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**Intelligence and the Netherlands: An unsettled relation. Dutch intelligence culture, strategic culture, and the decision-making process.**

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# **Intelligence and the Netherlands: An unsettled relation**

Dutch intelligence culture, strategic culture, and the decision-making process

Master Thesis – Crisis and Security Management

Intelligence Cultures capstone

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## 1. Introduction

*‘No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.’*

*Clausewitz, 1989, p. 579*

*‘The sacrifice involved in the deployment, plus the number of dead and wounded among the troops deployed, on the debit side must be balanced by the credit entry of the reduction in suffering in the region where the peacekeepers were deployed.’*

*NIOD, 2002, p. 1102<sup>1</sup>*

“We want to help the people of Afghanistan”, argued Dutch Prime Minister (MP) Balkenende in an attempt to convince the Dutch Parliament to support a contribution to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission to Uruzgan, Afghanistan (De Volkskrant, 2006). The Prime Minister guaranteed that the Dutch troops would be sent to rebuild and stabilize the region, and specifically not on a combat mission solely fighting the Taliban (De Volkskrant, 2006). Just prior to this, various media outlets reported that the Dutch Military Intelligence Service (MIVD) assessed the security situation in the province as dangerous and warned of severe resistance from local forces, threatening the safety and security of any rebuilding activities. Therefore, the MIVD allegedly advised against the participation in the ISAF mission if no additional measures were taken to deal with expected violent encounters (Hazelbag, 2009; Jockel, 2014; van Reijn, 2007).

The opposition parties in Parliament critically questioned the feasibility and intention of the mission, evaluating it more as waging war than rebuilding the community. At one point in the debate, access to the intelligence reports to evaluate the assessed risks themselves was demanded by the opposition. After intense debate, Parliament approved the participation in the ISAF mission in early 2006 (Hazelbag, 2009; van Reijn, 2007). Shortly after the arrival of the first troops, heavy resistance from local opposing forces and various violent encounters were experienced, costing the lives of Dutch soldiers. According to the formal Dutch evaluation of the mission, and supported by extensive media reporting, the deployment lacked adequate armaments and sufficient manpower, just as the MIVD warned about (Grandia Mantas, 2015, pp. 189-191; NRC Handelsblad, 2007; Jockel, 2014; Kitzen, 2017; Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en Ministerie van Defensie, 2011; De Volkskrant, 2006; Willis, 2012, p. 996).

### 1.1 Research question

The question that comes to mind is: what role did intelligence play in the decision-making process? Didn't the decisionmakers follow up on the MIVD's forecast regarding the violent resistance? From the body of literature on intelligence, it can be deduced that intelligence's aim is to provide knowledge

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<sup>1</sup> Quote from the official translated NIOD (2002) report.

and insight into the matters at hand, supporting decisionmakers in making an informed decision (Bang, 2017; Berkowitz & Goodman, 2000; Breakspear, 2013; Cox, 2011; Diderichsen, 2019; Herman, 1996; Johnson, 2006, 2010; Kent, 1949; Rovner, 2011; Sims, 2006; Warner, 2002; Wheaton & Beerbower, 2006). In the context of international military deployment, a correlation between intelligence and strategy of a state regarding the use of their military surfaces from the existing literature (Gill, 2018; Johnson, 2003, p. 639; Warner, 2009, pp. 26-27). This ties into the idea of intelligence culture: the culturally embedded preferences regarding conducting, assessing, and consuming intelligence (Davies, 2004, 2012; O'Connell, 2004; Warner, 2009). More specifically, the perception and use of intelligence is culturally influenced, consequently affecting the position of intelligence relative to its end, that being the policy or decision maker. This raises the question of whether the intelligence report, previously mentioned in the introduction, had any effect at all in the decision-making process or if its effect was suppressed by other factors of Dutch intelligence culture. One element of intelligence culture that is particularly interesting in this context is that of the strategic culture of a state (Davies, 2012; Gill, 2018; O'Connell, 2004; Warner, 2009). To determine the role of intelligence in the decision-making process, its relationship with intelligence culture, consequently including strategic culture, and the possible influence of these concepts have to be examined.

To come to an answer to these questions, this thesis will look at the intelligence culture of the Netherlands, how its strategic preferences influence this culture, and its consequences for the role of intelligence in Dutch decision-making processes on international military deployments. The main research question is posed:

‘To what extent has Dutch strategic culture influenced the role of intelligence in formal decision-making regarding deploying Dutch military forces to the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia in 1993 and the ISAF mission in Uruzgan in 2006?’

For a complete and encompassing possible answer to this, four elements are examined first. Based on these sub findings, the main research question will be answered. These sub questions read:

1. How can the strategic culture and the strategic preferences of the Netherlands be described during the time of the selected cases?
2. How was intelligence considered and assessed by the involved decisionmakers in the selected cases?
3. How did intelligence assessments compare to the influence of other factors in shaping Dutch decision-making to deploy military force in the selected cases?
4. How does the strategic culture or the strategic preferences of the Netherlands influence the way intelligence is viewed?

