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## **A Family Matter? Exploring Welfare Policy Alignment Between The GOP(s) And The European Populist Radical Right**

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**Universiteit  
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**A FAMILY MATTER? EXPLORING WELFARE POLICY ALIGNMENT BETWEEN THE GOP(s)  
AND THE EUROPEAN POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT**

**(MSc) Public Administration with a Specialism in International and European Governance**

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*To my wonderful friends who dealt with my ramblings about the radical right for months on end, I couldn't have done it without you. Manfredi, I can't even put to words how much your reality checks from Paris, London, Rome or wherever you have happen to be over this process have helped.*

*To Dr Fabio Bulfone, thank you for encouraging me to take on this ambitious project when I worried I might not be able to wrestle it down. That—and your patience—are deeply appreciated.*

*Finally, to my family who supported me in this as in all my hare-brained ideas, thank you for everything.*

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## Abstract

*Deploying a novel conception framework offering new understandings of familialism and the policy logic of PRR party family, this study will argue that the Republican Party's family welfare policy overlaps with that of European PRRPs to a currently limited and inconsistent, but significantly growing extent. Evidence from South Carolina and Wyoming—two of the four states selected for investigation to provide a cross-section of the party—indicates concerted familialisation, while data from Florida and Indiana implies GOP support fortification of the care role of the traditional family is conditional on exclusion of the Other, socially, ethnically, and nationally defined. Both policy offerings are understood as features of PRRP welfare logics concerning the family, but the substantial cross-state variation and continuance of long-standing neoliberal policy choices are too significant to decisively assert a Republican Party re-alignment with a radical right logic on the family. Nonetheless, intensified support for the 'natural' family since the early-mid 2010s can be discerned across all cases, leaving open the prospect of a truer policy overlap in the future. From this, the contributions of this study are two-fold: a clearer picture of an oft-posed but ill-understood transatlantic transmission of radical right logics, and an original, conceptually rigorous means to investigate it.*

## Introduction

There is a growing literature exploring the politics or policy impacts of the 'New Right' factions that have swept into public attention and many European legislatures in the last decades – so much so that noting the explosion of interest has become a truism.<sup>1</sup> Such focus is important: 'populist radical right-wing parties' from Poland to Hungary to Italy have won places in government, voices in parliaments, and exerted pressure on mainstream governance, making their policy priorities of ever-growing relevance to Western societies.<sup>2</sup> More fundamentally, studies of the conceptual mechanics of this right-wing faction repeatedly argue it carries a profound rejection of the liberal international order, from online 'alt-right' communities making open accelerationist calls for social collapse<sup>3</sup> to politicians rejecting multiculturalism in 'defence' of their nation.<sup>4</sup> Determining the extent of change these actors do and aim to effect is therefore a key forecast of (potentially destabilising) social transformation. However, the bounds of the 'New Right' are still contested. Political science studies usually treat this phenomenon through nativist European political parties<sup>5</sup> while intellectual genealogies<sup>6</sup> and discourse analyses<sup>7</sup> trace wider radical trans-Eurasian—and transatlantic—networks. Clarity on the extent of a shared agenda and logic is sorely needed.

Their welfare attitudes and policy are increasingly popular sites of analysis. Sitting at crossroads of issues of redistribution and of (protecting) social institutions, welfare stances intersect perspectives on the extent of: collective responsibility; entitlements to equality; the nature of the social units including family and community; and the place for an active role for the state. As such, analysis of this policy area can provide a cross-section of this party family's social outlook. Indeed, the loose contemporary cohort of identitarians has distinguished themselves from older radical right traditions—such as fascism—by denying they believe in biological differences between races; influential thinkers such as de Benoist insist *cultural* distinctiveness instead, but by emphasising 'birth culture' code in an immutable divide at the point of being born to parents of the (historic and ethnic) nationality (or not).<sup>8</sup> Considered alongside the lionisation of men as 'protectors' (of the family and the

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<sup>1</sup> Enns-Jedenastik, 2022, 154; Akkerman, 2015, 37; Bale et al., 2010, 410

<sup>2</sup> Meardi & Guardiancich, 2022, 130; Aubo-Chadi & Krause, 2018, 831-834

<sup>3</sup> Ross & Bevensee, 2020, 18

<sup>4</sup> Zúquette, 2019, 126; Michelsen & De Orellana, 2019, 278; De Orellana & Michelsen, 2019, 748

<sup>5</sup> Muddle, 2007, 5-8

<sup>6</sup> Betz, 2020, 4-6; de Orellana & Michelsen, 2019, 746-8; Bartee, 2019, 116

<sup>7</sup> Lyons, 2017, 5 ; Zúquette, 2019, 296-310

<sup>8</sup> De Orellana & Michelsen, 2019, 748, 754

nation)<sup>9</sup> and a commitment to heterosexual normativity in an idealisation of supposedly more moral past of traditional marriages,<sup>10</sup> a conception of the ‘natural’ family can be understood as rooting major claims of the radical right. This central role in ‘New Right’ logics means welfare policies—specifically familial ones—can reflect core mechanisms in this tradition. Thus, these stances are fruitful fields of study for breaking down this political phenomena.

This opening has been recognised by scholars: the expanding number of works have fallen into increasingly well-entrenched camps. Radical right welfare positions are mostly explored from the perspective of party politics—that is what the ‘demand’ from populist radical right constituencies is, which is taken to influence their programmatic offerings—or from comparative politics, entailing analysis of what such parties ‘supply’.<sup>11</sup> An emergent strand seeks to combine these traditions, holding the tendencies of PRRPs and their (expanding) voter base are influenced by conditions of political economy – including the shape of the welfare state. This formulation usefully puts the emphasis back on policies, which its proponents argue it offers a mediating ‘third level of analysis’.<sup>12</sup> This additionally usefully directs scholars away from indirect indicators of radical right governance implications such as voter-base preferences (mediated by the assumption parties understand and will adjust to their constituents’ views) or manifestos (which as ‘forward-facing’ documents may disguise preferences). Component to this, focusing on policy formation directs away from well-exploited sources such as the ‘Comparative Manifesto Project’ collection of European party programmes,<sup>13</sup> or the ‘V-Party’ dataset of political statements.<sup>14</sup> This means that the expanding scholarship buttress the conclusions of the field from further evidence. However, studies adopting this approach have frequently been directed toward how welfare policy choices can mitigate far right support, making them more elaborations of general comparative political economy analysis related to the far right rather than distinctive investigations from the perspective of the PRRPs.<sup>15</sup> Intending to offer a comparison of Republican Party state-level familial welfare policy, this thesis will focus on policy ‘supply’ for its own sake. This will offer a distinct direct perspective while building from the central insights of the emerging literature: that comparative and political analysis perspectives should be integrated to deepen causal understandings of the collection of identitarian actors broadly designated the ‘New Right’,<sup>16</sup> and that policy investigations are the best means to do so.

#### *America: An Underexplored Comparative*

With America’s economic might, place at the centre of the liberal international order and increasing prominence of radical right-wing actors questioning the legitimacy of its democratic order and the importance of (especially racial) social justice,<sup>17</sup> this global power is a key context in which to understand rising radical right-wing behaviours.

Genealogies of the Republican Party suggest a sharp turn away from that of Reagan in the 1980s as the world’s breeding ground of neoconservatism, complete with a self-confident belief in America’s global leadership (and the liberalising potential of globalisation), commitment to minimizing the involvement of the state—in the market or protections against it—and the profoundly neoliberal aim to promote ‘personal responsibility’ through moral and work-related conditions on welfare assistance.<sup>18</sup> These studies trace a progressively growing preoccupation with cultural exclusiveness, building from the conspiratorial alarm sounded by 1990s Republican iconoclast Patrick Buchanan over the state supposedly failing to address traditional ‘Middle America’ or national and moral decline, purportedly driven by declining (ethnically European) birth rates and pointing toward ‘Death of the West’.<sup>19</sup> These themes are found to be perpetuated in the anti-establishment movement that swept Republicans to power in 2010—the ‘Tea Party’—which repudiated neoconservatism and expanding

<sup>9</sup> Vandiver, 2020, 18; Blee, 2020 419

<sup>10</sup> Drolet & Williams, 2020, 35

<sup>11</sup> Rathgeb & Busemeyer, 2022, 3-10; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2022, 24

<sup>12</sup> Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2022, 27; Enns-Jedenastik, 2022; Chueri, 2021

<sup>13</sup> Akkerman, 2015, 41; Afonso & Rennwald, 2018, 178

<sup>14</sup> Enns-Jedenastik, 2022, 16

<sup>15</sup> Rathgeb & Busemeyer, 2022, 6-8; Busemeyer; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2022, 43; Swank & Betz, 2003, 215

<sup>16</sup> Zúquette, 2019, 77

<sup>17</sup> Zúquette, 2019, 292-300; Nieli, 2019, 145-150

<sup>18</sup> Drolet & Williams, 2020, 28

<sup>19</sup> Ashbee, 2019, 128-129

social safeguards, yet appeared to defend ‘New Deal’ entitlements such as ‘Medicaid’ which had mostly benefitted white Americans.<sup>20</sup> Most starkly, Trump’s rise is understood as a break with traditional conservatism. Though building from some of the same policy proposals present in the Bush administration, such as tighter restrictions on illegal immigrants, the demonization and exclusion of refugees and undocumented immigrants (including those arriving as children) arguably became the major narrative of the party.<sup>21</sup> Alongside this, influential Republicans attempted to recast the GOP welfare offering for American families, introducing legislation to boost child tax credits,<sup>22</sup> seeming to specify a nationalist duality. In fact, Trump’s zero-sum perspective on economic trade and narrative of ‘radical cultural despair’ but populist self-portrayal as a saviour suggests a growing streak of ‘the reactionary nostalgia’ of the New Right even within the highest echelons of the Republican party.<sup>23</sup> If Trump himself did not self-consciously proclaim himself the intellectual heir of (American) populist radical right tradition, this characterisation remains credible given these substantive choices, and the prominence of outward identitarians within that administration. Alongside senior presidential advisors including Stephen Miller referencing the lessons on unchecked immigration of dystopian French ‘New Right’ texts,<sup>24</sup> deliberate linkages are clear. Trump and then-prominent GOP operatives such as Steve Bannon have positioned themselves, alongside European ‘New Right’ actors like Le Pen, as part of an international movement against ‘globalism’.<sup>25</sup> This strongly suggests a growing basic shared worldview (notable for some continuation but on identitarian perspectives decided divergence from mainstream conservatism). In this, there is evidence for a paradigmatic shift that has, at least temporally, aligned with the rise of the ‘New Right’ in Europe.

There are few welfare policy—and in particular familial—studies of the radical right incorporating comparison with the European radical right; methodological difficulties including disunified databases and two-party system that blocks the rise of the easily identifiable new radical right parties have dissuaded scholars. The initial works attempting this have used unsatisfactory workarounds that compromise the comparability of the treatment groups, such as drawing material from Trump’s speeches exclusively, while the European data is collected from party statements proper.<sup>26</sup> Given this early stage state of investigation of ‘New Right’ trends stretching across the Atlantic, a firmer understanding of overlap between the Republican party more broadly and European PRRPs is needed.

This dissertation will aim to provide this deeper understanding. It will investigate the extent to which the Republican Party’s family welfare policy reflects the policy agendas of European PRRPs, seeking the answer to the research question:

**To what extent does the Republican Party’s family welfare policy overlap with those of European Radical Right parties?**

Offering a sharper picture of the extent of a shared agenda will contribute to the field by making clearer the value (or not) of pursuing such comparatives in greater depth, such as through full time-series analysis (to investigate correlation) or large-N studies (to begin to make causal claims). Establishing this assessment by creating a set of expectations of family welfare policies from the European radical right—and so the core of PRRP scholarship—then applying these in another context provides (a) a method for future studies (b) theory generation – and testing.

Deploying a novel conception framework offering new understandings of familialism and the policy logic of PRR party family, this study will argue that the Republican Party’s family welfare policy overlaps with that of European PRRPs to a currently limited and inconsistent, but significantly growing extent. Evidence from South Carolina and Wyoming—two of the four states selected for investigation to provide a cross-section of the party—indicates concerted familialisation, while data from Florida and Indiana implies GOP support fortification of the care role of the traditional family is conditional on exclusion of the Other, socially,

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<sup>20</sup> Drolet & Williams, 2020, 44; Disch, 2011, 123;

<sup>21</sup> De Orellana & Michelsen, 2019, 761

<sup>22</sup> Phelps, 2017; Stein, 2019

<sup>23</sup> Drolet & Williams, 2020, 38, 42-44; Ashbee, 2019, 126-130

<sup>24</sup> Peltier & Kulish, 2019

<sup>25</sup> De Orellana & Michelsen, 2019, 765-766

<sup>26</sup> Fenger, 2018, 193

ethnically, and nationally defined. Both policy offerings are understood as features of PRRP welfare logics concerning the family, but the substantial cross-state variation and continuance of long-standing neoliberal policy choices are too significant to decisively assert a Republican Party re-alignment with a radical right logic on the family. Nonetheless, intensified support for the ‘natural’ family since the early-mid 2010s can be discerned across all cases, leaving open the prospect of a truer policy overlap in the future. From this, the contributions of this study are two-fold: a clearer picture of an oft-positied but ill-understood transatlantic transmission of radical right logics, and an original, conceptually rigorous means to investigate it.

### *Structure*

To do so, this paper will first offer an extended discussion to select and tie together its theoretical framework. The review of literature on the welfare state first finds that (de)familialism is the best means to compare family policy, but that this concept’s subdimensions this must be minorly elaborated to include the extent of exclusionary logic. The thesis then briefly grounds its selection of cash allowance and childcare programs as the most appropriate policy indicators, building from this understanding. Turning to the object of study, a clear definition of the ideology—and the parties manifesting this—is offered to provide a foundation for a transatlantic comparative. Comprehensively accounting for scholarship on this so-defined ‘Populist Radical Right’, the following subsection offers a clear set of expectations on the family policy of the radical right. These hypotheses are expressed in terms the subdimensions of (de)familialism, staying true to the selected means to evaluate the welfare state. Through these two branches, therefore, the standards against which to evaluate the Republican Party are soundly formed.

The second chapter explains the research design. This traces the logic of case selection, then specifies the welfare programs which capture the relevant indicators of (de)familialism, and the means used to collect data on these. To prove the approach adopted is the most rigorous possible, at each of these three stages, potential critiques are addressed. These two chapters, taken together, fully operationalise an investigation of the overlap between (state) Republican party family policy, and that of PRRPs.

Finally, the empirical investigation is divided into four case study explorations, with judgements formed for the nature of the family policy against the hypotheses in each of the four states. Doing so in turn grounds a final discussion and conclusion on how far the Republican Party *as a whole* aligns with PRRP family policy; short of total confirmation, though not a causal exploration, the case study approach then hints at the potentially relevant factors explaining difference.

## **Theoretical Framework**

Such a research project bisects literatures on the radical right and welfare state typologies. This bridges political theory and comparative political economy, making for a crowded theoretical space. Importantly, though, these are interconnected: theory selection from welfare state typologies (via appraising the conceptual mechanics from which these build) makes clear the valid scope of comparative assessment *as well as* the appropriate dimensions for analysis; and assessments of radical right linkages informs what family policy behavioural expectations are possible, within this scaffold. This paper will therefore deal with each in turn, detailing the relevant reasoning through fields littered with competing formulations, to—soundly—progressively specify its conceptual framework.

### Assessing the Welfare State: Delineating Dimensions & Indicators for Analysis

The typology conventionally used to understand and compare welfare regimes has its uses for conceptualising contours of welfare states, but lacks the complexity to account for this aspect of the welfare state. This—and the need for an elaborated alternative conception of (de)familialism—is clear when its national emphasis, selected indicators and quantifying dimensions are broken down.



Esping-Andersen's 'social democratic' 'liberal' and 'conservative' 'Worlds of Welfare' have oriented studies of the welfare state since 1990, with his typology considered 'paradigmatic'.<sup>27</sup> This held the extent of (de)stratification—which is the embedded 'social ordering'—and the degree of (de)commodification—which relates to the ability of an individual to have a livelihood without requiring labour market participation—are the distinguishing factors between welfare regime types.<sup>28</sup> Expanded comparatives have demonstrated this remains a useful framework: Yoruk's, which incorporates the OECD countries and 52 emerging markets, aligned with Esping-Andersen's claim to a historically path dependent development in relation to social/labour power structures.<sup>29</sup> More relevantly, studies of the US welfare system(s) have repeatedly characterised it by strict conditionality and poverty alleviation<sup>30</sup>—with limited reach even measured against the conservatively calculated Federal Poverty Line<sup>31</sup>—that suggests the American welfare experience is one under 'varieties of liberalism' (or 'neoliberalism').<sup>32</sup> This implies understandings of welfare policy—especially comparatives—should account for his redistributive dimensions (and distinctions).

Though a useful situating point, this typology is insufficiently sensitive. Esping-Andersen's use of national indicators in expenditure anchors analysis to centralised policymaking. This excludes the devolved and negotiated power dynamics within federal systems, which are particularly strong in relation to issues of redistribution and social support, given their place in constructing a sense of community. The typology of countries therefore arguably manifests "methodological nationalism" in assuming the appropriate point of analysis is the nation-state.<sup>33</sup> Welfare provision in America, for instance, is mediated through the policy choices of state governments significantly empowered under the Constitution. This has been especially true since the so-called 'devolution revolution' of the welfare reforms of the 1990s, in which the creation of 'Federal Block Grants' delegated the spending and administrative choices of numerous national programs to the regional authorities.<sup>34</sup> Bruch, Meyers and Gornick's rigorous comparative found these manifests 'cross-state inequality' in proportion to the degree of state autonomy, indicating even nominally federal programs fail to guarantee a uniform level of welfare.<sup>35</sup> Further 50-state quantitative comparisons of family policy by Parolin and Daiger von Gleichen found state welfare packages consistently diverged: they specified clusters of those 'commodifying and familising' (25 states), displaying 'light decommodification and defamilisation' (15 states), offering 'moderate decommodification and defamilisation' (9 states), and one providing 'high decommodification and defamilisation'.<sup>36</sup> Thus, the overarching shape of welfare state administration dictates *state level analysis* is necessary to characterise national trends in welfare policy. Put simply, this demonstrates an analysis of the familial welfare offerings of the Republican party would be most firmly grounded through state-level policymaking comparatives; Esping-Andersen's 'Worlds of Welfare' are unsuitable.

More fundamentally, Esping-Andersen's typology is particularly inapt for evaluating family policy. The bulk of the indicators he uses to gauge welfare policy concern social insurance against *historic* social risks such as occupational hazards, irreflexive of the 'social investment policies' developing human capital and targeting the 'new social risks' such as family/work balance and precarious or low-skilled work.<sup>37</sup> This excludes programs which affect labour market participation indirectly under which family welfare could be usefully quantified, such as universal preschool, which partly releases adults from care responsibilities.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the evidence of this emergent class of policies implies welfare states increasingly contain competing priorities between such historic and 'new social risks', meaning Esping-Andersen's indicators cannot fully capture a welfare state's

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<sup>27</sup> Daigneault et al., 2021, 239

<sup>28</sup> Danforth, 2014, 165

<sup>29</sup> Yoruk, 2022, 119-122

<sup>30</sup> Daigneault et al., 2021, 242

<sup>31</sup> Bruch, Meyers & Gornick, 2018, 10

<sup>32</sup> Daiger von Gleichen & Parolin, 2020, 945

<sup>33</sup> Daigneault et al., 2021, 240

<sup>34</sup> Bruch, Meyers & Gornick, 2018, 6-7

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 6-7

<sup>36</sup> Parolin & Daiger von Gleichen in (eds) Niewenhuis & Van Lancker, 2020, 477-8

<sup>37</sup> Bonoli, 2005, 433-435

<sup>38</sup> Saxonberg, 2013, 27

characteristics.<sup>39</sup> This complexity dictates approaching welfare policy from its constitutive components, be it through detailed federalised analysis or through focusing more specifically on *an* aspect of the welfare state. Most importantly, his three welfare regime types are classified as ‘progressive’ on how far provisions secure a living standard independent of labour market participation.<sup>40</sup> This fails to appreciate that, far from aiming for de commodification, feminist policymaking efforts have concentrated on expanding the labour market participation of women so as to lessen dependence on the family, and thus the patriarchal family structure.<sup>41</sup> Welfare scholars employing gender lenses highlight the extent of policies enforcing ‘gender roles’<sup>42</sup> and others focusing on intergenerational/gendered duties of care,<sup>43</sup> indicating a strong biopolitical dimension: in the face of this, Esping-Andersen’s fundamentally socio-economic index falls short.

#### *Defamilialism:<sup>44</sup> defining this dimension*

Supplanting de-commodification, this thesis therefore adopts the concept of ‘(de)familialisation’. Itself fiercely contested, competing conceptualisations revolve around how policies influence care responsibilities and divert from (or help maintain) single-earner (gendered) income models.<sup>45</sup> This was originally defined by Lister in 1994 as ‘the degree to which one can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of family relationships, either through paid work or social security provision’, new insight has usefully elaborated.<sup>46</sup> Explicitly building on Leitner’s 2003 formulation, Lohmann and Zagel’s delineation of defamilizing policies as ‘*welfare state provisions (social policies and regulations) that reduce care and financial responsibilities and dependencies between family members*’ [my italics] better specifies the integral aspect of (patriarchal) *care roles*, and the responsibility of intergenerational care.<sup>47</sup>

Highlighting the policy design in relation to family structure also usefully elaborates past economic autonomy. This allows greater specificity in differentiation on *how* a policy effects dependencies—whether this is removed from the home—while accommodating this being encouraged by shifting the onus of care to the voluntary sector or market, as well as the state.<sup>48</sup> Some hold the extent a policy ‘degenderises’—fosters ‘the elimination of gender roles’—is the more compelling conception as the notion of ‘genderising’ already roots feminist at the centre of feminist scholarship, and therefore has wider critical meaning.<sup>49</sup> However, the ‘familialisation/defamilialisation’ conception’s attention to the distinction between home care and externalised provision of care is valuable, especially in better reflecting the market-oriented ‘liberal’ US welfare system. In fact, existing comparative literature on social policy of the radical right is mostly filtered through dimensions of ‘familialism’,<sup>50</sup> meaning retaining this concept improves generalisability.

More importantly, this definition provides the strongest basis for more nuanced differentiation. With classification systems abound, this definition can incorporate a crucial set of subdimensions: divide between ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ familialism.

These subdimensions sit within Leitner’s 2004 typology. She offers an overarching axis between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ familialisation and ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ defamilisation’, specifying within this: ‘*explicit familialism*’ that fortifies the family’s place in caring roles and further does not substantially provide for alternatives, therefore insisting of familial responsibility (mixing ‘strong’ familialisation and ‘weak’ defamilisation); ‘*implicit familialism*’ that does not promote defamilisation or support care functions, leaving the family the default

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<sup>39</sup> Boloni, 2005, 442

<sup>40</sup> Danforth, 2014, 165

<sup>41</sup> Saxonberg, 2013, 26

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 33

<sup>43</sup> Leitner, 2003, 358, 365-68; Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 52

<sup>44</sup> The spellings of ‘familialism’ vary significantly across national context. This thesis will use the UK English standard ‘familialism’, ‘familialising’ and ‘familialisation’, but preserve original spellings used by scholars who use alternatives.

