deaths, loss of life   | A unit of coding belongs to this category when a segment of text depicts climate change as having the potential to severely threaten human lives and/or threaten human survival.   | “it [melting glaciers] will contribute to rising sea levels with enormous consequences ... for millions of people all over the world living close to the sea” (NATO, 2022c, p. 6).  |
|  | Water Security | WS |  | Water, fresh water, water access, water security                                  | A unit of coding belongs to this category when a segment of text links climate change as negatively affecting water security. In this context, water security is defined as “the availability of the resource [water] in sufficient quantity and quality to ensure socio-economic development, livelihoods, health, and ecosystems” (World Water Council, n.d.). | <p>“disruption of ecosystems, loss of biodiversity, shifting weather patterns, melting permafrost, and coastal erosion with resultant risks to the security ... of water” (NATO, 2021a, p. 18).</p> <p>“As the planet heats up, our weather becomes wilder, windier, and wetter putting communities under pressures as sources of ... fresh water</p> |

|                   |                    |    |  |   |   |   |
|-------------------|--------------------|----|--|---|---|---|
|                   |                    |    |  |   |   | are threatened” (NATO, 2021h, p. 1).  |
| National Security | Conflict           | C  |  | Conflict, resource conflict, armed conflict, resources, scarce resources  | A unit of coding belongs to this category when a segment of text links climate change as fueling or causing an increase of (armed) conflict over, among others, scarce resources in relation to national security. National security is defined as “the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state as well as its core political and cultural values, against military threats from without disruptive elements from within” (Chandra & Bhonsle, 2015, p. 337).     | <p>“And we have to expect more ... fight, conflict about scarce resources ... caused by climate change” (NATO, 2021g, p. 4).</p> <p>“More extreme weather, global warming, rising sea levels will increase competition about scarce resources like water, land, and all of that will exacerbate crisis, conflict, many places in the world” (2021j, p. 10).</p> |
|                   | Military Readiness | MR |  | Military, military infrastructure, military operations, missions, operate, military readiness, military installations | A unit of coding belongs to this category when a segment of text links climate change as negatively impacting military readiness, military operations, and/or military operations in relation to national security. National security is understood as “the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state as well as its core political and cultural values, against military threats from without disruptive elements from within” (Chandra & Bhonsle, 2015, p. 337). | <p>“we need to understand that climate change will directly impact what we do as military, as a military alliance. Rising sea levels will impact infrastructure all over our territory.” (NATO, 2021g, p. 4).</p> <p>“More extreme weather, warm weather, will impact the way we conduct our missions” (NATO, 2021g, p. 4).</p>                                 |

|  |             |   |  |  |  |   |
|--|-------------|---|--|--|--|---|
|  |             |   |  |  |  | “and more extreme weather will just impact the way we operate in nature” (NATO, 2021g, p. 4).   |
|  | Migration   | M |  | Migration, move, flow of people, movement of people, refugee, flee | A unit of coding belongs to this category when a segment of text links climate change as increasing migration or mass flows of people that threatens national security. National security is defined as “the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state as well as its core political and cultural values, against military threats from without disruptive elements from within” (Chandra & Bhonsle, 2015, p. 337). | “And we have to expect more ... migration caused by climate change” (NATO, 2021g, p. 4).<br><br>“It [climate change] will force people to move” (NATO, 2019c, p. 13).                                   |
|  | Instability | I |  | Instability, volatility  | A unit of coding belongs to this category when a segment of text explicitly links climate change as increasing state instability, and state fragility.   | “Increasing surface temperatures, thawing permafrost, desertification, loss of sea ice and glaciers, and the opening of shipping lanes may cause volatility in the security environment” (NATO, 2021o). |

**Table 2:**

*Frequencies content analysis*

| Code      | L | FS | H | HL | WS | C  | MR | M  | I |
|-----------|---|----|---|----|----|----|----|----|---|
| Frequency | 5 | 8  | 3 | 3  | 8  | 15 | 19 | 17 | 7 |

## Honours College Extension

This thesis investigated how NATO discourse frames the relationship between climate change and security. One of the main findings of this research is that NATO seems to increasingly recognize climate change as a security threat. This is in line with previous research that suggests that IGOs are increasingly relied upon by states to address challenges regarding climate change (Dellmuth et al., 2018, p. 1). After all, the consequences of climate change, e.g. more extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and biodiversity and ecosystem loss, are transnational in nature (Dellmuth et al., 2018, p. 1). Indeed, there is evidence that IGOs increasingly link climate change and security and respond to climate-related challenges. At the same time, however, scholars state that addressing climate change often does not fall within the mandate of IGOs, and that IGOs sometimes even fail to incorporate climate change into their ‘modus operandi’ (Causevic, 2017, p. 79). For example, ASEAN has made some progress in recognizing climate change as a security threat but still locates the primary responsibility of tackling climate change on to its member states (Gersl & Helmke, 2012, pp. 138-139).

Nevertheless, as global warming is set to increase more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, most scholars agree that IGOs will increasingly play a role in climate governance in the future (Tollefson, 2021). To better understand how IGOs will play this role, this literature review aims to uncover previous research on IGO governance and climate security. In this case, the concept of governance refers to “systems of rule that are either embodied within formal institutions or based on intersubjective understandings in informal institutions” (Dellmuth et al., 2018, p. 5).

One area of academic research is centered around how IGOs have addressed and incorporated climate change into their governance approaches. Libertore (2013, p. 83) investigates what it has meant for the EU to incorporate climate change in its governance approaches. The author describes how the increasing securitization of climate change, as exemplified during the 2007 UNSC debate on climate security, has led the EU to become more active in combatting climate change through the introduction of the 20/20 targets (Libertore, 2013, p. 85). The aim of these targets was to reduce emissions by 20% and to increase the percentage of renewable energy of the energy consumption to 20%. Moreover, Libertone (2013, pp. 88-90) states that the EU is a prime example of multilateralism, i.e. the EU policy is geared towards complying to international climate targets and adhering to the climate framework of the United Nations.

Overall, the author argues that the EU is aware of the threat that climate change poses to its security and it has (in)directly already tried to address climate change by various policy initiatives (Libertone, 2013, p. 93).

Other scholars are, however, less confident in the EU's ability to address climate change as a security threat. Schunz and De Jong's (2012, pp. 180-185) research analyzed the coherency of the EU's climate policies before and after the Lisbon Treaty. The authors state that the climate policy outputs were not coherent nor consistent before the Lisbon Treaty (Schunz & De Jong, 2012, pp. 182-183). The main causes of the incoherency and inconsistency are the wide-ranging interests of member states and the differences in approach to foreign policy among member states (idem). Moreover, the hopes that the Lisbon Treaty would make the EU's climate policy more coherent and consistent were ultimately shattered after a conflict between the EU's member states and the Commission over EU external representation on climate related policies (Schunz & De Jong, 2012, pp. 183-184). Overall, Schunz and De Jong (2012, p. 186) argue that the EU has failed to utilize the opportunity to address climate change coherently and consistently in its policy outputs.

Another article tries to shed light on the UNSC's role in climate change governance (Cousins, 2013). Cousins (2013, p. 210) notes that while some states do support the idea of the UNSC playing a more formalized role in climate governance issues, the political will of states to allow the UNSC to play a bigger role in, for example, monitoring security threats related to climate change, does not exist yet. While high emitters from the Global North, e.g. Germany and the United Kingdom, tend to be supportive of the UNSC playing a more formalized role in climate governance, large economies from the Global South, e.g. China and India, tend to be more skeptical (idem). For example, China argued that the UNSC is ill-equipped to tackle climate change which from China's perspective fundamentally is a sustainable development issue (Cousins, 2013, p. 204).

Another organization within the United Nations that is analyzed in the academic literature is the United Nations Development Programme. Hall (2016, p. 118) describes that the UNDP has addressed the issue of climate change through a human security lens since the 1990s. Alongside the World Bank and UNEP, the UNDP was responsible for creating the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) which provided grants to developing nations to address environmental problems such as climate change and biodiversity loss (Hall, 2016, p. 120). Since 2007 the UNDP expanded

its operational mandate and deemed climate change as one of its top priorities. The organization has primarily focused on forging strategies and climate change adaptation plans and securing financing for these plans to be executed in the Global South. Last, Hall (2016, p. 118) argues that the UNDP was able to incorporate climate change as one of the organization's top priorities due to an increase of financing for its operations over the years, and the broad nature of its mandate.

Moreover, in another publication Hall (2015, pp. 83-84) analyzes UNHCR's engagement with the climate change regime. The author describes the UNHCR as an organization primarily concerned with the protection of refugees (Hall, 2015, pp. 85-86). Initially reluctant to participate with debates around climate-induced displacement and migration, the UNHCR eventually started to engage with climate change after António Guterres' speech on the linkages between climate change, migration, and environmental degradation in 2007 (Hall, 2015, p. 87). Still, the UNHCR bureaucracy was reluctant to engage with debates around climate-induced migration as exemplified by the organization's stance against the use of climate change refugee due to it having no legal basis in international refugee law (Hall, 2015, p. 90). Hall describes the UNHCR as a normative organization with supervisory authority over laws and norms and, therefore, argues that the reluctance to engage with climate change stems from the organization's strong focus on its original legal mandate, i.e. the protection of refugees (Hall, 2015, pp. 94-95).

Last, Depledge and Feakin's (2012, p. 73) discuss in their article climate change in relation with the 'managers' of international security, i.e. the UN, EU, and NATO. The authors identify how these institutions have responded to climate change and outline how climate change could have implications for these intergovernmental organizations (*idem*). First, Depledge and Feakin (2012, p. 75) identify that climate change is not going to affect all states evenly and, therefore, the willingness of countries to cooperate in international institutions to combat climate change varies. Second, states and communities that are likely to be severely affected by climate change, e.g. small states in the Pacific, tend not to have a large impact on the agendas of international organizations due to their lack of financial and human capital (Depledge & Feakin, 2012, p. 75). As a consequence, these states are virtually excluded from decision-making procedures that severely affect their security and existence (*idem*).

Depledge and Feakin (2012, pp. 77-78) also note that there are sharp disagreements on the securitization or politicization of climate change among UN member states. This is exemplified by the debate on whether the UNSC mandate should be expanded to tackle climate change security

challenges (idem). Currently, the UN has responded to climate change with facilitating agreements to reduce GHG emissions through the UNFCCC (idem). The authors argue, however, that the UNFCCC process represents the politicization of climate change, the difficulty to reach a consensus among all member states, and the disconnection between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ (idem). In the context of the EU, Depledge and Feakin (2012, p. 79) note that the EU has taken on the role of leader of global change policy by the introduction of its Climate and Energy Package, by stressing the importance of climate mitigation during the UNFCCC negotiations, and by providing capital and technology to states vulnerable to the consequences of climate change. Last, NATO, as a military alliance, is currently not directly involved in talks on climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies. There are, however, calls for NATO to play a more significant role in climate change governance, and NATO acknowledges that climate change has the potential to significantly affect the international security environment, including its military operations (Depledge & Feakin, 2012, p. 80).

The area of research that discusses how IGOs have addressed and incorporated climate change into their governance approaches is relatively elaborate. Although there is much literature available on how the EU and different branches of the UN have addressed and incorporated climate change into their agendas, there seems to be less literature available on how non-Western IGOs have addressed climate change. One reason for this could be that generally non-Western IGOs tend not to successfully securitize climate change as a security threat (Floyd, 2015, pp. 121-122). Nevertheless, as climate change is projected to hit non-Western countries the hardest, more academic research on how non-Western IGOs address and incorporate climate change in their governance approaches is needed and relevant (BBC, 2019).

Another area of research discusses the effectiveness of IGO governance on climate security. Compared to the literature devoted to addressing how IGOs have incorporated climate change into their governance approaches, less academic literature has been devoted to analyzing the effectiveness of IGO governance on climate security. One article that attempts to address IGO effectiveness is McAdam’s article on climate-induced migration. In McAdam’s (2010, pp. 3-4) article the advocacy efforts by multiple actors to make the UNHCR’s governance responses more effective regarding climate-induced displacement is discussed. These actors, consisting of states and NGOs, propose a new international treaty on climate change induced displacement to better protect ‘climate refugees’ (idem). McAdam (2010, p. 26), however, argues that the advocacy for

such a treaty is unsubstantiated as a universal treaty to address climate-induced displacement would have to take the interests of all states into account. The author, instead, argues that bilateral or regional agreements between states to address issues surrounding and underlying climate-induced migration would be more effective (*idem*).

Similar to McAdam's article, Biermann and Boas (2010, p. 75) propose a new institutional framework to protect people that are displaced by climate change more effectively. The authors criticize the current global governance system for climate refugees for not being able to deal with the predicted amount of climate refugees in the future. Next to this, and similar to Hall's article, the authors identify that the UNHCR, as the main agency within the UN that is concerned with the protection of refugees, is limited by it being a normative organization (Biermann & Boas, 2010, pp. 73-74). The UNHCR is limited by the restrictive definition of 'refugee' under the Geneva convention to address possible future climate-induced migration flows (*idem*). Nevertheless, and in line with McAdam's article, Biermann and Boas (2010, pp. 74-75, 83) argue against the enlargement of the legal definition of 'refugee' and instead propose a new legal instrument within the UNFCCC that specifically targets climate refugees.

The studies discussed above show that there is some literature available that shed light on the effectiveness of IGO governance on climate security. Most literature in this branch of research is dedicated to assessing the effectiveness of UN bodies that are concerned with migration, e.g. the UNHCR. However, the effectiveness of climate governance of IGOs outside the UN context is generally underdiscussed. Another branch of academic literature that provides some insights into IGO climate governance effectiveness discusses integrated governance and how it affects IGO governance (Dellmuth et al., 2018, p. 6). One publication within this branch of academic research is Matthew's (2012, p. 83) discussion of integrating climate change into peacebuilding. Matthew (2012, p. 83) identifies that peacebuilding countries are frequently located in areas that are highly vulnerable to the consequences of climate change. In addition, Matthew (2012, pp. 86-88) identifies that climate could be a factor that is actively driving various security problems, e.g. armed conflict. Despite this, peacebuilding efforts by, among others, the UN tend not to include climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies (*idem*). Matthew (2012, pp. 88-89) argues that these strategies have not been integrated in peacebuilding strategies as there is currently no organization that would support this sort of integration, and as the UNFCCC has failed to provide

concrete climate adaptation and mitigation plans that could be integrated into peacebuilding strategies.

Another publication focuses on how climate change is addressed in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) and the disadvantages of addressing climate change in the context of disaster risk reduction (Kelman, 2015, p. 117). For context, the SFDRR was endorsed in the UN General Assembly in 2015 and presents member states with strategies to minimize the effects of future disasters on development (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, n.d.). Kelman (2015, p. 117) analyzes in his article three things, i.e. (1) how climate change influences the possibility of disasters, (2) how the Sendai Framework discusses cross-sectoral interaction between climate change and the reduction of disaster risk, and (3) how the Sendai Framework integrates climate change into its disaster risk strategies. The author argues that the analysis and examination of how climate change is addressed in the Sendai Framework shows mixed results, i.e. the framework does not explicitly specify how climate change affects disaster risk and still discusses climate change separately from other dimensions of disaster risk (Kelman, 2015, p. 124). Overall, the author argues that the Sendai Framework fails to identify climate change as having the potential to severely affect disaster risk (Kelman, 2015, pp. 117-118).

This literature review has identified three different areas of research. These different areas of academic research focused on (1) how IGOs have addressed and incorporated climate change into their governance approaches, (2) the effectiveness of IGO governance and on climate security, and (3) integrated governance and how it affects IGO governance. The area of research that addressed how IGOs have addressed and incorporated climate change into their governance approaches is relatively elaborate compared to the two other areas of research. In this branch of academic literature there is not much literature available on how non-Western IGOs have addressed and incorporated climate change into their governance approaches. More research should be devoted to researching non-Western IGOs as climate change is prospected to hit non-Western countries the hardest (BBC, 2019).

The second and third area of research tried to shed some light on the effectiveness of IGO governance on climate security. The literature on integrated governance and how it affects IGO governance provided limited insights into the effectiveness of IGOs governance on climate security, while the second area of research mainly focuses on the UN context. In general, there is a lack of academic research that analyzes the effectiveness of IGO governance, and therefore, more

research should be devoted to analyzing the effectiveness of IGO governance on climate change preferably outside the UN context.

Word count: 2554

## Items data analysis

Item 1



NATO ClimateChangeand Security

# Action Plan

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## Impact of climate change on security

1. Climate change is one of the defining challenges of our times. It is a threat multiplier that impacts Allied security, both in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the Alliance's broader neighbourhood.
2. Climate change makes it harder for militaries to carry out their tasks. Greater temperature extremes, sea level rise, rapid changes in precipitation patterns, and an increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events test the resilience of our military installations and critical infrastructure, impair the effectiveness of our capabilities, and may create harsher conditions for our military operations and missions.
3. The effects of climate change shape our geopolitical environment and may influence state behaviour. For example, **thawing permafrost, desertification, and the opening up of new shipping lanes are factors that can contribute to increased instability** and geostrategic competition.
4. The implications of climate change include drought, soil erosion and marine environmental degradation. These **can lead to famine**, floods, **loss of** land and **livelihood**, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls as well as on

poor, vulnerable or marginalized populations, as well as potentially exacerbate state fragility, fuel conflicts, and lead to displacement, migration, and human mobility, creating conditions that can be exploited by state and non-state actors that threaten or challenge the Alliance.

## Context for the Alliance

5. NATO has been addressing environmental challenges for over half a century, initially mostly from a science and research perspective. Since the turn of the century, a number of environmental standards and guidelines have been developed. Climate change featured in the 2010 Strategic Concept, a Green Defence framework was adopted in 2014, and climate issues were highlighted in Summit Statements since Lisbon 2010. However, further work and sustained political ambition is needed to ensure that NATO is fully prepared to continue to deliver in a changing climate.

6. As parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and signatories of the Paris Agreement, NATO Allies have recognized the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change, and subscribed to the goal to limit global warming to well below 2, preferably 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels. In recent years, NATO Allies have stepped up their ambition and are taking concrete action, at national level and through coordinated efforts in a United Nations and European Union context, where applicable, to realize a transition towards durable sustainability.

7. Although NATO is not the first responder for every challenge related to climate change, the Alliance has a role to play in a comprehensive response to climate change. NATO also has to take into account the impact of climate change on security to successfully fulfill its three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.

## A NATO Agenda on Climate Change and Security

8. On 23-24 March 2021, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed NATO's Climate Change and Security Agenda. It provides a 360-degree approach and encompasses measures to increase both NATO's and Allies' awareness of the impact of climate change on security, along with developing clear adaptation and mitigation measures, and enhanced outreach, while ensuring a credible deterrence and defence posture and upholding the priorities of the safety of military personnel and operational and cost effectiveness. This approach capitalizes on existing initiatives, structures and mechanisms,

enhances and brings coherence to ongoing efforts, and identifies new policies and tools, where needed. It will allow NATO to respond to the impact of climate change on security within the framework of its mandate and purpose. Climate change and security is also an integral part of the NATO 2030 decisions taken by Heads of State and Government at the 2021 Brussels Summit.

## Taking Forward NATO's Agenda on Climate Change and Security

9. This Action Plan sets out the framework for delivering on NATO's Agenda on Climate Change and Security, to contribute to NATO's three core tasks and guarantee the security of the Alliance. The Action Plan comprises specific goals for the Alliance, as well as tasks for NATO as an organization along with a mechanism to ensure monitoring, visibility and Allied ownership. As part of this Action Plan NATO will:

9.1. *First*, increase Allied awareness. To this end, NATO will conduct an annual Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment. This Assessment will analyse the impact of climate change on NATO's strategic environment and NATO's assets, installations, missions and operations. To support this work, NATO will also integrate climate change considerations into security risk and resilience assessments and civil advice on the security situation in regions of key interest to the Alliance. In addition, NATO will leverage its science and technology programmes and communities to support research on the impact of climate change on security, including gender perspectives in the context of NATO's Women, Peace and Security policy.

9.2. *Second*, adapt to climate change. NATO will, building on its assessments, incorporate climate change considerations into its work on resilience, civil preparedness, defence planning, capability delivery, assets and installations, standards, innovation, training, exercises, and disaster response. NATO will also address the need to adapt its capabilities to the changing climate more prominently in its procurement practices and its partnership with industry. NATO will also assess how climate change might impact its deterrence and defence posture, including readiness, enablement, reinforcement, and military mobility.

9.3. *Third*, contribute to the mitigation of climate change. The Alliance will develop a NATO mapping and analytical methodology of greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and installations. This methodology will help Allies' own emission assessment programmes and could contribute to formulating voluntary goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the military. Furthermore, data on energy demand and consumption

in the military could inform Allies' investment decisions, help define the role of Emerging Disruptive Technologies and innovative energy efficient and sustainable technologies, as well as inform operational planning. In developing the methodology, NATO will draw on the best practice of Allies, and can also leverage expertise from partner nations and other international organizations, including the EU. NATO will also study the feasibility of scaling up innovative low carbon technologies through its own procurement practices.

9.4. *Fourth*, enhance outreach. NATO will strengthen exchanges with partner countries, as well as with international and regional organizations that are active on climate change and security issues, including the EU, the UN, and others, where appropriate. NATO will also increase dialogue with civil society, academia and industry on climate change and security issues, to support its work and contribute to the global response to climate change.

10. To track the progress made, re-assess the level of ambition, and inform the way ahead, the first Climate Change and Security Progress Report will be delivered at the 2022 Summit.

Item 2  
Chapter one: Environment

1. Climate change is forcing strategic perspectives on the Arctic to alter dramatically, demanding new connections be forged between environmental transformation, international trade, social resilience, technological advancements and global security. In turn, new opportunities and challenges will demand greater responsiveness from the geopolitics, economies, and societies of the North. Higher temperatures and diminishing ice cover in the Arctic create global impacts as sea levels rise, weather patterns shift and ecosystems are disrupted. The severe consequences for human life across the world include security issues. Defence planning must compensate accordingly. NATO will not be exempt: security alliances and partnerships will have to evolve to accommodate evolving risks, threats, opportunities, interests and capabilities.

2. As the world warms, the primary environmental concerns in the Arctic include the reduction of Arctic

Ocean ice cover, the disruption of ecosystems, loss of biodiversity, shifting weather patterns, melting permafrost, and coastal erosion with resultant risks to the security of **food**, **water**, homes, and **livelihoods**. Infrastructure, maritime activity, resource extraction, and **migration patterns** (in and out of the Arctic) are being affected already. These concerns are underpinned by the uncertain and non-linear characteristics of the ongoing changes. Yet, there are also likely to be some constants. Weather systems will remain unpredictable and across much of the Arctic the operational environment will remain austere and challenging. Considering the sheer distance, remoteness and geographical separation that isolates large swathes of the Arctic, human activities will remain expeditionary in most cases, even in the case of significant environmental transformation.

### 1.1 Accelerated Pace of Environmental Change

3. The scale of climate change in the Arctic makes reliable predictions difficult, but accelerating temperatures, rising sea levels, and weather

volatility undoubtedly will dominate an increasingly complex and changing Arctic future. Average temperatures will rise between 1° Celsius and 2° Celsius, and in the Arctic even by up to 3° Celsius, over the next two decades. Not only is the rise in sea level accelerated by melting ice and glaciers, but also by regional warming, because forests and other natural carbon stores such as permafrost release these stores into the atmosphere as carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>). The consequences will include disruptions of the ocean circulation system and global environmental impacts. Near and longterm changes in the Arctic will force NATO to change its operational perspectives in the region.

4. The consequences of Arctic climate change include increased flooding, soil/coastal erosion, pollution of air and water resources, forest and peat fires, changes in sea ice conditions, severe wind, failure of critical infrastructure,

and health effects on northern populations.

The associated challenges similarly affect all Arctic nations, but

mainly Russia, which has the largest Arctic territory and population. Yet the full scale and impact of climate change is difficult to comprehend, predict, and reconcile. Regardless of how it is managed or why it is undertaken, any exploitation of Arctic natural or mineral resources can expect resistance from indigenous groups and environmental NGOs. Thus, clear and demonstrated efforts by Arctic and northern nations to protect the region will be critical.

5. The expanding accessibility of the Arctic will attract increased commercial and military operations that alter the surroundings of previously isolated populations. Human resilience measures will need to embrace technology in order to off-set substantial shifts in fisheries, subsistence agricultures, resource extraction, and housing infrastructure. Perhaps most importantly, measures must plan for the influx of external actors and **potential migrations from local communities**.

Without adequate planning, increased commercial and military operations may create a security dilemma, where local populations perceive new

developments and outside actors as a threat.

“The sheer scale of climate change in the Arctic makes reliable predictions difficult, but accelerating temperatures, rising sea levels and weather volatility undoubtedly will dominate an increasingly complex and changing Arctic future.”

“Future security requires a sharper focus on the potential for disruptive actors to seek a comparative advantage in the region.”

## Implications

a. Increased impact of climate change.

Predicting future Arctic operating conditions remains extremely difficult due to the variations and volatility of changes to climatic and sea ice conditions. Current modelling efforts struggle to predict and keep up with the actual pace of and fluctuations in the accessibility. Greater situational awareness demands an improved use of spacebased technologies to observe and predict changes in the region, which will enhance NATO’s operational planning and strategic foresight.

b. Arctic cooperation remains paramount.

An appreciation for the speed and potential consequences of climate and environmental change is critical to understanding what the future Arctic may hold. Russia will remain a dominant

actor by virtue of its regional geography, economic interests and geostrategic ambitions. As climate change rapidly transforms the Arctic, Allies must remain open to cooperating with Russia in areas of common interest, despite being perceived by Russia as a principle threat and competitor. Russia's Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021 and its evolving partnership with China may provide sign posts for future relationships and possible cooperative efforts.

c. Enhanced regional security focus. As climate change accelerates and transforms the Arctic environment, the scope and scale of security concerns for the Alliance will also evolve. Future security requires a sharper focus on the potential for disruptive actors to seek a competitive advantage in the region. The Alliance should expect Russia to take every opportunity to exploit Arctic changes to its advantage. The threat posed by Russia and other actors, and the manifestation of their relationships, will likely become much more complex. NATO must respond by reconsidering its own interests and role in the Arctic and fuse IoPs

accordingly.

d. The Russian response to environmental change can threaten international security.

Russia's security and economic challenges are inextricably linked to climate change. The exposure of their once ice-locked northern border creates new resource and transit opportunities for both Russia and external competitors that Moscow may perceive as threats to its security and political stability. Russia will continue to develop its northern front for both security and commercial purposes. NATO's response planning demands vigilant awareness to rapidly assess whether Russian activities along its north coast impose a threat.

e. Non-traditional challenges gain importance in NATO planning. The NATO Crisis Management process will increasingly need to address the conditions created by climate change and other non-traditional threats such as pandemics. As a result, NATO needs to adapt its planning, exercises, and discussions on resilience. NATO must consider environmental change as an impact

upon collective defence rather than a separate issue in its own right and be more prepared to address developments in the Arctic.

## 1.2 ACUTE

### ENVIRONMENTAL

### TRANSFORMATION

6. The effects of climate change will continue to drive significant changes in the Arctic marine environment. The extent of changes in the region, already impacts environmental alterations elsewhere on the planet, notably as sea level rise. The expected sea-ice loss of over 3 million square kilometres by 2050 is alarming, and the ‘new normal’ for summer sea ice is now below 5 million square kilometres and diminishing. The Arctic Ocean is transforming from permanently icecovered to seasonally-ice free. The persistent loss of ice will shift both marine eco-systems and human activities.

7. Decades of continued ice reduction now question the primacy of current global trade routes and future of strategic choke points.

Russian waters around the Northern Sea Route

could open first, followed by the Northwest Passage (Greenland/Canada) with expanding accessibility. By 2050, the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) by Greenland conceivably could become navigable, creating a transpolar route that avoids Russian and Canadian EEZs. Choke points may become a greater issue. For example, disruptive ice chunks in the Beaufort Gyre could render the Northwest Passage (NWP) less navigable. Ice chunks may also remain for longer periods due to decreasing wind trends around the CAO. Such factors will influence commercial and military shipping alike, and ice-hardened hulls (not necessarily icebreakers) will likely become more prevalent in the region. Greater cooperation between oceanographic services will help track drastic environmental changes and their impact on navigability.

8. Ice melt in combination with the increasing ocean heat resulting from climate change leads to changed oceanic pH values and increased CO<sub>2</sub> levels. Acidification and thermal increase in the Arctic and surrounding seas will likely have

far-reaching and long-term impacts not yet fully understood. Changed seawater chemistry also contributes to altering the oceanic circulation system, as evidenced by the saline to fresh water inversion from the melting Greenland ice sheet.

The Arctic's altered oceanic chemistry further drives sea-level rise and influences the Gulf Stream with an overarching impact upon marine eco-systems adjacent to the Arctic

9. The impact on ocean services such as fisheries, aquaculture, and ultimately human sustainment will be significant as non-Arctic nations move further into the region. Fish stocks have begun migrating as far down as the mid-Atlantic and Bay of Biscay, whilst Arctic fish are expected to be highly sensitive to the changing conditions. Concern over these expected ecosystem changes prompted the international community to place a moratorium on commercial fishing. In 2018, Canada, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, the United States and the Russian Federation, as well as China, Japan, South Korea and the European Union signed the International Agreement to Prevent

Unregulated Fishing in the High Seas of the CAO.

This binding agreement commits the parties not to authorise any vessel flying its flag to engage in commercial fishing in the high seas portion of the CAO. The agreement is in place for up to sixteen years and renewable in five-year increments.

#### 10. Sea ice reduction and related marine

management of the CAO and associated seas will remain a high priority for all users. As such, the Arctic Council has endured as the ideal forum for coordinating and implementing relevant policy. Assisted by the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG14), the Council promotes direct means for improved management of the Arctic Ocean. In 2017 the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) entered into force the Polar Code, which establishes shipping resilience measures in Polar Waters with regard to safety and the environment. The IMO recently approved a ban on ships carrying heavy fuels in the region. The Central Arctic Ocean is governed by a robust international legal regime that includes UNCLOS,

international customary law, international treaties, the IMO and others. Current governance structures will need to monitor the evolution of ecosystems, technologies and Arctic accessibilities and be ready to address new gaps.

11. Severe storms, damaging wave action and increasingly disruptive (fragmented) sea ice will likely become more commonplace in the Arctic than elsewhere on the planet. Land and infrastructure will lose the solid ice protection barriers that once protected it from maritime disaster risks. Offshore commercial ventures are also at risk given the volatile currents, wave action, and fragmented sea ice, although they may provide profitable alternatives for resource exploitation. Because the logistical and technical challenges in the harsh Arctic environment are acute, the region demands collaborative maritime and aerospace efforts on research, shipping, offshore oil and gas, fisheries, tourism, and marine biotech. Addressing the problem of limited search and rescue (SAR) resources is a testament of why this collaboration is so important.

“The region demands collaborative maritime and aerospace efforts on research, shipping, offshore oil and gas fisheries, tourism, and marine biotech.”

#### Implications

a. Ice loss disrupting eco-systems. The combination of dramatic sea ice reduction and the melting of the Greenland ice sheet will cause both the CAO temperature to rise and a fresh/salt water inversion in the North Atlantic, altering the ocean’s chemical balance and shifting currents. Increased acidity will also contribute to disruption of the Arctic Ocean ecosystem. Losses of land and sea ice will therefore affect temperatures, weather patterns, sea levels, and ecosystems both regionally and globally.

b. Unpredictable weather systems. The combination of a changing oceanic system and continued recession of sea ice will increase oceanic unpredictability in both the North Atlantic and Central Arctic Ocean. In turn, this will escalate the likelihood of severe storms and periods of disruptive ice flows. Warmer oceans, loss of calming surface ice and larger tracks of open oceans will make the CAO more volatile and make

overall coastal erosion unpredictable.

c. Increasing commercial activity. Persistent loss of sea ice may lead to greater utilisation of the Polar Route or Northern Sea Routes over other global trade routes, due to shorter transits and avoidance of major choke points. Increased tourism activity can be expected. Commercial fishing traffic will expand to reach newly accessible fishing grounds and in pursuit of invasive fish stocks migrating northward. If neglected, uncontrolled resource exploitation, including unregulated and unsustainable fishing, can not only affect the eco system but also create tension across EEZ boundaries. This overall increase in maritime activity heightens the likelihood of international incidents over contested areas. Additional consequences include increased pollution in an already fragile ecosystem and maritime accidents requiring multinational SAR and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) capabilities that are not yet in place.

d. Increasing military activity. From a strategic standpoint, with the Kola Peninsula gaining yearround

access to the Atlantic Ocean, wider security implications for Russia, NATO and the EU will emerge. Current Russian activities create extra pressure to secure sea lines of communications in the North Atlantic and the GIUK-N gaps. With conditions more volatile year-round, NATO nations will need to consider the operational and tactical requirements to that will enable them to operate effectively across all domains. Such considerations are necessary to retaining an advantage over potential adversaries and to providing the necessary security to local populations and commercial actors. These could include, inter alia, measures to raise NATO's posture including the deployment of Stability Policing assets.

e. Increasing human and natural disasters.

Maritime shipping, fishing, tourism, military activity, as well as ocean mining or drilling will not only come with high costs, but will set the conditions for potential human and natural environmental disasters in both the CAO and North Atlantic. The remoteness and uncertain weather conditions restrict remedial activities and the ability to contain

incidents, conduct SAR, and avoid ecosystem impacts. NATO Allies exercising, patrolling, and operating in the Arctic should prepare for such incidents in testing conditions.

f. Susceptible Arctic governance cohesion.

The Arctic Council and IMO policy makers may struggle to keep pace with the changing conditions, which could lead to a failure to manage the marine environment effectively. Furthermore, non-Arctic or third-party exploitation and involvement in a natural or human disaster may break the trust between community or population at harm and the national government and Arctic Council members.

NATO can support Arctic governance by upholding and adhering to regulations and best practice regarding operations in the Arctic.

### 1.3 Land And Infrastructure

#### Degradation

12. The extreme conditions affecting the Arctic land environment inflict damage and degrade biodiversity, eco-systems, and infrastructure. Even with enhanced human resilience, environmental

degradation affects inward and outward migration

in northern regions.

This may destabilize social and political demographics in exposed communities. A greater frequency of natural disasters demands improved technological adaptation and resilient environmental management (including livestock and crops). A better understanding of ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ consequences of climate change could constructively impact agricultural conditions over time. However, perspectives about what constitutes favourable climate change vary between those who are hardest hit and those who can make the most profit.

13. Due to permafrost thaw, the enormous stock of organic material stored in permafrost soil is decomposing at an increased rate and leading to gas-producing microorganisms. The resulting release of CO<sub>2</sub>, methane and other greenhouse gases may reach the region of 110 to 231 billion of tons emitted by 2040, and in conjunction with a growing black carbon footprint marks a significant increase in global temperature rise. This in turn threatens localised Arctic infrastructure, ecosystems and biodiversity. As permafrost

recedes, contagious diseases, including anthrax and bubonic plague, will also pose problems for inhabited areas,

potentially forcing the relocation of towns and villages.

The potential biological threats will require monitoring and coordination by organisations to enhance early detection and promote an improved response. The rise in temperatures and drier Arctic climate associated with permafrost thaw will also result in wildfires, floods and severe storms that affect peripheral agricultures and living conditions and further threaten eco-systems.

14. Permafrost thaw and eco-system disruptions will cause significant damage to infrastructure, habitats and dependent species. Resultant damages to vulnerable economic and energy infrastructures, including also ice roads and pipelines, can involve substantial costs, especially in urban environments. As the Arctic tundra changes, native Arctic species will be confronted with losses of food and water, changing weather

patterns, and invasive species that will push them to the edge of survival or extinction. Despite scientific uncertainty about Arctic permafrost thawing over the next two to three decades, it is clear that where permafrost thaw is prevalent, ecosystem disruption will pose significant challenges to both ongoing and new human activity.

15. Commercial, scientific and military installations in the permafrost infrastructure, including vital lines of communication, ice airstrips, bridges and roads, make up approximately 70% of the inhabited or developed areas that are prone to thawing. As a result, significant infrastructure degradation and changing demographics in the Arctic are expected. Human-caused disasters such as the oil tank collapse at the Norilsk mining site in Russia (due to permafrost melt) serve as a wake-up call to all Arctic nations. From that event, around 21.000 tonnes leaked into the surrounding Ambarnaya river basin reaching an area of 180.000m<sup>2</sup>, which may take over one billion dollars and a decade to recover. Failures to account for permafrost thaw will result in future

costly incidents.

16. Among Arctic neighbours, Russia in particular can be expected in the near-term to significantly increase infrastructure along its northern coast.

The exploitation of Russia's northern resources is necessary to sustain its commercial sale of resources to Europe and Asia. Increased industrial and technological support are required to upgrade infrastructure and enhance resilience, but such upgrades involve great cost at a time when national budgets are under increasing pressure in the face of worldwide recession. Chinese infrastructure investment and financial support partly enables Russia's Arctic expansion but at the price of China's increased presence and perceived encroachments upon Russian sovereignty. For Beijing, investment is inspired by the continuation of its Belt and Road Initiative and political-economic ambitions. Unchecked development along the northern coast and resultant ecological damages will attract protest by both environmental groups and the global population, but that may not sufficiently restrain ambitions in the region or inspire the expenditures necessary to prevent

environmental disasters related to infrastructure development.

“Ecosystem disruption will pose significant challenges to both ongoing and new human activity”.

#### Implications

a. Critical infrastructure damage and manmade disaster. All Arctic states, but especially Canada, Denmark, Russia and the US face significant infrastructure challenges from the impacts of permafrost thawing and coastal erosion.

Challenges include improved land management solutions, the relocation of populations, and infrastructure upgrades. Man-made environmental disasters will increase as the impacts of climate change outstrip the ability to upgrade critical industrial infrastructure.

b. CO<sub>2</sub>/Methane and disease exposure. As the initial level of permafrost melts and soil becomes decompressed, it will release huge amounts of CO<sub>2</sub> and Methane into the atmosphere, accelerating the pace of global temperature rise. Permafrost thaw may also expose ancient diseases and render many areas uninhabitable.

c. Biodiversity Collapse. The potential collapse of Arctic biodiversity will force displacement and transformation of Arctic species, threatening extinction and affording invasive species a foothold. Water and food sources will also displace traditional grazing stocks. These anticipated changes impact both indigenous and agricultural land users, potentially forcing migration.

d. Disruptive weather patterns. Rising temperatures will influence weather phenomena that are likely to cause more flooding, wildfires and damaging storms. Although indicators of these changes are apparent today, reliable prognoses about the severity and the locality will be problematic over many decades to come. Severe and unpredictable weather is likely to impair both industry and **military operations in the Arctic**.

e. Infrastructure investments. Competition for newly accessible natural resources, such as rare earth materials, will drive increased infrastructure development in the region. Arctic states will need to fund significant investment to overcome both the physical changes in the environment

and the logistical challenges associated with the vast distances and remote locations. Absent external pressures from international laws and organizations, such investment may often not include funding for environmental protective measures.

e. Chinese investment expected to continue.

Given the recognized costs and difficulties of operating in the Northern territories and the Arctic, NATO members and Northern states can expect offers from China (or other sponsors) to strategically invest. The long-term implications of such investments must be carefully considered.

Item 3  
NATO 2030

*My vision for NATO 2030 is not about reinventing NATO. It is about making our strong Alliance even stronger. Strong militarily. Stronger politically. And more global.*  
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on launching the NATO 2030 initiative.  
8 June, 2020

At the December 2019 Leaders Meeting, NATO Heads of State and Government asked Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to lead a forward-looking reflection on NATO's future. This is why he launched 'NATO 2030,' his initiative to further strengthen the Alliance in an increasingly more unpredictable and competitive world.

NATO faces the most complex security environment since the end of the Cold War. Existing threats have not gone away. Russia's behaviour remains assertive and destabilising, and terrorism continues to represent a global security challenge and a threat to stability. At the same time, the rise of China is shifting the global balance of power, with implications for the Alliance's security, values and way of life. It is a world of growing global uncertainty, more sophisticated and disruptive cyber and hybrid threats, and exponential technological change rapidly transforming the way wars are fought. An environment where climate change will continue to exacerbate existing security challenges and generate new ones.

The challenges to Allied security are simply too big for any Ally to face alone. This is why strengthening the transatlantic bond and doing more together,

through NATO, is at the core of the Secretary General's NATO 2030 initiative. To ensure NATO continues to keep Allies safe in the next decade and beyond, the Secretary General established three clear goals for NATO 2030:

First, to **remain a strong military Alliance**. Military strength and solidarity underpin everything the Alliance does. Staying strong militarily is about continuing to invest in defence to ensure NATO has the right capabilities to deter and to defend against tomorrow's threats – on land, at sea, in the air, in space and in cyberspace. It is also about investing in innovation to help Allied militaries retain

their technological edge. And it is about boosting the resilience of the Alliance's physical and digital infrastructure, as well as of its critical industry, assets and technologies.

Second, to **make NATO stronger politically**.

This means ensuring NATO remains the forum for transatlantic consultation and coordination on all issues that affect the Allies' common security. It also means enhancing NATO's political tools to respond to existing and new security challenges, from cyber and hybrid threats, to terrorism and climate change.

Third, to ensure **NATO adopts a more global approach**. NATO is and will remain a regional Alliance. However, to guarantee the security of the nearly 1 billion NATO citizens, the Alliance needs to understand and respond to global challenges and have a truly global security network. Effectively tackling global challenges ranging from terrorism, to climate change, and from cyber attacks to the security implications of a rising China, requires the Alliance to work more closely with like-minded partners near and far. In the same vein, NATO also needs to strengthen its role in defending the rules-based international order and convening likeminded democracies to consult and address shared security challenges.

To support his work, the Secretary General initiated a number of initiatives to generate creative and bold ideas on how to further strengthen and future-proof the Alliance.

In March 2020, he appointed an independent group of 10 experts, five women and five men<sup>1</sup>. To inform its work, the group conducted extensive consultations, including with scholars, leaders from business and the technology sector, parliamentarians, military

officials and government representatives from all 30 Allies, as well as with a number of NATO partner countries and international organisations. In November, this group submitted a report to the Secretary General as an input to the NATO 2030 initiative.

Also in November, the Secretary General welcomed young people from across the Alliance to the NATO 2030 Youth Summit. At the Youth Summit, the Secretary General announced the

establishment of the NATO 2030 Young Leaders Group, consisting of 14 emerging leaders<sup>2</sup> from across the Alliance tasked to provide input to inform his recommendations for NATO 2030.

The Secretary General also held a series of digital roundtables and conferences to engage with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, youth, civil society and the private sector.

Based on all of these inputs, the Secretary General will continue to consult with Allies and put forward his recommendations for NATO 2030 to NATO Leaders at the Summit in 2021.

### **NATO 2030 – A Stronger Focus on Responding to the Security Implications of Climate Change**

In 2020, NATO laid the groundwork for playing a more ambitious role in climate security. During an online event in September, Secretary General Stoltenberg outlined his vision for NATO's role with regard to climate change and emphasised that "NATO's core task is to keep us all safe. Climate change is making the world more unsafe. So to fulfil our main responsibility, NATO must help to curb climate change."

He explained that there are three reasons why NATO needs to focus attention on climate change. First,

climate change is making the world more dangerous. It fuels conflict, exacerbates threats and puts pressure on natural resources like food and water.

Second, climate change creates harder conditions in which military forces need to do their jobs. As the climate changes, Allied forces will need to deploy in conditions that are wetter, hotter, dryer, or just more challenging. Global warming, sea level rise, rapid changes in precipitation patterns and an increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events also test the resilience of military installations and critical infrastructure.

Third, NATO and its Allies also have a responsibility to help reduce climate change by producing fewer emissions.

This is why, as part of his NATO 2030 initiative, the Secretary General is focusing on how to step up NATO's climate change and security work. The Alliance is developing a concrete climate and security agenda focused on increasing situational awareness and adapting to the security impact of climate change, for example by enhancing resilience, reducing climate vulnerabilities and integrating climate security challenges

into NATO plans, exercises and policies. Allies are also examining ways for NATO to concretely play its part in combating climate change, helping to reduce military emissions and improve operational effectiveness.

#### Item 4



## NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Environment, climate change and security

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The earth's rapidly changing climate and an increase in weather extremes have led NATO to accelerate its efforts in environmental security and environmental protection. For decades, NATO has been dealing with environmental security issues that can lead to humanitarian disasters, regional tensions and violence. NATO provides disaster relief support; focuses on environmental risks to military activities and security in general, including environmental factors that affect energy supplies; and is looking for ways to improve energy efficiency in the military through innovative technologies.

- ◆ NATO recognises that it faces many environmental challenges, particularly due to the risks posed by climate change, and has been acting on these challenges for many years.
- ◆ NATO engages in civil preparedness and emergency response to environmental disasters such as floods, forest fires and earthquakes.
- ◆ It also focuses on enhancing energy efficiency and reducing the environmental footprint of armed forces.
- ◆ In 1969, NATO first recognised environmental challenges by establishing the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), which managed studies and fellowships that focused on issues like air and noise pollution, advanced health care and the disposal of hazardous wastes.
- ◆ In 2006, NATO's Science Committee merged with the CCMS to form the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme to develop initiatives on emerging security challenges, including environmental security issues like water management and the prevention of natural catastrophes, and energy security.

- ◆ NATO's Science and Technology Organization (STO) also promotes and conducts scientific research related to environmental issues.
  - ◆ In 2021, NATO adopted an ambitious Climate Change and Security Action Plan to mainstream climate change considerations into NATO's political and military agenda.
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## Environmental security

NATO has been addressing security challenges related to the environment for many years. This includes extreme weather conditions, sea level rise, food risk, depletion of natural resources, land degradation, geological hazards, and pollution – factors that can ultimately lead to humanitarian disasters, regional tensions and violence.

The Alliance seeks to address environmental risks to military activities and to security in general. For example, environmental factors can affect energy supplies to both civilian populations and military operations, making energy security a major topic of concern.

NATO has also helped partner countries clean up ageing and dangerous stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and unexploded remnants of war that pose a risk to people and the environment.

NATO is currently conducting these initiatives via its Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and Trust

Fund projects.

## Building international cooperation

Since 1969, NATO's SPS Programme has supported cooperative activities that tackle environmental security issues, including those related to defence. Since NATO began working with partner countries in the 1990s through its scientific activities, partners have listed environmental security as a top priority, requesting NATO's support for cooperative activities to address those issues that threaten the security of their country and beyond.

To improve coordination of its activities, NATO joined other international agencies to address environmental issues that threaten security in four vulnerable regions: Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia. These agencies include (the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)) under the Environment and Security (ENVSEC) Initiative. As a first step, ENVSEC facilitated regional meetings with relevant stakeholders (experts, non-governmental organisations' authorities, governmental authorities and international donors) to consult and agree on regional maps highlighting priority issues that are a threat to security. As a second step, ENVSEC raised funds to address the identified issues.

Trust Funds were set up by individual NATO member states and partners in order to provide resources to help partner countries implement practical projects in the areas of demilitarisation, defence transformation or capacity building. Many Trust Funds assist countries with the safe destruction of surplus and obsolete landmines, weapons and munitions, and build capacity in areas

such as demining and munitions stockpile management. The Trust Funds were first launched in 2000 the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which promoted bilateral cooperation with non-member countries in certain regions, but over the years, the Trust Fund mechanism has been opened to all NATO partners. Trust Fund projects seek to ensure adherence to the highest environmental standards, and recycling of materials is an essential part of many projects.

### Boosting emergency response

The Alliance is also actively engaged in coordinating civil preparedness and civil emergency response to disasters. It does this primarily through its Euro-Atlantic Disaster

Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), which was launched in response to the earthquake disaster in Turkey and Greece at the end of the 1990s. Prior to the EADRCC, NATO had a disaster assistance scheme in place to assist member countries. It was developed in 1953, following the deadly floods that hit northern Europe, and the Netherlands in particular.

NATO organises consultations and scenario-building exercises involving military and civilian experts, supported in part by the SPS Programme, with the aim of increasing the understanding of the potential role of the military in disaster relief.

#### Energy security – critical energy infrastructure protection

Natural disasters, including those that are linked to climate change, can damage or disrupt infrastructure and pose risks to energy security. These environmental factors are pertinent to NATO, particularly because most NATO members and partners rely on energy supplies from abroad sent via pipelines and cables that cross many borders.

Allies agreed to consult on the immediate risks in the field of energy security, share information, advance international and regional cooperation, develop consequence management and help protect critical infrastructure. Since the early 2000s, the SPS Programme has supported projects that focus on the link between energy infrastructure and environmental security.

#### Energy efficiency and innovative technology in the military

Recognising the vital need to provide safe and reliable sources of energy for operations, the supply of which can cause severe security challenges for fuel convoys and armed forces, NATO started a Smart Energy initiative in 2011 that brought together NATO stakeholders and national experts from the public and private sectors. At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO Leaders

declared that NATO will “[...] *continue to work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces, and in this regard we note the Green Defence Framework.*”

Diversification of energy sources can also enhance mission endurance and operational effectiveness. By using a variety of energy sources and integrating innovative technologies into military platforms and systems, including ‘smart’ grids that exploit renewable energy and energy storage technologies, military operations can maintain the required levels of effectiveness for longer periods without the need to rely on conventional fuels and while reducing their environmental footprint. Such systems, as

well as hydrogen fuel cells, can provide additional benefits like reduced noise and heat signatures.

## Policies and standards

NATO started to develop its environmental protection policy in the late 1970s, resulting in a number of guidelines and standards. At present, NATO's environmental policy states that NATO-led forces "*must strive to respect environmental principles and policies under all conditions*".

Currently, two dedicated NATO groups are addressing environmental protection while promoting cooperation and standardization among NATO member and partner countries, as well as among different NATO bodies and international organisations, which regularly attend as observers:

- The Environmental Protection Working Group (EPWG) (under the Military Committee Joint Standardization Board, which reports to the Military Committee)
- The Specialist Team on Energy Efficiency and Environmental Protection (STEEEP) (under the Maritime Capability Group "Ship Design and Maritime Mobility", which reports through the NATO Naval Armaments Group to the Conference of National Armaments Directors).

The EPWG aims to reduce possible harmful impacts of military activities on the environment by developing NATO policies, standardization documents, guidelines and best practices in the planning and implementation of operations and exercises.

The goal of the STEEEP is to integrate environmental protection and energy efficiency regulations into technical requirements and specifications for armaments, equipment and materials on ships, and the ship to shore interface in Allied and partner countries' naval forces.

Decades of activities by expert groups paved the way for the overarching policy document on "NATO Military Principles and Policies for Environmental Protection", agreed by the NATO Military Committee in 2003 and updated in 2011. This document describes the responsibilities of military commanders for environmental protection during the preparation and execution of military activities. It also recognises the need for "a *harmonisation of environmental principles and policies for all NATO-led military activities*". It instructs NATO commanders to apply "*best practicable and feasible environmental protection measures*", in an aim to reduce the environmental impacts caused by military

activity. The document is complemented with several other NATO Environmental Protection Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and Allied Joint Environmental Protection Publications (AJEPP), which are all focused on protecting the environment during NATO-led military activities. These include a Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection during NATO-led Military Activities; Environmental Protection Best Practices and Standards for Military Camps in NATO-led Military Activities; and Best Environmental Protection Practices for Sustainability of Military Training Areas.

### Training and exercises

To ensure compliance with NATO standards, forces must receive appropriate environmental protection training. While this training is primarily a national responsibility, NATO is determined to provide common environmental protection and energy efficiency education to Allied forces. The aim is to embed environmental protection awareness into the daily routines of military personnel and increase their personal responsibility in this

field. To advance this objective, NATO has designated staff officers for the implementation of environmental protection at strategic, operational and tactical levels. The NATO School Oberammergau and the Military Engineering Centre of Excellence also provide environmental protection courses as part of their curriculum.

NATO has also used exercises to demonstrate the viability of energy-efficient military equipment. In various logistics exercises, NATO displayed how the integration of renewable energy like wind and solar, combined with energy storage, reduced the amount of diesel consumption in forward deployed military camps. This successful combination of fossil fuels and renewables demonstrated that energy efficiency and a smaller environmental footprint do not have to come at the expense of operational effectiveness.

## Research and development

NATO's Science and Technology Organization (STO) promotes and conducts scientific research on military-specific technical challenges, including those related to environmental issues. To this end, STO technical/scientific sub-committees, composed of experts from NATO and its member countries, look for "greener solutions" by conducting studies and research resulting in scientific reports.

The STO's Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE), located in La Spezia, Italy, conducts research to quantify the impact of the environment on operations, and vice versa. One extensive CMRE study resulted in a better understanding of how

marine mammals are affected by sonar systems. Based on the results, NATO developed the Code of Conduct for the Use of Active Sonar to Ensure the Protection of Marine Mammals within the Framework of Alliance Maritime Activities. Another project involved climate monitoring in the High North with a special focus on how climate change is transforming the Arctic Ocean.

Within the context of NATO's SPS Programme, environmental protection experts across NATO member and partner countries have been active in the development of policy and technical solutions for the reduction of the environmental and energy footprint of NATO-led activities. This includes monitoring energy consumption in military camps to identify opportunities to improve energy efficiency, therefore the overall effectiveness of an operation.

#### Collaborative approach

NATO's environmental community has been active in their cooperative efforts with other international organisations, including the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). This collaborative approach also includes discussions with industry, academia and governmental agencies.

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#### Responding to climate change

With the alarming acceleration of global warming and weather extremes across the globe, environmental issues have become more severe and the phenomenon of climate change has become a defining issue of our time. Climate change causes complications for fresh water management and water scarcity, as well as health issues, biodiversity loss and demographic challenges. Other consequences like famine, drought and marine environmental degradation lead to loss of land and livelihood, and have a disproportionate impact on

women and girls, and poor and vulnerable populations.

Climate change is also a threat multiplier that affects NATO security, operations and missions both in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the Alliance's broader neighbourhood. It makes it harder for militaries to carry out their tasks. It also shapes the geopolitical environment, leading to instability and geostrategic competition and creating conditions that can be exploited by state and non-state actors that threaten or challenge the Alliance.

Increasing surface temperatures, thawing permafrost, desertification, loss of sea

ice and glaciers, and the opening up of shipping lanes may cause volatility in the security environment. As such, the High North is one of the epicentres of climate change.

Climate change affects the current and future operating environment, and the military will need to ensure its operational effectiveness in increasingly harsh conditions. Greater temperature extremes, sea level rise, significant changes in precipitation patterns and extreme weather events test the resilience of militaries and infrastructure. For example, increases in ambient temperatures coupled with changing air density (pressure altitude) can have a detrimental impact on fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft performance and air transport capability. Similarly, preventing the overheating of military aircraft, especially the sensitive electronic and airbase installations, requires an increased logistical effort and higher energy consumption. Many transport routes are located on coastal roads, which are particularly vulnerable to weather extremes. These are not only challenges to engineering and technology development, but must also be factored into operational planning scenarios.

In March 2021, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed NATO's Climate Change and Security Agenda. At the NATO Summit in Brussels on 14 June 2021, NATO Leaders agreed a Climate Change and Security Action Plan, with the aim of making NATO the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. It provides a 360-degree approach, encompassing measures to increase Allied awareness of the impact of climate change on security. It outlines clear adaptation and mitigation measures, and enhanced outreach, while ensuring a credible deterrence and defence posture.

Regarding enhanced awareness, NATO will conduct an annual Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment. This Assessment will analyse the impact of climate change on NATO's strategic

environment and NATO's assets, installations, missions and operations. NATO will also integrate climate change considerations into security risk and resilience assessments and civil advice on the security situation in regions of key interest. In addition, NATO will leverage its science and technology programmes and communities to support research on the impact of climate change on security, including gender perspectives in the context of NATO's Women, Peace and Security policy.

Regarding adaptation, NATO will incorporate climate change considerations into its work on resilience, civil preparedness, defence planning, capability delivery, assets and installations, standards, innovation, training, exercises and disaster response. NATO will also address the need to adapt its capabilities to the changing climate more prominently in its procurement practices and its partnership with industry. It will also assess how climate change might impact its deterrence and defence posture, including readiness, enablement, reinforcement and military mobility.

To contribute to the mitigation of climate change, the Alliance will develop a NATO mapping and analytical methodology of greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and installations. This methodology will help Allies' own emission assessment programmes and could contribute to formulating voluntary goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the military. Furthermore, data on energy demand and consumption in the military could inform Allies' investment decisions, help define the role of emerging and disruptive technologies and innovative energy-efficient and sustainable technologies, as well as inform operational planning. In developing the methodology, NATO will draw on the best practices of Allies, and may also leverage expertise from partner countries and other international organisations, including the EU. NATO will also study the feasibility of scaling up innovative low-carbon technologies through its own procurement practices.

As part of enhancing its outreach, NATO will strengthen exchanges with partner countries, as well as with international and regional organisations that are active on climate change and security issues, including the EU, the UN, and others, where appropriate. NATO will increase dialogue with civil society, academia and industry on climate change and security issues, to support its work and contribute to the global response to climate change.

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## Evolution

Building on the disaster relief scheme it had created in the early 1950s, NATO first recognised environmental challenges by establishing the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) in 1969. The CCMS managed studies and fellowships that focused on issues like air and noise pollution, advanced health care and the disposal of hazardous wastes.

In the late 1970s, NATO began to develop its environmental protection policy, which resulted in a number of guidelines and standards that have adapted to the changing environment over the years.

NATO began engaging in civil preparedness and emergency response to environmental disasters in the 1990s. In the same decade, it began working with partner countries,

responding to requests for cooperative activities in many key priority areas, including environmental security. Towards the end of the 1990s, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) was launched.

In 2003, the NATO Military Committee agreed the overarching policy document on “NATO Military Principles and Policies for Environmental Protection”. It was updated in 2011.

In 2006, the Science Committee merged with the CCMS to form the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme to develop initiatives on specific key priorities including environmental security.

In the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO acknowledged climate change as a security challenge for the first time.

In 2012, NATO’s Science and Technology Organization (STO) was formed in order to promote and conduct scientific research in several areas, including environmental issues.

At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO Leaders declared that NATO will “*continue to work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces*”, and adopted the Green Defence Framework, which contained numerous suggestions to this end.

At the 2019 Leaders Meeting in London, NATO committed to a forward-looking reflection process that resulted in the NATO 2030 initiative, which underlines the impact of climate change on security as a major focus for the Alliance.

In March 2021, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed the Climate Change and Security Agenda, which provides a 360-degree approach, encompassing measures to increase Allied awareness of the impact of climate change on security.

At the NATO Summit in Brussels on 14 June 2021, NATO Leaders agreed a Climate Change and Security Action Plan, with the aim of making NATO the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.

In November 2021, during a high-level roundtable at a side event of the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26), in Glasgow, United Kingdom, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg explained the main focus of the new NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan, especially the key points of awareness, mitigation and adaptation.

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Item 5



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

# NATO and the security implications of climate change

Virtual speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

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28 Sep. 2020 - | Last updated: 29 Sep. 2020 08:22

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(As delivered)

Thank you so much Rector Wegener.

It's a great pleasure to meet you again. And this is actually the first time I have addressed so many students across so many countries at the same time. And I am really delighted to be together with all of you today.

NATO has been the most successful alliance in history. Because we have been able to adapt as the world changed.

But we need to ensure that we continue to change. So we have launched what we call NATO 2030.

This is about how we can shape NATO to better meet the challenges of the future. Like cyber, disruptive technologies and the shifting global balance of power.

Young people have the greatest stake in our future. And I look forward to your views and questions on all these subjects.

But today I will focus my remarks on climate change.

I have been passionate about climate change policy for many years.

My first job in government – 30 years ago – was as Deputy Minister for the Environment in Norway. After 10 years serving as Prime Minister of Norway, I had the privilege of serving as UN Special Envoy on Climate Change. And now, as Secretary General of NATO, I am concerned with how climate change affects our security.

NATO was established over 70 years ago. Our main task has been to preserve peace by making it clear that any attack on any ally is regarded as an attack on all allies.

Based on the principle of one for all and all for one, we have been able to prevent any military attack against any ally.

But unlike a military attack, climate change cannot be completely prevented. It is happening right now.

So it's even more important that we do everything we can to limit the warming of our planet. And that we adapt.

Some may ask if NATO, a military alliance, should be concerned with climate change. My answer is that yes, we should. And for three reasons.

Because climate change makes the world more dangerous.

Because it makes it harder for our military forces to keep our people safe.

And because we all have a responsibility to do more to

combat climate change. Let me set out how I think NATO

should deal with each of these three points.

First, climate change is making the world more dangerous.

The weather is becoming wilder, warmer, windier and wetter. Drought, floods and other extremes make life increasingly more difficult for people around the world. **Fuelling conflict.** **Exacerbating threats.** **And adding pressure on natural resources like food, water and power.** You can see this in the Sahel region of Africa. Where drought places further stress on communities, **creates fertile ground for terrorists,** and **drives migration.**

You can see it in the Arctic, where geo-political competition is heating up as the ice melts.

And in our own countries, **where our armed forces are increasingly called upon to rescue people from floods or wild fires.**

There is no doubt that climate change affects our security. So it is essential that NATO monitors and tracks what is happening much more closely. And that we fully integrate climate change into our military planning and exercises.

**The second reason climate change matters to NATO is because it makes it harder for our militaries to keep our people safe. NATO troops are often**

exposed to the world's most hazardous and difficult environments. On land or at sea, from the desert to the jungle. Whether engaged in combat operations, training or disaster relief.

For instance in Iraq, where NATO has a training mission. This summer, temperatures in Bagdad soared above 50 degrees Centigrade. That's over 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Just imagine being in that heat – let alone wearing full combat gear! It quickly becomes impossible for anybody to function.

And it's not only people that don't work properly in extremes. It's equipment too.

In Afghanistan, the UK had to replace some of its helicopter engines because they simply couldn't cope with the heat.

Climate change doesn't only affect how we operate, but also where we operate. Much of our critical infrastructure is exposed.

For example, the US naval base in Norfolk, Virginia, home to one of NATO's strategic commands, suffers from regular and extensive flooding. Major European ports like Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg face similar challenges.

To remain effective, we must adapt.

This means uniforms, vehicles, equipment and infrastructure that can protect our troops. And help them in their job of keeping us safe.

We already work with our 30 member countries across Europe and North America to better prepare them for shocks to things like energy, food and water supplies.

We do this through guidelines on how to be more resilient.

I want us to look at how we can further strengthen these guidelines to fully take climate change into account. Such as by ensuring our energy and telecommunications grids can withstand more extreme weather events.

And we need to strengthen our ability to respond to natural disasters.

NATO's Disaster Response Centre has brought many nations together in the face of COVID-19. Delivering hundreds of tons of critical supplies around the world. Setting up almost 100 field hospitals. And transporting patients and medical personnel.

Just as we have supported national governments during COVID-19, we must also be prepared to do more in relation to climate-related disasters.

The third reason why combatting climate change is simply because we all have a responsibility to cut emissions. So we can help preserve the future of our planet.

The supply of fuel has always been a critical, difficult and dangerous part of military operations. Fuel supply lines are notoriously vulnerable. Long lines of fuel trucks are open to attack.

NATO runs projects to reduce fuel use through our Green Defence framework. Championed by Denmark. We do this for practical military reasons. Not just to save the environment, but to save lives.

Dutch soldiers, for example, increasingly use solar panels instead of diesel generators during operations. The United States and Canada are also looking at integrating solar panels into their combat gear to power the increasing amount of electronic equipment soldiers carry. Other NATO countries are experimenting with hydrogen fuel cells and batteries to generate and store electricity. But we need to go further.

Countries around the world are setting in law the ambition to reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050.

I believe it is time to explore how NATO and our armed forces can contribute to this goal. Helping Allies to reduce their military carbon footprint. Without reducing their effectiveness. And sharing that expertise with our partners around the world.

A first step could be for NATO to help members of our Alliance to calculate the specific carbon output of their militaries. And then to report those figures. The next step could be to consider voluntary targets for Allies to progressively cut those emissions.

NATO is setting an example.

This headquarters, here in Brussels, is a green building. Using geothermal power for heat. And rainwater collection for building maintenance.

It is time to raise our ambition. And drive down carbon emissions across our armed forces. The 30 members of the NATO Alliance make up around half of the world's economy. We have close to one billion people. And we are leaders in technological change. So NATO can be a catalyst for positive change.

As the only institution that brings the nations of Europe and North America together around the same table every single day, it is the ideal vehicle for sharing information, ideas and expertise.

For developing best practice and training. And for supporting national policy. NATO's core task is to keep us all safe.

Climate change is making the world more unsafe. So to full our main responsibility, NATO must help to curb climate change.

For my generation and especially for yours.

NATO 2030 is about the future. You represent our future leaders. And I very much look forward to hearing your views.

Today I can announce that on the 9th November we will hold the first ever NATO Youth Summit. And I very much look forward to you joining me there.

Thank you so much, and then I'm ready for your questions.

MODERATOR: Secretary General, thank you for your speech that sets out so clearly just why climate change is NATO's business too and not just for the governments. I would also like to thank you for your willingness to engage with students. And my task here today really is just to facilitate this conversation. There has been a lot of interest in this event, over a thousand registrations. And we have . . . we will be joined virtually, of course, by 10 students who will be asking questions directly to you. But we will also be gathering further questions from our audience. Some we have already received through email. Others can be put to us via the Q&A box on the Zoom function. And at the same time, there will be some polling. And please take the opportunity to answer the questions and we shall read the results before the end of this conversation. But I don't want to take up more space, because this really is an opportunity for the students to engage directly with you. So let me introduce our first student from the University of Copenhagen. Please, the screen is yours.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. So when it comes to the handling of climates and these challenges, I find that some national military organisations have shifted their focus from more traditional defence focus, towards a focus on resilience, precaution and crisis response. So my question is whether this strategic shift is present within NATO as well. And if you're developing new capacities to be able to respond to a climate induced crisis. So you already mentioned this briefly, but maybe you can expand a little bit. Thank you.

MODERATOR: New strategic focus of NATO.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: Yes, absolutely, of course, we have to be focussed on resilience because to keep us all safe is not only about having the traditional military capabilities, but it is also to address many other types of threats and challenges. And climate change is adding on to that. Of course, this is about cyber, it's about terrorist threats, it's about what we call hybrid threats and many other threats, but climate change is adding to that. So that's the reason why NATO, actually also based on our founding treaty the Washington Treaty, in Paragraph 3, it's stated clearly that all Allies are responsible for being resilient, and part of that is having resilient infrastructure, health services and so on.

And NATO has seven guidelines or baseline requirements where we outline requirements for resilience of each and every country in these different areas. That has always been important. But with more extreme weather, with more vulnerabilities in power grids, for infrastructure, ports, telecommunication grids and so on, resilience has just become even more

important. And that's the reason why, also, NATO Allies, for the first time in our history, at our summit in 2016 in Warsaw, made what we call a resilience commitment, increasing the focus on the need to create resilient societies as response to many threats, including climate change.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much. I shall continue by inviting Phoebe Chubb from Exeter University to ask her question. And yeah, please, Phoebe.

QUESTION: Does NATO view the reduction of the Arctic ice as a strategic issue or opportunity?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, the melting of Arctic ice is an issue, it is a strategic issue, and it reflects something which is very dangerous: that actually climate change is taking place now.

I am from Norway. I visited the Arctic many times and part of Norway is actually in the Arctic and we see the melting of ice. We see it in Greenland, the Danish part of the kingdom of Denmark and we see it in Svalbard and we see it in many other places. So this is a very stark and very concrete warning about that climate change is not a theoretical possibility in the future. It is something that is happening right now.

And then, of course, that can lead to, especially when you have ice on land also on the Greenland, and Iceland, Greenland, glaciers on land in Norway and other places. When that melts, it will contribute to rising sea levels with enormous consequences, not only for infrastructure, but also for millions of people all over the world living close to the sea. And they may be forced to move. So this has, of course, strategic implications globally.

Second, it has also strategic implications in the High North in the Arctic, because new sea lines may be opened, military presence will be more easy, new access to natural resources, may be more accessible. And all of this has strategic implications.

At the same time, the High North has always been a place where we have aimed for low tensions. And even during the coldest period of the Cold War, we have seen a kind of minimum of cooperation between NATO Allies - many of them being Arctic countries, or at least several of them being Arctic countries - and Russia, and before that, the Soviet Union.

So working in the Arctic Council, working in what we call the Barents Council, the Barents Cooperation. These are platforms for also dialogue, working with Russia, to try to keep tensions low and address common issues

like climate change, environment, search and rescue and so on.

So, yes, there are significant strategic consequences of the warming in the Arctic. But at the same time, we need also to see the opportunities to maintain cooperation and hopefully also strengthen cooperation in the Arctic.

MODERTOR: So, from cooperation in the High North, we move to Spain University of Deusto, Jose Manuel, the screen is yours.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. So, NATO has been successful in providing with aid to member countries' authorities when managing this migration crisis. And also NATO has been successful in addressing the roots of these conflicts. However, when talking about climate-induced migration, the roots might be not managed well enough or not predictable enough. For example, when the case is the rise of the sea levels and the consequences, of course, they are not predictable enough. In this vein, and foreseeing potential risks such as ethnic or political conflicts in the host communities, my question is: what are the main challenges for NATO in this respect and what are the future expectations on the developing of a new Strategic Concept?

Thank you.

JENS STOLTENBERG: There are many different reasons for migration and many different reasons for why people try to leave the country where they are born and where they grew up. Wars, conflict, poverty, political oppression. There are many different reasons. **But climate change is now one additional reason because it creates living conditions for people, which become even more difficult with more droughts, flooding, extreme weather and so on.** So the problem is that in the regions of the world where we already faced huge challenges related to poverty migration, we have climate change on top. And **that exacerbates the situation and adds to the pressure on migration.**

Of course, NATO can only deal with part of that. But NATO is working hard to address those challenges, partly to address some of the root causes for the conflict instability we see in the south. And we strongly believe that prevention is better than intervention. We need to help countries stabilise their own countries. And that's exactly what we try to do in countries like Iraq, where we train and advise and help local forces to help to stabilise Iraq. It's actually also what we do in Afghanistan. And we are looking into how we can work also with other partners, Tunisia, Jordan and other countries in what we, in the NATO jargon, often call the south. So NATO is part of this, and to help build stability in our neighbourhood, it's important for our security. When our neighbours are more stable, we are more secure.

We have a Strategic Concept today in NATO, which was agreed in 2010, and in that Strategic Concept it is stated that global warming, climate change, is a strategic challenge, affects our security. So that's nothing new. We actually had that position for many years. What we are trying to do now is to develop and strengthen the approach. And that is part of what we call NATO 2030, addressing future challenges, including climate change I expect that some Allies will address the potential need for a new Strategic Concept, a part of the NATO 2030 process in NATO. It's too early to conclude, but some Allies have already announced that they see the need for a new Strategic Concept. So I expect that to be part of that discussion.

MODERATOR: Moving across the Atlantic to Georgetown University. I have a question from Jennifer Grosman Fernández.

QUESTION: The shifting balance of power will impact the climate security sphere as Russia and China securitise the newly-accessible Arctic, leverage climate-induced shocks for geopolitical gain, and dominate clean energy technology. While climate security is clearly rising in relevance, Alliance member countries vary in the recognition of climate risks. How will NATO build the

political consensus necessary to adequately respond to climate threats emerging from this shifting balance of power?

JENS STOLTENBERG: First, I think your question highlights one important message when it comes to climate change and security. And that is that climate change is a kind of crisis multiplier. Very often climate change in itself doesn't create the crisis, but it enhances the seriousness and the challenges we are already faced with. So, it's a crisis multiplier, but also a kind of a challenge multiplier. It adds to trends we have already seen in the security domain. And therefore it's important to build consensus. NATO is a consensus-based organisation. So when we are going to face, deal with climate change, of course, consensus is the tool.

Therefore, I welcome that Allies are now putting this on the agenda as part of the NATO 2030 debate. And just this month, UK – United Kingdom – and Italy, they invited all Allies to a discussion here at the NATO Headquarters to address climate change and the security consequences. And by having discussions like that with all 30 Allies from Europe and North America, sitting together in the same room discussing these issues, we are step-by-step building consensus among an alliance representing one billion people, close to one billion people, half the world's economic might, building consensus on climate change.

Then, of course, part of this broad picture is also the global shift in the global balance of power, with the rise of China. And what we do now in NATO is that we, for the first time in our history, we actually decided at our meeting, Leaders Meeting in London in December last year, to say that now NATO has to address the implications of the rise of China to our security. We don't regard China as an adversary or as an enemy, but there are security consequences, some opportunities, but also some challenges, to the rise of China.

NATO will remain a regional Alliance in North America and Europe. NATO is not going to move into the South China Sea. But we have to take into account the fact that China's coming closer to us in cyberspace, in the Arctic, in Africa, investing in infrastructure in Europe, in NATO-Allied countries, and also the fact that China is very much a presence in cyber, but also by developing missiles, weapons systems, that can reach all NATO Allies.

So China is one part of this big picture, changing global security environment, which we are addressing also through the NATO 2030 process.

MODERATOR: Thank you. And I'm sure questions about

China will return. JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah.

MODERATOR: I'm told we can try the Baltic Defence College.

QUESTION: Climate change and environmental issues are increasingly important with respect to regional sensitivity, as well as to all geopolitical order. How should NATO policy simultaneously develop to mitigate and adapt to climate change, as well as address existing security challenges in NATO's eastern flank?

MODERATOR: Prioritisation.

JENS STOLTENBERG: The easiest answer to that is that we are not going to choose between either address risks and challenges related to global warming, climate change, or threats and

challenges we see, for instance, related to a more assertive Russia, the challenges our Allies in the Baltic region face.

NATO has to be an alliance which is able to have a 360 degree approach, as we say, being able to defend all Allies against any threat from any direction. And that's the only way we can continue to be the most successful alliance in history. That's one of the reasons we have actually called on Allies to invest more in defence, because we live in a more uncertain, unpredictable world. And therefore, we need more resources for our security.

NATO has already responded to the aggressive actions of Russia against Ukraine. The military build-up, the deployment of new nuclear-capable missiles in Russia, violating the INF Treaty, the treaty that banned all intermediate-range missiles. We have done that partly by increasing the readiness of our forces, tripled the size of the NATO Response Force. We have air policing. We have increased our maritime presence in the Baltic region. But perhaps the most important bit, for the first time in NATO's history, we have combat-ready troops in the Baltic countries and Poland. We have also increased our presence in the Black Sea region. And the fact that we have multinational NATO troops in the Baltic countries sends a very clear message, because NATO is already there. If any Baltic country is touched, then NATO is already there, responding. And that sends a strong message of Alliance unity and it underpins the security guarantees that NATO provides to all Allies, also the Baltic countries.

MODERATOR: You mentioned Poland and, indeed, it is to the University of Warsaw that we will turn.

QUESTION: Yes, thank you. The United States and China have engaged in what is described by many as the Great Power Competition, or the New Cold War. For years the United States have been considered the backbone of NATO's deterrence policy, but now its strategic focus has started to shift from Europe and Russia to China and the Indo-Pacific. And there are many concerns that, at some point, the United States will decide to actually withdraw fully from Europe. And how NATO is adapting to the China challenge and what specific initiatives are being implemented in order to enhance the transatlantic cooperation?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Historically, NATO has been focussed on the Soviet Union, back in during the Cold War and then after that, Russia, especially after the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. But now we are, for the first time in our history, also addressing the implications of the rise of China. And again, as I said, we don't regard China as an adversary or an enemy, but there are some

security consequences of the rise of China – partly because they now have the second largest defence budget in the world, investing heavily in new capabilities, missiles, nuclear weapons. But, for instance, just over the last few years, they have deployed more ships than the total UK Navy. So it just demonstrates the magnitude of the military strength of China. And then we see China, Chinese companies, for instance, investing heavily in infrastructure in our own countries. And this raises some concerns.

We have seen the debate about telecommunications, 5G and Huawei, which NATO Allies have to address in one way or another.

Then, my message to the United States is that a strong NATO is good for Europe, but it is also good for the United States. Partly, peace and stability in Europe is good for the United States: two World Wars and the Cold War have taught us all that. But second, when I go to the United

States, I hear concerns about the size of China, the technological advances of China, the size of the Chinese economy, soon the largest economy in the world, defence budgets, their new military capabilities. The size of China is of concern in the United States.

And then I remind the United States on the following – I know I’m not the only one that do that, but many people do that – is that it is good for the United States to have friends. I spoke to the US Congress last spring and my main message was that it’s good to have friends. And it’s a great advantage for the United States to have 29 friends and Allies. No other major power has that.

So if the United States is concerned about the size of China, then it’s even more important to keep friends and Allies in NATO close, because together we are 50 per cent of the world’s GDP, 50 per cent of the world’s military might. And we are leading together in many, many areas when it comes to technological development. So, if anything, the rise of China makes NATO even more important for all of us, but especially for the United States.

MODERATOR: Now, the next question will be in French. There’s interpretation there. I will turn to Les Jeunes de l’Institut Des Hautes Etudes De Défense Nationale.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. Now, during this conference, you’ve talked about the impact of climate change on the geopolitical and geostrategic context. We’ve been talking about a more green strategy for defence. And today, the European Union, at community level, is trying to encourage initiatives of this kind to face the challenges of tomorrow. On this question of research and development in the defence sector, Secretary General, what do you think the Alliance can do and how do you see that linking up with what the European Union is doing on the same subject?