## 1.2 Relevance

Researching the role of intelligence in Dutch decision-making processes will shed some light on intelligence culture and the influence of its strategic culture. This will help to understand the causal forces that are at play. The Dutch experience with intelligence and international military missions is troubled, like with the Bosnian conflict or the invasion of Iraq. Especially with decision-making processes on matters with significant impact on both Dutch society and state, the use of intelligence is interesting. Unpacking this black box provides insight into and understanding of the dynamics between the different elements, offering potential opportunities to streamline the process as a whole.

The scientific contribution of this thesis is to test the hypothesis of the influence of strategic culture on the intelligence culture of a state, a relatively understudied relationship in the field of intelligence studies (Davies, 2012; Duyvesteyn, 2011; Gill, 2018; Rovner, 2011; Warner, 2009). In addition, much of this research is dominated by the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) as subjects (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012; Davies, 2002, 2012; Davies & Gustafson, 2013; Herman, 1996; Murphy, 2002; Turner, 2004; Wirtz, 2006). Both the relationship and the process could be different for a smaller powers like the Netherlands. The second contribution is using the method of process tracing with the aim of unpacking the black box of the decision-making process, both testing the existence of a causal relationship between Dutch strategic culture and the final decision on military deployment and locating the role of intelligence in this larger process. This, especially from an intelligence perspective, is rarely done in a Dutch context. Finally, this thesis is an addition to the field of Dutch intelligence studies as it is focused on the military intelligence service rather than its well investigated domestic counterpart (de Graaff & Hijzen, 2018, p. 148).

## 1.3 Structure

The outline of this thesis continues with the review of the relevant theoretical concepts of strategic culture, intelligence, and intelligence culture. This builds to a theoretical framework from which a causal mechanism is derived. In the third chapter, the method of process tracing and the two cases are introduced. Chapters four and five will cover the analysis of the Bosnian case and the Uruzgan case, respectively. In the sixth and last chapter, the findings are discussed, and some conclusions are drawn, followed by some limitations regarding this research and possible strands for future research.

# 2. Theoretical framework

For the analysis of the Dutch intelligence culture, multiple theoretical concepts are used to build a theoretical framework. Originating in the '50s, the strategic culture concept is the specific way a state formulates, views, and organizes its security (Lantis, 2002; Mirow, 2014; Zyla, 2015). During the Cold War, the concept enjoyed renewed interest, with particular interest regarding the use of force by a state (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein, 1996; Lantis, 2002; Mirow, 2014). One element of this concept is the conduct of intelligence. Because of the specific characteristics of a strategic culture, a

typical intelligence practice can be distinguished: the intelligence culture (Davies, 2012; O'Connell, 2004; Warner, 2009). In the first section, the strategic culture concept is reviewed. In the second section the concept of intelligence is briefly discussed, while in the third section the concept of intelligence culture is debated.

## 2.1 Strategic culture

The linkage between security policies and state behavior has been hotly debated over the years (Bloomfield, 2012; Haglund, 2014; Greathouse, 2010; Lantis, 2002; Libel, 2018; Mirow, 2014). The main idea is located in the cultural paradigm of explanations for state behavior and the cultural wave within the social sciences in general, with known works by e.g., Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba (1963) or Clifford Geertz (1973) (Welch, 2013, pp.13-18; Lantis, 2002). In an attempt to explain state behavior, Jack Snyder (1977) introduced the concept of culture into the field of security studies (Doerer & Eidenfalk, 2018, p. 6; Lantis, 2002, p. 93; Mirow, 2014, pp. 12-16). Snyder studied the assessments of American analysts on Soviet state behavior and concluded that their assessments were biased due to the culture in which they lived and worked. The semi-permanent general beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral patterns that analysts held regarding security were restricted by the American culture (Lantis, 2002; Mirow, 2014; Snyder, 1977).

Building on Snyder, Colin Gray (1981) argued that states have different national styles; “that culture referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from perception of the national historic experience, aspiration for self-characterization” (p. 22), including those distinctive experiences that characterize the state’s citizens. Lantis (2002) continued along this line by defining strategic culture as a context or milieu in which actors operate and security policy is formulated and gradually changes over time (Bloomfield, 2012, pp. 445-446; Gray, 1999; Lantis, 2002, pp. 93-94; Zyla, 2015, p. 106). Although the ideas of Grey produced a significant body of literature, they failed to develop a sound methodology to study the concept and the assumed mechanisms between the variables. The direction of the relation was ambiguous since the line of thought provided that if strategic culture is the context in which decisions are made, the decisionmakers that make these decisions are similarly enculturated by this context (Johnston, 1995, p. 40; Lantis, 2002, p. 95; Mirow, 2014, p. 16).

Besides some notable attempts to find an explanation or solution, like the works of Robin Luckham (1984); Bradley Klein (1988); Lantis (2002); Poore (2003); Morgan (2003) or Neumann & Heikka (2005), Alistair Ian Johnston (1996) initiated a renewed interest in strategic culture by the end of the Cold War. In his foundational study of Chinese strategic culture, he called for a new operationalization of the concept and demonstrated a more rigorous research method that enabled falsification (Greathouse, 2010, pp. 64-65; Johnston, 1996; Mirow, 2014, p. 16). Johnston argued that strategic culture should be isolated as an independent variable, that influences the behavior of states, being the dependent variable. Only then would the analytical value of the concept be found (1996;

Bloomfield, 2012, p. 443; Greathouse, 2010, pp. 64-65). Yet Johnston's proposals received critical reviews: the operationalization of the concept remained a significant issue, nuances in policy changes were lost due to its excessively continual character and therefore not being prone to change over time (Bloomfield, 2012, p. 443-451; Libel, 2018, pp. 7-9).