<sup>45</sup> Blofield & Franzoni, 2015, 42; Saxonberg 2013, 33; Saraceno & Keck, 2011, 372

<sup>46</sup> Lister, 1994, 34 in Saxonberg, 2013, 28

<sup>47</sup> Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 52

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 52-53

<sup>49</sup> Saxonberg, 2013, 33

<sup>50</sup> Ennser-Jedenastik, 2022, 156; Meardi & Guardincich, 2022, 129

primary caretaker; and ‘*optional familialism*’ buttressing both family care and externalisation of care work.<sup>51</sup> Though not defined within her ideal types, Leitner acknowledges an associated dimension of ‘gendered familialism’ relating to distinguishing gender roles, and clarifies that the ‘optional familialism’, in not interceding in family relations, ‘reproduces existing patriarchal norms’ and inequalities.<sup>52</sup> As such, the distinction of these two ‘varieties’ directly expresses an essential divide: how outwardly the (traditional) caring function is reinforced.<sup>53</sup> This introduces an element of intentionality—and normative framing—that provides a useful distinction in the context of family policy, where welfare offerings such as paid parental leave can have unclear *effects* on the extent of ‘familialisation’, depending on the peculiarities of their design and context.

The producers of the preferred definition, Lohmann and Zagel, offer their own more intricate typology that is certainly the most rigorously constructed in drawing from 11 conceptualisations of (de)familialism and a genealogy of the concept since its formulation in 1994.<sup>54</sup> Itself largely grounded in Leitner’s model, this makes mostly unnecessary conceptual innovation past this. Their work helpfully includes a bisecting notion of cultural legacies, noting that ‘attitudinal differences/norms’ can influence policies and be influenced by them.<sup>55</sup> Aside from this, splitting into ‘optional familialism’ and ‘optional individualism’ distracts from how these manifest in the same way: namely, a *choice* between care models. Indeed, the replacement of defamilialism with individualism (defined as policies treating individuals separate from the family) here and overall moves away from the accounting for care dependencies which Lohmann and Zagel themselves highlight as key validators of definitions in family policy.<sup>56</sup> Equally, the ‘*explicit*’ familialism of Leitner’s original formulation rather than the pair’s ‘strong familialism’ aligns more coherently with the ‘implicit familialism’, easing use, and better highlighting how outwardly the care function is defended.<sup>57</sup> As indicated by scholars such as Saraceno & Keck identifying variations on whether historic gender relations are deliberately enforced or not (‘familialism by default’ and ‘supported familialism’),<sup>58</sup> Leitner’s original distinction carries with it the most critical insight regardless. Leitner’s simpler typology therefore offers the greatest conceptual clarity.

Though they do not address this explicitly, the definitions selected and the typologies discussed hint at a final dimension to be acknowledged: a normative aspect, a social selection in addressing ‘the family’. Lohmann and Zagel’s ‘cultural legacies’, in being identified with culturally specific conceptions of appropriate roles, can be understood as revolving around *what is* the acceptable set of family relations.<sup>59</sup> Similarly, embedded in historic gender roles—the major focus of the ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ familialism divide—is the idea of a split between a (male) public, earning sphere and a (female) private, ‘intrinsically rewarding’ space.<sup>60</sup> When set in the context of the ‘golden age’ of the welfare state revolving around supporting the ‘breadwinner’ by protecting him from ‘life risks’,<sup>61</sup> this constitutes an ‘insider/outsider’ distinction. Indeed, in the language of social policy comparatives, targeting the family for support or the women in her ‘emancipation’ from the family could be described as ‘particularist’, or favouring ‘consumptive’ policies not ‘social investment’ ones.<sup>62</sup> Thus, gendered care roles are inherently tied to questions of exclusion. Works such as Blofield and Franzoni’s, which note that the effects of ‘optional’ and ‘implicit’ familialisation have differing effects across class lines (ie. whether child care services can be afforded independent of state support),<sup>63</sup> and Leitner’s reference to (heteronormative) married structures when discussing gender implications of explicit familialism<sup>64</sup> strongly suggest familialism

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<sup>51</sup> Leitner, 2003, 358-359

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 365-366

<sup>53</sup> Ennser-Jedanastik, 2022, 156

<sup>54</sup> Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 49-55, 60

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 54-55

<sup>56</sup> Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 49, 51-52

<sup>57</sup> Leitner, 2003, 358; Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 54-55

<sup>58</sup> Saraceno & Keck, 2011, 373;

<sup>59</sup> Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 54-55

<sup>60</sup> Blofield & Franzoni, 2015, 45

<sup>61</sup> Bonoli, 2005, 432

<sup>62</sup> Ennser-Jedanastik, 2022, 157

<sup>63</sup> Blofield & Franzoni, 2015, 47-48

<sup>64</sup> Leitner, 2003, 367-8; Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 54-55

entails *more specific* definitions of what—and who—constitutes ‘the family’ the state aims to support. Taken together, this reinforces the underlying relevance of exclusion.

Appreciating this, Jessoula et al.’s ‘exclusionary welfarism’ can be considered alongside the sub-dimensions of familialism, set in contrast to a ‘universal’ provision across social, ethnic and national groups or family structures.<sup>65</sup> Considering this alongside ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ familialism makes for an awkward addition in exclusion not neatly focusing on the preservation of (or challenge to) patriarchal structures. Still, just as Leitner notes the associated ‘gendered’ aspect but subsumes it within her existing categories, and Lohmann and Zagel’s identified of a normative element that bisects types of familialism, ‘exclusion’ can be understood within the subdimensions: this can be positioned as a normative, discursive element revealing the motivation (and potentially convoluted manifestation) of the policies these produce.<sup>66</sup> Explicit familialism will overall reinforce the prime place of the family while not reducing family care and financial responsibilities, but this could conceivably rest on positive or exclusionary logics. Support for the family’s care responsibility—and the gender roles this carries—could be a positive prioritisation of the (national, heteronormative) traditional family as the fundamental social unit, to be rewarded and sustained over funding distinctive relationships.<sup>67</sup> Alternatively, this could be defined by a negative, *regressive* rejection of other family structures, and so attempting to *preserve* this norm specifically by denying support to other forms while boosting familial responsibility. Conversely, policies actively reducing within-family dependencies—defamilialisation—might be driven by an inclusive, equalising intention: that is, only weakly supporting familialism and supporting other choices to make viable non-traditional relations.<sup>68</sup> Equally, the motivation could build from an aim to disrupt historic patriarchies, forcing change by excluding the earner/carer dynamic from supportive provisions. The remaining dimensions fall in neatly around this (discursive) divide. ‘Optional’ familialism fundamentally gives the individual/ individual family greater choice between modes of care, while ‘implicit’ familialism makes *necessary* certain structures. As such, the former sits within inclusive logics while the latter (even if not deliberately) restricts to a basic definition of the family role.




Figure 1. Own elaboration based on Lohmann and Zagel, 2016.

<sup>65</sup> Jessoula et al., 2021, 1

<sup>66</sup> Leitner, 2003, 355-366;

<sup>67</sup> Ennser-Jedenastik, 2022, 156

<sup>68</sup> Blofield & Franzoni, 2015, 39

Treating exclusion so reflects that exclusion is not a separate element of familialism, but an underlying factor helps shed light: adopting this understanding allows for deeper distinction within familialism that would otherwise have been lost. Further, this draws closer to discussions of ‘deservingness’ that are key to welfare state debates, especially on the radical right.<sup>69</sup> Appropriately, the radical right’s vocal defence of ‘the people’ before others indicates the way these actors define the nation could define radical right stances on family policy specifics.<sup>70</sup> Acknowledging and incorporating the possibility of ‘exclusionary’ or ‘inclusive’ (the latter defined by defending the universality of measures) is therefore important to making judgements on modern welfare state developments, and the radical right milieu.

### *Applicable indicators*

Surveys of the literature indicate that leave policies, family benefits, care services such as childcare, are the central measures of these dimensions of (de)familialism.<sup>71</sup> The first of these is generally considered to preserve parental reintegration to the workforce by protecting their positions while they provide infant care, but carriers with it unresolved debate over whether it is defamilialising or familialising.<sup>72</sup> There is little consensus on whether reserving some of the leave for parents ‘genderising’ or ‘degenderising’ in the extent it challenges gendered, traditional care divisions, as well as at what point the length of parental leave and what level of compensation constitutes ‘effective parental leave’ that will not disincentivise return to earning outside the home.<sup>73</sup> The nature of the policy implication could be addressed by detailed attention care intensity or adding assessments via outcome (the level of take-up, including by gender),<sup>74</sup> but even this would unnecessarily introduce a ‘fuzzy’ element of subjective and case judgement that might threaten the rigour of the evaluative criteria. For its lack of clarity, therefore, this study will not deploy parental leave as an indicator.

Firmly grounded by alignment with Leitner’s typology, Gornick et al.’s conceptualisation, Korpi’s study, and the comparative investigations of Ferrani’s,<sup>75</sup> Ennser-Jedanastik,<sup>76</sup> Meardi and Guardinachi<sup>77</sup> and Akkerman,<sup>78</sup> this work will instead adopt family ‘benefits’ or ‘allowances’ as the key measure of familialism. These, taking the form of transfers in cash, directed subsidy or in tax rebates to parents,<sup>79</sup> fundamentally aim to support or enhance how sustainable it is to care for family dependents (often independent of the work).<sup>80</sup> As such, they can be treated as a familialising policy par exemplar and the conditions under which they are granted as measures of the specific nature of this familialism. Allowing free spending from the funds, including purchase of care services, would offer ‘optional familialism’ by which in-family care is made financially viable but not the exclusive option.<sup>81</sup> Meanwhile, unless transmitted on a regular basis, the method of payment further may preclude *stable* support, which can therefore ‘implicitly’ perpetuate care reliance on a ‘breadwinner’ earner and ‘carer’ familialisation.<sup>82</sup> Specifically precluding spending on other care services, reinforcing gendered care designations such as in only offering benefits to mothers,<sup>83</sup> and even ‘rewarding’ greater numbers of children

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<sup>69</sup> Busemeyer et al., 2022, 82-83; Abts et al., 2020, 21-22

<sup>70</sup> Fenger, 2018, 196; Abts et al., 2020, 21-22

<sup>71</sup> Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 60

<sup>72</sup> Saraceno & Keck, 2011, 374-5

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 378

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 382

<sup>75</sup> Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 60

<sup>76</sup> Ennser-Jedanastik, 2022, 161

<sup>77</sup> Meardi & Guardinachi, 2022, 133

<sup>78</sup> Akkerman, 2015, 42

<sup>79</sup> Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 60

<sup>80</sup> Leitner, 2003, 156

<sup>81</sup> Saraceno & Keck, 2011, 386

<sup>82</sup> Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 56

<sup>83</sup> Saraceno & Keck, 2011, 386-388

with disproportionate rises in benefits, then, can be understood as reinforcing (and in promoting high natality, creating new) dependencies *within the family*, thus manifest an ‘explicit’ familialism.

Investigating via the provision of childcare, equally, advantageously can distinguish within defamilialism. Publicly subsidised childcare—whether through state provision or market provision supported by subsidies—removes care responsibilities from the home, usually on the premise that this will free mothers for labour market participation.<sup>84</sup> This ‘social investment’ policy lessens care burdens on the family, even if not completely if there is limited high-quality care available in the area, the funds granted are insufficient, or the hours of care are not full-time.<sup>85</sup> This therefore constitutes a defamilialising measure, if one effected by the policy design. Recognising this explanatory value, the extent of the provision for child care was used by nine of the eleven studies reviewed by Lohmann and Zagel.<sup>86</sup> As a result, adopting this as the indicator for defamilialism helpfully retains the generalisability of results.

As the element of exclusionary logic is formulated as a distinguishing feature *within* the dimensions, it can be best reflected as a *component* of the other indicators. The discursive frames in which policies are presented can confirm the logics behind what policy design choices indicate.<sup>87</sup> Alongside this, considering the indicators of family benefits and provision of child care with a particular focus on exclusion of social groups in the terms of access—such as requiring citizenship or disproportionately supporting married couples—can capture the final normative aspect of the subdimensions. As such, the extent of policy (and associated narratives) further restricting support to a certain definition of family, such as national or heteronormative, can reflect the lines of exclusion from ‘the family’.

This discussion of the suitability of the indicators makes clear precisely how the dimensions can be quantified. Embedded in the notion of family allowances adequately financially supporting stay-at-home care, and child care being providing an attractive alternative freeing family members from care during the work day is the question of whether the funding is sufficient: that is, *the generosity of this benefit*. As the outline of how the *type of provision* and the *terms of access* of the indicators allows them to capture the different subdimensions of (de)familialism makes further clear, the policy design (specifically rules relating to type of service and eligibility) is a second discriminating component. The interlinked feature of the narrative on this design confirms the explanatory value of these. Indeed, the insight that is available through policy design strongly implies that variables at greater risk of externally caused variability—outcome indicators such as the hours of childcare attendance per capita or the share of elder receiving home/residential care—are unnecessary. With reviews of studies of defamilialism finding of nine major works finding six used ‘generosity of child/family allowances’ and a number considering eligibility conditions for ‘familizing’ policies, this approach is firmly grounded.<sup>88</sup>

#### *The theoretical framework of welfare state assessment:*

Therefore, the US welfare package and its potential correlation with radical right priorities can be best understood at a state-based policy (-making) level, appreciating the broader context of limited destratification but against parameters of (de)familialisation. The mechanics of this concept suggest the distinct aspects of this dimension are best differentiated through indicators of family allowance, child care subsidy, and in considering these through an exclusionary lens. These themselves are quantifiable by considering generosity and eligibility rules, in keeping with general academic practise.

#### Defining the Radical Right

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<sup>84</sup> Leitner, 2003, 360

<sup>85</sup> Saraceno & Keck, 2011, 378; Estévez-Abe, 2016, 309

<sup>86</sup> Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 60

<sup>87</sup> Meardi & Guardinachi, 2022, 130-133

<sup>88</sup> Lohmann & Zagel, 2016, 60

Detailing the radical right makes clear to whom this set of concepts about the welfare state can be applied. Explicating the relevant political theory reveals both the validity of inclusion of the US in a study of the radical right, and the strongest basis for forming expectations of radical right behaviours. This section will first select and defend its definition of the radical right, along with the cases falling into this definition. From within this setting, it will then elaborate mutually exclusive hypotheses of radical right familial policy behaviours.

*Conceptual confusion and clarifying classification – validating treatment of the RR as a party family*

Treating the radical right across Europe, much less the United States, as part of a collective phenomenon is itself an assumption. Parties from similar but fluctuating constellations (usually including those of Western Europe such as Reassemblent National but varyingly excluding those framed as under special circumstances such as Greece's Golden Dawn,<sup>89</sup> Belgium's Vlaams Belang,<sup>90</sup> or even all Eastern European parties<sup>91</sup>) have been conceived as manifesting: 'ethnopoliticism';<sup>92</sup> 'authoritarian neoliberalism';<sup>93</sup> 'new developmental statism';<sup>94</sup> 'exclusionary populism';<sup>95</sup> 'racism'; 'neofascism' and more, under often inter-changeably used designations as part of the family of the 'extreme right', 'far right', 'radical right', etc.<sup>96</sup> Competing conceptions produce difficulty defining the bounds or core ideology of such a grouping, much less a shared logic in family policy.

This balkanisation is however artificial, constructed by conceptual confusion. For reasons both practical and conceptual, this thesis will adopt Mudde's conceptualisation of the 'populist radical right wing' party family (PRRP) to do so. His 2007 typology of the radical right separates an 'extreme right' branch on the grounds of its essentially anti-democratic ideology, but identifies a party family hostile to *liberal* democracy and characterised by (a) nativism (b) authoritarianism (c) populism.<sup>97</sup> This specifies 'nativism'—'an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state'—as the 'minimum definition' of these actors: that is, the core ideological feature they 'all' share.<sup>98</sup> The formulation as 'nativism' allows this to remain a useful distinguishing feature over the more passive 'nationalism' that can refer to fidelity to the state's interest (in the modern order of nation-states) that is arguably a characteristic of conservatives, in the 9/11 era an underlying part of the increasingly securitised discursive environment, and a 'banal' feature of everyday educational and social life.<sup>99</sup> Identifying a second element integral but not exclusive to the radical right, Mudde recognises authoritarianism as 'the belief in a strictly ordered society in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely' that translates into disciplining the population against particular ideals of social conventions.<sup>100</sup> Finally, he defines these actors by populism, which in this formulation is a 'thin-centred ideology' that holds society is divided into 'two homogenous and antagonistic groups[:] "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite,"' as well as arguing no constraint should inhibit the 'general will' of the people (monistically defined).<sup>101</sup>

This formulation has significant practical utility in that, while not uncontested, it has become almost the definitive classification used.<sup>102</sup> Following suit therefore protects generalisability. In centring on the nature of a *party family* and excluding the 'neo-fascist' strand of the radical right, Mudde's construction further usefully preserves specificity. Arguably, this neglects the heterogenous but associated (and often more extreme)

<sup>89</sup> Rueda, 2021, 226; Mudde, 2007, 204

<sup>90</sup> Calani in (eds.) Rydgren, 2018, 7; Georgiadou et al., 2018, A8

<sup>91</sup> Abts et al. in (eds.) van Kessel & Michel, 2020, 26

<sup>92</sup> Vachudova, 2020, 327

<sup>93</sup> Levdvai-Bainton & Szelewa, 2021, 560-562

<sup>94</sup> Orenstein & Bugarič, 2022, 176

<sup>95</sup> Jessoula et al., 2021, 4-5

<sup>96</sup> Mudde, 2007, 11-12

<sup>97</sup> Mudde, 2010, 1168; Mudde, 2007, 31, 89

<sup>98</sup> Mudde, 2007, 19

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 26-7; Mudde, 2010, 1174; Mudde, 2016, 296

<sup>100</sup> Mudde, 2007, 22-23

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 23

<sup>102</sup> Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018, 837; Fenger, 2018, 189; Rashkova & Zankina, 2017, 848; Akkerman, 2015, 41; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2022, 82

networks including that of Generation Identitaire—a youth movement now with chapters across Europe promising identitarian rejuvenation—that are a major feature of the counter-cultural radical right and key site of study to isolate conceptual logics.<sup>103</sup> Equally, more extensive genealogies have suggested shared reliance on proto-fascist ideas, meaning isolating an ‘extreme right’ on the basis of its fascist tendencies would be somewhat pernicky.<sup>104</sup> However, excluding those openly paying homage to historical fascism (such as former-political-party-cum-movement Italian CasaPound)<sup>105</sup> and opposing democracy restricts to those presenting within the PRRP, not older traditions. More importantly, incorporating the vast array of organisations, websites, pages and image boards on sites both mainstream and fringe<sup>106</sup> would exceed the bounds of this study of welfare policy, given their distance from policymaking power. The articulation’s narrower focus on formal political actors therefore protects the effective operationalisation of this study.<sup>107</sup> This, moreover, soundly defines via familiar ideological components that are available across the political spectrum, or that are derivative of such of nativism, ie. Nationalism). This is component to Mudde’s broader framing of radical right politics as a ‘radicalisation of mainstream views’ rather than a ‘normal pathology’ isolated within societies as an abnormality that must be activated by some form of societal psychological stress, as scholarship following the influential Scheuch and Klingemann’s theory of ‘globalisation’s losers’ arguably more tenuously assumes.<sup>108</sup>

#### *Empirical extent of the classification*

The classification by nativism, authoritarianism and populism can therefore validly speak to a European party family; in fact, the more recent evidence for conceptual and political alignment confirms the parameters of the European radical right within Mudde’s formulation, if also that the scholar overlooked several important manifestations. Previously ‘borderline’ cases and actors coalescing more recently planted themselves more firmly within ‘nativism’, ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘populism’ since Mudde’s 2007 work.

Seemingly nationally specific radical right formulations are nearly always traced back by intellectual genealogies to shared traditions: nativism, authoritarianism and populism, and more specifically within this to ‘volkish’ belief in a connection between land and people; a zero-sum view of a conflict of nations that can be sourced in Haushofer’s introduction of the concept of geo-politics; and a belief in the need for societal overhaul that draws Heidegger’s imagining of a ‘Conservative Revolution’.<sup>109</sup> In this context, the ‘illiberal democracy’ offering of FIDESZ of Hungary and changes to the welfare state that have been categorised as a conservative ‘rewriting of the social contract’ can be traced to an attempted offering of an authoritarian ‘Conservative Revolution’.<sup>110</sup> The same can be said for the compromises of the rule of law and disapproval of non-heteronormative social units in defence of traditional religious and conservative values by Polish ‘Law and Order’ Party (PiS), which has shifted right since 2007 and absorbed the ‘League of Polish Families’ that had previously been listed as the Eastern European state’s chief PRRP.<sup>111</sup> Exemplifying a de Benoist ‘culturalist’ formulation, the PiS and indeed Hungarian Fidesz’ pre-occupation with increasing natality<sup>112</sup> aligns with the logic that Le Pen of the quintessentially PRRP Ressemblment National (RN, formerly Front National) vocalised in 2017: that they had removed ‘race’ from the party’s vocabulary, but that being French could not be equated to simply ‘having been born in France’.<sup>113</sup> Equally, Salvini of La Lega has insisted on rejecting birth-

<sup>103</sup> Zuquette, 2018; Blee, 2020, 415; Vandiver, 2020; Richards, 2022, 28-47

<sup>104</sup> Rueda, 2021, 215, 221-2

<sup>105</sup> Zuquette, 2018

<sup>106</sup> Richards, 2022, 28-47

<sup>107</sup> Accepting the reservation of the ‘extreme right’ for neo-fascist parties, the terms ‘New Right’ and ‘radical right’ will be used alongside the formal designation as Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs). While ‘New Right’ had initially referred to the reactionary French ‘Nouvelle Droit’ intellectual network that emerged in the 1980s, scholars now use this as a broad designation for the European radical right political sphere.

<sup>108</sup> Mudde, 2007, 1170-1171, 1178

<sup>109</sup> Camus in (eds) Sedgwick, 2019, 73; Laruelle in (eds) Sedgwick, 2019, 159; Zuquette, 2019, 7-11, 15-17, 271, 275

<sup>110</sup> Orenstein & Bugarič, 2022, 183

<sup>111</sup> Meardi & Guardiancich, 2022, 139

<sup>112</sup> Orenstein & Bugarič, 2022, 183-186

<sup>113</sup> Alduy, 2017



right citizenship, protecting ‘Italy for Italians’; formerly the Lega Nord and identified as a borderline case by Mudde for its regionalism, the national expansion of the party and reorientation toward migrants as the ‘Other’ under Salvini has confirmed the party within this conceptualisation.<sup>114</sup> Reflecting this practically, Salvini’s speech post-2019 European Parliament elections deliberately aligned Lega’s victory with to the success of the parties of Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage, and the Lega would ally with (then) Front National to create the ‘Identity and Democracy’ group in the European Parliament that would aim to create a ‘Europe of Nations’.<sup>115</sup> Potentially excluded in Mudde’s 2016 update to his classification as their breakout stretched 2013 - 2017, ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) attacks on the ‘political class’, ‘gender madness’ and especially multiculturalism (supposedly threatening to extinguish cohesive society as well as historic Germany) equally exemplifies the PRRP nativist, populist, zero-sum perspective.<sup>116</sup>

From this weight of evidence of cross-fertilization, the main populist radical right parties of Europe—from which expectations on family policy logic could be validly formed—include: the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ, Austria); Flemish Interest (VB, Belgium); Attack (Bulgaria); Croatian Rights Party (HSP, Croatia); Danish People’s Party (DFP, Denmark); Rassemblement National (RN, formerly FN, France); Fidesz (Hungary); Fratelli d’Italia (Italy); Lega (formerly Lega Nord, Italy); Party for Freedom (PVV, The Netherlands); Law and Justice (PiS, Poland); Greater Romania Party (PRM, Romania); Serbian Radical Party (SRS, Serbia); Sweden Democrats (SD); Swiss People’s Party (SVP, Switzerland).<sup>117</sup>

In fact, this perspective, conceptually integrating the political mainstream and even several parties that had been more traditional but transitioned to a PRRP outlook, makes reasonable looking for the diffusion of this ideology, even into archetypal conservative parties such as the GOP. This thus usefully grounds a transatlantic focus.