MODERATOR: So, research and defence.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, I think it’s extremely important that NATO and the European Union work closer together. I’ve always believed in that, but also faced with the challenges we see related to climate change.

Therefore, actually, I’m very glad to see that, over the last years, we have been able to lift cooperation between the European Union and NATO up to unprecedented levels. This was something I worked very hard on, together with the previous leadership in the European Union, President Jean-Claude Juncker and President Donald Tusk, and also High Representative Federica Mogherini, but also the current leadership - President Ursula von der Leyen, Charles Michel and Josep Borrell, the Vice President. They, all of them, are

very engaged and supportive of working together, NATO and the European Union. So for me, it is extremely important that we continue to strengthen this cooperation. And I also welcome EU efforts on defence. I think it is important for all NATO Allies, for the European Union, for all of us, that Europe is investing more, doing more in the defence domain. Not to replace or to duplicate NATO, but to complement NATO, because, of course, EU cannot replace NATO. But EU and NATO has to work together and also in addressing how we can address climate change and the technological need to develop new and more advanced technologies.

MODERATOR: Thank you. So now we turn to the University of Heidelberg in Germany.

QUESTION: Thank you. Since ecological challenges are often, if not always, transnational in character and since NATO is international, the Alliance has a problem if its nations disagree on

the existence and extent of threats as they do. For instance, in the fields of climate policy, the US and parts of Eastern Europe do not prioritise climate issues, as evident in their stance on the Paris Agreement. And despite the adoption of the Green Defence Framework in 2014, one easily gets the impression that NATO still lacks concrete institutional structures or recommendations for action. So given its internal divide, what can NATO effectively implement at all? What can you personally do to get the member states to act now and not tomorrow or the day after? And

nally, as it is virtually impossible to make up for the carbon emissions caused by warfare and the defence industry, how can NATO avoid the impression of merely greenwashing the organisation?

MODERATOR: Thank you. Provocative question.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah, but that's reason why we have questions. So, first of all, it is absolutely correct that there are differences and disagreements between NATO Allies. And that's, in a way, perhaps my main task, my main reason to be Secretary General, is that I have the obligation to try to keep 30 Allies together and to find platforms where they can agree. The good . . . and that's a challenge. It's not always easy. There's no way to deny that.

But having said that, first of all, we have seen differences before, as part of NATO's history, dating back to the Suez Crisis in the 1950s, or when France decided to leave the military cooperation in NATO in the 1960s or the Iraq war in 2003. There has been and there still are differences, disagreements between NATO Allies, because we are 30 countries, with different political history, geography, North America and Europe.

And that's one of the reasons why we have launched NATO 2030, because we know that the only way to build consensus is by addressing the issues: discuss them, put forward different proposals and see how we can develop agreement consensus, because to try to deny the challenges, that's no way forward. So the importance of NATO 2030 is that we are honest and we put on the table also the difficult and sensitive issues.

And I agree that climate change that it, to some extent, divides Allies and therefore I welcome the debate. Climate change is already part of our Strategic Concept. But to develop a policy, to strengthen that to find out exactly what it means, that is what is on the table now as part of this forward-looking process, NATO 2030.

We are already doing things like the Framework for Green Defence. And as I said in my speech, the beauty of that is that you can be concerned about reducing the use of fossil fuels, not necessarily because you're concerned

about climate change. But even if you're not concerned about climate change, you should be focussed on how can we reduce the use of fossil fuels, because that makes our forces more vulnerable. For, also, for purely military reasons, we should look into how solar panels, biofuels, hydrogen fuel cells and so on can power more of our operations, because that will make them less vulnerable. The supply of fossil fuels has always been a great challenge and dangerous operations for military operations.

So I don't think we need so many new institutions. What we need is to use the existing institutions, the decision-making bodies of NATO, to make decisions on how to advance further the work which is already ongoing on how to reduce our emissions, either because we're concerned about climate change, which I am, or because we are concerned about the dependence on fossil fuels, which are always difficult and hard to supply. I am concerned about

both the vulnerabilities related to the supply of fossil fuels and climate change, so I have twice the reasons to be focussed on how to reduce emissions from military operations.

MODERATOR: Let me turn now Isabel Hernandez Pepe from Luiss in Rome.

QUESTION: Good afternoon, Secretary General. My question for you is: how can NATO work with big tech companies such as Facebook, Google and Twitter to address the problem of disinformation of the climate change debate, which is arguably compounded by their own use of artificial intelligence? Thank you.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Disinformation is a great, it's a big challenge and something we have to take very seriously. And of course, part of that is also to work with the big companies. My main message is that NATO will never meet or counter propaganda with propaganda. I believe in the truth. And I also believe strongly that the truth will prevail. What we do is that we provide facts and we share them with Allies. We push back when we see disinformation against NATO or NATO Allies in the security domain. We have seen that related to COVID-19, we have seen it related to how we respond to terrorist threats and in many other areas.

Let me also add two more things. And that is that, I think that we can do a lot, NATO, but at the end of the day, this is about protecting a core value for NATO and that is a free and independent press. If we have free and independent journalist, media who are able to check their sources, ask the difficult questions, check their stories, then that's the best way to respond to disinformation.

And I also think we all of us, all of us individually, you and I, we have a responsibility to check the sources and to not share on social media disinformation. So I would like to work with the big companies. I think that NATO as an institution has, of course, a great role to play. But I also believe strongly in the importance of a free and independent media, which is coordinated to protect, and the responsibility of each and every one of us to not share disinformation and check the sources when we read things on social media.

MODERATOR: Thank you. And now our final question from Carleton University, Canada.

QUESTION: I'd like to ask a question about whether you see a role for NATO in supporting global health, particularly universal vaccine access, for both current and future pandemics. The COVAX facility aims to develop and

distribute two billion vaccines to 92 middle and lower income countries by the end of 2021. But the challenge of delivering vaccines in insecure and under-resourced contexts remains. Can NATO support the administration of COVID-19 vaccines for the hardest to reach, especially those in fragile and conflict-affected states? And how can this support be accomplished without militarising vaccine delivery? Thank you.

MODERATOR: Great question.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah, we should always be very careful about militarising vaccine delivery and be very aware of our responsibilities and our different roles. Having said that, of course, NATO is ready to help if there is a request from the civil society and from different nations, member nations or partner nations. And if we do that in the right way, I think we can play a key role, at least an important supportive role, of the civilian efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, to address other health issues. Which we have already done – NATO has played a key role in, for instance, Afghanistan, a vulnerable country, where NATO has a significant presence.

And our military operation, the Resolute Support Mission, has helped to distribute protective equipment, masks, vaccines, set up field hospitals and helped a lot when it comes to basic health infrastructure.

We have also helped in Iraq, doing very much the same. In Kosovo and in other places where we have NATO missions and operations. Those NATO missions and operations have been extremely supportive in these countries to help them provide basic healthcare equipment, also in response to COVID-19.

Of course, we have not distributed vaccines so far, because there's been no vaccines to distribute. But, of course, we can do that also in the future as we have distributed face masks or other medical equipment if there is a request and if we find the right way of doing that.

NATO-Allied countries have also played a key role, in helping to distribute equipment, but also transport patients, medical personnel and so on. So the military effort in support of the civilian response to COVID-19 has been significant across the Alliance, partly also organised and supported by the NATO structures. So I think what we have seen is that military can support civilian healthcare services when there is a need and request for that.

Let me just briefly say that in my previous life, I also worked very much on vaccines. I was on the board of a consultancy called GAVI, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation. So I really see the need for a global effort to help the most vulnerable countries. And again, NATO is ready. We have done a lot already in some countries, we can do more if there is a request and if we find the right way to work together with other international institutions.

The last thing I'll say about this is that we have, for instance, responded to a UN request to set up a field hospital in West Africa, a huge undertaking, a big hospital. The UK and other Allies delivered the hospital, we delivered the strategic airlift. And it just shows that NATO can play a role, also, in responding to a major health crisis.

MODERATOR: Thank you. And you've been very disciplined with time management. So we actually have a couple of minutes to ask one or two questions from our audience. They have posted the questions on the Zoom chat. So I'd like to take first question which is about the Eastern Mediterranean and the rising tensions there and whether there are any mechanisms to mitigate or handle divergence within the Alliance.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Of course, in NATO we are concerned when we see

tensions increased between . . . or we see tensions between two NATO Allies, Greece and Turkey, in the Eastern Mediterranean. And we have also seen a significant presence of ships, planes, military capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. And therefore, here at NATO, we have taken an initiative. We have helped to bring together two highly-valued Allies, Greece and Turkey, to sit together and see how we can develop what we call military deconfliction mechanisms. This is about, you know, how to make sure that ships, planes keep the necessary distance, behave in a responsible way. So we prevent, avoid incidents and accidents, and if they happen, prevent them from spiralling out of control. And there are always risks with that when we have so many ships at the same place in the same sea territory, as we have seen in the Eastern Med.

I have reached out both to the Greek Prime Minister, to President Erdoğan, to the leadership in Ankara and Athens. And we are working on that. These talks are what we call technical military

talks, because they are addressing a technical military issue to try to deconflict in the Eastern Med. Hopefully, if we can find a solution, establish these mechanisms, then that can help to support the German-led efforts to facilitate talks on the underlying main problem: disagreement on border issues and other issues in the Eastern Med between Greece and Turkey. So there is ongoing work here at NATO. Deconfliction is important in itself. It reduces the risks, for incidents and accidents. And hopefully it can also then support the efforts of Germany to address the underlying main problem.

MODERATOR: Thank you. And I think we have to start moving towards ending this conversation, but I do have a question for you. I'm very impressed with the competence and knowledge that you have on all things with respect to climate change. And, of course, you have a deep personal involvement in this topic. I'd like to ask you on, again, on a more personal note: are you optimistic about our ability to fight climate change?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Fundamentally, I am an optimist, because the world and humankind has been able to address so many other challenges. And I strongly believe in science. So . . . and it is possible. But then, I have to also say that I am not an optimist if you think, if you ask me whether I think it's possible to prevent climate change. Climate change, as I already said, is happening right now, and it has all the negative effects on the life of many people around the world. But I am absolutely certain that it is possible to prevent, you know, the development moving into, what should I say, a really, really kind of catastrophic situation. And it's important and it is possible to curb and to start to limit the emissions and to start to get them down, mainly because I believe in science and technology, which has been so helpful in solving many other environmental issues. When I started to become engaged in environmental issues, then the big issue was the ozone layer and we have been able as a world to almost remove all the emissions that destroy the ozone layer. In our part of Europe, it was acid rain. We have been able to almost remove all the emissions that caused acid rain. And there are many . . . lead in gasoline, pollution in cities was a big issue – it's not fully solved, but to a very large extent has been solved as an environmental problem.

So when we have solved so many other environmental problems, then we should also be able to solve climate change.

And then, the last thing I would say is that when I meet young people, as the young people I met today, with the knowledge, the enthusiasm and also the criticism of power and people like me, then I'm very optimistic, because they are the future. They have the will, but also the competence to address climate change.

MODERATOR: So, Secretary General, I'm very glad, by the way, that you mentioned the battles that have been won, because I think it's important for the younger generations, who might not recall the debates in the 1980s and 1990s, to know that things can be changed. So we have done some polling with our audience. So let's see what results have come out. The first question was about: what is the biggest security challenge in 2030? And indeed, 68 per cent believe it's the impacts of climate change, versus 46 per cent on cyber and new technology, which suggests to me that other threats are seen as far less important, the more traditional threats are seen as less challenging. And what should the military do about climate change? So, 77 per cent believe that they should both use less fossil fuel and plan to operate in changing circumstances. And

that's a large percentage. And then what should NATO's role on climate change . . . what should it be? 60 per cent think realistic and 37 per cent ambitious. Where do you stand on this one?

JENS STOLTENBERG: I am amongst

the 37 per cent. MODERATOR: The

37 per cent.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Why not be? I think the only realistic thing is to be ambitious. So that's the way we have to deal with climate change.

MODERATOR: Well, thank you very much, Secretary General. I'd also like to thank the universities that have cooperated to make this event possible. And let me just thank, especially, the students. I think they've been very brave to come on screen and pose their questions to you, including challenging questions. There will be other opportunities to engage and you mentioned the NATO Youth Forum in November. So I do hope NATO as a whole continues to reach out to the younger generations in order to make sure that NATO has a good and participative future.

Thank you very much.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you.

Item 6



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Joint pressconference

with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of Slovenia, Marjan Šarec

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09 Oct. 2018 - | Last updated: 09 Oct. 2018 17:52

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(As delivered)

Prime Minister, thank you for your warm welcome, for hosting me and my delegation here. And also congratulations on your appointment as Prime Minister of Slovenia. I very much look forward to working with you but also with your Foreign Minister and your Defence Minister, two politicians I know very well from their previous positions. So I really appreciate it to be here and to meet with all of you and to discuss the challenges we face as an Alliance.

But I also appreciate to come to Ljubljana because as a child I lived in Yugoslavia in the 60s and we came back many times in the 1970s and I remember very well that when we went to Ljubljana I already then loved the city, mostly because my father always gave me sladoled in Ljubljana, so that was so to say the first time I started to like this city. This time I didn't get sladoled but I got a very good lunch so thank you also for that lunch.

We are grateful for Slovenia's contributions to our shared security to the NATO Alliance. You contribute forces to our presence mission in Afghanistan, helping to fight terrorism and make sure that Afghanistan doesn't become a safe haven for international terrorists once again.

You are present, you contribute forces to our mission in Kosovo, which is key to make sure that we keep a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. And we just saw the quality of your special operations forces with the display they had outside this building when we arrived, the high quality of your

forces, and especially of your special operations forces. I'm also glad that you have contributed to and have been part of the Enhanced Forward Presence of NATO troops in the Baltics, with your presence in Latvia. And I also welcome you to the big NATO exercise later on in October, Trident Juncture, in Norway, which will be the biggest NATO exercise in many many years, showing that NATO is adapting, showing that NATO is responding to a more demanding and difficult security environment.

Then, we had a very good discussion during lunch and we addressed how NATO is adapting to a new and more challenging security environment and how we are both strengthening our collective defence at home in Europe, but at the same time projecting stability beyond our borders, through our missions and operations in the fight against terrorism but also to help partners in Europe like Ukraine, like Georgia, and other partners in Europe, which are important for us, because when our neighbours are more stable, we are more secure.

We also mentioned the importance of NATO-EU cooperation. We welcome the strengthened cooperation between NATO and the EU, and I also welcome EU efforts on defence as long as they are complementing and strengthening the European pillar within NATO and not duplicating or competing with NATO. So done in the right way, I really believe that stronger EU efforts on defence can improve burden sharing within the Alliance, and therefore I also welcome the close cooperation between our two organisations.

But of course, burden sharing is about capabilities, it's about contributions, it's about NATO-EU cooperation, but it's also about spending and investing in defence. And NATO Allies reduced defence spending after the end of the Cold War when tensions went down. I was then a politician in Norway and I was also responsible for reducing defence spending in Norway but when we are reducing defence spending when tensions go down, we have to be able to increase defence spending when tensions are going up as they are now. Therefore I welcome that you so clearly have stated that you will increase the defence investments of Slovenia. Slovenia is currently spending just about 1% of GDP on defence, so I encourage you to do more to increase, and as you said, this is in our security interest, it's something we need to make sure we are safe, and therefore I expect all Allies, also including Slovenia, to make good on the promise we made together back in 2014, to stop the cuts and start to increase defence spending.

I look very much forward to working with you and to address many different challenges including how NATO can help to address the challenges we see in the south east of Europe, working with our members there. We have a new

member Montenegro. We have welcomed the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>1</sup> as our 30<sup>th</sup> member if they can implement the name agreement with Greece. And we also work with partners like for instance Serbia to make sure that NATO continues to contribute to stability in this part of Europe. So once again, thank you so much for receiving me.

Moderator [Interpreted]: Thank you, Mr Stoltenberg. Now the floor is yours. Both the Prime Minister and Secretary General are available for your questions. But please first of all introduce yourself and state the name of your media.

Question [Radio Slovenia] [Interpreted]: Špela Novak, Radio Slovenia. Mr Prime Minister, so considering your words, will Slovenia now more quickly increase the defence funds, and the commentary of the Secretary General, other Allies also do not comply with their commitments. And the second question for Mr Stoltenberg. Considering the climate change and the yesterday's report of the climate panel warns us that we must really take action, because the climate change is probably now the biggest threat to security, don't you think that those funds that go for climate change should also be considered as funds being spent on defence, or security?

Marjan Šarec [Prime Minister of Slovenia] [Interpreted]: Thank you for your question. Let me start at the end; you have said that also other Allies do not deliver on their commitment. This is just like a child who comes from school and says, well others have also had the worst mark for their test, not just me. It's about an increase in the defence budget and not so much for the sake of NATO but, as I have emphasised, for the sake of ourselves. It is about ourselves, so that we can have a state that we can be proud of, so that's why we have to fulfil the promises. The dynamic of an increase in the defence budget will follow the planned path. We have noted down what our objective is. Some Allies are already now paying 2% of GDP, of course this cannot happen overnight in Slovenia, but of course we'll make our utmost effort to attain our objective of at least 1.5% in a couple of years. If the situation will allow this of course.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: First on defence spending; I think we have to understand that when we made the commitment in 2014 to invest more, we didn't promise to spend 2% next year. What we said was that we should stop the cuts. After years of decline in defence budgets, we promised to stop that trend. Second, we promised to start to increase in real terms. And thirdly, we promised to move towards spending 2% of GDP within a decade, meaning within 2024.

The good news is that all Allies have stopped the cuts, all Allies have started to increase, in real terms, and the majority of Allies have put forward plans on how to reach 2% by 2024. When we made the pledge, it was only three Allies that spent 2% of GDP on defence. This year, we expect eight Allies to spend 2% of GDP on defence. So, we are really making progress. I welcome also the fact that Slovenia has at least stopped the cuts and started to increase, but we have to remember that the average now in NATO - it varies how much different Allies spend - but the average, if we exclude the United States, is around 1.5%, a bit above 1.5%. Slovenia is around 1% and the difference between 1.5% and 1%, that's 50%. So, that's a significant difference. So, as I said, I encourage Slovenia to do more and I am encouraged by the strong messages from the Prime Minister and from the Foreign and Defence Ministers. So, as I said, this is something we need to because it's in our security interests, with a more assertive Russia and with all the turmoil and the violence we see in the Middle East, fighting Daesh/ISIL, and also to protect our cyber networks and address new threats and challenges.

Then you asked about climate change. Well, for me, there is no way we can choose between either addressing our security challenges or addressing climate change. We just need to do both. NATO has recognised that climate change is a security challenge and that's also the reason why we have expressed concern about climate change, because it can lead to, you know, **more migration, more instability**. But we cannot say that we either spend on addressing climate change or defence, we just need to do both. And let me also add that, in my previous capacity, I worked with climate change - as Prime Minister of Norway.

And then I think we have to remember that to invest in new technologies, to invest in clean production, is that technology and the industry of the future. So, it's profitable. It's possible to earn money if you invest in clean and environmentally-friendly technology. On top of that, we have to remember that the principle we have agreed to, in the UN and in other fora is that we need to live by the principle polluter pay, or polluters pay principle, meaning that it's not just state budgets that are going to pay for the investments in green technology. It's the industries, it's you and me, and one of the most effective tools we have in the fight against climate change is carbon pricing, and that actually generates revenue to states' budgets, which can be used them to increase defence spending. So, this is a win/win for all of us.

Moderator [Interpreted]: Are there any other questions?

Question [TV Slovenia] [Interpreted]: Marta Razboršek, TV Slovenia. Did

you also talk about the Port of Koper? Is NATO going to use the Port of Koper? There is a protest announced in front of the parliament today, so what is your comment?

Marjan Šarec [Prime Minister of Slovenia] [Interpreted]: About the Port of Koper, there's disinformation in the public about this and I am convinced that Slovenia must make use of its good geostrategic position in general. And since NATO is not solely a military organisation, but also a political organisation, this means that it is also creates cooperation, and Slovenia has a very good geostrategic position and can exploit this potential in the future, if it wishes so. We can see many opportunities for this, but of course this does not mean that there will be a base like in Aviano, what I have heard in the public, but this is not true.

But as I have said, Slovenia is a member of NATO and we should state openly that there's a number of people in Slovenia who believe that NATO is not an organisation the member of which Slovenia should be, but I always look back into the history and I look back at the 70 years of NATO's history, and I concluded this organisation is successful. And let me emphasise once again that we should not throw away the results of the work of our predecessors, 15 years ago. Let us not forget the huge success at the referendum, at that time. Of course these protests, I understand them, as in spirit of democracy, what kind of a democracy would we be if people wouldn't protest? People have always protested and always will, but it should be the arguments that prevail and not power. Thank you very much.

Moderator [Interpreted]: Any other questions?

Question [TV Slovenia] [Interpreted]: The interest of NATO in the Port of Koper, for transport purposes.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Well, that's something we leave to our military authorities to address and to assess what kind of infrastructure and what kind of infrastructure we are interested in. So, I will leave that to our military authorities to comment on that.

Question [Interpreted]: ...some indicators, public support for NATO membership in Slovenia has significantly dropped since 2004. Are you concerned by this? You recently said in an interview that political debate over NATO should not be feared, but welcomed. Does that rule apply to all member states, including Slovenia?

Question [Interpreted]: And the question for the Prime Minister; is the Slovenian membership of NATO still legitimate, considering the public

opinion polls, where we can see that we have less... or half of the citizens' support for this? Some people who say that they wouldn't like to be members of this organisation also sit in the parliament, government, so what is your opinion?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: NATO is an Alliance of 29 democracies, and in democracies there are always different opinions about many issues, and sometimes also about NATO, and that just reflects the fact that we are democratic societies. So, we have seen in different countries, including my own, Norway, that there is discussion about NATO, and also some parties... some political movements want the country to leave NATO. But that has always been the case, for decades.

And I think that history has shown us that, despite those different opinions, despite those different views, within NATO Allies and between NATO Allies, we have always been able to gather and to mobilise the necessary support from all Allies, and to unite around our core task to protect and defend each other. So, the fact that there is debate, the fact that there is discussion, is something I welcome, because I believe in open democratic processes. We should not be afraid of that. In totalitarian regimes they are afraid of debate. In totalitarian regimes they are hysterical about different views. I actually believe it is a sign of strength, not weakness, that we have open debates in our countries, including about NATO.

Having said that, I know that the general trend now is actually increased support for NATO. It varies between different NATO Allies, but the support for NATO has increased, because people see that we live in a more dangerous world. We see a much more assertive Russia, using violence against neighbours - Ukraine and Georgia. A Russia which is responsible for attempts to meddle in our democratic processes, undermine our democratic institutions. And we saw last week how Russian intelligence officers tried to hack the International Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, an important international institution which is responsible for the convention that prohibits chemical weapons.

So, I think that not only the use of military force, but also what we call hybrid tactics, cyber, highlights the importance of having a strong NATO, defending not only our territories, but also our cyber networks and our democratic institutions. And then we have terrorism, we have ISIL, we have instability, and all that also requires a strong NATO. The Prime Minister mentioned during the lunch that he is a fighter and that fighters are not always very popular, except for when there are res, and that's exactly when

we need them. And that's also the case with NATO. When there are threats and challenges, then we need a strong NATO. And now there are more threats and challenges and then the support for NATO has increased.

Marjan Šarec [Prime Minister of Slovenia] [Interpreted]: About the public support, I would like to tell you that also in the UK, the public has expressed its opinion, at the referendum, that they would like to exit the European Union, but today we can see that this is not the case because some parties that kept convincing the public prior to the referendum that they should exit the EU, this has led to the problems for the entire European Union. The public opinion was also, here in Slovenia, that they will not be able to constitute the government.

So, the public opinion is very intangible and, as the Secretary General stated, in democracies we always have different opinions, and if the Left wouldn't have a different opinion then we would maybe be today be in the same political party, but we are not today, we are different political parties with different opinions, and this is democracy, and this is what they were fighting for in the 1990, later with independence. And the public opinion also tells that there is no sense in going to the elections and that's why the turnout is constantly diminishing. I have attended all the referenda and all the elections here, because I believe that this is my duty.

So, it's not just about the rights, it's also about the duties. And if we have become members of NATO, then when the time comes and we don't like something in NATO, we should say that we must exit NATO. But I'm asking all those NATO sceptics, what is the alternative? So, what else is left there? Maybe these concerns were in place at that time, but not anymore now. So, whether we should stay a member of NATO or not was an issue before, but now we should ask ourselves what can we do to improve NATO, how can we make sure that our voice is heard in NATO. And the same goes for the EU, because I consider that these two structures/organisations are linked and, as the Secretary General stressed, this is a group of democracies, and I hope that we will continue to be a member for a long time. And as I have said, it is completely legitimate to have different opinions.

Where all are of equal opinion, this means that nobody's using the brains anymore and I think it is our task, the task of the politics, to prevail with arguments, to convince with arguments those who think that there is no place in the world for this organisation. So, we need to persuade them so that they will change their minds. As the Secretary General said, the re ghters in Slovenia have been considered drunks, and I can say this because I am a re ghter, we were just considered to be good to organise a party of re

fighters, but when we had the natural disasters, like the sleet and others, then the public opinion up to 80% stated that firefighters are heroes suddenly. And I very much agree with this. If there are no such incidents, such events, of course then the awareness about the significance of such an organisation diminishes, and I am confident that this organisation will work towards this end in the future, so that Slovenia will be able to say that it does not regret its membership. And then, by way of conclusion, what is the alternative?

Moderator [Interpreted]: Thank you very much and this concludes the press conference.

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Item 7



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Food—ahungerforsecurity?

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17 Feb. 2011 - | Last updated: 17 Feb. 2011 14:50

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The potential of high food prices to act as a trigger for social and political changes has been evident across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. Higher food prices, coupled with a nancial downturn, have impacted hard on the region's people. Those hit hardest are the poor, who spend a higher percentage of their money on food.

The World Food Programme's representative in one of the countries which has seen protests, Yemen, recently stated: 'There is an obvious link between high food prices and unrest.'

The 2008 food crisis was a warning of things to come. More recently, food prices rose by 15% in just the period October 2010 to January 2011, according to the World Bank's Food Price Watch.

This time, the impacts have been felt more keenly in political and security circles. The President of the World Bank Bob Zoellick spelled out in February why this is important: 'Food prices threaten millions of poor people around the world; now food security is a global security issue,' he said.

People in NATO countries are also a ected. Europe is the world's biggest food importer. By far the largest part of the EU's budget is already dedicated to agriculture and food production.

Dealing with current - and future – increases in food prices is set to be a global problem. The UN's Food and Agricultural Organisation estimates that 70% more food will be needed globally by 2050. Part of the reason is that the world's population is set to rise by around 2 billion people this century.

But population growth is just one factor.

In the same period, **changes in climate around the world could add**

further pressure to food production.

Severe droughts in China this year are already predicted to have an impact. Dr Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India, the world's second most populous country, said in February that food security is becoming a major security issue in many developing countries.

Here NATO Review asks the experts about what the combined impact of less food security, higher populations and increased climate change could mean for security around the world. It also looks at how some of the worst effects could be avoided.



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO Secretary General attends

# United Nations “COP26” Climate Change Conference

02 Nov. 2021 - | Last updated: 02 Nov. 2021 18:38

On Tuesday (2 November 2021), NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg participated in the COP26 United Nations Climate Change Conference, hosted by the United Kingdom in Glasgow. At the World Leaders Summit, the Secretary General addressed the high-level roundtable “Climate, Peace and Stability: Weathering Risk Through COP and Beyond”. Mr Stoltenberg explained how climate change is now at the heart of NATO’s agenda, because: “climate change is a crisis multiplier, climate change is making our world more dangerous.”

The Secretary General described the action NATO is taking on climate change, including the first alliance-wide assessment to evaluate the impact of climate change on infrastructure, operations, and the security environment:

*“Windier, wetter and wilder weather matters for everything our armed forces do. So this will impact our exercises, our capabilities and we are integrating this into our military planning and our capability development. So climate change matters for NATO because it matters for our security, and NATO is now addressing these challenges.”*

Mr Stoltenberg also explained how NATO Allies are working to reduce their militaries’ dependence on fossil fuels by investing in sustainable solutions, including biofuels and solar energy.

While at COP26, the Secretary General met with several international leaders, including Prime Minister Scott Morrison of Australia, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen of Denmark, President Sauli Niinistö of Finland,

Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of Israel, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre of Norway, President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine.



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Brussels Summit Communiqué  
Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021

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14 Jun. 2021 - | Press Release (2021) 086 | Issued on 14 Jun. 2021 |

Last updated: 08 Apr. 2022 13:03

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1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the 30 NATO Allies, have gathered in Brussels to reaffirm our unity, solidarity, and cohesion, and to open a new chapter in transatlantic relations, at a time when the security environment we face is increasingly complex. NATO remains the foundation of our collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. NATO is a defensive Alliance and will continue to strive for peace, security, and stability in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain firmly committed to NATO's founding Washington Treaty, including that an attack against one Ally shall be considered an attack against us all, as enshrined in Article 5. We will continue to pursue a 360-degree approach to protect and defend our indivisible security and to

fulfil NATO's three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.

2. NATO is the strongest and most successful Alliance in history. It guarantees the security of our territory and our one billion citizens, our freedom, and the values we share, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. We are bound together by our common values, enshrined in the Washington Treaty, the bedrock of our unity, solidarity, and cohesion. We commit to fulfilling our responsibilities as Allies accordingly. We reaffirm our adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter. We are committed to the rules-based international order. We commit to reinforce consultations when the security or stability of an Ally is threatened or when our

fundamental values and principles are at risk.

3. We face multifaceted threats, systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian powers, as well as growing security challenges to our countries and our citizens from all strategic directions. Russia's aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security; terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains a persistent threat to us all. State and non-state actors challenge the rules-based international order and seek to undermine democracy across the globe. Instability beyond our borders is also contributing to irregular migration and human trafficking. China's growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance. We will engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance. We are increasingly confronted by cyber, hybrid, and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns, and by the malicious use of ever-more sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies. Rapid advances in the space domain are affecting our security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the arms control architecture also undermine our collective security. Climate change is a threat multiplier that impacts Alliance security. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territories and our populations against attack, and we will address all threats and challenges which affect Euro-Atlantic security.

4. We gather at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic continues to test our nations and our resilience. NATO and Allied militaries have supported the civilian response to the pandemic, while ensuring our collective defence and the effectiveness of our operations. We have also provided critical assistance to a number of partners through the delivery of vital medical supplies. We pay tribute to all those who combat this pandemic in our countries and around the world.

5. At our December 2019 meeting in London, we asked the Secretary General to carry out a forward-looking reflection process to further strengthen NATO's political dimension, including consultations. We recognise the important contribution of the independent group appointed by the Secretary General to support NATO 2030. As a result, today we agree NATO 2030 – a transatlantic agenda for the future. Throughout its history, NATO has continuously adapted to a changing security environment. The NATO 2030 agenda complements and builds on our ongoing political and military adaptation, strengthens our ability to deliver on the three core tasks and contributes to making our strong Alliance even stronger and ready for the future.

6. To that end we agree to:

- a. Reaffirm that NATO is the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum for consultations and joint action on all matters related to our individual and collective security. We pledge to strengthen and broaden our consultations and to ensure that NATO remains flexible and effective to conduct military operations in support of our common security. We reaffirm the Alliance's shared democratic principles as well as our commitment to the spirit and the letter of the North Atlantic Treaty. We commit to reinforcing consultations when the security or stability of an Ally is threatened or when our fundamental values and principles are at risk.
- b. Strengthen NATO as the organising framework for the collective defence of the Euro- Atlantic area, against all threats, from all directions. We reiterate our commitment to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence, and to the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge, in its entirety. We commit to the full and speedy implementation of ongoing work to further strengthen our deterrence and defence posture, and we pledge to continue to improve the readiness of our forces and to strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure to meet current and future defence needs.
- c. Enhance our resilience. Noting that resilience remains a national responsibility, we will adopt a more integrated and better coordinated approach, consistent with our collective commitment under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to reduce vulnerabilities and ensure our militaries can effectively operate in peace, crisis and conflict. Allies will develop a proposal to establish, assess, review and monitor resilience objectives to guide nationally-developed resilience goals and implementation plans. It will be up to each individual Ally to determine how to establish and meet national resilience goals and implementation plans, allowing them to do so in a manner that is compatible with respective national competences, structures, processes and obligations, and where applicable those of the EU.
- d. Foster technological cooperation among Allies in NATO, promote interoperability and encourage the development and adoption of technological solutions to address our military needs. For this purpose we will launch a civil-military Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic. We also agree to establish a NATO Innovation Fund, where Allies who so wish can support start-ups working on dual-use emerging and disruptive technologies in areas key to Allied security.
- e. Enhance NATO's ability to contribute to preserve and shape the rules-based international order in areas that are important to Allied security. We will

increase our dialogue and practical cooperation with existing partners, including with the European Union, aspirant countries and our partners in the Asia Pacific, and strengthen our engagement with key global actors and other new interlocutors beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, including from Africa, Asia and Latin America.

- f. Substantially strengthen NATO's ability to provide training and capacity building support to partners, recognising that conflict, other security developments and pervasive instability in NATO's neighbourhood directly impact Allied security.
- g. Aim for NATO to become the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. We agree to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and installations without impairing personnel safety, operational effectiveness and our deterrence and defence posture. We invite the Secretary General to formulate a realistic, ambitious and concrete target for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by the NATO political and military structures and facilities and assess the feasibility of reaching net zero emissions by 2050. We will also initiate a regular high-level climate and security dialogue to exchange views and coordinate further action.
- h. Invite the Secretary General to lead the process to develop the next Strategic Concept. The Concept will be negotiated and agreed by the Council in Permanent Session and endorsed by NATO Leaders at the next Summit.

7. The NATO 2030 agenda sets a higher level of ambition for NATO. It provides clear guidelines for further adaptation to address existing, new and future threats and challenges, building on the ongoing political and military adaptation of the Alliance. Delivering on the NATO 2030 agenda, the three core tasks and the next Strategic Concept requires adequate resourcing through national defence expenditure and common funding. Based on requirements, we agree to increase such resourcing, including as necessary NATO common funding starting in 2023, taking into account sustainability, affordability and accountability. When we meet in 2022, we will agree, alongside the Strategic Concept, the specific requirements for additional funding up to 2030 and the resource implications across the NATO Military Budget, the NATO Security Investment Programme and the Civil Budget, as well as identify potential efficiency measures.

8. NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. The evolving security environment increasingly requires us to address threats and challenges through the

use of military and non-military tools in a deliberate, coherent, and sustained manner. NATO will take a tailored and structured approach. NATO uses a variety of non-military tools which support the Alliance's three core tasks. It also serves as a platform for enhancing the coherent use of these tools by Allies, under their own authority and control, and alongside other international actors. We will continue to strengthen effective, clear, and convincing strategic communication as an essential element to support all three of NATO's core tasks.

9. For more than twenty-five years, NATO has worked to build a partnership with Russia, including through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). While NATO stands by its international commitments, Russia continues to breach the values, principles, trust, and commitments outlined in agreed documents that underpin the NATO-Russia relationship. We reaffirm our decisions towards Russia agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit and all our subsequent NATO meetings. We have suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, while remaining open to political dialogue. Until Russia demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities, there can be no return to "business as usual". We will continue to respond to the deteriorating security environment by enhancing our deterrence and defence posture, including by a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. Decisions we have taken are fully consistent with our international commitments, and therefore cannot be regarded by anyone as contradicting the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

10. We call on Russia to rescind the designation of the Czech Republic and the United States as "unfriendly countries" and to refrain from taking any other steps inconsistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

11. Russia's growing multi-domain military build-up, more assertive posture, novel military capabilities, and provocative activities, including near NATO borders, as well as its large-scale no-notice and snap exercises, the continued military build-up in Crimea, the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, military integration with Belarus, and repeated violations of NATO Allied airspace, increasingly threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and contribute to instability along NATO borders and beyond.

12. In addition to its military activities, Russia has also intensified its hybrid actions against NATO Allies and partners, including through proxies. This includes attempted interference in Allied elections and democratic processes; political and economic pressure and intimidation; widespread disinformation campaigns; malicious cyber activities; and turning a blind eye to cyber criminals operating

from its territory, including those who target and disrupt critical infrastructure in NATO countries. It also includes illegal and destructive activities by Russian Intelligence Services on Allied territory, some of which have claimed lives of citizens and caused widespread material damage. We stand in full solidarity with the Czech Republic and other Allies that have been affected in this way.

13. Russia has continued to diversify its nuclear arsenal, including by deploying a suite of short- and intermediate-range missile systems that are intended to coerce NATO. Russia has recapitalised roughly 80 percent of its strategic nuclear forces, and it is expanding its nuclear capabilities by pursuing novel and destabilising weapons and a diverse array of dual-capable systems. Russia continues to use aggressive and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and has increased its ongoing emphasis on destabilising conventional exercises that include dual-capable systems. Russia's nuclear strategy and comprehensive nuclear weapon systems modernisation, diversification, and expansion, including the qualitative and quantitative increase of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, increasingly support a more aggressive posture of strategic intimidation. We will continue to work closely together to address all the threats and challenges posed by Russia.

14. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova within their internationally recognised borders. In accordance with its international commitments, we call on Russia to withdraw the forces it has stationed in all three countries without their consent. We strongly condemn and will not recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, and denounce its temporary occupation. The human rights abuses and violations against the Crimean Tatars and members of other local communities must end. Russia's recent massive military build-up and destabilising activities in and around Ukraine have further escalated tensions and undermined security. We call on Russia to reverse its military build-up and stop restricting navigation in parts of the Black Sea. We also call on Russia to stop impeding access to the Sea of Azov and Ukrainian ports. We commend Ukraine's posture of restraint and diplomatic approach in this context. We seek to contribute to de-escalation. We are also stepping up our support to Ukraine. We call for the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements by all sides, and support the efforts of the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group. Russia, as a signatory of the Minsk Agreements, bears significant responsibility in this regard. We call on Russia to stop fuelling the conflict by providing financial and military support to the armed formations it backs in eastern Ukraine. We reiterate our full support to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. We stress the importance of ensuring its safety and full and unhindered access throughout the entire territory of Ukraine, including Crimea and the Russia-Ukraine border, in accordance with its mandate. We further call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia as independent states; to implement the EU-mediated 2008 cease re agreement; to end its militarisation of these regions and attempts to forcibly separate them from the rest of Georgia through the continued construction of border-like obstacles; and to cease the human rights violations, arbitrary detentions, and harassments of Georgian citizens. We reiterate our firm support to the Geneva International Discussions. We also call on Russia to engage constructively in the Transnistria Settlement Process. We are committed to supporting the Republic of Moldova's democratic reforms and providing assistance through our Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative.

15. We remain open to a periodic, focused, and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NRC, with a view to avoiding misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability. NRC meetings have helped us communicate clearly our positions, and we are ready for the next meeting of the NRC. We will continue to focus our dialogue with Russia on the critical issues we face. The conflict in and around Ukraine is, in current circumstances, the first topic on our agenda. NATO remains committed to making good use of the existing military lines of communication between both sides to promote predictability and transparency, and to reduce risks, and calls on Russia to do so as well. We continue to aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia when its actions make that possible.

16. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to pose a direct threat to the security of our populations, and to international stability and prosperity. We categorically reject and condemn terrorism in the strongest possible terms. Allies will continue to fight this threat with determination, resolve, and in solidarity. While nations retain the primary responsibility for their domestic security and their own resilience, the fight against terrorism demands a coherent, long-term effort by the international community as a whole, involving a wide range of instruments and actors. NATO's role in the fight against terrorism contributes to all three core tasks of the Alliance, and is an integral part of the Alliance's 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence. Cooperation in NATO adds value to Allies' national efforts and capacity to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and be resilient against acts of terrorism. We condemn all financial support of terrorism. We also recognise the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Our approach to terrorism, and its causes, is in accordance with

international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and upholds all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) on the fight against terrorism.

17. We remain fully committed to NATO's enhanced role in the international community's

fight against terrorism, including through awareness and analysis, preparedness and responsiveness, capabilities, capacity building and partnerships, and operations. We continue to implement our 2019 Action Plan and will update it by the end of this year, to take account of the evolving terrorist threats. We are determined to meet our commitments under UNSCR 2396, including through NATO's new Battle Field Evidence Policy, supported by improved information and data collection, preservation, sharing, and analysis, within NATO's mandate.

We will continue our work to defend against improvised explosive devices and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. We are developing capabilities to protect our forces against terrorist misuse of technology, while capitalising on emerging technologies to help us in the fight against terrorism. We are also stepping up support to partner countries to fight terrorism themselves and deny terrorists safe haven, which in turn strengthens NATO's own security. NATO will also continue to engage, as appropriate, with partner countries and other international actors to ensure added value and complementarity. NATO continues to play its part in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da'esh, including through our Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) surveillance flights and station-to-station support.

18. After almost 20 years, NATO's military operations in Afghanistan are coming to an end. We have denied terrorists a safe haven from which to plot attacks against us, helped Afghanistan to build its security institutions, and trained, advised, and assisted the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces; they are now taking on full responsibility for security in their country. We pay tribute to those who have lost their lives or have been wounded, and express our deep appreciation to all the men and women who have served under the NATO flag, and to their families.

19. Withdrawing our troops does not mean ending our relationship with Afghanistan. We will now open a new chapter. We reaffirm our commitment to continue to stand with Afghanistan, its people, and its institutions in promoting security and upholding the hard-won gains of the last 20 years. Recalling our previous commitments, NATO will continue to provide training and financial support to the Afghan

National Defence and Security Forces, including through the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. NATO will retain a Senior Civilian Representative's Office in Kabul to continue diplomatic engagement and enhance our partnership with Afghanistan. Recognising its importance to an enduring diplomatic and international presence, as well as to Afghanistan's connectivity with the world, NATO will provide transitional funding to ensure continued functioning of Hamid Karzai International Airport. We will also step up dialogue on Afghanistan with relevant international and regional partners. We continue to support the ongoing Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process, and call on all stakeholders to help Afghanistan foster a lasting inclusive political settlement that puts an end to violence; safeguards the human rights of Afghans, particularly women, children, and minorities; upholds the rule of law; and ensures that Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven for terrorists.

20. NATO remains a leading and active contributor to international security through operations, missions, and activities. We are grateful to our partners for their substantial contributions to these efforts. NATO and Allies support Iraq in its fight against ISIS/Da'esh and terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We commend the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces for their continued efforts to combat ISIS/Da'esh. Based on a request from the Iraqi Government, we will strengthen our support to Iraq through our NATO Mission Iraq. We will broaden our non-combat advisory, training, and capacity building mission to support Iraq in building more effective, sustainable, accountable, and inclusive security institutions and forces. This expansion of NATO Mission Iraq, including additional support to the Iraqi security institutions, will be demand-driven, incremental, scalable, and based on conditions on the ground. It will be carried out with the full consent of the Iraqi authorities, in full respect of Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in close coordination with relevant partners and international actors, including the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da'esh, the United Nations, and the European Union.

21. Deterrence and defence are at the heart of the Alliance, underpinned by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and an enduring transatlantic bond. We are united and resolute in our ability and commitment to defend one another. We will maintain and further develop the full range of ready forces and capabilities necessary to ensure credible deterrence and defence and provide the Alliance with a wide range of options to tailor our response to specific circumstances and to respond to any threats, from state and non-state actors, from wherever they arise, and potentially from multiple directions in more than one region simultaneously. While reaffirming our commitment to the three core tasks, we have placed a renewed

emphasis on collective defence, and have also ensured that NATO retains the ability to project stability and fight against terrorism.

22. We welcome the significant progress already made to implement our previous decisions to strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence posture and reaffirm our commitment to their full and speedy implementation. We have accelerated our military adaptation with increased defence spending, modern capabilities, enhanced political and military responsiveness, and higher readiness of our forces. NATO is taking forward a new military strategy through the implementation of two significant military concepts that will further strengthen our ability to deter and defend against any potential adversary and to maintain and develop our military advantage now and in the future. The deterrence and defence concept provides a single, coherent framework to contest and deter and defend against the Alliance's main threats in a multi-domain environment, and will strengthen our preparedness to address challenges, particularly pervasive instability and strategic shocks. The war fighting concept provides a long-term vision for maintaining and developing NATO's decisive military edge. The implementation of the deterrence and defence concept will guide enhanced advance planning to respond to potential crisis and conflict, as well as further improve the use and organisation of Allied forces and capabilities in all operational domains and ensure more effective command and control. We are developing strategic, domain-specific and regional military plans to improve our ability to respond to any contingencies and ensure timely reinforcement. We will emphasise persistent activities in peacetime to support deterrence, including through the presence and dynamic posture of our military forces and exercises, based on enhanced coordination amongst Allies and NATO. Through the implementation of the war fighting concept, we will ensure that the Alliance continuously develops its military and technological advantage, as the character of conflict evolves. We commit to the full implementation of these new concepts, and to taking the necessary steps to enhance the coherence between relevant national and NATO activities and plans and the concepts.

23. We commit to further strengthening and modernising the NATO Force Structure to meet current and future deterrence and defence needs. We will ensure a flexible, agile, and resilient multi-domain force architecture with the right forces in the right place at the right time. We will strengthen modern command and control tailored to support our 360-degree posture, dynamic force management, improved response system, and plans. In doing so, we will place increased emphasis on the interdependence of geography, domains, and readiness. As part of these overall efforts, we are committed to continue increasing the readiness of our forces and the Alliance's rapid response capability, including through the ongoing implementation of the NATO Readiness Initiative, which is

designed to strengthen the culture of readiness and help to provide forces at 30 days readiness or less. We have sourced all the combat forces of the NATO Readiness Initiative with 30 major naval combatants, 30 heavy or medium manoeuvre battalions, and 30 kinetic air squadrons. They are being organised and trained as larger combat formations for reinforcement and high-intensity war fighting, or for rapid military crisis intervention.

24. We will ensure that the NATO Command Structure is robust, resilient, and able to undertake all elements of effective command and control for simultaneous challenges across all domains and the full spectrum of missions, including large-scale operations for collective defence. Our two new commands, Joint Force Command Norfolk headquarters and Joint Support and Enabling Command, as well as the Cyberspace Operations Centre, have achieved Initial Operational Capability. Allied contributions to command and control through the NATO Force Structure and national headquarters as well as their strengthened relationship with the NATO Command Structure, including by providing host nation support, remain essential to improve the Alliance's regional understanding, vigilance, and ability to rapidly respond to any threat from any direction.

25. We will not be constrained by any potential adversary as regards the freedom of movement of Allied forces by land, air, or sea to and within any part of Alliance territory. Our deterrence and defence posture is underpinned by credible forces, both in-place and ready for reinforcement within Europe and from across the Atlantic. We will continue to strengthen and regularly exercise the Alliance's ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat. We will continue to give high priority, both nationally and in the Alliance, to ensuring enablement of SACEUR's Area of Responsibility to improve our ability to support the deployment and sustainment of Allied forces into, across, and from the entire Alliance territory. These efforts include taking forward our work on fuel supply distribution arrangements. We reiterate that NATO's efforts to ensure a coherent approach and synergies with the EU in the area of military mobility should be pursued, including with regard to military mobility related procedures that should apply to all Allies equally. We continue to reinforce our maritime posture and to protect our sea lines of communication. We welcome the establishment of the NATO Maritime Security Centre of Excellence in Turkey. We will maintain awareness of any potential threats to our critical undersea infrastructure and will continue to address them nationally and, where needed, collectively. We welcome the Full Operational Capability of NATO's Rapid Air Mobility which was activated and utilised by Allies for relief flights carrying critical supplies to Allies and partners in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

26. We reaffirm our commitment to respond in a measured, balanced,

coordinated, and timely way to Russia's growing and evolving array of conventional and nuclear-capable missiles, which is increasing in scale and complexity and which poses significant risks from all strategic directions to security and stability across the Euro-Atlantic area. We will continue to implement a coherent and balanced package of political and military measures to achieve Alliance objectives, including strengthened integrated air and missile defence; advanced defensive and offensive conventional capabilities; steps to keep NATO's nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective; efforts to support and strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; intelligence; and exercises. We have no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.

27. NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) is an essential and continuous mission in peacetime, crisis, and times of conflict, which contributes to deterrence and defence and the indivisible security and freedom of action of the Alliance, including NATO's capability to reinforce, and to provide a strategic response. NATO IAMD incorporates all measures to contribute to deter any air and missile threat or to nullify or reduce their effectiveness. This mission is conducted in a 360-degree approach and tailored to address all air and missile threats emanating from all strategic directions.

28. NATO has enhanced its IAMD mission and we have taken steps to improve our IAMD forces' readiness and responsiveness in peacetime, crisis, and times of conflict, strengthening our ability to ensure that all necessary measures are implemented for the security of the Alliance. We are taking into account the increasingly diverse and challenging air and missile threats from state and non-state actors ranging from simple Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to sophisticated hypersonic missiles.

29. Allies will continue to work on NATO IAMD to ensure that it remains effective and adaptive. Allies will also continue to effectively train and exercise their IAMD forces. Allies have committed to improving NATO IAMD capabilities, including sensors, interceptors, and command and control, in particular through the NATO Defence Planning Process. We welcome the establishment of NATO's new IAMD Centre of Excellence in Greece.

30. Resilience is essential for credible deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance's core tasks. It is a national responsibility and a collective commitment, anchored in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Recognising the significant progress achieved since our Resilience Commitment at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, we have agreed today a Strengthened Resilience Commitment that sets out further steps we intend to

take in the coming years. We will continue to take a whole-of-government approach to enhancing the resilience of our societies, and achieving these seven NATO Baseline Requirements for national resilience, through enhanced civil-military cooperation and civil preparedness; closer engagement with our populations, the private sector, and non-governmental actors; and the centres of expertise on resilience established by Allies. We welcome the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Centre for resilience in Romania. NATO and Allies, within their respective authority, will maintain and enhance the security of our critical infrastructure, key industries, supply chains, and communication information networks, including 5G. NATO will further strengthen its own resilience, ensuring our ability to consult, decide, and act together. We will continue to work closely with our partners and other international organisations engaged in similar efforts in order to make the Euro-Atlantic area and our broader neighbourhood more secure.

31. Our nations continue to face threats and challenges from both state and non-state actors who use hybrid activities to target our political institutions, our public opinion, and the security of our citizens. While the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid threats rests with the targeted nation, NATO is ready, upon Council decision, to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign being conducted against it, including by deploying a Counter Hybrid Support Team. In cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of an armed attack. NATO and Allies will continue to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid threats. Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing hybrid activities and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign national prerogative. We are enhancing our situational awareness and expanding the tools at our disposal to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing comprehensive preventive and response options. We will also continue to support our partners as they strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges.

32. Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive, coercive, and becoming ever more frequent. This has been recently illustrated by ransomware incidents and other malicious cyber activity targeting our critical infrastructure and democratic institutions, which might have systemic effects and cause significant harm. To face this evolving challenge, we have today endorsed NATO's Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which will support NATO's three core tasks and overall deterrence and defence posture, and further enhance our resilience. Reaffirming NATO's defensive mandate, the Alliance is determined to employ the full range of capabilities at all times to actively deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats, including those conducted as part

of hybrid campaigns, in accordance with international law. We remain that a decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. Allies recognise that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack. We remain committed to act in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law as applicable. We will promote a free, open, peaceful, and secure cyberspace, and further pursue efforts to enhance stability and reduce the risk of conflict by supporting international law and voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. We will make greater use of NATO as a platform for political consultation among Allies, sharing concerns about malicious cyber activities, and exchanging national approaches and responses, as well as considering possible collective responses. If necessary, we will impose costs on those who harm us. Our response need not be restricted to the cyber domain. We will enhance our situational awareness to support NATO's decision-making. Resilience and the ability to detect, prevent, mitigate, and respond to vulnerabilities and intrusions is critical, as demonstrated by malicious cyber actors' exploitation of the COVID-19 pandemic. NATO as an organisation will therefore continue to adapt and improve its cyber defences. Five years since the adoption of our Cyber Defence Pledge, we remain committed to uphold strong national cyber defences as a matter of priority. We continue to implement cyberspace as a domain of operations. We will enhance the effective integration of sovereign cyber effects, provided voluntarily by Allies, into collective defence and Alliance operations and missions, in the framework of strong political oversight. We will further seek to develop mutually beneficial and effective partnerships as appropriate, including with partner countries, international organisations, industry, and academia, furthering our efforts to enhance international stability in cyberspace. We welcome the recent opening of the NATO Communications and Information Academy in Portugal.

33. We recognise the growing importance of space for the security and prosperity of our nations and for NATO's deterrence and defence. Secure access to space services, products, and capabilities is essential for the conduct of the Alliance's operations, missions and activities. We will accelerate our work to deepen and expand our use of space as an operational domain, including through the NATO Space Centre in Germany and the upcoming establishment of the Space Centre of Excellence in France, which we welcome. We will strengthen NATO's space domain awareness and better integrate space in our activities, including training and exercises, resilience, and innovation efforts. Consistent with the Overarching Space Policy, NATO's approach to space will remain fully in line with international

law. We support the international efforts to promote responsible behaviour in space. We consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, the impact of which could threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability, and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. Such attacks could lead to the invocation of Article 5. A decision as to when such attacks would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.

34. We continue to stand and act together in response to the challenging security environment. As it continues to evolve, the Alliance will continue to respond and adapt as necessary. Since the Warsaw Summit, we have established a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. We continue to improve our enhanced Forward Presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland through alignment with plans and by ensuring the ability of the four combat-ready battlegroups to operate with national home defence forces in an integrated manner. We have increased our contributions to our tailored Forward Presence on land, at sea, and in the air in the Black Sea region, and we remain committed to its full implementation. Our assurance measures, including exercises and various other air, land, and maritime activities, remain in place and continue to provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence. We have increased our contributions to our tailored assurance measures for Turkey, and we remain committed to their full implementation. We have a range of forces, including the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, which are ready to deploy on short notice to respond to any contingencies and reinforce Allies. The full implementation of NATO's Framework for the South, as an enduring component of NATO's deterrence and defence posture, is ongoing. Building on the progress achieved since 2016, including the establishment of the Hub for the South, we will continue to strengthen our capacity to deal with the threats and challenges emanating from the South, including in the Mediterranean Sea region and its approaches, by enhancing our strategic awareness, our plans, and the readiness of our forces. In the High North, we will continue to undertake necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities in support of the Alliance's security interests. We will seek to strengthen cooperation with relevant and like-minded partners in the interests of NATO's agreed deterrence and defence objectives, in line with NATO's decisions, policies and procedures, as appropriate, and with consideration of political implications.

35. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to all aspects of the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit. Fair burden sharing underpins the Alliance's cohesion, solidarity, credibility, and ability to fulfil our fundamental Article 3 and Article 5 commitments. We are, individually and collectively, committed to further improving the balance of sharing the costs and responsibilities of Alliance membership. We have made considerable progress since the Wales Summit with seven consecutive years of real growth in non-US defence expenditure, which reinforces our shared responsibility to provide capabilities to the Alliance. All Allies have increased the amount they spend on defence in real terms and this trend is set to continue. Since 2014, European Allies and Canada will have added 260 billion US dollars by the end of this year. Furthermore, ten Allies are expected to spend 2% or more of GDP on defence this year. About two-thirds of Allies plan to reach or exceed the 2% guideline by 2024. Additionally, 24 Allies are spending more than 20% of their defence expenditures on major equipment, including related research and development, and, according to their national plans, 27 Allies will meet the 20% guideline by 2024. Our overall security and defence depend both on how much we spend and how we spend it. Allies continue to make valuable force and capability contributions that benefit the security of the Euro-Atlantic area through NATO's operations, missions, and other activities, as well as through the operations and missions conducted under national authority and the authority of other organisations. Allies invest considerable resources in preparing their forces, capabilities, and infrastructure for Alliance activities and Allies' operations. In the years ahead, in line with the Defence Investment Pledge and building on the good progress to date, we reaffirm our commitment to continue our efforts as a matter of priority across the three pillars of cash, capabilities, and contributions. We must and will do more.

36. We are investing in our military capabilities in order to meet new and enduring challenges across all operational domains. We continue to deliver an array of robust and sophisticated capabilities across all domains, including heavier, more high-end, technologically advanced, better-supported forces and capabilities at the required readiness. We will continue to improve and adapt the sustainability, deployability, and interoperability of our capabilities for a demanding strategic environment, as well as high-end operations. Our national capability development plans will support the full and timely implementation of the capabilities, in particular those required by the Alliance in line with the NATO Defence Planning Process. In light of the pace, breadth, and scale of technological developments, as we further develop our forces and capabilities, we recognise the vital importance of research and development and innovation to exploit the opportunities and to address the challenges posed by emerging and disruptive

technologies. This will help to ensure, individually and collectively, our technological edge now and in the future. We continue working to address, as appropriate, existing dependencies on Russian-sourced legacy military equipment through national efforts and multinational cooperation. We welcome the modernisation of the NATO AWACS fleet and the progress of the Alliance Future Surveillance and Control programme, as well as the initial operations of the new Alliance Ground Surveillance Force. Through NATO-supported multinational cooperation projects, Allies are committed to working together to develop or acquire new capabilities in key areas such as air-to-air refuelling, training, precision strike, munitions, air defence, CBRN defence, autonomous systems, and next-generation rotorcraft capability.

37. The speed of technological change has never been higher, creating both new opportunities and risks in the security environment and to the way NATO operates. We are determined to preserve our technological edge, and ensure Alliance interoperability, in order to maintain the credibility of our deterrence and defence posture. We have recently taken important steps to that end, building on the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) Roadmap we agreed in 2019, and have now adopted our strategy to foster and protect EDTs. This strategy outlines a clear approach for identifying, developing, and adopting EDTs at the speed of relevance, guided by principles of responsible use, in accordance with international law, and taking into account discussions in relevant international fora. Moreover, this strategy seeks to preserve our interoperability; safeguard our sensitive technologies; and actively address the threats and challenges posed by technological developments by others, both now and in the future. Drawing on the extensive innovation expertise of all 30 Allies, we will further leverage our partnerships, including with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological edge.

38. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. Faced with a highly diverse, complex, and demanding international security environment, NATO is determined to maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.

39. Credible deterrence and defence is essential as a means to prevent conflict and war and will continue to be based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities. A robust deterrence and defence posture strengthens Alliance cohesion and provides an essential political and military transatlantic link, through an equitable and sustainable distribution of

roles, responsibilities, and burdens. We acknowledge the increasingly challenging security environment with risks arising from changes in the posture, doctrine, and behaviour of potential adversaries and their significant investments to develop, modernise, and expand capabilities. NATO continues to adapt and remains steadfast in its resolve to take all necessary steps to ensure that its deterrence and defence posture remains credible, coherent, resilient, and adaptable to the security environment.

40. Allies' goal is to continue to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and to contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. In response to the more challenging security environment, NATO has taken steps to ensure its nuclear deterrent capabilities remain safe, secure, and effective. The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies' separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture also relies on United States' nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. National contributions of dual-capable aircraft to NATO's nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this effort. The Alliance reaffirms the imperative to ensure the broadest possible participation by Allies concerned in the agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements to demonstrate Alliance unity and resolve. Allies concerned will continue to drive forward progress on sustaining leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission. Allies will also continue to ensure greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO's deterrence and defence posture, strengthen effective strategic communications and enhance the effectiveness of NATO exercises to maintain and demonstrate a credible deterrence and reduce strategic risk. NATO supports efforts towards strategic risk reduction which constitute important contributions to regional and international security. In particular, transparency and dialogue can help avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation.

41. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Given the deteriorating security environment in Europe, a credible and united nuclear Alliance is essential. Nuclear weapons are unique. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. NATO reiterates that any employment of

nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. If the fundamental security of any of its members were to be threatened, however, NATO has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.

42. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute them. We reaffirm our commitment to continue to deliver a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability, to pursue the Alliance's core task of collective defence and to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. NATO BMD is purely defensive. The aim and political principles of NATO BMD remain unchanged from the 2010 Lisbon Summit. These principles are the indivisibility of Allies' security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability, and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can and will adapt accordingly.

43. NATO BMD is based on voluntary national contributions, including the US European Phased Adaptive Approach assets in Romania, Turkey, Spain, and Poland, as well as the NATO BMD command and control, the only component eligible for common funding. Additional voluntary national contributions will provide robustness. We are committed to completing additional essential components of NATO BMD command and control, which is necessary for achieving the next major milestone before reaching the Full Operational Capability. Full Allied political control and oversight are essential, and full implementation will be ensured and monitored. We will continue to engage with third states on a case-by-case basis to enhance transparency, build mutual confidence, and increase ballistic missile defence effectiveness.

44. NATO BMD is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence. NATO BMD is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. We have explained to Russia many times that the BMD system is not capable against Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent and there is no intention to redesign this system to have such a capability in the future. Hence, Russian statements threatening to target Allies because of NATO BMD are unacceptable and counterproductive. Should Russia be ready to discuss BMD with NATO, and subject to Alliance agreement, NATO

remains open to the discussion.

45. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made and should continue to make an essential contribution to achieving the Alliance's security objectives and for ensuring strategic stability and our collective security. NATO has a long track record of doing its part on disarmament and non-proliferation. After the end of the Cold War, NATO dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We regret that the conditions for achieving disarmament have not been realised since the 2018 Brussels NATO Summit. Allies remain collectively determined to uphold and support existing disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation agreements and commitments. We will further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment. We welcome and fully support the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty for seven years. NATO Allies believe the New START Treaty contributes to international stability, and Allies again express their strong support for its continued implementation and for early and active dialogue on ways to improve strategic stability. Allies will welcome new strategic talks between the United States and Russia on future arms control measures, taking into account all Allies' security. Allies will support further arms control negotiations, with the aim of improving the security of the Alliance, taking into account the prevailing international security environment.

46. NATO remains clear-eyed about the challenges Russia poses, including the qualitative and quantitative increase of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Alliance will be guided by experience, not least Russia's material breach of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which ultimately led to the termination of that agreement. NATO will continue to respond in a measured and responsible way to the significant risks posed by the Russian 9M729 missile, and other short- and intermediate-range missiles, to Allied security. We have agreed a balanced, coordinated, and defensive package of measures to ensure NATO's deterrence and defence posture remains credible and effective, including through potential arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation contributions. Russia's proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe is inconsistent with Russia's unilateral and ongoing deployment of such systems on the continent and would not prevent Russia from building up such missiles outside of its European territory; this proposal is therefore not credible and not acceptable. At the same time, NATO Allies remain open to meaningful arms control discussions and dialogue on reciprocal transparency and confidence-building measures that would take into account security interests of

all Allies and increase security across the Alliance.

47. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons, the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and the framework for international cooperation in sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. Allies remain strongly committed to the full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects, as an irreplaceable platform, and the strengthening of the NPT across its mutually reinforcing three pillars. We are committed to working towards a meaningful outcome at the upcoming Tenth Review Conference, which presents a major opportunity to contribute to the preservation, universalisation, and full implementation of the NPT. The Alliance reaffirms its resolve to seek a safer world for all and to take further practical steps and effective measures to create the conditions for further nuclear disarmament negotiations. NATO Allies support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons in full accordance with all provisions of the NPT, including

Article VI, in an ever more effective and verifiable way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. NATO's nuclear arrangements have always been fully consistent with the NPT, which remains the only credible path to nuclear disarmament. The enduring success of the NPT cannot be taken for granted and requires sustained effort to further its achievements. In this spirit, we call on all NPT States Parties to work together towards a successful Tenth Review Conference. We reiterate our opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which is inconsistent with the Alliance's nuclear deterrence policy, is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT, and does not take into account the current security environment. The TPNW does not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TPNW reflects or in any way contributes to the development of customary international law. We call on our partners and all other countries to reflect realistically on the ban treaty's impact on international peace and security, including on the NPT, and join us in working to improve collective security through tangible and verifiable measures that can reduce strategic risks and enable lasting progress on nuclear disarmament.

48. While NATO is not itself party to any arms control agreement, Allies will make best use of NATO as an important platform for in-depth discussion and close consultations on arms control efforts that will support Alliance unity,

political cohesion, and solidarity. We continue actively to address the collapse of the INF Treaty due to Russian actions, and we are committed to maintain appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

49. We remain deeply concerned by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery and related materials, by states and non-state actors, which represents a growing threat to our populations, territory, and forces. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria, as well as use in Iraq, Russia, Malaysia, and, for the first time since NATO's foundation on Allied territory, the United Kingdom. The use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, for any reason is unacceptable. There can be no impunity for those who use chemical weapons. We therefore welcome, as an important step towards accountability, the decision by the April 2021 Conference of the State Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to suspend Syria's rights and privileges under the CWC. We are determined to uphold the CWC and the global norm against the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and to hold those who use chemical weapons accountable for their actions, including through our joint commitment within the International Partnership Against the Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. We support the full implementation of the CWC and the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in addressing WMD threats and condemn those who seek to impede its work. NATO remains committed to ensuring that Allies can protect their populations, forces, and territories against CBRN threats, including through reviewing NATO's Comprehensive, Strategic Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Defending against CBRN Threats. We are united in our resolve to promote the goals and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We underline the need to bring the treaty into force and we support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, including the International Data Centre and International Monitoring System. We call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in

accordance with Conference on Disarmament report CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. In the meantime, the Alliance calls on all states to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

50. We remain committed to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security. We are determined to preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent. Russia's continuing aggressive military posture, its refusal to fully comply with its obligations under the Treaty on Open Skies, its ongoing selective implementation of the Vienna Document, and its long-standing failure to implement the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, continue to undermine security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies call on Russia to return to full implementation of, and compliance with the letter and spirit of all of its international obligations and commitments, which is essential to rebuilding trust and confidence, military transparency and increasing predictability in the Euro-Atlantic region. We specifically call on Russia to be open and transparent about its no-notice snap exercises, large-scale exercises and large-scale troop movements, in accordance with its Vienna Document commitments, particularly in light of its recent unprovoked and unjustified military build-up in and around Ukraine. Allies underscore the importance of modernising the Vienna Document, and welcome the broad support for its comprehensive modernisation package. We look forward to intensified discussions in the Forum for Security Cooperation leading to consensus on an updated Vienna Document at the 2021 OSCE Ministerial. To maintain the contributions of the Treaty on Open Skies to the security of all State Parties, it is essential that all State Parties fully implement its provisions. We will continue to actively support ongoing discussions at the OSCE, including the Structured Dialogue. We call on Russia to engage constructively on all these efforts.

51. We reiterate the Alliance's full support to the goal of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea, in accordance with relevant UNSCRs. We call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to engage in meaningful negotiations with the United States towards achieving this goal. We urge the DPRK to fully implement its international obligations; to eliminate its nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities and ballistic missiles; to return to the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and to abandon all related programmes. We call on nations to fully implement existing UN sanctions.

52. We are committed to ensuring that Iran will never develop a nuclear weapon. We welcome the substantive discussions between Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) participants, and separately with the United States, to accomplish a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA by the United States and Iran. We support the goal of restoring the non-proliferation benefits of the JCPOA and of ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It is vital that Iran preserves the space for these discussions by avoiding any further escalation. We strongly support the IAEA in its crucial monitoring and verification work to help ensure Iran's compliance with the NPT-related safeguards obligations, as well as its other commitments. A restored and fully implemented JCPOA could also pave the way to further address regional and security concerns, including in support of the non-proliferation regime.

We condemn Iran's support to proxy forces and non-state armed actors, including through

financing, training, and the proliferation of missile technology and weapons. We call on Iran to stop all ballistic missile activities inconsistent with UNSCR 2231, refrain from destabilising actions, and play a constructive role in fostering regional stability and peace.

Syria retains an inventory of short-range ballistic missiles whose range covers parts of NATO's territory and some of our partners' territories. Syria has used these missiles extensively against its own population. We remain vigilant over missile launches from Syria which could again hit or target Turkey. We continue to monitor and assess the ballistic missile threat from Syria.

The increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the vicinity of the south-eastern border of the Alliance has been, and remains a driver in NATO's development and deployment of a ballistic missile defence system, which is configured to counter threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

53. The conflict in Syria has entered its eleventh year and continues to have significant consequences on the stability of the region and the security of NATO's south-eastern border. We remain concerned and vigilant over its ramifications. We reiterate our determination to defend NATO territory and borders against any threats and to address challenges emanating from Syria. The presidential elections held on 26 May 2021 by the Syrian regime cannot be considered as free and fair and do not contribute to the efforts to achieve a political solution. We underline that stability and security cannot be reinstated in Syria without a genuine political process in line with UNSCR 2254. We call for a nationwide cease fire and the reauthorisation and expansion of the UN cross-border humanitarian assistance for a period of at least 12 months in order to meet the needs of the Syrian people. We

reiterate our appreciation to our Ally Turkey for hosting millions of Syrian refugees.

54. Allies remain deeply concerned about developments in Belarus since August 2020. The policies and actions of Belarus have implications for regional stability and have violated the principles which underpin our partnership. NATO will remain vigilant of and monitor the implications for the security of the Alliance. The unacceptable diversion of a civilian aircraft in May 2021 and the subsequent arrest of a journalist and his partner travelling on board endangered the safety of civilians and was a grave affront to political dissent and freedom of the press. We support the independent investigations, including by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). We support measures taken by Allies individually and collectively in response to this incident. We call on Belarus to abide by international law, respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, and immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, including those belonging to the Union of Poles in Belarus. A democratic, sovereign, and stable Belarus is in all of our interests. Allies stand ready for a mutually beneficial NATO-Belarus partnership, taking into account political and security conditions. We will follow the scale, scope, and aftermath of the Zapad-2021 exercise, and continue to call on Russia and Belarus to act in a predictable, transparent way in compliance with their international obligations and OSCE commitments.

55. China's stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security. We are concerned by those coercive policies which stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad. It is opaque in implementing its military modernisation and its publicly declared military-civil fusion strategy. It is also cooperating militarily with Russia, including through participation in Russian exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain concerned with China's frequent lack of transparency and use of disinformation. We call on China to uphold its international commitments and to act responsibly in the international system, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains, in keeping with its role as a major power.

56. NATO maintains a constructive dialogue with China where possible. Based on our interests, we welcome opportunities to engage with China on areas of relevance to the Alliance and on common challenges such as climate change. There is value in information exchange on respective policies and activities, to enhance awareness and discuss potential disagreements. Allies urge China to engage meaningfully in dialogue, confidence-building, and transparency measures regarding

its nuclear capabilities and doctrine. Reciprocal transparency and understanding would benefit both NATO and China.

57. We are working together as an Alliance and with like-minded partners, in particular with the European Union, to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen resilience, maintain our technological edge, and address these challenges to the rules-based international order.

58. Climate change is one of the defining challenges of our times. It is a threat multiplier that impacts Allied security, both in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the Alliance's broader neighbourhood. Climate change puts our resilience and civil preparedness to the test, affects our planning and the resilience of our military installations and critical infrastructure, and may create harsher conditions for our operations. Today we have endorsed an Action Plan to implement our NATO Agenda on Climate Change and Security, which increases our awareness, adaptation, mitigation, and outreach efforts, while ensuring a credible deterrence and defence posture and upholding the priorities of the safety of military personnel and operational and cost effectiveness. To increase awareness, NATO will conduct annual assessments of the impact of climate change on its strategic environment as well as on missions and operations. To adapt to climate change, NATO will incorporate climate change considerations into its full spectrum of work, ranging from defence planning and capability development to civil preparedness and exercises. To contribute to the mitigation of climate change, drawing on best practices of Allies, and taking into account their different national circumstances, NATO will develop a mapping methodology to help Allies measure greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and installations, which could contribute to formulating voluntary goals to reduce such emissions. NATO will also strengthen exchanges with partner countries as well as with international and regional organisations that are active on climate change and security issues.

59. Energy security plays an important role in our common security. A stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers, and energy resources, including the integration of sustainable energy sources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, are all of critical importance and increase our resilience against political and economic pressure. It is essential to ensure that the members of the Alliance are not vulnerable to political or coercive manipulation of energy, which constitutes a potential threat. Allies will therefore continue to seek further diversification of their energy supplies, in line with their needs and conditions. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national authorities, energy developments can

have significant political and security implications for Allies and also affect our partners. Consequently, we will continue to enhance our strategic awareness, including through regular Allied consultations and intelligence sharing, and will strengthen our links with relevant international organisations. We will further develop NATO's capacity to support national authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, including against malicious hybrid and cyber activity. We will ensure reliable energy supplies to our military forces.

60. NATO has long recognised the importance of Human Security, which focuses on risks and threats to populations in conflict or crisis areas and how to mitigate and respond to them. Taking a Human Security approach is a reflection of our values and makes us more operationally effective. We are committed to ensuring that all efforts are made to avoid, minimise, and mitigate any potential negative effects on civilians arising from our missions or activities, as underscored in our Policy for the Protection of Civilians. Today, we endorse NATO's new Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, a landmark demonstration of our commitment to addressing such violence, which inflicts long-term stigma and trauma on individuals and families, contributes to their marginalisation, destroys the social fabric of communities, triggers displacement, fuels armed actors' activities, fosters prolonged conflict and instability, and is an impediment to sustainable peace and reconciliation. We are updating our policy on combating trafficking in human beings. Our ongoing work on Human Security also includes Children and Armed Conflict and Cultural Property Protection. NATO will continue to work with its partners, international organisations, and civil society to further our Human Security agenda, which includes robust policies and clear operational guidelines, in support of lasting peace and security and our populations' common defence.

61. Recognising the critical importance of women's full, equal, and meaningful participation in all aspects of peace and stability, as well as the disproportionate impact that conflict has on women and girls, including conflict-related sexual violence, we are committed to fully implementing the Women, Peace and Security agenda set out by the UN Security Council. NATO's Policy and Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security better prepare the Alliance to address the challenges of today and tomorrow. NATO's Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, agreed in 2019, reinforces our commitment to hold ourselves to the highest standards of behaviour, in keeping with our values. Working together with partners, international organisations, and civil society, we will consistently continue to implement our policy on Women, Peace and Security, and, in this context, we will advance gender equality and integrate gender

perspectives and foster the principles of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in all that we do, including in NATO operations, missions, and activities.

62. We remain committed to NATO's Building Integrity Policy and Programme. Corruption and poor governance undermine democracy, the rule of law, and economic development, thus constituting challenges to our security. Implementing measures to improve integrity building, to fight against corruption, and to foster good governance is of continued importance for NATO, Allies, and partners alike.

63. NATO's partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works. The success of NATO's partnerships is demonstrated by their strategic contribution to Alliance and international security. They play an important role in supporting NATO's three core tasks and our 360-degree security approach. They are central to advancing NATO's cooperative security agenda, helping to shape our security environment, and contributing to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and to the pursuit of NATO's political and military objectives. We remain committed to the principles underpinning our relations with our partners, and have taken steps to make our partnerships more strategic, more coherent, and more effective. The Alliance's partner relationships are also based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect. We will strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners. We are grateful to our partners for their significant contributions to NATO's situational awareness, operations, missions, and activities, including Trust Fund projects. We recognise their sacrifices for Euro-Atlantic and international security over the years. We will continue to improve interoperability, in particular with our Enhanced Opportunities Partners. Recognising that conflict and instability in NATO's neighbourhood directly undermine Allied security, we will continue to intensify NATO's assistance and capacity building support to our partners. We reaffirm our commitment to expand political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nation that shares the Alliance's values and interest in international peace and security and will further develop our partnerships so that they continue to meet the interests of both Allies and partners. In line with our Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, we will continue to pursue coherence within NATO's own tools and strands of work, concerted approaches with partner nations and organisations such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as further dialogue with non-governmental organisations.

64. The European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. The NATO-EU strategic partnership is essential for the security and prosperity of our nations and of the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. The development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities, avoiding unnecessary duplication, is key in our joint efforts to make the Euro-Atlantic area safer. Such e

orts, including recent developments, will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance our common security, contribute to transatlantic burden sharing, help deliver needed capabilities, and support an overall increase in defence spending. Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU's efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies' fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. We look forward to mutual steps, representing tangible progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership. We reaffirm in their entirety all the decisions, principles, and commitments with regard to NATO and EU cooperation. We will continue to further strengthen our strategic partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the organisations' different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two organisations.

65. NATO-EU cooperation has reached unprecedented levels, with tangible results in countering hybrid and cyber threats, strategic communication, operational cooperation including maritime issues, military mobility, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, counter-terrorism, and defence and security capacity building. Political dialogue between NATO and the EU remains essential to advance this cooperation. We will continue to develop and deepen our cooperation by fully implementing the common set of 74 proposals, which contribute to the coherence and complementarity of our efforts. The current strategic environment and the COVID pandemic underscore the importance of NATO-EU cooperation in the face of current and evolving security challenges, in particular in addressing resilience issues, emerging and disruptive technologies, the security implications of climate change, disinformation, and the growing geostrategic competition. The ongoing distinct strategic processes within NATO and the EU offer a unique opportunity to intensify further our consultations and cooperation to enhance the security of our citizens and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, while reaffirming that NATO remains the

transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. We value the Secretary General's continued close cooperation with the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative, on all aspects of the NATO-EU strategic partnership.