In reaction, Alan Bloomfield (2012; Libel, 2018) proposed a more sociological and psychological approach to the concept. Bloomfield (2012) argues that multiple different subcultures, specifically "strategic cognitive schemas" (p. 452), exist and compete with each other over influence in strategic decisions. Each individual strategic culture is a "[packet] of information about a state's 'strategic situation'." that "affect our perceptions of the world, our attribution of causality, and the attendant behavioral responses which are considered appropriate" (Bloomfield, 2012, p. 452). The element of competition over influence poses a solution to the issue of excessive continuity, thus helping the field and research move on (Libel, 2018, pp.7-8).

To summarize the debate, strategic culture refers to the cultivated views and ideas on state identity that stem from civil identity, habits, traditions, and values concerning national security and the use of a state's military apparatus. Through particular events and interactions with other actors, elements of national identity like norms, values, experiences, interests, and ideas change over time, causing shifts in the influence of strategic cultures. Military state behavior and its way of waging war are guided by the prevailing strategic culture at that time (Bloomfield, 2012; Gray, 1999; Greathouse, 2010, p. 67; Jepperson et al., 1996; Korteweg, 2011, pp. 45-52; Lantis, 2002; Rosyidin, 2018).

## **2.2 The use of force and civil-military gap**

With strategic culture generating specific goals that are pursued by states, specific behavior is chosen to achieve these goals. There are three dimensions to the decision of whether to use force for this: priorities in policy; the appropriateness and effectiveness of force; and the appropriateness of the degree of the exercised force (Feaver & Gelpi, 2003). Priorities in policy relating to (national) security can be seen from a more narrow perspective dubbed as "realpolitik", encompassing control of territory, the defense of allies, or maintaining geostrategic access. The more broader "interventionist" perspective relates to issues that extend over the state's own borders but indirectly could impact its security interests (Feaver & Gelpi, 2003). Second, the question is whether the use of force is the right way to achieve the set goals and, third, to what degree force should be exercised (Feaver & Gelpi, 2003).

Here the civil-military divide comes into play. The divide relates to the difference in view between civilian and military leaders regarding the previous dimensions of a decision. Depending on the dominating view, deploying foreign and defense policies or exercising force will significantly differ (Cohen, 2003; Desch, 1999; Feaver, 2011; Feaver & Gelpi, 2003; Grant, 2021; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). In general, the divide can be characterized into two ideal type arguments. The

“professional” argument states that, for maximal effectiveness, the military has to be seen as an independent actor and institution when it comes to when and how to use force in international relations. They are prone to being narrow in their policy priorities and having lower confidence in the use of force as the applicable method (Feaver & Gelpi, 2003). Civilian or political prerogative regarding the use of force will hurt the professionalism of military experts and consequently its effectiveness (Feaver, 2011; Huntington, 1957; Grant, 2021). The “civilian” argument states that for maximal effectiveness, civil leaders have to be in the lead and the military has to obey when executing their orders, causing military opinions to be muted in the decision-making process (Feaver, 2011; Grant, 2021; Janowitz, 1960). Civilians are more prone to have broader interventionist policy priorities and have stronger confidence in the military being the right method (Feaver & Gelpi, 2003). Regarding the degree of force exercised, both arguments share the opinion that this should be done in measured amounts (Feaver & Gelpi, 2003).

### 2.3 Intelligence

With the debate on the definition of intelligence going back for decades, intelligence is frequently used to indicate or name various things, processes, and phenomena, making it an ambiguous concept (Argell, 2002; Bang, 2017; Breakspear, 2013; Diderichsen, 2019; Hastedt, 1991; Herman, 1996; Johnson, 2006; Rogg, 2018; Rønn & Høffding, 2013; de Valk, 2005; Waltz, 2003; Warner, 2014; Wheaton & Beerbower, 2006). Often seen as the father of the concept, Kent (1949) formulated three distinct components of intelligence: a kind of knowledge; the organization that produces this knowledge; and the activities that are conducted by these organizations (Bang, 2017; Cox, 2011; Hastedt, 1991; Rønn & Høffding, 2013; Warner, 2002; Wheaton & Beerbower, 2006). Continuing along this line, Mark Lowenthal (2002) defines intelligence as:

The process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities. (p. 9)

With this definition, intelligence can either be a product, a process, or an activity with various aims. According to Warner (2002, p. 21), secrecy is an essential part of intelligence, being “[a] state activity to understand or influence foreign entities”. Breakspear (2013) criticizes both definitions, claiming that carrying out operations, also known as covert action or operations, is limited to an American perspective and additionally rejects secrecy as an essential element since intelligence can be public, like OSINT for example (Breakspear, 2013; Diderichsen, 2019; de Valk, 2005; Wheaton & Beerbower, 2006).