#### Defining Radical Right *Logics*: Family Policy Expectations

From within this setting, studies of radical right behaviours can be used to conceptualise expectations of PRRP family policy. Sections of this literature would reject this possibility, and there is some validity to critiques—made by several foundational, quantitative comparisons—of forming expectations of a radical right family policy outlook. Mudde suggested PRRPs discerned a centrist position on welfare, Afonso and Rennwald found a redistributive outlook that made such parties leftist in this field, while Rovny’s understood their welfare outlook as strategically ‘blurry’ to appeal to a dissimilar voter base.<sup>118</sup> The argument for divergence in (or, at least, divergent interpretations of) family policy was recently partially supported by Enggist and Pinggera’s argument stances on welfare generosity are obscured (if there is a principled favouring of traditional ‘consumption policies’).<sup>119</sup> However, these instrumentalist conclusions must be weighed less within the context of the divergent definitions, dimensions and indicators they use: they all focus on the classical divide between ‘consumptive’ policies insuring against ‘old’ social risks and ‘social investment’ policies targeting new ones or seeking to generate labour capital.<sup>120</sup> These cannot offer concerted insight into radical right family policy. For instance, conclusions that PRRPs favour traditional ‘consumptive’ welfare policy indicate a commitment to the traditional ‘Fordist’ welfare state model and little provision for new social risks, so by extension, these hold PRRPs implicitly defend (historically existing) patriarchal structures, but drawing from such bases requires an extended inference-building process. Meanwhile, Mudde and Afonso & Rennwald’s use of a left-right, socio-economic redistribution and a generosity axis excludes the ‘producerist distinctions’ and ‘sovereignist’ appeals that are central to populist frameworks, and that exclude how decommunitarianism through welfare generosity can

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<sup>114</sup> Öner, 2022, 67-73

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 68

<sup>116</sup> Berbuir, Lewandowsky & Siri, 2015, 164, 166-167

<sup>117</sup> Mudde, 2016, 298

<sup>118</sup> Rathgeb & Bussemeyer, 2022, 8; Mudde, 2007, 136; Afonso & Rennwald in (eds.) Manow et al., 2018, 175

<sup>119</sup> Enggist & Pinggera, 2022, 102-105

<sup>120</sup> Rathgeb & Bussemeyer, 2022, 9-11

preserve care roles.<sup>121</sup> Thus, an absolute dismissal of a shared logic would be grounded on misleading evidence, but demonstrates the threat to asserting a single approach too.

Ennsner-Jedenastik's relevantly targeted analysis of 26 European states between 1980 and 2015 foresees strong familialisation along with weak de-familialisation, similarly to Meardi and Guardiancich's qualitative comparison. Still, the expectations from which these are built are almost exclusively constructed through analysing conceptual mechanisms and do not systematically address the verdicts of PRRP welfare state literature.<sup>122</sup> The very conflicting dimensions, subjects and areas of focus from family policy to welfare to social policy as a whole that soften the challenge of purely strategic explanations have left the field defined by disaggregation, making forming a more rigorous classification incorporating empirical findings difficult.

As this demonstrates, though, expectations can be formed, but one underlying logic cannot not decisively asserted. Indeed, recognising this and allowing for a multiplicity of radical right logics—each characterised by a dominant logic related to the distinct dimension of familialism—located via an exhaustive accounting of literature on the (family) welfare policy of PRRPs provides the opportunity to form and *test* expectations. This will inform both understandings of the European radical right and offer a more discerning comparative to the US context.

### *Instrumental explanation & Implicit familialism*

More relevantly focused studies do trace a significant element of instrumentality, but suggest a common underlying approach. European-wide<sup>123</sup> and country-specific<sup>124</sup> Policy centred studies have argued with rises to governing power, previous obscured stances have come into focus; context-specific policy positioning seems evidence of a deliberate choice, not a hidden agenda.<sup>125</sup> Akkerman suggested this was to the extent of a 'Janus-quality'.<sup>126</sup> Divergences from the Dutch Party for Freedom's (admittedly instrumental) for gay marriage to the opposition to 'gender ideology' (and discussion of LGBT free zones) in Eastern European radical right parties including PiS and Fidesz arguably imply fundamental, culturally-specific differences in depth of traditionalist commitment to the heteronormative family structure.<sup>127</sup> Fenger's analysis of Western European PRRPs (and the US), though built from speeches and manifestos, argues at a 'programme level' preferences that vary because of the context of party competition, which promotes preserving appeal by incorporating wider societal norms. He holds this is true to the extent of a fundamental split between parties such as PVV and Vlaams Belang, who are dogmatically opposed to immigrants and oriented toward welfare 'nostalgia', or more programmatic actors such as Sweden Democrats, who accept 'post-industrial modernisation'.<sup>128</sup> In fact, the identification of 'deep core beliefs' by Fenger<sup>129</sup> and the references to a basic 'nostalgic' approach by Norocel,<sup>130</sup> Rashova and Zankina,<sup>131</sup> and Betz<sup>132</sup> imply, these works do leave room for an underlying level of commitment to traditionalism, as manifesting in familialising, exclusionary welfare attitudes.<sup>133</sup> There is substantial evidence, even from Akkerman, that embedded the 'defence' of gender equality is highly selective, with PRRPs presenting their policies as not disrupting gender equality to mainstream their party, and especially to back claims existing social institutions need protection from migrants (with FPO<sup>134</sup> as well as the PVV, DF, RN arguing Islamic values are

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 8-10

<sup>122</sup> Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2022, 156-158; Meardi & Guardiancich, 2022, 129-130, 133

<sup>123</sup> Akkermann, 2015, 41

<sup>124</sup> Norocel, 2016, 378-381

<sup>125</sup> Meardi & Guardiancich, 2022, 129-130

<sup>126</sup> Spierings & Zaslove, 2015, 165; Norocel, 2016, 385

<sup>127</sup> Spierings & Zaslove, 2015, 167

<sup>128</sup> Fenger, 2018, 199, 202-204

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 194

<sup>130</sup> Norocel, 2016, 372

<sup>131</sup> Rashkova & Zankina, 2017, 846

<sup>132</sup> Betz, 2020, 12-13, 27-29

<sup>133</sup> Fenger, 2018, 202

<sup>134</sup> Aichholzer et al., 2014, 119-120; Lefkoffridi & Michel, 245-7

foreign to Western moral order and rights of women).<sup>135</sup> Even defending more progressive care roles fundamentally seems to maintain existing care conditions: the far right Swedish Democrats even framed their dismissal of measures aiming to create gender parity—in care and in business—as *unnecessary* because the historic leadership of the Swedish welfare state already guaranteed this.<sup>136</sup> Similarly, FPO, PVV and Lega argued against stronger measures to ensure gender equality in the labour market, with PVV opposing the use of equalising quotas and Lega calling suggesting further pushes would be part of ‘gender ideology’ not need.<sup>137</sup> In this, there is some support for already entrenched defamilialising measures such as paid family leave, seemingly tying their stances to alignment with wider norms where this would be electorally advantageous.<sup>138</sup> Crucially, though, even in this there is no significant disruption of existing inequalities in burdens of care. An understanding built from small-N comparatives of radical right social policy does therefore indicate a specific form of instrumentality: combining familialising in denying (and so seeking to not to disrupt) ongoing patriarchal structures, though doing so only implicitly (vocally repudiating any such intention), it can be strongly argued this is rationalizable as a logic built from implicit familialism.

These works are significantly focused on discourses or ‘social policy’, not the individual relevant indicators of family allowance, and public subsidies for childcare, but the repeated pattern of gendered policymaking is notable. From this, it could be expected:

H1: The PRRP family policy builds from a logic of *implicit familialism*. Policy is weakly defamilialising, offering a basic level of redistribution of care, frequently defending the sufficiency of existing efforts; this codes their welfare offering to a (culturally specific) mainstream logic on care responsibilities. Policy offers weak familialism by maintaining structures that support ongoing patriarchal power relations.

### *Familialising logics*

More directly, there is good theoretical grounding and significant evidence for radical right parties pursuing *explicit familialising* family policies.

Embedded in nativism is a core natalism. As Ennser-Jedenastik, Meardi and Guardiancich and Mudde himself all argue, holding non-native persons and ideas as threats makes conditional the success (indeed survival) of the nation on the ‘reproduction’ of the *native* population.<sup>139</sup> This is only reinforced by deeper analysis. Emphasis from such parties across Europe on passing citizenship through bloodline and explicit statements such as Le Pen’s that being French is more than being born in France, (implicitly) specifies the cultural divide they emphasise is not merely geographic, but in birth to parents of the (historic, ethnic) nation.<sup>140</sup>

This does not *necessarily* equate to familialising policy. Birth creates dependency, but formulations of paid parental leave and childcare policies such as reserving a portion of leave for the second partner or subsidising out-of-home childcare could lessen gendered distribution of care roles. However, within the PRRP core concept of authoritarianism there is a commitment to defending prescribed social roles, and through this traditional hierarchies. With the radical right’s broader opposition to ‘liberal’ values—which would include third wave feminism or at least actively equalising measures—and the proclivity of populism to nostalgia—in the case of welfare toward a supposed ‘golden age’ of the male breadwinner supporting his family—this would include traditional family relations. From conceptual features alone, the radical right can be expected to support the reproduction of historic care roles – that is, *familialising policies*.

Empirical evidence largely underscores this. Ennser-Jedenastik’s 2018 study found the radical right made limited attacks on universal family allowances, and her 2022 work found a (noisy) positive effect on expenditure on family allowances when these parties were in governance; this study found a statistically significant effect on

<sup>135</sup> Jessoula et al., 2021, 19; Akkerman, 2015, 54-56; Norocel, 2016, 201

<sup>136</sup> Norocel, 2010, 171; Norocel, 2016, 381

<sup>137</sup> Akkerman, 2015, 44-47; Donà, 2020, 162

<sup>138</sup> Akkerman, 2015, 56

<sup>139</sup> Ennser-Jedenastik, 2022, 157-8

<sup>140</sup> De Orellana & Michelsen, 2019, 748, 754

expenditure on this *over* childcare expenditure.<sup>141</sup> Similarly, both Akkerman and Jessoula, Natili & Pavolini found welfare policy stances can be strategically selected, but point to evidence of for *within family* child care, and features benefiting women in relation to enabling or rewarding care capacity; the latter even states ‘support for family policy expansion has become a key ingredient of the electoral offer of all selected’.<sup>142</sup> Case study investigations such as into the policy constellations of these parties indicate a familialising focus even more clearly. Rashkova and Zankina’s quantification of interventions in care policy related parliamentary committees demonstrated the radical right party in the Bulgarian parliament raised ‘women’s issues’ more than any other party, and almost exclusively related these to ‘child rearing’ or supporting birth-rates.<sup>143</sup> Where such parties had a stronger grasp on policymaking power—the OVP-FPO, MS5-Lega and PiS governments—studies trace both radical right parties preserving or reinstating gender-based differentiation in retirement. During coalition with the mainstream conservative party, FPO sought tax credits for Austrian families with multiple children, and a ‘mothers’ pension’ that similarly would count care years (if at a lower rate of pay-out than employment).<sup>144</sup> In Italy, Lega similarly allowed women to retire after 35 years of contributions (at 58), while in Poland this was reduced to 60 years, with both using defined contribution formulas that would result in lower future benefits.<sup>145</sup> With PiS politicians noting this was to release the ‘caring capital’ of women, this both reinforced the premise of a grandmotherly care role, and the dependent position of second-earner.<sup>146</sup> Further, even the minor policy shifts in pension age or in reverting to ‘mother’ and ‘father’ designations on official documents were narrated as victories of the traditional, national family.<sup>147</sup> Though it must be appreciated all political parties can overstate the significance of their ‘victories’, this deliberate emphasis implies the party self-defined its welfare stance via familialisation. Studies of Eastern and Southern European radical right parties have further noted generous support for family allowances and limited support—or retrenchment—in childcare. The Italian government removing the 600 euro-per-month childcare subsidy for working mothers and PiS reducing childcare spending, plus both as well as Orban’s Hungarian government increasing natality benefits—with all policies notably originally only applying or significantly scaling up on the birth of a *second* child, and so encouraging larger families—evidences this.<sup>148</sup>

The larger-scale comparatives, and particularly the evidence from country level studies that provide the policymaking detail of family policies rather than social policies generally, demonstrate strong alignment on familialising policy choices. Notably, this is visible through PRRP presence through coalition governments, suggesting significant priority/commitment given winning these would have required programmatic concessions elsewhere.<sup>149</sup> As such, building an understanding from conceptual mechanisms and studies of family policy, it can be expected:

H2: The PRRP family policy builds from a logic of *explicit familialism*. Narrating policy priorities as a defence of the (national, traditional) family, there is strong support for familialising aspects of policies such as family allowances or relative-based childcare, and very weak support for ‘defamilialising’ measures including inclusive, generous public provision of childcare.

#### *An overarching rationale: ‘deservingness’*

An alternative interpretation of these studies of wide, regional, and individual works PRRP social and family policy, highlighting the underlying element of exclusion, can be made.

Some of the earliest systematic works on PRRP stances held they had adopted the ‘winning formula’ of authoritarian capitalism through socio-cultural conservatism and socio-economic neoliberalism, carrying with it

<sup>141</sup> Meardi & Guardiancich, 2022, 131; Enns-Jedenastik, 2022, 164, 168

<sup>142</sup> Akkerman, 2015, 56; Jessoula, Natili and Pavolini, 2021, 17

<sup>143</sup> Rashkova & Zankina, 2017, 860-862

<sup>144</sup> Enns-Jedenastik, 2016, 420

<sup>145</sup> Meardi & Guardiancich, 2022, 137-8, 141,

<sup>146</sup> Levdvai-Bainton & Szelewa, 2021, 569

<sup>147</sup> Meardi & Guardiancich, 2022, 141

<sup>148</sup> Szikra, 2014, 488, 494-5; Levdvai-Bainton & Szelewa, 2021, 567-569; Meardi & Guardiancich, 2022, 139

<sup>149</sup> Meardi & Guardiancich, 2022, 137; Akkerman & De Lange, 2012, 580

welfare state retrenchment.<sup>150</sup> Recent works have reformulated the characterisation into ‘authoritarian populism’ (if in a kind of ‘Polanyian double movement’ to the decades of dominance of neoliberalism).<sup>151</sup> Orenstein and Bugarič, Levdvai-Bainton and Szelewa, Buzogany and Varga, as well as Szikra all argue PRRP success then choice of welfare reforms in Central and Eastern Europe have been led by government engineering of ‘competition states’ alongside particularist generosity to nationals considered deserving.<sup>152</sup> These designations are however not mutually exclusive to an assessment of familialising policy, nor should they be definitive. As a number of these scholars note, neoliberalism is a system centred on liberalising markets while attempting social control—specifically, incentivising work and wealth creation—through behavioural nudges and a particular concern for protecting (and extending) property rights.<sup>153</sup> The latter reinforces existing power structures and the former demonstrates a preference for disciplining individuals into desirable behaviours, doubly adhering to strict social order that defines authoritarianism.<sup>154</sup> Moreover, *defining* radical right social policy by neoliberalism overstates. The evidence for this past the Eastern European context is strongly limited, with academic consensus built in the 2010s tracing Western European parties shifting from whatever neoliberalism of the 1980s/early 1990s,<sup>155</sup> including FPO’s shift from the welfare retrenchment that had defined their mid-2000s governmental policy.<sup>156</sup> More importantly, though proponents of the ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ assessment err in making neoliberalism the operative term, implying this defines PRRP family policy. With this ideology’s concern with labour market activation, this would not accurately reflect the explicit defences of traditional family structures, therefore would be misleading. Thus, though this strand of literature usefully reminds of the compatibility between radical right policy behaviours and broader neoliberal welfare contexts—relevantly given the US welfare experience under ‘varieties of liberalism’<sup>157</sup>—this does not seriously threaten a typology categorising PRRP family policy instead by expectations of implicit and explicit familialisation.

Where observable, welfare retrenchment by PRRP could alternatively be better understood as component to an underlying exclusionary outlook. Differentiation on the basis of ‘deservingness’ is perhaps the strongest characterisation made by more broadly directed studies, being the major conclusion of works focusing on the policy supported by PRRP voters (held to inform their policy positions),<sup>158</sup> as well as the indirect policy impact of these parties (through robustly investigated influence on mainstream competitors).<sup>159</sup> Crucially, ‘deservingness’ as restricted to nationals, and within this specific social groups such as the elderly, is the key component rationalising otherwise contradictory evidence in the policy analysis works of Ennsner-Jeddastik (on Poland and Italy),<sup>160</sup> Spierings and Zaslove (suggesting the basis of otherwise divergent gender stances of the six most successful parties)<sup>161</sup> Fenger (in a comparative)<sup>162</sup> and Churi (explaining circumstances of retrenchment).<sup>163</sup> This selective solidarity is not mutually exclusive to the expectation of familialisation, and is in fact constitutive of it: as argued in the Eastern and Western European PRRP comparatives of Spierings and Zaslove<sup>164</sup> and Orenstein and Bugarič,<sup>165</sup> as well as the case studies of Hungary and Poland by Levdvai-Bainton and Szelwa,<sup>166</sup> the (productive) native family in its traditional form is coded as *the* deserving social group. For instance, as traced in Ennsner-Jedanstik 26-country quantitative comparative, any retrenchment was frequently

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<sup>150</sup> Kitchelt & McGann, 1995 in Churi, 2021, 1093

<sup>151</sup> Fischer, 2020, 373-4, 383-4

<sup>152</sup> Orenstein & Bugaric, 2022, 182; Levdvai-Bainton & Szelewa, 2021, 562-564, 569; Buzogany & Varga, 2018, 821; Szikra, 2014, 492, 495

<sup>153</sup> Fischer, 2020, 381-392

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 381-382

<sup>155</sup> Mudde, 2007, 136; Churi, 2021, 1093; Afonso & Rennwald, 2018, 175

<sup>156</sup> Akkerman & De Lange, 2012, 575; Mudde, 2007, 133-134; Aichholzer et al., 2014, 119

<sup>157</sup> Von Gleichen & Parolin, 2020, 937

<sup>158</sup> Bussemeyer, Rathgeb & H. J. Sahm, 2022, 77, 82-32

<sup>159</sup> Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018, 833-834, 840; Bale et al., 2010, 421

<sup>160</sup> Ennsner-Jedanastik, 2022, 167

<sup>161</sup> Spierings & Zaslove, 2015, 171

<sup>162</sup> Fenger, 2018, 202-204

<sup>163</sup> Churi, 2021, 1097-1098

<sup>164</sup> Spierings & Zaslove, 2015, 171

<sup>165</sup> Orenstein & Bugarič, 2022, 182-187

<sup>166</sup> Levdvai-Bainton & Szelewa, 2021, 579

framed by PRRPs as necessary because the measure advantaged immigrants, by virtue of a higher birth-rate.<sup>167</sup> The authoritarian/populist dimension of favouring the ‘hard-working people’ that is embedded within PRRP core ideology, or the ‘reciprocity’ aspect of narratives of deservingness, also explains the more limited examples of exclusion *within* the native population (increasingly treated by many PRRPs as inherently worthy),<sup>168</sup> such as the earned income child tax credit offered by Fidesz not being available to the lowest earning Hungarians.<sup>169</sup> This makes clear a driving preference for the national, socially conventional family. As such, this indicates the possibility of specifically *exclusionary* familialism, conditioning on a deeper perception of the deservingness of the recipient group, be it through nationality, ethnicity or perception of having ‘earned’ the benefit.

Accounting for this, it can finally be expected:

H3: The PRRP family policy builds from a logic defined by *exclusion*. Minimising access to those excluded from (ethnically, behaviourally) defined social classes explicitly narrated as deserving, while otherwise comparatively generous support, policy is likely explicitly familialising. Deviation from this into weak familialism will occur, but on the grounds of a vocalised welfare chauvinist distinction of ‘deservingness’.

Each hypothesis, though mutually exclusive in rooting PRRP family policy in a distinct dominant familialising logic, may have some practical overlap; in this understanding, strong support for family allowances could fall within an explicit familialism, or within *exclusionary* explicit/implicit familialism. This implies the bounds of the set are somewhat fuzzy. However, the number of and detail of policy indicators helps compensate for this, as each of the three can distinguish between the subdimensions of familialisation.

#### *Conceptual framework*

Through defending its theoretical selection at every stage, this section has progressively specified a strongly conceptually validated framework. Departing from Esping-Andersen’s framework leaves space for assessment of family policy via the more relevant dimensions of (de)familialism. The subdimensions of this concept—with the normative, exclusionary aspect newly appreciated—can helpfully distinguish amid the constellations of family policy/stances of party families such as the radical right. Defining this party family validates the transatlantic comparative this work seeks to offer. Most importantly, combining consideration of parties that fall within this definition of the radical right and indicators that code in these familialising dimensions firmly grounds the generation of a three hypotheses of radical right family policy behaviours. With this conceptual scaffold, this thesis can soundly investigate the US context for the presence of a radical right logic.

## **Research Design**

### Logic of case selection

Few studies of radical right policymaking attempt transatlantic comparatives, wary of the regional specificities that preoccupy scholars and dissuade from cross-regional research more generally.<sup>170</sup> Forming expectations within the scholarship on the European radical right context, then transplanting them, avoids direct comparison and so the pitfalls of accounting for variables across two very different socio-political and welfare contexts. This thesis made its case selection through maximum variability in socio-economic features within the bounds of states under sustained Republican Party governance best operationalises this; again following the lead of literature on welfare and social policy, this approach maintains internal and external validity.

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<sup>167</sup> Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2022, 160

<sup>168</sup> Ennsner, 2012, 418-419, 424; Abts & Dalle Mulle, 2020, 24

<sup>169</sup> Vachudova, 2020, 526

<sup>170</sup> Estevez-Abe et al., 2016, 302-303

The cases were selected from those states under Republican ‘trifectas’ for the majority of the past 15 years: doing so is logically and theoretically sound. Selecting where there is party ‘success’ is in keeping with small-N or case-study radical right research by Akkerman,<sup>171</sup> Meardi and Guardiancich,<sup>172</sup> and many others;<sup>173</sup> these build from the reasonable premise that political presence is a key condition to assessing policy influence (be it directly through creating access to governing power, or indirectly through increasing pressure on other parties). More practically, exploring the extent of a Republican *shift* toward radical family logics through their policy choices requires (a) the state parties studied having policymaking power (b) them having this power for a sufficiently sustained period within the period of the ‘rise’ of European PRRPs and the alleged radicalisation of the GOP. Only so can there be a judgement over path divergence. Within this, full control of the levers of state governance (having a ‘trifecta’) is the most complete benchmark of policymaking power, making this the most appropriate standard.

Controlling for minority and divided government positions by selecting so minimised the potentially confounding converse influence of Democratic policymaking, which could trigger reactive stances in pursuit of delegitimising or denying the opposite party. Nonetheless, blocking was not absolute—the universe of cases was not restricted to states that have *only* been subject to full Republican control—because this would limit analysis to only the most conservative states. There is explanatory value in including states with mixed governance records, even if only drawing evidence from the periods of Republican majorities, to evaluate GOP behaviours within the more liberal environments (significant portions of America) in which they also compete; this inclusion incorporates cross-party variation essential to validating any overall characterisation of the Republican party. Within this, cases were qualified through experiencing Republican control for a majority of the period since 1995 (14 years), the year before the major shift in programs covering child allowance and preceding by one year the foundation of a federal-state child care subsidy.<sup>174</sup> Using a simple majority standard and the beginning of the modern manifestations of the selected indicators avoids arbitrary further specification. This also sufficiently predates the period of suspected radicalisation of the Republican party, which as discussed above is most frequently linked to the 2009-12 ‘Tea Party’ movement or Trump’s 2016 election.<sup>175</sup> As such, this periodisation aligns with the inferences from the conceptual framework and ensures there is sufficient policy to ground evaluation. This definition of available cases therefore protects both the internal and external validity of this deductive study of policy overlap.