66. We reaffirm our commitment to NATO's Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which has been a historic success. North Macedonia's accession last year is yet another tangible demonstration of this commitment. Successive rounds of enlargement have strengthened Euro-Atlantic security by helping to spread and consolidate the rule of law and democratic institutions and practices across the European continent, and have respected the right of all states to seek their own security arrangements, as enshrined in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. NATO's door remains open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. Decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself; no third party has a say in that process. We remain committed to the integration of those countries that aspire to join the Alliance, judging each on its own merits. We encourage them to continue to implement the necessary reforms and decisions to prepare for membership. We will continue to offer support to their efforts and look to them to take the steps necessary to advance their aspirations.

67. Allies strongly support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a stable and secure Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other relevant international agreements, encourage domestic reconciliation, and urge political leaders to avoid divisive rhetoric. We commend Bosnia and Herzegovina, an aspirant country, for its contributions to NATO-led operations. We are committed to maintaining strong political dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and offer our continued support to the implementation of all reform efforts, including through NATO HQ Sarajevo. We encourage the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take full advantage of the breadth of NATO cooperative security and partnership tools. Allies welcome the work of the Commission for Cooperation with NATO. Allies urge political leaders to work constructively and to demonstrate political will for the benefit of all in Bosnia and Herzegovina in advancing Euro-Atlantic aspirations by implementing the much-needed political, electoral, rule of law, economic, and defence reforms, including through the country's Reform Programme with NATO, without prejudice to a final decision on NATO membership.

68. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process; we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions, including that each partner will be judged on its own merits. We stand firm in our support for Georgia's right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. As an Enhanced Opportunities Partner, Georgia is cooperating closely with the Alliance across a wide range of issues. We highly appreciate Georgia's substantial contributions to NATO operations, which demonstrate its commitment and capability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the recent political agreement on the Way Ahead for Georgia and encourage its full implementation by all sides. This agreement paves the way for the important reforms which will help Georgia, an aspirant country, progress in its preparations towards membership. We remain committed to making full use of the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual National Programme in deepening political dialogue and cooperation. We commend the significant progress on reforms which Georgia has made and must continue to make, and which have helped Georgia strengthen its defence capabilities and interoperability with the Alliance.

Georgia's relationship with the Alliance contains all the practical tools to prepare for eventual membership. We are working closely with Georgia on security in the Black Sea region, in response to Russia's increasingly destabilising activities, and welcome the steps taken to implement the refreshed Substantial NATO-Georgia Package. We stand ready to enhance our support to Georgia, including in building resilience against hybrid threats, in training and exercises, and in secure communications. We look forward to the next NATO-Georgia exercise in 2022.

69. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process; we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions, including that each partner will be judged on its own merits. We stand firm in our support for Ukraine's right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. The Annual National Programmes under the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) remain the mechanism by which Ukraine takes forward the reforms pertaining to its aspiration for NATO membership. Ukraine should make full use of all instruments available under the NUC to reach its objective of implementing NATO principles and standards. The success of wide-ranging, sustainable, and irreversible reforms, including combating corruption, promoting an inclusive political process, and decentralisation reform, based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities, and the rule of law, will be crucial in laying the

groundwork for a prosperous and peaceful Ukraine. Further reforms in the security sector, including the reform of the Security Services of Ukraine, are particularly important. We welcome significant reforms already made by Ukraine and strongly encourage further progress in line with Ukraine's international obligations and commitments. We will continue to provide practical support to reform in the security and defence sector, including through the Comprehensive Assistance Package. We will also continue to support Ukraine's efforts to strengthen its resilience against hybrid threats, including through intensifying activities under the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Countering Hybrid Warfare. We welcome the cooperation between NATO and Ukraine with regard to security in the Black Sea region. The Enhanced Opportunities Partner status granted last year provides further impetus to our already ambitious cooperation and will promote greater interoperability, with the option of more joint exercises, training, and enhanced situational awareness. Military cooperation and capacity building initiatives between Allies and Ukraine, including the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade, further reinforce this effort. We highly value Ukraine's significant contributions to Allied operations, the NATO Response Force, and NATO exercises.

70. The Western Balkans is a region of strategic importance for NATO, as highlighted by our long history of cooperation and operations. NATO remains strongly committed to the security and stability of the Western Balkans and to supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the countries in the region. We will intensify our efforts in the region and enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation in order to support reform efforts, promote regional peace and security, and counter the malign influence of outside actors. Democratic values, the rule of law, domestic reforms, and good neighbourly relations are vital for regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration, and we look to continued progress in this regard. We value the NATO-Serbia partnership. Strengthening NATO-Serbia relations would be of benefit to the Alliance, to Serbia, and to the whole region. We support the EU-facilitated Dialogue and other efforts aimed

at the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and urge the sides to seize the moment and engage in good faith towards reaching a lasting political solution.

71. We remain committed to NATO's continued engagement in Kosovo, including through the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) which contributes to a safe and secure environment and to wider stability in the Western Balkans, and through ongoing capacity building efforts with the Kosovo security organisations. Any changes to our force posture in KFOR remain conditions-based and not calendar-driven.

72. The Alliance's close and mutually beneficial security cooperation with our Enhanced Opportunities Partners Finland and Sweden, which share our values and contribute to NATO-led operations and missions, has grown across a wide range of areas. We will continue to strengthen our ability to respond rapidly and effectively to any common challenges and to work together on enhancing our resilience and civil preparedness. We will bolster our regular and open political dialogue and cooperation in support of our common security, including by crisis management preparation, exercises, and exchanging information and analysis, notably on the security situation in the Baltic Sea region.

73. We will work more closely with all our Western European partners to share expertise, address emerging security challenges, and continue our cooperation on operations, missions, and other initiatives. We will also seek to further develop relations with our partners across the globe. We are enhancing political dialogue and practical cooperation with our long-standing Asia-Pacific partners – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea – to promote cooperative security and support the rules-based international order. We will discuss common approaches to global security challenges where NATO's interests are affected, share perspectives through deeper political engagement, and seek concrete areas for cooperation to address shared concerns. We are intensifying our interaction with Colombia, NATO's partner in Latin America, on good governance, military training, interoperability, demining, and maritime security. We remain open to deepening our political dialogue and intensifying our practical cooperation with our partners in Central Asia, taking into account the regional situation. We welcome the interest of other global actors to work with NATO in addressing our shared security concerns and stand ready to explore further engagement on a case-by-case basis.

74. We are committed to enhancing our long-standing engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. We will strengthen our political dialogue and practical cooperation with our Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners. This will build stronger security and defence institutions and capacities, promote interoperability, and help to counter terrorism. We have upgraded our defence capacity building assistance to Jordan, our Enhanced Opportunities Partner, to include additional counter-terrorism support, and have contributed to the establishment of the new Military Women's Training Centre. We will continue our engagement with Tunisia on defence capacity building. We will leverage the NATO-ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait as an important hub for education, training, and public diplomacy activities, and we remain open to the potential establishment of other education and training centres with interested MENA countries. Our Regional Hub for the South, in Naples, is making tangible progress in implementing its four functions and contributing to our situational awareness and understanding. We will continue to engage with the African Union and further develop our relations with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council in order to enhance our ability to better address mutual security concerns.

75. The deteriorating situation in the Sahel region matters to NATO's collective security. This region is a theatre of complex and interconnected challenges. NATO's approach to the Sahel is currently focused on our long-standing partnership with Mauritania, and we are looking into providing additional advice and training support. We will also continue to engage in dialogue with relevant NATO partners, representatives from the Sahel region, international and regional organisations and entities such as the African Union, the G5 Sahel structures, the UN, and the EU, as well as with the Coalition for the Sahel. NATO will enhance its engagement with the G5 Sahel structures and remains open, upon request, to consider further engagements in the region.

76. The crisis in Libya has direct implications for regional stability and the security of all Allies. We welcome the progress achieved in Libya, including the recent endorsement of the interim Government of National Unity (GNU) and Presidency Council. We commend the UN efforts in support of a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process, aimed at promoting national reconciliation as well as unifying and strengthening state institutions. We call on all the relevant Libyan authorities and institutions, including the GNU and the House of Representatives, to take actions set out in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum roadmap and to make the necessary preparations for free, fair, and inclusive national Presidential and Parliamentary elections on 24 December 2021. We fully support the implementation of UNSCRs 2570 and 2571 and the 23 October 2020 cease fire agreement. In accordance with our Summit decisions, we remain committed to providing advice to Libya, upon its request, in the area of defence and security institution building, taking into

account political and security conditions.

77. NATO is an Alliance that constantly modernises and adapts to new threats and challenges. NATO is also adapting as an institution. To enhance our political-military coherence and situational awareness, we have restructured the activities of the NATO Headquarters, and established a Chief Information Officer function. We welcome and will continue progress towards an optimised NATO intelligence enterprise, better postured to provide timely and relevant support to Alliance operations and decision-making on contemporary and future challenges. We will also further strengthen the security of our cyber and communications systems and continue to protect the Alliance against espionage attempts. We will continuously pursue greater coherence, improved effectiveness, and new efficiencies, in support of the flexibility and responsiveness we need as an Alliance.

78. We express our deep appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to NATO by the Government and the people of Belgium for over five decades, and to us today on the occasion of our Summit meeting at NATO Headquarters. We pay tribute to all the men and women in uniform who continue to work daily for our collective security. And we extend a special word of thanks to all those who made it possible for us to have a safe and productive Summit meeting despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, including the NATO medical personnel and the Polish Medical Emergency Detachment.

79. With our decisions today, we have opened a new chapter in the transatlantic relationship and set the direction for the Alliance's continued adaptation towards 2030 and beyond. We look forward to meeting again in Spain in 2022, followed by our next meeting in Lithuania.

Item 10



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

## Remarks

by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Leaders Summit on Climate

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22 Apr. 2021 - | Last updated: 22 Apr. 2021 21:03

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(As delivered)

Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greeneld, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Let's start by talking about multilateral engagement and for that I'd like to turn to Secretary General Stoltenberg. Secretary General Stoltenberg, as the former UN Special Envoy on climate change, you have a unique understanding of security implications of climate change. You've pushed for a robust climate security agenda within NATO. What prompted this push, and why should NATO fold climate into its risk assessment planning? Also how is NATO becoming a leading voice among international organizations dealing with the security related aspects of climate change?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

Thank you so much Ambassador Thomas-Greeneld. And thank you Secretary Austin for inviting me.

I welcome President Biden's leadership on tackling climate change. As you mentioned, I am the former UN Special Envoy for Climate Change, so this is very close to my heart.

Global warming is making the world more dangerous. It has a serious impact on our security.

So it matters for NATO.

NATO has recognised climate change as a security challenge for many years. Now we are stepping up our efforts through NATO2030.

And I expect NATO Leaders to approve an ambitious action plan on the security impact of climate change at our Summit on the 14th of June. As part of our substantive and forward-looking agenda to deal with the challenges of today and tomorrow.

I see three areas where NATO has an important role to play in addressing climate change.

First, understand.

We must understand the problem, so we can better address it.

Climate change is a crisis multiplier, From the Sahel to the High North.

Floods and forest fires, droughts and famines devastate communities, increase competition for scarce resources, and fuel tensions and conflict.

So we need to increase our awareness by monitoring and tracking climate change much more closely at NATO.

To better understand and anticipate its impact on our security.

Including on the most vulnerable regions and on geopolitical competition. This includes investing more in research, and sharing data and analysis.

Second, adapt.

NATO must adapt so we can continue to operate in all conditions.

Much of our critical infrastructure is exposed to rising sea levels and more extreme weather. From major European ports, like Rotterdam and Hamburg.

To the world's largest naval base in Norfolk, Virginia, which houses NATO commands.

From Iraq to the Arctic, our soldiers and equipment face extreme heat and cold.

And increasingly our troops are being called on to respond to natural disasters, at home and abroad.

So climate change affects where and how we operate.

We will therefore conduct an Alliance-wide assessment of the impact of climate change on NATO assets and installations.

We will prioritise sustainable technologies in our procurement.

And partner with industry to deliver new climate-neutral capabilities. We will also integrate climate change into planning and exercises.

Third, cut emissions.

NATO must play its part in reducing military emissions. Greening our militaries can offer real win-wins.

For example, by decreasing our dependence on fossil fuel supply, which often makes our operations more vulnerable.

In this way we can reduce our environmental impact.

And at the same time improve our operational effectiveness.

Allied militaries are already stepping up to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and increase renewable energies.

Using biofuels to power fighter jets.

Integrating solar panels into soldiers' combat gear.

And planting trees on military bases to offset carbon emissions.

We must continue this good progress.

And work more closely with the private sector and partners.

To drive innovation and share expertise.

It makes little sense to have more and more electric vehicles on our streets, while our armed forces still rely only on fossil fuels.

My ambition for the NATO summit this year is a clear political commitment to plan for reductions in military emissions, contributing to the goal of net zero.

NATO is the unique platform for Europe and North America to ensure our shared security. And climate change is a generational challenge that requires a global solution.

So NATO must set the gold standard on understanding, adapting to, and mitigating the security impacts of climate change.

I look forward to working with you to make our planet safer for all.

Item 11



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

### Conversation on "The Future of NATO"

with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and students of the University of South Florida (USF)

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25 Mar. 2021 - | Last updated: 29 Mar. 2021 10:18

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(As delivered)

Golfo Alexopoulos [Professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies and Director of USF Institute on Russia at the University of South Florida in Tampa Bay]: Hello everyone and thank you for joining us from Florida and around the world for this exciting event with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. My name is Golfo Alexopoulos and I am a professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies at the University of South Florida in Tampa Bay. I'm also the Director of the USF Institute on Russia and I will be moderating today's discussion, together with my colleague doctor Thomas Smith.

We are distinctly honoured to welcome the NATO Secretary General virtually to USF. Before we begin, I want to thank everyone who helped make this very special event possible: Admiral John Kirby, the Public Diplomacy Division at NATO Headquarters and the College of Arts and Sciences. This event is co-sponsored by the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies and the USF Institute on Russia. And we are deeply grateful to our generous supporters especially the Institute on Russia's Advisory Council.

Now let's get started. Thomas over to you.

Thomas Smith [Professor and Associate Dean of the Judy Genshaft Honors College]: Welcome everyone. My name is Thomas Smith and I am the Associate Dean of the Judy Genshaft Honors College and also Professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies. We are delighted to have you with us for this conversation with the Secretary

General, as he addresses a range of security issues around the world, but also some that affect us right here, in Florida. It is my pleasure to turn things over to the President of the University of South Florida, Steven Currall, who will introduce our host, our guest. Doctor Currall is the seventh President of the USF. He joined us in 2019, bringing three decades of leadership and academic expertise from top universities, both in the US and abroad. He holds a PhD in organisational psychology from Cornell. He is an expert in innovation, emerging technologies, negotiation and corporate governance. President Currall, over to you.

Steven Currall: [President of the University of South Florida]: Well thank you, Thomas and hello everybody. On behalf of the University of South Florida, I'm honoured to welcome Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to this virtual conversation. And we thank him for joining us today from Brussels. I wish to thank USF Institute on Russia and our School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies for facilitating this event. Professors Golfo Alexopoulos and Thomas Smith have prepared our students for this exciting opportunity to speak with the Secretary General on a variety of current topics. And for me, personally, this is actually the second time I have had the privilege of being with Secretary General. In my previous institution we hosted him for an event with students and he was brilliant that day as I am sure he will be today as well.

There can be no better time for us to consider the global landscape. Today an international system is emerging that's defined by both the great power competition as well as by issues that transcend national borders such as pandemics, environment and resources issues, cyber security and disruptive technologies. As the NATO Alliance seeks to collaborate on forward facing solutions, global research universities have an important role to play. At the University of South Florida, our faculty and students are conducting research to improve understanding of an increasingly complex world and to make our world safer and more secure.

Now, we offer academic programmes and a range of fields and disciplines that impact global security. From cyber security, to artificial intelligence, and international studies, to medicine and public health. And we are proud of our partnerships and collaborations too, with US Special Operations Command and US Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base. And we're eager to learn more about NATO's 2030 initiative, so that we can adapt for the future, a future that will be shaped for, and by, the students gathered here today.

Throughout his distinguished career, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has been a strong advocate for greater global and transatlantic cooperation. He

became NATO Secretary General in 2014 after serving as Prime Minister of Norway from 2005-2013. He attended the University of Oslo where he earned his advanced degree in economics and he worked as a journalist before entering politics as a member of the Norwegian Labour Party. I'm grateful to Secretary General for spending time with us today. We have much to learn from his expertise and his experience.

Mr Secretary General, welcome.

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: Thanks so much, Steven. It is great to see you again and also great to see your colleagues and to be with you all. I'm really looking forward to this conversation and I am so grateful that you show this interest in NATO, the importance of Europe and North America working together. And I'm here to answer questions and to engage in a conversation with you and the students. So, once again, thank you so much for having me.

Golfo Alexopoulos: Thank you, Secretary General Stoltenberg. I'd like to start with our first question here, to get that get us all started. You have had a very busy week, you hosted all the NATO Foreign Ministers this week and you met the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken for the first time. What in your view was the most significant outcome of this meeting with Secretary Blinken?

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: So, first of all, it was a very good meeting, a very positive meeting for many different reasons. One reason was actually that this is our first in person meeting for more than a year. So the reality is that for Foreign Ministers, and especially for Foreign Ministers, to not be able to travel that has really been difficult. But because we were able to also follow very strict, or respect, strict COVID-19 measures to prevent the spread of the virus, we were able also to hold in person meeting over two days this week. And of course perhaps the most important thing was the message that Secretary Blinken conveyed to all of us. And that was at the United States is very committed to the transatlantic bond in NATO, the steadfast commitment to our collective defence clause and a message from President Biden, which Blinken express to us, that the new Biden administration is really looking into how they can rebuild alliances and also strengthening NATO.

So that was a positive message, a message that was very much welcomed by all Allies, and we are looking forward to also welcoming President Biden to the upcoming NATO Summit here in Brussels later on this year. And of course we made some preparations, we discussed NATO 2030, Russia, but

also the situation in Afghanistan. So, we covered many topics in a very positive atmosphere knowing that there are many problems, many challenges but as long as we work together, North America and Europe we are able to tackle all of them as a strong, united Alliance. So, I think that was the main message from that meeting.

Golfo Alexopoulos: Thank you, we will pick up this idea of the transatlantic bond and how to strengthen it in a moment, but I want to turn to Russia. You mentioned Russia and I'm the Director of the Institute on Russia here at USF, so my question is: some have argued that NATO's expansion has embolden hardliners in Russia and convinced ordinary Russians that the West poses an existential threat to their country. Even some members of the Russian opposition, the democratic opposition, have expressed this view. What would you say to those who argue that NATO's expansion has fuelled a Russian aggression and what is your view regarding the expansion of NATO to include Georgia and Ukraine?

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: First of all, I really believe that just the idea that an expansion of NATO is a kind of threat or a provocation towards Russia, is a very dangerous idea and it's completely wrong. Because we have to understand that what we have done is that we have respected the free and independent choice of sovereign nations. After the end of the Cold War and the end of the Warsaw Pact, a lot of countries in Central and Eastern Europe they got their freedom, they got the possibility to decide their own future themselves.

And this is enshrined in many documents, which are also subscribed to by Russia, that it is actually a sovereign right of every sovereign nation to choose their own path and to decide what kind of security arrangements, military alliances, they want to be part of not want to be part of. So, the whole idea that NATO, in a kind of an aggressive way is moving East is wrong, it is the countries in the East that has decided through democratic processes to join NATO. And for many years after the end of the Cold War we actually were in the process of not only getting new members from East and Central Europe, but Poland, the Baltic countries, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and so on, but we also gradually developed a more and more close partnership with Russia. I have attended many NATO summits, NATO meetings, where, for instance, President Putin, Prime Minister Medvedev had participated. It is Russia that has now stopped, in a way, believe in the idea working together, cooperating, trusting each other and that was partly triggered by the military, the use of military force against Georgia in 2008, but even more so by the aggressive actions against Ukraine where Russia illegally annexed Crimea and used military force against the neighbour Ukraine in 2014.

For me, as a Norwegian, it is extremely important to underline the right of every nation to decide their own future and also whether they want to be part of a military alliance or not. Because back in 1949, there was a big discussion whether Norway should join NATO. And of course at that time, the Soviet Union, our neighbour - Norway is bordering Russia - or before that the Soviet Union, and of course Joseph Stalin didn't like the idea of a neighbour Norway joining NATO. But we made our independent decision as a small country that we wanted to be part of NATO and I'm very glad that in Washington, or in London, or in Paris, that they did not say that because Russia or Soviet Union disliked that Norway is joining then we don't accept Norway as a member. And exactly the same idea should apply for the Baltic countries, for Poland, for all the others, who have joined. They have decided to join and it's only for NATO Allies and the applicant country to decide whether NATO is going to enlarge or not. It is not for Russia, they have no say in this and there is no way it is a provocation that sovereign nations make their own sovereign decisions.

Then on Georgia and Ukraine, we stated in 2008, NATO, at the summit in Bucharest, and I was there as Norwegian Prime Minister, that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO. We didn't set any date for that, we have repeated that decision at summits after 2008. What we do now is that we help and support Ukraine and Georgia as they move towards membership. We help them with the security sector reform, with strengthening democratic control of the armed forces to gradually meet NATO standards, and by doing that moving closer to the NATO membership. But NATO membership has to be agreed by consensus. All Allies have to agree. And therefore, I am not able to give you a date for when Allies assess that Georgia and Ukraine are ready to fully join the Alliance.

So, well, my short answer is that it's not the provocation, it is not a threat to Russia that European countries have joined NATO in Central and Eastern Europe, we don't want to live in a world where big powers are establishing a sphere of influence when they decide what small neighbours can do. It is a sovereign democratic right and the Baltic countries, the Eastern Europeans have demonstrated that democratic right and we have respected that.

Thomas Smith: Thank you Secretary General for being here. I know that much of what you talk about today will be a reflection of NATO 2030, your own, sort of, strategic initiative. As you, sort of, survey the coming decade and you are thinking about adapting to change, how does a big organisation like NATO to go about changing itself instead of staying current and abreast of current threat?

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: NATO is the most successful alliance in the history for one reason and that is that we have been able to change when the world is changing. After the Cold War, we totally changed what NATO did. We went into the Balkans and helped to end two ethnic wars there: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia. We enlarged with many new members from Eastern and Central Europe. Then, after the 9/11 attacks against United States, we changed again. Suddenly NATO was at the forefront fighting international terrorism and we have [been] there since then. And then, after 2014, we changed because we saw more aggressive Russia and we have implemented the biggest reinforcement of our collective defence in a generation since 2014. We need to continue to change, continue to adapt, because the world is changing. We are faced with more cyber attacks, a more brutal form of terrorism with [the] rise of Daesh, proliferation of nuclear weapons and we see also the global balance of power shifting with the rise of China. And we see many other challenges in a much more complex security environment which we have to address. Therefore, we have put forward and launched what we called NATO 2030 which is a project to make NATO future-proof.

It addresses a wide range of issues: how to strengthen our deterrence and defence, including by more NATO funded budgets or funding for our deterrence and defence activities. It's about resilience, making sure that we have reliable infrastructure, telecommunications, power grids and so on. Extremely important because we see that, we are actually, we see more means of aggression against, for instance our infrastructure that we have seen before. It's about technology, making sure that we maintain our technological edge. It's about building partnerships also with partners in the Asia-Pacific, addressing partly also the rise of China, protecting the rules-based order. It's about strengthening NATO's as a training alliance because we strongly believe that prevention is better than intervention. If we can train local forces, it also makes us more safe and secure. It's about strengthening NATO as a political alliance, consultations among Allies. And is also about renewing NATO's Strategic Concept and about taking into account the security consequences of global warming or climate change. All of this is in the NATO 2030 initiative. We discussed it at the Foreign Ministers Meeting at this week. I sense a very broad support. We will continue to discuss, negotiate, develop the proposals and then I'm very confident that when President Biden and all the other NATO leaders meet in Brussels later on this year, they will agree bold, forward looking conclusions on how to continue to strengthen NATO along these lines which are now presented in NATO 2030 project. So, change is the key for NATO's

success, and therefore, we need to continue to change.

Thomas Smith: Thank you, I heard you say the most important and the most difficult part of your job is managing the internal politics of a 30-member Alliance. I'm sure for example, if you have a meeting in Ankara one week, you are probably likely to have a meeting in Athens soon thereafter. How do you keep the Alliance moving more or less that everyone is moving in the same direction?

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: You are right, of course NATO being an alliance of 30 different countries, with different geography, with different history, from both sides of the Atlantic and always with different political parties in power, there are differences. That is a kind of natural consequence of being 30 democracies. And we have seen some disagreements and differences between Allies over decades, back to the Suez crisis in 1956 or when France decided in 1960s to actually leave the military cooperation in NATO, and NATO had to move its headquarters from Paris to Brussels and Belgium. Or the Iraq war in 2003, where some Allies were heavily in favour of the intervention, others were heavily against. So, we have seen differences between NATO Allies before, as we see them today.

But the strength and the success of NATO is that we have been able to always unite around our core task and stay committed to protecting and defending each other based on NATO's core principle, one for all, all for one. If one Ally is attacked, it is regarded as an attack on all Allies.

And I'm not saying this is easy, but I'm saying that the reason why NATO is able to make decisions, is able to function despite the differences, is that it is in the national security interest of each and every Ally that we stand together. A strong NATO is good for Europe but it's also good for United States. It's a unique thing for the United States, the only big power in the world, that it actually has 29 friends and allies. We saw that after the 9/11 attacks, NATO Allies invoked the Article 5, the collective defence clause, for the first time in our history to support the United States. And more than 100,000 soldiers from Europe, from Canada, from partner nations, have served shoulder to shoulder with American soldiers in Afghanistan for two decades. And more than 1000 have paid the ultimate price. This shows that NATO has been good also for the United

State, and with the rise of China, it is good to have friends, so it is the security interests, the fact that we are stronger together than apart, that is the main reason why I'm, and all NATO Allies, are able to find consensus, find ways to create compromises and then be able to make decisions despite the differences we see. So, yes it's not always easy, there are disagreements, I don't deny that, but it is encouraging to see how the Alliance is able to cope with

the differences and then continue to move on.

Golfo Alexopoulos: Secretary General, we are going to pick up on this point that you made about Article 5, an attack on one Ally is considered an attack on all Allies. Our first question comes from a USF alum who has question particularly on this notion of collective defence. You published a piece in the Tampa Bay Times this week where you mentioned that you visited MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, home to US Central Command and US Special Operations Command. Our first audience question comes from a USF alum, who works there. So, let's listen.

Question: Secretary General Stoltenberg and USF, thank you for the opportunity to ask a question on the important topic of NATO's future. My question is: given Russia's use of irregular warfare such as disinformation, cyber attacks, the use of private military companies and attacks involving nerve agents, all to advance his foreign policy goals, how does NATO interpret these activities in the context of collective defence? More specifically, do you anticipate Russia's continued use of irregular warfare will drive NATO to reevaluate the threshold of an Article 5 violation?

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: Thank you so much for your question. First of all, I'd like to say that it was really a pleasure and a great to visit to the MacDill Air Force Base back in 2017 and also to meet with the US Central Command and US Special Operations Command. Both these commands are of course providing extremely valuable support to different NATO missions and operations. I have seen US Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, in Iraq and elsewhere. And of course Central Command is of course key, for instance, the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh, where also NATO and NATO Allies are participating. So, Florida may be far away from some of the theatres where NATO troops are operating but their commands we see there are critical and extremely important for the NATO in many different ways. Then, what you point out is something which is extremely important, and that is that before it was a very clear line between peace and war, it was either peace or war. Now there is a much more blurred line, we have disinformation campaigns, we have cyber attacks, we have economic coercion, we have many different kinds of intelligence operations and we have seen NATO Allies been subject [to] aggressive actions by all the countries, where they use non-traditional military means but all these non-military means and to try to undermine us, divide us, attack us. And that's exactly what NATO has to adapt to, and what we actually have over some years now responded to, by changing the way NATO is operating. For instance in cyberspace, we have realised that cyber is a domain where we need to be present and we

have been there of course for several years but we are constantly stepping up, and we decided not so many years ago that an attack in cyber, the cyber attack, may trigger Article 5.

That is a totally new message meaning that before, we regarded, you know, an armed attack as something that had battle tanks or planes, or ships, but now we have stated clearly that cyber attacks could also trigger Article 5. So, we need to be ready to respond also to attacks which are conducted with different means of aggressions, not only the traditional, military means. I think also we need to realise that NATO has a lot to do even before we trigger Article 5. To counter disinformation, as we do every day, to protect critical infrastructure. So, that's the reason why we are focusing on, in our NATO 2030 project, how can we develop more concrete targets for the resilience of airports, energy grids, telecommunications, 5G. We had a big debate about Huawei and 5G and so on, and again technology and the other areas where we are working, broadening our security agenda. We will never give our adversaries, or our potential adversaries, the privilege of knowing exactly when we trigger Article 5. But what we have stated clearly is that we will trigger Article 5 when we find that necessary, and we can also trigger Article 5 when we see aggression conducted with other means than normal military means.

Golfo Alexopoulos: Thank you. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin made a surprise visit to Afghanistan on Sunday and this is at a time when the new administration is deciding whether to adhere to the previous administrations agreement with the Taliban to remove all US forces from the country by May 1<sup>st</sup>. The US and NATO have fought side by side in this conflict so this is an issue on the minds of many, including one of our graduate students who experience this conflict in his home country. I now turn to him for our next question. Let's listen.

Question: As the US is currently withdrawing its forces and negotiating a political settlement with the Taliban, what is NATO's role in these negotiations? Would NATO and US withdrawal together in case there is a decision on full withdrawal from the country or will NATO countries stay the course and train and advice Afghan security forces under the democratic government? Thank you.

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: First of all, NATO strongly supports the peace talks and we also strongly support the renewed efforts by the United States to reenergise, to reinvigorate the ongoing peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. These talks are not easy and of course the whole process is fragile and this was also very much addressed when Foreign Ministers met here in Brussels this week, also with

the Secretary Blinken. We discussed how can we continue to support the difficult but important peace talk. But these talks, despite the fact that we don't have any guarantee for success, they are the only path to peace. They are the only way to achieve a lasting political solution in Afghanistan, preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for international terrorists. And therefore, the renewed initiative is strongly supported by NATO Allies, this is the first time [the] Taliban and the Afghan Government actually sit around the same table and negotiate. It has to be, and it is, an Afghan owned process and at the same time United States, NATO Allies, of course support the negotiating process, and we consult closely. We have our NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul. He has attended [inaudible] in Doha and followed the negotiations, and of course Allies are closely consulting as we try to re-energize the process.

There will be a meeting in Istanbul, NATO Ally, where all the parties are expected to come and

we will really make a renewed effort to try to get some concrete results. If we succeed and if the Afghan succeed because at the end of the day it has to be the Afghan that agree a peace deal for Afghanistan, then of course that will be a great achievement. But at the same time we have to be realistic and there is of course a possibility that the peace process does not succeed, then we are faced with a very difficult dilemma because then we either we leave, but then we risk to jeopardise, to lose the gains we have made over two decades in Afghanistan. Or we stay, but then we have to be prepared for a long-term continued military presence, also with increased violence. So, again we are back to the peace efforts, the message to all parties at the negotiating table is that they have to show a real willingness to make compromises, to negotiate in good faith. We need to see the Taliban reduce violence, and we also need to see the Taliban stop

supporting international terrorists. I think we have to remember that now, the NATO presence in Afghanistan has changed a lot over the last years. Not so many years ago, we had more than 100,000 troops in the combat operations. Now there are roughly 10,000 troops in Afghanistan: NATO troops, international troops, and most of them are conducting training, assisting, support of the Afghan national security forces which are on the frontline. The Afghans are themselves on the front frontline. The majority of the NATO troops, the majority of the 10,000 troops in Afghanistan, there are non US, showing the importance of close coordination, consultation in Afghanistan or among NATO Allies regarding our future presence in Afghanistan. At the Foreign Ministerial meeting this week, it was clearly stated by all Allies that as now we discuss our future presence there, we need to adhere to the principle we have established over some years that we went into Afghanistan together, we have adjusted our presence there together, and when the time is right,

we will leave together. So, we need close coordination between Allies that's exactly what we do and we will make decisions on our future presence there together, based on the assessment of the peace negotiations and based on the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan.

Golfo Alexopoulos: We now have a question about China. This comes from one of the Honours College here who actually studied abroad in China. Let's listen.

Question: NATO was originally created to provide collective security against the Soviet Union but has expanded to deal with a variety of security threats or issues, you know how does NATO respond or view the growing influence of China in Europe and in the Mediterranean. For example, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China's Belt and Road Initiative, expansion into Africa, Latin America and other places with NATO influence? Thank you.

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: Thank you so much, and thank you for a very important and relevant question. I think we had to start with the following: and that is that NATO is a regional alliance. North America and Europe standing together and we have been that for more than 70 years. And NATO would remain a regional alliance of North America and Europe, but the threats and the challenges we face in this region they are becoming more and more global. International terrorism, cyber, proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also of course the rise of China, which is shifting the global balance of powers. Soon China will be the biggest economy in the world. They already have the largest defence budget in the world and they are investing heavily in new military capabilities, and they are also coming closer to us in cyberspace, investing in our infrastructure in Europe and in other NATO Allied countries. And we see them in the Arctic, we see them in Africa, so they are in many ways coming closer to us. The rise of China poses some opportunities for all of [inaudible]: economic growth, trade, the rise of China has helped to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, and we need to work with China, engage with China on common challenges like, for instance, climate change. At the same time, we need to also realise the security consequences of the rise of China, because China is a power that doesn't share our values. We see how they treat the minorities, the Uighurs, in their own country. We see how they coerce neighbours, close to their borders, but also countries all over the world. We see how they are hampering, undermining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and so on. So that's reason why NATO has to make sure that we, first of all, are engaging with China to address the concerns we have. Second, that we work with partners, that we establish a platform of like-minded democracies, standing up for the rules-based order, standing up for the values we believe

in. And when we see that China is actually violating basic human rights, we need to call that out as we have done, for instance, when it comes to their cracking down on democratic rights in Hong Kong. So, this is again part of something which is reflecting that NATO is changing. For many years we focused on the Soviet Union, now we need to focus a much more broad security spectrum of challenges. We remain the regional alliance, but in our region we need to respond to many more challenges that we did not so many decades ago.

Golfo Alexopoulos: Thank you. Another one of our Honours College students has a question about genocide. Let's listen.

Question: Thank you for taking the time to share your wisdom with the University of South Florida community today. I am honoured to have the opportunity to ask you a question about your work. In my freshman year I took a class by a leading genocide scholar at USF on the history and theory of genocide and international affairs. This class, as one can guess, is one I won't soon forget. Since taking it, however, I have kept up to date on news and genocide and suspected genocide around the globe. What realistic steps can NATO take to prevent genocide in China and around the world? Is it possible that western recognition of its own past genocide in the West might create more momentum to act on this threat to the Uighurs populations in China? How can western democracies build alliances against China and what is NATO's role in that?

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: First of all, I think that European nations and NATO allies, the United States, all of us have been very clear, for instance, on the genocide we saw during the Second World War and we have stated very clearly many, many times that of course genocide is something which is absolutely unacceptable. It is violating international law and we have been very clear on that. Second, I strongly believe that China's treatment of the Uighurs is absolutely unacceptable. We have seen mass detentions; we have seen forced labour and we also see population control measures such as forced sterilisation. So, this is apparent, this is appalling, and it runs directly against the core values that NATO is founded on: democracy, rule of law, individual liberty. And the way China is dealing with minorities and the human rights is absolutely violating these values. So, this is a clear message from NATO Allies and there's no doubt where we stand on that issue.

Golfo Alexopoulos: So, you said at the start of our programme at NATO was the most successful alliance in history. Our next question concerns the health of the Alliance. Let's listen.

Question: Thank you so much for this opportunity and for answering all the questions. Now it is proposed that one of this year's goal will be to strengthen the bond between Europe and North America. My question is what are going to be the active objectives in order to achieve this goal and improve the relations? Thank you so much.

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: Sorry, I didn't get the last question.

Golfo Alexopoulos: How would you, what are the goals, how would you strengthen the Alliance? What concrete measures would you take to strengthen the Alliance?

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: Well, I think that the most important thing we do is that we do what we actually discussed also doing the Foreign Ministerial Meeting today.

And that is to demonstrate that a strong NATO is good for all Allies. To demonstrate that, for European Allies, that of course this is a great advantage that United States, the strongest military power in the world, is providing them with security guarantees. And as long as all potential adversaries know that if they in anyway attack a NATO Ally it would trigger a response from all Allies, this is the best way to prevent conflict. NATO's task is not to provoke a conflict but to prevent a conflict and for European Allies to have US and also Canada providing security guarantees of course is of great importance. And vice versa. Because as I already alluded to, it is a great advantage for the United States to have so many friends and allies, not least in dealing with the shifting global balance of power with the rise of China soon being the biggest economy in the world. The United States represents like 25% of the world's GDP and the world's economic power. But if you add the NATO Allies we together represent 50% of the world's GDP, 50% of the world's military might and close to 1 billion people. So, it is a great advantage also for the United States to have NATO and so many friends and allies. And the best way to strengthen this Alliance is to demonstrate the value of that as we do in the fight against terrorism, in dealing more and more assertive Russia or in responding and acting when we see the rise of China. So, that is, in short, the best way to answer your question.

Golfo Alexopoulos: Mr Secretary General, we know that climate and its impact on global security is an issue that you care very much about and you've worked on for a long time even before, when you were a Prime Minister of Norway and served as UN special envoy on climate change. Climate change is

an issue that our students also care about deeply as evidenced by the next question. Let's listen.

Question: How would climate change impact global security and how would that affect the relationship between countries and international relations? In addition, is there anything that the world could do that has not been done already in order to limit the effects of climate change long-term? Thank you very much.

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: So, climate change matters for our security. Climate change is a crisis multiplier. More extreme weather, global warming, rising sea levels, will force people to move, will increase competition about scarce resources like water, land and all of that will exacerbate crisis, conflict many places in the world. So, climate change matters for NATO because climate change matters for security. And I think that NATO has at least three important tasks.

One is to be the leading organisation in understanding, assessing and analysing the link between climate change and crisis, military conflict. Second, NATO has an important role when it comes to adapting to climate change. Because our militaries they are operating out there, in nature. And of course when the sea level is rising it will affect our naval bases and NATO infrastructure. When we see more extreme heat, for instance as we have seen in Iraq over last year, we saw many days with more than 50 degrees Celsius, which is extremely high and warm weather, I do not know what that is in Fahrenheit, but extremely warm. And then of course it matters for soldiers who are going to operate out there. So, it is about uniforms, how we conduct our operations, vehicles, everything has to function in more extreme weather. And melting of ice of course affects our operations in the High North. And lastly, we need to make sure that we also look into how the military can help contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gases. How we actually going to have less emissions from different military operations and activities. And we've made an important step in our Foreign Ministerial Meeting this week, where we agreed a report on how to integrate climate change into our planning, into our exercises and also how to make sure that we have an assessment of the consequences of climate change for our security. So, we are moving forward as an Alliance. You ask me what is the most important thing? Well, the most important thing is that we all help to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases because that's the only way to reduce the effect of global warming.

Thomas Smith: Of course, Turkey has now been the sort of anchor for the south-eastern part of the NATO region, but that has now been challenged.

But we now have a questions from another of our Honours students about Turkey. Let's listen.

Question: I am a senior political science student at USF. Recently, we have seen Turkey make concerted efforts to improve its relations with Russia. Even that Turkey is such a strategic NATO member state, how do we incentivise Turkey to not further align itself with Russia?

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: Turkey is an important member of this Alliance, not least because they border Iraq and Syria and they have been extremely important in the fight against ISIS, liberating the territory ISIS controlled in Iraq considered not so many months ago. At the same time, there are serious concerns expressed by Allies, for instance on the Turkish decision to acquire a Russian air defence system S-400. And I have expressed concerns about the consequences of that decision, the United States have done it. And we also have all the issues in the eastern Mediterranean and where we see differences and concerns expressed by Allies. I think what NATO does is that we provide a platform for when we disagree, and when there are differences between Allies, to sit down, to discuss, consult and try to find ways to reduce tensions, differences and sometimes also solve the underlying issues. We have discussed of course the S-400 many times. We have been able to make some progress on the eastern Mediterranean, where we have been able to establish what we call a deconfliction mechanism here at NATO. And we will continue to use NATO as the platform for Allies to try to look for ways to address the differences we see. Turkey remains a committed Ally but there are differences and, as have eluded and already talked about, differences between Allies is nothing new, but NATO has proven to be extremely capable of dealing with differences and I am absolutely certain we can deal with that also now.

Thomas Smith: We have a lot of students on the call today and many of them are interested in careers in the foreign service or with international organisations. And I'm sure they would appreciate your advice and insights you have. Let's listen to a question.

Question: My question for you, Mr Stoltenberg, is what would you suggest to a new graduate who is interested in a career in foreign affairs? The qualities, the experience, what should they possess in order to make themselves stand out? Thank you for the opportunity to ask a question.

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: Thank you so much for the question. I don't know to what extent I really have any good advice to give you because I have never made so many plans for my career. I actually only

made one decision when I was in my early twenties and that I was not going to become a politician. So, I actually went into economics and statistics. And I worked as a researcher in the Norwegian Centre Bureau of Statistic for some years, because I was very much oriented towards mathematics and economics. And then, suddenly, I was asked to become the Deputy Minister for Environment, and I promised myself and my wife that I would only be in politics for a few years and then go back to research. But then things happened and I ended up in politics and then I was in Norwegian politics and I didn't dream about becoming Secretary General of NATO. But after I stepped down as Prime Minister, suddenly that was an opportunity. So, I have never been able to plan my career and it has gone in different directions over the years. But if there's anything I would like to say, then it is that focus on the work, the job you have today. And be focused on how you can do that as good as possible. So for the students just do your homework, study hard and be focused on that. And for those who have started in a new job, be focused on delivering good results in the job you have. I think sometimes it's a bit dangerous to think too much about the next job, because then you are less focused on where you are. And if you are delivering good in the work, or the position, or the job you have today, I am absolutely certain that there will be some new opportunities in the future. So, stay focused, work hard, own the responsibilities you have, and then something nice will happen.

Golfo Alexopoulos: Thank you so much. I want to ask one other question. We had we're running short on time, but I think we have a little bit of time for a couple more questions. Today, March 25<sup>th</sup>, is the 200th anniversary of Greek independence. So, I wanted to ask you a question about Greece on this bicentennial. You just talked about the tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. Greece has accused Turkey of gas exploration in its waters and making territorial claims. These tensions are probably the worst among any two NATO Allies. How do you mitigate these tensions? You talked about some of the response that NATO has made, but what more can you say about how NATO can defend Greece's territorial sovereignty?

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO]: You are absolutely right that those tensions are perhaps the most difficult tensions between two NATO Allies. Not only because there are serious differences, tensions, but also because they have been there for so many years. I have expressed my concerns both in Ankara and in other capitals, but I think also what NATO is doing is that at least we are bringing the parties together. And one of the concerns we had, especially few months ago, was the risk for any military incidents, accidents in the eastern Mediterranean, because we significantly

increased military presence of Turkey and Greece in the eastern Mediterranean with planes, ships, submarines. There was high tensions, it was a real risk for military incidents. As we have seen, for instance back in the 1990s where actually those incidents led to casualties, downing of planes and casualties. It was extremely, and still is, extremely important for NATO to prevent this from happening again. And that's reason why we used the NATO platform, we brought together Greece and Turkey, established what we call a deconfliction mechanism as very operative lines of communications, direct lines of communications, 24/7, some agreed procedures. Greece and Turkey also agreed to reduce tensions by cancelling some exercises. We still work on how we can expand this mechanism for deconflicting between two Allies in eastern Med. And we welcome the progress we have seen, and there is less military presence, less tension. It is not solved but at least the tension has been reduced. And this has also helped to pave the way for what is called exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey on the underline disputes in the eastern Mediterranean. We also have a NATO presence in the Aegean, we have something called the Aegean activity, another is NATO ships sailing there, to help implement the agreement between Turkey and Greece on the migration challenges in the Aegean. And that NATO presence is important because it actually brings together Turkey and Greece, Turkey and the European Union, FRONTEX - the Border Agency, and again, I think just the fact that we bring them together is at least one important step in the right direction. So, since NATO is an organisation based on consensus, when Allies disagree, that makes it hard for us to make decisions. But at least we can be a tool, a vehicle for trying to find solutions. Either to solve a whole underlying dispute or problem if we have that between Allies or at least reduce tensions and prevent the situation from escalating and coming out of control. And that is exactly what we do. When two valued Allies, important Allies, Greece and Turkey, have some tensions and some difficulties as we see for instance in the eastern Mediterranean.

Golfo Alexopoulos: Thank you so much, Mr Secretary General. I think we are out of time, sadly. We thank you so much for joining us and for your generous and thoughtful questions. We all learned so much, it was a distinct honour to host you at USF.

Jens Stoltenberg [Secretary General of NATO] Again, thank you so much. It has been a great privilege to be together with you and to listen to all the very relevant and important questions. And I wish you all the best and hope to see you in person at some stage where we can start to travel again. All the best, thank you.

Item 12



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

America, Europe and the Pacific  
Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Marines' Memorial  
Club Hotel in San Francisco

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09 Jul. 2014 - | Last updated: 10 Jul. 2014 19:31

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

Mr Graham,

Thank you for that warm Californian welcome.

As NATO Secretary General I have often visited the East Coast and the Mid-West. Actually, my son lives in Illinois with his American wife and their three beautiful children. So I have three American grand kids. But I am delighted to be in San Francisco to discuss issues that are important across America and in Europe.

And I would like to start by thanking the Commonwealth Club, the World Affairs Council of Northern California, and the Marine's Memorial Association for co-hosting our meeting.

And it is a special privilege to speak in this living memorial to the U.S. Marines. They served with remarkable courage during the Second World War. They continue to do so, including in NATO-led missions around the world.

I have worked closely with two outstanding Marines: General John Allen and General Joe Dunford, who have commanded our NATO-led mission in Afghanistan with skill and determination.

And I am delighted that General Dunford has been nominated as the next Commandant of the Marine Corps. He is a brave man, a great leader, and I am confident that he will continue to serve with distinction.

Almost seventy years ago, only a few blocks away from here, the Charter of the United Nations was signed.

On the other side of the country, the Bretton Woods agreements created the institutions that would guide the world through its longest and greatest period of economic growth to date.

A few years later, NATO was founded to unite America and Europe in the world's most powerful alliance.

From the ruins of the bloodiest conflict in history, a new rules-based international order emerged. Delivering unprecedented peace, progress and prosperity over decades.

NATO has provided a cornerstone of that shared security. NATO prevented the Cold War from getting hot. When the Berlin Wall fell, NATO helped bring Europe together. We offered a hand of friendship to former adversaries and opened the door to new Allies.

Today, we are an Alliance of 28 nations and 900 million people. Including everyone here on the West coast. And we are an Alliance that has partnerships with over 40 countries and organisations on five continents.

So whether you are in San Francisco or Sacramento. Or in Brussels or Bucharest. NATO's pledge to the collective defence of its members protects you. It means that we will stand up for one another and fight together when we have to. As we have done for more than a decade in Afghanistan.

But today, the international order that has guided us, that has upheld principles and shared values, that has pressed back against the tide of conflict, this order is under threat.

Today, an arc of crisis extends from Central Africa and the Sahel, to Syria, Iraq and the wider Middle East.

In Europe, Russia has ripped up the rulebook with its aggression against Ukraine. And across the Pacific, tensions are rising on the Korean Peninsula and territorial disputes remain unresolved.

Our world is more connected. And more competitive. But also more chaotic. And more precarious.

So it is vital that we maintain the rules-based order that promotes freedom,

democracy and the rule of law.

And a strong NATO is an essential part of preserving that order. At our summit in Wales in September, we will ensure that NATO remains ready to defend all Allies against any threats. With a strong bond between America and Europe. And strong partnerships around the world.

We have responded quickly to Russia's aggression in our neighbourhood. From the Baltics to the Black Sea, we have more planes in the air, more ships at sea and more troops on the ground.

The United States took the lead. And its continuing leadership remains crucial. But most of the planes are European, most of the ships are European, and many of the troops are European. All twenty-eight NATO Allies are playing their part.

At the summit, we will prepare for the future. To defend against any challenge with the right troops, in the right place, and with the right equipment.

But readiness requires resources. And I expect the summit to be the moment where we turn the corner on defence spending. So as our economies recover, we can reverse the decline and ensure a more balanced share of the burden across the Alliance.

To prepare for the future, we will also bolster our partnerships. As we prepare to complete our combat mission in Afghanistan at the end of the year, we must maintain the close ties we have forged on the field of battle.

Global threats like terrorism, piracy and missile attacks cross borders. They are too big for any one country to tackle alone. We can only deal with them together.

Not just as an Atlantic Alliance. But as a global network. Our security does not stop at the East Coast. The United States and Canada both border on the Pacific. Other Allies have territories and interests in the Pacific. And all Allies have concerns about the Pacific.

Our partners provide troops, planes and ships for our operations. They provide financial support. And together, we help build stability in the world.

In the Pacific, NATO has four partners – Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Australia and New Zealand have deployed many troops under the

NATO banner in Afghanistan. Japan and South Korea have made big contributions to reconstruction and development efforts there.

All four Pacific partners have taken part in our mission to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia. And all four have signed formal partnership agreements with NATO. We are deepening our political dialogue. And extending our practical cooperation to new areas like disaster relief and cyber defence. In the last few years, I have visited Australia, Japan and South Korea. I was struck by how much their citizens know about NATO. And by their enthusiasm to do more with NATO. And we want to do more with them. Because while we may be far apart on the map, we share the same values and the same commitment to a more stable world.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Both Europeans and Americans have a stake in making sure that the Pacific Ocean can live up to its name. And remain the peaceful ocean.

The success of the Pacific region depends on trade.

Trade can foster growth and cooperation. But on its own, it cannot deter autocratic regimes. It cannot defend against attack. And it cannot guarantee peace.

For this task, we need a strong, transparent, rules-based international order. An order that we started to create in this very city all those years ago. One that is upheld by the unshakable bond between this great country and its closest friends in Europe. An order that NATO will continue to uphold in the decades to come.

Thank you very much.

Tom Stephenson (Ambassador of the United States of America): (...) You all have been sending up some questions. I will try and go through them in a way that puts... that will create really more of a conversation than simply a Q&A. But let's start M. Secretary General. You talked a little bit about the fiscal challenges of NATO today. And we are in a world, in this country of sequestration and constrained resources. Certainly, our friends in Europe are going through some of the same fiscal challenges. How comfortable are you with where we are in terms of fiscal commitments today? It's been a source of frustration in this country. We felt we have carried a greater share of the burden than some of our

Allies in Europe. How comfortable are you that we have the resources committed today to the task at hand?

Anders Fogh Rasmussen (NATO Secretary General): Ambassador, I'm not comfortable; but I'm hopeful. Hopeful that we can now turn the corner. As I said in my introduction, I see encouraging signs that a number of countries now sign up to the NATO 2% benchmark. Let me explain a bit.

We have actually set a benchmark according to which we encourage NATO nations to spend on defence an amount equivalent to at least 2% of their gross domestic product. Only four Allies fulfil that requirement, among them, of course, the United States; but also the United Kingdom, Greece and Estonia.

Now, we need more investments in defence. During the last five years, Russia has increased its defence spending by 50% while NATO Allies during the same period of time have decreased their defence spending by 20%. This is simply not sustainable. We have to reverse the trend; stop cuts; and gradually increase defence investments.

I see encouraging times ... signs, as I mentioned, that countries now reverse the trend. Recently, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Turkey have decided to reach the 2% benchmark within a timeframe spending from 2017 to 2020. I hope more will follow. And this issue will be addressed at the NATO Summit in Wales; because we need to invest more in our security. Freedom doesn't come for free.

Tom Stephenson: Let's talk a little bit about potential expansion of NATO. In the context of what's going on in Crimea today with the threats to the Baltic States that appear increasingly imminent with what's going on with Russia's attempt to take back what they believe was theirs in terms of the former Soviet Union. How is all this going to impact...? Maybe Georgia is a good case in point of a country that there's been lots of discussion about... including in NATO.

I'm actually departing in a couple of days and will be in Georgia as well as Azerbaijan. But how do you think about... expansion today? And what's the likelihood in the context of where we are of NATO being willing to assume additional responsibilities as we look around a very troubled world today?

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: NATO's door remains open. But of course, we also have to make sure that our security guarantees remain credible. So each and every time...

Tom Stephenson: Article 5.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: That's Article 5, the famous article that states that we consider an attack on one an attack on all. And we will help any Ally that comes under attack. But of course, that security guarantee must remain credible. So each and every time, we let yet another country join our Alliance, we have to make sure that we can still exercise the Article 5 security guarantees. This is the reason why we say our door remains open. But in order to go through that door, you need to fulfil certain criteria. They are enshrined in the NATO Treaty Article 10, which states that we may invite European countries that can contribute to Euro-Atlantic security to join our alliance, if they are in a position to further the principles upon which we have built our alliance in our societies. This is implemented in a specific list of criteria that must be fulfilled.

Now, we have currently four aspirant countries: Georgia; and in the western Balkans, we have Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That's the official name. And the only official name that I'm allowed to pronounce.

Crowd: (Laughter)

Tom Stephenson: The Greeks won't like it.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Yes, they like

I'm doing it like this. Tom Stephenson:

Yes!

Crowd: (Laughter)

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Now, recently, NATO foreign ministers decided that at the Summit in Wales, we will prepare what we call a substantive package for Georgia, a package of cooperation measures that will bring Georgia closer to NATO.

We also decided that we will open what we call focussed and intensified talks with Montenegro in particular with the view to reform some of their security sector.

And then, at the latest, by the end of 2015, NATO foreign ministers will assess whether time is ripe to invite Montenegro to join our Alliance. So in other words, we don't envisage to extend invitations at the Summit in Wales. But

we will work with aspiring countries to help them carry through necessary reforms and down the road fulfil the necessary criteria.

And finally, let me just stress that no third country can veto future enlargements of NATO. This is a NATO decision. And it's a business to be addressed in cooperation between NATO and aspiring countries.

Tom Stephenson: Several people have asked how you think about what's going on in Iraq and Syria today, in the context of NATO. How does NATO think about? And is there any role for NATO in what is transpiring today, of concern to all of us in Syria, in Iraq and throughout the Middle East with the now known as the Islamic State? We're used to call it ISIS or ISIL or whatever.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: I'm gravely concerned about the situation in Syria and Iraq. And if I may put it into a greater context, actually, what we are witnessing right now is an arc of crisis surrounding NATO: in the East, Ukraine; in the Middle East, Syria, Iraq; in North Africa, Libya, but also other hot spots. And in the midst of this, you see NATO as a zone of security and stability and prosperity. And I think that's testament to the investment we have made in our security... and a testament to the strength of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance.

Now, NATO's role in all this: Our role is first and foremost to provide effective defence and protection of our Allies. In this case, in particular, of course, Turkey. And this is the reason why we have deployed Patriot missiles to Turkey to augment Turkey's air defence and protect Turkey against potential missile attacks, first and foremost from Syria.

But obviously, Turkey is also very much concerned about the situation in Iraq. NATO is not present in Iraq. Until 2011, we had a training mission in Iraq. We actually trained Iraqi security forces. But the Iraqi authorities decided not to extend our security arrangement. So we had to complete our training mission and withdraw in 2011. By the way, maybe a lesson to be learned, when we are speaking about Afghanistan.

As you know, the Iraqi government has requested assistance from individual NATO Allies, in particular the United States. If the Iraqi government were to request NATO assistance to train... to resume training of their security forces, I feel confident that NATO Allies would consider that carefully. But for the time being, I don't see a specific NATO role in Iraq. But obviously, we are following the situation closely. And we're also in close consultations with our Ally Turkey.

Tom Stephenson: You talked about NATO's relationship with the four countries in Southeast Asia. Hum, how do you think about the so-called US pivot to Asia? Is that a distraction from what... from NATO's perspective? Should it be the primary role and focus of the United States? Or does that fit into a global perspective that NATO shares in terms of how we need to protect the free world?

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: I welcome the American so-called pivot to Asia. I think we have a common interest in strong US engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, taking into account the rising powers like China and their role in the region. So I don't see any contradiction between a strong Trans-Atlantic relationship and at the same time a United States heavily engaged in the Asia-Pacific region.

On the contrary, we, in Europe, also have an interest in stability and peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. This leads me to more general remark. I think the world needs a strong US leadership. We see, based on experience, that if there's any doubt about the American leadership, then the vacuum will be filled by forces that definitely don't share our values. So, as a European, I welcome a strong and determined American leadership. And we have profited from a strong American engagement in European security since we established the NATO Alliance in 1949.

Tom Stephenson: I think if there is a silver lining to the foreign policy of this administration, it is a recognition that I see in Western Europe, much more so than when I was serving there, that the Free World doesn't do very well, when there isn't strong American leadership. So there are silver linings in every cloud. Several people have asked for you to talk a little bit about the focus on climate change and global warming. And how you view that in the context of the NATO mandate around... the NATO mandate and what's going on in the global environment today?

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: There's no doubt that climate change has and will continue to have strategic implications. One example is, of course, what is happening in the Arctic region in the High North. The fact that new sea lanes will be opened, the fact that there will be easier access to the exploitation of natural resources in these regions also raises the perspective of potential increased tensions in these regions.

Don't make any mistake: I'm not suggesting a militarization of activities in the Arctic region. But a number of NATO Allies are bordering the Arctic region or

they have territory in the Arctic region. And of course, they would expect that NATO's Article 5 applies to all NATO territories, including a NATO territory in the Arctic region. So seen from that perspective, we also have obligations to make sure that the Arctic region remains a region of peace and stability.

I mention it; because I took note of a speech delivered by President Putin some months ago. A speech which outlined how Russia intends to strengthen its military presence in the Arctic region. Of course, this is a development that must be followed closely by NATO and NATO Allies. And we will have to adapt to that situation.

Again, let me stress that I hope potential conflicts of interest in the Arctic region can be solved peacefully. And we have something called the Arctic Council which, I think, is an excellent instrument for solving so... such disputes. But based on my experience, sometimes, a firm and determined deterrence is the best way to facilitate peaceful, diplomatic and political processes.

Crowd: (Applause)

Tom Stephenson: The Arctic does represent an interesting challenge; but also an interesting opportunity to see whether we may be able to find an alignment of interest there that can create a generally better set of relationships between much of the West and Russia.

But this is an incredibly interesting time in terms of looking at Mr Putin and where he goes from here. We're at a critical step in the Ukraine today in terms of what his next step is going to be. I guess that Kiev is now moving into retake a lot of the territory in the East that had been taken over by the rebels. Do you....? What... what...? Talk a little bit more about your perspective on Mr Putin and whether he will back off here... Whether the economic... Whether the sanction threats are sufficient for him to be wary about going further than he has so far in Ukraine. And Ukraine is really a proxy for a lot of Eastern Europe and particularly the Balkans.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Mister Putin will not back off. This will last for a long time, I'm afraid. And I think it's important to put this in a greater context and understand that this goes well beyond Ukraine. This is part of a bigger strategy: a Russian desire or at least a Putin desire to re-establish, a zone of Russian influence in the near neighbourhood.

And to that end, it serves the Russian interest to see a series of protracted conflicts in the near neighbourhood. So this is not just about the illegal annexation of Crimea. This is not just about their destabilisation efforts in Eastern Ukraine. You could also include the Transnistria Conflict in Moldova; Abkhazia and South Ossetia occupied territories of Georgia. And I would add to this list also the unsolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

If you have a look at the map and see this series of protracted conflicts, you will see that they have at least one thing in common. Through these... or thanks to these conflicts, Russia hopes to prevent these countries from seeking Euro-Atlantic integration in the European Union and NATO. Because they know very well that the West is a bit reluctant to import these unsolved conflicts into our institutions and organizations. So this is what it is about. I'm not going to guess about what will be the next steps from the Russian side. You see a kind of a double game from the Russian side.

On one hand, you see occasionally some conciliatory remarks from President Putin, some public statements that served the purpose to defuse the Western reaction, possibly prevent further sanctions.

But then, on the other hand, we see a continuation of covert military operations and other operations in Ukraine with the aim to continue to destabilize the situation in Eastern Ukraine.

And I think at this stage, Mr Putin feels that he has, in a way, achieved at least one of the goals by weakening Ukraine politically, economically and I would not exclude the possibility that one of his options is to see Ukraine as maybe not a failed State, but at least a weakened State. And to that end, they will continue to create chaos, maybe a controllable chaos in Eastern Ukraine.

And we are witnessing what we, in NATO, call "hybrid warfare". It is a combination of traditional military means and more sophisticated covert operations; including unidentified green men, agents working undercover to destabilize the situation in Eastern Ukraine and sophisticated information and disinformation operations. You could also call it propaganda. And this is a new kind of warfare. And, of course, we also have to adapt to that; and make sure that we are able to

effectively counter such hybrid warfare as well in the future.

Tom Stephenson: Is there a case to be made that one of the dilemmas for Putin is the incredible dependence on natural resources of their economy? And if that

were... I was in a meeting recently with former Secretary Kissinger; and we were talking about the role of Russia and the sanctions... the potential consequences of sanctions. And he was very worried that there is some significant risk that if we really tighten up the sanctions, if the EU were prepared to go along with us in terms of doing some of the things we suggested that there's a chance the Russian economy could tumble out of control.

And he would worry about that from the perspective of then what happens with China; because in some respects, China (*sic*) is a cushion between Europe and China, or China and the Western World. Have you thought about just how vulnerable and maybe the reason we're seeing Putin as he has been in the last few days in terms of what's going on in Eastern Ukraine is his concern. He's watched what happened with the sanctions in Iran. We really brought Iran to its knees. We then left them o . But how... how much of the impact on Putin do you believe the potential threat of significant sanctions are?

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: If the thinking in the Kremlin were rational, I think... I think it would be a matter of concern. But I'm afraid it's not... I see Mr Putin surrounded by a circle of very nationalistic advisers. And as I said, I think the goal is to re-establish this zone of Russian influence in the near neighbourhood in the form of Soviet space. But what you just outlined points to a fact... I think... has been neglected, at least in the Kremlin; that in fact we share a lot of interests and constructive engagement between Russia and the West would be the right way forward also for Russia.

If Russia is threatened, it's definitely not from the West. We don't have any intention whatsoever to attack Russia. If Russia is threatened, it's rather from the south, in particular from religious extremists in the Caucasus.

Tom Stephenson: Right.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: When it comes to economy, Russia is faced with exactly the same challenges from globalization as we are. Russia is also challenged from China. Russia desperately needs to diversify its economy.

Tom Stephenson: Right.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen:

Because Russia is... Tom

Stephenson: A demographic

challenge...

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Demographic challenges... But the Russian economy is vulnerable, as you mentioned Ambassador; because it's very much dependent on the energy sector. Russia desperately needs new technology; and in general, reforms of their economy and their society.

And all that could be achieved through an intensified economic cooperation with the West. Europe and the United States still represent the strongest... by far the strongest economic block in the world, representing 50% on the world GDP. So it would serve the Russian interest to cooperate with us.

Tom Stephenson: What's interesting is that when Medvedev was president he understood that. He made a special trip here to Silicon Valley to learn... What he really wanted to do was to figure out how to duplicate the success... the entrepreneurial success of Silicon Valley in Moscow.

Unidentified: Yes.

Tom Stephenson: And he understood our concerns about intellectual property. What was interesting, we had a dinner the night before with a small group. But then we had a meeting... a big meeting down at Stanford where a number of people from the peninsula were there. And I think there were... After he gave some remarks, there were questions from the audience. And something like 75% of the questions were asked in Russian, indicating the brain drain that is going on from Russia because of their inability or unwillingness to create the right kind of environment.

We've got a question on the U... what's going on in the UK and their attitude towards the EU. The question is: Were the UK to withdraw from the EU... they're not part of the currency as you are... what would be the consequences for NATO of the UK dropping out of the EU? Anything?

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: I think it would have a major impact on European politics and by that also indirectly impacts on NATO. But, first of all, let me stress, this is still a very hypothetical question. It remains to be seen. And I'm definitely not going to interfere with a domestic British debate on their future relationship with the European Union. But let me put it this way.

Seen from my perspective as a former prime minister of Denmark and a politician very much engaged in European issues, I would strongly regret if the UK were to

leave the European Union. I think we need a British voice in the European Union.

As far as NATO is concerned, the UK is one of the leading Allies. As I mentioned, the UK is one of the countries spending more than 2% of GDP on defence. The UK has, on several occasions, been one of the major contributors to NATO-led operations. I think a British decision on their relationship with the European Union whatever it might be won't directly impact on their standing within NATO. I'm sure that irrespective on their European choice the UK will remain a strongly committed NATO Ally.

Tom Stephenson: We have a question about the use of drones... so-called drones. That's not what the military refers to them as... And the question solicits your views on the increased use of drones in our military and our intelligence agencies' activities; and your perspective on that trend.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Yes, you're right, Ambassador, we have a very... This is a terrible technical expression for drones, namely "unmanned aerial vehicles".

Tom Stephenson: Right.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Once I saw it for the first time. I requested never to be presented with that anymore. So in my papers, it's still drones. It's much easier. And we all know what it is about. They are, of course, unmanned. And I think it's important to realize that when it comes to improving the safety of our deployed troops also when it comes to saving civilian lives drones have played... and drones can play a crucial role. Let me mention, as an example, our Libya Operation in 2011. Drones helped us actually to identify carefully legitimate military targets and avoid the loss of civilian life and avoid collateral damage. So drones can really contribute to giving our commanders a much better picture of what is actually going on... on the ground. So drones can save lives. As regards... now I'm speaking about surveillance and reconnaissance drones.

As far as armed drones are concerned, I have taken note of a very heated discussion. But let me just point to one thing: from a legal point of view, we don't see any difference between manned aircrafts and unmanned aircrafts. We do believe that rules of engagements are the same and should be the same, whether we are speaking about armed or unharmed aircrafts. So I think, in conclusion, Ambassador, I'm in favour of using drones.

Tom Stephenson: Certainly, it has reduced the amount of casualties, fatalities

in our operations. I want to return a little... just quickly to the climate change and issue. Does NATO consider climate change to be an international security risk? How do you put it in the context of NATO's responsibilities?

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Hum, I wouldn't call climate change a security risk. Of course, climate change represents a challenge in many ways. And as I have outlined already I also see some strategic implications of climate change in particular speaking about climate change impacts on the Arctic region. Hum, but in general, I don't see a prominent NATO role in addressing the challenges stemming from climate change. It's a much broader... It's a much broader challenge that involves other organizations than NATO.

Tom Stephenson: The... We have a question, actually, from the Consulate General of Norway. And she asked: "What are the greatest challenges to the future cohesion of NATO? And what will your advice be to your successor?"

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Who is the Norwegian? Yes... former Norwegian Prime Minister Stoltenberg who I know very well. And I'm sure he will be a great Secretary General of NATO. Well, actually, I think the most important task for my successor will be to continue our work to reinforce our collective defence. And, at the Summit, we will lay the ground for that. I hope that at the Summit, we will adopt a so-called Readiness Action Plan which aims at improving our ability to act swiftly if needed to defend and protect our Allies.

Of course, this is very much seen in light of the Russian behaviour in Ukraine. We have seen a Russian capability to very quickly turn major military exercises into, if they so wish, attacks...

ensive operations. We have to adapt to that. So, we intend to adopt such a Readiness Action Plan which will improve our ability to provide rapid reinforcement. And that will, of course, include investments in necessary infrastructure, designation of bases to receive such reinforcements, prepositioning of equipment and supplies. We will also increase our responsiveness. The NATO Response Force should be more responsive, able to act more rapidly. We will improve our intelligence and early warning; adapt our military exercises scheduled to the new security situation; and also discuss how we ensure more visible presence in the East.

Now, I'm mentioning this because I think my successor will see this as one of the first major tasks. And to maintain cohesion within our Alliance, it is necessary to take seriously the security concerns expressed by, not least, our Eastern Allies.

For many good reasons, they are concerned about Russian statements that Russia preserves its right to intervene, to protect what they consider the interest of Russian-speaking communities in other countries.

And as you know, Estonia and Latvia have quite... they have Russian-speaking communities of 20- 25% of the population. So obviously, they're very much concerned about such statements. And we have to take that seriously. And I think that will be one of the important tasks for my successor.

But as a former Norwegian prime minister, he's used to deal with Russia. So I think he's... he's capable to do this.

Crowd: (Laughter)

Tom Stephenson: Having spent a little bit of time in Estonia I know how precarious they feel up there sitting where they do. And it is... It is really a challenging proposition for them to think about where they Not long after I showed up in Portugal, a good friend of mine was the Ambassador in Estonia. They had ... You remember the cyber-warfare, the cyber-attack which was pretty disconcerting. So that's a really tough area to be in those Baltic States today.

We had a question... And we're going to need to wrap things up... We had a question about a couple of your neighbours, Finland and Sweden, and the prospect of their.. joining and participating in NATO.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen: There is an interesting debate going on in both Sweden and Finland, of course, also in light of the Russian behaviour in Ukraine. Sweden and Finland are highly valued partners of NATO, actually very close partners. Both of them contribute to NATO-led operations. They participate in NATO exercises. They contribute to the NATO Response Force. So both Sweden and Finland are very close; and, as I said, highly-valued partners.

As regards to their future relationship with NATO, that's a domestic. And that's a national decision. And I'm not going to interfere with their domestic debate. But I can tell you that if they were, one day, to apply for membership I would welcome it. They fulfill... I think I could safely say

.....  
they fulfill all criteria. So accession talks would be very short. But, again, I say this without interfering with the domestic debate in Sweden and Finland.

Tom Stephenson: (Laughter) OK, well I think we need to end on that note. So on behalf of the World Affairs Council, the Marines' Memorial Club and the Commonwealth Club of California I want to sincerely thank the honourable Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen of NATO for being with us today for his ..... not only his great remarks; but terrific responses to the questions that you all have set up. So please joining me...

Crowd: (Applause)



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

## Remarks

by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the joint press with Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson of Iceland

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13 Aug. 2014 | Last updated: 19 Aug. 2014 13:33

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Thank you very much, Prime Minister.

It is really a great pleasure to be back in Iceland. This was the first country I visited after I took office as NATO Secretary General. And Iceland plays a crucial role within NATO.

The transatlantic relationship is at the heart of NATO: the cooperation between North America and Europe which makes our citizens safer, and our countries stronger. And Iceland embodies that transatlantic relationship.

You contribute to NATO's operation in Afghanistan. You contribute to the reinforcements which we have deployed since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. You are helping to improve our cooperation with partners such as Finland and Sweden, by hosting the very successful Iceland Air Meet.

You are also strongly engaged in promoting the issue of women, peace and security. So I thank you for all Iceland has done for NATO.

In a few weeks, we will have an important summit in Wales, a summit where we must make NATO's collective defence, our relationship with partner countries and the ties of friendship across the Atlantic even stronger.

Russia's actions against Ukraine have been a wake-up call. They show that the rules which have governed international relations since the end of the Cold War

can no longer be taken for granted.

I will look to Iceland, as to every Ally, to play a full role in our response to the challenges we face. For example, by building on the success of the Iceland Air Meet, by expanding it to cover Search and Rescue. And by exploring ways to contribute to shared NATO projects to enhance our capabilities.

In these unpredictable times, we need NATO more than ever. I count on Iceland's support as we make the Alliance even better, faster and more effective.

QUESTION: What is or what should be NATO's reaction to the situation in Ukraine?

ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN (NATO SECRETARY GENERAL): We are pursuing a 3-fold response. Firstly, our core task is to provide effective defence and protection of our allies and that's why we have enhanced our collective defence including enhanced air policing in the 3 Baltic states, deployment of naval vessels to the Baltic Sea as well as the Black Sea, more exercises in Poland and the Baltic states, for example and at the summit, we will take further steps to improve our ability to react swiftly, if needed. So, that's the first track to reinforce our collective defence. Second track is to enhance our cooperation with Ukraine. We will meet with the Ukrainian president at the summit and take decisions as to how we can step up our cooperation with Ukraine including helping Ukraine to modernize and reform their defence and security sector and make their armed forces more capable and the third track is our relationship with Russia. We had decided already in April to suspend all practical cooperation with Russia and as long as Russia doesn't comply with the fundamental principles of the basic documents creating the framework for NATO-Russia cooperation, as long as they don't comply with those fundamental principles, there can't be business as usual. We will keep the channel for diplomatic and political dialogue open through the NATO-Russia council but all practical cooperation will remain suspended.

QUESTION: Would you agree that Iceland's new political importance has increased in light of the threat coming from Russia? Secondly, would you agree that longer air policy deployments which act as Iceland's defences are feasible in that situation?

ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN: On the latter, first of all, let me stress we don't see any imminent threat against Iceland but we appreciate the peacetime

preparedness framework that makes it possible to enhance air policing over Iceland, also at short notice if needed. In that respect, I also think the annual air meet is important and that leads me to the first part of your question. I think it's safe to say that Iceland's geo-political importance is growing, not only because of the new security environment in Europe created by Russia's illegal military actions in Ukraine but also because of climate change and its impact on the Arctic region and the high north in broader terms. The fact that climate change opens new sea routes and gives easier access to natural resources in the high north will, of course, also increase Iceland's strategic importance.

QUESTION: Can NATO play a role in the presence in Iraq, in northern Iraq especially, in stopping the advances of IS?

ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN: I think individual NATO allies can play a role and as you know, the Iraqi government has requested assistance, military assistance from individual allies, notably the U.S. and I welcome the U.S. operations in Iraq because it is of utmost importance for regional security and also for global security to stop the advance of the so-called Islamic State which is a bunch of terrorists, terrorists that can constitute a threat not only in the region but also against Europe and North America.

QUESTION: As a NATO official, would you agree that it's kind of worrisome for our partners in NATO, strong ties that some of the Icelandic authorities have with Russia and with President Putin and would you think it would be important for Iceland to enhance its former strong ties with the United States, given the change in geo-political matters?

ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN: These are national decisions and to my knowledge, Iceland has kept very strong ties with the United States and Iceland remains a strongly committed ally within NATO. So, I have no concerns whatsoever as regards Iceland's strong commitment to the transatlantic relationship.

MODERATOR: I think we have time for one more question before we have to leave for the next event.

QUESTION: Are you at all concerned that Russia's appetite for land hasn't been satisfied and perhaps the next time they are looking for new adventures, they will look to the Baltic states?

ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN: First of all, I think the best security guarantee that

the Baltic States have got is their membership of NATO. I think the leaders in the Kremlin are very well aware that any attempt to test our determination to defend and protect our allies would provoke a very firm response from our side. The NATO Article 5, our collective defence, is unshakable and we will take all measures necessary to provide effective defensive protection of any ally if they were to be threatened and I think Russia is aware of that so the mere existence of NATO represents a convincing deterrent that will prevent the Russians or others from even thinking about attacking a NATO ally but having said that, I am concerned that the Russian ambition, Putin's ambition, goes beyond Ukraine. We have seen the illegal annexation of Crimea, we have seen a strong Russian hand in the destabilization of eastern Ukraine...



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

## Press statement

by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following his meeting with the President of Greece, Prokopis Pavlopoulos

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22 Apr. 2016 -

| Last updated: 22 Apr. 2016 16:09

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(As delivered)

Thank you, Mr. President. It's a great honour to be received by you here in Athens.

I would also like to thank you for your strong commitment to NATO and to the Alliance. And also the commitment of Greece over many decades to NATO. And a strong Greece is contributing to a strong NATO so therefore I welcome that Greece is investing so much in our collective defence.

Together we are as an Alliance now responding and adapting to a new and more challenging security environment. We are adapting to a more assertive Russia, responsible for aggressive actions in Ukraine. But we are also adapting to the turmoil, the violence we see to the south with ISIL, terrorism and all the problems we see in North Africa, the wider Middle East region, Syria and Iraq.

And of course the migrant and refugee crisis is linked to the violence and the fighting we see in Syria and Iraq. And Greece is on the frontline because you are so much affected by the migrant and refugee crisis and you are generously hosting tens of thousands of migrants and refugees in your country.

And after the request from Greece, from Turkey and from Germany, NATO decided in February to assist Greece, Turkey and the EU with coping with the migrant and refugee crisis. And we have deployed ships. Three of them are

Greek ships which are now active in the Aegean Sea, helping the Greek coastguard, the Turkish coastguard but also the EU border agency Frontex to cut the lines of the criminal networks and human smugglers.

So I think that we see how NATO provides practical assistance to the efforts of Greece and other countries to cope with the migrant and refugee crisis but also how NATO provides a platform for enhanced cooperation between Turkey and Greece but also between NATO and the EU and I welcome that very much.

I very much look forward to the NATO Summit in Warsaw, there we are going to address the big challenges we'd with and I'm looking forward to meet all the 28 Heads of State and Government and to make important decisions on how NATO shall continue to adapt to a more challenging security environment.

Global warming, climate change is not NATO's main responsibility but I promise not to forget about the importance of fighting global warming. Also because there is a link between global warming and security because global warming is causing conflict, is forcing people to flee and it's making it difficult to create sustainable development and therefore instability is caused by global warming and therefore that is a link between global warming and security.

So once again thank you so much for receiving me and thank you for having me and my delegation here in your office in Athens.