Supporting decision makers in their work and reducing uncertainty, is a broadly recognized element of intelligence (Bang, 2017; Berkowitz & Goodman, 2000; Breakspear, 2013; Cox, 2011;

Diderichsen, 2019; Herman, 1996; Johnson, 2006, 2010; Kent, 1949; Rovner, 2011; Sims, 2006; Warner, 2002; Wheaton & Beerbower, 2006). Johnson (2010) argues that intelligence's goal is to provide information to policymakers in order to "illuminate their decision options" in an accurate, comprehensive, and timely manner (p. 5). Ideally, policies or decisions ought to be effective if they're grounded in intelligence on the matter in question. This constitutes a hierarchical relationship between intelligence and policymakers (Betts, 2007; Marrin, 2017; Rovner, 2011). Often seen in this relationship is the phenomenon of politicization (Betts, 2007; Jervis, 2006, 2018; Lowenthal, 2012; Marrin, 2017; Pillar, 2006; Rovner, 2011). Intelligence becomes politicized when the process and/or product loses its objectivity and mainly reflects policy preferences, emphasizing the calibration of the means and policy goals (Pillar, 2006; Rovner, 2011). Policymakers politicize intelligence by pressuring, directly as well as more subconsciously, the analysts to report specific findings or conclusions favorable to the policy or omit contrary information. By doing this, decision makers drive the intelligence production process and intelligence loses its objectivity (Betts, 2007; Jervis, 2006; Marrin, 2017; Rovner, 2011).

The nature and the degree of the relationship vary, it can encompass excessive harmony or disregarding and neglecting nature. With excessive harmony, intelligence analysts are unable or unwilling to critically challenge decision makers' beliefs or conclusions (Betts, 1978, 2007; Jervis, 2006, 2018; Rovner, 2011). Such relation is prone to the creation of shared tunnel vision since the assumptions of policymakers or intelligence analysts are not critically questioned (Rovner, 2011). With the latter relationship, policymakers cherry pick intelligence that suits their plans and ideas or selectively ignore intelligence that rejects or counters those. Prone to this relation is the abuse of intelligence when policymakers' cognitive biases cause the rejection of discomfiting intelligence and filter out only the intelligence that reinforces their biases (Betts, 2007; Jervis, 2010; Rovner, 2011).

In this thesis, intelligence is defined as a specific sort of knowledge that provides policymakers of any kind with insight and understanding on issues they must decide on. Hereby excluding the concepts of counterintelligence and covert action. Intelligence is therefore something that serves specific actors for specific purposes. In order to do this, a specific kind of process is practiced that encompasses the gathering, researching and analysis, and distribution of information in its broadest sense (Lowenthal, 2012, pp. 6-11; Johnson, 2010, pp. 12-21; de Valk, 2005; pp. 12-18; Waltz, 2003, pp. 33-35; Wiebes, 2002, pp. 16-18).

## **2.4 Intelligence culture**

As there is no universally accepted concept yet, the formulation of a universal theory on intelligence will stagnate, holding back the growth of intelligence studies as a scientific field (Davies, 2002; Diderichsen, 2019; Rønn & Høffding, 2013). In addition, like the strategic culture concept, the definition of intelligence depends on the cultural embeddedness of the defining actor (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012; Bang, 2017; Davies, 2002, 2004; Hastedt, 1991; Herman, 1996, p. 269).

In his pivotal work on the differences regarding intelligence and its practices between the US and the UK, Davies (2012) points to these slight, although essential, nuances in the definition, usage, and practice of intelligence between both states. British intelligence practice can be characterized as integrative, as different reports from all services are combined and disseminated as one intelligence product. Whereas the US services work more fragmented, having all individual services produce and disseminate their own products (Davies, 2002, 2012; Duyvesteyn, 2011, pp. 526-527). These nuances can cause typical practical issues. The integrative approach of the UK is more prone to the phenomena of groupthink and mirror imaging extending into the decision-making process. While the more disintegrative approach of the US is more vulnerable to the phenomena of cherry picking and turf wars between services (Duyvesteyn, 2011, pp. 526-527).

Based on his findings, Davies (2002, 2012) argues that intelligence cannot be seen or studied as a universal concept and advocates for more comparative research. Such an approach enables researchers to find any differences between states and assess if such differences are typical for a state (Davies & Gustafson, 2013, pp. 4-5). In addition, including different perspectives on intelligence and its mechanisms will free the concept from what Aldrich & Kasuku (2012, pp. 1010-1014) call the Anglosphere prison, as the majority of current intelligence research is generally done from a Western or Anglo-Saxon perspective (Davies, 2002, 2012; Davies & Gustafson, 2013; Herman, 1996, pp. 269; Murphy, 2002; Turner, 2004; Wirtz, 2006). Second, comparing different states could provide insight into what variables are at play in similar decision-making processes and outcomes executed in varying contexts (Davies & Gustafson, 2013, pp. 5-6; Hijzen, 2017, pp. 119-127; Duyvesteyn, 2011).