Amongst these, to reach the level of detail required to measure against the extensive hypotheses, four cases finally were selected on the basis of maximum socio-economic differentiation. Specifically, factors widely considered relevant (if with their contested causal power is contested) to radical right success were used to differentiate across cases. As suggested by the exhaustive literature reviews of Rathgeb and Busemeyer, as well as Georgiadou, Rori and Roumanias’, scholars offer explanations of radical right support that essentially related to ‘economic insecurity’ or ‘anxiety’ and ‘cultural backlash’.<sup>176</sup> Studies explore at great length features of ‘labour market competition’ such as unemployment or GDP per capita (as a rough approximation of decline), and social conditions including the level of immigration (or a sudden shift within this),<sup>177</sup> the related feature of ethnic heterogeneity,<sup>178</sup> and education level.<sup>179</sup> Maintaining alignment with meso-level analysis of the radical right, case selection was conducted through these factors. Immigration was quantified through ‘immigration flows’: not only the immigrant population, but percentage change per year, from a percentage of immigration over the population.<sup>180</sup> Education, meanwhile, was classified into that up to secondary education, or ‘teritary’ education (bachelor’s degree or above).<sup>181</sup> Beyond this, Betz’s exploration of status anxiety in relation to

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<sup>171</sup> Akkerman, 2015, 37; Akkerman and De Lange, 2012, 575

<sup>172</sup> Meardi and Guardiancich, 2022, 129

<sup>173</sup> Aichholzer et al., 2014, 113; Paxton, 2021, 7-8; Abts & Mulle in (eds.) van Kessel & Michel, 2020, 26

<sup>174</sup> Ziliak in (eds.) Moffit, 2016, 303; Minton et al, 2016, 2

<sup>175</sup> Drolet & Williams, 2020, 44; Disch, 2011, 123; De Orellana & Michelsen, 2019, 761

<sup>176</sup> Georgiadou et al., 2018, 105-6; Rathgeb & Busemeyer, 2022, 6-7

<sup>177</sup> Georgiadou, Rori & Roumanias, 2018, 203

<sup>178</sup> Bustikova, 2014, 1745

<sup>179</sup> Afonso & Rennwald, 2018, 184-185; Aichholzer et al., 2014, 114, 118; Kitchell and McGann, 1995 in Chueri, 2020, 1093; Enggist and Pinggera, 2022, 102

<sup>180</sup> Georgiadou, et al., 2018, A2

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., A3

generational decline and the place of unskilled labour, indicates the relevance of a time-series on economic prosperity and the distribution of employment.<sup>182</sup> In fact, given the significant debate on the background of radical right voters—especially rural or manual workers by contrast to *petit bourgeoisie*<sup>183</sup>—the state’s industry profile is significant. Simplified slightly to exclude unemployment or inequality levels (which risks correlation with the outcome variable given this thesis assesses the welfare state), these socio-economic characteristics can be used to assess variability.

This is an imperfect means of division, but is the most appropriate within the context. Converting variables that are positioned as dependent in many of radical right studies as control ones departs from their usual use, yet follows the tradition of PRRP sub-national case studies including Paxton’s comparative of regional FPO and Lega governments, which premises its exploration of Wels and Casina through their economic decline.<sup>184</sup> In fact, this approach usefully ties the investigation to the broader evaluative mechanisms in study of PRRPs. Of key interest is the range of difference within Republican family policy, and underlying this whether the presence of a ‘radical right’ logic (defined through comparable European policy formulations) can be discerned. Appropriately for a framework involving significant theory development, dispersing such theoretically relevant potential predictors of welfare policy choices and radical right propensities can best distinguish whether there are overall shifts (and if there are any common features which therefore have causal potential). As such, this research design makes the logic of how to qualify the cases—the distinguishing features selected—component to the rigour of the conclusions.

Most importantly, this logic is more valid than alternatives. This avoids a circular reasoning that would arise if the study followed the wealth of comparatives building from universes defined by cases exhibiting the characteristics of ‘PRRPs’;<sup>185</sup> conducted via the presence of policy priorities expected from the radical right, this would condition on the outcome variable. Further, this avoids the endogeneity embedded in defining range on the basis of welfare state regime type—as numerous PRRP scholars do<sup>186</sup>—which arises from assessments of welfare state policy being *the* means by which the characterisation of the Republican is done. In fact, as hinted in the discussion of unemployment, this flaw would similarly plague distinctions built from socio-economic related to inequality. By the very nature of the welfare state, attributes such as income inequality, child poverty rates, earnings and employment ratios between men and women, and elderly dependency rates (which are all amongst those used to differentiate by Chueri<sup>187</sup> and are considered by Parolin and Daiger von Gleichen<sup>188</sup>) are affected by welfare policymaking. As such, these otherwise useful distinguishing features are not sufficiently exogeneous.

Taken all together, maximum variability (1) within states under sustained Republican control (2) distinguished on the socio-economic profile of the states is the most defensible methodology, both theoretically and practically.

The data on level of trifecta Republican control that defines the potential cases and the socio-economic indicators which further specify the states which can capture maximum validity have been presented separately below, to underscore this is a two-stage process. For the latter, though conscious that using state profiles from before the relevant welfare programs were created (which here would mean 1995) would best protect against cross-over effect on the socio-economic characteristics used to select among the states, the data from this period was flawed. The Bureau of Economic Analysis warns there is discontinuity in measurements of annual GDP by state at 1997 and again in 2014, when industry definitions were revised.<sup>189</sup> Moreover, speaking to the current state of the Republican Party would be more difficult if building from understanding their ‘operating environment’ as that from nearly 30 years ago. However, to demonstrate robustness and to capture the highly relevant aspect of ‘relative decline’ that scholars define radical right support by, the modern information was

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<sup>182</sup> Betz, 2020, 11-17

<sup>183</sup> Aichholzer et al., 2014, 113, 118

<sup>184</sup> Paxton, 2021, 7-8

<sup>185</sup> Akkerman and De Lange, 2012, 547; Bustikova, 2014, 1741; Ensser-Jedenastik, 2022, 154; Enggist and Pinggera, 2022, 111

<sup>186</sup> Enggist and Pinggera, 2022, 111; Jessoula et al., 2021, 2

<sup>187</sup> Chueri, 2021, 1095

<sup>188</sup> Parolin and Daiger von Gleichen in (eds.) Niewenhuis & Van Lancker, 2020, 459

<sup>189</sup> Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2020a



compared to that from 1990-1997, and the five year period preceding 2019 (the last full year of data unaffected by pandemic conditions).

<b>STATE (under Republican Party trifecta since 1995)</b>	<b>Years Under Trifecta Control</b>	<b>Dates of Trifecta</b>	<b>Years under dominant but not full control (Governorship and one legislative branch)</b>
Alabama	12	2011 - 2022	N/A
Alaska	6	2003 – 2006; 2013 – 2014	2007 – 2012; 2019 - 2022
<b>Arizona</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>1995 – 2000; 2009 - 2022</b>	<b>2001-2002</b>
Arkansas	8	2015 - 2022	N/A
Colorado	4	1999 – 2000; 2003 – 2004	N/A
<b>Florida</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>1999 – 2009; 2011 - 2022</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>Georgia</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>2005 - 2022</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>Idaho</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>1996 - 2022</b>	<b>N/A</b>
Illinois	1	1996	1997 - 2002
<b>Indiana</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2005 – 2006; 2011 - 2022</b>	<b>2007 - 2010</b>
Iowa	8	1997 – 1998; 2017 - 2022	2011- 2016
<b>Kansas</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1996 – 2002; 2011 - 2018</b>	<b>N/A</b>
Kentucky	3	2017 - 2019	2004 – 2007, 2016
Louisiana	5	2011 - 2015	N/A
Maine	2	2011 - 2012	2015 - 2018
Michigan	13	1996; 1999 – 2002; 2011 - 2018	1997 - 1998
Mississippi	11	2012 - 2022	2011
Missouri	10	2005 – 2008; 2017 - 2022	N/A
Montana	11	1996 – 2004; 2021 - 2022	N/A
<b>Nebraska</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>1999 - 2022</b>	<b>N/A</b>
Nevada	2	2015 - 2016	1999 - 2008
New Hampshire	6	2003 - 2004; 2017 – 2018; 2021 - 2022	N/A
New Jersey	6	1996 - 2001	N/A
North Carolina	4	2013 - 2016	N/A
<b>North Dakota</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>1996 - 2022</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>Ohio</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>(1995) 1996 – 2006; 2011 - 2022</b>	<b>N/A</b>
Oklahoma	12	2011 - 2022	N/A

Pennsylvania	11	1996 – 2002; 2011 - 2014	N/A
<b>South Carolina</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>2003 - 2022</b>	<b>1996 - 1998</b>
<b>South Dakota</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>(1995) 1996 - 2022</b>	<b>N/A</b>
Tennessee	12	2011 - 2022	1996
<b>Texas</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>2003 - 2022</b>	<b>1997 – 2002</b>
<b>Utah</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>1996 - 2022</b>	<b>N/A</b>
Virginia	4	2000 – 2001; 2012 - 2013	1998 – 1999; 2010 – 2011; 2022
West Virginia	5	2018 - 2022	N/A
Wisconsin	9	1998, 2011 - 2018	1996 – 1997; 1999 – 2002
<b>Wyoming</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1996 – 2002; 2011 - 2022</b>	<b>N/A</b>

Figure 2. Data collated from National Conference of State Legislators. 2022.

This narrows case selection to the 14 states of: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. Measured against the selected socio-economic factors, these manifest as:

State	Real GDP in millions of chained dollars 2012 - 2019	Real GDP in millions of chained dollars 2012 - 2019	Real GDP, Compound annual growth rate % 2014 - 2019	% Change in Immigrant Pop as a % of the total state pop, 2010 - 2019	% Change in Immigrant Pop as a % of the total state pop, 2010 - 2019	Estimated No. Immigrants, 1995	Estimated No. Unauthorised Immigrants, 2019	Ethnic Heterogeneity, 1990 W = White, B = Black, H = Hispanic	Ethnic Heterogeneity, 2019 W = White, B = Black, H = Hispanic	Level, 1990 HSO = High School Education Only, B+ = Bachelor's Degree or above	Level, 2019 HSO = High School Education Only, B+ = Bachelor's Degree or above	Occupation of State Workforce as % of the state pop, 2019	Top 3 Class of Workers as % of state pop, 2019
Arizona	188,408.80	325,894.30	3.2	(+14.0)	(+48.8)	3.6 (175,000)	273,000	90.8 W, 3 B, 18.8 H	81.7 W, 6 B, 31.7 H	26.1% HSO, 20.3 B+	23.8% HSO, 30.5% B+	37.3% Management; 18.6% Services; 22.8% Sales and office, 9.5% Nat resources, construction etc, 11.2% production, transportation	10% Private wage, 13.6% Government worker, 6.2% Self-employed in own not incorporated business
Florida	559,805.30	971,619.20	3.5	(+23.7)	(+69.5)	21.1 (4,526 million)	772,000	83.1 W, 13.6 B, 12.2 H	77.1 W, 17.6 B, 26.4 H	30.1% HSO, 18.3 B+	28.2% HSO, 30.5% B+	36.5% Management, 20% Services, 23.4% Sales and office, 9.4% Nat resources and construction etc, 10.7% Production, transportation etc	82.6% Private wage, 11.2% Government, 5.6% Self-employed
Georgia	318,118.70	558,277.30	3.5	(+15.8)	(+89.1)	10.3 (1,092 million)	339,000	71 W 27 B 1.7 H	59.9 W, 33.5 B, 9.8 H	29.6% HSO, 19.3% B+	27.5% HSO, 32.2% B+	39.1% Management, 16% Services, 21.0% Sales, 8.9% Nat resources and construction, 10.7% Production	80.4% Private wage, 14.0% Government workers, 5.4% Self-employed
Idaho	36,997.40	73,912.00	3.4	(+18.4)	(+60.9)	5.8 (103,100)	29,000	94.4 W 0.3 B, 5.3 H	92.5 W, 1.2 B, 12.8 H	30.4% HSO, 17.7% B+	26.7% HSO, 28.7% B+	35.5% Management, 17.1% Services, 22.3% Sales and office, 11.5% Nat resources and construction, 13.6% Production, transportation etc	77.6% Private wage, 11.2% Government, 2.2% Self-employed
Indiana	231,713.90	338,350.10	1.3	(+19.2)	(+92.2)	5.3 (359,000)	102,000	90.6 W 7.8 B, 1.8 H	85.2 W, 11 B, 7.2 H	38.2% HSO, 19.4% B+	33.2% HSO, 27.2% B+	35.1% Management, 16.5% Services, 20.1% Sales and office, 8.9% Nat resources and construction, 19.4% Production, transportation etc	84.2% Private, 11.2% Government, 4.4% Self-employed
Kansas	104,575.00	160,182.30	2	(+11.7)	(+55.0)	7.2 (208,900)	69,000	90.1 W 5.8 B, 3.8 H	87.1 W, 7.4 B, 12.2 H	32.8% HSO, 25.8% B+	25.8% HSO, 33.9% B+	40% Management, 15.8% Services, 19.7% Sales and office, 9.70% Nat resources and construction, 14.4% Production, transportation etc	79.9% Private wage, 15.9% Government, 5.9% Self-employed
Nebraska	70,412.50	118,286.50	1.8	(+27.0)	(+90.9)	2.3 (25,100)	42,000	93.8 W 3.6 B, 2.3 H	88.7 W, 6.1 B, 11.3 H	34.7% HSO, 23.7% B+	25.7% HSO, 32.5% B+	40.0% Management, 15.8% Services, 19.7% Sales and office, 10.6% Nat resources and construction, 13.9% Production, transportation etc	79.1% Private wage, 14.4% Government, 6.2% Self-employed
North Dakota	22,413.10	56,247.00	(-10.5)	(+19.0)	(+157.0)	4.1 (559,000)	5,000	93.8 W 3.6 B, 0.7 H	89 W, 3.9 B, 4.0 H	28.0% HSO, 22.0% B+	26.1% HSO, 30.7% B+	38.3% Management, 16.7% Services, 19.4% Sales and office, 12% Nat resources and construction, 13.6% Production, transportation etc	75.8% Private wage, 16.5% Government, 7.4% Self-employed
Ohio	471,450.90	611,145.80	1.3	(+16.4)	(+64.7)	4.8 (559,000)	89,000	87.8 W 10.6 B, 1.3 H	83.5 W, 14.4 B, 4 H	36.3% HSO, 21.1% B+	32.8% HSO, 28.9% B+	38.1% Management, 17% Services, 20.4% Sales and office, 7.6% Nat resources and construction, 16.9% Production, transportation etc	81.6% Private wage, 12.4% Government, 4.8% Self-employed
South Carolina	134,607.90	212,482.80	2.7	(+32.0)	(+148.7)	5.6 (288,000)	88,000	69 W 29.8 0.9 H	68.8 W, 28 B, 5.8 H	29.5% HSO, 20.4% B+	28.9% HSO, 29.0% B+	36.9% Management, 17.6% Services, 20.5% Sales and Office, 9.1% Nat resources and construction, 13.4% Production, transportation and moving material	79.3% Private wage, 14.9% Government, 5.4% Self-employed
South Dakota	24,951.20	46,641.00	0.8	(+63.4)	(+169.2)	4.1 (36,300)	7,000	91.6 W 0.5 B, 0.8 H	86.7 W, 3 B, 3.7 H	33.7% HSO, 21.5% B+	30.2% HSO, 29.3% B+	39.2% Management, 16.6% Services, 20.0% Sales and office, 9.9% Nat resources and construction, 14.2% Production, transportation etc	75.4% Private wage, 16.0% Government, 8.3% Self-employed
Texas	870,724.40	1,785,317.90	3.1	(+19.5)	(+70.8)	17.1 (4,951 million)	1,739,000	60.6 W 6.8 B, 25.5 H	75.9 W, 13.5 B, 39.7 H	25.6% HSO, 23.2% B+	24.7% HSO, 30.7% B+	37.6% Management, 17.3% Services, 21.1% Sales and office, 10.6% Nat resources and construction, 13.4% Production, transportation etc	79.8% Private wage, 13.3% Government, 6.6% Self-employed
Utah	80,658.90	171,134.70	4.6	(+23.3)	(+73.1)	8.6 (275,000)	89,000	93.8 W 0.7 B, 4.9 H	90.2 W, 1.9 B, 14.4 H	27.2% HSO, 26.1% B+	22.8% HSO, 34.7% B+	40.4% Management, 15.1% Services, 22.2% Sales and office, 9.4% Nat resources and construction, 12.9% Production, transportation etc	80.1% Private wage, 14.8% Government, 4.8% Self-employed
Wyoming	24,960.30	38,628.4	(-10.5)	(+12.2)	(+58.6)	3.1 (17,800)	7,000	94.2 W 0.8 B, 5.7 H	93.4 W, 2.1 B, 10.1 H	33.2% HSO, 21.9% B+	28.6% HSO, 28.2% B+	36.3% Management, 18.2% Services, 18.4% Sales and office, 15.4% Nat resources and construction, 11.7% Production, transportation etc	70.7% Private wage, 21.7% Government workers, 7.4% Self-employed

Figure 3. Data collated from: U.S. Census Bureau, 2019a; U.S. Census Bureau, 2019b; U.S. Census Bureau, 2019c; U.S. Census Bureau, 2002; Migration Policy Institute, n.d.a; Migration Policy Institute n.d.b; Pew Research Center, 2019; U.S. Census Bureau, 2011

Drawing on the information from Figure 3, the cases selected were Florida, Texas, Indiana and Wyoming.

One-party control Florida was only broken by the part of the governorship of Charlie Christ, who had won office as a Republican and only briefly held the post as an independent.<sup>190</sup> As such, deploying it provides representation of the sizable segment of states under almost continuous GOP trifectas. Further, it has a notably diverse (especially Hispanic) population with a particularly substantial number of immigrants that has risen rapidly since 1990, with especially marked growth in the last 10 years. Importantly, it cuts a distinctive economic profile, with a high GDP, sustained expansion in its compound annual growth rate from 2014-2022 at 3.5% and a significantly higher than average professionalised and service-based workforce. With the lowest percentage of those employed in production, transportation and material moving, this diverges significantly from the production-based bulk of the states in the universe of cases, therefore provides range.

As appropriate given over half of the available cases have been under continuous Republican trifectas, South Carolina reinforces the observation of ‘deep red’ states, offering a clear window into unobstructed welfare state policymaking. Its significant but still lesser annual growth in the context of smaller GDP overall, with a particularly high segment of the workforce in production occupations and an otherwise balanced economic profile offers another model of strong economic development. This adds nuance to differentiate the economic dimensions of cases. With the most drastic change in immigrant populations from 1990 and the second highest in recent years, as well as 28% of the state’s population being Hispanic, deploying this as a case provides for a divergent extent of ethnic heterogeneity and so the potential for nativist (or ethnic) divides that are held a significant predictor of PRRP success. This uniquely represents the drastic shift that Georgiadou and colleagues hold to be more impactful than numerical increase.<sup>191</sup>

Indiana, then diverges in its trifecta control only stretching the minimum number of years to qualify. More importantly, it provides a case of sluggish economic growth (at 1.3% compound annual increase) in the context of an above average GDP, offering a portrayal of relative stagnation. The state further offers a medium in seeing a notable increase in the immigrant population—by 92.37% since 1990—but with this remaining a small portion over the overall state population at just 5.3%. Usefully, this state adds complexity to the socio-economic profile of individuals too. Though the education profiles of the states are not significantly distinct, Indiana had the lowest percentage of any in the available cases of individuals with a university degree in both 1990 and 2019. It further has the highest percentage of those in production, transportation and moving occupations, given a high level of construction as well as manufacturing, and the lowest number of self-employed individuals. In this, Indiana can distinctively contrast the two voter profiles most frequently held to typify radical right voters: working class and small business owners.

Wyoming crucially represents one of only two available states that experienced decline in real GDP over the five years measured for this factor, and in numerical terms had the lowest GDP—as well as smallest total growth 1997-2019—of any of the states by 2019. This strongly contrasts significant output as well as the marked growth of Florida and Carolina, and middling increase in Indiana. In fact, the state had the largest proportion of those employed in natural resource exploitation, construction and maintenance as well as among the highest number of professional and those in the service industry. Thus, while Indiana presents a split profile between industrial and working class managerial populations, Wyoming holds a uniquely agricultural/professional character. With a population that was 93.4% white in 2019 with among the lowest percentage shift in immigrant population (both since 1990 and 2010), the state captures an environment of ethnic homogeneity under limited pressure. This contrasts to the more (and more historically) diverse Florida. Usefully, the state even had a gap in its Republican control for the bulk of the 2000s, distinguishing the states under full control.

These states’ economic profile, demographic pressures, ethnic and to some limited extent political history offer comprehensive range of socio-economic features. Georgia, with a growth similar to Florida and production similar to South Carolina, did not have the selected states’ immigrant (authorised and not) characteristics and thus the dimension of cultural backlash. Texas, meanwhile, occupied the top position in real GDP, the size of the undocumented immigrant population and the size of the Hispanic population, but did not have the additional explanatory value of Florida’s larger growth rate and particular economic profile. Similarly, North Dakota had a similar profile to Wyoming: the second highest proportion of workers within production and professional

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<sup>190</sup> Ballotpedia, n.d.

<sup>191</sup> Georgiadou et al., 2018, 203

sectors, as well as decline in GDP. Notably, the state has had an enormous—157%—change in the immigrant population, if a negligible increase in undocumented individuals. With just 3.9% of the population identifying as black and 4.0% identifying as Hispanic (with comparably low numbers in 1990), the state captures an environment of ethnic homogeneity under some pressure, setting a contrast to the more (and more historically) diverse Florida. However, Wyoming’s less than full Republican control, position at the end of the range for the economic characteristics the states are similar in, and its still significant reflection of a non-diverse environment mean the selected case has more explanatory value. Likewise, Ohio strongly represents a producerist economic base, low annual growth and change in immigrant flows, but does so to a lesser extent than Indiana, meaning this state offers more variability.

As a consequence, it can be strongly argued this spread of cases constitutes maximum possible variation over the relevant socio-economic indicators. This makes them credible representatives of the full range of the Republican Party, as well as grounding the possibility of speculative inferences about causation, allowing this thesis to offer paths for further exploration.

### Operationalising indicators

Specific programs can represent the broader indicators detailed by policy type in the conceptual framework. As argued by Lohmann and Zagel, family policies can contain contradictory aims, so a country’s policy constellation in relation to the subdimensions cannot be qualified with data from just one form of program.<sup>192</sup> This study will use deploy TANF, EITC (state) and the CCDF to best account for family allowances and publicly subsidised childcare, which in turn capture dimensions of familialism, defamilialism, and the question of exclusion.

The American federal structure and welfare experience through ‘varieties of liberalism’ are key contexts to be appreciated in translating ‘de-/familialising’ dimensions into case-specific policy indicators.<sup>193</sup> Historically neoliberal, many of the programs bear features of this design. Further, TANF and CCDF are largely funded through ‘Federal Block Grants’, therefore arguably too coloured by federal policy design through the (limited) directives attached to these resources.<sup>194</sup> Legislative changes at the national level also raises the spectre of co-variability, threatening the robustness of results.<sup>195</sup> Nonetheless, this broad shared framework that ensures a basic comparability, avoiding need for extensive controls for the peculiarities of the development of individual state programs. Moreover, state legislatures or executives must pass laws deciding the variables from eligibility to generosity to priority,<sup>196</sup> and there is substantial evidence of state-by-state variation in this context.<sup>197</sup> This suggests the presence of national parameters and an overarching neoliberal work-related welfare conditionality are more conditions of the American welfare state than a factor disqualifying such programs as accurate reflections of *state* level policy.