Item 15



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

"How NATO adapts to a changing world"

Lecture by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Leiden University College,  
The Hague

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19 Apr. 2018 - | Last updated: 20 Apr. 2018 16:35

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(As delivered)

Thank you so much and thank you for that introduction. It's a great pleasure to be here for several reasons. It's a great pleasure to be here because it's a great honour to be introduced by you, former Secretary General of NATO and you were responsible, you had the mandate when NATO actually had to respond to many difficult challenges at the same time. During your mandate, NATO was responsible for implementing, I think the biggest enlargement of our Alliance, so with many new members. Then we as an Alliance under your chairmanship we acted in a calm but also firm, and measured way to Russia's aggression against Georgia. And then, also when you were Secretary General we increased our presence in Afghanistan. Conducting the biggest and most difficult military mission and operation that NATO has ever conducted. So, for me it is a great honour to follow your footsteps and to meet with you and to be introduced by you here at the Leiden University. So thank you.

Then, the second reason why I like to be here is that I like being in the Netherlands, in the [inaudible], and in this country. It's very nice compared to my own country in Norway, but despite that I like it. Because I like the people, I like the culture, I like the atmosphere, and therefore it is always nice to be in the Netherlands. The only thing I really don't like with the Netherlands is that you have the bad habit of beating Norwegians when we do different skating races for instance in the Olympics. So if you want to change that habit, there will be nothing wrong with the Netherlands.

The third reason why I actually like to be here is that I like academic institutions. I like the place, institutions, the buildings, where scientific work, teaching is taking place. That is extremely important, and especially at a university like this. The oldest university in the Netherlands. I think it brings a lot of knowledge and experience, which is important for us all. Actually, I like academic institutions so much, that actually I only once really made a deliberate decision on what to become, when I grew up, and that was to become an academic. So my big ambition in my life was to become a professor, as you have now become. So I don't know what you have done but you have succeeded in what I have never succeed to become a professor. Because when I finish my exams back in Norway as economist, I remember we actually read some books of a Dutch professor called Jan Tinbergen, a great economist and he actually won Nobel Prize in Economics together with Ragnar Frisch, a Norwegian economist. Then I decided to leave politics because I had been active in youth politics, student politics, and do some real work. To start to do scientific work. And I worked in the research department of the Bureau of Statistics, working on econometrics and mathematics for two years. Then, I was asked to become Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Environment in Norway. And I said I will do it for one, maximum two years, then I will go back to this beautiful life of academics. I've been in politics since then. I've never managed. Also it is a disaster, my academic career is a disaster, because I've spent so many years in politics and therefore I will talk to you afterwards, and find out how you manage to become a professor, because that is actually an aim in my professional career. So therefore since I've not been able to pursue an academic career, it is even greater to visit academic institutions and to have some kind of atmosphere and to breathe in some of the air from academic institutions like this university.

But the most important reason why I appreciate to be here today is of course that it provides me with the opportunity to say some words about NATO. How NATO is responding to a changing world. I will not cover all the issues, not all the items which are important for NATO and our security, because I will really try to not be too long meaning that we will have some time for questions and comments afterwards and then you can raise the issues I don't in my introduction.

NATO is the most successful alliance in history. And the main reason why NATO is so successful is that NATO has been able to change when the world is changing. For forty years, since NATO was founded 1949, and the Netherlands was one of the founding members, forty years, from 1949 to 1989, NATO actually did only one thing, and that was to deter the Soviet Union during the Cold War. And we

did so quite successfully, because we were able to end the Cold War without ring a shot in a peaceful way. And the Cold War ended when the Berlin Wall came down in 89 and soon after the Soviet Union was dissolved and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. And then people started to ask do we need NATO anymore. Because in a way the reason why we were established, the reason why we existed, didn't exist anymore. The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact didn't exist, so why should NATO continue to exist. And then some people also said that either NATO has to go out of area, meaning go out of NATO territory, or NATO has to go out of business. And what we did, was we actually went beyond NATO territory. Meaning for that twenty ve years, we were not so focused on deterrence defence in Europe, deterring the Soviet Union or Russia. But we were focused on crisis outside NATO territory. First in the Balkans we helped to end two wars in the Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Serbia and Kosovo. And we went to Afghanistan where we helped to ght terrorism. We've helped to ght piracy of the Horn of Africa and our focus was outside NATO territory, mainly outside of Europe.

Then in 2014, that's another pivotal year in the history of NATO, and in the history Europe, and our security. Because in 2014, two things happened. The rst thing was that Russia illegally annexed Crimea. That's the rst time since the Second World War that one country grabs or annex a part of another country, when Russia annexed Crimea in the spring of 2014. Then, they also started to destabilise eastern Ukraine providing support and also have some military presence in the eastern part of Ukraine and they continue to do so also today. That was a more assertive Russia in Ukraine, using military aggression against Ukraine.

The other thing that happened in 2014 was that we saw a new kind of terrorism and a stronger and more dangerous type of terrorism, we saw Daesh or ISIL. And I remember very well when I was asked to become, rst there was some consultations whether I was interested in becoming Secretary General NATO in general in 2014, that was before anyone had heard about Daesh, it was only some few experts. Then some few weeks or months later, Daesh or ISIL controlled big part of Syria and Iraq, 7, 8 million people a territory as big of the [inaudible] and they were actually in the process of threatening Bagdad.

So then, NATO had to change again. And NATO has since 2014 implemented the biggest adaptations of our Alliance, the biggest change to our Alliance since the end of the Cold War. And we have done that because for the rst time in our history, we have to both address collective defence,

deterrence defence in Europe, but at the same time address the issue of projecting stability, stabilizing our neighbours and fighting terrorism beyond our borders. And we do that based on the core principle of NATO which is "one for all and all for one." We have in our founding treaty we have something called paragraph 5, our collective defence clause say that if one Ally is attacked that will be regarded as an attack on all Allies. And that's the strength, because then also small countries know that if they are attacked the whole Alliance will be behind them.

And the purpose of those security guaranties, so that collective defence clause, Article 5, is of course to provide what we call credible deterrence and the purpose of credible deterrence is not to provoke a conflict but it is to prevent a conflict. Because as long as all potential adversaries should know that if they touch or attack, or are aggressive against one Ally the whole Alliance will respond then there will be no attacks. That is in a way the simple idea of deterrence. So, the purpose is not in a way to win the war, the purpose is to prevent the war. And we have successfully been able to deliver that credible deterrence for almost seventy years and that's perhaps the longest peace in Europe for almost ever, at least for hundreds and hundreds of years. Because NATO, but also the European Union have helped to stabilize and prevent military conflict in our part of the world. Now we are, now we need to deliver the same kind of deterrence, collective security guarantees, in a different world than we have done up to now.

We are responding partly by implementing a big reinforcement of what we call collective defence, meaning our joint defences. We have for the first time in our history, we have deployed NATO troops, battle troops, to the eastern parts of our Alliance. Especially to the three Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, but also to Poland. And we also increased our presence in the Black Sea region. These battlegroups are not very big. They are around thousand each of them. The Netherlands is part of the battlegroup, you provide around more than 250 troops to our battlegroup in Lithuania, as I said well around thousand in each of them. But the important thing with those battlegroups is that they are multinational. Meaning that Germany leads the battlegroup in Lithuania, the United States leads the battlegroup in Poland, the UK leads the battlegroup in Estonia, and Canada leads the battlegroup in Latvia. And then there are many other NATO Allies providing troops. And by having combat ready troops in the Baltic region, along our eastern borders, we send a very clear message that if any other Allies are attacked, if any of these Allies are attacked, then NATO is already there, it will trigger a response from the whole Alliance. So that's the best

way of providing credible deterrence by having troops already deployed in these countries.

Then, we are increasing the readiness of our forces, meaning that if any Ally is attacked we are able to reinforce to move forces to help and to support. We are doing all the things addressing for instance what we call hybrid threats and cyber, and adapting also in many other ways. I can go into more details afterwards if you want. The thing is that we are significantly strengthening our deterrence and defence in Europe.

We do that in a measured and defensive way. Because we don't want a new Cold War. We don't want a new arms race, so we have to find the balance between being strong to deter any attack, but at the same time not provoke, overreact and increase tensions unnecessarily. And therefore we are pursuing what we call a dual track approach to Russia. Meaning that we are strong, we provide deterrence and defence. But we also work for dialogue. For us, for NATO, there is no contradictions between deterrence and defence and political dialogue. Actually, we believe as long as we are strong, we can also engage in political dialogue with Russia and that is exactly what we are doing.

Because Russia is our neighbour, Russia is here to stay, Russia will not go away. And therefore we have to continue to strive for a better relationship with our neighbour Russia.

And even if you don't believe it is possible to improve the relationship we have to manage the relationship with Russia. We have more military presence, we have more exercises, we have higher tensions, and then we have to make sure that we don't have accidents or incidents. We saw the downing of the Russian plane over Turkey a couple years ago. We have to avoid that kind of incidents and accidents. And if they happen, prevent them from spiralling out of control and creating a really dangerous situation between NATO and Russia. So we need transparency, we need predictability, we need dialogue with Russia to try to calm down, and reduce tensions and manage our relationship with our biggest neighbour.

Then we are responding not only to a more assertive Russia, but also to the increase terrorist threats. Fighting terrorism is about many different means, or we need many different tools in the fight against terrorism. We need police, we need intelligence, we need border control, we need also social workers, teachers. Addressing some of the

neighbourhoods in our own countries, in our own countries, where some of the terrorists are recruited from. This of course is not a NATO responsibility. But it is extremely important in the fight against terrorism. To do something with the [inaudible] causes in our own countries that create extremism in our own countries. But there is also role, an important role for NATO in the fight against terrorism. And that is to project stability as you called it, or to address some of the conflicts which is the breeding ground for at least some of the terrorists and some of the terrorist attacks that we have seen against in our own countries. And that's for instance why we are in Afghanistan. We are to remember that the reason why NATO went into Afghanistan, our biggest military operation, is a terrorist attack on the United States and that is the only time NATO has invoked our collective defence clause, Article 5, was after the terrorist attack on the United States, 9/11/2001. We have been there to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for international terrorists, a place where they can train, prepare, organise terrorist attacks against our countries. We are in [inaudible] we do some training there. And also NATO Allies are part of the Global Coalition to defeat Daesh. And we work with countries like Jordan, like Tunisia, our aim is to enable them to fight terrorism.

The message from NATO now is that of course we have to be able to deploy large number of combat groups in big combat operations, as we have done before for instance in Afghanistan. But the message now is that more important than deploying NATO troops in combat operations it is to enable local forces, train local forces to stabilize their own countries. Because we will always be foreigners. It will always be difficult to deploy Dutch or Norwegian or British troops in Afghanistan or in Iraq or wherever it is, because we will always be foreigners. So it's in the long run it is better if we are able to train local forces, build local capacities, build local institutions, and enabling them to stabilize their own countries, and to fight terrorism themselves. That's the reason why we have ended the combat operations in Afghanistan. That's the reason why we have started to train and advise the Afghan National Security Forces, but also while we plan to do more training and advising in Iraq. Because we have to make sure that ISIL is not coming back, and the best way of preventing that is to enable the Iraqis themselves to avoid that instead of us coming back and conduct a big combat operations. Prevention is better than intervention therefore we have to train the local forces.

We are also responding to many other challenges, cyber, proliferation of nuclear weapons, what you call hybrid threats and many other ways, and this

is part of the broader adaption and change of NATO which is taking place. But my last message to you is that the world has become more unpredictable, more uncertain, in many ways we live in a more dangerous world, therefore we have to invest more in our security. And security does not come for free. And I told the Defence Committee, in the Dutch Parliament this morning that when I was Minister of Finance in Norway in the 1990s, I was responsible of cutting defence budgets, so I know how to reduce defence spending. And then people ask me why can you argue in favour of increase defence spending, since you as Norwegian politician, were responsible for reducing defence spending. My answer is that when tensions are going down, when threats are reduced, then it is right thing to reduce spending as long as we are able to increase defence spending when tensions are going up.

So yes, all European countries, the Netherlands, Norway, many others, they spent less on defence after the end of the Cold War, and that was right. I am able to defend that today. As long as we are able to prove that we are able to increase defence spending again now when tensions are going up. I welcome that the Netherlands has started to increase defence spending. But it's more, [inaudible] need to do more because we have agreed that we should spend 2 % of GDP on defence based on the idea that we stand together and we all have to protect each other.

So let me end by just saying that what has really impressed me with NATO since I became Secretary General is that it's not that all 29 Allies able to stand together, but it's actually 29 Allies able to stand together and then change, and adapt and respond when the world is changing.

MODERATOR: Well, Secretary General, thank you so much for this introduction and now it's over to you guys, because Secretary General, as I said, has accepted a substantial Q&A. Stupid questions do not exist, as you know. Who is going to be the first and the courageous first? We go for ladies first, please, go ahead?

QUESTION: I was just wondering, as the world is changing and NATO has to adapt to different things, with the climate change and the melting of the ice caps, does the Article 5 apply to that situation, where all the member countries have to like work together to solve that issue or what is your opinion on that?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: NATO is a military alliance, so NATO doesn't have the tools to address climate change. Having said that,

climate change is important for our security, meaning that climate change will most likely lead to that people will start to move, it may lead to new conflicts about water, about agriculture, and it may also, you know, change for instance transport routes. I know that, for instance, many people are now looking into the possibility of starting regular commercial ship sea links ... sea lanes of transportation from, for instance, Antwerp or Rotterdam to Asia, not through the Suez Canal or around Africa, but over the North Pole or the North East Passage because the ice is melting. So, climate change has security consequences and NATO has recognised that in what we call the Strategic Concept, but to address climate change is about how to reduce emissions, how to develop cleaner forms of energy, how to make sure that we are able to protect the rainforest and develop technologies which allow us to... driving cars which are not polluting and so on. It's important that NATO Allies engage in that, but it's not for NATO to in a way develop windmills or clean energy, because we have other institutions and organisations for that.

MODERATOR: Yes, please?

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr Secretary General. I would like to ask you a question, a very specific question, and it's about the tension between Turkey and Greece at the moment. And I would like to ask you, is it enough for NATO... the fact that both countries are members of NATO, is it enough for NATO, in order for it to use it as a justification, as... yeah, as a justification for it not to take a clear stance on the issue when a country is breaching international law and is invading many times in... even within days, invading airspace and waters of another country member of NATO? Is it enough for NATO to use it as an excuse? Thank you very much.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: NATO is the answer to many problems, but NATO is not the answer to all problems. And meaning that NATO is established: we have structures, we have mechanisms, we have forces which are assigned to and which are tasked to address threats from countries outside and from threats coming from outside the NATO Alliance. I say this also because with any decision taken by NATO has to be by consensus. So, if we were going to do anything, we need not the majority of the Allies to agree, but all of the Allies to agree, and the only way we can have that kind of decision-making procedures is of course that we know that we will never be able to take a decision which is contradicting the interests of one Ally.

So, when NATO was founded, the way we are constructed makes us unable to address disagreements between Allies. So, I accept that there are differences

between Turkey and Greece. I have spoken with the Greek Prime Minister, I have spoken with the Turkish President, I've been briefed many times. This is about islands and territories and airspace in the Aegean Sea, and I recognise that this is a challenge, but it's not something that NATO can solve; it is something that has to be solved in the spirit of cooperation between Greece and Turkey, and I welcome that. I know that recently the Greek and the Turkish Prime Ministers spoke and I encourage them to continue to do so. But since NATO is an alliance based on consensus, it goes without saying that of course there's not much NATO can do when Allies disagree, because we have to agree at 29 to do anything.

MODERATOR: I think there's another question there. Yes, please? And then, in the back.

QUESTION: So, recently the United States has ended the Long War, the War on Terrorism, or at least the Pentagon says so, and in the United States National Security Strategy in December 2017 and recently the Comptroller for Pentagon outlined in the budget that, in the future great power competition would be the greatest security to United States security and, by extension, NATO as well. So, I was wondering will NATO try to revise their nuclear strategy to accommodate great power competition, rather than relying on Cold War bipolar strategies?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: The national security strategy is the US strategy, but NATO believes that we need a strong nuclear deterrent and of course, we are constantly making sure that we have an effective and secure nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons plays an important role in the deterrence I just described. We have conventional weapons, but we also have nuclear weapons and we have to make sure that they are effective and safe and secure. And therefore, we will constantly assess what we have to do to make sure that that's the case also in the future.

NATO's goal is a world without nuclear weapons and therefore we believe in arms control negotiations, and I think it's important to protect those arms control arrangements and agreements that we have in place.

MODERATOR: I think in the back here, you're close to the microphone, yes?

QUESTION: European Union is also developing defence structures, infrastructures. How do you see that working together with NATO and where does it conflict?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: I welcome stronger EU efforts on defence and we have to remember that the EU and NATO have very much in common. We share much of the same territory in Europe. We share many of the same members and more than 90%, actually 94% of the population living in the European Union, they live in a NATO country. So, when NATO is strong, also the protection of European, or EU, members is strong. I welcome stronger EU efforts on defence because I think that that can lead to more European defence capabilities: planes, tanks, drones, whatever, and brigades and divisions and different defence capabilities, which NATO has called for, for a long time, and if Europe is going to do more to provide that we should welcome that.

I also think that stronger European, or EU, efforts on defence can help EU and NATO Allies to work more closely together, which is also a good thing. The only thing we have to make sure, and EU leaders have stressed that many times, that they will prevent that from happening, is to see the European Union starting to develop competing structures and duplicate what NATO does. That will weaken our capabilities and our strength. And therefore, as long as the European Union complements, not competes with NATO, as long as we don't see EU developing and duplicating command structures or structures in general, we should welcome stronger EU efforts on defence.

MODERATOR: We're going to do something about the gender balance. Please, yeah? Pass the microphone.

QUESTION: Firstly, thank you so much for your talk. And perhaps building on the question that was previously asked and also on a point that you made in your speech, which was that NATO is in need for police forces, I was just wondering what is the nature of the relationship between NATO and, for example Europe, on Interpol?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: It was not my intention to say that NATO should develop police forces. If I said that, that was a mistake because NATO is not responsible or we will not develop police forces, but of course we work with Allies and institutions, for instance when it comes to exchange of intelligence because we have so many threats which requires partly military response and partly response from police, and I think I referred to the need to have police in the fight against terrorism. But those police forces will not be provided by NATO, they will be provided by NATO Allies, but in the national capacities, or for instance by

Europol. So, we work with these Allies, addressing common threats and challenges, but NATO is in a way looking outwards, national police will then look inwards at each and every NATO Ally.

MODERATOR: Next? The microphone is already with you. Yeah?

QUESTION: First of all, thank you very much again. I was wondering, since he got into presidency, Donald J Trump has expressed that he's not that much into NATO anymore, and I was wondering how is NATO planning on dealing with the possible threat of Trump of leaving the Alliance, seeing also that the United States is the main financial contributor to it? Thank you.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: The NATO is an alliance of 29 democracies and

different political leaders are elected, representing different political parties, coming from different countries with different political cultures, from the right to the left, and we are different in many, many ways. And that's for me, not a weakness, but actually a strength. Because we have proven that, despite those differences, we have always been able to unite against or around the core responsibility of NATO that is to protect each other. And President Trump has clearly stated that he is committed to NATO. This has also been supported by his security team, Secretary Mattis and all the other people surrounding him, which give him advice on defence and security.

But, even more important than words and commitments and language on support or providing support for NATO, is the fact that the United States actually now increases its military presence in Europe. After the Cold War ended, the US gradually reduced its presence. During the Cold War, the United States had 300,000, more or less, troops in Europe. Then, after the Cold War, this was gradually reduced, to 60,000/70,000. Now, the United States... and the last US battle tank left Europe in December 2013. Now, the US is back with not one battle tank, but with an armoured brigade. They invest heavily in something the US call The European Deterrence Initiative, I think it's US\$5/6billion for equipment, for training, for supplies and for more military presence. And this is happening now, so actions speak louder than words. So, not only has Donald Trump expressed his support to NATO, but he has also proven that by more spending and more presence, more exercises, more US military personnel in Europe.

So... and when I met President Trump in the White House last spring, he declared at the press conference that NATO... he used to say, he said, he used

to say that NATO is obsolete, but NATO is no longer obsolete, he said. So, that's a clear message.

MODERATOR: I'll go for one more in the back. I have tons of questions, so Secretary General, if you agree, I'll cluster a few. So, first we go to the back there, the lady at the back. And then we come to the centre and I have two gentlemen here. And then later we'll see. Please.

QUESTION: Thank you. I was wondering what's your take on Finland joining NATO due to increased tension with Russia? Would Russia take that more as a threat or like that would clearly provide security to Finland, but would it be... for NATO, would it be actually beneficial or not?

MODERATOR: Okay, please?

QUESTION: I'd like to ask you about defence budget policy, and what do you see the... how do you see the trend after 2014 and what NATO itself can do against it?

MODERATOR: Thank you. And final question in this round

QUESTION: You mentioned with respect to the recent... or to the developments in the Arctic and also you mentioned how NATO has increased its presence in the East. My question is about NATO has a relatively small presence in the North, particularly Norway, and now after 20 years there is finally a major operation, or exercise, the Trident Juncture is being held in Norway, and so what do you... what's the significance of this and to what extent do you believe that NATO should increase its presence in Norway and Northern Europe in general?

QUESTION: Thank you for giving me the final question and thank you for your talk as well. My question was originally going to be about EU-NATO cooperation, but now a little bit more specifically, we were told during a visit to the European External Action Service that occasionally intelligence-sharing between NATO and the EU does not run as smoothly as it ideally would. For instance, in the case of Turkey and Cyprus, who are respectively in NATO and an EU member state, but not vice versa, their disagreement, politically speaking, hinders intelligence-sharing on an institutional level, so a lot of different actions have to be taken by experts and ministers just to make sure that all member states of the both organisations have all the

intelligence that they need. So, how would you envision that being solved or working out on the longer term? Because that is obviously not ideal or sustainable.

MODERATOR: Secretary General, please?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: First, on Finland: the answer is that that's for Finland to decide whether they want to join NATO or not. And if Finland decided to apply, then of course we would assess that... or consider that application, and then it will be for 29 NATO Allies to decide whether we would deem or consider Finland qualified to become a NATO member. Finland is a very advanced country, so I think that will not be a big issue. But the main issue is whether Finland would like to apply and that's for Finland to decide. So far, Finland has clearly expressed that they appreciate very much a strong partnership, we work closely with Finland, we have exercises, we work with them in different ways and Finland contributes to NATO missions and operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but Finland has clearly stated they are not interested in applying for membership.

The important message is that Russia, or any other third country, does not have a say in whether Finland should join, or any other country should join NATO, because it is an absolute fundamental principle that each and every sovereign nation has the right to choose its own path. So, the whole idea of big countries having some kind of right to decide what small neighbours can do, that's a very dangerous idea, so the idea of kind of spheres of influence around big countries denying for instance Finland or Norway the right to join NATO, is violating fundamental principles when it comes to the sovereignty and independence of all nations.

Then the 2% spending: well, we are moving in the right direction, meaning that when NATO Allies, back in 2014 after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the rise of Daesh, decided in September 2014 to stop the cuts and then gradually increase and then move towards spending 2% of GDP on defence within the decade, then actually we were only three nations meeting the 2% target. Now we are eight. And also, those who are not at the 2% target, they have started to move. All Allies have increased defence spending in real terms. So, I'm not saying that everything is fine, but I'm saying that, after years of decline in defence spending, defence spending has started to increase. We have turned a corner and the picture is still mixed, but much better than it was just a couple of years ago. And we didn't promise 2% within the year, we promised 2% within

the decade, and we are really moving in that direction so we have... it's a good start, what we have seen since 2014.

Then on the Arctic: we used to say that in the High North we have low tensions and I would like to continue to work for that being the case because yes, we have seen increased Russian presence, we have seen more naval presence, more submarines, more exercises, but at the same time I think it is important that we try to keep the tensions low in the High North and we also see some cooperation with Russia within the framework of the Arctic Council, that, as a Norwegian, we also know that Norway actually, being a neighbour of Russia, we work with Russia on many different areas. When I was Prime Minister, I remember we negotiated with Putin and Medvedev on a delimitation line in the Barents Sea. We agreed that delimitation line up in the Barents Sea, in the Polar Sea. This is a continental shelf, potentially a lot of oil and gas. We agreed the line. We worked together with Russia on the fisheries, managing a big common cod stock, on environmental issues, border issues, search and rescue, and so on. So, I believe that we should continue to engage with Russia up in the High North. It's in our interest and in Russia's interest. But the message is the same: that we have to be firm, we have to be capable of delivering credible deterrence, and therefore NATO also needs more, for instance, naval capabilities. And also the new F35s are critical for the presence of NATO in the High North.

NATO is present in the High North because the Norwegian military presence in the High North is NATO in the North. Then of course, we need more. We have some Danes. They are in several places in the North. And I know also we like... Norwegians like Danes, but ... we were a joint kingdom for some years and we have some kind of different views on how that was. And then of course we have Canada and the United States, Great Britain, and we have all Allies, but not with big military bases, but with the capabilities to deploy forces, to project power, if needed, also up in the High North.

Then it was the question about intelligence: No, there are some challenges because there are of course some NATO... the majority of EU members are also NATO members and many NATO members, actually the majority of the NATO members are EU members. But not all EU members are NATO members and not all NATO members are EU members.

MODERATOR: Please write that down!

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: So yeah, you understand. So, the thing is that you have Norway being member of NATO but not being member of the EU, you have Austria or Finland, Sweden, being a member of EU but not member of NATO. And therefore, there are some challenges related to, for instance, how to share intelligence. But we have found practical ways of sharing information. We have, for instance, a NATO presence in the Aegean Sea, helping to implement an agreement between Turkey, a NATO member, and the EU on the migrant and refugee crisis, helping to stop the flow of illegal migration. And they will work together with Frontex, and we have been able to find pragmatic, practical ways of also sharing information. So, we haven't solved all the problems, but I think that pragmatic approach both from the EU and NATO, respecting the sovereignty and the decision-making integrity of both of the organisations, have enabled us to work together.

MODERATOR: All right. Secretary General, thank you so much. I see at the back and then we'll cluster again, see many members, but we'll wait and see. Please, go ahead?

QUESTION: Mr Secretary General, thank you very much for your speech. My question concerns Turkey and the change in dynamics in the Middle East. So, we have seen, after the low peak of the downing of the Russian jet, improvement in the relationship between Turkey and Russia in recent times, and in December 2017 there has been the - let's call it scandal - of Russia buying S400 systems from... of Turkey, sorry, buying S400 systems from Russia. What's your take on that and NATO's take on that? And how do you see the future development in the relation between Turkey and other NATO Allies? Thanks.

MODERATOR: Second member I saw there. Yes, please.

QUESTION: Yes, thank you for coming and well, my question pertains to the Skripal case in the United Kingdom and well, the use, or illegal use by international law, of the Russians of chemical weapons on British subjects and how... and is that not... does that not trigger Article 5 for NATO?

MODERATOR: Thank you so much. I see a third question here.

QUESTION: Yes, some of my friends think of Russia as this big enemy of the West and by experiment, I visit the country last summer and was surprised to find that a lot of young people there are very nice and similar in thoughts about good government and everything. So, my question is how

can NATO improve the more informal relationship between Europe and Russia?

MODERATOR: If you pass on the microphone then we have another question here.

QUESTION: So, there has been a lot of talk about whether... to what extent NATO should concern itself with terrorism, with all these new challenges emerging, and I was wondering how... what your view is on how much international cooperation... coordination is necessary in that field and maybe reflecting on your own experiences in dealing with the terrorism attack against [inaudible] which was very much domestic?

MODERATOR: Final question this round here in the front, please?

QUESTION: Thank you from my side as well. Secretary General, I'm wondering if you could tell us more about strategies of NATO against Russia's increasing strategies, which are apparently happening all over Europe? So, for example, the use of social bots and adverts on social media or the funding of right-wing parties. Because these are not necessarily physical military threats, but they could be on another level when they undermine trust and legitimacy of countries. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Secretary General, please?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you. First, on Turkey: Turkey is an important Ally because I think... I don't know if I already said that, but Turkey is important for NATO for several reasons, not least because of its geographic location, bordering Iraq and Syria, and it has been a key Ally in the fight against Daesh, where we have used Turkish airports, infrastructure, bases, to conduct airstrikes and other operations against Daesh. Turkey is also important because Turkey has suffered many terrorist attacks, no other NATO Ally has suffered more terrorist attacks than Turkey and of course Turkey has the right to address these legitimate security concerns and what we have conveyed is that we expect that to be done in a measured way and in a proportionate way and also in a way which is in accordance with the rule of law. And that's an issue which has been discussed many times with also the Turkish authorities.

Then, on the S400, which is an air defence system, as you mentioned, that's a national decision. So, the acquirement of military capabilities by different

NATO Allies is not a NATO decision, that's a decision by each and every NATO Ally. What matters for NATO is whether this system is going to be integrated in what we call the Integrated NATO Air Defence where, you know, we link the different air defence systems, we link the radar, we share information. That's extremely difficult to do with the S400 and it has also been clearly stated by Turkey that this is a system which they don't foresee integrated into the NATO Integrated Air Defence system, and that there has been no request for integration of the Turkish system into the NATO Integrated Air Defence system.

On the Skripal case: all NATO Allies have strongly expressed support to the United Kingdom, we have reacted in a coordinated way; NATO Allies, EU members, expelled Russian officials after the use of a nerve agent in Salisbury. That's the first time a nerve agent has been used on NATO territory. And I live in Brussels, not far away from Flanders and in Flanders 100 years ago, we saw the horrific effects of chemical weapons where... when chemical weapons were used in the First World War. And a few years after that, we had the first international ban on chemical weapons and we also have now a convention on prohibition of chemical weapons. And one of the reasons why we reacted so strongly after the attack... or the use of chemical weapon... a nerve agent in Salisbury, but also after the use of chemical weapons in Syria, where three NATO Allies conducted airstrikes against the Syrian chemical weapons facilities, was that we have to uphold the ban on chemical weapons and not accept that the use of chemical weapons is normalised or accepted.

And NATO has to respond in the proportionate way and a measured way, and it's serious what happened in Salisbury, but it's not an attack or an incident which requires Article 5. We have to remember that we have invoked Article 5 only once and that was after the 9/11 attack where thousands of people were killed in the United States. We don't trigger Article 5 every time there are serious incidents or that kind of attacks as we for instance have seen in Salisbury. But we will continue to provide support to the United Kingdom and we will continue to support the ban on chemical weapons, and that's also the reason why we take so seriously what happened in Syria.

Then on Russia: first of all, I think it is important to convey that when we criticise Russia for their behaviour in Ukraine or their support to the Assad regime or their development of nuclear weapons, or whatever we criticise them for, it's important to underline that we criticise the policies of the Russian government; we don't criticise the people of Russia. Actually, I know many Russians. During my life as a Norwegian politician, I met Russians in many different capacities, working with

them on many different issues, also people-to-people contact. Again, referring to Norway, up in Norway we have something called the Barents Corporation; we have visa-free travel for people living on the borders, on the Russian side and the Norwegian side of the border, and I believe in contacts, I believe in people-to-people contacts, and I believe also in trying to avoid any kind of ... [inaudible] of other countries. We disagree, we criticise them, we are firm, but also measured and defensive. Because Russia is our neighbour and we have to continue to strive for a better relationship with Russia.

Then international cooperation: yes, of course, we need international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and we need it on all levels. We need it of course when we work together in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, or Daesh, we need it in Afghanistan, we need it in Iraq, and we have a lot of international cooperation in NATO, but also in, for instance, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. And we have achieved a lot. We have to remember that not so many months ago, Daesh controlled big parts of Iraq and Syria, now they have lost almost all the territory they controlled.

That hasn't just happened, it has happened before because a lot of NATO Allies and other countries have devoted a lot of capacity and military resources, soldiers, planes to defeat Daesh. But of course, we need also international cooperation in many other areas. I mentioned police, intelligence and so on, which is partly outside NATO responsibility.

Then, was that all?

JENSSTOLTENBERG[NATO

Secretary General]: Cyber?

MODERATOR: Perhaps on cyber?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: Oh, disinformation, yeah, sorry. Yes, of course, that's something we take very seriously because what we see now is that we have what we call hybrid threats. Before, it was very easy to define peace and war. For instance, I think that's the same for the Netherlands as for Norway, we had... when we speak about the war in Norway, we speak about the Second World War and we knew exactly when it started and we knew when it ended and we knew where it took place. The war in Norway started 8<sup>th</sup>... 9<sup>th</sup> April and then it ended in 1940, and it ended 8<sup>th</sup> May. And then Norway, Denmark,

Netherlands, we were part of that war, Sweden and Switzerland was not. So, it was very clear - the difference between peace and war. Now, the problem is with hybrid threats, it's a much more blurred line between peace and war. It's hard to say. For instance, it's very hard to say when did the war against Daesh start. And it's very hard to say... and to be honest, I don't expect that we can have a date where we celebrate that we ended the war with Daesh. And it's actually also hard to say where does it take place. We all know that it takes place in Iraq and Syria, but it also takes place in our own streets, in Asia, in Africa and in cyberspace. So, that's what hybrid threats is all about, this blurred line where there's a mixture of military and non-military use of aggression, disinformation, cyber, covert operations and all that. And therefore, NATO has to be able to respond also to disinformation. We do that... and propaganda. I believe that the best response to propaganda is not propaganda. The best response to propaganda is the truth and the truth will prevail. Of course, NATO and NATO Allies, we can provide facts, we can counter when we see that there is disinformation being presented and we do that, we have teams, we have people who share the truth and the facts, when we see that this disinformation is presented in different ways. But perhaps the best tool against disinformation is a free and independent press. Is to have journalists, media, newspapers, TV channels, which ask the difficult questions, who are able to check the sources and to ask all the difficult questions, to make sure that we have the truth and not propaganda presented to us.

MODERATOR: Secretary General, thank you so much on behalf of all of us, not only for your speech but also for the open and frank way you have answered all the questions, almost all the questions, because there were many more from our students. Thank you so much for it. We wish you all the very best in your... all your activities in NATO, more specifically, as I said, preparing a very important Summit in the second week of July. Secretary General, I'm going to give you a small token of our appreciation, remembering... cu inks of Leiden University, remembering that when President George W Bush gave me cu inks he said, "Secretary General, here are cu inks, but I don't want to see them on eBay in a few days". I know you're not the person to do that, neither am I, but as a token of our appreciation, cu inks of Leiden University and thank you ever so much for having come.

MODERATOR: And I would ask the students to remain seated for a moment because we do a bit of Leiden promotion and we'll make a picture with the Secretary General and I think with the Rector in front of you, so that we can see that you're real students.

Item 16



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

## Remarks

by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Lowy Institute (Sydney)

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07 Aug. 2019 - | Last updated: 07 Aug. 2019 23:22

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(As delivered)

Thank you so much for that kind introduction, Dr. Fullilove (Michael). And I cannot promise you the same kind of magic speech as last time you listened to a Secretary General of NATO, I cannot promise that anyone will meet their future spouse during this evening. But I can promise you that I will say a few words about NATO and I will be quite brief in my introduction and then I'll be happy to sit down and to answer you questions. Let me also thank the Lowy Institute for hosting us all today. It is a great honour and pleasure to have this opportunity to meet with you and to be back in Australia, it's great for me to be here.

I was here in 2011, then in capacity as Norwegian Prime Minister. This is the first time I'm in Australia as Secretary General of NATO.

And we may be oceans apart, it's a long distance from Brussel, NATO HQ, to Sydney and to Australia but we are the closest of partners. And the close partnership between NATO and Australia is of great importance but I'm absolutely certain that the importance, the value of that partnership just has to increase because we face more and more global challenges which we'll only be able to address and face if we work together.

And the shared challenges we face bring us actually closer together.

We work side-by-side, NATO and Australia, fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are together supporting partners like Ukraine.

And we are standing up for the international rules-based order, NATO and Australia together.

This afternoon, I signed with Defence Minister Reynolds a renewed partnership agreement between Australia and NATO. This will deepen our cooperation and strengthen our ability to work together even further.

It was also a privilege to meet some of the incredible women and men serving in the Royal Australian Navy aboard HMAS Hobart. We were actually with the ship at the naval base here in Sydney. Wherever I go, whenever I meet members of the Australian Defence Force, I am impressed by their dedication and professionalism.

So I am proud that Australia and NATO are deepening our cooperation. And we will need that cooperation even more in the future because security challenges are becoming increasingly global. And let me mention three of them.

First, increasing great power competition.

This puts our global system and values under pressure. From Crimea to North Korea, and from Syria to the South China Sea.

Just a few days ago, Russia's disregard for rules and norms led to the demise of one of the great pillars of the post-Cold War arms control regime. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

For over three decades, this Treaty eliminated an entire category of weapons which threatened European security.

Unfortunately, Russia has deployed a new missile system, the SSC-8, which violates the Treaty. The new Russian missiles are mobile, hard to detect, reduce warning time to minutes, and lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict.

This makes the world less safe for us all.

NATO remains committed to effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. And to keeping our people safe.

In recent years, Russia has demonstrated a pattern of destabilising behaviour.

It has illegally annexed Crimea, continues to destabilise eastern Ukraine, and has attempted to interfere in domestic political processes in NATO countries.

Australia has shown strong support in calling out Russia's unacceptable actions. And in promoting the rules-based order.

China's role and influence is another sign of increasing global power competition. Its economic rise and technological prowess is powering global growth.

This brings many opportunities, financially and politically.

But China's rise also has implications for the global rules-based order and for our security. We see this in the South China Sea, in cyberspace, and in Chinese investments in critical infrastructure. So we need to better understand the challenges and opportunities China presents.

Second, international terrorism is another challenge we have to confront together, NATO and Australia. That is why we are in Afghanistan.

NATO Allies and partners like Australia are working side-by-side. Together we work to ensure Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for international terrorists. And we help the Afghans create the conditions for peace.

We are now closer to a peace deal in Afghanistan than we have been ever before. And we strongly support efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

NATO and Australia are also both members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Where we have made enormous progress.

We have liberated territory the size of the UK. And freed millions from oppression.

So now ISIS no longer controls any territory in Iraq and Syria. Australia is playing a key role by training local forces in Iraq. Complementing the efforts of NATO's new training mission in the country.

We strongly believe that prevention is better than intervention. And in the long-run, training local forces is one of the best weapons we have in the fight against terrorism.

A third global challenge we have to face together is cyber. Cyber challenges know no boundaries and no borders. They cannot be overcome by any one nation. And cyber is fundamentally changing the nature of conflict.

NATO is adapting. We protect our own networks from cyber-attacks. We have rapid responders on 24/7 standby that can help NATO countries under attack. And we are setting up a Cyberspace Operations Centre at our HQ in Mons.

We are also sharing information, real-time, about cyber threats with members and partners, including with the EU. And we hope to step up our cyber cooperation with Australia in the future. That was actually one of the issues I discussed, both with Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and the Foreign Minister this morning.

So Ladies and gentlemen,

Australia and NATO are stronger together when it comes to defending our shared values. Freedom, democracy, human rights.

Respect for the global rules and institutions which have helped keep us safe for 70 years. Today, the world is becoming more complex and more contested.

So whether great power competition, international terrorism, or threats from cyberspace, we are always stronger and safer when we work together.

And NATO is grateful to have a reliable partner and friend in Australia. Thank you so much and then I'm ready for some questions.

Moderator: Some of the world leaders that you mentioned, or perhaps you didn't mention but we talk a lot about at the Lowy Institute, and let me start with the United States, because the United States is in the cockpit of the liberal international order. Now, in Mr Trump's early months in office, he caused alarm in a lot of NATO capitals because he seemed reluctant to affirm Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mutual defence clause. He did reluctantly... or he did belatedly endorse it and of course he's subsequently said that he's a big fan of NATO. But you've dealt a lot with the President, what's your observation of how he approaches alliances, how he thinks about the principle you ended with, which is that we are stronger when we work together?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: I think we have to remember that NATO is an Alliance of 29 democracies, meaning that we have governments, presidents, prime ministers, representing different political parties. We are coming from different cultures, we have different history, different political traditions, we have different parties in government, we are coming from both sides of the Atlantic. So, there are differences between NATO Allies and sometimes also real disagreements. And therefore, there is no way to hide or... actually, I'm not trying to hide that there are disagreements also inside the family and some Allies disagree with President Trump and President Trump disagrees with some Allies. The strength of NATO, and President is representing that, is that despite differences we have always been able to unite around our core task, and that is to protect and defend each other. And President Trump is committed to NATO. As you said, he told me, and not only told me, he said at the press conference that he is a big fan of NATO and he has, at the same time, of course expressed very clearly that he strongly believes that we need fairer burden sharing in the Alliance. Meaning that it's unfair that the United States, which has a GDP the same size as the GDP of the European NATO Allies and Canada, but the United States pays around three times as much for defence than the other Allies do. That's not fair. That's not fair burden sharing. So, he has been very clear, he has a very... what shall I say... direct way of communicating that, that this has to change. I agree with him. But even more important, 29 Allies, or 28 other Allies agree with the United States. And this is a message not only communicated clearly from President Trump, but also from the former President, Obama. And it was back in 2014 when we made the decision that we needed fairer burden sharing, that those Allies who are spending less than 2% of GDP on defence have to increase defence spending. The good news is that, after years of reducing defence budgets, all Allies have now started to increase defence spending. More Allies meet the 2% guideline and the majority of NATO Allies

have put forward plans to reach the 2% goal within a decade, within 2024, which was what we decided. So yeah, so if you ask me whether United States and President Trump is committed to NATO, the answer is yes. But they want NATO Allies to have a more fair burden sharing, that we share the burden in a more fairly way. And the good news is that we are on track to doing exactly that.

Moderator: And should we give President Trump some credit for that? I mean is there a sense in which, by putting the issue of burden sharing so directly on the agenda, he's energised other NATO capitals?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: I strongly believe that the strong message from President Trump is having an impact on defence spending. And again, it's possible to disagree on issues as climate change or trade, but agree on the main issue for NATO, and that is that we protect each other and that we have to invest more in defence. And European Allies are stepping up, but we have to also understand that the United States is committed to NATO and to European security, not only in words, but also in deeds. Because, after the end of the Cold War, United States reduced their military presence in Europe, which was the natural thing to do after the end of the Cold War, the end of the Warsaw Pact, and tensions went down. The last American battle tank left Europe in December 2013. Now, the United States is back with a full armoured brigade, many battle tanks. There are more US soldiers, more US prepositioned equipment, more US investments in infrastructure now than it was... than it has been for many, many, many years. So, I cannot think about any stronger expression of US commitment to NATO and to European security than the fact that they are sending more US soldiers to Europe. And therefore, I'm not underestimating the differences and the challenges we have, but when it comes to again the core responsibility of NATO, we see that European Allies and North America are doing more together than we have done for many years. European Allies are investing more and US is increasing their presence in Europe.

Moderator: One president who is certainly focused on NATO

is President Putin. Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Yeah.

Moderator: What is your sense of what President Putin is trying to achieve in Europe and what does he want to do to NATO, do you think?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: So, I think that the goal of Russia and the goal of President Putin is to re-establish a system where you have some kind of spheres of influence, where big powers, Russia, can decide or at least have a big say of what neighbours do, or don't do.

And that's extremely dangerous, because that's the system where actually small nations are not really independent, are not really a sovereign. And that system has led to wars many times in Europe. So, the whole idea that Russia has the right to decide what neighbours can do is dangerous and it violates some absolutely fundamental principles which NATO believes in. But I think that they dislike the idea of having neighbours that do what they want, especially because the neighbours then want to join NATO, when they can do what they want. And that's the reason why he... Russia has been responsible for aggressive actions against Ukraine, against Georgia. They have Russian troops in Moldova, and also why they dislike the fact that for instance the Baltic countries, Poland, have joined NATO. Our answer is that we don't... that's not acceptable and that's also the reason why we have so strongly conveyed the message to Russia that all European nations have the same right to choose their own path, including what kind of security arrangements they want to be part of. And, over the last years, we have been able to invite two new European countries to become members of NATO; Montenegro and North Macedonia. Russia doesn't like that, but well, they don't decide, it's up to Montenegro and NATO Allies to decide, and North Macedonia has decided and we have decided they are welcome to NATO and they have joined NATO.

Moderator: One of the big discontinuities in Europe in recent years has been the British people deciding to exit the European Union. Will Brexit have an impact, do you think, either on the British commitment to NATO or the historic role that the British plays as a key western country, an outward-looking country that's able to project its power and its influence.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Brexit will change UK's relationship to the European Union. Brexit will not change the United Kingdom's relationship to NATO. If anything, I think the UK commitment to NATO will just increase because it will be even more important for the United Kingdom to show that while they leave the European Union, with or without a deal, but that doesn't mean that they're leaving the international community. And then NATO will become an even more important platform for UK to engage with other countries and to bring European Allies together, because then EU will not be

that platform for UK, but NATO will be that platform. And the UK is the biggest defence spender in Europe and the second largest in the whole Alliance, so it matters what UK does and therefore... so, Brexit will not change anything when it comes to the relationship to NATO, if anything it will strengthen the importance and the relevance of NATO. That was the first question, the second I have forgotten, but I think I answered.

Moderator: Alright, let me bring you closer to this

part of the world. Jens Stoltenberg [NATO

Secretary General]: Yeah.

Moderator: Also in Asia, just like in Europe, you have an order that has existed since the Second World War, but you have a number of powers that are seeking to change that order, and in particular you have China that is, some people would say is seeking to become the dominant power in Asia, certainly doesn't subscribe to everything that western countries say about the rules-based order in Asia. It's different from Russia because it's larger, it's richer, its future is brighter I think than Russia's future. As a visitor to Asia, what do you... how would you diagnose China's intentions? What would be your advice to a country like Australia that is trying to balance a deep economic relationship with China, but at the same time is a western country, a treaty ally of the United States?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: So, first of all, I'll be very careful giving advice to Australia. I concentrate on the 29 members I have and that's enough for me. Second, I think that what matters for NATO now is that we strengthen the partnership with Australia and the rise of... and also New Zealand and other partners of NATO in this region, Asia-Pacific region, which includes also our close partners Japan and South Korea, and that the rise of China makes that even more important. Because, as you have already alluded to, the rise of China provides us with opportunities; the economic growth of China has been important for all of us. It has helped... it alleviates a lot of power in China and it has fuelled growth in our own countries, and we should welcome that. But at the same time, we see that there are obvious challenges related to the rise of the military power of China and of course you are closer to China than European NATO Allies are, and traditionally NATO has been focused on the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and Russia after that. But what we see is that the rise of China is having an impact on our security, partly because

China is coming closer. We see them in the Arctic, we see them in Africa, we see them investing heavily in critical infrastructure, also in Europe. We see them in cyberspace and we also see that decisions by China and Chinese investments in new modern military capabilities have direct consequences for us. Perhaps the most recent example is the demise of the INF Treaty, because one of the reasons why Russia started to violate the INF Treaty, and the INF Treaty really has been a cornerstone for arms control in Europe for decades. It didn't reduce the number of intermediate- range missiles, it banned all of them, eliminated a whole category of weapons, extremely important for our security. One of the reasons why Russia started to violate that treaty and deploy new intermediate-range missiles in Russia, also as I say able to reach Europe, but also other parts of the world, was that China had developed these kind of weapons and deployed many of them. China was not or is not bound by the INF Treaty, so the deployment of Chinese weapons triggered the deployment... or at least contributed to the deployment of similar weapons in Russia, which then led to the demise of the INF Treaty, with direct impact on us. So, great power competition is global, affects us all.

I mentioned terrorism and cyber, two global challenges that affects us all. So, that makes it even more important that we work together, and that's exactly what I have discussed here during my visit to Australia, but also when I, earlier in the week, visited New Zealand. So, I think it's up to Australia to decide what to do, but I really hope that you... and I don't want to hope, because that's an expressed wish from Australia, is to work closer with NATO to deal with some of these global challenges, including the rise of China.

Moderator: And just one more question on that front. Do you think that European nations are really seeing... take a three dimensional view of China and understand the security challenges as well as the economic opportunities? Because often in Australia, I mean our history is of... is often trying to contribute to the rules-based order in Europe, from the First World War to the Second World War, but often it feels here that European countries see the economic upside of dealing with China, especially given economic difficulties in Europe, but are not so quick to see the challenges to the international order that China presents.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: I think that maybe that was right before, but I think that more and more European allies are aware of the different dimensions of the rise of China, including the challenges. And one thing that reflects that is that, in NATO, we have now started more systematic work on analysing and assessing the security consequences and the challenges. So I think... and just the fact that we are looking into what more we can do with partners in this region also reflects that. And again, it is in your interest and our interest that we work together.

Let me just also add that the last time I visited Australia was in 2011 and I went to the war memorial in Canberra and, to be honest, I should have known that before, but I am an example of the many Europeans that have not been fully aware of how much you contributed to our freedom, both in the First and the Second World War, and especially the First World War. And I think it's extremely important that we express the gratitude to Australia because one thing is to participate in the Second and the First World War if you are already part of it or a European country, but you were actually sending people around the whole... to the other side of the world and you suffered a lot to help us gain the freedom or maintain our freedom. So, that's a lesson I learned when I was here the last time and I feel a bit ashamed that I was not aware of that before I came.

Moderator: Alright, well thank you for that very generous comment. Let me go to the audience for questions.

Moderator: I'm going to go first to Deborah Snow. Deborah, if you and other questionists can wait for the microphone, if you can tell us your affiliation before you put your question and then keep your question brief, if you don't mind, thank you. Just behind you, Lavs. Deb, do you have a question?

Question [The Sydney Morning Herald / The Age]: Thank you, I was just trying to find this quote. Oh yes, here we go. Deborah Snow from The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age. Secretary General, thanks for your very interesting speech. I was looking just before you spoke at a Time Magazine article from earlier this year and it quoted former Kremlin Adviser, Sergei Karaganov, saying that history could have looked different. By not allowing Russia to join NATO, he said this was one of the worst mistakes in political history. It automatically put Russia and the West on a collision course, eventually sacrificing Ukraine. That's... he's not alone in thinking that NATO was perhaps... I won't say reckless, but hadn't thought through the consequences of allowing the Baltic

States to join it in the wake of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. So, I'd like to get your response on that, please.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: So, that is reckless to allow the Baltic States to join NATO?

Question [The Sydney Morning Herald / The Age]: There are those analysts who say that promises were made; Yeltsin has claimed that promises were made that that would not happen.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Yes. OK, then I understand. I understand, yeah. Question [The Sydney Morning Herald / The Age]:

Yeah, you understand the history.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Yeah.

Moderator: You may have heard this argument before.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Yeah, but first of all, no such promise was made. And second, just the idea that... so, first of all, if NATO was going to make such a promise, then we need... at that time I think we were 16 members of NATO, then all 16 members have to sit in a meeting and agree. And I can absolutely assure/guarantee you that that meeting has never taken place. So, there has been no guarantee from NATO and the only way to make decisions in NATO is by consensus, so of course no such decision, no such promise to Russia that after the end of the Cold War, after the end of the Warsaw Pact, that the former Warsaw Pact members, or republics in the Soviet Union, should not be allowed to join NATO. But another version of the same idea is that this was a promise made by, for instance, United States, that's also wrong. But second, if that had taken place, it would have been absolutely unacceptable, because the idea that in a way the United States, or any other country in NATO, should promise on behalf of other sovereign European nations what they can do is actually violating their sovereign right to choose their own path. So, how can... that's to re-establish the idea of great powers, big powers deciding what small powers can do. And that the whole idea of that I am a big power, so I deny you to do this or that. And that's absolutely against everything I believe in. I believe in the sovereign right of every nation to make their own decisions, including what kind of security arrangements or military alliance they would like to join or not join.

We have good friends and partners, like Sweden and Finland, they have decided to not join NATO and I fully respect that, as I respect the Baltic countries that decide that they wanted to join. And of course, Russia has no right to deny Latvia to join NATO. If Latvia, through democratic processes, comes to the conclusion they would like to join NATO, it's for them to decide and then for the NATO members to see if they meet the NATO standards. Not for Russia to say that's a provocation. And I use very often the example that if we accept that thinking, then how can Norway be a member of NATO? We are a small country bordering Russia and I know, I was not born then in 1949, but then of course Joseph Stalin was boss in Russia and the Soviet Union, he really disliked that Norway joined NATO. But I'm very glad that the British government and the American government and Truman and Clement Attlee and all the others, they said no, Norway is welcome to NATO, despite the fact that we are a border country of Russia.

So, first of all, it is wrong that such promises were made and, if they were made it would have been wrong. So, this is twice wrong, if you understand what I mean. And therefore, I believe in the right of every nation to decide their own path and that's what the NATO is pursuing.

Moderator: I saw Hervé Lemahieu from the Lowy Institute.

Question [Hervé Lemahieu]: Thank you, Secretary General. Hervé Lemahieu from the Lowy Institute. Another area where Australia and NATO have worked together on is in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and that has been an enormous effort, has cost the lives of both NATO soldiers and Australian soldiers. Australia dedicates \$80million a year on Afghanistan's post-reconstruction building and yet President Trump is now negotiating with the Taliban and has hinted towards withdrawing the troops that remain in Afghanistan. How do you feel the peace process is going and is this not reneging on the commitment which you made, which is to tackle international terrorism?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: First I would like to express my gratitude to Australia for participating and contributing to the NATO mission and presence in Afghanistan over many years, and also pay tribute to those who have paid the ultimate price and express my condolences to all those who have lost loved ones, family members, and Australia has paid a high price, as other NATO Allies and partners have in Afghanistan.

Then we have to remember why we went into Afghanistan. We went into Afghanistan because Afghanistan was a safe haven for international terrorists, a

place where Al Qaeda and other groups could plan, organise, train terrorist attacks on us, after 9/11. And the main task/purpose of our presence in Afghanistan has been to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming such a platform for international terrorism.

There are many problems in Afghanistan; we see continued violence; we see instability, where there are many, many challenges, but we have also seen some important progress. First of all, Afghanistan is no longer a safe haven for international terrorism. There are terrorists there, but they are not operating... what shall I say... in a free and safe environment; they are constantly under attack.

Second, we have helped, supported, enabled in economic and social and political progress, which has allowed millions of young people to get education. During the Taliban era, there were no girls getting education at all. Now, millions of young girls are getting education. So, the rights of women has made enormous progress, related to the rights and the role of women in Afghanistan.

I welcome the fact that we now have real peace talks going on; we are closer to a peace deal now than ever before. Ambassador Khalilzad, the negotiator from the American side, is closely consulting with all NATO Allies and partners because we went in together and we have made it clear that we will make a decision of our future presence in Afghanistan together, and when the time is right we will also then leave together.

What is important is that a deal preserve the gains we have made, meaning that it's important that we have a deal that preserves that Afghanistan doesn't once again become a safe haven for international terrorism, and that we also create the best possible framework to preserving the social and economic progress we have made, especially for when it comes to the rights of women.

I cannot tell you anything exactly about when there will be or if... or when or if there will be an agreement, because negotiations are difficult and nothing is agreed before everything is agreed. But we are closer to a deal now than we have been ever before. And we have to remember that NATO is there to create the conditions for peace, meaning that Taliban has to understand that they will never win on the battlefield, so they have to sit down at the negotiating table. And now they're actually sitting down at the negotiating table and hopefully that will lead to something that will create a situation in Afghanistan where we are able to reduce our presence, without risking the gains we have made

related to the fight against terrorism and the social and economic progress.

Moderator: Alright, who else would like to ask a question? Yes, I saw this gentleman in the middle. Yes? If you could wait for a microphone.

Question [Desmond Woods, Royal Australian Navy]: During the Cold War, there were only two NATO countries that had borders directly with the Soviet Union, your own and Turkey, and Turkey was the reliable southern bastion of NATO. President Erdoğan's rhetoric suggests that he sees Turkey as semi-detached from NATO and we know that there's a considerable dispute currently over the arrival of F-35 joint strike fighters and Soviet missiles capable of shooting them down in Turkey, and this is quite a stando going on. How reliable do you regard Turkey's current and future membership of NATO?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: The Turkish decision to acquire S-400 Russian air defence system is a national sovereign decision by Turkey, but I am concerned about the consequences of that decision. In NATO, it is a national decision what kind of systems different nations buy or acquire, but what matters for NATO is interoperability, that it can be... that they can operate together. And of course a Russian air defence system, S-400, will not be integrated into the NATO integrated air and missile defence.

And as you mention, there are also consequences for the delivery of the F-35, the fighter aircraft, and therefore I am concerned about the consequences.

Having said that, I welcome the fact that the United States and Turkey are talking together on the possibility of a US delivery of a US system, a Patriot system. There are also talks between Turkey and Italy and France on the possible delivery of a French-Italian system, air defence system called SAMP/T. And we have to remember that NATO is already augmenting the air defences of Turkey with the deployment of two air defence batteries, one SAMP/T and one Patriot battery, in Turkey.

Again, the S-400 issue is a serious issue, but Turkey's contributions, Turkey's role in NATO runs much deeper than the issue of S-400. Even those that's important, Turkish contribution is much more than that, and not least in the fight against terrorism. We have to remember that some months ago, a couple of years ago, Daesh/ISIS controlled a territory as big as the United Kingdom, as I said. They were threatening Baghdad. And now they have lost all the territory they controlled. That has been possible not least because we have been able to work with our NATO Ally, Turkey, in attacking ISIS in Iraq and Syria. With Turkish

infrastructure, the fact that we were able to control the border, all that has been extremely important. So, when it comes to the fight against terrorism, Turkey is an extremely important Ally. So yes, it is a problem. I am concerned about the consequences of the S-400, but I am absolutely certain that Turkey will remain a highly-valued and important NATO Ally, and we will address a lot of other challenges together with Turkey, despite the fact that S-400 is creating some problems.

Moderator: We've time for a couple more questions. I saw this gentleman over here, on the edge.

Question [University of New South Wales]: Thank you very much. Anthony Zwi. I work on development at University of New South Wales and while I understand that NATO's primarily focused on hard power and security in relation to military security, I was wondering if you could say something about some of the other things that you've referred to; issues like climate change; issues like the Belt and Road Initiative; maybe also thinking about the importance of development assistance and how, for a country like Australia, one should be thinking about the balances between these different forms of power.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Sorry, the last question was? The last issue? Moderator: How do you balance the different kinds of power, soft power and hard power?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: First of all, I think we have to understand that NATO is the answer to many problems, but NATO is not the answer to all problems, so we have different tools, different institutions, different multinational institutions and organisations addressing different challenges. And I'm very proud of NATO and NATO has been the most successful Alliance in the history and we have achieved our main task, our main goal, and that is to keep peace, preserve the peace in Europe. And that is not a small task, because we have an unprecedented period of peace in Europe, since NATO was established. That's not only because of NATO, but the establishment of NATO has been key to maintaining peace in Europe. We have to remember that the normal situation in Europe before was that we were at war and at least it's hard to find, in the East of Europe, at least for that part of Europe which is a member of NATO, any period as long as the period we have seen since the Second World War, which has been peaceful.

I sometimes refer to my own part of Europe, the Nordic countries; we used to fight each other all the time. That was the normal thing Swedes and Danes and Norwegians did, was to fight. And French, also France and Germany. Europe is full of conflict, kind of the Middle East, based on ethnic divisions, religious divisions, political divisions, we were fighting each other almost all the time. Now, we live at peace. So, I say this just to say that it's not a small thing, it's not a minor issue to maintain peace, that's a big thing and NATO has been key, essential to do exactly that.

Then I agree that there are many other issues which are extremely important, for instance fighting poverty, alleviating poverty, promoting economic growth, dealing with climate change. And in my previous political life as a Norwegian politician, actually I was more engaged in those issues than in defence and security, but I ended up in NATO, so then I thought it was time to also focus on defence and security.

But of course there are links; **climate change can fuel conflicts, can force many people to move and that can create conflicts**. Poverty can create conflicts. So of course, the more progress we are able to make in the fight against poverty, the more economic development we are able to create, the easier it is also to create a peaceful and stable international environment.

And climate change of course, if we are successful in dealing with climate change we are also helping to underpin peace and stability. But my answer is in a way that NATO is not the tool to deal with climate change, there are other... the Paris Accord, the UN efforts, that's the platform to deal with that. And NATO is not a development aid agency. We are important for prosperity because, without peace and stability, you're not able to create prosperity. And if we look at the least developed countries in the world, what characterises them is that there's war/conflict. So, a kind of first step to create prosperity/economic development, is to create peace, and NATO helps to do that. But then there are many other efforts which has to be done by others. So, I don't know whether I really answered your question, but I'm saying that yes these are important efforts, but I think NATO's task is to maintain peace and then we need to use other tools, international institutions, to address the other challenges.

Moderator: You've got enough on your plate is what you're saying, Secretary General. We'll take one more question, before we finish up. Alright, this gentleman here, if you could wait for the microphone, sir.

Question: Thank you very much. Paul Hatfield, private citizen,  
no allegations. Moderator: That's allowed.

Question: The United States was one of the original founding members of NATO in 1949, when there was only 48 states, and Hawaii didn't become a state of America until 1959 and Hawaii has never been a signatory to NATO and today is separate. Therefore, if there was an attack on Hawaii, even though America is a signatory and a member of NATO, NATO couldn't do anything... it's my understanding that NATO couldn't do anything.

Moderator: Alright, that's a very technical question. Thank you, sir.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Now, if one Ally is attacked, and Hawaii is part of the United States which is part of NATO, then Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states clearly that that should be regarded as an attack on us all and we can trigger Article 5. So, that's in a way the answer to that.

Having said that, I think that we have to understand that, at the end of the day, this is a political issue, meaning that, at the end of the day, this is about a political commitment that we are standing up for each other and just to have the idea that one Ally should be attacked and then we not reacting will undermine the credibility of the whole of NATO. And therefore I think it's also quite interesting to think about or reflect about the fact that those who wrote the Washington Treaty back in 1949, I think when they wrote the Article 5 the idea was to protect European NATO Allies against an attack from the Soviet Union. We never invoked Article 5 addressing the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union never attacked us, because we had credible deterrence. They knew that if they attacked one Ally, it would trigger a response from the whole Alliance, and that prevented a conflict. So, it is a paradox that the first time we invoked Article 5 was after an attack on the United States, by a terrorist organisation, by Al Qaeda. And again, it's not easy to ask those who wrote the article back in 49, but I guess none of them have thought about the idea that the first and only time we invoke that article was after an attack by a terrorist organisation on the United States.

Moderator: So, I think the Hawaiians can rest easy. I'm going... because I don't

want to finish on that point, I'm going to ask you one final question, Secretary General. You mentioned... I mentioned in the introduction that you were a... you're a national politician, you were Prime Minister, and you mentioned in your answer to the last question on climate change and the BRI, that you deal with very different issues as the head of an alliance, and now you're focused on defence and military issues. Can I ask you to reflect a bit more broadly on the differences between being a national leader and being the leader of an alliance, especially in the context of a world in which a lot of western countries, there seems to be distrust of international organisations and Davos Man and so on, what have you found... which of the roles have you found more satisfying? How are they similar and different? Do you feel that one can do good work at the international level as well as the national level?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: There are many similarities and many differences.

One big difference is that, as least when you are Prime Minister you are responsible for many different things. So, you address one... so, in the morning you work with... on education and then on health and then on transportation and then on climate change, and then on defence and security, and then... yeah, you deal with the challenges in the parliament and so on. So, there's a broad range of issues all the time mixed together. Now, as Secretary General of NATO, I'm focused on one set of topics, security and defence. So, that's a difference. Then there are... yeah, and then another difference is that... and I have to be honest and say that it's sometimes easier to see the link between a decision when you're a national politician and... what shall I say... the result. We build a hospital, the hospital stands there and we can cut the ribbon and everyone applauds and everyone is happy. It's less of that in international politics, it's more of a process, it takes time. But at the same time, when we are able to agree, when we are able to do something, it's really of great importance. So, I am extremely proud of what we have been able to achieve in NATO; the biggest adaptation, the biggest reinforcement of NATO since the end of the Cold War, in a generation. So, if anyone have told me that we were able to have combat-ready troops, thousands of troops, combat-ready troops in the eastern part of the Alliance, told me that in 2015, I would have said that will be highly unlikely. Now we have that. We have tripled the size of the NATO Response Force and just the fact that we were cutting defence budgets, now we are increasing with billions, you can like it or not like it, but that's huge differences and it's hard to imagine anything more important than preserving the peace. So, I

am happy when I go to bed, feeling that I have a meaningful job. But it's sometimes easy to... yeah, you make a decision one day in the budget of Norway and then you have the road, at least yeah, not so long after that. Then there are similarities. One similarity is that you need to negotiate, you need to make compromises. Perhaps that's a bit different in Australia, but at least in most European countries, including Norway, we have different kind of coalition or minority governments. So, you always have to sit down with some other parties and find some solutions. And to be honest that... I have never participated in any more difficult negotiations than when negotiate, for instance budgets, in Norway. So, there is no diplomatic or international negotiation which is in any way as hard than to agree on exactly how much money we are going to spend on that road compared to that road, or that hospital, or whatever it is. So...

Moderator: You should see the budget negotiations at the Lowy Institution, Secretary General.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: And I think that's actually a valuable experience to have in NATO, to know how to find compromises. And at the end of the day, we need compromises. Compromise is not a bad thing; compromise is a good thing. That's the way to find a solution, to be able to come to a conclusion and to make decisions, both on the national level and on the international level.

Moderator: Well Ladies and Gentlemen, that's all we have time for. I want to thank you very much for joining us today.

Item 17



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

## Speech

by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Institute for Regional Security and the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra

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(As delivered)

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you for that warm introduction. It is really a great pleasure to be here today and to have this opportunity to address you all. And it is a pleasure to be here for several reasons; first of all, it is an honour to be at this university, the Australian National University. It's a highly recognised university and I know that this university have more Nobel Laureates than any other university in Australia, including the Vice Chancellor of the university. So, it is an honour to be at this university. Second, I have to tell you that I have a special feeling every time I'm visiting an academic institution or a university because originally my plan was to become a real academic, to actually become a professor. That was my ambition in life and I started actually doing some serious research work at partly the University of Oslo and partly after that, in the Central Bureau of Statistics in Norway, something called econometrics, statistics and mathematics. And then I was asked, in 1990, to become Deputy Minister for Environment and I was very much in doubt, because I understood that that would undermine my academic career, so I promised myself to only be in politics for a very few years and then go back to do some serious business, to do some serious research. But I have been in politics since then, so my academic career was very short [laughs] and not very great. So, my advice to you is to stay here.

[laughter]

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: If not, you then risk ending up in

politics, which is also quite interesting, but it's not as serious as what you are doing. So, that's the reason why I think it's always nice to be back and to feel the air of an academic institution like this university. And the third reason why I really mean it when I say that it's a pleasure to be here tonight is that it gives me the opportunity to share with you some thoughts about NATO and some security challenges we face. I will try to not be too long, so we have some time afterwards to have some interaction, some questions, and some answers from my side. I am here as part of an official visit to Australia and NATO, we are based in... our Headquarters is in Brussels. NATO is a North Atlantic Alliance, Europe and North America, so we are in many ways oceans apart, Australia and NATO. But we are the closest of partners. We have been working together, Australia and NATO, for many, many years, in many different missions and operations, including in Afghanistan for many years.

And this morning, I went to the war memorial and I honoured all those who have sacrificed their lives in the NATO mission in Afghanistan. And we are extremely grateful for the support Australia has given NATO for many years. We appreciate the close cooperation with Australia and I strongly believe that the partnership between Australia and Norway... and NATO is... has been very important, but is actually going to be even more important in the years ahead, because security challenges are becoming more and more global. It is less and less meaningful to speak about some challenges for European nations and other challenges for nations in this part of the world. We face the same challenges, the same threats, and we need to face them and deal with them together.

And therefore, the partnership between Australia and NATO will become even more important. And let me just mention three challenges, three areas where we see more integrated, more global challenges, which we have to deal with together, Australia and NATO.

The first is the increased great power competition. What we have seen in recent years is that our global system and values have come under great pressure. We have seen that from Crimea, the illegal annexation of Crimea, the continued destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine by Russia. We have seen it in Syria, in the South China Sea, and with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and not least North Korea. So, many of the values, the rules based order we have tried to build in the decades after the Second World War, they are now under pressure. And that is very much linked to the increased great power competition we are witnessing. One very recent example, and you mentioned that in the introduction, is the demise of the INF Treaty. Last Friday, a week ago, this treaty ceased to exist. And the INF Treaty is the Intermediate Nuclear

Forces Treaty, which is a cornerstone for arms control; it has been extremely important for security, for especially European countries, for more than three decades, and the treaty doesn't only reduce the number of intermediate range weapons, including nuclear weapons, it bans them all. And we see now the demise of this treaty, because Russia has, over the past years, deployed missiles in violation of the treaty. These missiles are nuclear capable, they can reach European cities within minutes. They are hard to detect, they are mobile and they're lowering the warning time and therefore also they are reducing the threshold for any potential use of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict. So, this is one example of how the rules based order, arms control, is undermined by the behaviour of Russia violating the treaty, and it highlights the importance of trying to support and work together to build up again also arms control regime. We have seen, as I mentioned also, actions by Russia against neighbours, Georgia and Ukraine, and it has been extremely important that Australia has been so clear in showing support, in calling out Russia's unacceptable actions and in promoting the rules based order. We are also seeing the impact of the rise of China as a stronger economic power, stronger military power, and China's role [inaudible] is another sign of increasing global power competition. Its economic rise is powering global growth and it's quickly becoming a technological leader in many things. This brings many opportunities, financially and politically, for Australia, for European countries, for foreign countries all over the world. But at the same time, it also means that we are faced with some new challenges, and while China represents a very different challenge than Russia, it also...there are some implications for the global rules based order and for our security. We see this in the South China Sea, in cyberspace and in Chinese investments in critical infrastructure. So, we need to better understand the consequences of the rise of China, for our security. And one of the reasons why I think it's important that we work together with countries in this part of the world, with Australia, is actually to help each other to understand and also to deal with the consequences of the rise of China as an economic and military power. So, an increased great power competition is one of the areas where we see that security is interlinked and where we see the value of working with a country like Australia. Another area where we see the same kind of challenge is when it comes to fighting terrorism; that's a truly global challenge and NATO has played a key role in fighting terrorism ever since the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States, and we have been in Afghanistan for almost 20 years, together with forces from Australia. And we do that because it is extremely important to make sure that Afghanistan doesn't once

again become a safe haven for international terrorist, where they can train, plan, organise terrorist attacks on our countries. And we strongly believe that prevention is better than intervention, so therefore we do whatever we can to try to build local capacity, train local forces so they can stabilise their own countries and fight terrorism themselves. Therefore, we have turned the mission in Afghanistan, which was a big combat operation with tens of thousands of NATO troops, including Australian troops, as NATO and partner countries, into a train, assist and advise mission, where we train the Afghan forces so they can fight terrorism themselves and stabilise their own country. The good news is that this has created a condition for... or the reason why NATO is in Afghanistan is to create the conditions for a peaceful, negotiated, political solution. And the good news is that we are now closer to a political solution, a peace settlement in Afghanistan, than we have ever been before. And we strongly support the efforts to find a political solution, because we strongly believe that the only lasting solution to the conflict in Afghanistan is a political solution. Our military presence is to underpin a political and peaceful solution. Taliban has to understand that they will never win on the battlefield and they have to sit down at the negotiating table, and that's the reason why we continue our military presence, as our way to support the efforts to find a political solution. The idea of training local forces as a way to fight terrorism is also the reason why we do training in Iraq. We have made a lot of progress in the fight against terrorism, especially in Iraq and Syria. We have to remember that, not so many months ago, ISIS, or Daesh, controlled a territory as big as the United Kingdom in Iraq and Syria. They were threatening actually Baghdad. And then, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Australia is part of that, NATO is part of that, we have helped to liberate all the territory that ISIS held and therefore we have made significant progress in the fight against terrorism, also in Iraq and Syria. The fight is not over. Daesh, or ISIS, is still there, but at least it is a great achievement to make sure that they don't control any territory anymore. So, that's another example of how we work together with Australia in addressing a truly global security challenges... challenge, fighting terrorism.

The third area I will mention is cyber. Cyber is really global. Geography/distance doesn't matter. And we have seen more and more cyberattacks, we have seen cyber being used to try to undermine our democratic institutions, interfere in elections, and therefore we need to make sure that we have safe and secure cyber networks. NATO has done a lot to strengthen our cyber defences. We have developed rapid response teams on 24/7 standby that can help NATO countries under attack, and we are setting up a cyber operations centre at our

Headquarters in Mons, and we have actually decided that cyber is now a domain, military domain, alongside air, sea and land, recognising that cyber is as important as any other element, of a potential armed conflict, and it's absolutely impossible to envisage any kind of military conflict without a very important cyber element. That's also an area where we see a great potential for working closer with Australia. I signed a cooperation programme with the Defence Minister yesterday, and one of the areas we have identified where we can work more closely with Australia is exactly cyber. So, my message is that, when we face a more unpredictable world, new threats, new challenges, it is even more important that we have strong international institutions and strong partnerships, as we have with Australia, to deal with the consequences of an increased great power competition, international terrorism and threats from cyberspace. That's the best way to keep us safe, also in a more uncertain world. And with that, I thank you for your attention and I'm ready to answer your questions. Thank you so much.

Moderator: At the 2019 London Summit, which you've said will address current and emerging security challenges. We know that climate change is a threat multiplier and the last time that climate change was referred to in a summit communique was the 2014 Wales Declaration. You've been quite honest about your disagreements in NATO, but you've also made the point consistently that disagreements can be overcome. If the core driver of NATO is to defend and protect its members, then what are the prospects for NATO's climate change agenda?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: NATO is a political-military Alliance and we, as you said, we know that there are disagreements on different issues, also between NATO Allies, and it's a well-known thing that, for instance when it comes to the Paris Accord, addressing climate change, the agreement that we made back in 2015, there are different views between NATO Allies and at least one Ally has decided not to be part of that agreement.

I think it is important to understand that NATO is a tool to solve many problems, but NATO is not a tool to solve all problems. Meaning that the main purpose of NATO is to preserve peace, to create security. That's important because peace and security is so important to addressing so many other issues; development but also fighting climate change. But NATO is not the tool to solve the climate change challenge. I think that's, for instance the UN, the Climate Change Negotiations. NATO will not be the tool or the international platform where we make climate change agreements.

So, we have to understand that the international community have different tools to solve different tasks; NATO's main responsibility is to provide peace and stability, that's extremely important.

Then there are other important tasks, like climate change, there we use other tools, like for instance especially the UN, to deal with that.

Having said all that, I think it is important, as you mentioned, to realise that climate change has security implications. It can force people to move, change the way we live, where we live, and so on, and of course that can fuel conflicts.

So therefore, climate change matters for NATO Allies and, despite the disagreements on whether the Paris Accord is a good or bad agreement, we all have to realise that there are consequences of climate change. And for me, it just makes it even more important that NATO is able to deliver peace and stability, because that creates better conditions for the politicians, for the governments of the world to also deal with climate change.

Moderator: Thank you. We have very limited time, so if we keep the questions really brief and no comments. Let's re them away.

Question: My question was does the Eurasian Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which consists of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, pose a significant security challenge to NATO?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: No. For many reasons. Partly because that organisation is not a very strong organisation. And actually, some of those countries are also actually partners of NATO. So, we don't regard that as directed against us.

Second, Russia is part of that, but we don't see an imminent threat against any NATO Ally and actually, we try to reduce tensions. Our main task is to preserve the peace and therefore we continue to work for a better relationship with Russia. And therefore we don't regard that as a significant security challenge.

Moderator: Next question, Marcus?

Question: Hi, I'm Marcus Harrington, I'm a student here at ANU and my question is, so Russia and China have worked a bit more closely in recent years through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. What sorts of threats does this pose for

NATO and countries like Australia?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: I don't use the word threat, because I think that we have to realise that, for instance come to China, there is a potential for working together. There is a potential for also benefiting from the rise of China, with a stronger economy; it's important for our trade, for our economies, for our exports. And, as I also said, we don't see any imminent threat stemming from Russia either.

We see some challenges. We see some questions related to the rise of China and also a more assertive behaviour of Russia, and we are dealing with that, partly through strengthening NATO, partly by investing more in defence and making sure that we are able to deliver credible deterrence and defence every day. Because the main purpose of NATO is that we stand together and protect each other. Meaning that if one Ally is attacked we regard that as an attack against all Allies. It's one for all and all for one.

And by sending that message every day in a credible way to any potential adversary, we don't sort of point at any particular, then we don't provoke conflict, but we prevent the conflict. So, for us, it's not about establishing enemies or adversaries, it's about just sending a signal to everyone that we are safe, we are secure, because we stand together and we protect each other. And therefore, NATO is the most successful Alliance in history because we have been able to prevent any or all Allies from being attacked, and especially for European nations that's a very unique situation. It's an unprecedented period of peace in Europe we have seen since the Second World War and it's not only because of NATO, but NATO has been extremely important in making that happen.

Moderator: Thank you. Next question? Ladies? Front with the glasses.

Question: Hi, I'm Daniel. I'm a student at ANU. In China's 2019 ... [inaudible] White Paper, they've stated the renewal of the No First Use policy in their nuclear posture. However, with China's continual advancements in nuclear capability, will NATO at some point question this credibility?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: I think what we have seen is that China has invested heavily in new nuclear... new military capabilities, including in new nuclear capabilities, new nuclear weapons. For instance, China has developed and deployed many, many intermediate-range weapons, so weapons that would have been prohibited by the INF Treaty, if they had been part of the treaty. And that's a paradox; that the INF Treaty which we have

regarded as a very important treaty, it only covered the United States and Russia, or the Soviet Union originally back in... because it was signed in 1987, and at that time China didn't have so many nuclear weapons. Now, they have more and more nuclear weapons, including intermediate-range weapons.