The idea of comparative research of intelligence cultures is supported by multiple researchers (Davies, 2002, 2004; de Graaf & Nyce, 2014; Hastedt, 1991; Herman, 1996; Phythian, 2014; Warner, 2009). O'Connell (2004) paved the way for systematic comparative research by formulating an elementary framework to compare intelligence services of states, including elements like size and budget, national security context and structure, organization of management and oversight, analytic emphasis, and intelligence-decision-making relationship. Warner (2009) further develops this approach by introducing the concept of intelligence systems, solving some issues in O'Connell's framework, like the distinguishment of the dependent and independent variables in the relationships. An intelligence system consists of three different, what Warner (2009, p. 26) calls independent variables: strategy, regime, and technology. Starting with the latter, technology sees to the role of capabilities, methods and pursued goals of the state when using technology for intelligence means. Differences in the use of technology or its goals influence the way intelligence is conducted and what kind of intelligence is gathered (Warner, 2009, pp. 32-34). The regime variable refers to the governmental regime the intelligence service is placed in. This relates to, e.g., the organization of the state's bodies, the type of sovereign entity, and the type of government and produces a certain national identity of the sovereignty (Warner, 2009, pp. 29-31). Warner (2009) explains the strategy variable as "the sovereignty's 'grand strategy', or policies regarding other sovereignties." (p. 26), encompassing

the motives of the state to take certain actions, the strategic objectives it pursues, and its strategic culture (Warner, 2009, pp. 26-29). Warner argues that strategy is probably the main influencer on an intelligence system, primarily because the needs for intelligence follow from the states' relations with their perceived adversaries and other sovereignties (Gill, 2018, p. 580; Johnson, 2003, p. 639; Warner, 2009, pp. 26-27). In such a system, intelligence is part of the instrumentation of sovereignties in their effort to understand risks and uncertainties that aren't in the span of their control and, consequently, the dependent variable in the relationship (Warner, 2009, pp. 23).

In his chapter on "Cultures of National Intelligence", Phythian (2014) continues along the line introduced by Warner (2009). Phythian (2014) concludes that culture can be perceived in two ways. Narrowly defined, culture encompasses the whole collection of attitudes, practices, and thoughts regarding a certain organization. In a broader sense, the concept is defined as all meanings and values that are expressed through behavior, institutions, and symbols, resulting in a distinctive way of life (Phythian, 2014). Where the narrower defined approach is suitable for researching intelligence at the organizational level, like Aid (2011), Aldrich (2017), Duyvesteyn (2011), and O'Connell (2004) do. The broader perspective is more suitable for researching intelligence culture on a macro level, with connections to political and strategic culture (Phythian, 2014).

In his attempt to unravel the causal mechanisms of intelligence culture's/systems, Peter Gill (2018) integrates the works of O'Connell (2004), Warner (2009), and Phythian's scope refinement (2014) into a framework, see figure 1. In this framework, the concept of intelligence systems is influenced by the three independent variables of Warner (2009), as indicated by the dotted arrows. Furthermore, the kind of regime (1) influences the chosen strategy. While the regime itself will be influenced by the technology variable (2), limiting the action the regime can take (Gill, 20018, p. 579). The third relation visualizes the possibility of a feedback loop from the intelligence system into the regime itself (3). The autonomy or isolation in which intelligence systems are placed could develop as an independent factor regarding the regime itself (Gill, 2018, p. 579). Lastly, the relation between the




Figure 1 The relational scheme between the different actors regarding intelligence systems from Gill (2018, p. 580).

strategy and technology variables indicates the effects that both variables have on each other, either through limiting strategic choices by technological capabilities or by generating technological development through such strategic choices (Gill, 2018, p. 579). As Warner (2009) includes strategic culture as an element of the strategy variable, Gill (2018) treats the concept of strategic culture “as an *inherent* characteristic of the regime rather than as part of its (self-conscious) strategy or structural constraint.” (p. 580, emphases in original).

### **2.5 Strategic culture, Intelligence culture and state behavior: a theoretical framework**

To summarize, strategic culture functions as a filter through which decisions and actions towards political goals are seen and executed. Depending on the prevailing civil-military relations, different actions are taken, and thus state behavior is chosen. Civilian policymakers attempt to make decisions as late as possible to maintain flexibility in options. This is in sharp contrast to military policymakers that are in need of a speedy and concrete decision aimed at maximizing the time for preparations (Feaver & Kohn, 2021, pp. 4-5). Both turn to the practice of intelligence to provide them with an understanding of the context and options to reduce uncertainties (Lowenthal, 2009; Marrin, 2007; Steed, 2016; Warner, 2009). Inherently connected to this process is the uncertainty and unpredictability of the context; here being state behavior aimed at its strategic goal. As noted earlier, intelligence’s core aim is to fill these voids for decisionmakers, though this relationship is often complicated (Betts, 2007; Davis, 2006; Jervis, 2010; Marrin, 2017; Rovner, 2011). The former aims for successfully accomplishing the political goals and thus in need of clearing the ambiguity of the context, minimizing negative consequences, and optimization of the cost-benefit balance (Jervis, 2010, 2018; Lowenthal, 2012; Marrin, 2017; Rovner, 2011). The latter aims to provide information and context related to all the possible options for achieving this as unbiased as possible (Betts, 2007; Jervis, 2010; Lowenthal, 2012; Pillar, 2006; Rovner, 2011).

Since states differ in their goals and the prevalence of civil-military relations, their strategic interests and objectives equally differ and therefore exhibit equally different behavior. As Davies (2012), Warner (2009), and Gill (2018) concluded, such differences can lead to a typical organization of the intelligence apparatus, the need for intelligence, the intelligence process, the disseminated or produced intelligence, and lastly, the use thereof within decision-making.