Following Daiger von Gleichen and Parolin, the program Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and state Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) can be used to reflect family ‘Benefits’ (in cash), and capture the dimension of familialism that sits behind.<sup>198</sup> Replacing the cash allowance program ‘Aid to Families with Dependent Children’, TANF was a Clinton-era reform that offered ‘block grant funds’ to states to be spent on time-limited aid toward: facilitating in-home care of children; ending dependence on benefits; minimizing unmarried pregnancy and encouraging the ‘formation and maintenance of two-parent families’.<sup>199</sup> This has developed into federal requirements that the low-income recipients must participate in work or work-related

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<sup>192</sup> Lohmann and Zagel, 2016, 52

<sup>193</sup> Parolin & Daiger von Gleichen in (eds.) Niewenhuis & Van Lancker, 2020, 478

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., 478

<sup>195</sup> Adams & Pratt, 2021, 22

<sup>196</sup> Bruch et al., 2018, 11

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., 2018, 25

<sup>198</sup> Daiger von Gleichen & Parolin, 2020, 936-937

<sup>199</sup> Falk, 2021, 2, 10

activities for a minimum number of hours per week.<sup>200</sup> Thus seemingly an archetypal explicitly, exclusionary familialising policy in the context of a liberal welfare context, there is variability as states have significant discretion in the level of matching funds they contribute, and enormous amount of choice over the conditions for: eligibility; activities considered ‘work-related’; form of cash assistance (which can be ‘in kind’ in spending on jobs training programs or even child care); and minimum hours required (including whether this is per individual or per family unit).<sup>201</sup> The specifics of funding, prioritised programs, and terms of the assistance therefore can speak to the nature of familialism present in the case contexts.

The utility of this indicator could be called into serious question given the breadth of use of TANF funding, with just 19% of federal funds spent on direct cash benefits in 2019.<sup>202</sup> Up to 30% of TANF funds can be *transferred* to Child Care Development Fund funding pools, at which point they are counted toward *state* matching contributions in this program and so are not even isolatable within state spending.<sup>203</sup> However, not focusing on generosity but on evolving policy design protects against the latter threat; the distribution of added federal funds or the reassignment of the TANF block grants toward other family policy priorities in fact speaks to the *prioritisation* of care structures that is such an important element of (de)familialism.

This measure is also somewhat supplemented by the more direct, entirely cash-based Earned Income Tax Credit offered by states; these are frequently funded through the TANF program, thus integrally linked.<sup>204</sup> This is accessed through ‘earned income’, measured from income tax returns. As these almost always increase with the number of children in the family (often disproportionately), the state EITC decidedly acts as a familialising cash allowance.<sup>205</sup> Indeed, the ‘non-refundable’ structure by which taxes are off-set particularly benefits the middle class, while the ‘refundable’ design makes a lump sum payment ‘reimbursing’ any credit past tax liability.<sup>206</sup> This means the policy design of the state EITC too can offer a window into exclusionary/inclusionary choices. Nonetheless, this is only deployed as supplementary evidence as neither Wyoming nor Florida have personal income tax; though the similarly restricted Washington does not either and has introduced a separate declaration for the purposes of the credit,<sup>207</sup> this policy option is structurally obscured and so cannot fully capture policy choices on cash allowances. Thus, though each with their limitations, the combination of the TANF and state EITC programs can reflect the state of this familialising policy indicator.

The Child Care Development Fund, then, will be used to capture childcare (as done by Daiger von Gleichen and Parolin).<sup>208</sup> This combines federal block grants, mandatory contributions from states, and further supplementation to subsidize childcare for those—as federally required—earning at or below 85% of the median income of the state, with children under the age of 3 (unless they have special needs).<sup>209</sup> This further requires work-related activities. As with TANF funding, though, the definition of this is the prerogative of the states, as is income eligibility, prioritisation of groups of family, the extent of co-payments required, reimbursement rates for providers, and licensing requirements.<sup>210</sup> Taken together, the detail of variability in this policy design can reflect how far childcare provision is designed to reduce family care dependencies—defamilialise—and so is an appropriate indicator.

Similarly to TANF, CCDF-funded programmes does not account for the full range of public support: while CCDF programs provided care for around 386,000 children (aged 2 to 4) in FY 2018, roughly 1.63 million were placed in state or territory funded ‘pre-K’ and 887,000 were part of the Head Start initiatives.<sup>211</sup> However, ‘pre-K’ programs generally only serve children aged 3-4 and up—even often excluding 3-year olds—meaning the

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<sup>200</sup> Hahn et al., 2017, 2-6

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.6

<sup>202</sup> Center for Budget Priorities, 2021, 8

<sup>203</sup> Prenatal-to-3 Policy Clearinghouse, (n.d.)

<sup>204</sup> Parolin & Daiger von Gleichen in (eds.) Nieuwenhuis & Van Lancker, 2020, 478

<sup>205</sup> Maag, 2013, 2

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.,3-5

<sup>207</sup> Urban Institute, (n.d.)

<sup>208</sup> Daiger von Gleichen & Parolin, 2020, 936-937

<sup>209</sup> Minton et al., 2020, 1

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.,2-3

<sup>211</sup> Dwyer et al., 2020, 7

full distribution of child care would not be as imbalanced as the raw numerical breakdown implies.<sup>212</sup> This seriously threatens the validity these potential alternative indicators as the early years are amongst the most care intensive, and the care options in these years are strong determinants of the workforce reintegration of mothers (as the debate on parental leave reflects).<sup>213</sup> Therefore though a demonstrably imperfect, state CCDF-funded efforts are the most useful indicator.

These indicators are sufficient to capture the necessary conceptual subdimensions for the targeted nature of this study. Attention to whether caring circumstances involving frail or sick relatives qualify as exemptions can quantify the intergenerational dimension without requiring the additional indicator of medical leave policies. The particulars of the policy design of these TANF, (state) IETC and CCDF programs can also indicate an exclusionary aspect, where welfare generosity and ease of access is restricted to certain social groups. Equally, as conceptually posited, narratives surrounding these indicators can add clarity to these inferences, and so which subdimension family policy manifests; discourse used to justify choices more directly reflects exclusionary logic, or vocalised defence of traditional care responsibilities. A full discourse analysis since the inception of the programs—accounting for continuous and evolving framing of long-lasting policy features—would both be unfeasible and distract from the recent GOP choices that are the centre of this project. In light of this, isolating the presentation of the significant policy shifts—identifiable through the tracing policy design of the indicators and locatable through the commentaries on the passage of the causal legislation—offers an avenue to confirm that at which the policy details hint.

#### Data collection method

The details of the policy design of TANF, EITC, CCDF were largely collected from the program's own year-on-year 50-state collations of welfare rules: specifically, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families' 'Welfare Rules Databooks' and 'FY Financial Data', and the Child Care Development Fund's 'CCDF Policies Database Book of Tables'. These, produced in collaboration with the Urban Institute and the OPRE, contain hundreds of pages of tables detailing conditions of eligibility, reimbursement rates and more across 56 States/Territories.<sup>214</sup> These therefore provided an enormously detailed cross-section of policy design, allowing confidence in the comprehensiveness of judgements from this evidence. These year-on-year productions further highlight new and longer-lasting cross-state variations, and their corresponding online databases, searchable by policy, state, and range of years, were consulted to supplement these where the time series so important to judging a shift in logic was unclear.<sup>215</sup> These therefore can root the inferences about *change over time* that is necessary to confirm policy shifts within the Republican Party are not mere continuations of underlying conservative (not radical right) logics. The comparatives within each policy priority through productions by research institutes 'Tax Policy Center' and the 'National Women's Law Center, amongst others, were further used for contextualising analysis on family benefit programmes and contextualising detail on family policy shifts.

It must be recognised that organisations such as the 'National Women's Law Center' double as advocacy organisations, frequently ending reports with recommendations for policy reform.<sup>216</sup> Nonetheless, the broad base of analyses consulted restrict the likelihood systematic error would remain unnoticed and cause misrepresentation. Moreover, the core focus on raw data collected from the official records protect against analysis being misled by any political priorities embedded in others' research productions.

The period of data collection aligns with that of the case selection. The most recent CCDF Book of Tables was dated only to 2019, which to make limits the most in-depth time-series comparative possible to this point. Conversely, the policy books of the CCDF and the financial data reporting of TANF were recorded in somewhat different formats before 2010 and 2015 respectively, making some of the rules before this more difficult to locate and compare.<sup>217</sup> This dictates a particular focus on policy from 2010-2019 (liberally supplemented from

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<sup>212</sup> Ibid.7

<sup>213</sup> Saraceno and Keck, 2011, 374-375

<sup>214</sup> Shantz et al. 2020, 1; Dwyer et al. 2021, 1-10

<sup>215</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022; CCDF Policies Database Data, Oct 1, 2019

<sup>216</sup> Schulman, 2021, 4

<sup>217</sup> Minton et al., 2013, 3; Cohen et al., 2016, i-iv

the still extensive records before), but this restriction is not severe, given this is the period in which a Republican shift is most strongly alleged. This is even advantageous in the context of the pandemic and its series of ‘lockdowns’; there were massive changes in child care uptake/reliance on family benefit and numerous states adjusted eligibility requirements or terms of payment to help sustain the families and future care infrastructure.<sup>218</sup> The wave of federal funding from the March 2020 CARES Act significantly made this possible, contributing further distinctiveness to this anomaly.<sup>219</sup> As such protecting comparability and so internal validity, this thesis used online data about policy design from 2020-2022, but focus analysis on the 1996-2020—and especially 2010-2019—period.

The supporting discursive analysis, evolving from the evidence of policy shifts in the indicators and aiming to trace the logic offered, followed a two-step process. This involved using the ‘National Conference of State Legislatures’ searchable database tracking legislation across all 50 states, which is filterable by state, year, policy area, keyword, and the status of the bill.<sup>220</sup> This has the advantage of a focus on state policy, making it more relevant than the mechanically similar alternative legislative database produced by ‘GovTrack.us’ that tracks congressional legislation.<sup>221</sup> Cognisant of the fact determining relevance from the summary descriptions of these bills on the NCSL website would hinge the investigation on an unaccounted-for judgement process, the content of all ‘enacted’ bills that led to policy change were directly checked. Where these led to the policy change noticed in the policy investigation, governor/state legislature office websites were mined for press releases on or discussions of the bill. Only where these were incomplete were further commentary—from major state publications or organisations—used, and then merely for direct statements from legislators. If some third-party narrative was unavoidable in the latter in their selection of the discourse, this rigorous snowballing process preserved strong links to the original policy source, largely maintaining validity. Together, these resources offered a textual portrayal of the legislation that was comparable across all of the states, not dividing into the reactive particulars of the (variable) social media habits of individual politicians. Given the discursive aspect is treated an additive, clarifying element and the *level* of a certain discourse is less relevant than the overall narrative frame used, this is not treated in the manner of a concerted discourse analysis, coding every sentence or paragraph by topic.<sup>222</sup> Rather, direct evidence (which is consistent with the overall sentiment of the statement) was integrated into the analytical text.

## **Empirical Findings**

### **FLORIDA**

Florida cannot be categorised as a case of unequivocal, explicit familialisation. Its TANF priorities, policies on eligibility (and exceptions), as well as the provisions for access and types of care through the CCDF subsidy present a mixed picture—appearing to represent implicit familialism—but its inconsistent support for familialism can be better understood as component to an increasingly strong underlying logic of exclusionary ‘deservingness’.

#### *Defamilialism*

The terms of eligibility, lack of generosity, and provision of different types of priorities with Florida’s family allowance program makes clear a relatively weak familialism. Republicans have maintained and even exacerbated this in their almost continuous hold on power. The conditions on TANF do not promote natality, as might be expected of a family policy underwritten by explicit familialism. Florida since 1997 does not exclude two-parent families in which both are able-bodied,<sup>223</sup> and its benefit calculation policy of ‘Payment Standard minus net income’ increasing with ‘assistance unit’ size means that a two-parent family would accordingly

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<sup>218</sup> Schulman, 2021, 3

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., 4

<sup>220</sup> National Conference of State Legislators, n.d.

<sup>221</sup> GovTrack.us, n.d.

<sup>222</sup> Paxton, 2021, 7-8

<sup>223</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022



theoretically have greater support.<sup>224</sup> This suggests an accommodation of—even a somewhat more generous attitude to—a traditionally arranged care unit. However, Florida has since 1998 maintained a ‘Family Cap’ policy by which children born to a parent receiving assistance are disqualified from the benefit, meaning there will be no increase in cash assistance corresponding to the increased cost of the new dependent.<sup>225</sup> This is softened by offering half the amount for the first child, but this itself indicates having more children incurs sanctions, far from the bonuses for additional births evident in the allowance policies of Hungary and Poland.<sup>226</sup> Indeed, Florida has not significantly pursuing the familialising, moralising ‘core aims’ laid out for TANF in 1996. Reporting no expenditure on ‘Two-Parent Family Formation and Maintenance Programs’ and has spent under \$600,000—between 0.0% and 0.1% of total funds used—in each year from 2016 (the first year of reporting under the more detailed TANF spending categories breakdown) to 2020, the state has exhibited no particular focus on reinforcing the two-parent family structure.<sup>227</sup> The income eligibility limits for the ‘Basic Assistance’ (the monthly cash support) further do not demonstrate intrinsic intent to provide for each set of parents. The asset limit, maximum monthly income and the size of the benefit unchanging since the program’s roll-out, meaning a precipitous decline in value in real terms over the past 25 years that therefore excludes ever more and provides ever less.<sup>228</sup> Exemplifying this, by 2012 the \$303 provision for a single parent with two children fell from providing 28 to 19 percent of the monthly income of those at the federal poverty level.<sup>229</sup> Receiving this meagre maximum benefit is, in fact, less likely for two-parent, dual-earner households; if one had disproportionately higher earnings, they would be more likely to be past the point of eligibility, given units are assessed by their household income.<sup>230</sup> As such, in this deep lack of provision, there is little evidence for a principal of rewarding those having families for their own sake. The lack of a state Earned Income Tax Credit—which would offer broader access, cash support, and less stringent work requirements—can be largely attributed to the lack of any state personal income tax (the mechanism by which these are assessed), yet confirms the scarcity of support.<sup>231</sup> Thus, exceptionally limited generosity within key terms of access and spending decisions means this cash assistance program could not realistically replace an earned wage. As a result, the targeting in welfare provision implies the family policy is not conducive to a breadwinner-homemaker caring female divide.

Florida is more clearly defamilising in the funding distribution within TANF and CCDF, if not decisively so. Direct provision for childcare constituted over 20% of the state’s total TANF spending every year between 2015 and 2020.<sup>232</sup> The percentage of funds transferred to CCDF—another child care program—itsself grew from 8.7% of total funds in FY 2015 to 12.2% in FY 2019, meaning around 30% of this state’s ‘family allowance’ was redirected into providing care to enable work.<sup>233</sup> Taken together with ‘Basic Assistance’ declining year-on-year from 18.7% of all funds in FY 2015 to 16.10% in FY 2019 to 14.10% in FY 2020,<sup>234</sup> this implies a shifting priority *away* from underwriting existing family structures, in favour of increasingly enabling—and giving strong support to—earner-externalised care dynamics. The reduction in co-payments (the monthly cost to the family over-the-top-of the subsidy) from 2015-2019 did favour traditional two-parent families, with the cuts for single-parent units being proportionately smaller than the dramatic cuts in 2018 and 2019 to that for two parent-families, when the price dropped to roughly half of 2015 rates.<sup>235</sup> This implies somewhat preferential treatment toward bonded couples, but this increasing their access to this defamilialising measure negates implications this reinforces breadwinner-carer care dependencies. Policies on the reimbursement of care providers make this more definite. The maximum monthly payment for licensed centre care for toddlers stayed consistent at \$518 for the base rate and \$622 for the highest rate since 2017 to 2019, whereas licensed family child care homes saw a

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<sup>224</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 118

<sup>225</sup> Ibid. 284

<sup>226</sup> Orenstein and Bugarič, 2022, 185-186

<sup>227</sup> Appendix A, 1

<sup>228</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 256

<sup>229</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 256; Falk, 2014, 11

<sup>230</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 118-120

<sup>231</sup> Urban Institute, n.d.

<sup>232</sup> Appendix A, 1

<sup>233</sup> Ibid., 1

<sup>234</sup> Ibid., 1

<sup>235</sup> Dwyer et al., 2020, 358; Stevens et al., 2019, 220; Stevens et al., 2016, 219

consistently lower rate (at \$466 and \$559) from the same period.<sup>236</sup> Significantly, the level of reimbursement determines whether it is financially viable for care providers to be open to subsidised students, and the extent of differentiation in compensation levels is key to it being realistic to create higher standard (higher cost) care.<sup>237</sup> Thus, under the logical assumption parents seek the highest quality care that is affordable, these unbalanced terms indicate both a disposition toward external care, and a promotion of it. Repeating the lack of priority or provision that is evident in the TANF spending policy, these together threaten the viability of in-home care. Key financial metrics therefore imply Floridian Republican policymakers are party to the disruption of traditional care structures that characterises defamilialism.

### *Familialism*

Amid this, however, the specifics of reimbursement and work requirements in both programs betray a preference for—or at least preserve the option of—a traditional *family* care provision, within the overarching neoliberal welfare context. The conditioning of welfare payments on a level of ‘employment’ activities from work to education to job search is at the core of the Clinton-era federal law that created TANF and the CCDF, so their presence cannot be understood as particularly deliberate defamilialising on the part of the GOP of Florida.<sup>238</sup> In fact, two parents participating in the TANF program are expected to work for 55 hours per week if they have publicly subsidised childcare and just 35 hours between them where they do not, disproportionately lower than the demand for single parents to work an average of 30 hours in the same period.<sup>239</sup> With the latter under the length of one individual’s working week, this permanently facilitates cash support amid stay-at-home parenting by one spouse. Thus favouring an earner-carer model and rewarding nuclear family structures, this notably contrasts to the contingent, limited reductions for single parents; the state only exempts these individuals from work where their child is less than 3 months old or if they are caring for an ill or incapacitated individual.<sup>240</sup> Especially as Florida has since 1997 had no exemption for the elderly and may require even those incapacitated to participate in activities,<sup>241</sup> this strongly conditions breaking from neoliberal premises of the necessity of work for those in non-conventional families *on them taking on care responsibilities*, be they intergenerational or to the young.

Demonstrating a strengthening of this logic recently, since 2019, Florida offers \$612 as a base reimbursement and \$735 maximum for full-time care in licensed child care centres, but also \$528/\$634 for family child care homes *and in-home care*.<sup>242</sup> Consequently, while routing payments through the market by framing kith-and-kin in these environments as ‘care providers’, this offers almost as generous support for direct familial care. This strengthening suggests at least an optional familialism, by which traditional care structures are at least maintained. Recent legislation such as April 2022’s Senate Bill 7074, which increased monthly cash payments in the ‘Relative Caregiver Program’ by which kin take in TANF-eligible children whose parents cannot care for them, further the solidification of the support for family dependencies.<sup>243</sup> As such, the details of conservative party’s welfare policy design reveal the preference for traditional relationships and the reinforcement of familial dependencies that constitutes familialism.

The contrary evidence—with limited access and assistance pointing to a basic defamilialism while closer analysis evidences reinforcement of care dependencies—can be best rationalised through an exclusionary lens. Both programs are characterised by significant sanctions; these, and arguably the limited cash provision, can be related to equity. More specifically, since the beginning, inability to prove work requirements have been fulfilled results in the entire benefit being suspended for whichever is longer of 3 months or until compliance.<sup>244</sup> Notably, though later ruled unconstitutional and voided, the state’s drug screening for eligibility was even briefly extended far past the long-standing policy of tests in individual cases where there was reasonable

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<sup>236</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 367

<sup>237</sup> Schulman, 2021, 14

<sup>238</sup> Minton et al. 2020, 3

<sup>239</sup> TANF Florida, n.d. ; Shantz et al., 2020, 149

<sup>240</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>241</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 139; Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>242</sup> Dwyer et al., 2020, 361-368

<sup>243</sup> Florida Governor’s Office Staff, 2022a

<sup>244</sup> Shantz, 2020, 264

suspicion of use; a 2011 law extended testing to every applicant and requiring they pay the upfront cost.<sup>245</sup> This denotes particular, recent, wariness of and behavioural demands on welfare recipients as a class. That TANF cash assistance is conditional on the sufficient school attendance of dependent children demonstrate behavioural dictates extend even past the claimant.<sup>246</sup> Such punitive design implies a drive toward enforcing desired conduct over maximising access for families. Indeed, the fact that Republicans eased the process to confirm access to childcare subsidies in 2016, removing the requirement for a randomly selected half of all (non-TANF) families receiving subsidies to have their eligibility redetermined every six months but *preserving this requirement for TANF recipients* is significant: this suggests an increased suspicion of the already dependent poor.<sup>247</sup> The maximum income a parent can have and still be eligible for CCDF is relatively exclusively defined in terms of initial assessment, at \$2,666 for a family of three (150% of the FPL), however Florida has offered a higher continuing eligibility than a number of other states (\$4171 therefore 325% of the federal poverty).<sup>248</sup> Seemingly rewarding the ‘hard-working’ employed, this generosity can therefore be understood as selectively directed toward those groups with a track record of being ‘productive’. This is true too of CCDF regulations disallowing job search as an activity when first applying but maintaining the grants for parents searching for a job for an extra three months after they have completed program with its work requirements, even if their eligibility period has expired.<sup>249</sup>

Given the economic structural disparities in poverty in the United States, this in practise entails greater scrutiny of non-white populations.<sup>250</sup> Indeed, a review of CCDF policies drawing from more than 25 interviews with experts in the fields indicated strong focus on compliance and fraud detection was associated increased barriers to access—or retention—of the subsidy for non-white American (and immigrant) individuals, because the increased reliance on caseworker judgement leaves more room for unconscious biases, and because of their structural impediments to formally recording eligibility such as increased likelihood of working more casual hours.<sup>251</sup> Thus, the seemingly strengthening preference toward governing social behaviour of the poor, in the US historical context, entails racial particularism. As such, though the generosity of childcare subsidies imply some outward support for different care models—and details such as Florida allowing English as a Second Language learning amongst its CCDF activities implies some inclusiveness—<sup>252</sup> the weight of evidence of discriminatory sanctions and eligibility suggest the programs hold a structurally embedded, ethnically homogenous, logic of exclusivity.

### *Discursive Analysis*

The discourse on these shifts makes clear the essentially exclusionary, but also increasingly familialising, logic taking root in Floridian welfare policy. Governor Rick Scott highlighting ‘personal accountability’ as well as stating it was ‘unfair for Florida taxpayers to subsidize drug addiction’ when signing the 2011 TANF drug testing law puts the burden of proof on the applicant to make that they can be trusted, and are ‘worthy’ of assistance through their previous (substance-related) conduct.<sup>253</sup> The language around even more recent policy shifts are further especially familialising, framing the family model as central, under attack and presenting ‘the family’ and its place in the life of the child to be rewarded. Both Scott and his successor Governor DeSantis positioned their achievements in child care and pre-K funding in their press releases on annual budgets as the second issue only behind tax reforms, with the latter describing this under the title ‘Putting Students, Families and Teachers First’.<sup>254</sup> More than this, press releases from April 11<sup>th</sup> and April 12<sup>th</sup> 2022 from the Office of the Governor of Florida narrate two bills increasing funds for family education, increasing in monthly payments, and offering additional childcare subsidy for relatives/kin taking in a child (paid for from TANF block grant funds) in indicative terms. These highlight quotes from senior Republicans from the governor to the state senate

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<sup>245</sup> Lyle, 2012, 14; Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2011

<sup>246</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 137

<sup>247</sup> Dwyer et al, 2020, 352

<sup>248</sup> Ibid., 316, 335

<sup>249</sup> Schulman, 2021, 46-47

<sup>250</sup> Adams & Pratt, 2021, 12

<sup>251</sup> Ibid., 4

<sup>252</sup> Hill et al., 2019

<sup>253</sup> CNN Wire Staff, 2011;

<sup>254</sup> Scott, 2016 ; Governor’s Press Office, 2020

president emphasising “There is no more important institution in our society than the family” and “incredibly, there are those who diminish the importance of fatherhood and the nuclear family – we will not let that happen.”<sup>255</sup> Though raising care standards and care provision has been an ongoing preoccupation, this strongly defensive language implies a narrative shift toward familialism.