So, that's the reason why several Allies, including the United States, have argued in favour of establishing or developing a new regime or a new way of addressing arms control, which is not only about bilateral agreements between Russia and the United States, but which includes also China.

I'm not saying that this is easy, but I think that it is the right thing.

I will not speculate so much about the credibility of China's No First Use strategy. What I will say is that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.

NATO's aim is a world without nuclear weapons. We all see the danger, the potential, devastating effects of any use of nuclear weapons. So we strive for a world without nuclear weapons. But that has to be achieved by a balanced, verifiable, controlled reduction of nuclear weapons. It cannot be achieved by unilateral nuclear disarmament by NATO countries. Because a country, or a world where China, Russia, North Korea and so on have nuclear weapons, while NATO has none, then that's not a safe world. So, we strive for nuclear disarmament, but it has to be balanced and verifiable. And as long as there are nuclear weapons, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.

Moderator: Great, thanks. At the back?

Question: Hi. Thank you for your comments earlier. NATO has been at the forefront of investment in cyber security. Does it take an event like 2007 to make that a ... [inaudible] Alliance's priority.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: When you refer to 2007, you're thinking about the attacks against Estonia, yeah? No, cyber was on the NATO agenda also before 2007. Estonia is a NATO Ally that was under heavy cyber-attack in 2007. I remember that very well because at that time I was Prime Minister of Norway and Estonia is a close, almost neighbour, at least they are part of the Nordic-Baltic Group and I remember I met with the Estonian Prime Minister. He told me how actually the whole society was under attack and it demonstrated the vulnerabilities, when it comes to cyber and cyber-attacks.

But the 2007 attacks against Estonia triggered focused and increased efforts related to cyber defence, because it demonstrated how vulnerable we are. So,

it was a very bad situation. The only good thing to say is that it made us able to do more and since then we have really stepped up our efforts and what we do to protect our networks, and also protect our societies, against cyber-attacks.

Moderator: Great, thanks.

Question: Hi. Following the conclusion of any US-Taliban negotiations and presumably the withdrawal of US forces, do you envisage any ongoing NATO commitment to Afghanistan?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: To be honest, it's a bit too early to answer that question. It is a possibility. First of all, we don't know if and when there is a deal. Of course that deal, that agreement will have consequences for the presence of NATO and US troops, and Australia troops, in Afghanistan.

Since the deal is not agreed yet, it's a bit early to say now exactly what kind of consequences, what kind of drawdown and what kind of reduction and how fast and so on. We are prepared for the fact that a deal will reduce the NATO presence, the presence of international troops in Afghanistan.

Then I believe that there at least may be a need for continued presence, in one way or another. That has to of course been in accordance with the agreement and we will only stay in Afghanistan if we are invited to stay in Afghanistan. But at least there is a possibility for that because I think that, even if there is an agreement between Taliban and the United States, and supported by NATO Allies, there will still be other terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda, ISIS. And there is a need to

fight those groups. And it's absolutely possible to foresee a situation where there will be a need for continued international support from NATO countries and partners, in helping Afghanistan to fight those groups.

But it's a bit early because first we don't know what kind of agreement there will be; second, any presence of NATO is dependent on the agreement and that we are welcome by the Afghan government.

Moderator: Great. At the front here?

Question: Thanks. Ben Hewitt from the Royal Australian Navy. You mentioned a few issues that are global in nature and some things that have been on the agenda recently. One of those issues is space. I'm interested in what the... what's the challenge involved in negotiating space policy between NATO member states, that have diverse interests in the space arm and what opportunities do you see for collaboration between Australia and NATO in outer space?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Space is extremely important and we just agreed - when was that, I think it was in June - the framework for a NATO Space Policy. Different NATO Allies have of course a space policy, but this is the first time NATO as an alliance have agreed and established a space policy. This is a framework, so we will fill it with content and different activities as we move on.

This is not about militarisation of space, but it's about recognising the importance of satellites for our communications. What's happening in space is extremely important for what's going on on earth. Tracking forces, early warning of missile attacks, all kinds of communications, surveillance, all that, navigation, GPS, all of that is dependent on space capabilities.

And therefore to protect them, to make sure that we work together in addressing some of these challenges, we have established this space policy. We have also an absolutely open mind to work together with Australia in addressing some of these issues and challenges related to space.

Moderator: Great, thanks. Just in the middle.

Question: My question is do you think Huawei is a threat to cyber security?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: So, we are now in the process of revising what we call NATO's Resilience Guidelines and especially the guideline on telecommunication. NATO has different resilience guidelines. The aim of these guidelines is to ensure that we have safe and secure, resilient infrastructure, including telecommunications, and we are now in the process of

revising the guideline on telecommunications. Also to make it relevant and updated in light of the 5G issue. And we haven't concluded that work yet.

There is always the belief that we will name different companies, but what we most likely do is to establish a kind of minimum standards for the safety, the security, the resilience of our 5G networks, and then make sure that these are agreed by all NATO Allies. And that's the best way also to make sure that different NATO Allies, not necessarily have exactly identical approach, but at least have some kind of minimum common approach to the issue related to 5G. Because 5G is extremely important. It will affect all sides of life, whatever we do, or at least almost all activities, from healthcare to industrial production, to communications to energy. And, therefore, it is important that we make sure that we have secure and resilient networks.

Different NATO Allies are now addressing this issue. I don't think any of them have named specific companies, but of course they have set standards which not all companies in the world are able to meet.

Moderator: Right at the back.

Question: Thanks for coming. I just want to ask you, is there a future for an Arab-NATO Alliance, and if so, which region, which side would you choose, in terms of like the ... [inaudible]?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: An

Arab-NATO... Question: An Arab-NATO Alliance.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Arab-NATO? We have several Arabic countries which are partners of NATO, especially in North Africa, but also a country like Iraq for instance, and we are working closely with them. But there is not a specific NATO-Arabic Alliance. But there are several countries, Arabic countries, which are close partners of NATO. We have something called the Mediterranean Dialogue, that's not an Arabic thing, but it involves the countries in North Africa and also Jordan. And as I said, for instance, Iraq is a partner; we work with Iraq in the fight against Daesh and also work for instance with Jordan, in helping to stabilise the region. So yes, we are working with Arabic countries, but there is no prospect of a NATO-Arabic Alliance.

Moderator: Right. Final two questions, one at the front and one right at the back.

Question: Hi, thank you for coming. MacCallum Johnson from Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. Many in our defence force are saying that artificial intelligence, like cyber, is a new frontier in kind of the big issues that are happening around the world. What is NATO currently doing to engage with artificial intelligence? And is there any capacity for us to engage with you on that?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: The answer is yes. There is absolutely the potential to work together with Australia on the development of disruptive or new emerging technologies, as artificial intelligence. And again, the Cooperation Programme I signed with the Defence Minister yesterday mentioned development of capabilities, also technology, as an area where we can work together. You have also some excellent scientists, some very qualified people, who can also really contribute to development of different types of technology.

Second, the fact that we are now investing more in defence means that we are also investing more in new, very advanced military capabilities, and artificial intelligence will become more and more an integrated part of that. The issue is of course to make sure that, when we develop new systems, we do that in a way which is in accordance with international law. And of course that we also realise it also raises some ethical issues. We need to try to develop some norms for how we deal with these kind of new weapons systems, including autonomous weapons and other weapons, which will change the nature of conflict as fundamentally as the industrial revolution changed the nature of conflict before the First World War. So, we have just seen the beginning of a fundamental change of how weapon systems are working.

Moderator: And to wrap us up with questions, at the back.

Question: Hi, I'm Colleen from the Department of Defence. Just going back to the discussion about

... [inaudible] agreement you signed yesterday, one of the things that came out of it was the potential options for NATO engaging more in the Pacific, and just going back to the first question, about climate change is one of the biggest security... or the biggest security threat countries and I was just wondering how you'd imagine NATO engaging in the Pacific playing out?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: As I mentioned in the introduction, I have been a UN climate envoy and, in my capacity as a Norwegian politician, I worked on climate change for many, many years, and actually my first political position was to be Deputy Minister for Environment,

back in 1990. We prepared the first Rio Conference in 1992 that agreed the Climate Change Convention, which is the convention that is the basis for all the different protocols, the Kyoto Protocol and also the agreement in Paris.

And I believe that climate change is really serious and we have less and less time to be able to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. The reality is that we have to find a combination of mitigation, reducing emissions, and adaptation. Adapting to the fact that the temperature is rising, and there are potentially extremely serious consequences of climate change.

I think that, as with many other ... when I was young, which is many years ago, then climate change was not a big environmental issue. We hardly knew about it in the 70s and actually even the beginning of the 80s. Then the big issue was acid rain, emissions of sulphur. It was the ozone layer, the hole in the ozone layer. It was a lot of emissions from... you know, with poison from industry or... yeah, polluting water and so on. Lead from gasoline; in many big cities, all over the world, emission of lead from gasoline, from cars, was a big environmental problem. Now, all these environmental problems, at least in countries like Australia, Europe and so on, they have been absolutely solved or mitigated, or at least we are very close to doing that.

So, the big environmental problems from the past have been solved, in a way hardly anyone believed was possible. The destruction of the ozone layer was really scary in the 80s. And now there are hardly any emissions of ozone... destroying gases anymore. I say this because the way we have been able to solve is by introducing new and very advanced technologies.

And I strongly believe that it is possible also to solve the global warming and address climate change, through the development of technology. To do that, we need to use the market forces, and the best way of doing that is to price carbon emissions, because then it will become extremely expensive, or expensive to pollute, and very profitable to develop new and clean technologies.

This is not a NATO position because NATO, as I said, is not the platform, not the international tool to address these issues. That's, as I said, other international bodies, especially the UN. So, in the capacity as Secretary General of NATO, I am not working on, for instance, pricing of carbon. That's for others to deal with. But I think that NATO has to realise that there are, as I also said, some potential security consequences of global warming.

NATO is analysing and looking into the consequences of the security changes we see, also in the Pacific region, for our security. But that's not directly linked to the issue of climate change. That's something we do based on the more traditional issues and challenges we are faced with in the military and security domain.

Moderator: Great.

Item 18



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Speech

by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Plenary Session (London, Queen Elizabeth II Center)

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(As delivered)

Dear Madeleine,

First of all let me just say that I also appreciated working with you, David, and it is a strange thing that you are no longer to be here leading these meetings, but it has been a really great honour for me also to be working with you for all the time, for all the years I served as Secretary General of NATO.

Dear friends, it is a great pleasure to see you again.

And let me start by expressing a special thanks to our hosts, the UK Government and the UK Parliamentary Delegation.

It is a particular honour to be here in London, in this important year of anniversaries.

NATO not only  
celebrates our 70<sup>th</sup>

anniversary, 70 years since the creation of our Alliance.

But also 30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

An important milestone for the Alliance and for the new democracies who joined NATO after the Cold War.

So we may have real causes to celebrate, but we have no reason to become complacent. That is why I am delighted to have this opportunity to discuss with you today.

Not only about what we have achieved.

But more importantly, about where we are going. NATO is the most successful Alliance in history.

For over seven decades, it has created an area of unprecedented peace and prosperity.

And prevented devastating conflict, which had marred so much of Europe's history for so long. London itself witnessed the heavy cost of war.

And the UK has always made a major contribution to European and transatlantic security. A bold, outward-looking and responsible global power.

Which I know it will continue to be. This city is part of NATO's history.

Our first home was less than a half hour walk from here, at 13 Belgrave Square.

Lord Ismay, our first Secretary General, helped turn NATO into a political, as well as a military alliance.

And in 1990, London hosted the meeting where NATO Leaders agreed to 'extend the hand of friendship' to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The UK has always been a highly valued member of our alliance.

It leads by example, spending 2% of its GDP on defence, and by investing in new capabilities and innovation.

Regardless of the UK's changing relationship with the European Union, the UK commitment to NATO remains unchanged.

If anything, it will only become more important.

So we are delighted to be 'coming home' to London in December, and grateful to the UK for helping us to close this year of celebration.

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As an Alliance, we face many

challenges today. The

balance of power is shifting.

And our values are under pressure.

China is now the second largest economy.

And the second largest defence

spender in the world. The rise of

China presents opportunities.

But opportunities that

also come with risks.

Russia is not the partner

we once hoped for.

It continues to threaten its neighbours, disregard international law, and interfere in our societies. Instability in the Middle East and North Africa continues.

Despite the enormous strides we have made against

Da'esh in Iraq and Syria. Increasingly, the lines between peace and war are being blurred.

Our adversaries are using hybrid tactics to undermine our institutions, our values, and our democracies.

So the list is long.

And I am ready to answer your questions on all of these challenges. But in my opening remarks I

would like to focus on three of them:

- ◆ Afghanistan, arms control,
- ◆ and disruptive new technologies.

These are all challenges NATO Leaders will discuss when they meet in London at the end of this year.

First, Afghanistan.

The day after 9/11, NATO invoked Article 5 of our founding treaty for the first and only time in our history.

This was not just an attack against the United States.

It was an attack against freedom and democracy everywhere in the world.

This is why NATO Allies and partners continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder in Afghanistan.

To make the Afghan security forces stronger, so that they can fight international terrorism, and create the conditions for lasting peace in Afghanistan.

I commend the Afghan forces, and the Afghan men and women for what they have achieved, and I commend the Afghan people who exercised their democratic right to vote in the recent presidential elections.

NATO supported the peacetalks.

We would welcome the resumption of these peace talks, but then Taliban must show willingness to make real compromises at the negotiating table.

Unfortunately, what we see now is that the Taliban are escalating violence, not ending it.

This demonstrates a lack of commitment to lasting peace, and it proves the need for firm and credible guarantees for any future peace deal.

NATO remains committed to Afghanistan and to ensure the country never again becomes a safe haven for international terrorists.

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Second, Russia's challenge to arms control.

We have seen this most recently with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

For years, the United States and NATO pressed for Russia to verifiably destroy its treaty-violating SSC-8 missiles, and to come back into full compliance.

But instead, Russia took a different path.

It developed and deployed intermediate-range missiles in Europe for the first time in decades.

Missiles that are nuclear capable, mobile, very hard to detect, and can reach European cities with little warning.

All Allies supported the United States' decision to withdraw from the Treaty, because no treaty is effective if it is only respected by one side.

While we must respond to the presence of new Russian missiles in Europe, we will not mirror what Russia does.

NATO has no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Europe. We do not want a new arms race.

We remain open for constructive dialogue with Russia, and committed to effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

And at the same time, we will continue to maintain credible deterrence and defence. To keep our people safe.

That is the core purpose of NATO.

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The third challenge I will mention is innovation, and the rapid pace of technological change. Artificial intelligence, autonomous weapon systems, big data, and biotech.

Extraordinary technologies that are changing our lives.

That have the potential to revolutionise our societies, and to change the nature of warfare.

Throughout NATO's history, our deterrence and defence has depended on maintaining our technological edge.

We achieved this by investing more in research and development than our rivals. But today, we can no longer take our technological edge for granted.

China, for example, intends on becoming the world's leading power in artificial intelligence by 2030. Our security depends on our ability to understand and adopt emerging technologies.

And NATO plays a key role.

It coordinates defence planning among nations, ensuring Allies are developing and investing in the best technologies for our defence.

It creates common standards and procedures, ensuring we continue to work effectively together, including in this new domain.

And NATO can serve as a platform, as a forum for Allies and partners to consider the difficult practical, ethical and legal questions that will inevitably arise from these new technologies.

For example, how to deal with the advent of entirely autonomous weapons systems that can locate, identify and kill with no human interaction?

How do we ensure effective arms control when the challenge is not counting warheads, but measuring algorithms?

Or how do we respond to the increasing use of off-the-shelf drones for surveillance, or to attack and disrupt civilian infrastructure?

So there are many challenges which are connected to how NATO is responding to the development of new and disruptive technologies.

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Ladies and gentlemen,

Every one of these challenges depends on NATO maintaining strong deterrence and defence. And every one of these challenges requires your support as parliamentarians.

Every single day.

I was, as I told you before, a parliamentarian for 20 years. So I know the difficult debates that must be had.

Particularly when it comes to deciding budgets, and allocating resources for defence. When other domestic priorities, such as health or education, are more pressing.

But our security is the foundation for everything else. We cannot take it for granted.

Especially as our world becomes more unpredictable, and as our security challenges grow. In recent years, NATO Allies have made progress,

More Allies are meeting the 2% guideline.

Defence spending has increased across European Allies and Canada for ve consecutive years.

And by the end of next year, those Allies will have added one hundred billion extra dollars for defence spending.

So we have really turned a corner.

And I thank you whole-heartedly for that progress, for continuing to make a strong case for investing in our shared security.

Your experience and expertise is essential as we navigate the complexities of our modern world. Afghanistan, arms control, new technologies and many more challenges besides.

They require the wisdom that only our democratically elected parliaments can offer.

And perhaps even more important, is your role as the direct link between the almost one billion people we protect.

We must continue to demonstrate that working together is always better than going it alone. NATO is an Alliance of values.

Of liberty, democracy and the rule of law.

For 70 years, it has kept our people and our nations safe.

And with your support it will keep us safe for many more years to come.

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Before taking your questions let me just say a few words about the ongoing situation in Syria. The situation is of great concern.

I met with President Erdoğan as well as Minister Çavuşoğlu and Minister Akar in Istanbul on Friday.

I shared with them my serious concerns about the ongoing operation and the risk of further destabilising the region, escalating tensions, and even more human suffering.

Turkey has legitimate security concerns.

No other Ally has suffered more terrorist attacks.

No other Ally is more exposed to the instability, violence and turmoil from the Middle East. And no other Ally hosts so many refugees from Syria.

Nevertheless, I expect Turkey to act with restraint and in coordination with other Allies so that we can preserve the gains we have made against our common enemy – Da'esh.

A few years ago, Da'esh controlled significant territory in Iraq and Syria.

Working together in the Global Coalition, we have liberated all this territory and millions of people. These gains must not be jeopardised.

An imminent concern is that captured terrorists must not be allowed to escape.

The international community must find a coordinated and sustainable solution to deal with foreign fighters held in Syria.

With that I am ready to take your questions, and as I said in the opening I'm ready to also answer questions about all the other issues I didn't mention in my opening remarks.

So, many thanks

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: I will announce those called to ask questions in groups of three, so that you will be prepared. Anyone who'd like to ask the Secretary General a question should let me know as soon as possible. As I explained in the Standing Committee, it's highly unlikely that I will be able to call more than one member from each delegation, because of the limited time that we have. I'm now going to set a time limit of one minute for questions, to ensure that as many delegations as possible can participate. The Secretary General has said that the list that we have, which is now closed, if we don't get to those already on the list, he will respond in writing, and I think that's a very generous offer. So, Secretary General, we have three first questions from Richard Benyon from the UK, Gerald Connelly from the US and the Miguel Angel Guttierrez from Spain.

Question: Secretary General, thank you for your kind words about the United Kingdom and welcome to London. Can I cheekily suggest two items that should be on the agenda for the NATO Leaders' meeting in December here in London, first one you've mentioned at the end there. Not an issue that's popular with constituents, but one that I think really is important, which is about the jihadist fighters and the tragic circumstances sometimes around families and children of those in conflict zones. And it is really important, I believe, that nations like ours should take responsibility for the human detritus of conflict and I really hope that this is an issue that is going to be tackled, because it has been highlighted under the circumstances in north east Syria. And the second is around Magnitsky legislation. We've had Bill Browder here talking to us about the ability to tackle

those who do wrong and human rights abuses through our legal system and I hope that that would be on the agenda.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Thank you. Sorry, I'm going to be strict with everybody. If I'm not, we won't get through the questions. Gerry?

Question: Thank you Madam Chairman and welcome Mr Secretary General, and we were delighted to have you before the United States Congress, as the first Secretary General to address. Real quickly, would you address the internal as well as external challenge that faces the Alliance? There's backsliding in some quarters in terms of those shared values you mentioned that we certainly believe are a part of the Alliance. What can NATO do to try to ensure that we are committed to those shared values and we don't see erosion from within? Thank you.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Miguel?

Question: Thank you Madam President and Secretary General. I would like to speak in Spanish. [interpreted] Thank you, Secretary General. I would like to ask you a question. At the Parliamentary Assembly, for a long time, we've been working on the significant development for those countries in the EU that are in the southern borders of the EU, the challenges that countries south of the Mediterranean mean for us and the Atlantic Alliance. We've done our homework, we've reached agreement, as President Madeleine Moon said, with the African Union that is represented here, and today we will be reporting on the MENA region situation, and I think the Assembly has played its role. What role will the rest of the Atlantic Alliance be carrying out now and will you convey to the other Allies whether you are going to highlight and give the necessary importance to this threat coming from the south, to the Atlantic Alliance, from Africa? Thank you very much.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you so much. I can start with the last question. First of all, so NATO has a 360 degree approach, so of course everything that happens also to the south of NATO matters for the whole Alliance. Then of course, depending a bit on where in NATO you stand, the south may be a bit different places, but I think mostly when we speak about the south, we think about North Africa and the Middle East. And NATO is, or is addressing those challenges in many different ways. We have to remember that our biggest military operation ever is in Afghanistan, which is about fighting terrorism. We have the training mission in Iraq, which is about fighting terrorism. And then we are working closely with partners in North Africa and the Middle East, as Tunisia and Jordan, to help them build their military capabilities, intelligence services, command and control, to help them stabilise their own countries. Then we also have the Sea Guardian presence in the Mediterranean. I think there is a potential for NATO to do more, but the precondition for NATO to do more is that Allies agree. So, actually one of the things, challenges I'm working on is to create the necessary political consensus within the Alliance to step up and do even more when it comes to addressing the challenges stemming from the south.

Then on the US, first of all it was a great honour to speak to the US Congress, that was really an honour and a recognition to NATO and it provided also an excellent platform for me to highlight that NATO's strong transatlantic bond is of course good for Europe, but it's also good for United States. It is good to have friends. And no other country, no other power, great power, has more friends and Allies than the United States. This has proven extremely important after 9/11, but it is also important if we for instance address the challenges related to the rise of China. If anyone, United States are concerned about the rise of China, then of course it is even more important to keep friends and Allies as NATO close. You asked in particular about values. Well, NATO is based on core values; individual liberty, rule of law, democracy. And I highlight and I underscore and I stress the importance of these values in my meetings, in my speeches, because these values are actually what we are based on. Then I know that there are concerns and I think that the... one important role that NATO plays is that we are bringing Allies together, we provide a platform for Allies in an open way to discuss those concerns and raise those concerns. So, for instance, it's the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, that's an idea platform to have a democratic open debate on concerns which I know exist. NATO cannot enforce any decisions on national parliaments, but what we can is to provide a platform for open democratic discussions where also Allies are free, and actually welcome, to raise concerns about to what extent we are all able to live up to

those standards. The last thing I would say about this is that, even if there are concerns, and I accept that and I raise this issue in different capitals when I travel around, we have to remember that NATO has really contributed to the spread of democracy and rule of law, especially throughout Europe after the end of the Cold War. The enlargement of NATO, together with the enlargement of the European Union, has by far been one of the biggest gains for those values for decades. So yes, there are problems, but in the bigger picture NATO has really made a difference, strengthening rule of law, democracy, throughout the former members of the Warsaw Pact, Central Eastern European countries, that were not democratic countries at all until the end of the Cold War.

Then the UK, well to be honest the last part of your question I didn't really get, but if it's about human rights, it's partly the same, that these are core values for NATO. Peace and stability is absolutely essential for human rights. The fight against terrorism is essential for human rights. So, this is partly about protection our own countries, but it is also working with partners beyond NATO territory, to help to stabilise them, to help them to promote our values. And if they are more stable, we are more secure, and that's one of the main tasks of NATO, to work with partners also outside the NATO territory.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Thank you. We now have the following Heads of Delegation, Mr Christian Cambon from the French Delegation, Mr Sven Koopmans, Head of the Netherlands Delegation and Mr Luca Frusone from the Italian Delegation. So, Christian first.

Question [interpreted]: Thank you Madam President. Mr Secretary General, we are of course very worried by the situation in Turkey. We know, as you do, the challenges that Turkey has to face up to, you've mentioned them. However, nothing authorises an Ally to carry out, to help Daesh maybe reconstitute its presence in a territory in which we have fought very hardly for. This situation is unacceptable and France firmly condemns this situation and has suspended its arms sales and it calls on Turkey to cease its offensive. We have been surprised, Mr Secretary General, by the tone of your statements in Istanbul. Were this the consequence of consultation with our major Ally, the US? Don't you think it is now up to the NAC to mention these issues and to defend the values of democracy and pay that characterise NATO's work? Thank you very much.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Sven? Sven Koopmans?

Question: Thank you Madam President and thank you Mr Secretary General.

The Turkish invasion in Syria is causing a lot of suffering and creating insecurity, and we see now a resurgence and emergence of terrorists. What are you proposing to do to counter this action and what can NATO itself do in terms of denying support and means that may be used by the forces of President Erdoğan? Thank you.

Question [interpreted]: Italy has long had a NATO mission in Turkey to protect Turkish airspace and the local population from missile strikes. The mission has run its course, but some time ago we decided to stay in place because we believe in NATO's values, because we believe that all Allies should do their share, because we believe that multilateralism is the way to go. But some Allies, like Turkey, decided to take action unilaterally against people who helped us defeat Daesh, bringing chaos to the region again and endangering Allies on Turkish soil, as the Italians. This action will strengthen Russia's position in this area and will further destabilise other important countries for Allies like Italy, Libya being one of these. A mention must be made of the newly displaced persons and civilian victims. It is NATO's duty to protect all of its Allies or we will be witnessing a unilateralist drift that will undermine the Alliance and values it represents. So, if you were in Italy's position, would you withdraw your troops from the mission

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: All the questions were about Turkey and the situation in northern Syria, so I will answer them together. I expressed my deep concern, and I did that in Istanbul, because I am deeply concerned. And I think what has happened since Friday has just underpinned and underscored those concerns. Because we see a very unstable situation, we see human suffering, and that's exactly why I expressed not only my concern for the ongoing military operation, but my serious concern for the ongoing military operation and for the risk of increasing tensions, further destabilising the situation, and more human suffering. I also highlighted exactly what some of you alluded to, that we must not put in jeopardy the gains we

have made against our common enemy. There are many challenges and many problems, and there's still violence and instability in Iraq and Syria, but at least we have made enormous progress by liberating the territory that was controlled by Daesh not so long ago. And that progress, the liberation of these territories held by Daesh, was something we all did together in the Global... the US-led Coalition to defeat Daesh. All NATO Allies are a part of that coalition. NATO as an Alliance is part of the Coalition and it was a great achievement to liberate the territory they controlled. And that's also the reason why I, in Istanbul on Friday, expressed my concerns that we may see that these gains are now put in jeopardy. So, I conveyed exactly the same message as I did from the lectern here today, in Istanbul on Friday. Then I also say that we have to... the only way you can understand what is going on there is also to understand the important role Turkey has played.

Turkey is important for NATO. It has proven important in many ways, not least in the fight against Daesh. We have used... so, NATO Allies, the Global Coalition, all of us have used infrastructure in Turkey, bases in Turkey, in our operations to defeat Daesh. And that's exactly one of the reasons I am concerned about what is going on now, because we risk undermining the unity we need in the fight against Daesh. And Daesh has... they don't control any territory any longer, but I visited Baghdad and the NATO training mission in Iraq not so many weeks ago, and it was clearly conveyed to me, a message, that Daesh still exists. Daesh is still there, underground, operating sleeping cells. So, Daesh has not disappeared, Daesh may come back, and that makes it even more important that we do whatever we can to maintain the unity in the fight against Daesh, because that's our common enemy. And then I expressed, and I repeated that today, that the most immediate concern is the concern about those terrorists, Daesh fighters, who have been captured which we now risk that can be set free. So, I think we share those concerns. And then the challenge is that we need a more coordinated approach from the international community in general and from NATO Allies in particular, to deal with the issue of foreign fighters. We have not been that successful so far and I think we should see more commitment and stronger efforts to try to find a coordinated, international solution to how to deal with the foreign fighters.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Thank you, Secretary General. We now have the next set of three from the heads of the... Karl Lamers from the German Delegation, Mariori Giannakou from Greece, Theo Francken from Belgium. Karl Frist.

Question: Excellency. Dear Secretary General, first of all thank you very much for your efforts to keep the Alliance together. I turn to Afghanistan; Resolute Support is successful in training, advising and assisting the Afghan national defence and security forces. The progress made is visible.

Germany and many other countries supported, in close coordination with the United States, to achieve political progress for the future of Afghanistan. My question is, how do you see the possibility for NATO to stay included in the political and diplomatic process and can you assure us that we will be able to decide, condition-based, in time and together, on the way forward? Thank you.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Mariori?

Question: Mr Secretary General, as you know, the EU, according to the treaty of the Union, prepares a common security and defence policy, including military capacities. What do you think about a formal cooperation between NATO and the security and defence system of the EU? Thank you.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: And nally, Theo?

Question: Yeah, thank you, dear Secretary General. Yesterday, Hervin Khalaf was murdered. She was a famous Kurdish human rights activist. She was the Secretary General of the Future Syria Party. She was murdered by Turkey-backed jihadists, following multiple independent sources.

Hervin wasn't a terrorist. Hervin wasn't a YPG, she wasn't PKK. She was a young woman engaging for her people, for human rights, just like all of us I think. I hope. The Kurds aren't our enemies, they are our allies. They were and are our allies in the fight against ISIS. We cannot let ISIS regain power or strength. The Kurdish people aren't a threat. Daesh is a threat to us all; they attacked our people in London, Madrid, also in Brussels, Belgium, Paris, Stockholm, Nice, and other places. The real terrorists are now escaping from prison. NATO must act. The Belgium Delegation wants an urgent gathering of NATO Council. Turkey has to cease fire. Mr Stoltenberg, will you support the demand for immediate cease fire, not only expressing your concern? Thank you.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you so much. First Afghanistan, well we are there to create conditions for a political solution, but for us there is no contradiction between our military presence and the work for a political solution. On the contrary, I strongly believe that the best way we can create the conditions for a political solution in Afghanistan is to send a clear message to Taliban that they will not win on the battlefield; they have to sit

down and negotiate at the negotiating table. Therefore we welcome the resumption of peace talks, but today, for them to be successful, Taliban has to show more real willingness to make compromises and to create credible instruments for enforcing a peace deal. And therefore we will stay committed and we will also stay very coordinated. It has been the US that has negotiated with Taliban, but the US has briefed, consulted with NATO Allies, again and again, to make sure that all Allies are on board, because our presence in Afghanistan is not only US, but many NATO Allies and partners are also there with forces. We will stay committed and then, by our military presence, create the conditions for something, for what I hope can be renewed peace talks and a political settlement.

Then on NATO-EU cooperation, yes, NATO supports of course cooperation with the EU also on defence and security matters. I have stated again and again that I strongly welcome the EU efforts on defence. I think that can help to improve burden-sharing between North America and Europe. What I've also stated again and again is that the EU efforts on defence cannot replace NATO. It has to complement, not compete with NATO. We must avoid duplication and EU cannot replace NATO as the guarantor for the security of European NATO Allies. Especially after Brexit, we have to remember that 80% of NATO's defence expenditure will come from non-EU Allies, three of the four battlegroups we have in the eastern part of the Alliance, or in the Baltic countries and Poland, will be led by non-EU Allies. So, we have just to make sure that, yes we welcome EU efforts on defence, but they should not replace NATO, they should complement the efforts of NATO.

Then also we have seen many reports about civilians killed, actually on both sides, and that's one of the reasons why I think it was right to express, from the outset of this conflict, what happened last week, serious concerns about increased human suffering. I cannot confirm every report, but there is no doubt that there are civilians that have been killed in this conflict and there are civilian casualties, and we see human suffering, people also being forced to flee. So, that's exactly why what we need in Northern Syria and in Syria in general, is a political solution. And we call on all those parties involved to support the UN led efforts to find a political solution to the ongoing conflict in Syria.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Thank you. We now have the heads of... Matej Tonin, Head of the Slovenian Delegation. Njall Fridbertsson, Head of the Icelandic Delegation. And Osman Askin Bak, the Head of the Turkish Delegation. Matej first.

Question: Dear Secretary General, you said in March 2019, in United States Congress, that NATO Alliance is not only the longest lasting Alliance in history, it is the most successful Alliance in history. And Slovenian Delegation totally agree with you. We are satisfied that Montenegro is in; that North Macedonia is almost in the Alliance. Slovenian Delegation, we support enlargement of NATO. We would like to see Georgia as a part of NATO. They are great NATO partner and contributor to our missions. So, Secretary General, when will we see Georgia as a full member of NATO?

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Njall?

Question: Thank you, Madam President. Secretary General, I share the view and concerns my fellow parliamentarians have expressed regarding the serious situation in Syria. The Foreign Ministers of EU are now meeting in Luxembourg, inter alia discussing reactions to the invasion. Are any formal discussions or actions intended on a NATO level? I also want to address climate change, which is our greatest national security threat. This is especially relevant to the Arctic as the Arctic region is rapidly warming due to global climate change. It is time for both our governments and NATO to adapt to a new reality. Does NATO intend to become a leading force in battling climate change and thereby taking a prominent seat in safeguarding our future?

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Osman?

Question: Thank you very much, Secretary General. Turkey will eliminate the terror threat across our borders that are also NATO's south eastern borders. This threat is also for Europe and the Alliance. Your Excellency was received by President Erdoğan and met with our ministers, I was there too. All of these meetings were excellent examples of comprehensive dialogue between Turkey and NATO. We have been also discussing Operation Peace Spring for two days. Turkey is always ready to listen to views of our Allies and to explain its legitimate securities. You stress on many occasions that you recognise our legitimate security concerns, this is extremely important. Turkey is focused and determined to continue to fight against Daesh and is also a country that is fully dedicated to fighting these cowardly terrorists and killed, chest to chest, 4,000 Daesh militants. Daesh is an enemy of Turkey. Daesh has attacked many times.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Sorry Osman, I have to stop you. We've gone past the minute. My apologies to everyone that I have to do this to, but we have so many questions to get through.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: OK, thank you so much. First, Slovenia: First of all, NATO's door remains open. We have proven that by allowing Montenegro to join, so Montenegro became the 29th member of our Alliance two years ago, and soon North Macedonia will become the 30th member of the Alliance. So, we have proven over the last few years that NATO's door remains open. We have also clearly stated, and restated again and again at different NATO Summits, that Georgia will become a member of NATO, but we have not put a timeline to that process. We support the efforts of Georgia to modernise, to strengthen its defence and security institutions to meet the NATO standards. So, that is something which we are working on, together with Georgia. And I think it's also important to remember that, even without membership, we have seen more NATO in Georgia. We have a joint training centre there now, we have exercises, we have more NATO presence in Georgia than ever before. And this is good for Georgia and it's good for NATO. So, even without full membership, we have a very strong partnership with Georgia.

Then Iceland asked me whether we will discuss the situation in Syria. Well yes, absolutely. That's a discussion which has been going on in NATO, between NATO Allies, for a long time. And we have also of course discussed the recent developments. We did that last week and I know that NATO Allies discuss this as we speak and also an issue which has been addressed and will be addressed at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. I think we also have to admit that when we see the public debate also between NATO Allies there are different views and NATO is not present on the ground in northern Syria. Some NATO Allies are, but NATO as an Alliance is not present on the ground in northern Syria. We are part of the Global Coalition and I have expressed my serious concerns about the risk of jeopardising the progress we have made in that Coalition.

On climate change: well, before I became Secretary General of NATO, I was UN Special Envoy on Climate Change and my views and my concerns about climate change have not changed. And climate change... and NATO has recognised that in our Strategic Concept back in 2010, that climate change may have security consequences. **It may lead to conflicts about resources of water, it may force people to move,** so of course there are security consequences of climate change. It will also **affect our military infrastructure and the way we have to plan and conduct military operations.** And we have also highlighted in some of our work that, if we are able to make our operations more energy efficient, that will be good for climate, but also good for the resilience of our military operations. So, through

some of our projects, some of our research projects and so on, we are addressing how can we reduce energy use in military operations because that's a huge effort to provide all the energy, and it'll also address some climate concerns. Having said that of course, NATO is not the main tool to address the reasons for climate change. We have other international bodies dealing with that. I focus on what is NATO's core task, security and collective defence, and then I think it's important that those tools, especially the UN and the UN Climate Change Convention, are the platforms where the international community addresses climate change more broadly.

Then Turkey, well I was in Istanbul on Friday, as I've already stated. I said exactly the same there as I said here now, but one part of that message is that we have to recognise that no NATO Ally is more exposed to the turmoil to the south than Turkey, bordering Iraq and Syria, and that they're hosting more than almost four million refugees. And of course, for NATO Allies to deal with the refugees and migrant crisis, it is critical to work with the European... no, to work with Turkey. And for instance, NATO plays a key role in helping to implement agreement between Turkey and the European Union on the migrant and refugee crisis. We have our own military presence, the naval presence in the Aegean Sea to help to implement that deal. And I think it highlights that close to four million refugees in Turkey is a challenge not only to Turkey, but to all other NATO Allies, and therefore we need to also address that together.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: We now go to Deputy Heads of Delegation, Julio Miranda Calha from Portugal, Ants Laaneots from Estonia, and we have Ausrine Armonaite from Lithuania. Julio, over to you.

Question: Thank you, President. Dear President and dear Secretary General, the Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships recently visited Addis Ababa, where the Headquarters of the African Union is located. From our visit, we learned that security developments in Sub-Saharan Africa are closely intertwined with the stability of the Middle East and North Africa region. My conclusion from the briefings that we received there was that the challenges on NATO's southern flank should not be considered in isolation or as a local problem. Security issues facing [inaudible] and some parts in Africa [inaudible] potential which can ultimately threaten the safety of NATO's southern European Allies. Are African security issues on NATO's radar screen? If not, do you think that NATO should do more to increase awareness about these subjects? That's that question, thank you.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Ants please, from Estonia.

Question: Thank you, Madam President. Mr Secretary General, Russia has deployed intermediate- range nuclear missiles Iskander in all its 12 armies. It means one missile brigade in each, with 12 launchers. Understanding Russia has two navy missile brigades with the same missile system. One is in Kaliningrad area and second in Crimea peninsular. A few weeks ago NATO announced, and you, Mr Secretary, repeated it now again, that Alliance doesn't know, not foresee deployment of the NATO intermediate-range missiles in West Europe. From our point of view, it means a serious threat in balance of nuclear power in Europe, between NATO and Russia. Would you like to explain a little bit more [inaudible] what is the reason of such NATO decision? Thank you.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Ausrine?

Question: Thank you, Madam President. Dear Secretary General, I'm right here. Right here. Last week, the New York Times has published an article about the existence of top secret Russian unit that seeks to destabilise Europe and their sources claim that an attempt, well poisoning of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury and also an attempt to poison the arms dealer in Bulgaria, and the recent murder of a former Chechen insurgent in Berlin, are related and that Russian State is behind these cases. It's getting more and more obvious that NATO can't ignore that kind of modus operandi by Russian State and we have to combat it. Could you please elaborate more about this? Thank you.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Secretary General?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you. First, on Africa: so yes, I think that NATO can do more when it comes to the south in general and Africa in particular. We have partners there, we work with them. We have fruitful cooperation with also the African Union and partners in Africa, but I think the potential for doing more is absolutely there. I think one of the main challenges we face as an alliance is to have agreement within the Alliance, what more we should

do, because when I travel I meet leaders from the south, from Africa, they actually want more NATO and more cooperation with Allies. And I think Portugal plays a key role in promoting that agenda.

Then Estonia: well, we have stated that we don't have any intention of deploying new nuclear- capable land-based missiles in Europe for several reasons. Partly because we think it is important to find a balance between responding in a way that makes sure that we have efficient and credible deterrence and defence also in a world without the INF Treaty and with more Russian missiles in Europe, but without triggering a full new arms race. Second, we know that we have alternatives. We are now working on other ways to respond and that includes conventional options, air and missile defence, readiness of our forces, better intelligence, and other ways to make sure that we are able to respond. Then I think we have to understand that the violation of the INF Treaty and the deployment of the SSC-8 and also the Iskander, which is not... also are short-range missiles, they are part of a pattern and NATO has already responded to that pattern, meaning that the increased investments of Russia in modern military capabilities we have seen over several years is one of the reasons why we now, for the first time in our history, have combat-ready troops in the eastern part of the Alliance, why we have tripled the size of the NATO response force, why NATO Allies are investing more in defence, and why we are in general modernising our Alliance and have implemented the biggest reinforcement to our collective defence since the end of the Cold War. So, it's not that this is only SSC-8, this is SSC-8 as part of a broader pattern. NATO has already responded to that and we will continue to take the necessary decisions and measures to make sure that we have credible deterrence and defence also with a more assertive Russia.

Part of this is also to continue to work for arms control. Arms control is our interest and therefore the whole idea of deterrence, defence and dialogue, when it comes to Russia, is just highlighted by the violation of the INF Treaty, because if Russia wants to confront us then well we are ready to respond. If they want to work with us, to cooperate with us, then we are ready to sit down and work with them. Arms control should be part of that.

Then, Lithuania: so, I cannot confirm each and every report and comment on our intelligence, but what I can say is that of course Russia is using what we call hybrid tools, trying to meddle in our democratic elections, using cyber, disinformation, they were behind the use of a chemical agent in Salisbury, as you mentioned. So, we see a pattern of Russian behaviour which is of course of great

concern. That's the reason again why we are responding and adapting NATO also to address and to respond to these hybrid threats. Meaning, for instance, significantly increasing our intelligence to better understand, to see what is going on; significantly strengthening our cyber defences, which we have done and we are in the process of further strengthening; increasing the readiness of our forces, because if we saw... you saw what happened in Crimea, readiness of forces, so not a NATO Ally, but readiness of forces is perhaps the most important tool we have to respond if we suddenly see some little green men somewhere in NATO territory. And also then a presence of forces in the eastern part of the Alliance is partly also to respond to potential hybrid threats. Last thing I will mention there is resilience of our infrastructure; making sure that we have telecommunications, energy infrastructure, which is resilient, that is also part of the way NATO is addressing these hybrid threats. So yes, we are also addressing that.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Thank you. We move on to Sverre Myrli from Norway, Ojars Kalnins from Latvia, and Chris Peters from the European Union.

Question: Thank you, Mr Secretary General. First we can inform you, it's functioning quite well in your home country, even without you as our Prime Minister. Believe it or not. And we are happy to see that NATO is functioning very well with you as the Secretary General. You mentioned China and the growth of the Chinese economy in your speech. I have a question to you about the development in China and China's role in the future. In this Assembly, we have several times discussed the links between the transatlantic area and Asia, and in particular China. So, could you, Mr Secretary General, from your point of view, comment on the development in China and the future role of China, from a NATO perspective, from a security perspective? Thank you.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Ojars?

Question: Yes, thank you, Madam President. Mr Secretary General, the NATO Leaders' meeting will take place in London this year, in what could be a post-Brexit period, and if there's a no-deal Brexit it could impact civilian mobility between the European continent and the United Kingdom, but this could also impact military mobility and, as you've pointed out, EU-NATO cooperation is essential to deal with the regulatory and infrastructure issues that are necessary. Do you have any concerns at all about the UK's departure from the EU affecting this NATO-EU cooperation, especially on mobility issues?

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Chris?

Question: Thank you, Madam President. Dear Secretary General, the best achievements do not guarantee future success multilateralism. Is that a core of the European Union and of the NATO [inaudible] Alliance is a very... that is the very reason we have spent time and energy to build our organisations and engage our soldiers in many operations on a daily basis, because dear colleagues, we are convinced that this is the only way we can achieve peace, security and prosperity. Today we witness a search of unilateralism. This lack of consultation not only undermined the stability of entire regions, but put a threat to security, our security, and I would also like to make clear that this endangers our organisations. Dear colleagues, the crucial part of an alliance is the trust we put in your Alliance and in the upholding of our values. As a result, dear Secretary General, I would like to ask whether the current situation is discussed or will be discussed in the Council? Thank you.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Sorry Chris, you went over the minute. Sorry. I've got to be the same strictness for everybody. Sorry.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you. First, to Sverre Myrli from Norway, it's very hard to imagine that you manage without me, but... I see it works. Then, China: I think we have to understand that, for historical reasons, NATO has been focussed on the Soviet Union and Russia. But I think that, at the same time, that more and more NATO Allies realise that the rise of China has security implications. We have seen what they have done in the South China Sea. We see how they use modern technology also to control their own people. And of course many Allies are also concerned about what they see in Hong Kong. The fact that China is also investing heavily in new military equipment is something that is gradually shifting the global balance of power. Then I think, no NATO Ally is arguing in favour of moving NATO into the South China Sea. But China is coming closer to us, partly because we see them in Africa; we see them in the Arctic; we see them actually investing in critical infrastructure in our own... in Europe; and we see them in cyberspace. And we also know that what happens in Asia also has implications for our own security. The debate about intermediate-range nuclear forces is one example of that. So, we need to address these challenges and I welcome the fact that NATO Allies are now assessing, discussing how we can both see the opportunities but also the challenges related to the rise of China.

Then Latvia: military mobility. Now, that's an excellent example of where there is a huge potential for cooperation between NATO and the European Union. We address those issues. I had a meeting recently with President Juncker and President Tusk, and one of the main issues we discussed during that meeting was exactly how we can speed up the cooperation when it comes military mobility, because our collective defence depends on our ability to move forces quickly throughout Europe.

And EU, well I think my main message is, in a more unpredictable world with more uncertainty, we need stronger multilateral institutions, and NATO is such an institution, EU is such an institution, because I think that's the best tools we have to deal with surprises and to deal with the uncertainty we all are faced with. And of course also an argument for two multilateral institutions, as NATO and EU, to work together.

I try to be short myself, but that's hard.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Right, we now move on to Afrim Gashi from Macedonia, Irakli [inaudible] from Georgia and [Yemov] Chernev from Ukraine. Afrim?

Question: Thank you, Miss Moon, President. Distinguished Mr Stoltenberg, as you mentioned earlier, my country, North Macedonia, very soon is going to be the 30th member of NATO. In accordance with that ... thank you. You are taking my seconds. Even though I process of joining NATO is a long standing in time, even though 18 MAPS were delivered in past 18 years, even though our real military contribution to NATO peace missions in the world is evident and highly appreciated by NATO Allies, at the end of the day we can all openly say in knowledge that all these achievements, national and painful concessions are the result of the adherence and commitment of our governments so far, of all our parliamentarians so far, and of all the large majority of citizens who support Euro-Atlantic integration. We believe in the benefits of NATO membership, not only because we know that the states and armies of the 29 Allies will be beside us and with us, but also for the future of our children and future generation. Thank you.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: So, I did give you a few extra seconds for the applause. Irakli?

Question: I would like to thank you very much, Secretary General, for your great address and for your continued support to Georgia's sovereignty,

territorial integrity and our membership aspirations. NATO membership is a value based choice of the citizens of Georgia and 2019 has been very special and very unique in terms of enhancing political and practical dimensions of our cooperation. We witness more NATO in Georgia and more Georgia in the NATO. We attach great importance to the recent visit of the North Atlantic Council to Batumi, which is a strong signal of political and practical support to our country, as well as an ample proof of Georgia's significance in the Black Sea security architecture, in land, air and maritime domains. My question is, to what extent does Georgia's engagement on the Black Sea contribute and approximate our country to its top foreign and security policy objective, which is NATO membership? Thank you very much.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Yemov from Ukraine?

Question: Dear Secretary General, dear Madam President, we have been fighting against Russia aggression for our sovereignty, for the European values, for Europe, since 2014. We have already paid high price for it, by losing more than 13,000 people. NATO has supported us, both politically and practically. We do appreciate this strong support. However, it is so important for Ukraine to see major signs that NATO's door is open for Ukraine, I'm talking in particular about the enhanced opportunity programme and growing cooperation together, in particular navy, as the steps to Membership Action Plan. I kindly ask you to bring Allies' attention to us as part of the modern security environment and consider various options to make Ukraine, and thus Europe, even stronger. Thank you.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: First, North Macedonia: it's a great achievement and I would like to commend North Macedonia for the enormous progress you have made and I really looking forward to welcome you as a full member. As you know, you're already participating as an invitee at all NATO meetings, you will also... at least most of the meetings, and you will also be present at the Summit in December. So, I look forward to having you as a full member.

Georgia, I have not so much to add, but just to say that you're... we are also working with you on the Black Sea and everything you do to modernise, to improve your defence and security institutions, including naval capabilities, is of course helping you to move towards NATO. We also work with your coastguard, so Black Sea is also part of the cooperation with Georgia.

The last one was Ukraine. First of all, I think we have to understand that NATO stands in strong solidarity with Ukraine. We provide practical support, political support, and it's absolutely not acceptable what Russia has done, illegally annexing, taking a part of another country, illegally annexing Crimea and continuing to destabilising eastern Ukraine. And therefore we are stepping up our support, our cooperation with Georgia. After the incidents and the capture of the Ukrainian vessels in the Strait of Azov, we decide also to do more in the maritime domain, to work with the naval academy in Odessa. And in a few weeks, the whole North Atlantic Council will go to Ukraine, visit Ukraine, and express our strong political support, and I urge also NATO Allies to provide even more practical support to Ukraine. They need our support. This is about supporting Ukraine, but it is also about upholding and supporting a rules-based order, which is of great importance for all of us. We are supporting Ukraine's ambitions for further Euro-Atlantic integration, including membership. We think that the focus should be on reforms, on how to modernise Ukraine. I see that President Poroshenko is back in the... in the crowd back there, and we have worked together on these issues for many, many years. And we of course also work with the new President on how we can further strengthen the partnership with Ukraine - that's good for NATO and it's good for Ukraine. And to modernise their defence and security institutions is the best ways also to move towards membership.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: We've got two national questions. Dragan Sormaz from Serbia and Andranik Kocharyan from the Head of the Armenian Delegation.

Question: Thank you, Madam Moon. Mr Secretary, short question. What is your assessment of NATO-Serbia cooperation, NATO-Serbia partnership today?

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Andranik?

Question [interpreted]: Thank you. Secretary General, Prime Minister of Armenia made a declaration that solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be acceptable both for Armenian people, Nagorno-Karabakh people, and Azerbaijan. This signal from Armenia fully complies with the appeal of the Co-Chairs of Minsk Group on preparation [of people to peace]. Unfortunately, we haven't heard any similar declaration from another side, even more from there we hear militant rhetoric. My question is, how the North Atlantic Alliance can help to resolve Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on a fair and long-term basis? And how are you going to support the efforts of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk OSCE

group?

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: First, on Serbia: I strongly believe that we have a very good and strong partnership with Serbia and I welcome that, based on the fact that NATO fully supports the decision by Serbia to be a neutral country. NATO of course respects the decision of any country when it comes to what kind of security arrangements it wants to be part of, or don't want to be a part of. So, when North Macedonia or Montenegro want to the join NATO, we welcome them. But when Serbia decides that they don't want to be a member of NATO, we absolutely fully respect that. So, we respect the sovereignty and the sovereignty of Serbia to make its own decisions about its path and its role in the international community. Based on that, we have a good partnership with Serbia. I visited Serbia not so long ago and I saw how we actually had a big civil preparedness exercise together, NATO Allies and Serbia, and how we are working also in other areas together, strengthening both the practical cooperation and political cooperation. So, we welcome that partnership. We also hope that it is possible to make progress in the Pristina- Belgrade dialogue, to deal with the challenges we have in Kosovo, and therefore we urge all parties to be constructive and find a political solution and to reactivate the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue.

Then on Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh: First of all, I met the Armenian Prime Minister in the UN not so many weeks ago, that was a very good meeting; we addressed a wide range of issues. When it comes to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an unresolved conflict and of course we are concerned about that we have not been able to find a political and a permanent solution to that conflict. It is clear that there is no military solution to the conflict. NATO has no direct role, but what we do is to support the work of the OSCE Minsk Group and the Co-Chairs, to try to find a political solution.

Then I would like to thank you all for all your questions, on a wide range of issues. I think it is extremely important that I, as Secretary General, meet the parliamentarians. This demonstrates that NATO is an alliance with 29 democracies, with many partners and many, many parliamentarians, and that is what makes NATO so strong, that we are an alliance of democratic nations with democratic institutions and parliaments. Thank you so much. It's great to see you.

Moderator [Madeleine Moon]: Thank you. Well colleagues, we managed to get through 24 questions and full answers in that hour, so that's really well

done. Thank you for being disciplined and I apologise for having to use the gavel, but really it was important that we got as many in as we possibly could. Now, we have a departing Secretary General and we say thank you for your time, thank you and good luck for the tra c in London.

Item 19



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The Geopolitical Implications of

# COVID-19

Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

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(As delivered)

Thank you so much, Amrita.

And good morning from Brussels. It's great to be together with you all today.

A few weeks ago I launched NATO 2030.

To reflect on where we see our Alliance ten years from now. And how it will continue to keep us all safe.

One of my main messages is that NATO must become more global. So today I will focus my remarks on three examples of why NATO needs a global approach. COVID-19, terrorism, and the rise of China.

First, COVID-19. A global crisis that shows how something that started on the other side of the world can have huge consequences for us all. Also in NATO.

NATO's main task during the pandemic is to make sure the health crisis does not

become a security crisis.

And throughout, we have remained ready, vigilant and prepared to respond to any threat. We have done what is necessary to keep our forces safe. To maintain our operational readiness. And sustain our missions and operations. From the battlegroups in the Baltics to countering terrorism in Afghanistan.

Beyond that, we have also been able to provide support to civilian efforts to cope with COVID-19. Across NATO, we have seen the vital role that our armed forces have played to help save lives.

So far, some 350 flights have delivered hundreds of tons of critical supplies around the world. Across the Alliance, almost half a million troops have supported the civilian response. Constructing almost 100 field hospitals. Securing borders and helping with testing.

For instance, the Bundeswehr airlifted ten million face masks through a strategic airlift arrangement enabled by NATO.

And Germany has helped other Allies by providing medical supplies and transportation of patients.

NATO is currently preparing for a possible second wave of the coronavirus. We have agreed on a new operation plan to provide support to our Allies and partners.

A new stockpile of medical equipment and supplies. And a new fund to enable us to quickly acquire further supplies and services. Many Allies have already offered to donate to the stockpile. And contribute to the fund. In a clear sign of Alliance unity and solidarity.

But the virus has exposed weaknesses in our resilience.

For example, we have relied far too much on global supply chains for essential medical equipment. And so allies recently took decisions to strengthen requirements for national resilience. Taking greater account for cyber threats. The security of our supply chains. And the consequences of foreign ownership and control of critical infrastructure. Such as transport hubs and energy.

The pandemic has also led to an increase in disinformation and propaganda. Aiming to undermine our democracies and deepen divisions. Even insinuating that NATO Allies are responsible for the virus. And that authoritarian regimes are better than democracies at keeping their people safe.

NATO has been countering with concrete actions of solidarity. With clear facts and myth-busting. And also by cooperating with other international actors – such as the European Union, the G7 and the United Nations.

These disinformation efforts target all of us, and the rules-based international order.

And we all have a stake in telling the truth, and upholding our values through global solidarity.

The second reason why NATO needs a global approach is the instability and terrorism beyond our borders. One of the lessons from our experience in Afghanistan, where Germany has a leading role,

has been the importance of training local forces. So they can better stabilise their own countries.

Of course, NATO must be able to intervene with large numbers of combat forces when we need to. But prevention is always better than intervention. By focussing on training and building local capacity, by being a training alliance, we can reduce the likelihood that we will ever have to intervene.

Look at ISIS. In recent years, the international community has made great progress. ISIS no longer controls territory in Iraq or Syria. But it remains a threat. We must do all we can to support our partners.

So that it can never return.

That is why we are training local forces in Iraq. So they can better fight ISIS. Without the need for a large scale NATO presence.

We are also working with other partners, such as Tunisia and Jordan. To increase stability and security. For them, and for us all.

And a third reason why NATO needs to take a more global approach is the rise of China. China will soon be the largest economy in the world. It is a global leader in new technologies. And it also has the world's second largest defence budget.

China's rise presents opportunities, especially for our economies and our trade.

So it is important to continue to engage with China. China is not an adversary to NATO. But we must fully understand what its rise means for us – and for our security.

It is clear that China does not share our values. Democracy, freedom, and the rule of law.

We see this in Hong Kong, where the new security law undermines its autonomy. And the liberty of its citizens. With the imprisonment of tens of thousands of Uighurs in so-called 're-education camps'.

With the use of Artificial Intelligence and facial recognition to monitor and control Chinese citizens.

And just last month, we saw it when China imposed economic sanctions on Australia after it led calls for an independent enquiry into the origins of COVID-19.

I remember when I was Prime Minister, and the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. The Chinese government froze political relations and imposed sanctions in retaliation.

So there is a clear pattern of authoritarian behaviour at home and increased assertiveness and bullying abroad.

The best way to face each of these global challenges, to keep our societies secure and our people safe, is for Europe and North America to continue to stand together. And for us to take a more global approach.

Working even more closely with our international partners to defend our values in a more competitive world. Partners near and far - like Finland and Sweden. But also Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

The aim of 'NATO 2030' is an Alliance that is strong militarily. Stronger politically. And more global.

To support me with this, I have nominated a group, co-chaired by former German Defence Minister, Thomas de Maizière.

This is part of a consultation process that will inform my recommendations to NATO leaders when they meet next year.

We do not need to reinvent NATO. But we do need to ask how we can make our Alliance stronger and more effective.

Germany has an important role. As the largest economy in Europe, with the biggest defence budget in the European Union, the leader of a battlegroup in Lithuania, a contributor to operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and from tomorrow, the holder of the EU Presidency.

Germany has a key responsibility to help strengthen NATO for the next decade. Those next ten years will be challenging for us all. But when Europe and North America stand together, we are strong and we are safe.

The NATO Alliance is 30 democracies. Each with their own politics, history and geography. We will always have our differences. But NATO remains the cornerstone of our collective security.

And through NATO, we can continue to live in

peace and freedom. Thank you so much.

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR [President of GIGA]: So, SG Stoltenberg, thank you very much for a very inspiring talk. We appreciate that you are so forthright and so clear on several important issues and we especially appreciate the

attention that you are giving to the question of values and ways to strengthen the Alliance, also by strengthening some international partnerships. In my eyes, it is only by paying attention to values that one can make multilateralism meaningful again. And we stand with you on the global approach that you have outlined. We at the GIGA in fact offer a global approach to scholarship that complements some of what you have identified.

So, before opening the floor for questions, I have lots of questions too. But I will limit myself to three and you decide which ones you want to take up. And . . . I'll just pack them together in the interests of time, and after this we will open floor also to our participants.

So, my first question, and one of the big issues that you've touched upon is that of weaknesses in our global supply chains. And as you know, we are seeing this debate playing out in the European Union too, where opinion is very divided. Indeed, even within Germany, opinion is very polarised on ideals of decoupling and diversification of global value chains. And especially so, as you know, when it comes to China, and the pressures that we face from big business within Germany on this question. So, my first question to you is: can NATO approach this problem differently and handle it more effectively than the EU has done so far? And how and why?

My second question is about, you know, there's a lot of attention, a lot of public attention on questions of AI and cybersecurity. But I wondered if you could tell us a little bit about hypersonic weapons. So, the German newspaper Tagesspiegel reported last week that the German Defence Minister had expressed concern on China's pace in developing these systems, which could change the balance of power even more in East Asia. So what is your view on this? What should NATO and its members be doing?

And my third and last question, as we are in Germany, could you tell us more about US plans to withdraw 9,500 troops from Germany? And this has caused a lot of consternation in Germany, how do you see it? How worried should we be in Germany? And would redeploying these troops to Poland be a breach of the NATO-Russia Founding Act?

So those are my first three questions to set the ball rolling. And over to you.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you so much. And thank you for three very relevant and important questions, I will try to respond to all three of them as briefly as I can.

First, on the issue of global supply chains. I strongly believe in free trade. I strongly believe that countries trading with each other, investing in each other's economies, has promoted economic growth all over the world, has been extremely important for the prosperity we see in NATO Allied countries, but, of course, also in many other countries, and has been a key to alleviate poverty for hundreds of millions of people over the last decades. At the same time, we have to realise that supply chains sometimes create vulnerabilities. And we have seen that clearly demonstrated during the COVID-19 crisis, where Allies and countries had problems getting access to critical medical equipment. And actually, for NATO, to address these kind of vulnerabilities is nothing new.

What we call the resilience of our civilian societies has been enshrined in the NATO Founding Treaty since 1949. So NATO is not only a military alliance, we are also an alliance which has obligations to focus on resilience, the ability to make sure that our societies are functioning, working, of course, in peacetime, but also in times of crisis. So therefore, we have guidelines for all Allies on resilience in areas such as transportation, energy, telecommunications, including 5G, but also on the health services.

And partly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, we have updated, revised those guidelines. We agreed the guidelines and then we also have reviews and assessments of to what extent Allies are implementing the guidelines. So, yes, supply chains demonstrates vulnerabilities. We have to address them by agreeing and implementing some minimum requirements for resilience, not least making sure that we have, for instance, the necessary medical equipment in health crises or pandemics, as we have seen during the COVID-19 crisis.

Second, hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic weapons are extremely advanced, extremely fast-moving and manoeuvrable. And, of course, they can carry nuclear and/or conventional warheads.

Russia has actually made some hypersonic weapons already operational. China is investing heavily in hypersonic weapons. And, of course, this is one of the reasons why we need to assess and understand the security implications of the rise of China, is that China is investing heavily in new, modern military capabilities, including hypersonic weapons.

And, of course, these weapons, many of them can reach all NATO Allied countries. They can bring nuclear weapons and, for me, that highlights the

importance of the point here that NATO maintains its technological edge. We have, traditionally, always had the technological edge. That's not always the case anymore, especially when you compare it to China, which is actually leading in some technologies.

But second, it highlights the importance of arms control that we have witnessed, over the last years, that some of the architecture, the arms control arrangements we were able to put in place during the Cold War from the 1960s and actually up to 2010 with the New START agreement, that some of these arrangements, some of these agreements have been weakened. We have seen the demise of the INF Treaty banning intermediate-range weapons and so on. So this is extremely important that we put, also, new technologies on the arms control agenda, because the combination of these technologies—hypersonic weapons, autonomous systems, drone technology, facial recognition— if you combine all that, you see a change in the nature of warfare, which is potentially more dramatic, or at least as fundamental as the Industrial Revolution changed the nature of warfare.

Therefore, we also need to change the thinking when it comes to arms control. Traditionally, arms control has been about counting warheads. Now we need to count algorithms, or at least address totally new technologies in the arms control domain.

So, the last thing I would say about this is that it highlights that China is becoming a global military power. And with that comes global responsibilities. And therefore, China should be part of global arms control regimes. China must be part of any effective global arms control. And therefore, we support the efforts to try to include China in global arms control.

The last question was about US presence in Germany. The US President, President Trump, has been very clear, and I spoke to him also recently on this, that his intention is to reduce the US presence, military presence in Germany by 9,500 troops. I spoke to him before he made the announcement. Now, this is a public statement. At the same time, the President made it clear that NATO and I should consult with the United States, because no decision has been made on when, the timelines, how such a plan will be implemented. And Secretary Esper came to NATO and we now consult with United States on the issue of how to implement such a plan.

At the same time, the US has made clear that their commitment to European

security remains rock solid; that they will consult with Allies and that, of course, US presence in Europe goes beyond Germany. Over the last years, we have seen actually an increase in US presence in Europe with a US-led battlegroup, a NATO battlegroup, multinational battlegroup in Poland, led by the United States. More rotational presence by US forces in the Baltic countries where we have new NATO battlegroups also there. US presence in the Black Sea Region, Bulgaria, Romania. We have a new naval presence, more destroyers deployed by the United States in Spain, the Rota Base. And in my own country, Norway, we have more US Marines, more US presence than we ever had before.

So actually, the picture has been that the United States is increasing their presence in Europe. And it's too early to say whether the troops that will be withdrawn from Germany will be taken back to United States, deployed somewhere else in the world, or redeployed in Europe. That's part of the ongoing consultations. Whatever NATO does will, of course, be in full compliance with our international obligations. I stop there. Thank you.

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: Thank you very much for answering my questions very succinctly and also with a wide angle view. So thank you for that. We have lots of questions coming in. And so

rst, what I would like to do is collect a couple of questions using the mic. And I would like to give the mic rst to Ambassador Boris Ruge and then to Dr Marie-Agnes Strack. And then to Dr Ali Wyne. So, if you could please go in that order and pass the mic, rst to Ambassador.

Ambassador Boris Ruge, Vice Chairman, Munich Security Conference. Then to Dr Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann from the FDP. And then to Dr Ali Wyne from the Atlantic Council. That would be great. And I would request people asking questions to limit themselves to one question and keep their questions succinct, in the interest of time. Boris, over to you.

BORIS RUGE [Vice Chairman, Munich Security Conference]: Wonderful. Can you hear me, Amrita?

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: Very well, thank you.

BORIS RUGE Wonderful. Thank you Amrita. Thank you very much, Secretary General, for your . . . for your statements and for being here today. Last week, Chancellor Merkel gave an interview and speaking about Russia, she said that we could detect a pattern of Russia engaging in destabilisation and hybrid warfare. I would say that was a pretty unusual statement in terms of its directness,

describing Russia's actions. Too often, in my analysis, the German debate is perhaps less clear cut. What can we do, do you think, to bring in the perspective of countries like your own country, Norway, or Estonia, or Poland, who are more exposed to Russian policy and Russian efforts at destabilisation?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Shall I answer that now?

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: What would it be okay if you . . . if we collected them, in the interest of time?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah.

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: Thank you so much. So, to Dr Strack-Zimmermann.

DR MARIE-AGNES STRACK-ZIMMERMANN: Thank you very much. Just a question to the General Secretary again about the situation, American troops leaving Germany. Do you think that there will be a real chance that something happens before the election in the United States?

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: Okay. Thank you so much. And to Ali, please, Ali Wyne.

ALI WYNE [Atlantic Council]: Thank you very much, Professor Narlikar and Secretary General Stoltenberg. It's really an honour and a privilege to spend some time with you this morning. You talked a lot about China and the resurgence of China in your remarks this morning. I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit and, in particular, if you could compare and contrast the challenges that China and Russia pose to NATO's cohesion. So what are some of the differences, what are some of the similarities? And also, to what extent and in what ways are China and Russia interacting to destabilise NATO's cohesion from within? Thank you.

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: Thank you. So, over to you, sir.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you. First to the question from the Ambassador on Russia and how to respond to Russia and my own experiences coming from Norway. As you know, Norway is a neighbouring country of Russia. We have a land border up in the north, but most importantly, we have a very long sea border, or delimitation line with Russia in the Barents Sea and the Polar Sea. And I actually very often use my own country and my own experiences, as a Norwegian politician as an example of how it is possible to work with Russia. Because

actually, in the High North, we were able, even during the coldest periods of the Cold War, to work with Russia, on issues like the delimitation line, we agreed that; shery – the management of huge economic values also connected to these big sh stocks up there, cod; on environmental issues; the military of Norway have regular contacts with the military in Murmansk or in the north, they have regular contacts, they meet, they also have direct lines; search and rescue, and so on. And I have been part of that, as Minister of Energy, Deputy Minister of Environment, I worked with Russia, but, of course, also as Prime Minister.

We have also something called the Barents Council, where actually it's visa-free travel from Russia to Norway and vice versa, for the people living in the northern part of Norway, and also close . . . not so far from the border.

So the thing is that the cooperation, the working relationship between Norway and Russia in the High North is not despite of NATO, but is because of NATO. Because being a small country of ve million inhabitants, of course, it's sometimes a bit challenging to engage with a big neighbour, Russia. But the reason why Norway could do that was, of course, the strength that NATO provided. So, so we were not afraid. We were actually able to go in dialogue, talk with Russia on a wide range of issues, make agreements. Russia has respected them on the delimitation line and shing quotas, energy issues.

And that's my main message also for all of NATO, is that we should not be afraid of talking to Russia. Russia's there. Russia is our neighbour. And we have an interest in de-escalating, avoiding a new arms race, avoiding, preventing a new Cold War. And therefore, I strongly believe in what has been formulated as the NATO approach to Russia, and that's the dual-track approach: deterrence, defence and dialogue. Because we need to be rm. We need to be predictable. But at the same time, we can reach out for a political dialogue with Russia, because we need to strive for a better relationship.

And, of course, there are di erences between NATO Allied countries. But the fundamental idea of combining strength and dialogue, deterrence, defence and dialogue applies for all Allies and for the whole Alliance. And I think that's the absolute best way to deal with Russia. If they confront us, of course, we are able and ready to respond. If they are ready to cooperate and change behaviour, then we're ready to do that, too. And that's our approach to Russia. And I think ... actually I've spoken with Chancellor Merkel about these issues many times. And I know that this is also very much a German and her approach, and Germany has played a key role in this dual-track approach to Russia.

Then Dr Zimmermann, US troops in Germany. Well, as I said, no decision has been made on how to implement the intention of withdrawing the troops. And therefore, as Secretary General of NATO, of course it would be very wrong if I started to speculate about potential timelines.

What I can say is that, of course, many of the troops in Germany are permanently based there. So this is about families. This is about, you know, housing, this is not only about rotational forces you can move quickly in and out. Permanently-based forces, that will take more time.

And let me also put this in perspective. We have to remember that during the Cold War, there were 250,000 sometimes up to 300,000 US troops in Germany. And then you have to remember that Germany was Western Germany. And that was, in a way, the border of NATO. So we had hundreds of thousands US troops there. Now after the end of the Cold War, it was a dramatic reduction. And now there are roughly 35,000 US troops in Germany.

But, of course, there are US troops and NATO troops elsewhere in Europe, partly on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact countries. So there are fewer troops, US troops and NATO troops in Germany. But there are more US troops in Poland. Of course, there were no US troops in Poland during the Cold War. But now we have a significant NATO presence there, with a battlegroup with an armoured brigade, with the aviation brigade. We're building a missile defence site, we have more rotational presence and so on. In Poland, we have air policing, naval patrols in the Baltic Sea, we have the battlegroups in the Baltic countries. So there's significant presence of NATO for the first time in our history in that part of our Alliance and that includes also a lot of US presence. So it's at the moment, it's a bit strange to compare German numbers during the Cold War with numbers for the whole of NATO after the end of the Cold War.

And then Ali Wyne was about China. Well, first of all, I think that it is . . . you have to admit that that's something new. China has, of course, been important for NATO Allies for a long time. But for NATO as an institution, for NATO as an organisation, China has not been very much on our agenda, because we have traditionally been focussed on the Soviet Union and then afterwards Russia, and after that fighting terrorism, Afghanistan and so on.

For the first time in our history, NATO leaders agreed at the summit in London in December 2019 to address the rise of China. They stated there are opportunities,

but also challenges. And now we have started the work in NATO to assess, to analyse the consequences for our security. And I outlined some of them in my speech: technology, defence spending of China. This is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea, but it is about taking into account that China is coming closer to us. We see them in the Arctic. We see them in Africa. We see China investing heavily in our own infrastructure in Europe. And we also see, of course, China very much present in cyber. And, of course, the fact that we have a global-reaching Chinese navy and so on - all of this makes it important for NATO to be able to also deal with the rise of China.

The reality is that we are united on this and Allies have a common approach. And I think it proves the importance of NATO being a platform for bringing North America and Europe together to deal with global challenges, as the shift of the global balance of power caused by the rise of China.

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: Okay, thank you very much Secretary General. Now I have 50 questions, so this is clearly a sign that everybody is very excited and enthused. And now, in the interest of time, what I would suggest I do, if this is okay with you, is that I read out brief versions of three questions. Would that work for you?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yes.

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: Yeah? Okay. Very good. So, the first one is by Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, who is from the FDP. He is the Deputy Head of the FDP faction in the Bundestag. And he asks: you said that China is not an adversary of NATO, that is technically correct. The US, however, both the executive and the legislative branches of government, seem to think otherwise. What does that mean for a more global Alliance down the road, i.e. in 2030?

Ambassador Markus Potzel from the Federal Foreign Office in Germany, writes: according to the

US-TLB agreement, signed in Doha on 29 February 2020, the US promised to scale down their troop numbers in Afghanistan to 8,600 by mid-July. This has already been completed. US Secretary for Defense Esper announced that there will be a further reduction in autumn. Will there be a political discussion about conditions before that?

And a third question coming from Ambika Vishwanath a former Munich Security Conference Young Leader and now working in really interesting areas, including water security, asks: the SG spoke about the importance of NATO's role in the

current health pandemic and their role in building resilience in certain areas – health, energy – for member states. Does he see a role for NATO in other non-traditional security spaces such as climate change, water security, for example?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Okay, thank you . . . thank you again for very relevant questions. It's hard to be brief, but I will try. First, what does it mean to be a global alliance and how do NATO Allies deal with the rise of China? Well, the thing is that the process we have launched with NATO 2030, what we have said clearly is that this is also about a more global NATO, reflecting the fact that we are faced with more and more global security challenges, including the rise of China. We, of course, don't have all the answers. We have actually . . . we have started now a process, we're going to reach out to Allies, to partners, to civil society, to academia, to think tankers and then listen to their advice. And then, based on that, I will put forward my recommendations to the leaders, heads of state and government, when they meet next year. So this is part of a discussion, part of a process where we try to have an open mind and have as much input as possible. Actually, GIGA, this event, is also part of that possibility for us to reach out, to listen and to have discussions with others.

But if I should mention some elements in what I think will be part of the response, and which is already to some extent there, is, of course, for NATO to work with global partners. And especially those who are, you know, in Asia or Asia-Pacific. So parties like Japan, South Korea - I visited both of them not so long time ago. They are eager to step up. They're working the partnership with NATO. But also Australia and New Zealand, I also visited them recently. They are also ready to work more closely with NATO.

So these four Asia-Pacific partners, to work more closely with them, I am certain will be part of the outcome of NATO . . . I am quite confident that it will be part of the outcome of NATO 2030.

Then technology, the importance of NATO working with industry, with science research institutions to make sure that we maintain the technological edge, which has always been the advantage of NATO and NATO Allies. That becomes even more important when we see how heavily China is investing in new, advanced technologies, which they also use for developing military capabilities.

And then, of course, the unity of the Alliance, because the reality is that China is not an adversary. China is totally different from the Soviet Union. It's not the same in any way. We're not in a Cold War. It's totally different. But if you just compare the size, of course, China population-wise, is much bigger than the Soviet Union ever was. China's economy is much bigger than the economy of the Soviet Union

or Russia ever was. Because the Soviet Union peaked, their economy peaked at 60 per cent of US GDP. China's GDP is, in purchasing terms, already bigger than the US economy. So, and of course, technologically, China is much more advanced, compared to NATO Allies than the Soviet Union ever was.

So just the size China makes it important that Europe and North America stands together. And I tell the Americans that very often: that if they are concerned about the rise of China, they should make sure that they keep their friends and Allies very close. Because the Chinese economy is bigger than the US economy. But, of course, if US and Europe stand together, if North America and US stand together, then we are 50 per cent of world GDP and 50 per cent of world military might.

So if anything, the rise of China makes NATO even more important, even more important that North America and Europe stands together.

Then, Afghanistan. Well, we are consulting very closely. I was in Kabul when the peace agreement was signed. We have consulted closely, we will continue to consult closely, because the US is withdrawing, but the US is also part of the NATO Mission. And we have reduced the NATO Mission now currently from 16,000 troops in the NATO Mission – US and non-US – to 12,000. And we will, of course, consider any further reduction as part of our efforts to support the peace process.

Of course, there will be political discussions. We will assess the situation on the ground, to what extent Taliban is delivering on their part of the deal. So this is a condition-based withdrawal, a condition-based adjustment. We went into Afghanistan together. We will make adjustments together. And when the time is right, we will then also leave together. But when that will happen, it's too early to say.

The best way we can support the peace process now is to make sure that the Afghan security forces are able to be strong and counter the attacks from the Taliban and make sure that Afghanistan doesn't become a safe haven for international terrorists once again.

Then, climate change. Well, climate change matters for NATO. And climate change is a security issue. We know that global warming leads to windier, wetter, wilder weather. **It will force people to move, to change where people can live and conduct agriculture and so on.** So, climate change is a conflict multiplier. So when we analyse, and also part of NATO 2030, challenges in the future, climate change is part of those analyses.

Second, global warming affects our military operations. To conduct military operations in more extreme weather, the consequences of increased sea levels on our military infrastructure, especially our naval bases and so on, has consequences for our military operations.

And thirdly, anything that can reduce emissions from military operations will be climate-friendly, but will also increase the resilience of our troops. We know that the supplies of fossil fuels, of oil and diesel and so on to our military operations makes . . . is always a challenge. So if we can make our military operations less dependent on long supply chains of delivering, for instance, gasoline, more energy efficient, able to produce our own energy, then it will also strengthen the resilience of our military operations. Thank you.

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: Okay. Sir, thank you very much. There are some very interesting questions here. So there's one on smart power. Several colleagues, many of my academic colleagues are asking fascinating questions about Asia, NATO in Asia, especially Indian democracies. Asia . . . NATO in Africa, and the tug of war over Africa. So what I suggest we would do, Secretary General, is we would send your team these questions, with attribution, because some of these might give . . . might be useful food for thought also for you and your team. And there are also interesting . . . [inaudible] who is an historian, is asking very interesting institutional questions. And my GIGA colleagues are asking questions about sanctions. So we'll send you these. I want to do one slightly naughty thing. Steve Erlanger has had his hand up for a while, New York Times. Steve, if we give you the mic, would you promise to ask your question, like, in 30 seconds? And can the Secretary General then answer it in a minute? A rapid-re session, please.