## **3. Research design and methods**

To answer the research questions, two case studies were conducted. With process tracing, the theorized causal relationship between X and Y is explored. The Dutch strategic culture is the independent variable and the outcome of the decision-making process the dependent variable, with the intelligence being located in this mechanism. This chapter will first discuss the case study design, followed by the process tracing method as applied in this thesis. Next, the expected data per

hypothesis for both cases will be elaborated upon. The chapter will end with an account of consulted sources and data gathering procedures.

### **3.1 Case studies**

Case study research is the best fit to answer the posited research question. Case study research is defined in various ways (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 24; Vennensson, 2008, pp. 225-226). According to Rohlfing (2012), a case is “a bounded empirical phenomenon that is an instance of a population of similar empirical phenomena” (p. 24). The notion of a bounded empirical phenomenon relates to the temporal and substantive boundaries that characterize the phenomenon in this thesis (Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 24-25; Vennensson, 2008, pp. 226-227). The posited research question explicates these boundaries further by the specific time period, the spatial location, and the institutions relevant to the phenomenon under study. Additionally, the notion of an instance of a population of similar empirical phenomena relates to the phenomenon’s membership in a group of similar phenomena that share distinctive characteristics (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 24; Vennensson, 2008, pp. 226-227). The phenomena that form the population are disputed formal decision-making processes in the Netherlands regarding the participation of Dutch troops in international military missions in the last 30 years. The theoretical concept of intelligence culture in the decision-making process is included in the research question as an extra boundary to specify the phenomenon even more.

The aim of this research is to discover the Dutch intelligence culture by analyzing the strategy-intelligence relationship and unravelling the role of intelligence in the Dutch decision-making process. Therefore, the analysis is done at the within-case level (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 69; Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 12-15). A theorized causal mechanism is built upon the relevant variables found in the literature (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 69; Loyens, 2014, p. 27). This approach is able to provide detailed insight into the ‘black box’ relationship between strategy and intelligence, one element of the intelligence culture concept. The outcomes of this research cannot be generalized across other cases, so cross-case inferences cannot be made (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 69; Loyens, 2014, p. 35; Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 12-15). Furthermore, this research aims to either confirm or disconfirm the hypothesized causal mechanism. Cases of the most-likely kind, based on theory, are best suited for such research since the hypothesized mechanism is most likely to be found in the empirical data of the case (Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 84-85). Based on this, the cases of the Dutch contribution to the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia in 1993 and the Dutch contribution to the ISAF mission in Uruzgan in 2006 are selected from the population.

### **3.2 Process-tracing**

Process-tracing is a way to systematically explore the relationship between X and Y, revealing ‘what’ the causal chain is made of and ‘how’ the causal forces travel through the chain (Beach, 2017; Loyens, 2014, p. 27; Vennensson, 2008, p. 232). From a mechanistic viewpoint, variables X and Y are not

regularly directly associated but are coupled by a mechanism of multiple elements through which the causal relation flows (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 24-25). Each individual part of this mechanism operates differently and produces its own effects on its consequent part. This creates a specific chain that builds the causal relationship between the independent and the dependent variable (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 29). For elements to be included in the causal mechanism, each individual element should have a critical role in the process of X producing Y (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 30-31). The theory-testing kind was chosen from the three forms of process-tracing for this research. With theory-testing process-tracing, the goal is to unpack the relation between X and Y and to test if the hypothesized mechanism is indeed present (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 14-16).

The overall aim of process tracing is to confirm the hypothesized causal mechanism in a case by finding supporting evidence in the empirical reality. This approach is based on logical reasoning; the hypothesized mechanism can only be confirmed when the a priori formulated elements and empirical manifestations that constitute this mechanism are found (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 83-84). One can predict that each part of the mechanism produces certain specific empirical traces or manifestations, which, when true, can be traced back to the empirical reality (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 100-101). Depending on the strength of the found data, confidence in the existence or confirmation of the mechanism can be increased or decreased. To do so, the data is assessed on its uniqueness and consequently plotted against its certainty, both relative to its hypothesis. Data will score high on uniqueness when it specifically, and only then, manifests when the hypothesized part of the mechanism is true (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 101). Expected data of high uniqueness is able to increase the confidence in the hypothesized part by ruling out other explanations for the presence of the found data (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 102-105; Collier, 2011, p. 827). A low level of uniqueness does not directly imply the disconfirmation of the hypothesized part. In such an event, the data cannot be solely explained by the hypothesized part and other explanations might be true as well (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 102-105; Collier, 2011, p. 826-827). The degree of certainty of the data relates to the necessity of the data for the part to be present (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 101-102). By sharpening the boundaries or thresholds in the hypothesis, the certainty and uniqueness of the expected data can be increased. Highly certain data provides more confidence in the hypothesized part when empirically found (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 102-105; Collier, 2011, pp. 826-827). When data is found that is both highly certain and unique to the hypothesis, the hypothesis is the only logical conclusion for the presence of the data (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 102-105; Collier, 2011, pp. 825-827).