Thus, the case of Florida presents increasing familialism. The state arguably initially reflects the weak familialism but lack of narrative or policy commitment to defamilialism of ‘implicit familialism’: the prediction of H1, if that. Still, the weight of jumps driven by jumps in generosity toward two-parent applicants and within-family care options in the 2010s suggests a prioritisation of familial care roles, if tempered by an accelerating ‘deservingness’ logic that presents as largely neoliberal in the extra restrictions on the poor but has racial implications for family support. If the longevity of some restrictive terms such as care-related work exemptions means there was no wholesale policy shift. The strength of defamilialising aspects further indicates this case does not fully align with explicit familialism. With Republicans solidifying of exclusionary and familialising terms of access, and particularly the strongly fortifying discourse, the GOP offering can be rationalised as approaching fulfilment of the H3 – a family policy increasingly driven by an exclusionary logic.

## SOUTH CAROLINA

South Carolina meanwhile demonstrates an explicit familialising policy that aligns closely with the second hypothesis. Its widely accessible CCDF program represents a component of defamilialism, however evidence from the state’s TANF policies (in funding priorities, rules on eligibility and exemptions) and its Earned Income Tax credit make clear a concerted—and increasing—effort to reward traditional family care models.

### *Defamilialism*

Defamilialism is present, and to some extent well-provided for. This is especially evident in the terms of access to its CCDF program. The state makes childcare significantly available through minimal behavioural requirements and relatively expansive income eligibility limits; parents must work only 15 hours per week to qualify for a subsidy (though notably if both parents in a two-parent household work this minimum, they will only receive part-time care).<sup>256</sup> In fact, in 2019, income eligibility limits were increased.<sup>257</sup> This made its offering a minimum of 159% of the federal poverty line, and 246% for those within the program.<sup>258</sup> Already not counting state EITC payments as income and so including the segment of the lower-income population whose one-time cash bonus from this would put them outside their more realistic classification of need, South Carolina then made ‘four-person’ (two-parent) families with an annual income of \$40,000 eligible.<sup>259</sup> The program demands co-pays from even the lowest income recipients, though did in 2017 cut these nearly in half for those on an annual income of \$15,000.<sup>260</sup> Taken together, an expanded range of families have access to affordable childcare. As in Florida, this removes the care responsibilities during work hours for more, encouraging participation in the labour force over staying within the home. Moreover, the fact that childcare co-payments must be made for every child (where others such as Florida ‘discount’ higher numbers)<sup>261</sup> denotes these inclusive terms are not designed to reward natality; rather, the policy terms seem to make this more costly. Thus, opening paths to alternative models of care, this policy creates no glide path for ‘traditional’ conservative family dynamics.

With in-home care reimbursed in 2019 at just \$195 for infant and toddler care and declining from here, compared to \$802-\$889 for licensed centre care, funding within the program might be understood as directed

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<sup>255</sup> Staff, 2022a; Staff, 2022b

<sup>256</sup> Dwyer et al., 2020, 61

<sup>257</sup> Ibid., 344

<sup>258</sup> Ibid., 317

<sup>259</sup> Ibid., 235; CCDF Policies Database Data, Oct 1, 2019

<sup>260</sup> Dwyer et al., 2020, 360

<sup>261</sup> Ibid. 359

toward the externalisation of care.<sup>262</sup> These updates to the rate for licensed centre care coming in 2016 and 2018 after years of fixed prices suggests Republican focus on securing this defamilialising measure.<sup>263</sup> The in-home option is not excluded as the state offers up to \$620 per child per month for ‘licensed family child care homes’—this generosity exceeds the maximum for even centre care in Wyoming—however this provider type still places children in the houses of others.<sup>264</sup> Especially in comparison to the reimbursement of licensed centre care, this makes the infrastructure of family care less financially viable. Choices over provider payments in South Carolina therefore appear to direct care outside the home. Coupled with significant childcare subsidies, this implies a basic defamilialisation rather than a preservation of traditional care responsibilities.<sup>265</sup>

### *Familialism*

This defamilialism is however weak in comparison to the familialising dimension of South Carolinian welfare policy. The state—increasingly—expansive cash allowances to support families with children from the most poor to the middle class. Legislation has made significant adjustments to the maximum income for initial eligibility for TANF assistance over the program’s lifetime, rising with it each year from \$614 in 1996 to \$1606 in 2019; with a drastic increase in 2003 and consistently raised standard, this was continuously either the broadest or second broadest inclusion in the universe of Republican cases in absolute terms.<sup>266</sup> Notably, there is little evidence of this being restricted to those groups nativist authoritarians would consider especially ‘deserving’. In fact, for cases in which a parent’s immigrant status means they will not receive assistance but their income may be counted, South Carolina disregards 50% of the first 4 months of earned income (once), then \$100 after this, extending assistance toward non-native families in lowering the income counted against the benefit amount (and so likely increasing the cash amount).<sup>267</sup> Demonstrating no real focus on disciplining behaviour, in the late 2000s South Carolina entrenched one of the more lenient sanction policies, with the maximum penalty for non-compliance being closing the case, but only until the recipient can show compliance with work requirements for one month.<sup>268</sup> This evidences an intrinsic aim to ease the financial burdens of poor South Carolinian families, supporting them through easing the financial burden of caring for a child.

Within the broader familialising context, most significantly, the terms of eligibility, measurement of income and exemptions to work requirements are especially favourable toward those undertaking familial care responsibilities. Showing a long-standing strong support for intergenerational family care, South Carolina disregards income up to 185% of the state defined Need Standard for the carer and any dependent in the house when grandparents are caring for a minor and their child.<sup>269</sup> Further, since 2004 parents have been exempt from work requirements where caring for someone who is ill or incapacitated; though since 2008 more broadly applied, the familialising underlying intent evident in the first exemption being related to care for disabled adult relatives or child dependents.<sup>270</sup> It even exempts those doing so from the intermittent time limit that requires they be receiving cash assistance only 24 of every 120 months, and in doing so shows prioritisation of creating stable support for those engaging in these care responsibilities.<sup>271</sup> As such, South Carolina exemplifies the encouragement of within-family care responsibilities: familialism.

This is true through the even where some of its absolute rules suggest otherwise. For instance, the state has held since 1997 ‘Family Cap’ which formally precludes extra benefits for those having children when already on welfare.<sup>272</sup> Crucially though, they offer a voucher equivalent to the increase in cash assistance that the parents would have received;<sup>273</sup> far from punishing natality, as the presence of a cap might imply, this denotes an

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<sup>262</sup> Dwyer et al., 2020 271

<sup>263</sup> Stevens, 2015, 301; Table E-8. CCDF Policies Database, 2019, 362

<sup>264</sup> Dwyer et al., 2020, 362, 367

<sup>265</sup> Ibid., 270

<sup>266</sup> Shantz et al. 2020.,244; Goehring et al., 2018, 239

<sup>267</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 95

<sup>268</sup> Ibid., 263

<sup>269</sup> Ibid., 84

<sup>270</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>271</sup> Shantz et al., 2020. 209

<sup>272</sup> Ibid., 283

<sup>273</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

underlying effort to guarantee support. Similarly, Republicans removed the exemption from work requirements for child-care responsibilities on taking power in 2003, implying absolute priority of work-life over supporting family care roles.<sup>274</sup> Progressively shifting from this, however, a parent caring for their child (who is under 13) cannot be sanctioned for fully not meeting these requirements, and since 2013 single parents with children under 6 cannot face penalties for not meeting them in any circumstance for which they cannot find childcare.<sup>275</sup> Taken with the fact post-2012 the elderly have no special lenience but anyone from the 7<sup>th</sup> month of pregnancy to the first birthday of their child are exempt from the federally mandated 60-month time limit on cash assistance, this adds weight to the evidence for prioritising natality.<sup>276</sup> These multi-faceted mechanisms to direct resources to securing familial care, even in the face of the state's long-standing or even the federal rules, thus indicates an even stronger defence of familialism than on first observation.

Indeed, its cash assistance program spending record confirms a robust familialism. Well above the nation-wide average of roughly 20% of total funds since 2012, Republican-led South Carolina increased the proportion of TANF funds it spent on direct financial transfers from 33.60% in 2015 to 31.70% in 2019.<sup>277</sup> Given the state has never transferred funds to the CCDF program and spent a beneath-average 18.90% on child care and Pre-K/Headstart programs (which occupy children during school hours), there is evidence for direct familial support over externalising, defamilialising measures such as childcare.<sup>278</sup> The inclusive terms of access for both the TANF and CCDF programs can therefore be understood not merely as making viable a number of forms of family care, but specifically rewarding those retaining home-care responsibilities. The limited dollar value of the TANF benefit could call into question this characterisation—despite regular increases, the South Carolinian's maximum monthly transfer for a family of 3 is less than 20% of the federal poverty line income—but the state's EITC negates significant doubt.<sup>279</sup> In absolute terms, South Carolina offers the most lavish state EITC anywhere, starting at 20.83% of the federal credit in 2018, 41.67% in 2019 and to rise to 125% in 2023.<sup>280</sup> Thus, where the 2019 federal refund offered \$3526 for a single child and \$5828 for two children to even those with a low earned income (between \$10,000 and \$20,000), South Carolina offered an additional lump sum of \$2448, and by 2023 will provide parents with at least \$4407 (with the exact amount keeping pace with inflation).<sup>281</sup> This is not fully inclusive—2017 analysis indicated the full benefit will reach just 2% of those with incomes under \$21,000—because in being a 'non-refundable' credit this program can only reduce tax liability to zero.<sup>282</sup> As such, the EITC has limited value for the lowest income families, who already pay little state income tax. Still, with steep phase-ins on low income (reaching the maximum where there is an earned income of \$10,000 and a single child) and longer phaseouts (at just over \$40,000 in 2019), this generosity is extended to the bulk of the lower- and lower-middle income quartiles.<sup>283</sup> This significant generosity is thus more directed at the lower-middle and middle-class who are considered deserving in accruing some earnings, but this Earned Income Tax Credit still remains significantly familialising in offering cash support to a large portion of the population without conditions or work requirements that remove a parent from the home.<sup>284</sup>

How the credit is assessed reinforces this inference. The requirement for the child to be related to the claimant by blood or marriage and live with them for more than half of the year gives first indication South Carolina's welfare measure is deeply oriented toward supporting family care responsibility.<sup>285</sup> More than this, Republican lawmakers having tied the assessment to the terms of the federal EITC<sup>286</sup> translates to a state level married

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<sup>274</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>275</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>276</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 227; Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022 // Welfare Rules Databook, 2013, Table IV.C.3(b), Welfare Rules Databook, 2018, 228

<sup>277</sup> Appendix A, 3

<sup>278</sup> Appendix A, 3

<sup>279</sup> Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2021, 8-9; Shantz et al. 2020 118

<sup>280</sup> South Carolina Government Communications, n.d.

<sup>281</sup> Internal Revenue Service, 2022

<sup>282</sup> O'Neill, 2017

<sup>283</sup> Prenatal-to-3 Policy Impact Center, n.d.

<sup>284</sup> Maag et al. 2019, 5

<sup>285</sup> Ibid., 5

<sup>286</sup> SC Infrastructure and Economic Development Reform Act, 2017

couples having the same phase-in rates and maximum credits as single parents, but a higher threshold at which it begins to phase out (\$25,000 instead of \$19,000 available to sole guardians).<sup>287</sup> As a consequence, a wider segment of those within this traditional family model will receive larger amounts of support. There is further evidence of ‘marriage bonus’ where an individual with no income marries a high-earner (such as around \$50,000) which, along with the option to file as a ‘head-of-household’, implies a marked effort to sustain the financial viability of earner/carer divisions of labour.<sup>288</sup> Notably not paid from TANF funds in which federal matching resources can mitigate the costs to the state, this substantial commitment of state resources in creating the program in 2017 clearly denotes a recently surfacing logic in which within-family care responsibilities—especially that of the ‘nuclear’ family—are supported the support.

### *Discursive Analysis*

The justifications offered for the TANF expansions—and to some extent the initiation of the EITC program—partly vocalise what the bulk of the analysis of the policies suggests: that South Carolinian cash allowance policies were designed as a defence of the traditional family structure. Seemingly indicating disunity and so not the level of vocal defence component to familialism, the South Carolinian legislature had to override the Republican Governor’s veto to pass the state Earned Income Tax Credit into law.<sup>289</sup> However, McMaster’s veto message was centred on his opposition to the gas tax increase, with the single oblique reference to the EITC being that the tax breaks were “grossly insufficient to offset the massive liability” and problematically “temporary”.<sup>290</sup> The credit itself being negotiated across the aisle—the key cross-party sponsor narrated the key achievement of the bill as this tax relief “for people who really need it...that group is working families”—<sup>291</sup>could imply conservative commitment to this support for the family past scoring partisan points. More outwardly, in 2014 his predecessor Nikki Haley in ‘State of the State’ addresses in 2014 and 2017 highlighted the TANF changes under her administration’s leadership; though she emphasised the transition to earned income in the repeated use of the phrase “welfare-to-work”, her language on moving away from “meet[ing] numbers and process[ing] people” and holding up the successful cases as individuals who wanted “to make their children proud.”<sup>292</sup> This implies a broader centring of her record as not just mechanically but inclusively supporting parents. More compellingly, narratives related to childcare notably carries these themes too. Component to the favourable terms of assistance for direct relatives, South Carolina’s TANF-funded ‘Kinship Care Program’ has been a significant priority for the current Governor; McMaster signed legislation strengthening the requirement to seek out direct blood relations for a child who required care, and singled this program out for praise, declaring an “Appreciation Month” for these caregivers.<sup>293</sup> If not combatively, in keeping with the state’s non-exclusionary policies, key lawmakers’ discursive choices when relating notably familialising legislative changes hint at a broad prioritisation of the role of the family over previously significant neoliberal focus on ‘workfare’.

If the defamilialising dimension is not abjectly weak given open-handed policies of childcare could reduce care dependencies between family members, the even greater outlay of resources focused on enabling guardianship of children by relatives means there is no systematic disruption of historic care roles. Meanwhile, the remarkable crafting of policies to circumnavigate long-standing restrictions so parents of all immigrant statuses, grandparents, those having additional children in sum suggest a concerted effort to fortify the place of family members with linear, traditional ties to the child. Discursive analysis is not strongly conclusive, but the more substantive policy development—benefits to a ‘head-of-household’ over a single parent in the state EITC are considered alongside the shifts in TANF funding loads from 2015-2019—since 2017 program indicates South Carolina Republicans liberally reward ‘nuclear’ family members taking on care responsibilities, not prioritising alternative models. Thus, South Carolinian family welfare policy increasingly contains the strong familialism

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<sup>287</sup> Maag et al., 2019, 1

<sup>288</sup> Ibid., 12

<sup>289</sup> O’Neill, 2017

<sup>290</sup> McMaster, May 9, 2017

<sup>291</sup> NWLC, May 12, 2017

<sup>292</sup> Haley, 2014, 9

<sup>293</sup> McMaster, 2022

and (relatively) weak defamilialism that constitutes an explicit (inclusive) familialism; as such, the case largely evidences H2.

## INDIANA

Policy choices across each indicator—the CCDF, TANF and state EITC programs—in this third state demonstrate a lately solidifying fortification of familial care responsibilities. This is clear from the targeted funds and eligibility requirements for both TANF and CCDF. As might be expected of a set of subsidies making external care affordable, the terms of access for the latter do introduce a certain level of defamilialism. Nonetheless, that which appears defamilialising can be partly understood as the product of an underlying, exclusionary logic. Given this, Indianian family policy constitutes a coded familialism.

### *Defamilialism*

As with Florida and South Carolina, there is a level of defamilialism perpetuated by long-standing welfare design. Its maximum monthly income for initial eligibility for the TANF program has not increased since 1996, remaining at \$378 for single parents and therefore significantly declining in real value.<sup>294</sup> The largest benefit for a family of 4 with no income—among the poorest and most vulnerable parents—has not change in an even longer period, holding at the preceding welfare program’s rate of \$385.<sup>295</sup> This minimal amount means the TANF program support could not fully sustain a family seeking to have one parent as a full-time carer if the other did not earn enough, in which case the unit could be excluded from assistance all-together through strict income standards.<sup>296</sup> By making necessary two-earner structures for the state’s poorest, this contributes to the disruption of historic care responsibilities. Such a defamilialising impact is reinforced through the open-handed optional externalisation of care in the CCDF program’s relatively high income threshold for continuing to receive benefits—with legislation in 2007 encoding yearly raises, and one of the nation-wide highest in 2019 at \$5388 for a two-parent, two-child family—and the exemption of families with incomes less than 100% of the Federal Poverty Line from any co-payment on the childcare.<sup>297</sup> Equally, though Indiana requires some activity from the parents, as is federally mandated, the state has never had any minimum work hours per week for CCDF eligibility, freeing parents from care responsibility without stringent requirements. Where parents do work, the state has no maximum hours of care and offers up to 10 hours per week outside of regular working hours so parents can travel to the place of care from their work.<sup>298</sup> This too holistically reducing care dependencies by extending the possibility for out-of-home care for the bulk of the day. As such, while not necessitating labour market participation, the terms of childcare liberally enables it. Thus, in the generosity of its CCDF, Indiana appears to disrupt traditional care models and promote alternative ones: there is evidence of defamilialisation.

Much of this can however be significantly discounted as Indiana applying an exclusionary lens mixing producerist and nationalist differentiation. The strictness of eligibility for TANF exemplifies this: since 2007 the only immigrants Indiana has allowed access cash benefits—even after the expiration of the federally required five-year qualifying period—are refugees and deportees.<sup>299</sup> Therefore, unlike South Carolina and even Florida, Indiana does not give the vast majority of immigrants the right to support for their families, orienting entirely toward the native population. Meanwhile, Indiana in 2015 became one of only four states who allow parental assistance units to be converted to ‘child-only’ ones that can receive support beyond time limits (if the parents still complete activities).<sup>300</sup> This direct contrast indicates a recently-solidifying preference—even willingness to circumnavigate strict neoliberal federal rules imposing a five-year TANF access limit—for those already completing the work requirements. In this, the (defamilialising) poor TANF provision for families relates to judgement of worthiness. As such, access policies betray the prioritisation of national, and within this ‘hard-working’, parents, as is characteristic of PRRP exclusion. CCDF eligibility increasingly reflects a similar weighting. Where the childcare program’s initial income threshold was a paltry 127% FLP, it rose to the

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<sup>294</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 244

<sup>295</sup> Ibid., 256; Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>296</sup> CCDF Policies Database Data, Oct 1, 2019

<sup>297</sup> Dwyer et al., 2020, 118, 202

<sup>298</sup> CCDF Policies Database Data, Oct 1, 2019

<sup>299</sup> Dwyer et al., 2020, 63; P.L.161-2007, Sec.40

<sup>300</sup> Cohen et al., 2015, 136, 150; Huber et al., 2015, 142; Shantz, 2020, 136, 167



comparatively generous 235% for ongoing and redetermination.<sup>301</sup> Previously at similar levels, for FY 2016 Indiana also made the income threshold for continuing benefits more than double the initial eligibility, solidifying distinctions between those ‘on-the-path’ to employment over the full population.<sup>302</sup> As such, the generosity *within* CCDF may imply defamilialism, but the structural terms of both programs—the conditions of access to this largesse—make clear an exclusionary logic roots this dimension. This weakens the impression family policy in Indiana is designed to reduce care dependencies, or disrupt historic family structures.

### *Familialism*

There is far more consistent evidence for familialism, especially in the distribution of funds within TANF and the CCDF. Its topline expenditure on cash payments is slightly misleading: spending only an average of 5.66% of funds each year on cash assistance from FY 2015-2019 while averaging 16.68% directly on child care assistance and 20.94% implies a prioritisation of securing childcare and so freeing individuals for labour force participation.<sup>303</sup> However, that Indiana’s Republicans (increasingly) expect and enforce traditional family models is clear in the state moving from spending nothing within ‘Fatherhood and Two-Parent Family Formation and Maintenance Programs’ in 2015 to 10.8% of total funds on this priority in 2019.<sup>304</sup> This demonstrates a dramatic reorientation of poverty/family assistance toward the ‘nuclear’ family that is especially exceptional given only 0.5% of all TANF funds nationally are directed toward this priority.<sup>305</sup> More than this, the state spent a further five-year-average of 8.54% of TANF resources on a refundable—meaning the taxpayer can be reimbursed past the point of their tax burden cancelling out—EITC.<sup>306</sup> This is significantly more inclusive of lower-taxed lowest income individuals, suggesting an intention to fully support all the families of the state.<sup>307</sup> At 9% of the federal EITC in 2019 (set so in 2009), this bonus more than doubles a monthly cash assistance payment offered through TANF; an parent earning between \$10,000 and \$14,900 with two qualifying children would, for instance, receive an average of an extra \$465.<sup>308</sup> Though paid yearly and so not ‘stable’ support, the broad reach in far wider income eligibility than TANF—and crucially though the tax credit being ‘refundable’—means the cash allowance program helps alleviate the financial burden of having children, supporting this. Moreover, building on federal parameters, this generosity is available largely only to relatives (although it does allow authorized foster parents) who are responsible for youths up to 24 (if they are in full-time education) resident for the full year.<sup>309</sup> By definition, this is component to supporting individuals with family dependents. In fact, the state enforces these ties: it diverges from federal rules in further requiring married couples file their return jointly, submerging them within the family unit instead of allowing for individual (or separated) circumstances.<sup>310</sup> Taken together, the structure of this credit fortifies traditional family structures. Though EITC funding as a percentage of total spending falling from 10.6% to 5.7% from FY 2016-17 implies a drop-off in support, the minimal real-terms drop from \$31.9 to \$28.9 million, the year-on-year funding increase from 2018-2020, then legislation in 2021 expanding the benefit to 10% of the federal credit suggest this measure and entailed dimension appears a renewed priority.<sup>311</sup>

Most remarkably, the most generous reimbursement package within the CCDF is directed toward familial care dependencies. Since records were accessible on the matter (2007), Indiana has set the co-payment for a childcare at the family level, meaning costs do not increase at all by the number of children cared for under the subsidy.<sup>312</sup> The TANF program has a ‘Family Cap’ policy that means the benefit does not increase for children

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<sup>301</sup> Dwyer et al. 2020, 101

<sup>302</sup> Ibid., 344

<sup>303</sup> Appendix A, 3

<sup>304</sup> Ibid., 3

<sup>305</sup> Ibid., 3

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., 3

<sup>307</sup> Maag et al., 2019, 45

<sup>308</sup> Crandall-Hollick et al., 2021, 23

<sup>309</sup> Publication EIC, 4

<sup>309</sup> Moreno, March 30, 2022

<sup>310</sup> Publication EIC, 4

<sup>311</sup> Appendix A, 3; Prenatal-to-3 Policy Clearinghouse, n.d.

<sup>312</sup> Dwyer et al., 2019, 223

born after welfare aid begins,<sup>313</sup> and the state EITC only makes corresponding payment increases up to three children, but through this CCDF policy choice Indiana supports larger family sizes. Moreover, while it has periodically raised licensed centre rate to offer one or the highest base and maximum rates for each age group (at \$1070 base/ \$1499 maximum for infants and \$966 base / \$1352 maximum for toddlers by 2019), the state has offers even more consistently generous reimbursement for in-home child care: since 2007 it has offered at \$1257 per month for infants, toddlers and pre-schoolers to be cared for within their own home.<sup>314</sup> This enables *relatives* to be paid well for staying home to take this on through a child's early years, with Indiana not allowing non-relatives living in the home to be the care 'provider'.<sup>315</sup> Coupled with lesser level of reimbursement for 'Licensed Family Child Care Homes' in which the child is cared for in a home setting that is not their own (holding at \$758 since 2016),<sup>316</sup> this strongly suggests a traditionalist conception of the family care responsibilities, and a concerted effort to reward this behaviour while providing much less for alternatives.<sup>317</sup> In this, the cardinal 'defamilizing' program supports traditional dependencies even more strongly than the state's family allowance policy.