STEVE ERLANGER [New York Times]: Hello. Thank you. Thank you, Secretary General. You have restated, as you always do, the position on Russia very well. But I want to press you briefly, because you have said recently that NATO is engaged in a more serious look at how to deter Russia, on all . . . [inaudible] including air defence and air and missile defence. So are you finally admitting that air missile defence is being aimed at Russia and not just at Iran or . . . or some sort of Martian invasion? Thank you very much.

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: Brilliant. Steve, thanks. A minute to the SG to answer that not very trivial question.

JENS STOLTENBERG: No, but it's a very important question and I think the

challenge is that we have to distinguish between BMD – ballistic missile defence – which is a programme we agreed, I think it was back in 2010, and which we are now, step by step, developing and deploying also in Europe. That includes some different radar sites. It includes a site with interceptors in Romania. We are building a site in Poland and we have the new the US Aegis destroyers deployed in Rota in Spain, which are equipped with systems which support our ballistic missile defence.

This system is not aimed at Russia. This system is aimed at threats coming from outside the Euro- Atlantic area. And both the geography, the deployment and the physics makes it clear that this will not undermine or be relevant for the strategic or intercontinental ballistic missiles of Russia.

Then that is a total different thing –and I understand that it's possible to confuse or to mix them – but that's NATO's integrated air and missile defence. And that's about, like, systems like, for instance, the Patriot batteries or SAMP/T batteries or fighter jets. They all connect. And there are also different radar sites, of course. They connect, they operate, they share information, they share the same radar picture. And that's about, you know, threats from any direction, including also, of course, from the east. And we have, as part of our response to the new Russian missiles, Russia is deploying new intermediate-range missiles in Europe, violating the INF Treaty that led to the demise of the INF Treaty. Nuclear-capable. Hard to detect. Mobile – can reach European cities within minutes. They are deploying also other kinds of new missile systems. So we have now a process in NATO where we are responding to that. And there are different elements, including arms control. But one element is increased . . . strengthening our air and missile defence. And that part, the NATO integrated air and missile defence is able to cope with threats from all directions.

So that's two different things. The ballistic missile defence and integrated air-missile defence, which is something we are now strengthening.

Once again, thank you. It has been a great honour to be with you here at this GIGA event. And thank you for raising very many important issues and questions. I'm sad I was not able to answer

more questions. The problem is not the questions, but the very long answers. And then please send over the questions and I guess that will inspire us to further strengthen that process, NATO 2030, and then also adapt NATO to a new future. Thank you.

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR: Thank you so much, Secretary General Stoltenberg. This was fascinating, a real tour de force, lots of food for thought. We will send you the questions and in my old universities in Oxford, in Cambridge, we used to always say, 'All good things have to come to an end,' whenever a really interesting seminar ended. But today, I don't want to say that. What I want to say is: this is hopefully the beginning of many more brainstorming sessions together and finding sustainable solutions together. Thank you so much. It has been a great honour. Thank you Team NATO and thank you our wonderful global audience for engaging in such a lively way. Let's continue the conversation, to address these key questions. Thank you. Goodbye.

Item 20



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO must combat climatechange

Op-ed article by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

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27 Sep. 2020 - | Last updated: 29 Sep. 2020 16:08

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Growing up in Norway, I learnt in school that temperatures in Svalbard, arctic home of the polar bear, would hardly ever rise above freezing. But this year, thermostats in Svalbard reached a record 21.7 degrees. And this is just the latest peak in a pattern of rising temperature that is turning sea ice to slush and is melting the Norwegian permafrost.

We all know examples like this. Of a warming climate melting the ice caps, causing droughts, giant storms and forest fires. The facts of climate change are undeniable, and the situation is getting worse.

I have been passionate about climate change all of my life. My first job in government was as Deputy Environment Minister, and I had the privilege of serving as UN Special Envoy on Climate Change. Now, as NATO Secretary General, it is my responsibility to address the threat climate change poses to our shared security.

Climate change is one of the biggest challenges of our time. As the planet heats up, our weather becomes wilder, warmer, windier and wetter, putting communities under pressure as sources of food, fresh water and energy are threatened.

We can see this today in the Sahel region of Africa, where climate change is driving migration. In the Arctic where as the ice melts, geopolitical tensions heat up. Or here in Europe, where record-breaking floods and wild fires increase year on year.

Climate change threatens our security. So NATO must do more to fully

understand and integrate climate change into our all aspects of our work, from our military planning to how we exercise and train our armed forces.

Climate change also makes it harder for NATO troops to keep people safe. Our soldiers work in some of the most difficult environments on earth. For example, NATO's training mission in Iraq where, this summer, temperatures regularly exceeded 50 degrees. Imagine just being in that heat, let alone coming under fire while wearing full combat gear.

It is essential that we adapt to this new reality. That means better combat gear, vehicles and infrastructure. And it means explicitly including climate change in NATO's work to improve the resilience of Allies and partners, something that we have been doing for decades in areas like infrastructure.

NATO must also be prepared to react to climate-related disasters just as we have during the COVID-19 crisis. This year, NATO countries have delivered hundreds of tons of medical equipment around the world, set up almost a hundred field hospitals and transported patients and medical staff.

NATO and its member countries also have a responsibility to help reduce climate change by producing fewer emissions without compromising our core tasks. We have long focused on fuel efficiency to improve our military effectiveness. Reducing our dependency on fossil fuels, for instance by using solar panels to power military camps, will not just help combat climate change, it can make our troops and equipment more secure, by improving our ability to operate independently and flexibly.

Members of the NATO Alliance are taking a lead with plans to cut emissions from our armed forces through initiatives such as using biofuels, developing hybrid vehicles and improving the energy efficiency of bases and other infrastructure.

As many countries increasingly plan to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, NATO can also do more to help our armed forces contribute to this goal. It is time for NATO to raise its ambition and help drive down emissions. A first step could be to help our members measure their military emissions. The next step could be to agree voluntary cuts in their carbon emissions.

Climate change is making the world more dangerous. NATO's task is to preserve peace and keep us safe. So to fulfil our main responsibility, NATO must help to curb climate change for our security today and for the security of future generations.

*This article was first published by German newspaper Die Welt on 27 September 2020.*

Item 21



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Keynotespeech

by NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană at the Bucharest Forum:  
'Resilience, Pandemics and the Great Acceleration'

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08 Oct. 2020 - | Last updated: 08 Oct. 2020 14:52

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(As delivered)

Thank you so much Terry and, I'm so, so very happy to be with you today.

You know how much the events and everything that the Aspen Institute Romania does is close to my heart.

And also let me thank again the German Marshall Fund and The Bucharest Office for supporting this prestigious forum.

And also I welcome participation of so many great speakers, moderators from all walks of life and also a very large number of European and global network of Aspen Institutes.

It's a little bit counter-intuitive because for the first time since its inception in 2012, I am (and we are) not physically present for this 9th edition of the Bucharest Forum.

But the fact that we are able to meet virtually underlines our ability to adapt in face of adversity. To be resilient. And this is the very topic I want to focus on today.

Because we all need to be resilient. And we need to be prepared for the post-pandemic economy and geopolitics, which appear to be leading the world into a new, more turbulent, historical cycle. Or as the title of the forum aptly coins it, an acceleration of history. Listen, just before coming into this discussion, our

presidential advisor to the UNESCO mentioned on behalf of President Johannes the fact that Romania's national defence strategy for 2020-2024 puts resilience at the core of the principles of good strategic governance. The efforts to enhance the social resilience and critical infrastructure must be calibrated in order to generate the capacity to respond to new types of threats which are amplified by current global intricacies and developments including technological advancement.

I would also like to thank to Prime Minister Orbán, not only for his remarks at the beginning of the forum, but also because he understands, like we all do, that resilience is also a whole of Government angle.

And also I would like to thank Romania, here from NATO Headquarters, for the concrete contributions to the broader Allied efforts. Because Romania is indeed a vital NATO ally. Its commitment to our Alliance is continuously demonstrated by the central part our country is playing in the overall deterrence and defence posture of the Alliance. Its contribution to Allied operations and missions, as well as the truthful involvement in the debate about the future of the Alliance – you see the logo and NATO 2030 just behind me.

Ladies and gentlemen, this year has been an extraordinary year of change. The coronavirus has had a deep impact on all of us.

Most obviously this is a health crisis, but it has proved to be so much more than that. The global lockdown, and the restrictions that we live with every day affect us politically, economically, socially and strategically.

The economic impact of COVID-19 will be far greater than that of the financial crisis just over a decade ago, from which many of our nations and communities have only just recovered. And it will be unfortunately felt most by the young and the have-nots in our societies.

The full implications will not be known for many years, but they will be profound. It is fundamentally changing the way we work, where we work and how we interact with each other. It is affecting the way our children go to school, how we socialise with our friends and our families and how we organise our lives.

It is also shaping our security - even the idea of what security means. Traditionally, security issues discussed at conferences like these, and dealt with in the corridors of NATO, have focused on military operations, troop movements or preventing terrorist attacks.

There is still much to discuss of these kinds of things. Especially here in the Black Sea region. Where we see Russia continuing its attempts to establish a sphere of privileged influence with its military build-up, exercises like the recent Kavkaz 2020, the frozen conflicts on the territory of close Partners of NATO, like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova – and also, this was highlighted by a recent study on ‘Russia, NATO and Black Sea Security’ which was just published by this great organization. And, of course we see these very days, the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Also we see the protests of people’s right to choose in Belarus. And political upheaval in Kyrgyzstan.

But the nature – the very definition – of security threats is changing. Today, competition between nations often becomes in more subtle forms. Disinformation campaigns, election interference, cyber-attacks, foreign direct investment. This is the return of political warfare.

Military and non-military threats overlap with each other – and they also compete for political attention and resources.

We are also now more concerned than ever about the security implications of climate change. The NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, just gave a speech on this subject only last month, in which he set out the very real security threats that emanate from our changing climate.

Drought, floods and other extremes of weather are making life increasingly difficult for people around the world. **Fuelling conflict**, exacerbating existing threats, adding pressure on natural resources like **food**, **water** and power, and, yes, **driving migration**.

The fall in the price of oil we have seen this year, which looks set to continue, will have a dramatic impact on those nations that depend on the sale of oil and gas to fuel their economies. Especially, as more countries commit to achieving net-zero emissions and moving away from fossil fuels towards renewable forms of energy. How those countries will react remains to be seen, but there are, also, certainly risks in this realm too.

These changes are compelling countries across the Alliance and around the world to reassess their defence and security strategies. They are reaching beyond the traditional defence matters to issues of the economy, health, climate, disruptive technologies and critical infrastructure. And ensuring their nation’s resilience is a top priority.

Also, at the level of the European Union, they engaged in a similar process - their Strategic Compass is a good example of the work done on the other side of the city. It is important that NATO and the EU continue to work in an ever-closer strategic partnership. And that the lessons learned from this crisis brings more convergence on our strategic culture.

NATO too, is looking to the future.

Last December, NATO leaders asked Secretary General Stoltenberg to reflect on how to make our Alliance even stronger, even more successful. So earlier this year, he launched a process called 'NATO 2030'.

It will help our Alliance to be stronger politically, bringing more issues that affect our security to NATO's table, even if sometimes, discussions are not easy. We should continue to be even stronger militarily, so we have the capabilities to deter and to defend ourselves whenever necessary – on land, at sea, in the air, in space or cyber-space.

And we have to be more global in our approach. This doesn't mean a global presence of NATO, but NATO of course remains a regional organisation, but working ever closely with our partners around the world to defend our values and way of life is paramount for our continued success.

This is essential as we deal with an increasingly broad definition of security. With threats not only coming from any point of the compass, but affecting the entire world at the same time. Like we see today COVID-19 or climate change.

If we are to weather these storms and meet the challenges of the future, then the transatlantic relationship that has been the beating heart of NATO for over 70 years must deepen even further.

Because the challenges we face are far greater than any single country can meet alone, no matter how strong. But the beauty and value of the NATO Alliance is that no country is alone.

Together, we make up half of the global economy, we are almost a billion people and we are at the forefront of new technology.

In fact, if there is a positive to be taken from the current crisis it is the acceleration in the adoption of new technologies, which benefit our security. NATO's challenge – and our opportunity as well – is to ensure we fully adopt and exploit

these new technologies and gain their maximum benefit. While also planning and preparing for additional vulnerabilities they may bring.

NATO's ability to innovate is what has guaranteed our military superiority – including our technological edge – for the past seven decades. But NATO and the West may now be on the verge of a new 'Sputnik Moment'. A moment where a non-Western power, not sharing the same values as we do, might actually overtake us.

So we must re-double our efforts. And focus our investments even more on new, cutting-edge capabilities.

We also have to ensure that NATO Allies coordinate as they develop the new technologies. Never before has the issue of interoperability been more important. A ship from one country can always sail next to a ship from another. But if they are unable to share information, if their radar and tracking systems cannot communicate, they may as well be in different oceans.

Beyond our efforts within the Alliance, we also have to engage with those who are driving technological innovation in the private sector: with the defence industry, the big tech companies and, sure, with the small start-ups.

Science and technology is increasingly becoming a formidable instrument of political power. Maintaining NATO's technological edge is key for the enduring success of our Alliance.

This also means making the most of the talents of all of our people, including and especially here in Central and South Eastern Europe. We have so many talented people, young people, smart people, who can not only help to transform our militaries, but also our societies.

It is vital that we invest in them, train them, support them and encourage them to stay in their home countries – and also to return to their home countries – for the benefit of all our people.

But no matter how strong we are militarily, it alone is not enough. No matter what challenge you can think of, the first line of defence is a strong, resilient society. Able to prevent, to endure, to adapt and bounce back from whatever happens to it. So we need to place a far greater emphasis on resilience in the years to come.

NATO Allies have already agreed high standards for the resilience of our societies, in areas including the continuity of government, secure transport and communications, including 5G; energy, food and water supplies.

And we are working closely with the EU on these because ultimately, although resilience is a national responsibility, it is also a collective effort.

As part of NATO 2030, we want to see how we can strengthen these requirements. We will discuss this at the meeting of NATO defence ministers later this month and look forward to agree further requirements at the next NATO Summit in 2021.

I very much welcome the study on national resilience presented by the Aspen Institute Romania for this forum. And I am also especially pleased that the Aspen and GMF young professional from our networks will participate in the first ever NATO Youth Summit this November; where Secretary General Stoltenberg will be addressing the young generation of our community.

So, resilience is like a muscle. It needs to be trained and exercised to keep it strong. And NATO has been working these muscles for many, many years.

Article Three of the Washington Treaty, NATO's founding document, places a duty on all Allies to work to make themselves more resilient.

When the document was drafted, of course, they were concerned with an armed attack from the Soviet Union. But today we need to be resilient against a far broader range of threats.

Resilience must be at the very core of our societies and of our security. But this thing, and the thing that is most important, that most sets a robust, resilient society, a robust citizenry, apart from one that will crumble when under pressure, and things that are keeping us together, the glue of our Alliance, the glue of the political West, are our values.

Because a society that is based on freedom, democracy and the rule of law; where people are free to act and choose as they will; a just society where people trust the institutions and the people who govern them. That is a resilient society.

We know this well in Romania and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. After the fall of the communist system, the prospect of membership of

NATO and European Union helped transform our nations and societies. We strengthened our democratic institutions, improved respect for minority rights, established civilian control over our militaries, and resolved border and ethnic disputes peacefully through dialogue.

All of this made our nations, our societies immeasurably stronger and more resilient. Just as the absence of any of these things made the communist bloc so brittle that it collapsed almost overnight.

We must constantly be on our guard for the erosion of our values – from without or from within. Freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law. Without these values we place ourselves at risk. And we cannot allow that to happen.

The challenges of our free societies in the political West face now are greater than any in living memory. This is why our values are so important. Why our unity is so important. And why our NATO Alliance is so important. Because when we stand together, work together and protect each other, we are stronger and we are safer.

Next year, the year Aspen Institute Romania will celebrate its 15th anniversary and the Bucharest Forum its 10th edition. We are counting, and I am counting, on all the Aspen global network to continue to spur transformational and value-based leadership, continue to stimulate an educated argument-based debate on topical issues facing our societies. And continue to put the work of the unmistakable Aspen method with the triple helix of public, private, and civil society sectors interact and build lasting and resilient solutions for the challenges of today and of tomorrow.

I want to thank you again for inviting me, and having me for this great conference, and Terry, sorry for being a little bit too long, but I wanted a little bit to give, if you want, our thoughts and our reactions on this very topical conversation that you are starting today.

I am all yours, ready to engage in a conversation and, I understand, taking questions is even more important than anything else.

So I am in your hands now Terry.



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

## Remarks

by NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană at the Road to Warsaw Security Forum 2020 conference

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18 Nov. 2020 -

| Last updated: 18 Nov. 2020 15:33

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(As delivered)

NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană: Thank you so much, Kristine, good to see you again.

And good afternoon to everyone. And of course may thanks to the Casimir Pulaski Foundation and the German Marshall Fund for inviting me to address this Road to Security Forum. We always respond with great pleasure to invitations from our Polish friends. It's also a pleasure, despite the fact that we have to meet virtually hopefully next year we'll do to do this in person. But let me also thank the host country Poland, strong and steadfast member of our alliance. Just a few months ago, on the other side of the building of NATO Headquarters, we marked the 40th anniversary of the Solidarity Movement. And on that occasion, I unveiled a Solidarność sign at the NATO headquarters in Brussels and I invite especially the young ones, when they visit and when you visit us when we'll be able to travel, please do come and see this symbol, not only of Polish history, but also an event that had a huge impact, an enduring impact, on the whole of nature and on the whole of the democratic world. It is our unity and our solidarity that makes us credible and strong. Poland, like all Allies, must continue to nurture this bond in words and in deeds.

Dear friends, our world is changing rapidly. And there are fundamental geopolitical shifts and also considerable technological advances. There is also a widening array of security threats and challenges, including terrorist and

nuclear proliferation, hostile cyber activity, climate disruptions and now we see also pandemics. So that's a pretty complex picture. There is also the more traditional and ongoing threats of Russian military and hybrid activities. Along the Alliance's eastern

flank, Russia continues his attempts to establish a sphere of privileged influence. We see this through his military buildup and exercises. We see this in Belarus. We see also in the protracted conflicts in the territory of our partners like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova.

By the way of Moldova, we congratulate Maia Sandu, for her historic victory just the other day. I look forward to continuing our partnership with the Republic of Moldova.

And, of course, speaking of partners, NATO is working very closely with all these partners, and I mentioned here, our partners from the east, building their capacity to better resist Russian pressure. In these very complex and unpredictable times, strong transatlantic cooperation is indispensable to keep us safe and free. This is true today. This will be true in the future. That's why it is so important that we all work together. Also, on broadening the lenses a little bit. It's vitally important for us to continue to further strengthen the ties between Europe and North America.

And to reinforce our strong institutional bonding, starting with NATO. This is why Secretary General Stoltenberg is leading this initiative called NATO 2030, as we speak; the North Atlantic Council

concluded the first conversation on this topic. And this is why we are looking into the future, not only to our exceptionally bright past of 71 years because NATO has, and should, and will continue, to protect our almost 1 billion citizens, in the coming decade, and far, far beyond. This is what I would like to do in a few minutes I have with all of you, is to highlight three issues that will impact, that will have a definite and defining impact on how the Alliance adapts towards 2030. And that will require creative, forward looking and realistic thinking from all of us.

The first one is innovation and new technologies.

Because NATO's ability to innovate, is what has guaranteed our military superiority, our technological edge. This is the essential part of deterrence and defence. We have done this brilliantly over the last seven decades. But now our dominance in the political West is being challenged. Because other nations like China or Russia that do not share our same values, the same values

like we do, are developing new technologies from hypersonic missiles to autonomous systems to artificial intelligence or cyber warfare. And we risk, if we're not careful, and don't work together, we risk a second Sputnik moment where we suddenly find that we have been outpaced.

This is something that will not allow to happen, and will not allow it to happen. But for that we have to redouble our efforts to maintain our technological edge, because we can and we have already, new cutting edge capabilities in nature. But we also have something even more important: the ecosystem of innovation, the best universities, the best scientists and engineers, and certainly Eastern Europe has a huge contribution, critical skills and intellect. And I think this is something that we have to cherish and nurture all across the Alliance. And of course something probably even more importantly, and when I speak to our Polish friends or friends from former communist Europe, living in open societies where people are free to challenge and to choose to explore and innovate. This is something that is a hugely competitive advantage in comparison to our rivals. And this is something we should continue to nurture. We have an abundance of World Class academic institutions, nest researchers, creative startups, a mature, and well resourced financial ecosystem. These are the driving forces of the innovation ecosystem. And, of course, speaking of talent, we see amazing positive experiences in the Baltic region, in Poland, in my country Romania, we see from the Silicon Valley to, let's say the eastern flank of NATO, we see a huge potential to deepen our transatlantic cooperation on innovation.

The second issue that I would like to highlight - is also a buzzword that is not just a buzzword – it's not just a nice headline in our speeches, and this is resilience.

Because a strong military and political alliance is essential but it's not enough. Because we need to build strong societies, able to prevent, to endure, to adapt and bounce back from whatever happens to them. And of course, NATO allies have already agreed high standards for resilience in areas including the continuity of government, secure transport communications, including 5g energy security, food and water supplies. And I like to thank our Polish friends, because at the Warsaw NATO Summit, ve years ago, 2016, our leaders were anticipating something that we have today unfortunately in abundance; the need for NATO to look into resilience, the baseline requirements for resiliency in NATO are today, world class indicators of performance, and we are looking forward to working also with other institutions, and nations that are developing their own national resilience indicators. Because as I mentioned

before, resilient societies, are our first line of defence. Our security and prosperity depend on them. We need robust supply chains and civilian infrastructure, because if we speak of large operations, around 90% - nine zero percent - of military transport relies on civilian ships, railways and aircraft and businesses. And we need to protect the undersea cables and the overhead satellite systems on which our civilian and military communications rely. Because as I mentioned countries like China investing aggressively in ports, in airports, in critical infrastructure, in ownership in critically creative and innovative companies, and our telecommunication networks remain vulnerable to attacks from the outside, or from being compromised from within.

So in taking our efforts forward to boost resilience. We are working closely with the EU, with the private sector, with civil society, with academia, and ultimately with nations because, in the end, resilience is a national responsibility, but is also a collective effort.

And here NATO brings a lot to the table and will continue to do this.

And my third and final issue for today's conversation is about partnerships and working more extensively and more effectively with like-minded partners globally, is key to ensure we remain competitive in a more competitive and complex world. Because none of our countries, even the biggest ones, can deal today alone with the challenges we are faced with.

So we need to work together and find common solutions.

A very obvious partner for NATO is European Union. We are the two sides of the same coin. We are living in the two sides of Brussels. And we do hope that our strategic partnership that was launched again, a few years ago, will be reconfirmed, will be strengthened and will reach its full maturity.

Because we are indispensable partners when it comes to security peace and prosperity in Europe because we are covering, in a complimentary way, and this is what we should stay in the future as well, a much broader array of issues of interest of our citizens and of interest to the rest of the world.

And the level of cooperation between NATO and EU has reached unprecedented levels, we have today a common agenda of 74 concrete points to work on. Right now, we are working together to counter disinformation, defend against cyber activities, enhance military mobility. And we have to work closely together, also on defence, making very clear and keeping in mind that over half of the NATO citizens do not live in the EU, but 90% of the EU citizens live

in NATO countries as well, These are factors that we have to look into realistically, ambitiously, but also in a sense of common purpose and common values. So let me try to conclude because I think the question part, and hopefully the answers part, will be more interesting. Let me say this, Poland has an important voice in the debate about the future of our alliance. And as we are entering a discussion about NATO2030 and beyond, as we are approaching the next NATO summit or leaders meeting of early next year, as we are entering a new cycle of politics and geopolitics and geo-economics and hopefully this pandemic will be behind us. We need places like the Warsaw Security Forum devoted to the transatlantic cooperation, an excellent platform to discuss ideas and solutions to make NATO, even stronger. So thank you so much for inviting me and I look forward to be with you, accompanying the road towards the Warsaw Security Forum in the period ahead.

Thank you so much and Kristine thank you for being together and say hello to everybody we know together.

~~Moderator~~ Moderator: Absolutely. And thank you very much for your introductory remarks, you have set out a tremendous task that NATO needs to do. Not only in the next few years, but generally. Looking at new innovation and technology threats, looking at all of the vulnerabilities that we have at home, in our own societies, in our infrastructure as you mentioned significantly the telecommunications infrastructure, NATO is going to need additional resources it needs to think about what is available to the Alliance itself, but also what's in each member state, in each ally to make it more possible for allies to tackle these threats, you very nicely you mentioned the role of partnerships as your third set, of the EU, but what additional capabilities, what additional resources will NATO need in the next 10 years and beyond to tackle all of these new threats and also continue being such an important security guarantor on the old issues that are so important to us. Are there new partnerships that NATO should seek to establish, what other things can NATO allies provide.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană: Well, thank you Kristine, but I mention NATO2030, and I mention this reflection process which is, in fact, a process of anticipation. Because we will be living in very uncertain times, in the future, and this is no sign that these things will slow down. The acceleration of history, the acceleration of tendency, the ever widening of the very definition of security. And the pandemic has brought the few new dimensions to already a very complicated canvas, even before that. So,

NATO like always in our history; I mentioned the ingredients of our success.

One is values, because they're enduring, and this is what keeps us, the glue that keeps us together at a sort of ideological, philosophical, democratic level.

The other one is keeping your innovation, technological edge because you have to be superior to your potential rivals and adversaries.

But the third one is also the capacity to permanently adapt to be agile. To be able, despite our 30 nations, is that the easy proposition? 1 billion people that's a lot of people, but we are in a way, forced to show our agility and adapt to a changing context.

You mentioned new technologies. That's something that is 90% produced in the private sector today. So, the way in which we were used, in the last decades, to procure innovation and to end to fund innovation for the military purposes was mainly governments. We remember all of us that the internet was born out of the Pentagon works and we remember that many things we see just last Sunday, a joint venture between a private American company and NASA to really send people again on a station orbit.

So, we have to learn how to embrace this ecosystem of innovation in a far more modern way. And during the innovation body NATO, I know that this is critically important, is not always easy. But the idea that we basically harness the talent and the private sector and venture capital and transfer, you know, intellectual, and practical solutions to our security challenges is one important thing.

The second thing that you mentioned, even the 1 billion people, even the fact that the NATO allies together. We have more than 50% of global GDP, as we speak. Even if we have a meter of superiority, which is unrivalled, even we have challenges that are trying to catch up with us, we are significant. But in order to be able to compete, also in the realm of global competition, and also to making sure that our liberal democracies, our way of life will be protected against a counter proposition which is coming from, very big and influential nations around the world. This is where we need all our partners, all our like-minded nations, to come together to work with us to work with European Union, because they have a number of instruments that we don't have, we have some instruments that they don't have. So I think the whole political West, in a way, should be aggregated in a proposition, that is, is very important.

And the third one which is something I believe you mentioned and that it's a very

relevant question and a very complex answer to give, is how to keep our political unity, how to manage. Because when the definition of security is shifting, automatically, you introduce another level of complexity for the political dialogue on making sure that we see eye to eye on a broader range of issues. And we have sometimes, you know, things that are not politically easy, we see even divergences inside the Alliance we've seen them recently, we've seen them before. So I think keeping this alliance politically coherent, politically resilient, getting back to the source of our strength, to the need for NATO also in the future, this is, if you want, the magic formula for keeping NATO relevant, for keeping our public opinions, believing that NATO is a useful organization, during peace, security and a decent life for all of us, for the young ones. That's why we started with this NATO Youth Summit just a few days ago by Secretary General Stoltenberg. And this is why we have to also talk to audiences and to places and platforms that are not usually our natural place to be. So a long answer to a very complex question which is very much on our minds as we speak.

~~Moderator~~ Moderator: That's great to hear that it's really lovely for you to also talk about the young leaders and young voices, because that is where we're going to next we have collected a few questions from young leaders in partner countries and among the Alliance and we're going to play those for you right now, and you'll be able to approach these diverse sets of questions next so if we could play the video of the young leaders questions please.

[Video playing]

*My name is Iryna Krasnoshtan, I'm from Ukraine. I'm an alumna of New Security leaders Programme. NATO has launched its 2030 reflection process, in your opinion, the world in 2030 would it be a more secure, and more insecure place, and why.*

*Good afternoon, my name is Malgorzata Zacheja and I'm from Poland. I'm part of the Academy of Young Diplomats Programme. My question is related to the coronavirus pandemic. As we entered the second wave of, COVID-19, what are some measures that NATO offers its allies in fighting the virus globally. Have they changed from the first wave, and if so, how. Thank you very much.*

*Hello, and chindobre. My name is Stefan Raab from Germany. I'm part of the programme European*

*Academy of Young Diplomats and my question relates to the Arctic. Currently climate change is a quite controversial topic, and there are lots of geopolitical interests within the Arctic, but*

*there's also a chance to overcome them. Therefore, my question relates to that rather remote area. Do you consider the Arctic as a window of opportunity to overcome global rivalry between East and West. Thank you.*

Kristine Berzina (*Moderator*): So those are the three very small questions. Very easy to solve immediately but maybe you could give us a taste of how, you know, you and NATO see 2030, and the security will increase or decrease the second question, we had is on the pandemic and what NATO is doing to solve the pandemic globally and a third is on the Arctic and then what is the role of the Arctic for you.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana: First of all, thank you so much. It really is so, so, so wonderful to see brilliant young leaders, engaging in such conversations and there's no greater pleasure than to try to, to be up to it.

Now, coming to Iryna to your question about the world we will be living in, probably nobody knows for sure.

And there is probably one certainty that we'll be living in an uncertain world. And this is why, being able to be resilient to shocks, to unexpected Black Swans or whatever colour future challenges might look like. We witness this tragedy of the pandemic. Something else might come. The world is becoming very complex. So I think the art of what NATO has been doing, and also, the measure of our success over time as I mentioned before, is the capacity to always broaden the conversation about the definition of security at one specific point in time, anticipating things that might arise, and be prepared, sorry to say, for the worst. Because that's the essence of a political, military alliance like NATO. So, I mentioned resilience earlier. I strongly believe also coming from our region, and knowing that there are some structural weaknesses and there are some problems that we see as we speak. We see sometimes how fragile we are to disinformation and fake news. We see also the fact that sometimes there is, you know, discontent about the way in which capitalist and representative democracies do work for the citizens. These are issues, it's not for NATO to solve those, but I'm saying that this trepidation of the world is also trepidation of the very system we believe in. So permanent investment in our fundamental values, in our capacity to be ahead of the curve, and be ready. This is, I think, the way we should go about it. Including new technologies that will be basically changing not only the way in which we work, we live, human species or climate change, I'll come back to that, but also the way in which we define security, and this is one of the most important, and exceptionally rapid transformation that we are

witnessing as we speak. This is probably the most condensed period of modern history that we have ever witnessed. So, buckle up. Good news that NATO is here and we're here to stay.

Now when it comes to the pandemic. We have to recognise that the first moment of the impact of the pandemic there was a sort of a tendency for nations to withdraw towards, let's say, more narrow definitions of national interest. And, of course, after that, we started to realise that we cannot do it alone. And then nations including NATO allies rediscovered the fact that NATO has instruments and strategic airlift, that we have capacity of logistics, that our military medical staff and our logistics are just the best thing in the world. And we have seen, you know, more than half a million of our troops in NATO countries coming to the rescue being together with the civilian response and to the other heroes, on the thing. What we are doing now we are preparing for the second way we have a stockpile, we have developed an operational plan for doing this, we'll see how things... will distribution of the vaccine. Thanks God, the good news on that front. So, I just want to reassure you that we are on top of our game and we are ready to play the part the nations will ask us to be playing, in making sure that we continue to be useful, practical and show solidarity amongst ourselves and our partners, and our partners as well.

Now, speaking of the question of the Arctic that's a sort of very important question because on the one side it tackles on climate change. At a NATO we look at climate change, also from a security perspective. Because, floods, you know, melting of the ice or on the other opposite, lots of wreckage. Lots of tension. Lots of competition for **water resources**, for **food supply**. All these things are very important. But NATO has taken, and our military colleagues, our military commanders are working as we speak on something which is a 360 degree analysis, all threats coming from all directions, geographical directions, including the North. The east of course continues to be important. The South is very important, but also the outer space. NATO has declared space as an operation domain. From cyberspace. From New technologies. So, the Arctic is becoming, or becoming again, a place of great power competition, a place where we see Russia, placing, you know, fresh equipment investing in their capabilities for up north. We also see China coming closer to this, we also have a number of NATO allies. NATO doesn't have as we speak, a policy for the Arctic, but we have many important allied nations that are part of that conversation. So, I do believe that the Arctic, the 360 degrees analysis about security will continue to be our game. We're seeing the future of things evolve. But let me assure you because you put this question from Germany, that we are very much interested in making sure that

the east, the north or the south, and of course, everything in between is very much on our front burner, and we are ready to making sure that our security is covered from all directions from all possible threats or enemies or rivals.

~~Moderator~~ Kristine Blumstein (Moderator): Thank you very much. I think that's a good look at the way that NATO is relevant and is essential for the many of the challenges that we are facing. And you've also done a very extensive job of showing the unpredictability of the challenges we would face. If you had a 30 second answer, what is the thing that you think is on the horizon that we're not thinking about enough, that I mean we've done a big thing, but what is the one thing that we should think about more that we haven't done thus far.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană: I think we have to pay a lot of attention to the intersection between artificial intelligence and data between quantum computing and biotechnology. I think that the intersection the transversal connections between these things that usually we treat them separately. I think there is a possibility for a combination between these three, and other technological revolution main vectors, to interact in ways that we could be even surprised by the speed of the transformation that they will bring. They would bring opportunities like always, innovation and breakthroughs in science is always good. But being in the business of preparing for the worst, we have to look to the other side of the of the coin. So this is where if you want my, my, not concern, but I think where we could see the fastest, most complex and far reaching consequences of breakthroughs in some things that will change dramatically the way in which human species operates works and sees also national security and international security.

~~Moderator~~ Kristine Blumstein (Moderator): Thank you very much. That's a very sobering national comment at the same time it's also something for all of the allies and especially the young people who are inventing things and studying within universities to think carefully so that we do have the solutions and capacities to take these on as an alliance on both sides of the Atlantic and globally with available partners.

Thank you very much, Deputy Secretary General for joining us today for this conversation for sharing your thoughts and for inspiring our thought.

Item 23



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO2030-Safeguardingpeacein  
an unpredictableworld

Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Sciences PO Youth  
& Leaders Summit

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18 Jan. 2021 -

| Last updated: 18 Jan. 2021 19:43

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(As delivered)

Thank you so much and good afternoon to you all in Paris – or wherever you  
and yourselves in these Corona-times.

And thank you Dean Letta, dear Enrico, for inviting me to speak at the  
International Sciences Po Youth and Leaders Summit.

It is actually a special pleasure to address one of France's top  
educational institutions. Because France is a key NATO ally.

A founding member of our Alliance.

And for over seventy years, it has played a crucial role in safeguarding peace.

When I look back to my own years as a student at the University of Oslo,  
the world was a very different place.

In 1987, I wrote my thesis on 'Macroeconomic planning under uncertainty' - on  
how to manage

fluctuating oil revenues.

Little did I know then about what 'uncertainty' would look like today.

It was the time of the Cold War. The time when NATO had to focus on a single  
adversary: the Soviet Union.

And when the line between war and peace  
was clearer. Today, this is a more blurred  
line.

We need to deal with multiple threats. Coming from state and non-state actors.

And from multiple directions – on land, at sea, in the air, in space and in cyber  
space.

Our adversaries challenge us using bombs and aircraft. But also bots and algorithms. In this more unpredictable world, we face a more assertive Russia.

Brutal terrorist groups like ISIS. More sophisticated cyber-attacks.

Intensifying geopolitical competition, with the rise of China. Potentially dangerous new technologies.

Disruptions due to climate change. And deadly viruses.

For NATO, this means we need to be prepared for any threat. And any challenge. At any time. And this is actually what we are doing.

Let me give you some examples.

After years of cutting defence spending, all Allies are investing more in defence. For the first time, we have deployed combat-ready forces to the east of our Alliance in response to Russia's aggressive actions.

We are working together to deal with the security impact of the rise of China and new technologies.

And we have designated cyber space and space as operational domains. And our militaries are supporting civilian efforts to counter the coronavirus.

So NATO is doing more. But the world is moving faster than ever before. So we need to adapt even faster.

That is why NATO leaders asked me to conduct a reflection on the future of the Alliance. It is why I launched the NATO 2030 initiative.

And why engaging with tomorrow's leaders, like you, is so valuable.

Because you were born into this unpredictable world. You have the greatest stake in our security. And you must have your say in the future of NATO.

So I have appointed a group of emerging, young leaders from across the Alliance to advise me on NATO 2030.

They will share their ideas with me in early February.

At the same time, NATO will host ten prestigious universities - including Sciences Po - to compete in

NATO's first ever policy hackathon, to develop disruptive ideas on NATO's future. My conversation with you today is part of my broader engagement with young people, civil society, and the private sector. It will help me formulate my recommendations on NATO 2030, which I will present at the next NATO Summit in Brussels later this year.

NATO 2030 has three priorities:

To keep our Alliance militarily strong. Make it politically stronger. And ensure it takes a more

global approach. Let me

take each of these in turn.

So first, for a strong military Alliance, we have to invest.

To have the right forces with the right equipment. And we have to keep our technological edge.

To remain competitive in a more competitive world.

But to have strong militaries, we also need

strong societies. That is why boosting

resilience is a key task for NATO.

We need more robust infrastructure.

Power grids, telecommunications – including 5G, ports, airports, roads and railways.

And we need safer and more diverse supply lines. For example for fuel, food and as we have seen recently, for medical equipment.

Resilience is a collective effort.

And it requires continued cooperation with partners like the European Union. Together, we must do more to identify and address gaps in our resilience.

This means we need to take into account the risks related to foreign investments and foreign control of our critical assets, infrastructure and technologies.

Decisions on investments and ownership are not just financial or economic. We should not let short term economic gains undermine long term security interests.

The second priority of NATO 2030 is to strengthen NATO as a political alliance. NATO is the only place where Europe and North America come together every single day. It is a unique political platform.

We should use this more to discuss issues that affect our security, such as the consequences of climate change. And to coordinate the use of our military, economic and political tools more effectively.

This unique platform is also the best venue to address our differences. Because 30 Allies don't always agree on everything.

But when we disagree, we discuss.

And look for ways to solve our differences together.

That is what we have always done.

And that is what we are doing today.

For example, to deal with tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. NATO provides the platform for Greece and Turkey to come together. We have developed a mechanism between the two Allies.

To help prevent dangerous incidents and accidents.

And to pave the way for diplomatic discussions to settle the underlying disputes.

The third priority for NATO 2030 is to ensure our Alliance takes a more global approach. NATO should remain a regional organisation for Europe and North America.

But the challenges we face are global. From terrorism to nuclear proliferation. Pandemics

to disinformation  
campaigns.

And of course the return of great power competition, with the rise of China.

China is not an adversary and its rise presents opportunities for our  
economies and our trade. But there are also serious challenges.

China has the world's second largest defence budget.

It continues to invest massively in  
military modernisation. And China  
does not share our values.

It does not  
respect human  
rights. It  
bullies other  
countries.

And tries to undermine the international rules-based order.

Neither America nor Europe can deal with such challenges  
on their own. That is why I don't believe in America alone.

Just as I don't believe in Europe alone.

I believe in America and Europe together.

Because together in NATO, we represent half of the  
world's economic might. And half of the world's military  
might.

So we must adopt a more  
global approach. And build a  
community of democracies.

Together with existing partners, like Australia, Japan, New Zealand  
and South Korea. And possibly new ones, like Brazil and India.

We must step up to defend our values and protect our way of life.

Dear students,

I started by telling you about my  
university thesis. On the  
uncertainty created by fluctuating  
oil prices.

The message of my thesis was that we cannot get  
rid of uncertainty. But we can find a way to  
manage uncertainty.

Today, this same message is true when it

comes to our security. We do not know what the next crisis will be.

So we have to be prepared for the unforeseen. Therefore, we need a strategy to deal with uncertainty.

We have one.

That strategy is NATO. All for one, one for all.

So that regardless of what happens, we can keep our

nations safe and free. Thank you and I look forward to

your questions.

Enrico Letta [Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA) at SciencesPo in Paris]: Thank you very much, dear Secretary General, dear Jens, for your introductory remarks, for having focused on NATO 2030 as a key point of our discussion. Thank you for sharing with us some of the ideas around this perspective.

We have some questions. I start by reading the questions and I would like, of course, to ask you to answer these questions. The first one is from Ana Lucia. The question is about, I think we will pose this question, the same question this afternoon to your good friend Josep Borrell to listen also his answer. And the question from Ana Lucia is: what is NATO's view in regards to the prospect of a stronger European Security Union? We know very well that the debate in Europe about strategic autonomy is a debate that is crossing debate with the future of NATO and NATO 2030 discussion. So, I think maybe it is the best way to start our interaction, and the question from Ana Lucia is the perfect kick-off. I give you the floor.

Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: I strongly welcome efforts by the European Union to strengthen its work when it comes to defence. That has actually been something that NATO has called for, for many, many years. Because if more EU efforts on defence means increased defence investments, then of course, that's something we welcome. And I believe that more efforts by EU on defence will require more investments. And that's absolutely in line with what NATO has been asking for, for many, many years. And we will welcome that. The same increased EU efforts on defence will help to develop new capabilities, also available for NATO Allies – also, something we have been calling for many, many times and we welcome those efforts by the European Union.

And I also think that EU efforts on defence will be important for another reason, and that is that it will hopefully be a way, at least that's a stated goal of these efforts, to address the fragmentation of the European defence industry. That's politically very sensitive, but it is important. Just to give you one example, in the United States, they have many, many battle tanks and they have only one type of main battle tank. So, the cost of maintenance, development, training, spare parts, goes down because you have the economy of scale, many tanks, same type: low cost per unit. In Europe, there are much fewer battle tanks and there are nine different. So, the cost of maintenance, training, spare parts, all that increases. The unit cost goes up. So this fragmentation, the lack of ability to develop one system adds very much to the cost of providing defence in Europe.

And battle tanks is only one example. My good friend, Josep Borrell, has a long list and he uses this example many, many times of many other capabilities: ships, planes, drones. All over, you have the same problem of lack of economy of scale because of the fragmentation of the European defence industry. So, not only do they spend too little, but what they get out of that is also much too little, because the cost is so high because of the fragmentation.

So, I believe that EU efforts on defence – and that's the stated goal – will address these challenges: too few capabilities, too much fragmentation, too little spending. So, in that sense and in that way, EU efforts on defence is something I really, really welcome, support and have actually called for, for many years.

But, we have to also know and recognise that EU efforts on defence cannot replace NATO. Should not compete with NATO, can never be an alternative to NATO. Partly because less than 50 percent of the people living in NATO live in an EU country; less than 50 percent of GDP in NATO comes from an EU country. And we need to, of course, mobilise 100 percent of our resources and protect 100 percent of the people. And only 20 percent of NATO's defence expenditure comes from EU members, from NATO EU members.

So, EU efforts cannot replace, EU cannot defend Europe. NATO is, for the NATO members in Europe, the bedrock for our security. This is partly about money. 20 percent of defence expenditure comes from EU Allies. It's also partly about geography. Norway in the north, Turkey in the south, and in the west, of course, the United States, Canada, but also the United Kingdom, are critical for European security, for the defence of Europe.

And then lastly, this is also about politics, because any attempt to divide

Europe from North America to increase the distance, to go alone will not only weaken NATO, but it will divide Europe.

So, I don't believe in America alone, I don't believe in Europe alone, I believe in North America and Europe together. And as long as we stand together, we are able to deal with any threats and any challenges. Alone, we are weak. Together we are stronger.

Enrico Letta: Thank you. There are other questions on the same topic, so I would like to put them together, Miruna, Luis and Yohana: the questions are, first of all, on the on the topic of burden-sharing, you just mentioned this topic. What are, in your view, the steps to have a more concrete burden-sharing, which timing? Another point is about: is there the possibility to have cooperation with different missions? What domains for the European Union and which ones for NATO, for instance? And the other one is about the structural changes: do you see the need of structural institutional reforms at NATO level in the relationship with the European Union and in the way to organise a more effective institutional framework for the cooperation between the European Union and NATO?

Jens Stoltenberg: I think it's always important to have an open mind and also look into structural issues. And, actually, over the last years we have been able to lift NATO-EU cooperation to unprecedented levels. I signed, with the former presidents of the European Union, President Donald Tusk and President Jean-Claude Juncker, back in 2016. And then later on in 2018 . . . I think it was, two joint declarations outlining 74 different areas where Europe, EU and NATO can work more together.

And we are now stepping up when it comes to cyber, maritime exercises and in many other areas, we are working more closely together, Europe – or EU – and NATO than we have ever done before. And that's not strange because more than 90 percent of the people living in EU live in a NATO country. So, of course, it makes . . . and we share the same neighbourhood, we share many of the

same threats and challenges. Of course, it makes a lot of sense that we work together, despite the fact that we are two different organisations and of course, also covering some different responsibilities.

So, we should always look into how we can further strengthen, how we can further develop our cooperation and partnership. And I'm proud and I know that this is also something both High Representative Vice-President Josep Borrell, who will speak later on to you, but also President Ursula von der Leyen, President Charles Michel, they also support this idea of strengthening further the cooperation between NATO and the European Union.

Part of that can also, of course, be a structural discussion. I'm just afraid to make structure the most important thing. We have structures. We have institutions. So, what we need is political will and the strength to implement actions. So, I'm not against structural changes. I'm only a bit afraid of making the structures the main issue instead of the content – what we actually do together – the main issue. And that has been the focus of the leadership in EU and me.

I recently, for instance, as the first Secretary General of NATO ever, met with a whole College of EU Commissioners. President von der Leyen invited me, and that was a great honour to meet them all, discuss, and of course, what NATO does matters for the EU in many ways and vice versa on military mobility, transportation, resilience, telecommunications.

All that is important for the EU, but also important for NATO. And, of course, it matters that we coordinate as much as possible.

Then burden-sharing was one of the issues. Burden-sharing is important. And I think we have to understand that different US presidents have stated again and again that it is unfair that 70 percent of NATO's defence expenditure comes from the United States. And as I said, 20 percent from EU NATO Allies and then the rest from countries like the United Kingdom, Turkey, Canada, Norway and so on, non-EU European countries and Canada, while 50 percent of NATO's GDP comes from non-US Allies.

It was actually President Obama who was very strong on this back at the NATO Summit in 2014, where all NATO Allies agreed that we should spend more. The good news is that we have followed up on the commitment we made in 2014. So, now all NATO Allies have invested more and have added extra. We still have a long way to go, but more Allies now meet the 2 percent guideline than ever before - up from three in 2014 to 10 now. So, that's a huge difference. And the timeline,

which was also part of the question, is that we decided in 2014 to move towards spending 2 percent of GDP on defence within a decade, meaning 2024.

So, burden-sharing is important. The good news is that we are making progress and that's also part of the adaptation, to reenergise the strength of NATO.

Let me add one more thing and then I promise to stop! Is that, of course, the incoming Administration offers a unique opportunity to revitalise, to reenergise the cooperation - North America-Europe, in NATO, and I look forward to working with the next president, President Biden, on especially these issues.

Enrico Letta: Thank you, we have many questions on the US, on President Biden, I will leave this question maybe for a second part of our discussion, because there was an interesting question on Russia and I would like to ask you: NATO constantly expanded to countries from the former Soviet sphere of influence, asks Renaud. What do you respond to those who consider that that is a fuel to Russian nationalism? So the relationship with Russia and the relationship with countries that were part of the USSR. And, if I may, add a question. The question is about also the frozen conflicts on the borders of Russia, ie, you mentioned your thesis. I have to mention my Ph.D. thesis. In this period, we were, during the Nagorno Karabakh explosion of the conflict and Nagorno Karabakh is since then, and it is still one of these conflicts. In the last months, not only frozen, but also very, very hot conflict. What do you think about all these frozen conflicts? Because we have, we had, in these years – in South Ossetia or in Donbas, more and more parts of these former USSR regions that are today in this very difficult situation. Do you see any possibilities to overcome these complicated issues? Do you see a role for NATO? Do you see other exit strategies? The topic is a very hot one.

Jens Stoltenberg: Yes, absolutely. First, on this issue about NATO enlargement and whether that has fuelled Russian nationalism, as if, in a way – and I've heard that question phrased in different ways many times – as if, in a way, the enlargement of NATO has been some kind of aggressive action against Russia; has justified Russia's use of force against other countries, like you mentioned, Donbas and Georgia and so on. And, as if the enlargement of NATO is a kind of unacceptable, assertive behaviour of NATO.

I think we have to start with the basics. The basics is that all countries in Europe have signed the Helsinki Final Act - and also many other documents - which clearly states that all nations have the sovereign right of choosing their own path. And, to be honest, for me, you don't need the Helsinki Final Act to agree

with that. It's so obvious that sovereign nations should have and must have the right to decide their own path, including what kind of security arrangements they want to be part of, or not want to be part of.

So, the whole idea that, in a way, NATO has been very assertive, aggressive by moving eastwards, by enlarging with countries that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact: Poland, Hungary, at that time Czechoslovakia - Czech Republic and Slovakia - and many other countries in Eastern and Central Europe. And including some former countries which used to be republics or part of the Soviet Union - the Baltic countries.

You have to understand that that's sovereign decisions by them. It's not NATO forcing its way eastwards. It's these countries that, through democratic processes, decide that they want to be members of NATO. And, then NATO's door is open. We will never force a country to join. So, when our good friends and neighbours, Finland or Sweden have, for decades, decided they don't want to be members of NATO, we totally respect that. But when countries like Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and many others, Romania, decide that they want to be members, of course, if they meet the NATO standards, they should be allowed to be members.

And the most important thing is that whether these countries are going to be members of NATO or not, is for NATO and the country to decide.

Russia has no right to try to intervene or to block or to stop the membership of a sovereign nation into NATO. And sometimes I use my own country as an example. Because the idea is that since Russia or since Moscow don't like, or dislike, that Lithuania joined NATO, they should never have been allowed to join. Well, if you apply the same thinking on my own country, Norway, we joined in 1949. Norway's a neighbour of Russia. Russia didn't, or the Soviet Union at that time, didn't like that Norway joined. Stalin actually expressed clearly that he wanted Norway to stay out of NATO. But, luckily, the leadership in NATO at that time, in Paris, in London, in Washington and elsewhere, they said, 'No, Norway, the neighbour of Russia, has the sovereign right to decide its own path. They want to become a member. They meet the NATO standards. So we welcome them.' And that's exactly the same. We have said to other independent countries, for instance, the Baltic countries, when they wanted to join some years ago.

So, for me, it's almost a provocation, just to, in a way, question the right of sovereign nations to decide their own future. That's in a way to accept

sphere of influences, it's to accept that big nations have a kind of say over neighbours. I don't want to live in that kind of world, because I'm coming from a small country, neighbouring a big country. And if we accept that big countries can decide what small neighbours can do or not do, then we're back to the old times where the big powers decided over the small countries. We don't want that kind of world. We want a world built on rules, on respect for nations, regardless of the size of their armed forces or their economies or whatever.

So, this is about fundamental principles. And if we start to compromise on that, we are in a very dangerous path towards a place we should not end.

And that's my answer also when it comes to, for instance ... that's the kind of bridge to some of the issues you raised about the frozen conflicts. Georgia wants to become a member of NATO. And that's not for Russia to stop. Whether Georgia becomes a member of NATO or not is for Georgia and NATO Allies to decide, and only them. Because anything else would be to infringe on the sovereign rights of sovereign independent countries. And then, of course, you can have different arguments, but it's not for Russia to decide what Georgia is to do. It's for Georgia and NATO Allies.

And, therefore, what they have done in Abkhazia, in South Ossetia, violating their territorial integrity, the sovereignty of Georgia, an independent country, is unacceptable.

The same with the Ukraine, of course, illegal annexation of Crimea, destabilising Donbas, eastern Ukraine. It's violating absolute fundamental principles in the way we should create a peaceful, stable world.

NATO's role is to provide support to these countries: capacity-building, help with reforms, NATO Allies by training, we have presence in different ways in both Georgia and Ukraine. But, of course, we need to find political solutions. Different conflicts, Moldova, Nagorno Karabakh you mentioned, different conflicts, but the main message is that we should respect the sovereignty. And, of course, we should also look for political solutions. And NATO supports the different efforts to find political negotiated solutions to the different conflicts, more or less frozen.

Enrico Letta: There are two questions on the US and on the new President and the new US Administration. Two students, Anna and Martha. First question is, is exactly about the fact that

Trump was not a great friend of multilateralism, we know very well this point. But we have to say that maybe NATO was the only multilateral forum where he was a little bit more involved and he was not only involved, but he was asking a bigger involvement, engagement, as you said, from the different Allies and from the European Allies. So how do you foresee the change and the role of the new Administration, President Biden's Administration? What do you expect? And the second point is related. That's another interesting question, Martha, saying that: given that the threat to stability in the US is increasingly internal, how would increased defence investment effectively address this threat and its causes? So, do you see a deal, or a contradiction in US between the need for more internal defence investment and the need for the US to be present at world level? What do you think about these two very large and very complicated issues?

Jens Stoltenberg: First of all, I have to clearly state that it is not for me to speak on behalf of an incoming new Administration in the United States of America, a NATO Ally. What I can say is that I look forward to working with President Joe Biden when he assumes office in a few days this week. And also with the incoming new Vice President, Kamala Harris.

I spoke with Joe Biden after the elections and I know him as a very strong supporter of NATO, of multilateral institutions, of multilateral cooperation. And he knows NATO very well because he has served as the Vice President. And I had the honour of working with him in that capacity and also in my previous position as Prime Minister of Norway, I had the privilege of working with then Vice President Joe Biden and also in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. So, he knows Europe, he knows NATO. He has publicly over many, many years been a strong supporter of the transatlantic bond. And I'm absolutely confident that when he assumes office, that will provide a platform to reenergise, to revitalise the transatlantic bond.

Of course, that doesn't mean that there will be zero challenges and no problems, but the value of sitting around the same table is recognised. And I think we have to understand that NATO is unique because it's the only institution where North America and Europe meet every day. We have, of course, many ministerial meetings, we have summits, but we have this day-to-day presence in the NATO headquarters with the political cooperation, the political staff, the ambassadors. We have the Command Structures, the NATO bases, the NATO Missions and Operations in Afghanistan, in Europe, in many other places, bringing together

North America and Europe on a daily basis, on all levels, bringing us together. And that in itself creates a partnership, a friendship, a trust which is of great importance for the transatlantic bond, the key, the bedrock of the transatlantic bond. And I'm absolutely confident that he and his Administration will build on that.

Then, burden-sharing. So, burden-sharing is part of that, because we have to realise that there is a very strong bipartisan support for NATO in the United States, Democrats and Republicans. And when you look at the opinion polls, actually now there is record high support for NATO in the United States. And I'm absolutely confident that one of the reasons we see this is that they see that European Allies and Canada are stepping up when it comes to burden-sharing. We still have a long way to go, but we have taken it seriously, not only to please the United States, but because we see that we live in a more unpredictable, more dangerous world, every day, everything from ISIS, changing global balance of power, cyber threats – so we need to invest more in our security. And that is recognised in the United States. And I'm absolutely certain that also the incoming Biden Administration will, of course, be focussed on burden-sharing. You have to remember that Joe Biden, he was Vice President when President Obama made this an important issue at the NATO Summit in 2014, when we made the decision to start to increase defence spending and European Allies have delivered.

Then, I think that, of course, there are many domestic challenges in all NATO-Allied countries and over the last weeks, we have seen clearly exposed some of those challenges in our biggest Ally, the United States. But I think it's absolutely possible for the United States, as it is for other Allies, to both address domestic challenges, unrest, whatever it is, and at the same time see the value of protecting ourselves against external threats and challenges. And actually, if anything, I think that the more we are able to prove to the United States that NATO is relevant for them and we are striving for fairer burden-sharing the more support and the stronger support we will have from across the United States to our Alliance.

So, I don't accept in a way the contradiction between either being focussed on domestic challenges, which of course is important for all Allies, also the United States, and/or being focussed on external threats and challenges, which is the main responsibility of NATO. If anything, I think that the more successful we are in showing that NATO delivers, in NATO we stand together, we help each other, it also helps the United States to address some of the challenges they see

domestically.

Let me just add one thing, and that is that the rise of China. The change in the global balance of power makes NATO even more important for the United States. China will soon have the largest economy in the world. They already have the second largest defence budget. They are leading in some technologies which are also important for defence. We know, disruptive technologies as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, facial recognition, all of this is also important when it comes to future defence systems. And, therefore the United States needs friends. And in NATO they have 29 friends and Allies. And if they are concerned about the size of China, then it's even more important to keep friends and Allies close, because together we are 50 percent of GDP, 50 percent of the world's military might.

Enrico Letta: Thank you. There are two questions on the Mediterranean, on Turkey and the Mediterranean. One from Aurelie and the other one is from Denise. Aurelie on Turkey. I think you are expecting a question on Turkey. Turkey is incontournable in this present situation. So what are your explanations on what will be the future of relationship within NATO Allies? Turkey is facing a period in which relationship with the European Union, relationship with the US are very tense.

What . . . how do you see the situation there? How do you feel the future? And Aurelie asks also: how is your personal diplomatic relationship with Erdogan? And so this is on Turkey. And the other one on the Mediterranean, I think it's related: is there the possibility to have more focus from NATO on the southern flank? And would such a commitment dilute the Alliance's attention to the eastern flank? In a few words, is there a contradiction in being involved in the south, in the Mediterranean and in the rest of the scenarios?

Jens Stoltenberg: Let me start with the last part of that question. Again, NATO has to be ready and NATO is ready and capable of dealing with threats from whatever direction. We cannot focus on one direction. We need to be prepared for threats, challenges from the east, from the south, from the west, from the north. And also from cyberspace. And, therefore, we cannot accept and we should never end in a situation where we have to choose between either focussing in that direction or in the other direction, because there will be surprises and we cannot tell from where the next crisis will happen.

Just to illustrate, you know, I guess there were a lot of analyses and assessments and intelligence in the 90s about what was the most risky, what was the most

likely attack against NATO. I think hardly anyone imagined that the biggest attack on NATO was going to happen in the United States, against the Twin Towers and Pentagon and the United States. So actually, that happened in the West, organised from Afghanistan in the Far East, or at least the East. So, I'm saying this because we cannot foresee the future and, therefore, we have to be prepared for the unforeseen in all directions. And that mind has to be there, because if not, we will be too narrowminded and we will not be able to respond in a proper way.

Second, it's a bit artificial, although I agree that something is north and something is south and west and east. I agree that that's geographical directions, but from a security perspective, it's a bit artificial to put that into these categories. Because when you speak about the east, we often think about Russia. And we see a more assertive Russia in the east, but we see them also in the south. We see much more Russian presence now in North Africa, in Libya, in other parts of North Africa, in the Middle East, in Syria. We see them in the north, in the Arctic, in the Polar seas, in the Barents Sea with new military bases, with more naval presence, new submarines. And these submarines, they can travel around. So, if we are concerned about Russia, then Russia is also in the north, in the south and also sometimes in the west. So, my message is that NATO has to be able to address challenges from all directions at the same time and they actually merge, they go together, because, for instance, cyberspace is all over.

Then on Turkey. There is no way to hide, and I have never tried to do so, that there are disagreements and differences within NATO. And Allies have expressed their concerns about different issues, like, for instance, the Turkish decision to acquire the Russian air defence system, S-400, or the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, and other issues. I have raised those concerns myself, and I had many discussions in Ankara about these issues and expressed my concerns, for instance, about the consequences of the Turkish decision to acquire S-400.

But, I believe ... at the same time, I believe that our task is to look for ways forward to address these concerns and to make sure that NATO is the platform we actually are, providing a meeting place for Allies to sit down, discuss, have open, frank discussions, when there are disagreements, to try to find ways forward, positive approaches. And that's exactly what we had done when it comes to the eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, Libya, or other issues. And we have been able to make some progress. For instance, establishing the decontamination mechanism between two NATO Allies, Greece and Turkey, is important,

because, we have seen before - we actually saw in the 1990s that similar tensions between Turkey and Greece in the same area, in the Mediterranean and also in the Aegean Sea, actually led to casualties, to downing of planes, helicopters, and fatalities. We need to avoid these kinds of incidents, accidents now, as we have seen before, because they are dangerous, they can lead to the loss of lives and they can spiral out of control.

And that's exactly why we have established this mechanism at NATO with a hotline between the two countries. They meet, we have technical military communications. They have agreed to cancel some military exercises in the eastern Mediterranean. All of this – and we are looking at how we can expand this mechanism – all of this to reduce risks, for incidents and accidents. We have seen some already, but we need to prevent them from happening again and becoming more serious.

And we also believe that the NATO efforts on military deconfliction is a way to pave the way and help to support political negotiations on the real underlying issues, disagreements, between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. And we have seen also some positive steps in that direction, the resumption of talks between Greece and Turkey.

So, I'm not saying this is easy, but I'm saying that NATO's role is to bring Allies together and look for ways to find solutions. Also, because I think we have to understand that, yes, there are concerns and disagreements, but, at the same time, Turkey is an important Ally. They have the second biggest army in NATO. We can just look at the map. Geography matters. They have a strategic location. The only NATO Ally bordering Iraq and Syria. Have helped us in the fight against terrorism, helped to liberate the territories controlled by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. NATO uses infrastructure in Turkey to support that fight. We have the AWACS surveillance planes flying out of Konya, a Turkish base, helping the Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS. And no NATO Ally hosts more refugees than Turkey and no NATO Ally has suffered more terrorist attacks. So, we need to stand together. Yes, there are differences, but then NATO provides the best platform to sit down and address those differences.

Enrico Letta: There are some questions on climate change. And, of course, it will be one of the topics that, in this Youth & Leaders' Summit, will be focussed, there will be one entire panel on this topic. So, it would be very interesting for us to have your take on that. So, Stanisla, Arnaud, John – different questions but the questions are all focused on the . . . is there a role for NATO in facing issues as

climate change? Is there a strategy in NATO 2030 on these topics? What role can NATO play in cross-border environmental challenges? What is your reaction on these questions?

Jens Stoltenberg: Climate change is extremely important. And climate change is important for many reasons. Also because it affects our security. **Rising sea levels, warmer weather, more extreme weather, more flooding, more wildfires, will directly affect the livelihood of people all over the world.** But it will also be a conflict multiplier. **Force people to move.** Increased competition over scarce resources: **water**, land, and so on. So, in that sense, climate change is also a security issue. And, therefore, NATO has to address climate change.

And NATO 2030 is also about how can NATO adapt, how can NATO respond, how can NATO in a better way deal with the security consequences of climate change? Of course, NATO is not going to, in a way, be the main platform for negotiating climate agreements like the Paris Accord. That's for the UN, that's for those institutions to do. And I think we all should support those efforts, not try to establish competing structures.

But, NATO's responsibility is to address the security consequences of climate change. And that's partly just by analysing, understanding, demonstrating the security consequences. Because that will add to the urgency. That will make it easier for those who are negotiating climate agreements and working for mitigation efforts, measures to reduce emissions. I think that will give them one extra argument. I think they already have more than enough arguments. But, if they need an extra argument in combatting climate change, reducing emissions of greenhouse gases or global warming gases, then security is yet another argument for doing what they are already doing.

So, I think by providing facts, by being transparent, by analysing the problem, the security consequences of climate change, we are helping all those in different countries, in the UN system, in the climate convention to address these issues, and that's one role of NATO.

We also need to understand the problem, because we need, when we do our assessments of threats, of challenges, and adopt our posture and prepare, then we need to understand the consequences of climate change for our military forces and the conflicts we may be faced with in the future. And this is everything from, for instance, the challenges we see emanating from the south, **the instability, migration, refugees**, but also very practical issues. **Rising**

sea levels will affect our naval bases. We already see that in many places in the world. Soldiers are operating out there in extreme weather already, in the High North or in the deserts and the jungles. And of course, equipment dealing with, for instance, extreme heat. We have a Mission in Iraq, they have seen the consequences of extreme heat in Baghdad, in Iraq. So, whatever we do will also have to take into account more wilder weather, extreme weather in different ways. And that will affect the development of capabilities, equipment for our personnel.

And thirdly, NATO could also do its part to try to help reduce emissions. And, therefore, I welcome that we have different programmes in NATO trying to reduce, for instance, the dependence on fossil fuels. Dutch soldiers increasingly use solar panels instead of diesel generators during operations. The United States and Canada are looking at integrating solar panels into their combat gear so as to power their electronic equipment. And all other NATO countries are experimenting with hydrogen fuel cells and batteries to generate and store electricity.

I use these examples to illustrate that, whatever we can do to try to increase energy efficiency of our battleships or our battle tanks or our operations and missions in general will be good for the environment. It will reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, but it will also reduce the vulnerability of our forces. Because we know from many operations, for instance, in Afghanistan, that just the transportation of fossil fuel, of diesel, is actually a very huge, challenging task. And there is a need for a lot of fossil fuels, diesel, to generate, for instance, electricity at the different camps we have.

So, if we are able to switch to other more environmentally renewable, friendly sources of energy, we help to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, CO<sub>2</sub>, global warming gases. But, we also make our forces less vulnerable and more resilient. So, that's a double reason to do exactly that. And we are looking at it. We are working on it. We are stepping up. And NATO 2030 is very much about that.

Enrico Letta: We are approaching the end of our time, our conversation, but of course, there's many questions on China, so I ask you to take the questions together and to try to give a global answer. Robert: what will be the key steps for NATO to build a successful relationship with China? Luis: how can Allies work together within NATO to address the rise and political assertiveness of China? Marlene: What is NATO's role in the South China Sea and East China

Sea disputes? And Stanislas, a more general question: is there . . . do you see a risk that NATO 2030 could further antagonise China? So it's . . . it will be one of the most interesting topics, I have to say that, and I take the opportunity also to announce to our students that March 3, we will dedicate our usual Wednesday to focus on the G20, because G20 this year will be probably the unique opportunity for Chinese leadership, US new leadership and European leadership to be together. And so we will have the Italian Sherpa, the president of the G20 this year, addressing students. And it will be, I think, interesting. I say that because, of course, the relationships between China, US and Europe are probably one of the most interesting focus in this period of Biden taking the lead of the US. So, many questions. What what are your answers?

Jens Stoltenberg: My answer is that China is not an adversary for NATO or to NATO, and actually the rise of China provides a lot of opportunities for all of us, for our economies, for our trade. And we also have to understand that the rise of China has already fuelled a lot of economic growth in Europe, in the United States and all over the world. And, of course, the rise of China has also been very important when it comes to alleviating poverty, because the fact that hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty, has been extremely . . . the rise of China has been extremely instrumental in doing exactly that.

So, I will first recognise that the positive effect, the opportunities of the rise of China. But, at the same time, we have to realise that there are some serious challenges. China is a great power that doesn't share our values. For several centuries, the biggest and strongest power in the world has been a country which has been sharing our values: democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law. For some centuries it was the United Kingdom, then later on the United States of America. But now, soon, the biggest economy in the world will be China. In purchasing-power terms, it has already surpassed the United States. Soon it will also surpass the size of the American economy in market value. So, that's something new.

And the new thing is that the biggest economy in the world, is something we find in a country that doesn't share our values. And we see the way they behave, partly against their own population in Hong Kong, how they treat minorities, or the Uyghurs, millions of people being forced into different kinds of camps, heavy censorship, no freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly. And a brutal social control with these social points, monitoring everything that goes on the Internet, giving awards to those who behave in the right way and punishing

those who behave in the wrong way.

This is an authoritarian system which is using advanced new technologies to monitor, to control their population in a way we have never seen before.

But, we also see how they behave against countries, also not only against their own population, but also against other countries in the world. Australia called for an independent investigation into the sources of COVID-19, or the coronavirus. China has punished them with sanctions or restrictions on trade and so on. Canada, they have arrested Canadian citizens as a kind of punishment for what Canada did in implementing the rule of law in their own country. And I know this myself, because I was Prime Minister in Norway when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident. And they wanted Norway to regret and criticise that decision. And since we didn't do that, they punished us by blocking trade, blocking all political dialogue, blocking all meetings, trying to inflict severe damage on the Norwegian economy as a punishment.

So, they are bullying neighbours, bullying countries all over the world, including, for instance, Norway and that's a behaviour which we have to take very seriously. And, therefore, I think we need to work even more closely with partners, likeminded democracies, as Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Japan. And we have a lot of our partners all over the world, but also looking into whether we can develop new partnerships with, for instance, countries like India or Brazil.

China is also strong militarily. They are developing new nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, second largest defence budget, new naval capabilities, aircraft carriers and so on. And this is something we have to take into account when . . . and they are also leading in many of the technologies which will be important for the future weapons systems, artificial intelligence, facial recognitions and so on.

So, therefore, we need to invest. Therefore, we need to make sure that we maintain the technological edge. And that's exactly what we are doing in NATO, partly due to the shifting global balance of power.

And then we also have to realise the challenges related to our infrastructure, the resilience of our societies. We had a discussion about Huawei, 5G, and we have seen a convergence of minds, positions, views in NATO over just the last year. And we have developed in NATO something we call The Resilience Guidelines, based on requirements for resilience, stating clearly that all Allies have to make sure they have safe and secure telecommunications, roads, airports, all the critical infrastructure. And, therefore, we also need to take into

account the risks related to foreign ownership. And I think we have seen a very important discussion and also development in European countries and the United States, Canada, about the risks related to vulnerabilities in, for instance, 5G networks.

And that links to the question about the South China Sea and the East China Sea. NATO is not going to move into the South China Sea. Some NATO Allies, of course, sail there. It's about freedom of navigation. But, NATO as an alliance is not going to move into the South China Sea. But that's not the issue. The issue is that China is coming closer. We are not going to move in there, but they are coming closer to us: in cyberspace, investing in our infrastructure, in the Arctic, in Africa, and also with weapons systems that can reach all NATO Allies. So, there is no way we can deny or hide or not take into account that there are security consequences of the rise of China that NATO has to address. We will do that in a way which doesn't antagonise or establish a new adversary. But, we need to understand and also address the security consequences of a fundamental shift in the balance of power, which is caused by the rise of China. That is what NATO 2030 is very much about: NATO remaining a regional alliance, but developing a stronger global approach, because the threats and the challenges we face are more and more global. Thank you so much.

Enrico Letta: Thank you. There are many other questions. It is not possible to take all the questions, but I ask you in one minute to say maybe one word on two topics that will be at the very heart of our discussion in these very days, because we will have two panels discussing, debating on space and on cyber. So Lisa and Veronique are asking: space was declared an operational domain in 2019. What concrete steps is NATO undertaking to strengthen its collective space capabilities?

Veronique: responsibilities on space-related questions are extremely widespread over NATO and member states, how can this misalignment be resolved? And on cyber, the topics that Anna and Benji are asking are related to: which kind of steps do you see in the future, I mean, NATO 2030 perspective, for having at the European level and at NATO level an upgrade in the possibility to respond to cyber threats? I'm sorry, because I know we are at the end, but maybe if you give us just some nuances of what you think in these few minutes?

Jens Stoltenberg: First on the cyber. NATO has recognised the importance of cyber over the last years, and more and more so. Not so long time ago, we

actually decided that a cyber-attack can trigger Article Five, meaning that we regard a potential cyber-attack as damaging, as serious, as a conventional attack. So if we have a serious cyber-attack, we can decide to trigger Article 5 – one for all, all for one – as our Collective Defence clause. We don't have to respond in cyber. That's up to us to decide. But, a cyber-attack can trigger Article Five. And that demonstrates the seriousness of a potential cyber-attack. Cyber-attacks take place daily, so we cannot trigger Article 5 every day. But, we send the message that, if needed, we trigger Article 5 as response to a cyber-attack.

Second, we have established cyber as an operational domain alongside land, air and sea. And that's, in a way, to make sure that we have the best way to organise, to plan, to exercise our cyber defences. And it is absolutely impossible to foresee a conflict in the future which doesn't include a cyber dimension, because it is so important for everything we do. And, of course, cyber is also integrated in our other capabilities: our new aircraft, our ships, whatever it is, they have cyber elements. They have cyber as a part of what they do. And, therefore, cyber is extremely important for all our defence capabilities.

We have also created a new Cyberspace Operations Centre and we have established a malware information-sharing platform, where we're also working with the European Union to share a real-time information about malware cyber-attacks. We also have teams where we can deploy, help Allies who are under cyber-attacks.

The last thing I would say is that: perhaps the most important thing is that we share best practices, we help each other and we have big exercises. Because cyber is partly about defending the NATO networks to NATO operations and NATO missions. But, of course, it's also very much about helping Allies to defend their systems. And we do that by sharing information, by conducting exercises and sharing best practices and constantly adapting and improving the way we do cyber defences in NATO.

Sorry, one more last thing, and that is that we have also started to integrate what we call 'national cyber effects', sometimes also referred to as 'offensive cyber' into our planning and our missions and operations. We have seen the importance of these kinds of cyber effects in fighting Daesh/ISIS. NATO Allies were instrumental in attacking the home pages, the networks, the cyber capabilities of Daesh in Iraq and Syria. That was of great importance because Daesh/ISIS used cyber to recruit, to spread their information, to finance and to conduct operations. So be able to penetrate these systems with offensive

cyber is also part of what NATO Allies do and where NATO is working together on these issues.

On space ... what happens in space is important for what goes on on the Earth: communications, GPS, intelligence, surveillance, all of that is dependent on different space capabilities. And you are right that different Allies have a lot of different capabilities. One of the purposes of establishing space as a domain and also strengthening the focus on space in NATO is not for NATO to develop space capabilities, but it is for NATO to make sure that NATO Allies work more closely together, learn from each other, coordinate more their efforts, and that we can share information and support the activities we have with different space capabilities.

So, this is, what should I say, the first steps. We have just recently established a Space Centre at our base in Ramstein. And then we will go step-by-step, filling this framework of space as an operational domain with more and more content. But, it's very much about mobilising, working together with Allies and trying to coordinate their efforts in a better way.

Let me just end by saying that this has been a great honour to address this distinguished audience and to listen to your questions. I hope that at some time I can meet you in person. And, in the meantime, you are more than welcome. And I'm actually looking forward to that SciencesPo will participate in the NATO hackathon, which is, for the first time ever, a way to try to invite students and also then for SciencesPo to take part in developing new ideas, disruptive ideas for NATO and make sure that the younger generation have their say in the development of the future of NATO. But, once again, thank you so much for inviting me. It has been a great, great thing to meet you all. And Enrico, it has been great to see you. See you again and all the best.

Enrico Letta: Thank you very much and thank you for your generosity, you answered 26 questions. So I think it's a record, in one hour. So very, very good. Very good kick-off. Now it's time for panels. And then 4:15 Paris time, we will have Josep Borrell and 5:00 Paris time we will have Florence Parly. Thank you, thank you so much.

Item 24



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Opening remarks

by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on NATO 2030 and the importance of strengthening the transatlantic bond in the next decade and beyond

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04 Feb. 2021 -

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(As delivered)

Thank you so much, Robin. It's great to see you again.  
And good morning North America. And good afternoon Europe.  
Welcome everyone.

Let me start by thanking Chatham House.  
For over a hundred years, your intellectual leadership has helped to guide governments, societies and leaders through constant global change.  
So, therefore, you are the ideal partner for today's event.

Like many of you here today, I became interested in politics at an early age. Because I wanted to work for a better, safer world.

I grew up during the Cold War,  
Always aware of the risk of a nuclear conflict. So I  
protested against nuclear weapons,  
and celebrated the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.

For so many centuries, conflict was a constant companion in Europe.  
But since the creation of NATO, more than seventy years ago, peace has been preserved and freedom maintained.  
The nations of Europe and North America have stood together. Pledged to defend each other.  
To protect our peoples. And to uphold our values.

That pledge remains.  
But the world has changed.  
And it has become much more unpredictable than when I was growing up.

We don't just face one clear challenge, but multiple,  
complex challenges. From pandemics to infodemics,  
From climate change to disruptive technologies.

And the lines between peace and war, civilian and military,  
state and non-state,  
are increasingly blurred.

To continue adapting our Alliance to this unpredictability, we launched the  
NATO 2030 initiative. This is why we are all here today.  
And why I asked a group of 14 young leaders from across the Alliance to  
advise me on NATO's future.

In addition, students from 10 universities have been competing all week in  
NATO's first policy hackathon.  
And later, you will have the chance to vote for the most innovative ideas.

Today's event is about generating fresh, new thinking about  
the future of NATO. We asked you to look at five areas that  
are vital to our security.

First, we asked you to look at how we can continue to protect our values,  
and the rules-based order that has brought us peace and prosperity for so  
many decades. These values – freedom, democracy, the rule of law – are  
not abstract notions.

They are at the very core of who we are.  
And we got a shocking reminder of this as we watched the attack on the United  
States Congress just a month ago.

That was not only an assault on the heart of  
American democracy. But also on the core values  
of NATO.

President Biden's inauguration on those same steps just two weeks later  
showed the strength of democracy.  
It also showed that we must never take our democracy for granted.

The second area we asked you to look at is resilience. Increasingly, our security does not just rely on strong militaries. We need strong, resilient societies and economies too.