In a more simplified sense, the relation between the uniqueness and certainty of expected data can be explained, as Beach & Pedersen (2013) concisely do, through two propositions: “What evidence must appear in the empirical record if the hypothesized part of the mechanism is present (certainty)? If found, can we explain the evidence using alternative hypotheses (uniqueness)?” (p. 106). Starting with a certain “degree of confidence in the validity of a hypothesis prior to gathering

evidence” (p. 84), based on previous research and known theory, the expected data ( $e$ ) of the mechanism is sought, evaluated, and weighed in the context of the data (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). The Bayesian logic followed here is that the inferential weight is the product of the probability of  $e$  versus the probability of  $\sim e$ , increasing the confidence of the causal mechanism being true when  $e$  outweighs  $\sim e$  (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

For each element in the hypothesized mechanism, including X and Y, the empirical manifestations that are needed for the confirmation of its existence in the case are formulated a priori (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 14-16, p. 33). For both cases, variable X is the strategic culture of the Netherlands at the time of the case, and Y is the outcome of the decision-making process regarding the Dutch participation in an international military mission. The causal mechanisms for the Bosnian and Uruzgan cases as based on the model of Beach & Pedersen (2013, p. 50) are shown, respectively, in Appendices A and B, including the hypotheses and expected manifestations for each element. The causal mechanism is similar in both cases, yet the empirical manifestation in each case differs slightly. In addition to the hypothesis, the expected data of X and Y are explicated as well, although not tested.

### 3.3 The Bosnian case

The mechanism starts with variable X, here the strategic culture of the Netherlands during the 1990s. As derived from the literature on this concept, strategic culture cannot be found in a standalone document or piece of data. For the analysis and construction of the concept, expert and scientific literature are used. Variable Y is found in the official governmental announcement of the deployment of military troops to the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia.

The first hypothesis states that the Dutch strategic culture is translated into specific preferences regarding the use of military force. The expected empirical manifestation of this hypothesis is the Dutch Cabinet formulating its vision and position regarding the use of the military to achieve its strategic goals against the background of the changing international and security environment, including the Bosnian conflict. It is expected that this will be accompanied by account data in the form of governmental documents found with the MoD and MoF on or referring to the Dutch strategic position in the world, preferably a military doctrine. This data is considered unique and not necessary in terms of supporting the hypothesis. If the data is found, the confidence in the hypothesis is increased, although it will not be strong enough for the disconfirmation of alternative hypotheses. If no data is found, the hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed.

The expected data for the second hypothesis encompasses state behavior aimed at accomplishing its formulated strategic goals. In the case of the Bosnian war, such behavior is expected to be expressed by the Dutch Cabinet by taking action according to its preferences aimed at its strategic goals. Account data of an official announcement by the Dutch cabinet in Parliament to see to the possibility of contributing troops to an UN mandated international mission to Bosnia implies such

behavior. This data is expected to be found in the minutes of the Parliamentary debates, the Bosnia dossier, or media reports and is relatively unique to the hypothesized part. Communication about the contribution does not have to take place, although it is most likely to do so according to the constitutional responsibility and transparency regarding the public. Moreover, this is accompanied by the accountability the state has to communicate what its plans and motivations are regarding the deployment, giving the data a similar high degree of certainty. If indeed this data is found, then the confidence in the hypothesized part is raised, although no alternative explanations can be ruled out. If no data is found, i.e., no communication has taken place, the hypothesized part could neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed.

The third hypothesis states that intelligence is consulted when designing the plan for a military operation or contribution. This hypothesis will empirically manifest itself through a sequence of events. It is expected that intelligence is gathered, analyzed, and disseminated by intelligence departments or services before a plan or advice is formulated by the Dutch Supreme Commander, who refers in this advice to the intelligence's conclusions. To establish this sequence, various data could be relevant, for example, the dates of reports or letters to Parliament regarding the intelligence or military advice, interviews with key people in the process, or media reports about the progress made in the process. It is crucial that this sequence can be reconstructed, therefore holding a high degree of certainty, but it is not unique to this kind of hypothesis. Alternative hypotheses could have a similar order or be explained by coincidence or convenience. If no sequence is found, due to lack of documentation or records of dates or times, either by accident or on purpose, the hypothesized part can neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed.

The next element in the hypothesized mechanism is the finalization of the decision-making process and the military advice, the fourth hypothesis. The expectation is that at this stage of the decision-making process, a final plan or advice on how the perceived deployment has to be carried out is produced and disseminated. The accompanied data to the empirical manifestation is a formal document or reference in the Parliamentary debate detailing the Cabinet's decision on the international contribution of troops, and is expected to be found in the Parliamentary dossier on the Bosnian conflict. If found, the uniqueness of the data is high, therefore capable of ruling out alternative explanations. Accounts of the operational planning and details regarding a mission will only be present if the process of exploration and evaluation prior to the formulation of the plans has taken place. The certainty of the expected data is of moderate value. The decision-making process can be finalized without any operational plan or advice regarding the deployment, although the sequence of events may urge such. If no data is found, the hypothesis cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed.