Policy choices concerning earned (and earning) income in the CCDF, TANF and EITC add weight to this implication that the implication the state tilts support toward family care responsibilities. Mitigating the evidence for defamilialism in restrictive access to TANF cash, the state EITC is available to a parent earning up to \$47,440 per year (if they have two children, \$41,756 if they have one) and so means the state widely supports families.<sup>318</sup> Indeed, where the parent is a minor and so they are potentially dependent on care too, the state demonstrates support for within-family support networks through the TANF program. In 2016, Indiana expanded its earned income waiver on grandparents' income to 100% of the Need Standard for any family members, as well as an extra \$90.<sup>319</sup> Given the grandparents could bear the expense of other dependents, this breaks down the risk of financial insecurity. In the context of otherwise strict income eligibility limits, these exemptions—which specifically support intergenerational family care—are key pathways to access. This implies a substantial preferential provision for those with such dependencies.

Arguably running counter to this, Indiana turned back to a restrictive standard on work exemptions after a brief period of the federal maximum for those caring for an infant from 2005-2007.<sup>320</sup> The failure to secure this support suggests, in this mid-2000s period, preserving the care roles of the family was not a priority. However, in exempting those caring for children from non-compliance penalties since 2015, the state weighs this act of care heavily enough to override the behavioural dictates of the program.<sup>321</sup> Further, though its TANF program has high work requirement of 30 hours per week for single parents, the state reduces this to 20 if the relevant child is under 6.<sup>322</sup> Thus, where support is otherwise restricted or made contingent on full workforce participation, Indiana lightens burdens where familial dependencies are most acute: for young children or minor parents (in their grandparents' homes). Thus, the state recognises and fortifies parental care responsibilities while making only limited provision for alternative situations.

### *Discursive Analysis*

The narratives offered surrounding many of these key changes reflect the strong defence of the family's role in care, but also an—especially producerist—logic, with both elements somewhat strengthening. Where Governor Mitch Daniel's press releases justified the 2006 expansion of childcare coverage (that would culminate in the 2007 enormous raise to in-home care reimbursement) with the essentially neoliberal "moving people from welfare to work....means more need for childcare vouchers",<sup>323</sup> his successor coded the potentially defamilialising measure in defence of family care roles. Mike Pence stated in his speech at the bill signing of a

<sup>313</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 283

<sup>314</sup> Ibid., 2019, 361, Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>315</sup> Dwyer et al., 2020, 307

<sup>316</sup> Table E-9., CCDF Policies Database 2019, 367-8

<sup>317</sup> Table 42. 2019, 204

<sup>318</sup> Crandall-Hollick et al., 2021, 3

<sup>319</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 83; Goerhing et al., 2018, 82

<sup>320</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project 2022

<sup>321</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 259; Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>322</sup> Shantz et al, 2020, 149

<sup>323</sup> Jankowski, 2006

2014 trial expansion of the childcare program (which was state-funded but is administered under CCDF rules)<sup>324</sup> “I have always believed that the best pre-K program is going to be a prosperous family that can provide a child with the kind of enrichment in the home that every child deserves” but that he had realised “that’s simply not the case for too many Indiana kids”.<sup>325</sup> Repeating this statement almost exactly in a 2016 letter to the federal administration requesting funding to enlarge the pilot,<sup>326</sup> statements from the highest levels of the Indiana Republican Party repeatedly justify the support for externalised care and education on the infeasibility of home care for some. Language on the recent development of the Earned Income Tax Credit, however, emphasises the ongoing strength of a ‘producerist’ distinction. The public statements by the chief sponsor of the corresponding bill exemplify. His five press releases on the passage of the legislation all repeat work-focused sentiments including that the bill’s expansion of TANF and CCDF income eligibility requirements, earned income discounts, and boost to the EITC would “ensure Hoosiers who are actively pursuing higher-paying jobs or workforce education and training don’t lose their government benefits solely because of an increase in income”.<sup>327</sup> While this is a hypothesised facet of PRRP family policy, the focus welfare as a tool to generate productivity is also characteristic of the neoliberalism of the historic Republican party. Therefore vocalising the twin dynamics of exclusionary familialism, discursive evidence demonstrates continuity in conservative policymaking as well as change.

Taken with structural discrimination in CCDF and TANF seeming to root aspects of outwardly defamilialising design, the weight of evidence of the targeting funds toward (traditional) family care (rather than buttress alternatives) in all relevant programs implies familialism, if one conditional on the basis of an underlying, growing exclusionary logic. This, alongside some defence of the patriarchal family’s primacy, stem from deep roots in features such as the EITC orientation toward married couples, or producerist discursive narratives to justify welfare. Nonetheless, a large portion of the familialising—plus nationally privileging—policy shifts and discourse activating 2015-16 and 2019-2022 strongly indicates an emergent, exclusive familialism. Indiana therefore exhibits a somewhat novel family policy centring on a logic of exclusion, significantly aligning with H3.

## WYOMING

The rules on eligibility, exemptions, but especially the variable standards of generosity denote an explicit familialism: a significant imbalance between weak familialism and strong, self-conscious familialism.

### *Defamilialism*

The growing inclusivity of CCDF benefits speaks to some policy designed to externalise care responsibilities. Wyoming has historically not require a minimum number of work hours from the parents, be they single or joint.<sup>328</sup> The state became even more lenient—and therefore inclusive—on what activities were qualified recently; in 2016, job search was allowed for continuing eligibility, whereas previously this had been entirely ignored. In the same year, the state doubled its redetermination period to 12 months which, by reducing the regulatory burdens under which a family could be excluded, eases ongoing support, which in turn sustains stable childcare.<sup>329</sup> Notably, the state also exempts single parents earning under \$20,000 or married couples earning \$30,000 from co-payments<sup>330</sup> and prioritises subsidies for children within families with a ‘Very Low Income’, defined as less than 150% of the FPL.<sup>331</sup> In the reality of oversubscription for the subsidy, this represents a significant orientation toward the vulnerable, poor population who would be especially hard-pressed to pay the costs of external childcare otherwise. As such, this policy choice expands the availability of these out-of-home

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<sup>324</sup> IC 12-17.2-7.2-7, n.d.

<sup>325</sup> Elliot, 2014

<sup>326</sup> Pence, 2016

<sup>327</sup> Sommers, 2021 ; Hurt, 2021

<sup>328</sup> Dwyer et al., 2019, 57

<sup>329</sup> Ibid.,353

<sup>330</sup> Ibid.,235

<sup>331</sup> Ibid.,179

care options, reducing care dependencies. Still, this expansiveness is not absolute. Wyoming, though periodically raising the standard, has a lower continuing eligibility than most states within the universe, rising from the initial standard of 175% of the federal poverty line to only 225%.<sup>332</sup> This is below states with more systemically meagre provision, such as Florida.<sup>333</sup> Indeed, even within the outwardly defamilialising offer of childcare, Wyoming has since 2009 made all relative caretakers eligible to apply for childcare subsidies but only legal gardens among non-relative ones.<sup>334</sup> Thus, the state betrays a slight preference for traditional or at least formalised family relationships over mixed, fluid parental structures. If far from decisive as the individual's access to the CCDF program is still significant, and the latter policy came into force under a Democratic governor so cannot speak to Republican welfare design, the direction of the targeted expansion of CCDF hints at a—solidifying—familialising aspect rather than strong defamilialism.

Arguably, such an implication of weak defamilialism still pales before overall still liberal terms of access to childcare and costs within it. Where treated comparatively alongside TANF offerings, 'generosity' in measures externalising care is however less than it seems. Though not having a state income tax effectively precludes Wyoming from offering a state EITC,<sup>335</sup> it prioritises cash support for parents through the TANF program. Republican legislation notably raised the cash assistance amount year-on-year, being one of only three states to increase it at least enough to match inflation.<sup>336</sup> At \$697 in 2019 for a three-person family with no income, Wyoming has more than doubled the offering of South Carolina (\$292), Florida (\$303) and Indiana (\$288) since 2011, the year of Republicans assuming trifecta control.<sup>337</sup> Completing this picture of generosity, unlike the other three cases, at least since 2012 Wyoming offers transitional cash assistance for up to 6 months after the federally-imposed time limit has been reached, providing half the amount of the final benefit.<sup>338</sup> Understood alongside 17.4% of total funds in 2015 and rising to 38.4% in 2018 of TANF spending dedicated to basic cash assistance, the holistic and generous nature of these choices demonstrate an increasing orientation toward reliable, direct alleviation of the costs of having children.<sup>339</sup> This affirms a marked focus on making sustainable care dependencies.

Moreover, that the balance of Wyoming's family policy constitutes a weak defamilialism and relatively strong familialism is evident *by contrast* to the CCDF provision. Exceptionally for state TANF programs, Wyoming transferring none of these funds to CCDF and spending only between 4.7 and 11.3% on child care assistance from 2015-2020 indicates no significant focus on easing the burden of care that may preclude individuals from working. This contrast is reinforced as within the CCDF system itself, there is little to disrupt historic care responsibilities. Since 2009, the childcare program has had no minimum work limits, therefore not demanding full-time labour market participating that would preclude some level of family care.<sup>340</sup> The state further restricts childcare for travel hours to the site of care to one per day, considerably complicating use of the subsidy for parents who do work given the rural vast context has introduced childcare 'deserts' that necessitate travel.<sup>341</sup> Most importantly, in the last 10 years, each of the four forms of childcare within the CCDF system is underfunded. Wyoming has held a particularly low reimbursement rate for in-home child care, with a flat provision of \$335 for infant, toddler and preschool care, but this cannot speak to a preclusion of family care models; this is similar to maximum reimbursement for 'Licensed Family Child Care Homes' and even almost matching the maximum reimbursement of licensed child care centre.<sup>342</sup> In fact, compensation for the in-home care option was last raised in 2018,<sup>343</sup> while professionalised 'Licensed Centre Care' was last updated in 2012 (and then as a slight cut).<sup>344</sup> This strongly suggests a common lack of support—and even within this more

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<sup>332</sup> Ibid., 317

<sup>333</sup> Ibid., 317

<sup>334</sup> Ibid. 93; CCDF Policies Database data, Oct 1, 2019

<sup>335</sup> Prenatal-to-3 Policy Impact Center, n.d.

<sup>336</sup> Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2021, 8

<sup>337</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 256; Goehring et al., 2018, 251-252

<sup>338</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>339</sup> Appendix A,

<sup>340</sup> Dwyer et al., 335; Stevens et al., 2016, 280; CCDF Policies Database data, Oct 1, 2019

<sup>341</sup> Dwyer et al., 2019, 164; Jessen-Howard et al., 2018, 7-8

<sup>342</sup> Dwyer et al., 2019, 36-37, 260

<sup>343</sup> Ibid., 254

<sup>344</sup> Stevens et al., 2016, 301

attention to family-based care solutions—rather than policy designed to externalise responsibilities, as might be expected of a federal program intended in part to increase the labour market participation of mothers. Moreover, these low reimbursement rates threaten the financial viability of providing high-quality care in any of these approved forms, likely provoking both gaps in available childcare and reticence on the part of parents. As such, Wyoming’s iteration of the CCDF does effectively supply alternative models of care: the defamilialising dimension in within this measure supposedly conducive to it is weak because of poor provision, while the childcare income eligibility, terms of funding, terms of use, and reimbursement structures sustain a notable level of familialism.

### *Familialism*

The specifics of generosity within the state’s family policy affirms it explicitly familialises. The nature of Wyoming’s work requirements and definition of legitimate recipients, for instance, solidify this interpretation. Wyoming has since 2001 made ‘lawful permanent residents’, ‘parolees’, ‘battered noncitizens’ eligible for TANF assistance where the other three cases of the study do not; with federal law precluding national funds being used to support such individuals for the first five years, the state uses its own funds for this purpose.<sup>345</sup> Such deliberate extra expenditure seems to implies a logic heavily weighted toward families, whatever their background. Beyond this, mirroring Indiana, work expectations are reduced from 30 hours of work activities per week (for single-parents) to 20 if their child is under six.<sup>346</sup> Wyoming does not exempt (single-parent) recipients from work requirements if they are caring for someone who is ill or incapacitated, or are incapacitated themselves, they do extend assistance past the federally mandated time limit in which the head of the unit is caring for an incapacitated other.<sup>347</sup> Taken together, these betray a wealth of extra provision directed at sustaining care dependencies, over even accommodating for the care of the parent as an individual. If these rules existing since 1998-2001 means this cannot evidence a shift in Republican logic,<sup>348</sup> this indicates an ongoing preference for family support for its own sake over conditioning this on ‘deservingness’.

More immediately, the eligibility rules reaffirm the gulf in priorities: remarkably inclusive for the TANF program, in contrast to the above outlined relatively limited provision within the CCDF program. For the former, most basically, the state has one of the more lenient sanction policies since 2016, with a maximum penalty for not meeting work requirements of merely suspending the benefit until compliance.<sup>349</sup> As such, policy design ensures no behavioural issues could fully cut those with care responsibilities from maintenance. This included two-parent families, with the state removing its ‘Family Cap’ in 2008 (if under a Democratic governor).<sup>350</sup> Opening the door to growing families as a result, Wyoming has also consistently raised maximum monthly income eligibility, and at \$1296 was significantly more generous than Indiana at \$378 and Florida at \$1602.<sup>351</sup> In fact, in 2016 the state raised its asset limit to \$5000 dollars (at least doubling the limit of each other case studied), inclusively widening support to low-income but not absolutely poor parents.<sup>352</sup> Confirming wide provision, rather than restricting support of parents under conditions of poverty or by their background, the state as of 2015<sup>353</sup> further expanded the montly earned income disregard from \$200 to \$600 for any parent, stepparent, parent that is a recent immigrant and does not qualify for assistance but their income counts against their child’s eligibility,<sup>354</sup> and the grandparent where the child is a minor and lives with them.<sup>355</sup> The lack of restriction beyond a parental relationship seems to confirm the open-handed support of parents for its own sake, rather than conditional on poverty or national background; taken with the disregard of 100% of the Family Need Standard’ from the income of grandparents and as of 2019 stepparents for any other dependents they may

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<sup>345</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 61; Table I.B.5 2002, 46

<sup>346</sup> Shantz et al, 2020, 157

<sup>347</sup> Ibid., 2020, 142

<sup>348</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>349</sup> Shantz et al., 2012, 218

<sup>350</sup> Ibid., 283

<sup>351</sup> Ibid., 245

<sup>352</sup> Welfare Rules Database Project, 2022

<sup>353</sup> Table I.D.1 2015, 76; Table I.D.1 2014, 77

<sup>354</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 65

<sup>355</sup> Ibid., 2019, 85

have,<sup>356</sup> a weight of evidence suggests the state directs its generosity toward those taking traditionally formulated (ie. within marriage or generational care) dependencies. Extending this, the change to the rules in 2015 specified that married parents *with a child together* (or grandparents in the same circumstance) may disregard \$1200: double the amount of earned income of single parents.<sup>357</sup> Deliberately rewarding—arguably incentivising—this traditional family structure, this policy shift therefore evidences the state digging in in its fortification of the family, and within this the ‘nuclear’ family structure.

Recent state policy changes related immigrants is component to this. Wyoming does not allow English as a Second Language as a work activity, though in the context of its low immigrant population, this cannot be considered conclusive of exclusionary intent.<sup>358</sup> Rather, even more inclusively, Wyoming in 2018 increased the maximum benefit provided monthly to ‘child-only’ units; as these are formed in circumstances of non-parent guardians or parents banned for their immigration status, this expanded support for non-native but still traditionally related family populations.<sup>359</sup> This holistic, context-sensitive provision, taken with the broader rewarding of within-marriage or generational-care parenting in the earned income disregard, makes clear a support of (closely tied) family dependencies in whatever form has seen a renewed focus in the last 10 years of Republican governance.<sup>360</sup>

### *Discursive Analysis*

There is less explication of this logic than might be expected of a state characterised by explicit familialism, though this in the context of limited sources: neither the Wyoming Republican Legislative Caucus nor the Office of the Governor have extensive archives of statements before 2019, and the few legislators have a consistent social media or personal platform presence to air their own voice.<sup>361</sup> The available evidence does broadly, if not emphatically, confirm a narrative logic centred on the family’s role. Though not specific to the Child Care Development Fund, the comments by both Governor’s on funding the program’s parent body are arguably indicative. It is notable that in his final ‘State of the State’ Address, looking back on the achievements of his 2011-2019 Governorship, Mead defending the funding for the Department which houses the childcare program—which under his administration saw a funding shift toward in-home care—saying “the Departments of Health and Family Services and a few others, the cuts have gone too far”.<sup>362</sup> This is circumstantial link cannot confirm a family policy logic. More compelling, the bipartisan legislation tripling the earned income disregard in 2015, complete with the exception for married couples rocketing from \$400 to \$1200 dollars, was not highlighted by Republican leadership at the time; Governor Matt Mead merely listed the “personal opportunity with employment responsibility” Act alongside 36 “bills signed by Governor Mead today” on 9<sup>th</sup> March 2015.<sup>363</sup> However, the Republican State Senator who brought the legislation to the floor, in his statement presenting it, acknowledged the importance of enabling “people to have assets when they are on our POWER program...to ensure people had [sic] better success when they left the program”, but focused his argument on passing the bill to secure the double allowance for married parents because “[w]hat the House did was discover that in the process we were discriminating against married people”.<sup>364</sup> The statement focusing on the latter suggests a concern for the ‘nuclear’ family was at the core of Republicans passing the generous expansion of welfare support. If the poor information environment clouds whether there is a lack of attention or merely a lack of access to such sources, that which is available therefore gives some added credence to Wyoming family policy being characterized by an explicit familialism.

Though the discursive evidence cannot add much weight, the mass of evidence across the terms of eligibility, sanctions, work requirement exemptions and sheer direction of generosity within the TANF cash assistance

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<sup>356</sup> Shantz et al., 2020, 85

<sup>357</sup> Ibid., 86, 233

<sup>358</sup> Ibid., 50

<sup>359</sup> Welfare Rules Databook, 2019, 299

<sup>360</sup> Table I.D.I, 2012 Databook, 76; Table I.D.1, 2015, 76

<sup>361</sup> Office of the Governor, (n.d.); The State of Wyoming Legislature, (n.d.)

<sup>362</sup> Mead, 2018

<sup>363</sup> Bush, 2015

<sup>364</sup> State of Wyoming 66<sup>th</sup> Legislature, March 5, 2013, 44

program demonstrate scales strongly tipped in favour of fortifying the traditional family and its care responsibilities. Taken with the more restrictive access to the state's childcare program—and therefore most compelling conduit of defamilialism—and even the fact of growing largesse for in-home care models over externalising centre-based care, Wyoming conclusively exhibits a strong, explicit familialism. As such, this case aligns with H2.

## **Discussion & Conclusion**

The pantheon of Populist Radical Right Parties should not induct a transatlantic member – yet. The divergent characteristics of these four state iterations of the Republican Party mean that the GOP does not exhibit any of the hypothesised logics of radical right family policy fully.

No case aligns with H1. The closest approximation—Florida—demonstrates a growing familialism that negates the early weakness of this dimension, and so any claim the Republicans in the 'Sunshine State' sought the maintenance of the status-quo that constitutes implicit familialism. Beyond this, the evidence for H2 and H3 currently bears cross-state variation between these two hypotheses and within them. The consolidating mass of policies reinforcing relative and intergenerational care roles not only in the cash assistance but also in the childcare programs of South Carolina and Wyoming seems to meet the expectations of a Republican party deliberately fortifying the traditional family structure: H2. Similarly though, the increasing exclusionary designs and discourses cases of Florida and especially Indiana furnished H3—that the right wing party will have adopted a familialism dependent on an exclusive conception of deservingness, nationally, ethnically and socially defined—with even stronger support. Overarching divergence is plain in variation even in state policy formulations buttressing each hypothesis, as in Floridian policymakers deploying behavioural requirements to enforce deservingness criteria while Republicans in Indiana leveraged eligibility to exclude immigrant populations. Though each state can be usefully understood through an expected logic of PRRP family policy, and the four case studies are not significantly aligned with one type.

Most importantly, the time series shift is not strong enough across the cases to hold a new, party-wide Republican family policy logic overlapping with that of the PRRP. GOP governments notably intensified commitments to the traditional family model from roughly 2015, with each charting policy changes from 2015-2022 that expanded support for relative caregivers, and increased cash assistance to (especially married) parental figures. Notably, shifts in every case were justified to some extent as defence of the family's primary place in care dependencies. Significant continuity does root much of that which enforces familialism across the four states, especially in South Carolina and, arguably, Wyoming, making untenable assertions to wholly distinctive shift in logics. The empirical investigation provides some stronger grounding to H3. Given their initially meagre welfare offerings, targeted welfare expansion (and discourse justifying it) in Florida and Indiana more assertively herald a major pivot toward supporting famil(ies) judged deserving. Still, both retained strongly 'producerist' distinctions that may often be component of a nativist, authoritarian populism, but also continued each state's historic neoliberal offering. As such, neither case conclusively evidences a welfare policy shift. Growing affinities are becoming more evident, but GOP(s) family policy does not yet overlap with that of the European populist radical right party family.

The claim of an intensified alignment must be provisional, tempered the limitations embedded in this exploratory research design. In forming PRRP policy behaviour expectations, this study constructed a transmissible understandings of how radical right welfare logics manifest, but did not create a benchmark of conservative policy from which to consider the divergence of mainstream parties *into* these logics. This was not necessary or suitable to a deductive policy investigation examining each state's Republican party within its own context rather than generalising to a national level. Still, this would have strengthened the assertions of change (or lack thereof), and would be necessary for an unimpeachable causal link to be made.

Moreover, the choice to analyse policy at the state level did better reflect the reality of the federalised US welfare system, but entailed hundreds of variables from which evidence needed to be curated. This gave detailed insight but left an element of interpretation that could not be entirely mitigated by the comprehensive case-by-case account. Component to this, the discursive investigation was replicable and appropriate to the deductive approach, but the mechanisms used added some difficulty to the process. The legislative databases and most

especially state websites were incomplete in cases such as Wyoming. The value of conducting a discursive review remains, however the data collection strategy could be refined to seek a more direct collection of narratives—such as through interviews with policymakers—and analysis of this could be separately conducted to comprehensiveness.

Still, the approach deployed means the conclusion can on the whole be confidently asserted. The theoretical formation of the expectations of populist radical right paper was systematic in first defining how family policy should be understood, then defining the radical right from which to understand it, then exhaustively reviewing the existing evidence to generate three nuanced hypotheses. The logic of case selection controlled for potential confounders such as opposition party influence and grounded a characterisation of the Republican Party as a whole as firmly as possible through maximum variability, systematically assessed. In this, the research design secured the internal and external validity appropriate to theory generation, as well as testing. Moreover, with each case assessed against the expected PRRP behaviours for its defamilialising, familialising and discursive characteristics over the full time period, the judgement against the hypotheses was well-substantiated. As such, it can be held that (a) the Republican Party has not yet adopted a form of nativist, authoritarian, populist family policy, but that (b) evidence from a cross-section of the party suggests that it is tending toward this: that is, it increasingly convergences on the position of the populist radical right.