We need more robust infrastructure.

Transport and telecommunications, including 5G and undersea cables. And we need safer and more diverse supply lines.

For fuel, food and medical supplies.

We must do more to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate risks. And hold each other to account.

For example, by screening foreign investment, ownership and control of our critical infrastructure and assets.

Because these are not just economic decisions. They are crucial for our ability to protect ourselves.

We should never trade short-term economic benefit for our long-term security interest.

The third area we asked you to look at was NATO's role in the world. NATO is and will remain a regional alliance of Europe and North America.

But the challenges we face are more and more global. So we need a global outlook.

We need to work even more closely with like-minded partners across the globe to develop a community of democracies.

Like Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

And also to reach out to potential new partners, like Brazil and India.

To contribute to global peace and security, NATO must continue to work with partner nations to protect civilians in war zones and counter-terrorist operations.

NATO is a standard setter in this area.

Because for NATO, national security and human security must always go hand in hand.

Fourth, we asked you to look at the security implications of climate change. Global warming puts pressure on people and resources and makes the world a more dangerous place.

Climate change affects our security.

**And makes it harder for our military forces to keep us safe.**

Therefore, we all have a responsibility to do more to combat climate change. Which is why we are looking at how NATO can play our part in reaching Net Zero.

Finally, we asked you to look at emerging and disruptive technologies. For decades, our technological edge has kept our militaries strong. But today it is being challenged. By countries like Russia and China.

So we must continue to innovate and invest in the right forces with the right capabilities. To remain competitive in a more competitive world.

For all these areas, the ideas you put forward today will help me finalise my recommendations to NATO Leaders at our Summit later this year.

Your generation has the greatest stake in our future. So it is essential that your voices are heard.

This is your chance to shape our agenda for NATO 2030.

So I thank you for your energy, your ideas and your optimism today. We must be bold.

Together, we can make NATO stronger.

To keep our nations safe on both sides of the Atlantic. In a fast-changing world.

I very much look forward to hearing from you.

And I wish all the hackathon teams the very best of luck.

Robin Niblett: Thank you very much, Secretary General thanks for those very important remarks for laying out the scope of the challenge that you set to the NATO Young Leaders to look at the diversity of the challenges and risks, which as you described cover a spectrum that no longer has some of perhaps the simplicity of the Cold War challenges that faced NATO in that time.

We want to draw in some questions right now, we've got about 15 minutes to be able to get some questions over to you and points back.

What I wanted to do though if I may is start with a question on behalf of one of the young members of the Common Futures Conversation, a network, actually as Chatham House, has helped convene with the support of the Robert Bosch foundation and a number of other organisations, that looks, brings young Europeans and young Africans together, to think about their common future, and [...] from Nigeria, wanted me to pose the following question to you.

So if I could kick off with this one, and his question goes as follows:

Africa has a security challenge which needs both internal and external support. NATO has already established a working relationship with the African Union. What role will NATO play in curbing the insecurity that has been plaguing the continent, beyond 2021. Could you share any thoughts on that specific question first, please.

Secretary General: For NATO it is extremely important to work with the partners in our neighbourhood, and Africa is a neighbour of the North Atlantic region where NATO operates. NATO is and will remain regionalized for North America and Europe.

But of course, what happens in Africa matters for our security.

So therefore, we strongly believe in the importance of working with partners, countries but also organisations like the African Union, and as you just alluded to NATO has already established cooperation with the African Union. We also work with the UN, so we help for instance with the training of peacekeeping forces, capacity building, how to deal with things like improvised explosive devices, how to protect the peacekeeping troops in their missions and operations, including in Africa.

Then we also have some partner nations through something we call the Mediterranean Dialogue. We work with countries like Tunisia, Morocco, other partners in Northern Africa. I also recently met the President of Mauritania, we are of course concerned about the situation in the Sahel region, and NATO allies are helping supporting, to fight international terrorism, different terrorist groups in the region and NATO is also looking into how we can step up and do more both when it comes to exercises, capacity building and training.

So in NATO we will often say that when our neighbours are stable we are more secure. So, I think it is extremely important that we work with Africa, with African

Union, with countries in Africa and in particular our partners, to support, to help the efforts to fight instability, and to fight international terrorism, and work in other ways with African countries.

Robin Niblett: Thank you very much and I think with your commentary about the cascading effects of climate insecurity, we could easily see the relationship with African countries in that focus growing.

I'm just going to turn to a couple of questions that I see here, we've got a huge amount coming in already as we might imagine into our Q&A. But, [...] if I can stick with the sort of international NATO, part of your remarks that you gave here, NATO in the World, your third topic, he says here:

Which NATO model are we heading towards, given the strategic rivalry between the US and China will NATO be more of a global alliance, or will collective defence against threats, for example from Russia, continue to be central. We know certainly during the Trump administration Secretary General there are quite a bit of emphasis about turning towards the risks from China, which I think you did allude to in your remarks. But do you see, as he asked this question is there going to be a new model where NATO becomes part of that US- China rivalry?

Secretary General: We don't regard China as an adversary. And there are opportunities, connected to the rise of China, the strong economic growth has helped to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and of course the strong economic growth in China over decades have also been important for NATO allies, important for our export markets, our economies. Having said that, at the same for that there are some challenges for our security.

Soon, China will have the biggest economy in the world.

China is an authoritarian society, which does not share our values, we see that in the way they cracked down on democracy, human rights activists in Hong Kong, how they deal with minorities, or oppress minorities in their own country like Uighurs, and also the way that they have threatened Taiwan or the way they actually behave for instance in the South China Sea.

China is also now, investing heavily in new modern military capabilities, including new nuclear capabilities and China is present in NATO countries, investing heavily in infrastructure. We had an important discussion about 5g and I think we've seen a convergence of use within NATO realizing

that, for instance, 5g network is crucial, not only for our economies but also for the resilience of our societies. And fundamentally about the security of our societies,

And NATO is a unique platform to bring together North America and Europe to address these challenges because in security, science matters. And, of course, NATO is important for Europe but the NATO is also important for America and especially addressing the complex security consequences of the rise of China. It matters for the United States that they have 29, friends and Allies in NATO.

Let me just end by saying that, for me, this is not about making NATO, a global Alliance. NATO will remain an Alliance with members from Europe and North America and our collective security guarantees, they apply for North America and Europe. But the threats we face in this region, they are becoming more and more global terrorism, cyber, space, and the rise of China, these are global challenges that affect our regional security.

Therefore, being a regional Alliance, we need a global approach, and this is also what we address in NATO2030.

Robin Niblett: Thank you for that important term distinctions, and as you said, a North Atlantic Alliance in terms of collective security guarantees, but an Alliance that has global interests.

There are a number of questions I'm sort of grouping them together, but [...] in particular, along with others, asking about the dilemma I'm sure you're having to deal with, with two key members, Greece and Turkey, facing quite a serious set of disputes and disagreements including deployment of vessels and so on, in eastern Mediterranean. How are you, as the Secretary General managing this challenge. And how do you see the way forward, to put it bluntly, given both countries' central role for a strong need to go in the future.

Secretary General: It is well known, and it's actually part of what we also addressed in NATO at several occasions that there are differences between NATO Allies and in this case, between two important NATO Allies Greece and Turkey. Both Greece and Turkey are valued Allies. But they disagree on some issues related to the eastern Mediterranean.

I think that NATO's role is to provide the platform to address these differences. When we disagree, when there are differences we need to convene, and to sit

down and to have open and honest discussions about the differences. And that's exactly what we have done.

When it comes to for instance situation the eastern Mediterranean. And therefore we have been able to establish at NATO, what we call a deconfliction mechanism and that's actually military lines of communications, hotline, military technical talks between the Greek and Turkish military personnel here at NATO in Brussels. And by that, reducing the risks of incidents, accidents, between ships, planes in the eastern med, coming from Turkey and Greece.

This is important because in the 1990s where we had similar differences, tensions between Greece and Turkey, we actually saw that that led to casualties to serious incidents that lead to actually fatalities and loss of personnel. We need to prevent that from happening again and that's the reason why we have established this deconfliction mechanism at NATO. This has all helped to pave the way for Greece and Turkey to sit down and re-start what they call exploratory talks on the underlying disagreements.

So, yes, there are concerns but I think the most important thing that NATO can do is to try to find ways, step by step, not only complain about the concerns and express concerns, but also find a positive approach, a way forward and over the last weeks or months we have seen some important steps in the right direction, proving that NATO has an important role to play, Also when allies disagree as the differences in the eastern Mediterranean..

Robin Niblett: Thank you. We have quite a few questions coming in on the cyber question as well. I'm just looking here. Obviously you highlighted this as I think your fifth or one of your key topics in your list for the young group to focus on.

And I can see [...] has asked a question about whether NATO, having created its cyberspace Operations Centre in Belgium. This is a big discussion about broadening the Article V commitment to include significant cyber attacks and he asks, What do you consider a significant cyber attack? I think there are a couple of other questions about cyber security but let's focus on that one first if we could. How are you going to be able to keep that predictability the deterrent effect of NATO alive in this cyber era in particular.

Secretary General: So we will never give a potential adversary or enemy the privilege of telling them exactly when we're going to trigger Article V. That's for us to decide based on a concrete assessment of a concrete situation. But

what we have clearly stated is that is that a cyberattack might trigger Article V.

So if we assess it, deem it, as serious enough, then we can trigger Article V, meaning that then we have all NATO Allies, stepping up and protecting the Ally or the Allies, that are under a cyber attack. We can respond in cyber, but you can also respond in other domains - that's up to us to decide.

The whole purpose of deterrence, is to prevent an attack. And, and the success of NATO has been that we have been able to prevent conflict, the purpose of NATO is not to fight the war, the purpose of NATO is to prevent the war. And we have done so successfully for decades, then I think we have to recognise that in cyber, the line between peace and war is more blurred. And that's one of the challenges we face that before it was, it was easy to determine whether we were at war, whether it was living in peace. Now with terrorism, cyber, hybrid threats that line is more blurred and that, that in itself is a challenge.

We have established cyber as an operational domain, and we also developed what we call National Cyber effects, sometimes also referred to as 'offensive cyber' and NATO Allies use that in a very effective way for instance in combating Daesh, ISIS in Iraq and Syria. We were able to take down many of their cyber capabilities that were important for them recruiting, spreading their propaganda, financing, so offensive cyber or National Cyber effects are also part of what NATO has developed over the last years, and, and we continue to strengthen our cyber defences.

Robin Niblett: Thank you. A couple of, we've got another four minutes between the two of us, so Secretary General, just so you know where we are in the row, and thank you everyone for all the questions I don't know how many more we'll be able to take but I've got a few left here. I want to make sure we touch on maybe a little bit traditional, but [...] asks the very obvious question.

What mechanisms, do you foresee NATO developing in its 2030 agenda to contain continued Russian aggression. Full stop.

Secretary General: Credible deterrence, and that's exactly what we have done for 70 - more than 70 - years and we will continue to do so. And we have done that, over the last years, also by significantly, strengthening our collective defence the biggest reinforcement of our collective defence, since the end of the Cold War, with the deployment of combat

battlegroups to the Eastern part of the Alliance, in the Baltic countries and Poland. With increased readiness of our forces with a new command structure. And of course, with the fact that all NATO Allies after the cutting defence spending for many years, all NATO allies have since 2014 increased defence spending.

So, the adaptation of NATO, the fact that we are modernising our military capabilities, that's the best way to make sure that no Ally is suffering any attack from any direction including, of course, also from Russia.

Robin Niblett: Two more questions [...] asks again a very big and important question how do you see the arrival of the Biden administration, affecting the future of NATO and the kind of plans that you're developing, do you see some fundamental change?

Secretary General: I welcome the new Biden administration I'm looking forward to working with President Biden and his security team. I have spoken with President Biden twice since the elections and he has expressed strongly his personal commitment to NATO. I have worked with him in his previous capacities, and I know that President is a strong personal supporter of the transatlantic bond and he knows NATO very well.

I have also spoken with Secretary Blinken and the new Defence Secretary, Austin, and they also express their strong personal commitment. So I think that the new Biden administration provides a unique opportunity to re energise to revitalise to rebuild NATO, and I look forward to welcoming President Biden, to the NATO Summit in Brussels later this year.

Robin Niblett: And maybe one last question I think this is what we've got time for now.

[...] has asked a question about environmental threats I've had a couple of questions about environmental issues here.

For environmental threats is NATO going to have to rethink, its value structure and its habits and its customs and can nature play a role in that redefinition of what security is? [...] asks a similar question. Climate change is not just a climate threat, it is driven and is affecting biodiversity, in particular, and that also has security implications. So how inventive can NATO be in rethinking these environmental dimensions of future security, how much of a role, and they do play in that

space.

Secretary General: So climate change is a serious issue for many reasons. One of them is that climate change affects our security. Climate change is a crisis multiplier. And therefore, it matters for NATO, and therefore, NATO has to address the security consequences of climate change. One of the reasons I want to, as part of NATO 2030 to launch a process where NATO is adapting, developing a new Strategic Concept is that actually in the existing Strategic Concept we agreed back in 2010, climate change is hardly mentioned, it is mentioned one word tiny reference to climate change.

I think that in a new strategic concept for NATO, which hopefully will start to develop when we meet at the NATO Leaders meeting later this year, climate change has to play a much more prominent and important role. NATO should do its part to look into how we can reduce emissions from military operations. We know that heavy battle tanks or fighter jets and naval ships, they consume a lot of fossil fuel and emit greenhouse or CO<sub>2</sub>, greenhouse gases, CO<sub>2</sub>, and therefore we do have to look into how we can reduce those emissions by alternative fuels, solar panels, other ways of running our missions.

That will be good for the climate, reduced emissions of greenhouse gases, but it will also increase the resilience of our troops and military operations, because we know that one of the vulnerabilities in any military operation is the supply of fossil fuels. Along supply lines, vulnerable supply lines, As always, for two decades been a critical vulnerability for many different military operations so if we can make us less dependent on that, we are both reducing emissions, but at the same time, increasing the military effectiveness, the resilience of our troops. So, so we are working on that with different projects to look into how we can make our militaries greener and less dependent on fossil fuels.

So, we will address a climate change. We are in the process of stepping up in that area and for me it is a privilege to have my background as UN Envoy on climate change, and then bringing that background into my current responsibility as Secretary General of NATO.

Robin Niblett: Thank you very much for those answers and actually in particular the one you made at the end there about actually potentially being more resilient, as an Alliance by actually addressing the climate challenge, because otherwise we're going to be facing enemies who may be ignoring these issues.

Item 25



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO2030: future-proofing the Alliance  
Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security  
Conference 2021 (online event)

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19 Feb. 2021 - | Last updated: 19 Feb. 2021 19:41

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(As delivered)

Thank you so much, Wolfgang, for that kind introduction.

I am really delighted to be part of this special edition of the Munich Security Conference. At an important juncture in transatlantic relations.

We have heard from President Biden and from European leaders. And I look forward to hosting them at our NATO Summit in Brussels later this year. To set a new transatlantic agenda.

In recent years, we have seen differences between Europe and North America. With serious questions asked about the strength of our Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic. And competing visions of the transatlantic relations.

We now have a historic opportunity to build a stronger Alliance. To regain trust, and to reinforce our unity.

Europe and North America working together in NATO, in strategic solidarity.

Because we are facing great challenges. The rise of China.  
Sophisticated cyber-attacks. Disruptive technologies.  
Climate change.  
Russia's destabilising behaviour.  
And the continuing threat of terrorism.

No country – and no continent – can go it alone.

On the contrary, we must do more together.

And we have to demonstrate our commitment to transatlantic solidarity not just in words, but in deeds.

That is why, under a banner of NATO 2030, we are working on an ambitious agenda for the future of our Alliance.

First, we must reinforce our unity.

That unity derives from our promise to defend each other.

We must strengthen our commitment to our collective defence and fund more of deterrence and defence on NATO territory together.

This would incentivise allies to provide the necessary capabilities, and contribute to fairer burden sharing.

NATO is the unique platform that brings Europe and North America together every day. Allies should commit to consult on all issues that affect our security.

We should update NATO's strategic concept, to chart a common course going forward. And reaffirm the fundamentals of our Alliance.

Second, we must broaden our approach to security.

Our potential adversaries use all the tools at their disposal - military, political, economic – to challenge our institutions, weaken our societies and undermine our security.

Of course, to keep our people safe, we need a strong military. But we also need strong societies.

As our first line of defence, we need a broader, more integrated and better coordinated approach to resilience. With concrete national targets, for communications, including 5G and undersea cables, energy and water supplies.

And a joint assessment of any vulnerabilities.

We also need to invest to maintain our technological edge, ensure our forces remain interoperable, and develop ethical standards on the use of new,

disruptive technologies.

Broadening our approach to security also means addressing the security impact of climate change. I believe NATO should set the gold-standard on how to reduce the emissions of our militaries, contributing to the goal of Net Zero.

And third, Europe and North America must defend the international rules-based order. Which is being challenged by authoritarian powers.

China and Russia are trying to re-write the rules of the road to benefit their own interests. The rise of China is a defining issue for the

transatlantic community.

With potential consequences for our security, our prosperity and our way of life.

This is why NATO should deepen our relationships with close partners, like Australia and Japan, and forge new ones around the world.

Only through concerted action can we encourage others to play by the rules.

Defending our rules, defending our rules based order, starts by defending our values at home. We must recommit to our values, strengthen our democracies and protect our institutions, because ultimately, this is what makes us who we are.

For over 70 years, NATO has secured peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. Despite evolving challenges and changing political winds, our transatlantic relationship has not only endured, it has flourished.

This is a testament to the values we share, and to NATO, the embodiment of our transatlantic bond.

We all have a responsibility to seize this moment. To strengthen that bond.

And to keep Europe and North America together, in

strategic solidarity. Thank you.

Wolfgang Ischinger: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary General. I know you

are familiar with our Munich Young Leaders Group, and you will probably not be surprised that we have young leaders even at NATO. The first question therefore will be asked by one of our young leaders who happens to be working at the Polish mission to NATO. This is my friend, Dominik Jankowski, so Dominik, why don't you go ahead and ask your question.

Dominik Jankowski, Poland: Secretary General, in...(inaudible) great power competition. NATO needs friends and partners but the alliance will face old and new friends. How should NATO adapt its military posture until 2030 in order to deter the challenges and threats of today and tomorrow?

Wolfgang Ischinger: Secretary General, please.

Secretary General: Well NATO has already implemented the biggest reinforcement of our collective defense in Europe with the new battle groups in eastern part of the lines, including in Poland. We have increased the readiness of forces, and allies are, after years of cutting defense spending, all allies are now investing in more. We need also to make sure that we maintain our technological edge. So anything we can do on innovation, on understand the full impact of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, autonomous weapon systems for our security is of course also about our collective defense in Europe. I think the most important thing is that we stay committed to Article 5 and send a very clear message to any potential adversary that an attack from one ally will trigger the response from the whole Alliance. That's exactly what we can do by further strengthening our collective defense in Europe.

Wolfgang Ischinger: Thank you very much. Second question comes from another young leader Kati Piri is actually a member of the European Parliament. She's from the Netherlands. Kati, your question please.

Kati Piri, Netherlands: Secretary General, this information has emerged as a crucial challenge to our democracies, certain state actors, including Russia and China have made use of the uncertainties of the COVID-19 pandemic to actively undermine faith in NATO and the European Union, governmental institutions and the democratic system. Now what actions should NATO member states take to ensure the integrity of their democracies? And what additional action could be taken at the level of NATO?

Wolfgang Ischinger: Secretary General, please.

Secretary General: Well, I think the use of disinformation is just one

example of how our adversaries are using the whole range of the tools for their disposal: military means, economic means, political means, but also disinformation. And of course we need to respond to that by focusing more on the resilience of our societies. Strong societies are less vulnerable to disinformation. That's exactly why in the NATO 2030 agenda, resilience is the first line of defense and something we are focusing on as we prepare for the upcoming summit later on this year with all the NATO leaders. But fundamentally, I think that the best way to respond to disinformation is to make sure that you have it free and independent press. Journalists that ask the different and difficult questions, that are able to check their sources, and make sure that disinformation never prevails. The truth will prevail as long as we have free and independent press.

Wolfgang Ischinger: Thank you very much. I think we have time for one or two brief additional questions. Let me ask one on the relationship between NATO and the European Union. I know, Jens, that you've been very very strongly engaged in creating better institutional and operational links between the two organizations. Describe to us, if you could, in a few words, how you see this going forward and could close NATO-EU cooperation also provide the kind of framework for all of us meeting the challenge of China? Because I'm not so sure everybody will want to have only NATO as the organization responsible for ending this relationship and maybe only the European Union will also not be sufficient to cover the whole ground. Please.

Secretary General: Over the last years, we have been able to lift the cooperation between NATO and the European Union up to unprecedented levels, and I really welcome that. And that's because of the political will from the European Union side, and from the NATO side. We work on issues like cyber, fighting terrorism, exercises, maritime security, and on many other issues. And I think that in the future we will need even more cooperation, NATO and the European Union. You mentioned the security impact of the rise of China, and you are absolutely right, neither NATO nor the European Union has all the tools we need to address the consequences of the rise of China, we need to work together. Resilience, technology, also areas where there is obvious need for more cooperation between EU and NATO.

And I also very much support and welcome the efforts by the European Union on defence because I really believe that more EU efforts on defense can provide new capabilities, can try to reduce the fragmentation of the European defense industry, which will be good for all of us, and can also increase defense spending.

So this is something I support and encourage and welcome very much. Increased defense spending for instance in Europe is something that NATO has been calling for many, many years, now actually it happens. But, EU you cannot replace NATO. EU cannot protect Europe. This is partly about resources, 20% of NATO's defense spending is coming from EU NATO allies. It's also partly about geography, Norway and Iceland in the north or Turkey in the south, or in the west United States, Canada and United Kingdom – these countries are of course important for the defense, the protection of Europe.

And thirdly, it's about politics, any attempt to weaken the transatlantic bond will not only weaken NATO, it will also divide Europe, so we have to have Europe and North America together in NATO, that's the best way. And especially in light of the rising challenges related to terrorism, cyber, but not least, the changing global balance of power with the rise of China. And we are very much together. You have to remember that more than 90% of the people living in the European Union – they live in a NATO country. So we really have to work together, and we have a unique opportunity now to strengthen that cooperation, a new transatlantic Chapter. I think the message in this conference today has been exactly that, a positive message about working together, and as Secretary General of NATO I welcome that very much.

Wolfgang Ischinger: Jens, I think I have time for one last question. Normally, when we meet at the Munich Security Conference, you would be talking to an expert group of foreign ministers and national security advisors. Today, of course, this program is being broadcast to the wider public. So I'm going to ask you a question that I think is of interest to the wider public. Our previous speaker spent a lot of time talking about climate change, the challenge of it. That is one of the biggest challenges for the global community, any role for NATO in climate change?

Secretary General: Yes, absolutely. And again, our NATO 2030 agenda is how to make climate change and the security impact of climate change an important, more important issue for NATO. In my previous capacity, before I became the Secretary General of NATO, I had the privilege of being the UN Special Envoy on climate change. And therefore, I see very clearly the relationship between climate change, and security. We often say that global warming, more extreme weather – that's a crisis multiplier, and crisis creates threats, and therefore climate change matters for our security.

NATO has at least three things we should do. First, we need to fully

understand the security consequences, assess, map, analyze the security consequences, we should be the organization bringing Europe and North America together to have the expertise, the knowledge on the security consequences of climate change. Second, we need to adapt our missions and operations. We know that a lot of military infrastructure will be directly impacted by global warming, rising sea levels. So this will have direct consequences for how we invest where we can have our bases, especially naval bases, but also for instance we have now, we are increasing our training mission in Iraq, in Baghdad last summer it was more than 50 degrees Celsius for many, many days.

Of course, this will impact the way we organize our missions, equipment, uniforms, ice is melting, it impacts how we can operate in the High North. So climate change is directly impacting our missions and operations we need to adapt to that. And thirdly, NATO should be part of the solution. We have a responsibility to contribute to reduce emissions, and therefore I think that our militaries, NATO should aim of becoming part of the net-zero goal. And this is therefore one of my proposals for the heads of state and government that actually we should make climate change an important issue. Reduced emissions from military operations is a way to address climate change, but actually less dependence on fossil fuels would also make our military operations more resilient and reduce vulnerabilities. So security and climate goes hand in hand as we address it in NATO.

Wolfgang Ischinger: Thank you very much Mr. Secretary General. This last issue, of course, leads us wonderfully into the next segment. My job now is to say thank you to you. See you at our next in-person Munich Security Conference, over to Natalie.



## NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO: keeping Europe safe in an uncertain world  
Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the College of Europe in Bruges

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(As delivered)

So thank you so much, Federica. Thank you for those kind words. It is really great to see you and to see you again in your new role. And your experience, your knowledge, your background make you the perfect rector for this school and therefore it's a great pleasure to be here, together with you, and to be able to continue our cooperation, our collaboration, which we have developed over many years, as old friends. But not least in the time when you were EU High Representative/Vice- President of the European Commission.

At that time I saluted you. We were able to lift NATO-EU cooperation up to unprecedented levels and that was very much because of your efforts, your commitment and your leadership. And therefore I'm really glad to be here and to meet with you and in many ways, to continue to strengthen the cooperation between NATO and EU and the European institutions.

So when you reached out and asked if I was ready, prepared to come here and visit, it was very easy for me to say yes. Also because I had never been to the College of Europe, never been to this beautiful city before. But I know a lot about it because I've read, I've heard, I know that this has been an institution, the College of Europe, has been an important institution for many many years. And I know that some students here have been studying NATO. NATO-EU in particular, and that you also have something called International Model NATO which is a project where you actually address and look at and study NATO. And of course at the Secretary General of NATO I welcome that this institution actually links together and focuses both on the EU but also on NATO and the interaction

between NATO and EU.

I'm happy to address all of you in this room but of course also all the students following online. And I also know that the College of Europe is a highly-recognised institution, building expertise on European issues, international issues, and you have done that for many many years.

I know it also because I have some Nordic friends who have attended this school as students some years ago. That is Helle Thorning-Schmidt and Alexander Stub, two Nordic friends who both became Prime Ministers. So for me it's obvious that students at this college are destined for great things.

So it's also for that reason, great to be here.

Then, I'm also happy to be here, because I am a committed European. I have campaigned for Norway joining the EU not only once, but actually twice. And the first time I did so I was thirteen years old.

But I strongly believed in the idea of European integration. And I still believe in the importance of countries coming together. Solving and addressing the common challenges they face.

And I also see how EU over the decades has helped to provide peace and prosperity in Europe.

As you well know, we failed to convince the majority of the Norwegian people to join the EU, but for me participating in for instance the European Council last week or coming here as a kind of private membership in the EU. So at least I appreciate that opportunity.

But as a committed European, I do not just believe in

European integration. I also believe in transatlantic integration.

Because a strong transatlantic bond is the bedrock of Europe's security.

For more than 70 years NATO has embodied this unique relationship.

Our Alliance is the only place that brings North America and Europe together every day to discuss common security challenges.

To preserve peace. And prevent war. Based on our common solemn pledge. To protect one another. All for one and one for all.

For centuries, conflict in Europe was our constant companion. The Seven years', the Thirty Years', the Hundred Years' Wars.

The Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-German War, and two World Wars, are only a few examples of many.

And NATO was established back in 1949 help make that this didn't happen again, to stop this meaningless bloodshed in Europe.

The Alliance has had to bring peace and democracy to a divided continent over decades. And enabled strong European integration from the very start.

For 40 years, Europe and North America stood together in NATO to deter the Soviet Union.

After the Cold War, we helped the newly free democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to fulfil their euro-Atlantic aspirations.

NATO membership paved the way for EU membership.

And in the 1990s, NATO ended two ethnic wars in the Western Balkans.

After 9/11 when the US was attacked, NATO Allies stood in solidarity. Deploying hundreds of thousands of troops to Afghanistan.

And today, NATO remains at the forefront of fighting new more brutal forms of terrorism.

Through the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, we have helped liberate vast territory and millions of people in Iraq and Syria.

Following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO has

implemented the largest reinforcement of our collective defence in a generation. Deploying combat-ready troops in the east of our Alliance, to deter any aggression.

Let's not forget, that this attempt to redraw borders by force, as we saw in Ukraine and Crimea, happened only a few years ago.

So the need to prevent conflict on our continent and to defend Europe remains very real. And the commitment of NATO and NATO Allies to protect and defend each other has therefore not changed.

Today, NATO stands 30 Allies strong. And keeps almost one billion people safe. But our Alliance continues to change as the world around us changes. And we must continue to adapt, as we address challenges, both old and new.

Russia's destabilising behaviour. Brutal forms of terrorism. Sophisticated cyber-attacks. Disruptive technologies. The security impacts of climate change. And the rise of China.

China is not our adversary. But it has the world's second biggest military budget, and it does not share our values. The rise of China and all of these global challenges make it all the more important for Europe and North America to work together.

Because no single country and no single country and no single continent can face these challenges alone.

But together in NATO, we represent half of the world's economic might, and half of the world's military might.

And we now have a unique opportunity to open a new chapter in relations between Europe and North America.

I welcome President Biden's clear message on the need to rebuild alliances and strengthening NATO.

And I look forward to welcoming him and all other Allied Leaders to our Summit in Brussels later this year.

At the heart of our preparations for the summit and at the heart of the summit will be NATO 2030, an ambitious and forward-looking agenda to prepare our Alliance for the future.

We must reinforce our unity, which derives from our promise to defend each other. By strengthening our deterrence and defence, as well as our political consultations.

We also need to broaden our approach to security. By increasing the resilience of our societies, maintaining our technological edge, and addressing the security impact of climate change.

And we must defend the rules-based order. By building a community of global democracies, with like-minded countries that share our values.

Stronger cooperation with the European Union is part of this ongoing adaptation. NATO and the EU are already working closely together in many areas.

Supporting our partners from Afghanistan to Ukraine. Countering disinformation and cyber- attacks. And working on maritime security.

And I see potential for strengthening our cooperation even further. I have stated many times that I welcome EU efforts on defence. With the fullest possible involvement of non-EU Allies.

So I welcome therefore the recent US decision to join the project on military mobility, which is a flagship of NATO-EU cooperation.

This can enable US and other NATO troops and equipment to move faster across Europe. For instance to reinforce NATO battlegroups in the Baltic Sea region.

A European Union that spends more on defence, invests in new capabilities, and reduces the fragmentation of the European defence industry, is not only good for European security.

It is also good for transatlantic security. And that's exactly also why NATO has called for Europe to do more in addressing these challenges, including increasing the competitiveness of the European defence industry. It would be good for Europe, but also good for the whole of NATO.

At the same time we know that the EU cannot defend Europe alone.

More than 90 percent of EU citizens live in a NATO country. But EU members provide only 20 percent of NATO's defence spending.

This is not only about money. It is also about geography. Iceland and Norway in the North are gateways to the Arctic. Turkey in the south borders Syria and Iraq.

And in the west, the United States, Canada and the UK link together both sides of the Atlantic. All these countries are vital for the defence of Europe.

And most of all, it is about politics. Any attempt to divide Europe from North America, will not only weaken NATO, it will also divide Europe.

So I do not believe in Europe alone. Or North America alone. I believe in North America and Europe together. In NATO. In strategic solidarity.

Whatever challenges we face, we are stronger together. In uncertain times we need strong institutions. Like NATO and like the EU. To defend our values, promote our interests, and keep our nations safe and free.

And with that, I'm ready to take your questions, and I think I'll remain here because then I can keep my mask on.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI [Rector of the College of Europe]: I know a clap of six people in a room is unusual, but you have to imagine the virtual clap and I'm sure some physical clapping also from all the audience connected from the rooms, I see they're clapping their hands. And Jens, thank you very much for this . . . this speech, this introduction. It's so great to see you here. And with those three flags behind you, it really feels . . . feels a right combination, thank you very much. I will open immediately to questions. I actually have some myself, but I will leave the floor to the students. And I maybe start with Orkan?

QUESTION: Could you hear me? Thank you very much, Mr Secretary General, for your presentation. So, my question is about you mentioned in your speech, Ukraine. And, my question is about, actually, the Ukraine crisis, that started the same year, in 2014 when you became Secretary General. Actually, if Ukraine was a member of NATO, could this country avoid the violation of its territorial integrity. And as the follow up, we know that until 2008 Ukraine and also Georgia, they were preparing their membership and they could obtain the

Membership Action Plan during NATO Summit in Bucharest and my question is, so why these two countries, Ukraine and Georgia, didn't get MAP that normally leads to NATO membership. Thank you.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: The short answer is that it could not have happened, because the core task, the main reason why NATO exists is to defend any Ally against any threat and, of course, to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all members is our main responsibility. So therefore, no NATO Ally has ever been attacked and . . . and has been attacked in the way that Ukraine was attacked back in 2014. Because the whole idea is, if one Ally is attacked, it will trigger a response from the whole Alliance. One for all and all for one. So that's the purpose of NATO. But then we also have to understand that the purpose of NATO is to prevent it from happening. So the purpose of NATO is to preserve peace. It's not to provoke a conflict. But it's to make sure that if all potential adversaries know that an attack on one Ally will trigger the response of the whole Alliance, they will not attack.

So that's the thinking. And that has been extremely important and made NATO the most successful alliance in history. And as you know, and as I referred in my speech, the history of Europe is actually a history about wars. Also in the part of Europe that I came from, the Nordic, we were fighting each other for centuries. And then after the Second World War, because of more than NATO, but NATO, the European Union, the institutions we established after the Second World War have played a key role in preserving peace in Europe.

NATO's door is open, meaning that NATO, again, together with the European Union, has helped to spread democracy, the rule of law, throughout Europe, especially after the Berlin Wall came down and the Cold War ended. Because then, former members of the Warsaw Pact, they first joined NATO and then a few years later they, most of them, decided to join the European Union. And through the enlargement of NATO and the European Union, we have been able to spread democracy, the rule of law across Europe. I'm not saying that this is without challenges, without problems, but at least compared to where we were some decades ago, democracy is much more rooted, much stronger in Europe now than it has been perhaps forever. And NATO has played a part in that, and the security guarantees helped to facilitate the enlargement also of EU and European integration. So that goes hand in hand.

NATO's door remains open. And I was at that summit, NATO summit, in

Bucharest, where we made the decision that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO, but we didn't set any fixed date. For a country to become member, they need to meet the NATO standards. And therefore my message to both Ukraine and Georgia, two different countries with different geography and history, but both aspiring for NATO membership, my message is that they have to focus on reform. To reform and modernise their institutions, strengthen their democratic institutions, fight corruption, implement reforms. NATO and the European Union, but I can speak on behalf of NATO, we are helping supporting those reforms efforts.

And they are important, regardless of whether you think that these countries will become members of NATO in the near future or more distant future, because these reforms are actually helping Georgia and Ukraine.

The last thing I will say about, there's two more things about membership. So, we have proven that NATO's door is open, because just since 2014, actually, two more members have joined: Montenegro and North Macedonia. So NATO's door remains open.

The last thing I would say about my membership is the following, and that is perhaps the most important thing, and that is that whether a country becomes a member of NATO or not, is to be decided by that country and the members of NATO, no one else. Because sometimes you get the impression that, for instance, Russia has some kind of veto, has the right to deny a country the right to join NATO. And my message is that, actually, it's enshrined in many documents, including documents that Russia has signed, that it is an absolute right for every sovereign nation to decide its own path, including what kind of security arrangements it wants to be part of, or not want to be part of.

If a country doesn't want to join NATO, I fully respect that. We have good friends like Sweden and Finland, they don't want to join NATO. That's fine. It's up to them. But if they want to join NATO, like Ukraine or Georgia, it's for the 30 members of NATO and the applicant countries to decide, no one else, Russia cannot deny a sovereign nation the right to join. And I say that also knowing, because some are telling the story that these are countries bordering Russia, so it would kind of be a provocation to Russia if they join. It will be a kind of aggressive act. No, when the Baltic countries joined NATO, also bordering Russia, they did that through democratic processes and they exercised their sovereign right to decide their own path. And Russia has no right to regard that as a provocation, or to try to deny them the right to make that sovereign

decision.

And I say this also because I'm from Norway and Norway is a small country bordering Russia. And Russia, or the Soviet Union back in 1949, when we joined, they disliked that Norway joined. But I'm very glad that in Washington and London and Paris at that time, they said that it's for Norway to decide, not for the Soviet Union to deny a small neighbour to make his own decision. So, the same principle should apply for all the countries that would like to join NATO today, it's a sovereign right, by all nations to apply, and then it's only the members and no one else to decide whether they meet the NATO standards. That was a very long answer to a very short question.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: But it was excellent. And by the way, I was just thinking there was a time, it seems really long, long, long ago, it seems another life, there was a time when Russia itself was considering partnership with NATO and working in some kind of partnership, not only with NATO but also with the European Union. So things might evolve, hopefully, in the future. Shall we take one question from some students connected from their rooms?

MODERATOR: And we have a follow-up question from Miloš Mirković, so please, Miloš the floor is yours.

MILOŠ MIRKOVIĆ: Thank you very much. Thank you for this opportunity. So, Mr Secretary General, I was interested in how would you assess the state of play of the security in the Western Balkans, especially considering that we have two new member states and also having in mind the Russian influence? So maybe especially commenting on the situation in Bosnia and maybe the state of play also of democracy, let's say, in the region? Thank you very much.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, the Western Balkans is of importance for Europe and for NATO. And often we say in NATO that when our neighbours are stable, then we are more secure. And NATO has, again, together with the EU, but again, I speak on behalf of NATO, we have a history in the Balkans, in the Western Balkans. After the end of the Cold War, you have to remember that for 40 years, NATO didn't operate outside our borders. It was, in a way, beyond our imagination that we should operate beyond NATO borders. We had one task and that was to deter the Soviet Union. And then when the Cold War ended, people started to say that either NATO has to go out of area or out of business, because the Soviet Union was not there anymore, the Warsaw Pact was not there anymore. And then the Balkan Wars, while we were discussing this on kind of a

theoretical level, the Balkan Wars dragged us into a position where we had to move out of area. And it was a very long step for us to take, to go from protecting NATO members in Europe to actually be involved in something beyond our borders. The Balkans is not far away, but politically, it was a very long step. And then we went into Bosnia-Herzegovina, helping to end the bloodshed there, in a big NATO mission in the mid-90s. And then towards the end of the same decade, in 1999, we went into, or we had launched, the air campaign in Serbia and Kosovo to help stop the fighting and the conflict in Serbia and Kosovo. And since then, NATO . . . and we also actually had some military presence in North Macedonia or it was called FYROM at that time.

We still have a presence in the Western Balkans. We had some offices and also some military presence in Sarajevo, in Belgrade, until recently also in Skopje, but now they have become members. And we have close partners in the region. I think for NATO, of course, what has really made a difference is that many of the countries in the Western Balkans, they have joined NATO. So you have Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania. And of course, you have also Slovenia, Croatia – former Republics in Yugoslavia – they are now members of NATO.

This has been important for NATO, but it has also helped to stabilise the region, preserve peace and, again, some of them are members of EU. And together, this has helped to promote economic development, prosperity – important for the whole region. We also have a military presence in Kosovo helping to protect all the communities there. We strongly support the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina, Pristina-Belgrade dialogue, Federica worked hard on that, and I supported her, we continue to support the efforts of the European Union. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a close partner, the three party presidency just made a decision a few days ago to further develop their partnership with NATO. We welcome that at NATO.

There are many challenges and many problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But I think that one of the main things that NATO has done there is to try to build multi-ethnic defence and security institutions, armed forces, and by that trying to reduce the risks for new conflicts and new fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We continue to provide help for reform and to reduce tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Then, I would like to add that, of course, some of the countries in the region have joined NATO – free, democratic decisions. Some are still aspiring, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we help them with their forms, and they know that this will be a decision for Bosnia-Herzegovina and for NATO. And then we have a country like Serbia. They don't aspire for NATO membership. They aspire for EU membership, but not for NATO membership. And for me it's important to say that that's a decision I fully respect. So we respect, also, when countries decide to be neutral. So when Serbia decides to be a neutral country, is not aiming for, or applying, or working for NATO membership, that's ne.

We will never force a country to join. But then we appreciate the fact that we can have Serbia as a partner. We don't agree on all issues as we hardly do inside the Alliance either. But then we work together and, actually NATO and Serbia, we work together on issues also, for instance, we had an exercise not so long ago, I went to Belgrade, an exercise on the civil preparedness and so on.

So, I strongly believe that NATO should strengthen its partnership with different countries in the region, working with the European Union, actually an excellent example of where NATO and the European Union complement each other. EU has many tools that NATO doesn't have, the economic tools and other tools. We have some military presence there and we are working together. And, because we share the same neighbourhood, we want peace and stability and hopefully we can help to promote that together in the Western Balkans.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: Thank you Jens, I'll come to the room, maybe I'll turn to Marta?

QUESTION: Good morning, thank you so much for being with us today. So, my question: historically EU-NATO cooperation has been blocked by some member states of each organisation. In your speech, you mentioned a stronger EU-NATO cooperation. What future do you see for that, keeping in mind these political obstacles? Thank you.

JENS STOLTENBERG: You are right that there are some political obstacles, but we have been able to find ways to cooperate and work together, because it's so obvious that it is in the interest of both the European Union and NATO. And many of the members are the same. So it will be very strange if we are not able to work together.

I am very much aware that not all EU members are NATO members and not all NATO members are EU members. But as I said, more than 90 percent, I think

it's 93 percent of the people living in the European Union, they live in a NATO country. And it would be strange if we cannot cooperate, because for many of these countries it's about cooperating with themselves. So if we end up in a situation with two institutions that share the same neighbourhood, the same challenges, the same values – in many ways, actually, were established for the same historical reasons – and have the same members to a large extent, are not able to work together, then there's something fundamentally wrong with the people working in those institutions. And that's not the case. So therefore, we have been able to work together.

And this was what Federica realised when she was High Representative; it's something I have seen, and therefore it is really something I am pleased to see, that there are, of course, difficulties and challenges and many other things we had to overcome, but compared to where we were not many years ago, and especially before 2014, we have really been able to lift the NATO-EU cooperation to new levels. We identified, I think it was 76 different areas where we work together.

But, also in respect of the fact that we have not the same members, all the same members, and the fact that we know that there are some political sensitivities, I remember, Federica – and I also try to say that as elegant as Federica – that we respect the integrity and the decision-making procedures of each and every organisation.

So, of course, EU is EU and NATO is NATO and we make our independent decisions, but then we

find ways to work together, at least work in parallel to coordinate our activities. So, I think this pragmatic approach is the only way to also continue to do this in the future.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: You know, Jens, when you were answering this question, I was actually trying to remember the exact wording of that disclaimer. And I perfectly remember now I'm free, I can share anecdotes more than ever, that every time we had a ministerial meeting – because Jens was always invited and kind enough to come to all the foreign ministers meetings, and defence ministers meeting of the European Union, and I was going to the NATO ones – and he, at a certain moment told me, 'How is it that you always say exactly the same wording at the end of this session?' And this is because, actually, in the European Union, there is a sort of disclaimer, that is the one that he quoted. And imagine, I forgot it! Maybe we can get a question from the online-connected

students?

MODERATOR: Yes, we will have two questions from Anna-Liisa Merilind.

ANNA-LIISA MERILIND: Hello Secretary General, thank you so much for being with us today. My name is Anna-Liisa Merilind, I'm a Masters student, for transatlantic affairs, and I come from Tallinn, Estonia. And actually, my first question is about the rise of China and the military might and then the increasingly assertive behaviour. There is a strategic forum called the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which is between the US, Japan, Australia and India. And then my question is, with regard to China's rise, what is the state of NATO's cooperation with the Quad and how do you see it developing in the future?

And, if I may, then also I had one question from a colleague of mine, a second year Masters student, [*inaudible*] who is from Georgia, and she was actually asking a follow-up question to already what was being discussed earlier on. And she was asking: if Russia doesn't have a third party veto, right, then when do you expect the Bucharest summit promises to be fulfilled vis-a-vis Georgia? Would you explain that then neglecting Russian aggression in 2008 led to the Ukrainian crisis in 2014? And where do you see NATO's role in resolving the creeping occupation of Georgia by Russia? Thank you very much.

JENS STOLTENBERG: First on China. The rise of China is going to be defining for transatlantic cooperation in the years to come, because it will impact and has already started to impact the global balance of power. And again, NATO should remain a regional alliance – North America and Europe. But we have to take into account that the threats and the challenges we face in this region, the North Atlantic region, they are becoming more and more global. That's the case for the terrorism, cyber, space, disinformation campaign – it doesn't matter. These are really, truly global challenges.

So NATO should remain a regional alliance, but we need to address global challenges. There's no way you can protect this region without having a global approach, and that also applies for the rise of China. And China will soon have the biggest economy in the world. That demonstrates, also, that the rise of China also represents opportunities for our economies, for our markets, for trade. And of course, the rise of China has been extremely important when it comes to lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. So, it's not a black and white issue, black or white, it's actually something which we also see some

opportunities related to, for all of us.

Having said that, we have to understand that it's something fundamentally new, that the country with the biggest economy and already the second largest defence budget in the world, is an authoritarian country that doesn't share our values. And we see that in the way they are cracking down on democratic rights. Protests in Hong Kong. How they prosecute the minorities, the Uighurs in their own country. How they actually use modern technology, social media, to monitor people in a way we have never seen before. And how they actually openly say that they don't share our democratic values. And also how they're trying to reshape the international order, undermining the rules-based international order that we have built together for decades.

They are investing heavily in new military capabilities, new nuclear weapons, long range missiles, intercontinental missiles. Just over the last five years, they have deployed 80 new battleships, which is actually the same amount of naval capabilities as the total navy of the United Kingdom. So they're adding a lot, making China a more and more global military power. And then they try to expand their influence in the South China Sea, taking control there, threatening Taiwan.

And we have seen how they are bullying countries all over the world: bullying Australia when Australia asks for an independent investigation into the origins of the coronavirus; Canada, where they have arrested two Canadian citizens as a kind of punishment for Canadian behaviour – which is totally unacceptable. And I know it myself because I was Prime Minister in Norway when the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee awarded the Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident. And then China immediately broke all ties, boycotted trade, political ties, to punish Norway.

So this way of behaving, as a growing economic and military power, is really undermining the world we like to build, based on rules, respect to sovereignty, international law. And the challenge is that this is not one country among many, it is the biggest economy in the world if you measure in purchasing power – taking into account the difference in cost between different countries – and also, the biggest economy in market values, shifting the global balance of power. And therefore, for me, it's so obvious that for instance, when the United States expressed concerns about the size of China – the military size, the economic size, leading in technology in many areas, artificial intelligence and so on – for me, that makes it just obvious that we need to be together, because if you are

alone, we will all be small compared to China, even the United States in many areas: economy.

So, for the United States, this is a big advantage to have 29 friends and Allies in NATO. And I tell the Americans that NATO is not only, anyway, good for Europe, NATO's not only about the US protecting Europe, NATO's about we protecting each other, including the United States. We saw that after the 9/11 attack on the United States. But we also see it when it comes to addressing the rise of China.

So NATO has come a long way. Not long ago, we hardly addressed the rise of China at all. At the NATO summit in December 2019, we for the first time had language on China in the statements from NATO leaders. And since then, we have seen development, for instance, when it comes to resilience, protecting our infrastructure, because it's not about moving NATO into the Asia-Pacific, but it's about taking into account that China is coming closer to us: in cyber, in the Arctic, in Africa, investing in our critical infrastructure in Europe. We saw the discussion we had about telecommunications and 5G. We have seen an enormous convergence of views among Allies that we need 5G communications, which can be reliable and take into account the risk related to foreign ownership and foreign control. So NATO has stepped up. We address and try to understand, assess and respond, also by strengthening our resilience. Part of that is also, of course, to realise the importance of working with partners. So we are stepping up our cooperation with the partners in the Asia-Pacific, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea. And I welcome, also, the United States are, of course, also stepping up, strengthening their partnership, cooperation with partners in Asia and the Pacific.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: Thank you Jens. We come back to the room, I promised Philip to go next, and then we go to Christine.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Madam Rector, and thank you very much Secretary Jens Stoltenberg for joining us today. This is truly a unique opportunity, which I'm sure we're all very happy to be here for. During your position as Secretary General, you've signed two agreements with the European Union, the 2016 agreement and 2018 agreement, which I'm sure there was a lot of work with the Rector in her former capacity. However, one of the most important agreements that remains is the 2002 Berlin Plus agreement between the EU and NATO, in the EU being able to use NATO's capabilities. This agreement has been wavering in these past years. In fact, the only operation that operates under it is Operation Althea, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So I want to ask you,

what do you believe is the future of the Berlin Plus agreement and will it be replaced once, or if indeed, Operation Athea ends? Thank you very much.

JENS STOLTENBERG: You are right, that is only in Bosnia-Herzegovina that this has any practical relevance, the Berlin agreement that was signed many years ago, or agreed many years ago. So far, we have not seen any need for using that mechanism in other missions and operations than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I will not speculate whether that will be, or may be, the case in the future. But we have actually found other ways to work together, for instance, in Iraq, where you now see an expanded NATO Training Mission. And of course, when I say a NATO Training Mission, that includes a lot of EU Allies and also not only EU Allies, actually Sweden and Finland are considered to be part of this Training Mission. So, it's a NATO framework, NATO Training Mission, but EU NATO Allies, like, for instance, Germany are planning to be part of this. And many others, France, Italy, they have all declared interest. So, EU members are part of it, through the NATO Training Mission, and then also some partners like Finland and Sweden.

Then the EU, they are also in Iraq, but they are doing different things, complementing each other. And again, a kind of pragmatic way, instead of trying to establish a kind of common mission and operation using the Berlin Plus mechanisms, which may be a bit complicated, we just agree in parallel to work together and then we fulfil and complement each other in Iraq. So there is a big difference between Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it illustrates that EU and NATO can find ways of working together without using these formal structures, but just pragmatic ways of working together.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: I can actually not only confirm but underline what you said indeed, well, I remember I was in office when the European Union established the mission in Iraq. I remember the coordination which it's doing still now, I think the support to the security sector reform on the civilian side. And I remember that contacts at our level and staff level between the European Union militaries – and not only militaries in that case, mainly not militaries – and NATO staff was constant, especially as NATO was planning to establish their own presence there. And it worked perfectly well. Indeed, there are ways of establishing coordination and cooperation. Afghanistan was another example, where the European Union was training the police. And obviously NATO was doing something different. And there was very close cooperation on the ground and at the level of headquarters. So I can only confirm what you said. Maybe we'll get one question from the online

rst?

MODERATOR: OK, so a follow-up question on China from Michelangelo.

MICHELANGELO DE LISI: Mr Secretary General, first of all, many thanks for your most interesting presentation and discussion. My name is Michelangelo and I study in the International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department at the college. And I also had a question regarding the rise of China and its impact on global security, which you touched upon already. I would like to ask whether, in your own view, you believe that China can rise peacefully in the coming decade, as it has been doing for many years, without provoking a major conflict in the process, which would probably force the involvement of NATO. For instance, do you believe that China can actually win the battle for regional and global hegemony without needing to fight it? Thank you very much.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, our task, our responsibility is to make sure that China's rise does not lead to conflict. And that's also one of the reasons why we are setting the rise of China, why we are putting the rise of China higher on the NATO agenda, because even though we remain a regional alliance, the rise of China matters for our security. And it matters for our values: democracy and the rule of law. And I think that, in many ways, I think this just highlights, again, the importance of standing together. And we have said again and again that the best way to preserve peace is to be committed to collective defence, because there will be no attack against any NATO ally, as long as it's very clear conveyed that the whole Alliance stands together. I know there are written a lot of analyses and books about the risk of when you have a rising power, challenging hegemon, it will in a way always lead to war. The Thucydides's trap – it was a book recently written by a professor at Harvard about the *Destined for War*, and it's about the rise of China and he goes all the way back to Sparta and Athens, where the rise of Sparta and the fear it instilled in Athens made war inevitable.

That's, in a way, the main message. But in those historical studies, what they have actually studied, I think, is 16 different cases when you have a rising power challenging an existing big power. Most of those cases ends in war, but not all of them. So it is possible. And therefore we need to learn and make sure that the rise of China does not lead to war and conflict. We will all be losers, also, China, if that leads to conflict. And for me, that just highlights the importance of working with the partners. NATO Allies are strong, 50 percent of the world's military might, 50 percent of the world's economic might. But if you add that with likeminded democracies, for instance, in the broader Asia-Pacific region – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Korea and others, India – then it's a formidable force. And for me, it underlines the importance of building these relationships, standing up for our values at home, but also the international rules-based order. And also engaging with China.

Of course, then it's not always for NATO, but for instance, it is important to engage with China on issues like climate change. There's no way you can solve climate change without working with China. And then convey a message that we are ready to engage, to work, also NATO. I met the Chinese Foreign Minister, there are some military contacts also, between China and NATO, and then, by that, demonstrating our unity, our strength, but also our willingness to avoid, prevent any kind of conflict.

So that's always the case, to in a way convey a message of strength and unity, a commitment to our values, the rules-based order, but at the same time, an openness to engage, to talk, to solve common problems – climate change, whatever it may be – and also reduce the scope for misunderstandings and miscalculations that can lead to conflict.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: I would ask one moment of patience to Christine and the others, because I actually have a follow-up question. I think one of the most interesting statements and the policy changes you are introducing, as the Secretary General in the Alliance, is this focus on the global new frontiers of threats and challenges that are not military in nature, but that cannot be ignored by a military alliance like NATO, like climate change, for instance. And as you mentioned, the fact that on climate change, there might be some work to be done with China, and this seems inevitable and indeed very much needed. I was wondering if you can share with us a little bit more about NATO's plans or NATO's projects or ideas on what can be the role of NATO, of a military alliance like NATO in addressing climate change, as a as a threat – because already denying climate change as a threat is a shift in paradigm?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Well, NATO, we always say that we have to be able to defend all Allies against any threat from any direction. And again, back in the Cold War it was one threat, one direction, it was the Soviet Union. And now it's a much more complex, multifaceted threat environment we are facing. And one of the threats we face is climate change. Because climate change is, as we often say, a crisis multiplier. A lot of the conflicts and fight over resources, water, food, arable land is, more or less, directly linked to climate change, global warming, and it will be more so in the future.

Migration will be triggered by climate change, because people can't live and work where they used to do, because the world is changing, climate is changing, wilder, wetter, windy weather will change how people can live and where they will live. That will increase crisis in many places.

And many people have analysed, for instance, the war in Syria and link that also to the fight about resources and link that, again, to climate change, the Sahel region is also . . . it's not only climate change, but climate change adds to the tensions and the conflict.

So I see for NATO, actually, three roles or tasks related to climate change. One is to understand, monitor, fully assess the security implications of global warming and climate change. Because climate change impacts our security, therefore, it matters for NATO because NATO is about security. And we need to understand that. So that's about analysing, but to understand is the first step to be able to respond.

The second role NATO should have is that we need to adapt the way we do our work. We need to adapt NATO. And it's very basic.

A lot of our infrastructure will be directly impacted by climate change. Rising sea levels will impact a lot of naval bases' infrastructure. We have seen that, for instance, in Norfolk, Virginia, where there are naval bases, including NATO headquarters. They see flooding as a big, big problem. And we have seen numbers, very high numbers, related to how much of military infrastructure, NATO infrastructure, that will be impacted by climate change, so, rising sea levels.

But rising sea levels is only one part. Melting ice is another part. It will change the strategic environment up in the High North, where much more will be available for shipping, for traffic, military, but also civilian use, when the North Pole is melting – or, at least, the Arctic ice is melting.

It will impact such basic things as uniforms and the way we do military operations. We operate in Iraq. In Baghdad last summer it was more than 50 degrees for many, many days. And of course, when you have more extreme weather, extreme heat, it matters what kind of uniform, weapon, equipment, vehicles you have. More wet, windy, extreme weather, the military they operate out there in nature, so when nature becomes more extreme, we need to adapt the way we operate. So this is everything from the big decisions about infrastructure to smaller decisions about clothing, equipment, ammunition, whatever. So we need to adapt the way we conduct military operations to be able to operate in more extreme weather, climate change.

And the third element of the NATO response is that we should be part of the effort to reduce emissions. Of course, NATO will remain a military alliance. And the big effort is to get to make new agreements and so on will be done by EU and others, but we should play our part in supporting those efforts. And we know that in military operations, if you see a battle tank or an aircraft carrier and so on, it's not the first thing you think about, it's not, 'It's green.' Meaning it's also green, meaning 'environmentally friendly'. They use a lot of energy, for good reasons, because this is heavy stuff. But we know that it emits CO<sub>2</sub>, a climate change or a greenhouse gas – and we also know that there are ways to reduce those emissions, which will both make it more environmentally friendly, but at the same time actually increase our operational strength. Because in many military operations, if you read books about the Second World War or the First World War or the Afghan war and military operations, the supply of fuels. If you read about the Rommel in North Africa, then one of the big, big, big vulnerabilities was the supply of fuel over the Mediterranean.

So supply of fuels has been so critical for so many military operations for so many years. So if you can reduce dependency on fossil fuels, you reduce emissions, but you also increase the resilience, the strength of our military operations. In Afghanistan, one of the most vulnerable things over decades has been the transportation of a lot of diesel for cars, vehicles, but also for just aggregates to make electric power. If you can have more solar power, more biofuels, local produced energy and/or less energy consumption in our military operations, energy efficiency, we will reduce emissions, help curb the global warming, but at the same time also make our military missions less vulnerable.

So we should set the gold standard in NATO for how we conduct military operations in an effective way, but in a way which is also, at the same time,

more environmentally friendly.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: Excellent. I find this fascinating. By the way, we are going to work on our own green deal in the college in the coming weeks and months. Christine?

QUESTION: Thank you so much for your presentation. So, you mention in your presentation the new challenges, the new technologies, so I have a more specific question: do you see any potential EU-NATO cooperation in setting international standards for artificial intelligence?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah, at least I see a need that likeminded countries and likeminded institutions, as EU and NATO come together, and try to figure out how do we develop some ethical standards for these new technologies, especially when it comes to . . . so, for many reasons, but for NATO, especially when it comes to the application, the use of these technologies in military systems, in new weapons. The challenge is, of course, that our potential adversaries, they are now developing these technologies at a very high pace, and they are introducing new technologies in their systems more and more.

And so, we also need to maintain our technological edge. And artificial intelligence is something we already use, in systems. And artificial intelligence is not something separate from what we have.

When we have new fighter jets or new drones, they use a lot of new technologies, new disruptive technology. We implement that in those systems already. So we are already in a world where these new disruptive technologies are used, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, big data and so on.

The challenge is how do we make sure that we keep the technological edge, which always has been the advantage of the West – NATO – but at the same time trying to develop ethical standards and also arms control. We don't have the full answer to that today. But, again, one part of my NATO 2030 agenda is how to develop ethical standards for new disruptive technologies and how, also, to apply arms control. Up to now, arms control has been mainly about counting warheads putting a number – we agree that it should not be more than 1,050 warheads on each side, Russia, the United States, strategic warheads – that's an easy number to adjust and to measure.

But now, how do you do arms control in cyberspace? How do you count algorithms, if that's possible to count at all? And how do you apply the thinking of arms control and then also ethical standards which is banning chemical

weapons, banning other weapon systems, as we have done up to now? How do we apply that same kind of thinking in this new area? We have to be honest and say that nobody has that answer today and even to a lesser degree, a political agreement on how to address it and do something about it. But it is an increasing understanding that is an issue we cannot hide or deny.

The last thing I would say about this is that living in Belgium reminds me of the brutality of the First World War. Because I'm from Norway and the First World War, we were not part of that, so, I have to be honest, it was when I came to Belgium that I realised how brutal and how bad that was. For me, the World War was the Second. The First War was something not so much affected. But when you go to the battle fields in Belgium, to the Ypres, for instance, you read about the brutality. And the brutality of that war is that that's the first big war where they used industrial power to kill each other.

And that changed the many of the soldiers that went into the First World War, they didn't have helmets and they had [*inaudible*] because that was kind of the Napoleonic war way of fighting. And they had that kind of equipment moving into industrialised war with cannons and bombs and all that and gas. So the Industrial Revolution changed the nature of warfare in an absolutely fundamental way. These new technologies we are now introducing are going to change the nature of warfare in the same way, as fundamentally as the Industrial Revolution. And therefore, we need to, and then I'll come back to your question.

Yes, of course, this is an area where NATO and EU should see if there are something we can find to work together on. And also an area where EU has a lot of tools where they address these technologies regardless of weapons. But of course, there's a blurred line between civilian use and military use of the same technologies.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: Indeed, I think that's the famous normative power of the European Union could really helpfully be applied. Maybe this is something for our law department to look into, to how especially, I always thought the accountability, not only the ethical, but also the accountability, the command chain on the weaponisation of artificial intelligence. But maybe we can get, if this is OK for you, Jens, we still have some 10, 15 minutes, we get a couple of questions? Do you want to take, maybe, two together?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah, yeah, I'm

good, yeah. FEDERICA MOGHERINI:

You've been very generous.

JENS STOLTENBERG: I can try to be shorter. So we can take two and

two, and whatever. FEDERICA MOGHERINI: Perfect, good. We'll try to take two.

MODERATOR: Okay. So the first question from Ediz, and after from Viktorya.

EDIZTOPCUOGLU: Thank you very much, Secretary General, for taking the time to come here. And thank you, Madam Rector, and to all the organisers for organising this. My question is about NATO in space. It's only recently been declared an operational theatre and the EU has quite recently entered into the space domain, too. How do you see that relationship evolving, especially with regards to the fact that the EU considers it not to be a security area, so the questions of duplication of forces, etc. come up. Do you think NATO and the EU will be able to cooperate here or will there be another one of those duplication issues?

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: Can we take another one?

VIKTORYA MURADYAN: Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Secretary General, for the chance to ask a question. My name is Viktorya and I'm from Armenia. My question is the question that my President wanted to ask you back in October. As you know, at the end of the last year, as confirmed by the intelligence services of the US, France and Russia, Turkey has been identified as one of the perpetrators of the disastrous war in Nagorno-Karabakh, with active military support to Azerbaijan. I would like to ask why Turkey, a NATO member, was involved in a war that had nothing to do with NATO or its interests in the region and why nothing has been done to restrain Turkey's involvement, knowing that the weapons made by NATO, by NATO member states were used during indiscriminate attacks on civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh? And in the same context, this new post-war reality in the South Caucasus, meaning Turkey's transformation into a regional superpower with a larger control in the South Caucasus and more upcoming connectivity to the Central Asian countries, doesn't that bother NATO member states? Thank you very much.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you so much. First, on space. First of all, space is

becoming more and more important for civilian purposes – it has been for a long time – but also more and more important for military purposes. Not in a way that NATO is planning to militarise space, but what is going on in space matters what takes place on the earth. Everything from communications, command and control, monitoring, intelligence, weather forecasts – all of these things are dependent on space satellites, space capabilities. So we have to make sure that they are protected. We have to make sure that they will function in peace, crisis and conflict, because modern military operations are, already today, dependent on a wide range of space capabilities. And therefore, NATO has developed our cooperation, the efforts, the work we do on making sure that we have available space capabilities. As always in NATO, this is very often about drawing on national capabilities, it is not about NATO owning a satellite, but it is about NATO working with Italy or with Germany or other Allies on making sure they provide to NATO missions and operations, to collective defence missions in Europe or counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan, the necessary space capabilities.

And I, to be honest, I don't see any big problem, actually, I see a potential for working with the European Union, because the European Union is, of course, investing in these capabilities, or EU members are investing in these capabilities, EU has some work on these capabilities. And well as this, what we always said is that as long as these new European capabilities, civilian or military, are available for NATO Allies, if that satellite is developed by some money from the European Union and from some EU member states, as long as the information this satellite is able to transmit is available for NATO Allies, which it is, because it's very much the same Allies, the same countries, then it's fine.

So, often I think we shouldn't make a problem out of something which is not a problem and that many Allies are both members of EU and NATO and have, for instance, capabilities like satellites providing information both for civilian and military use, for NATO operations and maybe EU

activities, whatever it is, that works fine. So, most of all, I think we just have to work together on the issue of space and technology.

Then, Nagorno-Karabakh. First of all, I am, of course, concerned about the situation. I was extremely concerned when we saw the bloodshed, the fighting. I know that it's still a difficult situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, but I welcome the fact that at least that the fighting has stopped and there is a political process. NATO is not part of that. You are right that a NATO Ally, has supported and expressed support to one party in the conflict. But it's not a NATO mission. It's not something that NATO has been part of. And I think it just reflects that NATO, of course, is important and, and we protect each other. But NATO Allies don't agree on everything. And historically, we have seen that NATO Allies have been engaged in military operations where not all allies agree, so, going back to the Suez crisis in '56, or the Vietnam War in the 60s and 70s, or the Iraq war in 2003, I'm not saying that these wars and conflicts are not important. They were extremely important. But Allies had different views. Some Allies supported the Iraq operation in 2003, or war, in 2003 – other Allies were heavily against. It was never a NATO mission, a NATO operation.

So, NATO is not a part, NATO supports the political efforts, and we think it's extremely important that we prevent a resumption of military conflict, fighting.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: Thank you, Jens. Maybe we go for the last question to Omar?

QUESTION: Thank you, Rector. Thank you, Mr Secretary General. My question would be more like on the fragmentation of NATO members, like we see Turkey buying S-400 missile systems from Russia and then we see a lot of criticism on that on Turkey, on the other hand, we see Turkey as supporting a government of national accord in Libya, but we see France supporting Haftar against a UN-recognised government of national accord that is supported by Turkey and Italy. So we see NATO members in different sides in different areas of the world in different topics. So how can we explain this fragmentation of NATO members? Is this the new normal for NATO Alliance in the 21st century? Thank you.

JENS STOLTENBERG: It's always easier when all NATO Allies agree and have a common position on every issue. So, as Secretary General, that would make my life much easier. But when you say that, you asked whether this is a new normal, if I could say anything, I would say that this has been the case for decades. It's to some extent the same issue I just answered. It is nothing new that Allies

disagree. The strength of NATO is that despite these disagreements on important issues, we have always been able to unite around our core task: to protect and defend each other.

But in '56, just seven years after we were established, we had the Suez Crisis, where Allies seriously disagreed on how to deal with a situation in Egypt and the Suez Canal. Then, in the 1960s, France decided to leave the military cooperation in the Alliance. That was not an easy decision for NATO and for France. In the 70s we had different views about, for instance, colonial warfare of some members in Africa. And we have the Vietnam War – Allies disagreed. And, as I said, we had as recently as 2003, the Iraq War. I'm not saying this because I'm underestimating the importance and the difficulties related to these disagreements. They have been difficult all the way. But it's nothing new. So, the strength of NATO is that despite these serious differences on serious issues – colonial warfare in Africa, or the Vietnam War, or the Iraq War and other things – we have been the most successful alliance in history because we have been able to concentrate on our core task.

I will always try to do whatever I can to minimise disagreements, to solve differences. And when we are able to do that, that's the best thing. When we are not able to do that, my task is to prevent those differences from creating problems which are undermining NATO as a military alliance.

On some of the issues you mentioned, Eastern Mediterranean and so on. Well, there are obvious differences, but then I think that what is important for me is to try to then use NATO as a platform to reduce differences, reduce tensions, prevent any escalation. And for instance, when it comes the Eastern Mediterranean and the differences we have seen between two NATO Allies, Greece and Turkey, over the last weeks, months, we have seen at least some positive steps. Partly, we have seen that Greece have declared, sorry, Turkey has declared that, they will not deploy this Oruc Reis, this ship that conducts these seismic surveys, in disputed waters. I have welcomed that.

We have been able at NATO to establish what we call a deconfliction mechanism. Because we need to avoid that when we see more Greek and Turkish military presence in the Eastern Med, we need to avoid coming back to where we were in the 1990s. Because in the 1990s, similar tensions between Greece and Turkey ended with casualties, downing of planes. And that was very serious. We have to do whatever we can to prevent that from happening again. And

therefore, we have established this deconfliction mechanism where military experts from Greece and Turkey meet, they have cancelled some exercises and agreed on some basic procedures of communications to try to prevent the same from happening again: that this increased presence, military presence, leads to casualties, real conflict. Talks have started, exploratory talks have started between Greece and Turkey on the underlying disputes in the Eastern Med and NATO has helped to support those efforts by establishing this deconfliction mechanism.

And I'm not saying that we have solved the problems, but I'm saying that, given that we see the value of being together in this Alliance, when we see serious differences, we should try to address, solve, if not at least try to prevent them from spreading and creating even more problems for all of us.

Just briefly on Libya, we support the political process, the UN-led process. We have seen some positive steps there, too. So let's just be strong supporters of that political process. OK, I think perhaps I'll leave it to you.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: I think that, yeah, I think we should now wrap up. If I can ask you one sentence of advice for our students, because you have been, as you said, always a convinced European. You have not studied at a college, but you've focussed on Europe a lot and on international issues as well. And here we have, between here and our campus in Poland, in Natolin, we have some 500 young, committed and young people, relatively young people, wondering what to do next. What would be your personal advice?

JENS

STOLTENBERG:

For them?

FEDERICA

MOGHERINI:

For them.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, first of all, I think the most important thing is to be a good student, now. No, but it's not only a joke, it's serious. I have never planned for anything and I ended up here, to be honest. It's almost true. For instance, I was a student myself, I made one decision: that I would never become a politician, because I'd been very active in the young party, the young Labour Party, back in Norway. And then I decided I should never go into politics. That was the only clear decision I made. And then I was asked to become Deputy Minister of Environment in Norway back in 1990.

And I said, 'OK, for a year.' And now I'm here. So I think that, I'm not against planning, actually, as a Secretary General I should be very much in favour of planning, but be focused on what you do now. That's the best thing.

So, write your thesis, read your books, do your homework, and then some good things will happen. Those who are too focused on the next step, I think they may, may lose the focus on what matters now. So that's actually my most important advice.

And then I think if you have some good education, and then you have that if you attend the school, this college, then there will always be need for you and your knowledge.

And be open. That's another advice. You have to be able to work with other people. One of my greatest skills is that I'm very good at receiving help. I love to be helped. And don't be shy of asking for help. And don't be afraid of asking stupid questions. I asked stupid questions my whole life and I continue to ask stupid questions. So if you are willing to and able to and open for being helped, and focused on today and not too much on the next job or next task, then you will have a happy and good life.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: Thank you. Thank you very much, Jens, I fully subscribe. I think that now I can invite you to sign our golden book for guests of honour and also receive a small present, a book of photos of Bruges that I will not hand over to you because we cannot touch common things. But thank you so much for having done this. Maybe one of next year's next promotions, we will organise a visit to the NATO headquarters.

JENS STOLTENBERG: You're welcome.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: And come to see you or your successor there. Thank you so much for coming.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you so much. Thank you, thank you.

FEDERICA MOGHERINI: Having the photo with the disinfectant is perfect! Let me also thank, as you

nish, all our sta and also NATO sta that made it possible, all the technical support, all colleagues that have been really working very hard to make it possible in challenging circumstances. Thank you very much and thanks to you.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you so much.



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

## Conversation

between NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Rose Gottemoeller, Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University

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(As delivered)

ANNA GRZYMALA-BUSSE [Europe Center, Freeman Spogli Institute]: Hello, everyone. I'm Anna Grzymala-Busse, Director of the Europe Center here at the Freeman Spogli Institute. And on behalf of CISAC and the Europe Center it is my great pleasure to welcome you to our reside chat with NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg. We have all been following the dramatic changes in international security cooperation and very much look forward to the conversation. If you have questions, please post them in the Q&A.

And we'll start with Ambassador Mike McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute and former ambassador to Russia with the introductions, followed by a conversation between the Secretary General and Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, and then a question and answer session. This has been a very eagerly anticipated event. And so without further delay, I'm going to turn things over to Mike. Thank you.

MIKE McFAUL [Director, Freeman Spogli Institute]: Thanks, Anna. And thanks to the Europe Center and for CISAC for cosponsoring this. They're both centres here at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, which I direct. We are thrilled today to have NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at this pivotal moment, I think, for both the Alliance and America's relationship with NATO. So it's a huge honour to host you here, here in

California. We hope that someday we'll do this physically. I guarantee it'll be worth the trip, Mr Secretary General. Jens Stoltenberg became NATO Secretary General in October 2014, following a distinguished international and domestic career. Twice Prime Minister of Norway, Mr Stoltenberg also served in 2013/14 as the UN Special Envoy on Climate Change. Under his leadership, NATO has responded to a more challenging security environment by implementing the biggest reinforcement of its collective defence since the Cold War. At one of the most pivotal moments in the Alliance's history, he has advocated for increased defence spending and better burden-sharing within the Alliance and a greater focus on innovation and resiliency.

Today, we have the perfect person to lead this discussion, not only because she actually has a real

re going, but because she has a tremendous career and service in thinking about issues of NATO, most recently serving as the Deputy Secretary General of NATO. And I think, Rose, you said yesterday in your event that you were the first woman ever to do so, is that correct? Currently, Rose is our Payne Distinguished Lecturer here at CISAC – the Center for International Security and Cooperation. She's also a Hoover fellow here at Stanford University. And before going to NATO, she served for five years in the Obama administration, including, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. And she was a lead negotiator for the New START Treaty, the subject of her forthcoming book, which we will be sure to discuss in this series at a later date. But today, the focus is NATO and General Secretary Stoltenberg. So over to you, Rose.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER [Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, and a former NATO Deputy Secretary General]: Thank you, Mike, and thank you, Anna, for your warm greetings to the Secretary General. And Jens, on my own behalf, a warm welcome to Stanford. We do indeed hope that we'll be able to invite you in person before too long. But it's a great honour and pleasure to have you with us here virtually today. And a little bit amusing, but I thought I'd turn on our re, even though it's the morning here and here in Mountain View the sun is peeking out a bit, but nevertheless, I thought it would be appropriate.

So, let's dive right in shall we? The first topic I wanted to turn to, I think is on top of everybody's head, you know, President Biden has been clear, including in his phone conversation with you, that he is committed to rebuilding the transatlantic relationship. And just a few weeks ago, you had the Secretary of Defence, Lloyd Austin, there at NATO headquarters for the defence ministerial,

his first since being sworn in. They say that they're going to really focus on rebuilding alliances, both in Europe with NATO and in Asia. How are the Americans showing you that they are serious?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: First of all, Rose, I would like to thank you for inviting me to this event and we really miss you here at NATO. It was great to have you as a Deputy Secretary General and the best regards from all of us here in Brussels. And I hope that at some stage I can come to Stanford and meet you there in person.

Then, on the Biden administration, I really welcome the very strong commitment and a very strong message from a President Biden and from his whole security team, the message on strengthening alliances, strengthening NATO. And I have had the privilege of working with President Biden in his previous capacities as Vice President, but also as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And I know that he knows NATO and he knows Europe. And he really understands the importance of NATO bringing North America and Europe together. And I have spoken with him – twice, actually – and also with Secretary Austin, he also attended our defence ministerial meeting. Secretary Blinken will come to our foreign ministerial meeting in two weeks' time. And the message is the same: that the United States really wants to step up and do more together in NATO.

We have seen it already by the decision to halt the withdrawal of troops from Germany and also the clear message about consulting closely with Allies. But at the same time, I think that the United States will continue, of course, to focus on, for instance, the importance of fairer burden sharing in this Alliance.

And I have put forward also what I call the NATO 2030 agenda, which is a project now to renew and adapt NATO for the future. This will be about strengthening further our deterrence and defence, closer consultations inside the Alliance, resilience technology, a wide range of issues, which is covered in the NATO 2030 agenda. And I, of course, hope and expect that the US will be very supportive of the idea of doing more together in North America and Europe.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you, Jens. And a follow up question to that, I do understand that you are looking forward to welcoming President Biden. I hope it's planned to the brand new and very impressive NATO headquarters in Brussels, but you may be planning to meet somewhere else in the Alliance.

In any event, I wanted to ask you, what are your particular priorities for that

summit meeting? It doesn't yet have an exact date, as I understand, but the planning is for some time in the early summer of this year, of 2021. So how are you thinking about scoping the agenda for that meeting? Will it be all about NATO 2030 or are there other things you are planning?

JENS STOLTENBERG: First of all, I very much look forward to welcoming President Biden to the NATO summit that will take place later this year, the exact date is not yet decided, partly that's because of the pandemic. But when I spoke to President Biden, he expressed his strong wish and desire to come to Brussels to meet all the other NATO leaders and the summit will take place here in Brussels in the new impressive headquarters. I think the most important issue for that summit will be the NATO 2030 agenda. But that covers a lot of different topics. It will address how we can further strengthen our deterrence and defence in Europe and in NATO.

We will also broaden the NATO security agenda because we need to address military threats, but also understand that our potential adversaries are using economic tools, political tools. So we need also to, for instance, focus more on resilience, critical infrastructure, we have seen the discussion about 5G telecommunication networks and also how to make sure that NATO maintains the technological edge.

Then we need to make sure that NATO is used as the unique political platform, because NATO is the only institution where North America and Europe meets every day. And this is important also to use when we face challenges where NATO may not be the first responder, but where NATO provides a perfect platform for Europe and North America to sit down together and discuss and try to find common positions on a wide range of different issues.

And then I think also climate, not only think, but I also know, that climate change is part of the NATO 2030 agenda. So actually, NATO 2030 agenda covers a wide range of issues, but it is a kind of forward-looking, ambitious agenda for the future of NATO, making sure that we continue to be the most successful alliance in history.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. I'm glad you mentioned climate change, because that was a topic that was fairly well, I will put it this way, 'complicated' to talk about at NATO in recent years. But again, it's one of those priorities. I know it's a personal priority for you, but also it's a priority for the Biden administration as they plan to re-enter the Climate Accord, the Paris Climate Accord. So I'm glad to hear you'll be picking that up. There are just so many practical ways that NATO needs to work on these issues, including making it easier for our troops to operate in the field.

JENS STOLTENBERG: As you said, climate change is important for me personally, partly also because in my previous capacity as Prime Minister of Norway, I was very much working on climate change issues and also as UN Special Envoy for Climate Change, of course, this is something I have been working on, actually, since I had my first political position as Deputy Minister for Environment back in Norway in 1990, preparing the Rio Conference where we agreed the convention, which is actually now the framework for the Kyoto Protocol in '97 and later on the Paris Agreement from 2015.

I strongly believe that NATO has a role to play when it comes to climate change, because climate change, global warming, matters for our security and therefore it matters for NATO. Of course, NATO is not the institution where we are going to negotiate the big agreements between the countries of the world on how to address climate change more in general. But we have a role to play as NATO. Partly because global warming, climate change, is a crisis multiplier. And we have to expect more extreme weather, more fight, conflict about scarce resources, more migration caused by climate change. So NATO should be the institution that has the best knowledge, best understanding of the security implications of climate change, because a precondition to take the right decisions is to have the right understanding of the problem.

Second, we need to understand that climate change will directly impact what we do as military, as a military alliance. Rising sea levels will impact infrastructure all over our territory. We have seen it also in reports, for instance, from the United States, Norfolk, where there's a major, big naval base, and it was a NATO headquarters. But across the Alliance, rising sea levels will impact our infrastructure. More extreme weather, warm weather, will impact the way we conduct our missions. NATO is present in Iraq. In Baghdad last year, we had many, many days warmer than 50 degrees Celsius. I don't know what that is in Fahrenheit, but extremely warm. Melting ice will affect the security situation up in the High North. And more extreme weather will just impact the way we

operate out in nature. So we need to look at infrastructure, uniforms, capabilities, how they can work, operate, in more extreme weather. And that is a huge task for a military alliance.

And thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, we need to look into and act when it comes to that NATO should play its part in helping to reduce total emissions of greenhouse gases, CO<sub>2</sub>. And we know that military operations, they require a lot of energy to move heavy equipment, but also just to run missions and operations bases. And that is normally fossil fuel. And there are two problems with that. One is, of course, the emissions of greenhouse gases when you burn all this diesel to generate electricity in our different camps and bases. But it's also the vulnerability it creates, because transporting huge volumes of fossil fuel is a big challenge for any military operation. So anything that can make our missions and operations more energy efficient, turn to alternative sources for energy – we have seen some examples where we have used solar powered energy, biodiesel and so on – will not only reduce emissions, but it will also increase the resilience of our military operations because we'll be less dependent on very vulnerable lines of supplies of fossil fuels. This is something I will discuss with Special Envoy John Kerry tomorrow morning when he comes to Brussels – or actually, I think he came today, but I will meet him tomorrow – and we will have breakfast, and then we can discuss NATO's role in supporting his agenda of addressing climate change.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Well, that's fantastic, I did read in the paper that he's going to be there today and I'm delighted you'll be having breakfast tomorrow, so please give my warmest wishes to John Kerry when you see him.

JENS STOLTENBERG: I will do so.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: And it's clear, Jens, that you are very passionate about this subject, but that is fantastic. And yeah, a lot of our viewers may not know, but NATO has a huge network of its own, like pipelines and everything, to move the amount of fossil fuel around that NATO needs for its missions and operations. So it's a really, really important set of issues for NATO also. So I'd note that some of you are already putting your questions in the Q&A portion here at Zoom. So please do use that function if you've got a question. I have a couple more for the Secretary General and then I will move to the Q&A list that is building up already. But Jens, I wanted to ask you about a topic we did discuss at NATO a lot over the last four years, and that is defence burden-sharing. And I think you and I always agreed that it was good to put more

emphasis on that matter and to get the Allies to really sit up and take notice of their promise to more fairly share the burden of their defence. But it's a difficult period now with economies across the Alliance reeling from the pandemic and a lot of economic pressures on all of them.

So how are you thinking nowadays about keeping up the momentum in this area? And are there different ways you're thinking of approaching this issue of how to share the burden of defence? I'd be interested in how you're thinking about that.

JENS STOLTENBERG: First of all, I think we have to admit that it's always hard to allocate sufficient resources, funding, for defence, because I've been a politician myself and I know that to prioritise between healthcare, education, defence is never easy. But my message to Allies has been that – and is – that when we reduced defence spending, when tensions went down after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s and also the beginning of the 2000s, then we need to be able to increase defence spending when tensions are going up, as they do now. And the good news is that all Allies not only agree, but actually deliver on that pledge we made together in 2014 at the Wales summit when President Biden was part of the Obama-Biden administration. The United States strongly conveyed a message to European Allies and Canada that we need fairer burden-sharing in this Alliance. And all Allies agreed.

And since then, defence spending has increased every year across Europe and Canada. In total, since 2014, European Allies and Canada have added 190 billion extra over these years for defence spending. And the latest figures we shared with our ministers at the NATO defence ministerial meeting in February showed that they continued to do so also last year in 2020, and we expect that to continue in 2021. So the reality is that, despite the pandemic, Allies continue to invest in defence. And they do so partly because they know that the threats and challenges that led to the decision in 2014 to invest more, they have not gone away because of the pandemic. If anything, they are even more serious now than a year or two ago.

Second, they have also seen that the military actually has played a key role in providing support to the civilian efforts, to the civilian health services' efforts to fight the pandemic: setting up military

field hospitals, transporting equipment, medical personnel, helping to control borders, and now also in many Allied countries, the military is helping with the rollout of vaccines. So, yes, it is

difficult, but we cannot stop investing because of the pandemic. And that's

exactly also what Allies do – they plan to continue to increase defence investments.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Very good. And I know that history over the last year, even, of what NATO has done to deliver medical supplies and services around the Alliance, I think is really impressive and probably not known enough here in the United States. I have one last question.

We've already got a number of really good questions building up in the Q&A list. But I have one more question and that has to do with Silicon Valley. You are speaking today to a Silicon Valley audience, amongst others. Your audience is really from across the globe. But how is NATO using science and technology nowadays? There's a lot of challenges that come about because of emerging technologies, new threats, new dangers.

Of course, NATO has to get their arms around those. But also emerging technologies are a great opportunity and represent new ways of addressing the challenges of deterrence and defence and keeping the peace. So how are you thinking about using new technologies, emerging technologies in the NATO context? And what do you think about the partnership with places like Silicon Valley that are placing a lot of emphasis in this area?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, I think that technology always represents both opportunities and challenges, dangers. It's the way we apply, the way we use the technology. And every technology can be used in good ways or bad ways. That has been the case always, but in one way, even more so now, as we see so many new and disruptive technologies with enormous potential, both in a constructive but also in a destructive way.

Second, I strongly believe that new and disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, big data, biotech, facial recognition, all of that and especially combined, will change the nature of warfare as fundamentally as the Industrial Revolution. And I think it's hard to grasp, hard to understand, for good or for bad, how technologies are now changing the nature of any potential future conflict.

And thirdly, of course, NATO and NATO Allies need to maintain our technological edge. That has always been an advantage we have had compared to any potential adversary. And we need to maintain that in a world with more competition. We, for instance, see China investing heavily and actually being in the lead in some of these technologies and having great

ambitions, for instance, when it comes to artificial intelligence. And they also have access to data because they are such a state-controlled country, easier access to data than, for instance, in some of our countries, or in most, or in all NATO allied countries.

I think that what we have to do is at least three things.

First of all, we need to invest. One of the reasons why we have pledged to invest more is that that's the only way to keep our technological edge. The best way to develop new technologies and to also apply them in military systems and capabilities is, of course, to invest in new, modern systems. So when we have new, modern fighter jets, we use new technology in them. NATO just had some new drones deployed - ground surveillance drones we have deployed in Sigonella in Italy. The drones themselves, they're ... new and excellent, but the most impressive thing is the technology we put into the drones. So when we decided to invest more at the Wales summit, NATO summit, in 2014, we decided to invest more, but also better – meaning that we also decided that 20 percent of our defence budget should go to research and development and investment in new capabilities. That is driving technological change and driving the implementation of new technologies in military capabilities. So, spending: extremely important.

Second, NATO has always had a role to make sure that the Allies can operate together – interoperability. This has been a basic task for NATO. Up till it has been, you know, about fuel standards, so we can fuel each other's planes and ships and whatever it is; spare parts that the different nations can use, so basic standards. This is even more important when we have extremely advanced systems, because we must avoid a kind of technological gap where Allies are not able to operate together, where we have planes or ships or whatever or soldiers' communications systems that cannot communicate, they have to be connected and NATO has to help to set those standards to make sure that 30 Allies can operate together, also with new, disruptive technologies.

And thirdly, I think that NATO has an important role to play when it comes to addressing some of the serious and difficult ethical questions related to these new technologies: arms control issues – and Rose, you could help us there – how do we do arms control in cyberspace? And then when it comes to Silicon Valley, I strongly believe that we need to work with the private sector. We need to engage with them. We are looking into new, innovative ways of finding funding

and also working with start-ups. And I think that for NATO it is extremely important what is going on in Silicon Valley. Traditionally, it was, you know, government programmes that was driving technological change: nuclear, GPS, the Internet is actually a result of government technological development. Now, we are more dependent on the private sector and we need to work with them. And therefore, part of the NATO 2030 agenda is also about technology, working with the private sector, innovative ways of building partnerships with the private sector.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Well, thank you. As Mike McFaul and I said at the outset, we really do hope that we'll soon be able to invite you in person to come and visit and certainly to also spend some time visiting some of the companies out here and talking to them. I'm going to open up now to our very good questions that have been coming in.

And I'm going to start with an old colleague and friend, Ambassador Fatih Ceylan, who you'll remember very well, former ambassador of Turkey to NATO. And he asks, 'Mr Secretary General, a new Strategic Concept or an updated Strategic Concept? What is the intention with President Biden at the helm of the United States?' For those of you who aren't familiar with NATO, we have, for decades, had Strategic Concepts that are a kind of overarching concept for the operations of the Alliance and the one we currently have dates from a decade ago. So it's an issue to be looked at. But, Mr Secretary General, how are you thinking about this matter today?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So I, strongly – first of all, it's great to hear from Fatih Ceylan again, and my best regard to you. Then, on the Strategic Concept, I think the time has come to update, renew, NATO's Strategic Concept. The current Strategic Concept has served us well for more than a decade, actually. It was agreed at our NATO summit in Lisbon in Portugal in 2010. And a lot of what is there today, I think should be also part of a new Strategic Concept. But some things also have to be changed. And the most important, the reason for update, develop a new Strategic Concept, is the fact that the world has changed. And that is not fully reflected, of course, in the in the Concept we agreed in 2010. For instance, in the current Concept, we refer to Russia, where we say that we are aspiring for a strategic partnership with Russia. That was before Ukraine, before Crimea and before the much more assertive behaviour of aggressive actions by Russia over the last years and especially since 2014.

Climate change is, as I just mentioned just briefly, and hardly mentioned at all.

And climate change, I think, it really impacts our security environment, so it should be addressed in a new Strategic Concept. China is not mentioned.

And I think that the rise of China really is defining for the transatlantic relationship and NATO has to address the rise of China. We don't regard China as an adversary, but of course, the fact that they are now the second largest defence spender in the world, soon the biggest economy, the challenge China represents to the rules-based order, to our core values of democracy, that we have a big power, China, not sharing our values, all of that makes it necessary for NATO to remain a regional alliance, but to respond to the global challenge that the rise of China represents. So I hope that when the NATO leaders meet at the Brussels NATO summit later this year, they will agree to task me to start to develop a new Strategic Concept. And then they can agree a new Strategic Concept at the following summit in 2022.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Very good. Thank you very much for that, that's very interesting to hear of how your thinking is evolving on that. Now, you raised China right at the end, and several questions in the chat get at the NATO-China relationship. I will mention my Hoover colleague, Elizabeth Economy, who's also at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. She said, 'I appreciated Secretary General Stoltenberg's expressions of concern about some troubling behaviour by China. Could he say a few words about how he envisions NATO's future engagement in Asia?'

So, beyond China, but primarily, I suppose the gist of the question is focussed on that pivot to Asia that President Obama first announced some years ago and the fact that the United States is going to be spending more time and attention focussed in the Pacific Basin, rather – or we say now the Indo-Pacific region – rather than all in Europe. So that is Elizabeth's question. And as I said, there are several excellent questions about China here in the chat.

Daniel Gough also asks, 'What are the opportunities and limitations of NATO when it comes to engaging states such as China to tackle global challenges such as climate change or the pandemic?' So lots of food for a response, Mr Secretary General, and back over to you.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, first of all, it is absolutely correct to say that the rise of China also represents opportunities. And we have seen that over many years. The rise of China has helped to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. And it has represented big economic opportunities for our economies, for our markets, for our exports. So, of course, the rise of China has also been important for all NATO Allies, especially when it comes to economy and trade. But at the same time, there are some serious challenges.

I strongly believe that NATO should remain a regional alliance. NATO should remain an alliance for North America and Europe. But being a regional alliance, we need to take into account that the challenges we are facing are more and more global. Traditionally, we faced one big challenge, and that was the Soviet Union in Europe. Now the world is very different. So we need to have a global approach, while we remain a regional alliance. And then, of course, the rise of China is one of those global challenges. I mentioned that they don't share our values and we see that they crack down on Democratic protests in Hong Kong. We see how they persecute minorities, the Uyghurs, violating basic human rights. We see also how they expand their influence in the South China Sea, how they are threatening Taiwan and how they also bully countries all over the world. Australia, when Australia asked for an independent investigation into the origins of the coronavirus; or Canada, where they actually just arrested some Canadian citizens.

And I have seen it myself, as a Norwegian politician. I was Prime Minister when the Norwegian Peace Prize Committee awarded the Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident. And then immediately China just blocked everything with Norway: economic sanctions, no political interaction and so on. So this behaviour is a great challenge to all of those who believe in a rules-based order – an order we have developed over decades together. NATO should respond in many different ways. Partly, we should work more closely with our partners in the Asia-Pacific: Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and potentially also others. And because we should help to form a community of like-minded democracies and NATO is therefore stepping up the cooperation or the partnership with these countries. But we need also to respond at home.

One of the reasons why we need to invest and make sure that we keep the technological edge is the rise of China and their heavy investments in new, modern capabilities and the use of new, disruptive technologies. Thirdly, we see that China . . . it's not about NATO going into the Asia-Pacific, but it's about the fact that China is coming closer to us: in cyberspace, and we see them in

Africa, in the Arctic, and investing in our own critical infrastructure in Europe. We have seen the discussion about 5G and I welcome very much a convergence of views among Allies on that issue.

And for NATO to address China is something quite new. The first time we actually had a decision on China, language on China, was at the NATO summit in London in 2019. But since then, a lot has happened and it proves that NATO can change and adapt when the world is changing. And we will, of course, also continue to engage with China. We have some military contacts, but I also, for instance, met with the Chinese Foreign Minister. And we are open to further strengthening our engagement with China.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you so much, because I really agree with you that China represents both opportunities and challenges. That was the language from the London summit, and I think it's important to take that balanced look. Lots and lots of questions about Russia. And you already mentioned that, of course, the USSR's role in Europe and the threats that it imposed on Europe and now evolved to this period when Russia has seized Crimea and when there are many concerns about the continuing destabilisation of the Donbass and what is going on there.

We have a question about how NATO is thinking about the situation in the Black Sea, for example, with the militarisation of Crimea that is going on by the Russian Federation. So can you talk a bit about NATO and work with its partners in the Black Sea Region, with Ukraine and Georgia in particular, and how you're thinking about addressing the challenges – and indeed the threats – that Russia imposes in that area on some of NATO's partners and indeed on some of the NATO countries in the region, such as Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, of course, is a special case – I assure the viewers we'll come to Turkey in a moment – but there is a lot of interest, of course, in how NATO thinks about deterrence and defence in the Black Sea Region. So back over to you, Jens.

JENS STOLTENBERG: I will say some few words about the Black Sea Region in a moment.

But first, more general about Russia. In our current Strategic Concept, as I mentioned, agreed in 2010, we stated that we are aspiring for a strategic partnership with Russia. And after the end of the Cold War, we really believed that we could develop a close partnership with Russia. I thought that myself and NATO Allies were working hard to achieve that, we established what we

call the NATO-Russia Council, you know that very well, Rose.

And we had President Putin and President Medvedev, they attended NATO summits – in Bucharest, in Lisbon, and elsewhere. And we had much engagement at summit level, ministerial level, ambassadorial level with Russia, and we worked for a strategic partnership. Just months before the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia and NATO were planning a joint military operation to safeguard the destruction of chemical weapons from Syria – that was going to be a joint NATO- Russia operation.

So since then, especially since 2014, things have really changed. And NATO has responded. We have to understand that we have implemented the biggest reinforcement of our collective defence in a generation, since the end of the Cold War, with the battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance, something we never had before, combat-ready battlegroups in Poland and the Baltic countries, tripled the size of the NATO response force, higher readiness of our forces, and increased investments in defence, 190 billion extra across Europe and Canada just since 2014. Part of that adaptation is also new command structures for the Atlantic, the vital link between Europe and North America and in Europe, in Germany. Then, on the Black Sea, well, that has been part of our adaptation, that we also have increased our presence in the Black Sea, with air policing, with more naval presence. Just the last few couple of months we have seen several US naval ships sailing in the Black Sea. All the NATO Allies have operated there with naval and air assets.

And we have also established what we call a tailored forward presence in Romania. And we are working not only, of course, we have three littoral states, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, but also two very close partners, Georgia and Ukraine, and we are working closely with them. So we have also the Enhanced Air Policing in the region. And all of this is part of NATO's response to a more assertive Russia. Let me just add briefly that by saying that we are delivering credible deterrence and defence, because we see Russia responsible for aggressive actions against Ukraine, increased military presence in North Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East.

But we continue to pursue what we call a dual-track approach to Russia: deterrence and defence, combined with an effort to establish, develop, a meaningful dialogue with Russia. That's not easy, but I think it's extremely important, also because we, of course, support all efforts for verifiable and balanced arms control with Russia.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. I am very glad you gave that more extensive answer. I want to make sure that we got the southeast of the Alliance included, but it's very good to have that entire laid down. So thanks very much for that, Jens. Now, as promised, the tough question. I remember I used to get it quite a bit while I was still NATO Deputy Secretary General and I know you get it quite frequently.

Given Turkey is becoming a dictatorship and its recent closeness with Russia – I understand Erdoğan and Putin are even meeting, or speaking by phone even today – but should not Turkey be expelled from NATO? What do you think about that?

JENS STOLTENBERG: I think that Turkey is an important Ally. At the same time, I have expressed my concerns about many issues and I know also that many Allies have expressed their concerns. I think that it is nothing new, that we see differences between Allies. That has been the case throughout our history. And of course, the best thing is when you are able to agree on everything, but when there are differences and disagreements, also on serious and important issues, at least NATO is a platform for Allies to raise these differences and disagreements and to express their concerns and to have open and frank discussions. And that's exactly what we have had in NATO on many of those issues where I know that Allies are concerned about issues related to Turkey.

For instance, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, migration, the Turkish decision to acquire the Russian air defence system S-400, the rule of law, and so on. And then I think it is important at least that NATO is a platform where these issues are openly discussed. I raised these concerns myself, including the S-400 issue, the Eastern Med and so on, also in Ankara. And, of course, NATO is founded on some core values: democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty. And I personally attach great importance to these values. But at the same time, I think that we need to understand that Turkey is an important Ally, because you can just look at a map and then you see that Turkey is extremely important, not least because it's bordering Iraq and Syria. And the progress we have made in fighting ISIS, liberating the territory they controlled in Iraq and Syria and controlling millions of people, infrastructure bases, airports in Turkey have been of great importance. And therefore, I'm always looking for: how can we try to reduce tensions? How can we try to find some steps in the right direction?

And we have, for instance, been able to establish what we call a deconfliction mechanism in NATO to address the risks related to increased tensions,

combined with increased military presence of two NATO Allies, Turkey and Greece. During the 1990s, when we had similar tensions and similar increased military presence, that led to casualties, to downing of planes and we need to prevent that from happening again. And therefore, I welcome the fact that we have been able to find some positive steps, establish a deconfliction mechanism at NATO, where military experts from Greece and Turkey – two valued Allies meet, sit down, establish communication channels, cancelled some exercises, and by that, at least reducing the risks, for incidents and accidents, and if they happen, prevent them from coming out of control. And this has also helped to pave the way now for exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece on the underlying disputes in the Eastern Med.

So, I realise, I recognise that there are challenges, but I think the best thing is to address them as NATO Allies, inside NATO, in an open way and have NATO as a platform for trying to find ways to reduce tensions and find positive steps in the right direction.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very much and I'm very glad you brought up what NATO has been doing in the Eastern Med, working with the two NATO Allies there, Greece and Turkey. That was another question that we had in the chat, so I'm very grateful to you for covering that. Now, yesterday, we had International Women's Day and we had a very nice event that Condoleezza Rice chaired at the Hoover Institution, celebrating some of the women scholars. And, well, my book was part of the mix, but a number of us were on the call, it was really a great event. And I was glad because here in the United States, to be honest with you, International Women's Day isn't that big a celebration compared to in many other countries of the world and including, I know, the Russian Federation is very, very big on it as a national holiday even.

But we have a question from Heidi Hart that is relevant. It says, 'What is the future of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the NATO 2030 framework? How is it being prioritised and mainstreamed as NATO's strategic priorities shift?'

JENS STOLTENBERG: First of all, congratulations both on the International Women's Day yesterday on 8th March and then also congratulations on your new book on arms control. You are really an expert and you know so much about that, so I think it's very important that you write it down and that we can

all read it in different articles, books and speeches you have written. So thank you for that.

Then Women, Peace and Security remains important for NATO and we are constantly looking into how we can do more. We say both because it's the smart thing, but also the right thing to do. We know that, of course, for NATO to be able to mobilise the full potential of our populations in the different NATO allied countries is of great importance. And if you only focus on half of the people living in your country and in NATO, then we are half as good as we could be if we mobilise the strength of both men and women.

We are, gradually, more and more capable of doing that. And I welcome that we see that tradition, of course – defence, army, military – have been totally male dominated, but that's gradually starting to change. And for instance, if we look at our armed forces, but also when we look at, for instance, the defence ministers, more and more are women. Not so many years ago, there were hardly any. Now it's roughly six, seven, eight ministers are women. It's not half, but it's significantly better than not so long ago. And you were our first woman, Deputy Secretary General.

Then, of course, this is also about the women in conflict. This is about NATO missions and operations. And we do whatever we can to make sure that, for instance, sexual violence, gender-based violence is something we have to fight in all ways. And therefore, we train our troops and our forces, first of all, of course, to behave in a correct way themselves, but equally important, to make sure that when we train other forces, when we train in Afghanistan or in Kosovo or in Iraq and many other places, we help them to be aware of, to monitor, to see, to report on any kind of gender-based violence and to build the right attitudes among the armed forces. And of course, we have achieved that, or at least we have made a lot of progress together with local forces.

I had the privilege myself some time ago to visit female pilots in Afghanistan trained by NATO. And of course, that's good for the Afghan air forces to have pilots, but it is also extremely important for, as role models, changing the way people regard women and the role of women in the Afghan society when you suddenly have female pilots flying helicopters and planes in Afghanistan. So, we will continue to push that also as part of the NATO 2030 agenda.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. Well, again, Mr Secretary General, you've given me the great opening for the next question. We've had some questions about Afghanistan and the Afghanistan peace process. And, of course, the Biden

administration is carefully reviewing this matter now and has been, I'm sure, also in touch with you about it.

And I'm interested – and of some of our viewers are interested – in knowing how are you thinking currently about the situation in Afghanistan, our NATO Training Mission there, but also then the Afghan peace process and how to continue it and, we all hope, garner success from it? So Afghanistan is the next the next question.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Afghanistan demonstrates the importance of NATO because we have to understand that we are all in Afghanistan as a result of an attack on one Ally: the 9/11 attack on the United States. And that is the first and only time we have invoked Article 5, the collective defence clause of our founding treaty. Hundreds of thousands of European and Canadian soldiers have served shoulder to shoulder alongside US troops in Afghanistan over now two decades, more than a thousand of them have lost their lives. And this is in addition to all the American soldiers who have paid the ultimate price in Afghanistan. So I think it demonstrates that when one Ally was attacked – the United States in 2001, 9/11 - it mobilised the whole NATO, the whole of NATO and partners.

And they have paid with blood and treasure in support of our common fight against international terrorism. And the main reason why we have been in Afghanistan for so long is, of course, to prevent the country from once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorists, planning, organising attacks against the United States and other NATO allied countries.

And we have also been able to build an Afghan security force, which is now responsible for the security in their own country. And I think that if there's any lesson learnt from Afghanistan, then it is that we should have started earlier to build local capacity.

I strongly believe in NATO as a training Alliance. Prevention is better than intervention. And of course, we are still in Afghanistan, but our presence today is very different than what it was not so many years ago, when we were more than 100,000 troops in a big combat operation. Now the

NATO mission is roughly 10,000 troops in the Train, Assist and Advise Mission. And of course, that's a very different thing than 100,000 plus in combat. Having said all that, it is no good solution. There are only difficult dilemmas in Afghanistan.

No Ally would like to stay in Afghanistan longer than necessary. At the same time, we will not leave too early, because then we risk that Afghanistan again becomes a safe haven for international terrorism. This is a difficult dilemma. My main message to Allies is that we need to stay very closely coordinated, act together, decide together, under the principle or the motto of: we went into Afghanistan together, we should adjust our presence there together, and when the time is right, we should leave together. Therefore, we strongly support the peace process.

All Allies welcome the agreement that was made last year and we welcome the renewed efforts by the Biden administration, by President Biden, to find a peaceful, negotiated solution. That will not be easy, but talks, the peace process is the only way to a viable, lasting political solution in Afghanistan. I think also what demonstrates the commitment of European Allies, non-US Allies and partners to our presence, to our mission in Afghanistan is that now there are actually more non-US troops in the NATO mission than there are US troops in the NATO mission. And it just, again, demonstrates the strength of NATO. We work together, we stand by each other and we consult very closely on the peace process. Secretary Austin updated Allies when he met them virtually at our defence ministerial meeting not so long ago. And I also expect and I am absolutely certain that when Secretary Blinken meets all the NATO ministers in two weeks, Afghanistan will once again be one of the main issues we will discuss and consult, to make decisions together.

ROSE GOTTEMÖLLER: Very good. You know, sadly, Jens, we are running out of time, we have such a wonderful list of questions here, which we haven't had a chance to touch on. So I apologise to some of the 53 questioners who haven't had a chance to get their question asked.

But I'm going to end on the question that is near and dear to your heart. Greg Nelson asks, 'How important do you think the emerging Arctic region is to NATO's security? Is NATO prepared to take advantage of the Arctic? What capabilities does NATO have to protect it from Russian activity?'

JENS STOLTENBERG: First of all, it's near to my heart because I have spent very much of my time up in the Arctic. And then you have to really understand

that the Arctic is not only up by the North Pole, the Arctic is - half of my own country is north of the Arctic Circle. And we have the midnight sun and zero sun during winter. So the Arctic is not far away.

Five NATO Allies are actually Arctic countries and much of NATO territory and NATO waters are in the Arctic. And therefore, NATO is present in the Arctic. And as part of the broader adaptation of our Alliance over the last years, we have increased our presence in the Arctic, meaning with more naval presence, more air presence. We have NATO Allies, but also including the United States, operating more in the Arctic.

And we, of course, realise the increasing strategic importance of the Arctic, partly caused by global warming, because less ice, more open sea, and partly because of the increased Russian presence in the Arctic. We used to say that in the High North, we have low tensions. I think that's not as correct to say anymore because we have seen increased tensions also in the High North. But to some extent, it reflects something which I think is important to try to preserve, and that is that we have more cooperation with Russia in the High North than we have elsewhere.

NATO Allies work in the Arctic Council, in the Barents Council, the Barent regional cooperation with the Nordic countries and Russia, and the Arctic Council with all the Arctic countries. We work with Russia on issues like search and rescue, environment and so on. And I know from – again, from Norway – that Norway, being a NATO Ally, they had developed quite close cooperation with Russia up in the High North, on shery, on energy, on environment, on search and rescue. We agreed a borderline or a delimitation line on the Barents Sea and the Polar Sea and the military in Norway, they have regular contacts with the Russian military, very open lines of communications to avoid any misunderstandings and miscalculations up in the High North. So I say this because there are many reasons to be concerned.

We see a more military presence of Russia, also with extremely advanced new capabilities, nuclear capabilities, submarines. We see the transatlantic undersea cables, all of that, something that NATO is very focused on. But at the same time, we see that in some areas and in some ways it's actually possible to work with Russia and the High North is an example of that. So we should continue to strive for, at least to some degree, lower tensions in the High North, because that's the best way to secure the interest of NATO Allies.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you so much. And to those of you, 54 questioners

we didn't get to, I'm really sorry. We could keep you here all night, Mr Secretary General, but as it's already after 9:00 p.m. your time, I think we shall have to let you go. But thank you so very, very much.

I've had many messages in the chat about how much people have appreciated your remarks and what a great event you've made it. So thank you very much for that. I can applaud from where I am in Mountain View, California, but I know the rest of the audience is applauding as well. And again, next time I hope we will be able to invite you in person to the NATO . . . to the NATO headquarters – you are there! To our campus here at Stanford. So thanks, thanks again very, very much.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thanks so much, Rose, great to see you and all the best. And I hope to see you soon in person.



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Interview with NATO Secretary

# General Jens Stoltenberg at the Goldman Sachs event "Talks at GS"

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10 Mar. 2021 - | Last updated: 10 Mar. 2021 11:16

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MODERATOR: Hello everyone and welcome to Talks at GS. I am honoured to be joined today by Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO. Before serving in his current role, Secretary General Stoltenberg was the UN Special Envoy on Climate Change and also served as the Prime Minister of Norway. Secretary General, thank you very much for joining us today.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you so much for having me. It's really a great pleasure and honour to be with you all today.

MODERATOR: So let me ask you, you've transitioned obviously from Prime Minister of an important country to, you know, to now running an important global organisation obviously and, you know, dealing with alliances and so forth, I'm interested in how your time running Norway has influenced how you've thought about, you know, sitting in your current seat?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: So first of all, I like that you say that Norway is an important country. We regard our self as a very important country, but we are five million people. NATO represents close to one billion people, so when it comes to numbers, at least, it's much bigger. I think the most

important thing I bring from Norwegian politics is the importance of compromise, to understand that when there are different views, different interests, the main task of a political leader is to find a way to reconcile the different views and create some kind of unity, so we as a country can move forward in Norway.

But this is even more so in NATO because, in national politics, a majority can always vote through a bill or legislation in the parliament, in the United States, in Norway and in other democratic parliaments, while in NATO we need consensus, we need all to agree. So, the need to see the beauty and the strength of compromise is even bigger and more important in NATO. So, that has been perhaps the most important experience I bring from national politics to NATO and international politics.

MODERATOR: I'm just interested in drawing you out a little bit more and talking about how you try to balance the 30 countries, you know, and their individual desires, with the broader Alliance, and how you think about that tension and, you know, any insight you have there, which I imagine is, you know, a challenge of your position.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: I think that first of all, it is to recognise that when you are 30 different nations, as we are in NATO, from both sides of the Atlantic, with different geography, different history, different political parties in government, there will be differences.

So, we should not panic when we see differences between NATO Allies.

We have seen, of course, that over the last years we had some challenging times and we had also disagreements between Allies over the last few years, in NATO, but we can also go back, sort of all the way back to the Suez Crisis in 1956, or when France decided in 1966 actually to leave the military cooperation in NATO, or the Vietnam war or the Iraq war in 2003 that divided NATO Allies.

But the beauty, or the strength, of NATO is that despite these differences, we have always been able to unite around our core task. And our core task is to protect and defend each other. If one Ally is attacked that will be regarded as an attack on the whole Alliance. And the reason why this commitment is so important is that by conveying that message to any potential adversary, we prevent war, we preserve peace. The purpose of NATO is not to provoke conflict but to prevent conflict by having this collective defence clause.

MODERATOR: So, I believe you spoke with President Biden just a few days after

he took office and one of the things that you discussed was the continued presence of troops in Afghanistan. It was obviously an important issue. I'm interested in how you are thinking about the future of NATO troops in that region.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: So, I've spoken with President Biden actually twice and I'm looking forward to welcoming him to Brussels, to the NATO Summit, as soon as that's possible to convene. Now it's a bit difficult because of the pandemic. But in both those conversations, NATO's presence in Afghanistan has been a key topic.

It is important because we have been there now for 20 years. We went into Afghanistan as a response to the 9/11 attacks. We went in there to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorists, a place where they can plan, organise, finance attacks on the United States and other NATO Allied countries. But no Ally would like to stay there longer than necessary and therefore the United States and all other NATO Allies, we strongly support the peace talks which are now taking place in Doha.

These talks are difficult, they are fragile, there is no guarantee for success, but they are the only path to peace and the first time actually Taliban and the government sits down together and try to find a way forward for a peaceful negotiated solution. So, we support those.

There is an agreement between Taliban and the United States that all international troops, also NATO troops, should be out of Afghanistan by 1st May. Taliban has to negotiate in good faith, they have to reduce violence, we see a lot of targeted killing, and they have to break all ties with international terrorists. We will coordinate, we will assess the situation together and then we will make a decision together.

MODERATOR: Okay, so let's just shift to the pandemic which obviously, you know, at the moment is kind of front of mind as a collective threat, you know, around the world, and it's certainly having a real impact on the way we're all navigating, you know, policy and you know, the fact that we're not physically together right now is an example of, you know, some of the challenges that we face. You've stated that NATO's main task is to make sure the health crisis does not become a security crisis. How has NATO been executing on that task now and is there any change today versus what you would have been doing at the beginning of the pandemic?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: Well of course we have adapted some of our activities, also at these Headquarters, people work from home as they do most places around the world. We have reduced, changed, the format of some of our exercises and there's much less travelling. But the main message is that the readiness of our forces, the deployment in Afghanistan or Iraq, Kosovo and other places, they have continued. We have big battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance, combat ready. They are fully operational. So, with some minor adjustments in the way we conduct our task and conduct our activities, NATO has maintained what we call its operational readiness. And that's a good thing. NATO is a military Alliance, of course we have to be able to function also throughout or in the midst of a pandemic.

MODERATOR: So, in addition to the pandemic and other global threats, you are focused on Russia, and you've certainly been focused on Russia, I know, for a long time. Maybe just talk about what threat you see Russia posing to democracies around the world as we sit here today and, you know, any commentary on how NATO is focused on meeting those challenges.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, that was the main reason for NATO's existence for decades. Russia is very different from the Soviet Union and, for some years after the end of the Cold War, we developed a more and more close partnership with Russia. There were actually some people talking about the possibility of Russia joining NATO because we had all the members... the Warsaw Pact - there were eight members to the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, Poland, Eastern Germany, Romania and these central and eastern European countries. Out of those eight countries, seven are today a member of NATO. And the eighth, the Soviet Union, doesn't exist. But three former republics in the Soviet Union, the Baltic countries, are member of NATO. So of course it was not impossible to imagine that Russia could also join NATO.

This is not the case anymore. And things have really changed and especially in 2014, when Russia used military force to annex a part of another country, Crimea in Ukraine. And we see a more assertive Russia. We see Russia investing heavily in new military capabilities, new nuclear weapons, new advanced delivery systems and of course that's the reason also why NATO has implemented the biggest reinforcement to our collective defence since the end of the Cold War, with combat ready battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance - we didn't have that before, we have it now, higher readiness of our forces, increased defence

spending - after years of cutting defence spending, all Allies have started to increase defence spending, and also changed our command structure and implemented really big changes of this Alliance since 2014.

But then, this is not only about military. Because what we see is that Russia is using a wide range of tools. Military tools, as they have done for instance in Syria or in Libya or against Ukraine, but they use economic tools and they use cyber and political tools, and they try to meddle in our domestic political processes. We have seen that in the United States. We have seen it in other European countries. We have seen many reports about cyberattacks.

So, we need, in a way, to develop this whole range of different tools in responding to a more assertive Russia, including the fact that they are using propaganda and disinformation to try to undermine the trust in our democratic institutions. Social media, disinformation. And for NATO of course that's a different track, it's a different challenge. NATO has a role to play. We counter this information when we see, we provide facts, we try to pushback.

But I think actually that when we see disinformation, when we see the use of social media to try to undermine trust, I think that the best and most important tool we have is a free and independent press, journalists that are asking the difficult questions, checking their sources and making sure that we're not victims to organised disinformation campaigns from, for instance, Russia or others.

MODERATOR: So let's talk about China, you know, the size, the military might, the economic picture, you know, their achievements in technology. Just talk a bit about how you think NATO, you know, should address China and how you think it will address China.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: China is not an adversary and the rise of China also represents a lot of opportunities, for our economies, markets, for working together with China on issues like climate change. And we should seize these opportunities and work with China on many different areas. But the rise of China also represents some serious challenges. China is an authoritarian regime, they don't share our values, they don't pretend that they share our democratic values. They believe in another set of principles and values, and it will be the first time actually in centuries that the biggest economy in the world doesn't share our liberal democratic values. And that does something with the balance between the different powers, and you know these numbers better than I do, but based on the purchasing power, China

already has the biggest economy and in market value, it will soon have the largest economy in the world. And that makes something, it really impacts the power, the global balance of power.

And again for me, that's just an argument in favour of NATO because, yes, China will have the biggest economy, but they don't have friends and Allies as NATO. And together, NATO Allies are 50% of the world's GDP and 50% of the world's military might. So yes, the US is big, but together with United Kingdom, France, Germany, Norway and many other countries, Italy, Spain, and all other NATO Allies, we are able to deal and handle any threat.

MODERATOR: You mentioned climate change, so I want to spend some.. I want to linger on climate change a little bit with you, because I know you've got strong feelings about it and you've spent a lot of your career focused on it as a security issue. So, maybe you can talk about climate change from that perspective, in terms of how that shapes NATO's thinking in response, you know, to dealing with it as a security issue.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: So, NATO is a military Alliance. Actually, NATO is a military and political Alliance, but our main responsibility is to preserve peace, is to provide security and is to maintain the strong commitment to defend and protect each other. So therefore some people ask, so does climate change matters for NATO, and the answer is yes, because climate change matter for security.

Climate change, global warming, is what we call a crisis multiplier. It will increase the competition for scarce resources - for water, for land. It will force people to move - migration.

And we have already seen an analysis about the conflict in the Sahel region in Syria is partly fuelled by climate change.

I'm not saying that climate change is the only reason for crisis and conflicts but it may exacerbate and fuel and multiply the consequences of different conflicts, in many places in the world.

So NATO, since we are concerned about security, we have to understand all the factors that impact our security, and climate change impacts our security, it's a crisis multiplier and therefore the first thing NATO should do, and we are starting to do that, is to have the best possible understanding of the link between climate change, global warming and security threats and conflicts. So that's the first thing - analysis, understanding. But that's a precondition for any response

is to understand a problem.

The second thing we should do is that we need to adapt the way we conduct our missions, operations, how we do our work, because we have to understand that the military, they operate, at least mostly, out there in nature.

And when we have wilder, wetter, windier weather, it will impact the way we can operate.

The melting of the ice, the polar ice, is opening up new sea routes but also new possibilities for military operations in the North, for good or for bad. So, this will affect everything from investments in military infrastructure to the uniforms, the equipment of our military of our soldiers, where to operate, how to operate, and so we have to implement the necessary adaptation of our military structure, infrastructure, operations, missions, caused by global warming.

And the third thing I think NATO could do is that we can try to reduce emissions. We should, of course, we cannot be the main, the first responder to the call for reduced emissions, but NATO and our military forces, they can play their part. Because today, military operations are normally extremely energy consuming and very much depend on fossil fuels.

So, all of these are tasks where NATO is now stepping up, trying to do more, because we should play our part in addressing climate change, but also realise that this has real security implications and therefore climate change matters for NATO.

MODERATOR: You announced an initiative that you've called NATO 2030, maybe you can just expand a little bit further into what you're trying to achieve there and what we might expect that comes out of that initiative and how that shapes the future of NATO going forward.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: So partly, we have already talked a lot about NATO 2030 without calling it NATO 2030 in our conversation today, because the main idea with NATO 2030 is to have a forward looking, ambitious agenda for this Alliance that makes sure that we continue to adapt, because we are the most successful Alliance in history because we have constantly changed. Change, change, change. And that's never easy, it's often a bit painful, but if NATO is going to continue to be a successful Alliance, we need to continue to adapt and change as the world is changing.

MODERATOR: Well Jens, as an American and as a member of the Alliance, we really appreciate everything you're doing and thank you for taking time out of your day to join us.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you so much for having me here it was a great thing to see you all.

MODERATOR: Appreciate it. Stay well, take care.

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you.

Item 29



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Discussion with NATO Secretary

# General Jens Stoltenberg

at the Council on Foreign Relations' "Morse Lecture" series

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11 Mar. 2021 - | Last updated: 12 Mar. 2021 16:30

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(As delivered)

Thank you so much Jim,

It's really great to see you again.

And many thanks for your strong commitment to our transatlantic Alliance, to NATO.

And also many thanks to the Council on Foreign Relations for inviting me to address such a distinguished audience today.

This year, CFR celebrates its centennial.

That is an impressive milestone, congratulations!

Foreign Affairs magazine has been with me

from my young age. My parents would get a

copy delivered at our house in Oslo.

And I loved flipping through the pages.

It gave me the impression that the big, wide world out there was coming straight into our home in Oslo!

Over the decades, much has been said and written about the importance of adapting the NATO Alliance.

Including by you Jim. And others in this audience.

After the Cold War, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and again following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the rise of ISIS.

Now, we are at another pivotal moment in transatlantic history.

A moment to reinforce the unity between Europe and North America.

Because we are facing many great challenges; the rise of China, sophisticated cyber-attacks, disruptive technologies, climate change, Russia's destabilising behaviour.

And the continuing threat of terrorism.

No country or continent can tackle these

challenges alone. Not Europe alone.

Nor America alone.

So Europe and North America must work together, in strategic solidarity.

So therefore, I very much welcome President Biden's clear message on rebuilding alliances and strengthening NATO.

Making our strong Alliance even stronger and more future-proof, is at the heart of NATO 2030, the NATO 2030 initiative.

And it will be at the heart of the NATO Summit later this year.

Together we have the opportunity to set an ambitious and forward-looking agenda for the future of the Alliance.

Let me briefly set out what I see as the main

priorities going forward. We must strengthen our

commitment to collective defence.

2021 will be the seventh consecutive year of increased defence spending by

European Allies and Canada.

Since 2014, they have contributed a cumulative extra of 190 billion dollars. So the trend is up and it must continue to go up.

We should also increase common funding for our deterrence and defence activities. This would boost our ability to defend and deter.

Demonstrate our solidarity and political resolve.

And contribute to a fairer burden sharing within the Alliance.

We must also strengthen our transatlantic consultations on security and defence issues.

NATO is the unique platform that brings Europe and North America together to discuss and decide every day.

And together, we need to continue to broaden our agenda to tackle existing and new challenges to our security.

For example, we need to do more on climate change.

NATO should aim to become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding, adapting and mitigating the impact of climate change on our security.

We should also raise our level of ambition when it comes to resilience and innovation. We need strong militaries.

But also strong, resilient societies, to address the full spectrum of threats. NATO should aim to guarantee a minimum standard of resilience among Allies.

And we need more investment in innovation, to maintain our technological edge and remain competitive in a more competitive world.

Lastly, we must stand up for the international rules-based order, which is being challenged by authoritarian powers, including China.

The rise of China offers opportunities, for instance for our economies, but it also poses challenges for our security and way of life.

That is why we should deepen our partnerships with countries like Australia and Japan. And reach out to other like-minded countries around the world.

I also believe this is the time to develop a new Strategic Concept for NATO.

The last one dates back to 2010, and our strategic environment has significantly changed since then.

We need to chart a common course going forward, agree on how to prioritise and tackle existing and emerging challenges.

And recommit to our fundamental values.

This year is a crucial year.

With an important Summit coming up, we have a unique opportunity to open a new chapter in the transatlantic relations.

We must all seize it.

So let me stop there, and I look forward to our discussion, thank you so much Jim.

JAMES STAVRIDIS [Operating Executive, The Carlyle Group; Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO]: Thank you very much, Secretary General. The format here is that I will ask the Secretary General a few questions, sort of bouncing off his excellent opening statements, and then at about half past the hour I'll open it up to the membership. I think we all wish we were together in one place in New York but I see our participants are over 300

and it'd be hard to pack that many into the headquarters in New York. So perhaps there is a silver lining here.

Secretary General, let me begin with something you spoke about a moment ago. And that was China. Over my right shoulder, I'm now going to indulge myself and mention, yesterday I released a new book, the title is 2034: A Novel of the Next World War, and it projects us into the future, 2034, to think about the rise of China, if it all goes terribly wrong.

My question for you is how do we avoid that, how do we avoid a war with China? And specifically in broadening NATO relationships in Asia and I completely agree, Japan, Australia and New Zealand Singapore - the list is quite long of potential partners.

Would NATO be willing to operate, for example, on freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea? So a two part question. How do we avoid conflict with China? And a specific question: would NATO be willing to join these freedom of navigation patrols?

JENS STOLTENBERG [NATO Secretary General]: Thank you so much, Jim, and congratulations on your new book. The rise of China is, it will be defining for the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead. And we need to understand that when we look at China from NATO, we have seen an enormous change.

It was actually at our summit in 2019, in London, in December – that was the first time we as an Alliance, made common decisions, had agreed language on how to address the rise of China.

And at that time that was seen as a kind of radical step, an important change of how NATO addressed the security implications of the rise of China.

Since then we have seen convergence of views, among Allies. Allies recognize of course that there are opportunities but also challenges related to the rise of China.

I strongly believe that NATO should remain a regional Alliance, North America and Europe together.

But at the same time we need to take into account that the threats and challenges we are facing in this region, North America and Europe, they are global, and they are impacted by the rise of China. So we need what we call a global approach.

And this is partly about standing up for our values.

China would soon have the biggest economy in the world, the second largest defense budget they already have and they don't share our values. And therefore just to stand up for our values, work with like-minded countries, for instance in Asia-Pacific: Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan and potentially others, is part of our response.

Fundamentally, the way to prevent war is always to send a clear message to any potential adversary, that if one Ally is attacked, the whole Alliance will respond. That message, our collective defense security guarantees - Article 5, that has preserved peace for more than 70 years.

Because as long as there is no misunderstanding, no room for miscalculation, an attack on one Ally will never happen because it will trigger the response from the whole Alliance.

This is important for Europe. But it's also important for the United States, because the United States is of course big; big military, big economy. But compared to China, I meet many in the United States who are actually concerned a bit about the size.

Then for the United States, it is a great and big advantage to have 29 friends and allies, as the United States has in NATO. And together, all of us, we represent 50% of the world's GDP and 50% of the world's military might.

So, NATO has always been important, but if you are concerned about the security consequences of the rise of China, and the size of China, then actually NATO is more important than ever. Because together we will be able to prevent war, prevent conflict, by just sending a very clear message of unity and the collective defense commitment within the Alliance.

Then, whether we can be participating in freedom of navigation patrols or activities. There is no such proposal on the table, and I will be very careful starting to speculate because that will only create uncertainty and potential misunderstandings.

So I will just limit myself to saying that NATO Allies, as individual Allies, are already present in the South China Sea. Germany sent some naval ship there recently. United States, UK, France, others have operated there. We have a close partnership with Australia. I visited Australia a couple of years ago. And

one of the things that were of course very much concerned about was freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. So, no concrete proposal on the table. But we are consulting, working closely with partners, and with Allies which are operating in the South China Sea.

JAMES STAVRIDIS: Thank you. And I'll just add to your excellent remarks about 50% of the world's GDP and 50% of the military budget. What I try to point out to Americans who say: oh, you know, why doesn't Europe spend more money on defense? I tell them, hey, add up all of the European spending and collectively, it is Europe that has the second largest defense budget in the world, China would be third.

So, again, your point, this collective action together is very much a part of the future of NATO.

Sir, I'd like to turn to climate. Here, I would like to just make one point, which is that this is an area where conceivably, the United States, European Union and China, collectively, could work together, I think. This could be a zone of cooperation, even as we deal with the challenges that we've both just discussed about China.

Help the audience understand in a little more detail what NATO's role could be in climate change. Because I agree with you I think it very much has to be part of the future the Alliance.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Climate change matters for NATO.

Because, climate change, matters for security. And climate change is a crisis multiplier.

So therefore, it matters for NATO. Of course NATO will not be the main platform to negotiate big climate conventions and protocols and agreements in the future, that's for the UN and other international organizations to do. But NATO has a role to play.

And I think that, at least in, in three ways.

First, since climate change matters for our security, we need to be the organization, the international institution that has the best understanding, the best analysis, and the best assessment of the security because implications of climate change. Because without understanding the problem we are not able to cope and tackle the problem.

More migration, more competition, conflict about water, land, scarce natural resources, are already the consequences of climate change, and it will be even more important in the future. So, first task for NATO is to understand the security consequences of climate change.

The second task is to adapt to climate change, global warming. Because our militaries they are operating out there in nature.

At sea, in the air, on land. And with climate change, it impacts the way we can operate.

It is as simple as that. Rising sea levels will impact a lot of our naval bases, other infrastructure and we need to plan and to take into consideration the consequences of rising sea levels.

Melting ice impacts where we can operate in the High North. And the security challenges, for instance, in the Arctic. Increased temperatures, as we for instance have seen many places in the world already, it will impact how our soldiers can do their work.

NATO is present in Iraq with a training mission. Last summer, there were many days with more than 50 degrees Celsius. I don't know how much that is in Fahrenheit, but it's very warm.

So of course, if you're going to operate in that kind of extreme weather, you need uniforms, you need training, you need soldiers who are able to tackle extreme weather; be it cold, windy, wet stormy, whatever, but more extreme weather will impact military operations. So we need the uniforms, we need vehicles, we need equipment, we need the infrastructure that is able to sustain more extreme weather. So that's the second task of NATO and we need to share best practices, provide guidelines, exercises, all that enable us to deal with more extreme weather.

Wilder, windier, warmer weather will impact military operations.

The third task for NATO is to help to reduce emissions. Because we know that military missions planes, ships, bases, they are emitting a lot of carbon dioxide. And the challenge is that we need to be able to reduce emissions without undermining our operational effectiveness.

We need to be effective, we need to function, but at the same time try to reduce emissions, partly because that will reduce the contribution of military footprint to global warming. But secondly, because it's actually possible to reconcile operational effectiveness with being more environmentally friendly. We know that, you know, throughout history at least throughout the history of hydrocarbons, the supply of fossil fuel has been one of the most critical things in any military operation.

You can read about the Rommel struggling in the North Africa, not being able to get gasoline to his battle tanks or Patton who could have moved much faster to France if he had more access to gasoline. And there are many other examples.

In Afghanistan, one of the most vulnerable operations we actually did was to transport diesel in trucks from Pakistan all the way to our different bases to fuel our aggregates to produce electricity.

So the thing is that if we can make our operations more energy efficient, turn to solar panels or biofuels or other types of energy, it will be environmentally friendly, but also potentially increase the strength and the resilience of military operations.

So these are areas and we already work on that. Our Science for Peace Programme, developing alternative fuels, sharing best practices and so on. NATO is not perhaps the main responder to climate change, but we need to understand, we need to adapt and we need to contribute to reduce emissions.

JAMES STAVRIDIS: What an excellent portrait of the role. The only thing I could add to it just from the perspective of the United States. I'm coming to you from my native state of Florida, which is often, if you will, attacked by hurricanes. In the summer, we have terrible fires in our forests in the West. Often our militaries are called into participate in humanitarian work, disaster relief. That takes time away from training, it takes attention away from it, it becomes an additional burden.

And I think in your remarks I hear in an awareness in the NATO context of that

as well.

Secretary General, let me turn to one other area that has been very much on my mind and on the minds of many Americans over the last few weeks, and that is cyber, and cyber security. As you are well aware, we've undergone a significant cyber event here.

I would personally define it as a cyber-attack, we could have a conversation about what defines a cyber attack but it's of course the SolarWinds hack, which came at companies and attacked 400 of the Fortune 500 companies, have penetrated many sectors of the US government. It was almost certainly generated from Russia. It's an example of the challenges we all face.

I'd love to hear some comments about what NATO is doing in thinking about cyber. I remember as a Supreme Allied Commander going into the NATO Cyber Security Centre in Tallinn, Estonia.

This was something that was coming on line, as I departed some years ago. Where are we now and where are we going in cyber, Secretary General?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Cyber will only become more and more important for our defense, both for our military defense but also for protecting our civilian societies, our critical civilian infrastructure.

And again, NATO has adapted but we need to continue to do more, because we are confronted with more frequent and more sophisticated cyberattacks.

What we have done is that we have decided that cyber can trigger Article 5, and that's a very strong message, meaning that we equalize cyber attack with kinetic attacks.

So, if we assess that the cyberattack has the seriousness, the scale and the scope, then we can trigger our collective defense clause. We don't have to respond in cyber, but of course we can respond in cyber, or in other domains.

Second, we have established cyber as a military domain, alongside air, sea, land.

And we are helping Allies with improving their cyber defenses. We again share best practices, have the center in Tallinn you just mentioned. We have conducted the biggest exercises in the world when it comes to cyber defense,

and we are constantly both improving the protection of our own cyber networks at our headquarters.

But you know when we operate in Afghanistan, or Iraq, or in Kosovo, or the battlegroups in eastern part Alliance, cyber networks are critical for command and control for everything we do, we need to protect these networks.

Then let me add that we have also the last years, been able to develop and integrate into NATO, what we refer to as sovereign national cyber effects. It is all very often called offensive cyber and that has been used by Allies. I've seen for instance how Allies have used offensive cyber against ISIS, taking down their networks, reducing their capabilities to recruit, to finance, to send out propaganda.

So, we also have national cyber effects, integrated in the NATO planning, and when necessary NATO operations, because we need to be able to be defensive but also when necessary also to use offensive cyber as NATO Allies used against for instance, ISIS.

The last thing I will say, which is a task for NATO is to address some of the very difficult ethical, but also arms control, questions raised by cyber warfare, cyberattacks.

We don't have to find answers, but we need to look into how to address that because it will be an important part of any potential military conflict in the future, it will have a cyber dimension.

JAMES STAVRIDIS: Well said. And here in the United States, there's a conversation that is beginning about whether or not we need a cyber force. As I'm sure you're aware last year we created a space force, the United Kingdom is moving toward a space force. This isn't really a question just a comment that I think within the Alliance there'll be more specialization in this area on the part of the uniformed military, [*inaudible*] civilians.

I think your comments are precisely correct in that keeping this front and center for the Alliance is just critical.

Well we've talked about three topics and they all began with C: China, cyber and climate. I can't think of any other topics that begin with C. So I think it's time to open this up to the larger membership. I'm sure there'll be some terrific questions. I'll conclude my small part here by just saying, drawing a line under your comment that it's time for a new Strategic Concept for the

Alliance.

As you said, 2010 was the last time we did this. I participated in that as SACEUR. Madeleine Albright, did a marvelous job chairing that effort. I'm sure this will be something to watch as it unfolds and I'm so glad, if I can conclude with this, that you have extended and will now be our Secretary General for another two years. Certainly time to do this and bring all your experience as we create this new Strategic Concept.

Okay with that, Laura, I'll turn it over to you to bring in individual questions, as you will. MODERATOR: We'll take the first question from Mirna Galic.

MIRNA GALIC: Thank you so much. This is Mirna Galic from the Atlantic Council, Secretary General, it's such a pleasure to be able to listen to you speak and ask you some questions. You've mentioned and also the expert report that came out in December mentioned the importance of NATO engaging more holistically with its allies in the Asia-Pacific: Japan, Australia, South Korea New Zealand.

China is a great entry point for that but there's some ways in which those relationships can be improved more holistically, including in terms of exercises. It's sometimes difficult for these partners to make it to Europe or North America, where the majority of NATO's military exercises are held. And in theory, a more mutually accessible location like perhaps the Indian Ocean might be better.

I know you've wisely already said he would not speculate on NATO operating in the South China Sea, but do you think that given that NATO has operated in the Indian Ocean before, this area might be a potential place for some NATO exercises with these partners down the line, if all sides are agreed? Thank you.

JENS STOLTENBERG: I personally have an open mind to look into different ways of working more closely with our Asia-Pacific partners and you mentioned. And I also think actually there is potential to look into whether we can also have new partners in the Asia-Pacific, for instance mentioned, India.

But when it comes to concrete activities I'm a bit careful about speculating because I think that we need to discuss this among Allies, and we need to discuss it with our partners in the region.

But as you have said, or as you just said, NATO has operated in the Indian Ocean before, fighting piracy. We are in Afghanistan, which is actually in Asia. So, of course, if we make a decision, then of course it's possible for NATO to operate also in that part of the world.

I think the big decision was actually taken back in the beginning of the 1990s, then we had this discussion whether NATO should go beyond our borders, but it was about you know after the end of the Cold War, we discussed whether NATO should just stay in NATO territory as it did for 40 years during the Cold War.

And then we had this famous discussion of whether NATO should go beyond our territory, and we went beyond NATO territory first in the Balkans, then later on into Afghanistan, and I have opened mind to also do more with Asia-Pacific partners, but that has to be decided when we have complete discussions with partners and with all Allies.

JAMES STAVRIDIS: Thank you Laura. How about another question for

the Secretary General. MODERATOR: We'll take the next question from

Alexander Vershbow.

ALEXANDER VERSHBOW: Hi, I'm Sandy Vershbow, I'm at the Atlantic Council as well. And I was Mr Stoltenberg's Deputy Secretary General until the end of 2016. Good to see you and Jim Stavridis again. I've a easy question - relationship with Turkey.

Turkey and the rest of the Allies have been drifting apart over the last few years over many issues: Syria, refugees, maritime boundaries, offshore gas exploration, and of course, the acquisition of Russian technology by the Turkish armed forces.

Mr. Secretary General how successful, have you been so far in your efforts to defuse some of the disagreements and tensions among Allies? And do you see any prospect of a compromise on the S-400, such as a deactivation of the system that would enable Turkey to rejoin the Alliance and the F-35 Program in particular?

JENS STOLTENBERG: First of all, it's great to hear your voice, Sandy and I really appreciate the time we work together at NATO. You were there when I came in

2014 and I have learned a lot from you. So great to hear your voice. I am not able to see you, but I recognize the voice.

Then on Turkey: Well, there are concerns and there are problems. And I have never tried to hide that. You mentioned them. The decision to acquire S-400, the Russian air defence system. I have actually raised those concerns myself in Ankara several times. I raised concerns I have about the consequences of the Turkish decision to acquire Russian air defense system, Eastern Mediterranean migration, there are other issues that has caused concern among Allies. And I have discussed them directly with the Turkish leadership. And we have seen also some difficulties in the relationship between Allies, for instance, Greece and Turkey regarding the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. So I don't try to deny that. But I think that we have to take into account at least one important thing, and that is that Turkey is an important Ally.

You can just look at the map and realize the strategic geographic location of Turkey. The Black Sea. The Mediterranean. And then of course bordering Iraq and Syria. Turkey has been important, infrastructure in Turkey has been important in the fight against ISIS, liberating the territory ISIS controlled in Iraq and Syria. Turkey remains important in our efforts to fight terrorism in that region.

So I strongly believe that my task, NATO's task, is to do what you alluded to: how can we defuse tensions, how can we find positive steps in the right direction. And what we have done is, on S-400, to look into whether there are other alternative systems. We have, of course, the European system SAMP/T, Italy and France. We have a US Patriot batteries.

And NATO has actually deployed Patriots to Turkey. Spain is now deploying one Patriot battery on behalf of our reliance in Turkey and we continue to try to find ways to find alternative systems that can help address the problem related to the Turkey's decision to buy, acquire the S-400.

We are also looking into other ways to try to defuse tensions, and we have succeeded in establishing what we call deconfliction mechanisms at NATO, where military experts from Turkey and Greece, meet. And where have agreed some improved lines of communications, to cancel some military exercises in the Eastern Med.

And by doing that at least, reducing the risks for repeating what we saw in the 1990s where the similar tensions and similar increased military presence, by Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Med, the Aegean, led to downing our planes casualties and really serious situations. By the NATO

decontamination mechanism the risk for that happening again has been reduced. And we have helped to pave the way for talks, exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece on the underlying disputes in the Eastern Med.

NATO also helped to try to address the migration issue, we have the NATO activity, NATO naval presence in the Aegean, which is important partly because you have ships there. But most important because we actually bring Turkey and the EU, Turkey Greece, Turkey Frontex together. And by that, helping to implement the deal, the agreement between Turkey and the European Union on migration.

So I'm not saying that we can solve all issues but at least NATO is a platform where we address

differences, try to find ways to defuse tensions and make some steps in the right direction. And we continue, of course, to look for ways to how to deal with the S-400 issue which is of great concern for Allies.

JAMES STAVRIDIS: Excellent and comprehensive. And Ambassador Vershbow, my dear friend Sandy, great to hear your voice. Ambassador Vershbow and I also work together during my time, which kind of, Sandy overlapped both of us. This is a nice chance for the three of us to be virtually together for a moment.

Secretary General, if I may, I'd only add one thought to your excellent composition. And it's simply an observation as the SACEUR in charge of operations globally. In every operation that we undertook, Turkey delivered. They sent troops to Afghanistan, the Balkans, to counter piracy, to Libya, which many nations opted out of. So we ought to, as you said, recognize what comes with Turkey is a basket of challenges that we have to work with, but they've also been strong contributors across the fabric of the Alliance certainly during my time there, I believe, on to the present. A balance view I think is the bottom line here. Again, thank you, Ambassador Vershbow. And Laura, we are ready for the next question.

MODERATOR: We'll take the next question from John Kornblum.

JOHN KORNBLUM: Thank you very much. I am also a longtime NATO veteran going back into the 1970s. And my question deals with maybe the other elephant in the room that you didn't mention: Russia.

NATO, beginning in the 1970s, together worked out an approach to Russia, which ended up being very successful. We do not, especially with the enlargement of NATO it's much harder to have a common position. But I don't see much evidence of NATO working on a common position and

wonder if, first part of my question is, isn't this a time for the NATO Council to take up Russia, the way it did back before the end of the Cold War?

Second question is the NATO Russia Council. That was an effort. I was also part of that, to try and engage Russia with NATO. For many reasons it didn't work. I wonder if you see any opportunity to reactivate, to focus, to use the NATO-Russia Council to start a dialogue with Russia, which could perhaps lead to some improvement for all NATO's Allies?

JENS STOLTENBERG:

Well, we are regularly discussing and addressing Russia in NATO and in the North Atlantic Council.

And I think we have to remember that actually there is one other C that we could discuss, we will because we discussed climate, China, and cyber but we can add Crimea.

And that was actually a trigger for a renewed effort by NATO to respond to aggressive actions by Russia and then more assertive Russia which we have seen over the last years.

And since 2014, not least because of the Russian behavior, not only in Ukraine, Crimea, but also elsewhere, and also the deployment of new novel weapon systems, the violation of the INF Treaty and so on, NATO has implemented the biggest reinforcements or collected offense in the generation.

You know we have combat-ready battlegroups in eastern part of Alliance. If someone has suggested that back in 2014 or before that, it would have been said that's impossible. Now we have them in place, every day, 24/7. All Allies have stopped cutting defense spending. Until 2014, all Allies were reducing defense spending every year. Now, all European Allies and Canada have increased defense spending every year in seven years, added 190 billion extra over those years for defense spending, and that's very much triggered by the behavior of Russia.

We have tripled the size of the NATO response force: more exercises, new commands, and so on. So, I'm not I'm not saying that's only because of Russia, but it's very much because of Russia and the battlegroups, the increased presence in the Black Sea region, the Baltic region, is triggered by Russia's behavior, since it is a response to Russia.

But as you know, NATO's response to Russia is not only the deterrence and defence. It is also dialogue, and I am a strong supporter of, and believer,

in the NATO response which has been there since the 70s actually: the dual track approach: deterrence and defense, and dialogue. And for me, there is no contradiction between deterrence, defense, and dialogue. Actually, as long as we are strong, as long as we are firm, as long as we are united, we can talk with Russia.

Dialogue is not a sign of weakness for me. Dialogue is a sign of strength. And therefore, we should continue to strive for dialogue with Russia. We have been able to activate the NATO-Russia Council, there were no meetings in NATO-Russia Council for a couple of years after the illegal annexation of Crimea. Then, over the last one and a half years, there has been no meetings in the NATO-Russia Council. But that's not because of us, that's because of Russia, because they have not responded positively to our invitations to convene new meetings in the NATO-Russia Council. But we are ready, we would like to sit down and continue to use this Council, the NATO-Russia Council as a platform for dialogue, meaningful dialogue with Russia.

Let me add one more thing about dialogue.

We need dialogue to try to strive for a better relationship with Russia.

But even if we don't believe in a better relationship with Russia in the foreseeable future, we should talk to Russia. We need dialogue to manage a difficult relationship. Dialogue is for instance about arms control. And even during the coldest period of the Cold time, we were able to talk to the Soviet Union, about arms control. We need dialogue to prevent incidents, accidents [inaudible] risk reduction in our interaction with Russia.

So, so, I strongly believe that, we should prevent any room for miscalculation, misunderstanding about the readiness of Allies to defend each other, but based on that we can sit down and talk to Russia, because Russia is our neighbor and we should do whatever we can to reduce tensions and at least manage a difficult relationship with a neighbour.

JAMES STAVRIDIS: Thank you, Secretary General and thank you, Ambassador Kornblum and also for your long, long service in the diplomatic corps and your ambassadorship to Germany at a very important time. Sir, thank you.

Secretary General, I might just take the moderators prerogative and add a fifth C, since you added Crimea. The one I'm going to add is: what about NATO where it's really cold? So I'd like to hear your thoughts on the High North, something as a Norwegian you understand deeply. I think I once said to your chief of defense General Harald Sunde that you know I really didn't want to

go all the way up North. It was so cold and the weather was so bad and he said: Jim, there is no bad weather, only bad equipment.

Norway, understands the High North, I think, perhaps better than any other NATO ally with the possible exception of Canada. The two of you, however, have had different views as nations on the High North, low tension. Could you say a word about NATO and its views up there where it's really, really cold?

JENS STOLTENBERG:

So first of all, Jim, I know that you know the cold, the High North and cold environment up there quite well. You have been there and, and as NATO's Supreme Commander you know that part of our Alliance very well.

Second, for me it is important to say that the High North, the Arctic is not something beyond NATO territory, it is within our area of responsibility. You mentioned Canada but also the United States, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, we are NATO members, and we are Arctic states with territory, land, but also territorial waters, which are in the High North, north of the Arctic Circle. Almost half of Norway is actually in the Arctic. So we should, you didn't do that, but sometimes we speak about the Arctic as something beyond NATO. No, the Arctic is inside NATO, and five Arctic states, our NATO Allies, and we are present.

But, and you also were right at that what we always said is that the High North, we have low tensions. It's still High North, we think is a bit too easy to say that we have low tensions but we should strive to have at least not as high tensions as we have, as we have other places in our relationship with Russia. Because we need to work together. And that's exactly what we do in the Arctic.

I welcome the fact that NATO Allies are working with Russia in the Arctic Council, in the Barents Council, in this regional cooperation between the countries in the Barents region.

Not least on issues like search and rescue, environment, energy and so on. I think there is potential, not only potential, we actually see that that NATO Allies are working with Finland, Sweden as countries outside the Alliance, but also with Russia. It demonstrates that dialogue works, also when we have a difficult relationship with our neighbour, Russia.

The strategic importance of the High North, the Arctic has always been

there, but with the melting of the ice. And the melting of the ice has been regarded as a kind of first step towards more commercial traffic.

So far, we have not seen that much but potentially it will be more ships sailing from Asia to Europe, over the Northeast Passage. And military operations will change when the ice is melting. And this is not something that will potentially happen in the future. It is happening now. The extent of the ice in the Arctic North Pole has diminished significantly already. And it will continue to do so as we see increased global warming.

Increased Russian presence, more Russian bases in the High North has also triggered the need for more NATO presence, and we have increased our presence there with more naval capabilities, presence in the air, and not least, the importance of protecting transatlantic undersea cables transmitting a lot of data.

So, we need to be present in the Arctic, we need to step up and the increase readiness of our forces also affect our ability to be present in the Arctic.

The last thing I would say is that, if you look at the map, it's very easy to think...Actually Russia and the United States, they are very close, you just pass the North Pole. And that's the shortest distance between our two continents. And we have to remember that even though the maps normally confuse us a bit because if you look at the globe you see the proximity between Russia and the North America. You can see there, crossing the North Pole.

JAMES STAVRIDIS: Well, Sir, we have about 10 minutes left. We've got six or seven questions in the queue so we'll kind of consider this a bit of a lightning round here at the end. Laura, can you see how quickly we can get through some of these questions so make them move, thank you.

MODERATOR: We will take the next question from Jane Harman.

JANE HARMAN: Thank you. It consoles me that both of you are so close to NATO and still heading NATO, it means a lot to me and certainly my colleagues at the Wilson Center. I also want to salute the service of our immediate past ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison, my colleague from Congress, who I think did a magnificent job.

Here's my question. I was thinking of what are the strategic advantages of NATO, compared to other organizations in Europe or other organizations the US belongs to, to meet current threats? And here's an idea. The most

important threat right now is the pandemic and NATO and certainly the US defense apparatus are extremely good at logistics. Is it a goal of NATO or should it be a goal of NATO, with our participation, to master the logistics for the world of distributing vaccines, and not just distributing them but making sure that get into arms? Wouldn't that build enormous goodwill for any follow on activities of NATO and also enormous goodwill for the US as it re-enters, hopefully, a friendly set of alliances?

JENS STOLTENBERG:

I will now try to be short, because only 10 minutes left or even less than. But first of all, I must say Kay Bailey Hutchison she has been really a good friend and a strong supporter and a very staunch supporter of our Alliance. And I really appreciate working with her the time she was Ambassador of United States to NATO.

Second, the strategic advantage of NATO is that NATO is the only institution that brings together North America and Europe, every day, in NATO.

We are the most successful alliance in history because we are actually military alliance, 30 allies, standing together. So as long as we stand together we can manage any threats from any direction.

Thirdly on COVID. Well, NATO has already coordinated and facilitated help from our militaries to the civilian efforts of dealing with the pandemic.

And you also see across the Alliance, in different ways but across the Alliance, we have seen how military has helped to support the civilian efforts to combat the pandemic. Transporting patients, transporting medical equipment, setting up military field hospitals, helping to control borders and now also, again, it differs a bit between Allied countries, but our military, supported often by NATO, are also helping with the rollout of the vaccines.

So, different allies need help in different ways but NATO has coordinated and the military has provided a lot of help already and I'd like to see more of that in the future.

JAMES STAVRIDIS: Thank you so much Jane excellent question, I agree. Next question please Laura. MODERATOR: We'll take the next question from Ivo Daalder.

IVO DAALDER: Secretary General, thanks so much for being there. Jim Great to see you, was wonderful to do our adventure together for so

many years.

Jens, I just wanted to follow up on your answer to John Kornblum's important question on Russia. And you're rightfully stressing the importance of dialogue.

I am struck that 50 years after the Harmel Report, 55 years after the Harmel report and 45 years after we had a serious arms control engagement. We have no more arms control. INF is gone. The Conventional Forces agreement is gone, the Vienna Document is gone. Even the Open Skies agreement has disappeared.

And I wonder whether you could, just in a few minutes, say something about how NATO is going to get back into the arms control frame, starting with, first of all, having a dialogue among the Allies themselves about what it is that we seek and how we might be able to enhance that dimension of our relationship with Russia, which is, has been so critical and for the future of our security will remain critical.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you, Ivo. I will again try to be telegraphic. Arms control has been, and still is, extremely important for NATO. NATO has been on the forefront of efforts on arms control for decades. Therefore, we are also extremely concerned that we have seen that not all, but much of the arms control architecture that has been developed over decades has now unraveled.

You mentioned some of the examples, especially the demise of the INF Treaty. Therefore, I also strongly welcome the recent decision by the United States and Russia to extend the New START, which is actually the only remaining arms control agreement, limiting the number of nuclear warheads in the world. The extension of the New START should not be the end, it should be the beginning of a renewed effort on arms control.

And I think there are at least a couple of things that are important.

First, we need to extend arms control to more weapon systems than the strategic weapons which are covered by New START. Especially Russia has a high number of intermediate range systems and non-strategic or tactical systems, and they are not covered by New START. So we need some kind of agreement, whether it's another agreement or just expanded START agreement that covers all these other systems.

Second, we need to address the importance of getting China on board. China is becoming more and more global military power. And with global

strength also comes global responsibilities. And China should be part of the future arms control.

And thirdly, new disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, autonomous systems, facial recognition are now in the process of changing the nature of warfare, as fundamentally as the Industrial Revolution. And again, we don't have the final answers, but this should also impact the way we do arms control. There are some serious ethical questions and some arms control issues related to new disruptive technologies that I think NATO should be a platform to address.

JAMES STAVRIDIS: Ivo, great to see you and thanks for your good work in this world of international relations at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Secretary General, we're going to impose on you to do one more question and I think that'll wrap up our time together. Laura, last question please.

MODERATOR: We'll take the last question from John Jumper.

JOHN JUMPER: Hello Jim, good to see you again. Mr. Secretary, thank you for this opportunity. I was Commander of the chief staff of the Air Force, US Air Force and Commander US Air Forces Europe during Kosovo operations. My question is, the issues we've discussed here today, I want to add another C, Jim, if that's okay and that's Charter.

We've gone through this list of issues which are very much global in nature. And would seem to expand our horizon behind the sort of regional context of the current Charter, and the mentality of NATO, I might add. During the operations I was involved with, some nations actually cited the Charter as for reasons not to do things. And so the question is, Mr. Secretary General, is it time for a review of the Charter to insert some more agility, to reflect this sort of global role that we've discussed here today? And to actually be this force of stability that gets some global notoriety for our efforts, more than we perhaps do today? Thank you.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you so much. I agree that NATO must be agile and to change, and always look to how we can adapt to evolving security environment. NATO is the most successful alliance in history, partly because we have been able to stand together, 30 Allies, but also very much because we have been able to change when the world is changing. And that's the kind of need for permanent change since the world continues to change.

But I don't think that the Charter in itself is the challenge.

I think actually the beauty with the Washington Treaty, the founding charter of NATO, is that it's very short, very brief document, and it has worked, and it has been.. it has enabled change.

Because as I briefly mentioned, for 40 years NATO did one thing and that was to deter the Soviet Union in Europe. Period. And then, suddenly, the Soviet Union was dissolved and the Warsaw Pact disappeared. And then people asked: what should we do? Out of area or out of business. And we went out of area, we didn't change the Charter, we actually, we did something that was unthinkable few years ahead.

We went into Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as US was part of few years later, started the missions and operations, the airstrikes in Serbia and Kosovo. We didn't change the Charter, but we just changed our interpretation of what it means to be part of a collective defense alliance.

And then, if anyone told you in August 2001 that NATO was going to go into Afghanistan that was absolutely impossible. And then, after a few months, the whole of NATO was there, and we've been in Afghanistan for 20 years. Our biggest military operation ever. We didn't change the Charter, we just changed the way we use the Charter to protect Allies, and then we saw the need that to protect the United States, we invoked Article 5 of the Founding Charter as a response to terrorist attack on the United States, and now we need to adapt again.

So, that's also one of the reasons why I think that instead of changing the Charter, we should change that Strategic Concept which builds on the Charter. Because when we agree that Strategic Concept back in 2010, China is not mentioned at all. So the fundamental shifting of the global balance of power with the rise of China is not mentioned in the current Strategic Concept.

Russia is mentioned as something we strive for a strategic partnership with Russia, that's the way we refer to Russia. Climate change is hardly mentioned at all.

So, so I think, as I understand what you say. I totally agree with your intention. But I think the best way of doing that is to renew the Strategic Concept. But most importantly, to act. And that's what I put forward in my NATO 2030 proposals. There are eight proposals, strategic level proposals, on how we actually can do more together, on resilience, on technology, on climate change, but also on deterrence and defense, including more common funding for deterrence and defense activities in this Alliance. Because I think

that will demonstrate that NATO is the organizing framework for collective defence for all NATO Allies.

And therefore I hope also that when President Biden comes to Brussels later on this year at the NATO Summit we can agree, a forward looking, agile, ambitious agenda for this Alliance, as we continue to adapt to a changing world.

JAMES STAVRIDIS: Well, that's a wonderful place to leave. General Jumper, Sir, thank you for your excellent question and your service to the Alliance and to our nation. Secretary General, you have been absolutely terrific you've walked us around the Alliance and really around the world in so many very powerful ways. We're lucky to have you at the helm of this superb organization. On behalf of the 300 members of the Council who've listened to this David A Morse lecture, thank you sir and you can't see them all but I will stand in for 300 people applauding your fine performance. Thank you, Mr. Secretary General, I salute you.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you so much. Thank you. This was really good. Thank you.