This leaves a number of insights and practical implications. Most obviously, the hints at especially recent and discursive shifts do denote this matter is far from closed: this validates both seeking transatlantic comparatives when assessing the radical right, and makes clear the need for future research in the US context. Expanding the causal heft and empirical breadth of data via time-series or large-scale quantitative studies could strengthen—or usefully recharacterize—the evidence asserting an overlap in GOP-PRRP family welfare policy. The research design deployed here even provides some initial indications of what features of the cases might be linked to the mirroring of PRRP logics, and so what characteristics it would be of particular interest to investigate or control for. The socio-economic characteristics of the two cases which most fully uphold the hypotheses—Indiana and Wyoming—can speculatively speak to the factors behind the presence of the radical right. Neither sharing the same levels of economic or historically conservative strength, commonality is instead evident in *relative* economic and social insecurity, and arguably linked to the form of PRRP logic displayed. Indiana, having faced small but proportionately significant immigration over the last 30 years developed notably exclusionary provisions, while Wyoming, with insecurity through significant recent economic decline, exhibited a strengthened safety net for almost all (traditionally formulated) families. More broadly, both states were characterised strong manufacturing or construction industries and below-average numbers of college-educated individuals, as well as a limited professional/ petit bourgeois presence in Indiana's case: both states were typified by those PRRP literature considers most vulnerable to modernity. As far as a deductive, exploratory investigation can, this suggests status anxiety both general and immediate may have particular relevance for the rise of radical right logics, indicating insight into PRRP transmission could be strengthened from investigations of more states differentiated on the presence of these conditions.

Beyond this call, the insight illuminated study emphasises the value of adopting a set of expectations formed within the core PRRP context—Europe—to understand transmission further afield. Specific PRRP policy logics were not confirmed, but this clarified the current state of the oft-suspected but ill-understood transatlantic dynamic in the radical right. The three-part understanding of radical right family policy could usefully differentiate across the cases, and as formed from an exhaustively defended theoretical core could be validly transmitted to another context or study. In fact, this study's capacity to form clear expectations in a field defined by disagreement is through the focus on a subset of welfare and the incorporation of a definition of defamilialism elaborated to include exclusion revealed the intersection of comparative political economy and political studies is a well-positioned window into radical right logics. In short, the theoretical framework formed, and the testing of this in the American context, makes clear this study offers a measured, transmissional means to study welfare policy.





## Appendix A

### A1. Florida TANF Financial Data FY 2015-2019

Spending Category	FY 2020 All Funds	FY 2020 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2019 All Funds	FY 2019 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2018 All Funds	FY 2018 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2017 All Funds	FY 2017 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2016 All Funds	FY 2016 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2015 All Funds	FY 2015 Percent of Total Funds Used
Basic Assistance	\$133,883,128	14.10%	\$145,676,585	16.10%	\$160,442,905	17.00%	\$163,180,192	17.50%	\$167,512,569	17.40%	\$177,243,696	18.70%
Basic Assistance (excluding Relative Foster Care Maintenance Payments and	\$64,712,082	6.80%	\$78,265,416	8.70%	\$82,898,650	8.80%	\$88,826,157	9.50%	\$152,716,225	15.90%	\$156,620,168	16.50%
Relative Foster Care Maintenance Payments and Adoption and	\$69,171,046	7.30%	\$67,411,169	7.50%	\$77,544,255	8.20%	\$74,354,035	8.00%	\$14,796,344	1.50%	\$20,623,528	2.20%
Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Payments	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Payments	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Child Welfare or Foster Care Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Emergency Services Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Work, Education, and Training Activities	\$50,224,364	5.30%	\$46,106,428	5.10%	\$43,769,764	4.60%	\$46,314,000	5.00%	\$45,918,308	4.80%	\$47,357,786	5.00%
Employment	\$4,767,005	0.50%	\$3,351,122	0.40%	\$1,762,593	0.20%	\$903,182	0.10%	\$567,174	0.10%	\$384,588	0.00%
Training	\$5,932,538	0.60%	\$6,833,957	0.80%	\$5,133,790	0.50%	\$4,488,375	0.50%	\$5,213,080	0.50%	\$4,315,189	0.50%
Activities	\$39,524,821	4.20%	\$35,921,349	4.00%	\$36,873,381	3.90%	\$40,922,443	4.40%	\$40,138,054	4.20%	\$42,658,009	4.50%
Work Supports	\$4,762,523	0.50%	\$4,644,842	0.50%	\$4,147,909	0.40%	\$4,674,677	0.50%	\$4,712,247	0.50%	\$3,424,025	0.40%
Education	\$231,148,488	24.30%	\$180,571,689	20.00%	\$206,588,350	21.90%	\$207,915,572	22.20%	\$239,150,874	24.90%	\$218,644,055	23.00%
(Assistance and Non-Assistance)	\$231,148,488	24.30%	\$180,571,689	20.00%	\$206,588,350	21.90%	\$207,915,572	22.20%	\$239,150,874	24.90%	\$218,644,055	23.00%
Kindergarten/Head and Asset Development	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Refundable Earned Income Tax Credits	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Non-EITC Refundable State Tax Credits	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Non-Recurrent Short Term Benefits	\$876,886	0.10%	\$950,065	0.10%	\$902,114	0.10%	\$933,915	0.10%	\$953,259	0.10%	\$836,210	0.10%
Supportive Services and Youth	\$20,297,592	2.10%	\$20,327,946	2.20%	\$19,923,876	2.10%	\$19,521,199	2.10%	\$22,508,558	2.30%	\$18,837,188	2.00%
Prevention of Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies	\$304,805	0.00%	\$576,393	0.10%	\$204,322	0.00%	\$298,070	0.00%	\$379,213	0.00%	\$735,043	0.10%
Parent Family Formation and Maintenance Programs	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Child Welfare Services	\$244,252,347	25.70%	\$250,139,494	27.70%	\$269,205,488	28.60%	\$242,112,746	25.90%	\$263,112,169	27.30%	\$270,946,065	28.60%
Support/Family Preservation /Reunification	\$42,735,706	4.50%	\$46,004,911	5.10%	\$47,325,112	5.00%	\$42,277,704	4.50%	\$50,662,770	5.30%	\$50,066,630	5.30%
Adoption Services	\$404,222	0.00%	\$1,757,702	0.20%	\$2,794,452	0.30%	\$1,929,011	0.20%	\$839,285	0.10%	\$1,600,571	0.20%
Additional Child Welfare Services	\$201,112,419	21.20%	\$202,376,881	22.40%	\$219,085,924	23.30%	\$197,906,031	21.20%	\$211,610,114	22.00%	\$219,278,864	23.10%
Programs	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Program Management	\$97,793,364	10.30%	\$88,941,120	9.80%	\$70,037,612	7.40%	\$83,370,850	8.90%	\$51,110,711	5.30%	\$81,396,467	8.60%
Administrative Costs	\$91,972,170	9.70%	\$85,195,722	9.40%	\$61,705,158	6.60%	\$72,393,293	7.70%	\$42,090,881	4.40%	\$44,992,916	4.70%
Provision	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Systems	\$5,821,194	0.60%	\$3,745,398	0.40%	\$8,332,454	0.90%	\$10,977,557	1.20%	\$9,019,830	0.90%	\$36,403,551	3.80%
Other	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$3,991,524	0.40%
<b>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>\$783,543,497</b>	<b>82.50%</b>	<b>\$737,934,562</b>	<b>81.60%</b>	<b>\$775,222,340</b>	<b>82.30%</b>	<b>\$768,321,221</b>	<b>82.20%</b>	<b>\$795,357,908</b>	<b>82.70%</b>	<b>\$823,412,059</b>	<b>86.80%</b>
Transferred to CCDF Discretionary	\$110,005,981	11.60%	\$110,005,981	12.20%	\$110,290,876	11.70%	\$110,290,876	11.80%	\$110,662,021	11.50%	\$82,996,516	8.70%
Transferred to SSBG	\$56,048,440	5.90%	\$56,048,439	6.20%	\$56,048,440	6.00%	\$56,048,440	6.00%	\$56,234,011	5.80%	\$42,175,507	4.40%
<b>Total Transfers</b>	<b>\$166,054,421</b>	<b>17.50%</b>	<b>\$166,054,420</b>	<b>18.40%</b>	<b>\$166,339,316</b>	<b>17.70%</b>	<b>\$166,339,316</b>	<b>17.80%</b>	<b>\$166,896,032</b>	<b>17.30%</b>	<b>\$125,172,023</b>	<b>13.20%</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS USED</b>	<b>\$949,597,918</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$903,988,982</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$941,561,656</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$934,660,537</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$962,253,940</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$948,584,082</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

## A.2 South Carolina TANF Financial Data FY 2015 – 2019

Spending Category	FY 2020 All Funds	FY 2020 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2019 All Funds	FY 2019 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2018 All Funds	FY 2018 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2017 All Funds	FY 2017 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2016 All Funds	FY 2016 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2015 All Funds	FY 2015 Percent of Total Funds Used
Basic Assistance	\$48,818,450	29.40%	\$52,506,551	31.70%	\$52,919,369	32.10%	\$38,231,245	23.50%	\$41,716,691	20.90%	\$40,790,583	22.60%
Basic Assistance (excluding Relative Foster Care Maintenance Payments and Adoption and Guardianship Subsidies)	\$34,549,375	20.80%	\$33,567,600	20.30%	\$33,411,262	20.30%	\$22,217,210	13.60%	\$25,734,864	12.90%	\$28,542,103	15.80%
Relative Foster Care Maintenance Payments and Adoption and Guardianship Subsidies	\$14,269,075	8.60%	\$18,938,951	11.40%	\$19,508,107	11.80%	\$16,014,035	9.80%	\$15,981,827	8.00%	\$12,248,480	6.80%
Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Foster Care Payments	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Juvenile Justice Payments	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Emergency Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Non-Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Child Welfare or Foster Care Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Juvenile Justice Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Emergency Services Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Work, Education, and Training Activities	\$8,203,184	4.90%	\$9,839,897	5.90%	\$33,401,475	20.30%	\$14,781,529	9.10%	\$19,920,368	10.00%	\$18,088,836	10.00%
Subsidized Employment	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Education and Training	\$8,184,646	4.90%	\$8,919,692	5.40%	\$28,876,306	17.50%	\$9,738,626	6.00%	\$13,720,070	6.90%	\$10,226,681	5.70%
Additional Work Activities	\$18,538	0.00%	\$920,205	0.60%	\$4,525,169	2.70%	\$5,042,903	3.10%	\$6,200,298	3.10%	\$7,862,155	4.40%
Work Supports	\$329,641	0.20%	\$640,593	0.40%	\$722,776	0.40%	\$762,691	0.50%	\$856,555	0.40%	\$1,273,483	0.70%
Early Care and Education	\$31,862,288	19.20%	\$31,278,081	18.90%	\$30,467,026	18.50%	\$30,879,670	19.00%	\$32,051,493	16.10%	\$4,085,269	2.30%
Child Care (Assistance and Non-Assistance)	\$4,085,269	2.50%	\$4,085,269	2.50%	\$4,085,269	2.50%	\$4,085,268	2.50%	\$4,085,269	2.00%	\$4,085,269	2.30%
Pre-Kindergarten/Head Start	\$27,777,019	16.70%	\$27,192,812	16.40%	\$26,381,757	16.00%	\$26,794,402	16.40%	\$27,966,224	14.00%	\$0	0.00%
Financial Education and Asset Development	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Refundable Earned Income Tax Credits	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Non-EITC Refundable State Tax Credits	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Non-Recurrent Short Term Benefits	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Supportive Services	\$2,811,692	1.70%	\$3,189,438	1.90%	\$3,538,125	2.10%	\$3,619,770	2.20%	\$3,736,330	1.90%	\$3,620,973	2.00%
Services for Children and Youth	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Prevention of Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Fatherhood and Two-Parent Family Formation and Maintenance Programs	\$1,986,020	1.20%	\$3,282,487	2.00%	\$3,825,412	2.30%	\$2,536,458	1.60%	\$3,462,819	1.70%	\$1,634,087	0.90%
Child Welfare Services	\$5,062,771	3.00%	\$6,692,874	4.00%	\$5,050,109	3.10%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Family Support/Family Preservation/Reunification Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Adoption Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Additional Child Welfare Services	\$5,062,771	3.00%	\$6,692,874	4.00%	\$5,050,109	3.10%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Home Visiting Programs	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Program Management	\$41,992,857	25.30%	\$33,466,269	20.20%	\$32,298,793	19.60%	\$47,864,779	29.40%	\$55,259,997	27.70%	\$22,416,411	12.40%
Administrative Costs	\$16,883,776	10.20%	\$18,360,305	11.10%	\$15,547,453	9.40%	\$19,955,035	12.30%	\$19,693,551	9.90%	\$18,576,084	10.30%
Assessment/Service Provision	\$23,032,244	13.90%	\$12,260,972	7.40%	\$13,367,987	8.10%	\$22,881,629	14.00%	\$31,152,440	15.60%	\$0	0.00%
Systems	\$2,076,837	1.30%	\$2,844,992	1.70%	\$3,383,353	2.10%	\$5,028,115	3.10%	\$4,414,006	2.20%	\$3,840,327	2.10%
Other	\$24,990,030	15.00%	\$24,585,748	14.90%	\$2,538,413	1.50%	\$24,209,408	14.90%	\$42,522,651	21.30%	\$88,446,241	49.00%
<b>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>\$166,056,933</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$165,481,938</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$164,761,498</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$162,885,550</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$199,526,904</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$180,355,883</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
Transferred to CCDF Discretionary	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Transferred to SSBG	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
<b>Total Transfers</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS USED</b>	<b>\$166,056,933</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$165,481,938</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$164,761,498</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$162,885,550</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$199,526,904</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$180,355,883</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

### A.3 Indiana TANF Financial Data FY 2015 – 2020

Spending Category	FY 2020 All Funds	FY 2020 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2019 All Funds	FY 2019 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2018 All Funds	FY 2018 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2017 All Funds	FY 2017 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2016 All Funds	FY 2016 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2015 All Funds	FY 2015 Percent of Total Funds Used
Basic Assistance	\$16,013,393	4.80%	\$12,748,734	3.60%	\$14,744,438	3.60%	\$16,713,895	3.30%	\$18,557,718	6.10%	\$20,433,286	6.90%
Basic Assistance (excluding Relative Foster Care Maintenance Payments and Adoption and Guardianship Subsidies)	\$16,013,393	4.80%	\$12,748,734	3.60%	\$14,744,438	3.60%	\$16,713,895	3.30%	\$18,557,718	6.10%	\$20,433,286	6.90%
Relative Foster Care Maintenance Payments and Adoption and Guardianship Subsidies	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Foster Care Payments	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Juvenile Justice Payments	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Emergency Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Non-Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Child Welfare or Foster Care Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Juvenile Justice Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Emergency Services Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Work, Education, and Training Activities	\$5,707,478	1.70%	\$6,364,812	1.80%	\$83,762,279	20.20%	\$182,299,818	35.70%	\$8,487,028	2.80%	\$15,036,003	5.10%
Subsidized Employment	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Education and Training	\$3,019,765	0.90%	\$2,935,313	0.80%	\$80,058,675	19.30%	\$181,174,442	35.40%	\$8,487,028	2.80%	\$14,922,588	5.10%
Additional Work Activities	\$2,687,713	0.80%	\$3,429,499	1.00%	\$3,703,604	0.90%	\$1,125,376	0.20%	\$0	0.00%	\$113,415	0.00%
Work Supports	\$996,505	0.30%	\$841,685	0.20%	\$1,102,831	0.30%	\$893,778	0.20%	\$104,375	0.00%	\$30,345	0.00%
Early Care and Education	\$52,180,748	15.70%	\$61,329,335	17.40%	\$56,617,229	13.60%	\$50,569,270	9.90%	\$41,522,015	13.70%	\$38,550,929	13.10%
Child Care (Assistance and Non-Assistance)	\$52,180,748	15.70%	\$61,329,335	17.40%	\$56,617,229	13.60%	\$50,569,270	9.90%	\$41,522,015	13.70%	\$38,550,929	13.10%
Pre-Kindergarten/Head Start	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Financial Education and Asset Development	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Refundable Earned Income Tax Credits	\$24,844,970	7.50%	\$25,176,855	7.20%	\$27,529,635	6.60%	\$0	0.00%	\$32,034,389	10.60%	\$31,909,902	10.80%
Non-EITC Refundable State Tax Credits	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$28,903,520	5.70%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Non-Recurrent Short Term Benefits	\$290,265	0.10%	\$191,416	0.10%	\$387,960	0.10%	\$545,523	0.10%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Supportive Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Services for Children and Youth	\$19,431,304	5.80%	\$16,483,653	4.70%	\$21,141,988	5.10%	\$22,999,917	4.50%	\$21,375,984	7.10%	\$497,908	0.20%
Prevention of Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies	\$3,622,982	1.10%	\$3,956,663	1.10%	\$4,426,798	1.10%	\$5,682,031	1.10%	\$5,010,948	1.70%	\$2,356,733	0.80%
Fatherhood and Two-Parent Family Formation and Maintenance Programs	\$32,619,860	9.80%	\$38,085,615	10.80%	\$25,369,587	6.10%	\$15,447,447	3.00%	\$43,351	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Child Welfare Services	\$2,759,252	0.80%	\$9,169,443	2.60%	\$9,336,994	2.30%	\$15,519,548	3.00%	\$17,596,052	5.80%	\$0	0.00%
Family Support/Family Preservation /Reunification Services	\$2,759,252	0.80%	\$9,052,252	2.60%	\$9,043,322	2.20%	\$15,519,548	3.00%	\$17,596,052	5.80%	\$0	0.00%
Adoption Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Additional Child Welfare Services	\$0	0.00%	\$117,191	0.00%	\$293,672	0.10%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Home Visiting Programs	\$27,233,780	8.20%	\$24,440,522	6.90%	\$23,622,474	5.70%	\$31,403,909	6.10%	\$20,810,789	6.90%	\$0	0.00%
Program Management	\$28,414,823	8.50%	\$30,519,266	8.70%	\$24,101,671	5.80%	\$23,452,444	4.60%	\$25,657,915	8.50%	\$23,669,810	8.00%
Administrative Costs	\$15,617,148	4.70%	\$17,481,253	5.00%	\$15,546,671	3.70%	\$14,894,985	2.90%	\$17,070,580	5.70%	\$19,589,146	6.60%
Assessment/Service Provision	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Systems	\$12,797,675	3.80%	\$13,038,013	3.70%	\$8,555,000	2.10%	\$8,557,459	1.70%	\$8,587,335	2.80%	\$4,080,664	1.40%
Other	\$57,351,743	17.20%	\$60,755,384	17.30%	\$60,893,803	14.70%	\$54,977,622	10.80%	\$48,861,788	16.20%	\$100,714,527	34.10%
<b>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>\$271,467,105</b>	<b>81.40%</b>	<b>\$290,063,383</b>	<b>82.40%</b>	<b>\$353,037,687</b>	<b>85.10%</b>	<b>\$449,408,722</b>	<b>87.90%</b>	<b>\$240,062,352</b>	<b>79.50%</b>	<b>\$233,199,443</b>	<b>79.00%</b>
Transferred to CCDF Discretionary	\$61,835,002	18.60%	\$61,835,002	17.60%	\$61,835,002	14.90%	\$61,835,002	12.10%	\$62,039,733	20.50%	\$62,039,732	21.00%
Transferred to SSBG	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
<b>Total Transfers</b>	<b>\$61,835,002</b>	<b>18.60%</b>	<b>\$61,835,002</b>	<b>17.60%</b>	<b>\$61,835,002</b>	<b>14.90%</b>	<b>\$61,835,002</b>	<b>12.10%</b>	<b>\$62,039,733</b>	<b>20.50%</b>	<b>\$62,039,732</b>	<b>21.00%</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS USED</b>	<b>\$333,302,105</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$351,898,385</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$414,872,689</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$511,243,724</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$302,102,085</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$295,239,175</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

## A.4 Wyoming TANF Financial Data FY 2015 - 2020

Spending Category	FY 2020 All Funds	FY 2020 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2019 All Funds	FY 2019 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2018 All Funds	FY 2018 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2017 All Funds	FY 2017 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2016 All Funds	FY 2016 Percent of Total Funds Used	FY 2015 All Funds	FY 2015 Percent of Total Funds Used
Basic Assistance	\$11,460,599	38.90%	\$8,321,466	32.60%	\$9,075,196	38.40%	\$6,706,124	24.30%	\$4,412,032	13.30%	\$4,881,309	17.40%
Basic Assistance (excluding Relative Foster Care Maintenance Payments and Adoption and Guardianship Subsidies)	\$4,873,212	16.50%	\$8,321,466	32.60%	\$9,075,196	38.40%	\$6,706,124	24.30%	\$4,412,032	13.30%	\$3,327,602	11.90%
Relative Foster Care Maintenance Payments and Adoption and Guardianship Subsidies	\$6,587,387	22.30%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$1,553,707	5.50%
Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Foster Care Payments	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Juvenile Justice Payments	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Emergency Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Non-Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Child Welfare or Foster Care Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Juvenile Justice Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Emergency Services Authorized Solely Under Prior Law	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Work, Education, and Training Activities	\$5,192,309	17.60%	\$4,741,535	18.60%	\$3,033,144	12.80%	\$3,507,597	12.70%	\$4,022,764	12.10%	\$546,577	2.00%
Subsidized Employment	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Education and Training Additional Work Activities	\$0	0.00%	\$69,721	0.30%	\$55,383	0.20%	\$65,217	0.20%	\$5	0.00%	\$6	0.00%
Work Supports	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Early Care and Education	\$3,263,191	11.10%	\$2,882,598	11.30%	\$2,492,735	10.50%	\$2,569,456	9.30%	\$4,221,785	12.70%	\$0	0.00%
Child Care (Assistance and Non-Assistance)	\$1,553,707	5.30%	\$2,882,598	11.30%	\$1,553,707	6.60%	\$1,553,707	5.60%	\$1,553,707	4.70%	\$0	0.00%
Pre-Kindergarten/Head Start	\$1,709,484	5.80%	\$0	0.00%	\$939,028	4.00%	\$1,015,749	3.70%	\$2,668,078	8.00%	\$0	0.00%
Financial Education and Asset Development	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Refundable Earned Income Tax Credits	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Non-EITC Refundable State Tax Credits	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Non-Recurrent Short Term Benefits	\$3,219,757	10.90%	\$3,294,209	12.90%	\$3,175,468	13.40%	\$3,399,126	12.30%	\$3,176,073	9.50%	\$3,410,646	12.20%
Supportive Services	\$1,614,037	5.50%	\$1,160,204	4.50%	\$977,195	4.10%	\$900,570	3.30%	\$878,314	2.60%	\$0	0.00%
Services for Children and Youth	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Prevention of Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Fatherhood and Two-Parent Family Formation and Maintenance Programs	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$3,303	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Child Welfare Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Family Support/Family Preservation/Reunification Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Adoption Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Additional Child Welfare Services	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Home Visiting Programs	\$922,906	3.10%	\$547,954	2.10%	\$244,707	1.00%	\$693,878	2.50%	\$1,357,205	4.10%	\$0	0.00%
Program Management	\$3,820,927	13.00%	\$4,602,795	18.00%	\$4,629,746	19.60%	\$6,834,217	24.70%	\$14,184,175	42.60%	\$7,068,270	25.20%
Administrative Costs	\$3,433,359	11.60%	\$4,213,709	16.50%	\$4,213,708	17.80%	\$4,353,127	15.80%	\$8,207,212	24.70%	\$6,978,901	24.90%
Assessment/Service Provision	\$303,980	1.00%	\$273,653	1.10%	\$360,008	1.50%	\$353,595	1.30%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Systems	\$83,588	0.30%	\$115,433	0.50%	\$56,030	0.20%	\$2,127,495	7.70%	\$5,976,963	18.00%	\$89,369	0.30%
Other	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$3,003,788	10.90%	\$1,036,513	3.10%	\$12,112,322	43.20%
<b>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>\$29,493,726</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$25,550,761</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$23,628,191</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$27,614,756</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$33,292,164</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$28,019,124</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
Transferred to CCOF Discretionary	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
Transferred to SSBG	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%	\$0	0.00%
<b>Total Transfers</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS USED</b>	<b>\$29,493,726</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$25,550,761</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$23,628,191</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$27,614,756</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$33,292,164</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$28,019,124</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Data for tables A.1-A.4 collated from: Office of Family Assistance, 207, 2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020, 2021.

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