The fifth hypothesis describes the process of weighing the motives regarding the deployment. The empirical manifestation of this is expected to be the discussion on the motivation of the Cabinet's decision to either continue with the deployment or otherwise abort it. This discussion and motivation are expected to be found in the final plan or advice, minutes of the Parliamentary debates, letters sent

to Parliament on the Bosnia dossier, media reports, or in the personal accounts of key people involved, e.g., ministers or top government officials. This data is unique to the hypothesis in the sense that the outcome will only be there if any process precedes it. Regarding the certainty, the expected data doesn't explicitly need to be present for the hypothesis to be true. Yet, the communication of their decision is preferred by Parliament. If found, the data is not able to rule out alternative explanations. The decision and its official reading could be used as a vehicle to achieve goals other than those of the deployment. Accounts of such different motives or agendas are communicated through other channels than the Cabinet's one. These accounts are expected to be found in media reports or in the personal accounts of key people involved, e.g., ministers or top government officials. If such alternative data is found, the certainty of the initial expected data will be undermined and the confidence in the hypothesis will be decreased. If no data is found, the hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor rejected.

The last hypothesis states the gathering of support by the Dutch Cabinet for their decision, aligning it with the pursuit of the strategic goals. The expected manifestation of this hypothesis is the Cabinet trying to convince, based on their motivations, the majority of Parliament to support its decision, as this is preferred to avoid a no-confidence vote if the Parliament argues the decision is not in line with the strategic goals. Data on this process is expected to be found in accounts of the Parliamentary debates, the records of the General Parliament and Parliamentary commissions, and in media reports. The expected data is of a highly certain nature. Such a matter has to be debated in Parliament to establish a majority vote. The data is not unique to the formulated hypothesis, as debate is not specifically unique to this situation, making it unable to dismiss alternative hypotheses. If none of the expected data is found, the hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed.

### **3.4 The Uruzgan case**

Similar to the previous case, the X variable is the strategic culture of the Netherlands. The Uruzgan case is set during the 2000s. The expected data for X is similar to that in the Bosnian case. The dependent variable Y in this case is found in the official governmental announcement of the deployment of military troops to the ISAF mission in Uruzgan.

For the first hypothesis, evidence has to be found for the translation of Dutch strategic culture into specific preferences regarding the Dutch military. The Dutch Cabinet is expected to formulate and document its vision regarding the current international environment, the implications this has on achieving its strategic goals, and how its military should preferably be used herein. This is accompanied with data like a military doctrine and written governmental accounts on the international strategy of the Netherlands. This data is not explicitly necessary for the existence of the mechanism, thus having low certainty. Concerning the uniqueness of the data, any documents on strategic preferences will logically only be found if actual strategic thinking took place. Although the uniqueness of the data is not sufficient enough to rule out any other alternative hypotheses, it does strengthen the confidence in the hypothesis being present. Concluding, if such data is found,

confidence in the hypothesis is increased, although it cannot rule out alternative hypotheses. When no data is found, confidence in the hypothesis remains unchanged.

For the second hypothesis, the expected data relates to state behavior aimed at the accomplishment of the set strategic objectives. The empirical manifestation of this behavior is expected to emerge through the presence of, as the constitution prescribes, the official notification letter from the Dutch minister of Defense to the Dutch Parliament, notifying it of any intention or ambition of the Cabinet to deploy troops. As resources are scarce, investigating the feasibility of a deployment will only be justified if it serves Dutch interests. This official notification letter is expected to be found in the Parliamentary dossier on Afghanistan. The certainty and uniqueness of this data are both high. As the Dutch cabinet is bound by the constitution to inform the Parliament, the presence of the notification letter is necessary for the hypothesis to be true. In addition, such notification will only emerge when the MoD initiates exploration for future military missions, as is demanded as well by the constitution, making the data unique for the hypothesized part. If the data is not found, the hypothesized part has to be disconfirmed, lowering the confidence in the presence of the causal mechanism.

The empirical manifestation of the third hypothesis is found in the sequence of events leading to the military advice by the Chief of Defense (CDS). As the Cabinet is bound to the “Toetsingskader 2001”, intelligence has first to be gathered and disseminated by the MIVD before the military advice of the CDS can be formulated. This advice, with references to the used intelligence and foreseen security risks and mitigations, has to be discussed in the article 100 letter. The expected data is not any specific document but is composed of a specific and crucial sequence of events or actions. To establish this, various data can be relevant, for example, dates on reports or letters to Parliament regarding the intelligence or military advice, interviews with key people, or media reports on the process. For the confirmation of this hypothesized part, the certainty of the data is of utmost importance. The uniqueness of the data is only relatively specific to the hypothesis. Therefore, alternative hypotheses could explain the sequence of events. In the situation that no sequence of events is found, the hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed.

The fourth hypothesis relates to the finalizing of the decision-making process and the military advice. The expected empirical manifestation is the Cabinet sending the article 100 letter to Parliament to inform it of its decision to either deploy or not and its motivation to do so. Therefore, the expected data will be the presence of the article 100 letter that includes the motivation to deploy, the justification, and the military advice. The uniqueness of expected data is high for the hypothesis. This advice will specifically be present or produced when the preceding decision-making process has taken place. The certainty of the data is of similar importance as the Cabinet is required by the constitution to expand on their decision and communicate this to Parliament. Without this letter, the decision-making process couldn't be finalized legitimately. Still, the data isn't able to completely rule out any

alternative hypotheses that could produce a military advice. In the event of not finding the expected data, the hypothesis will be rejected.

Hypothesis five is about the justification of the participation of the mission by the responsible ministers. The expected manifestation is that the Cabinet, as it is constitutionally bound to do, has to motivate its decision in the article 100 letter and, if it decides to deploy, link the goals of the deployment to the Dutch strategic goals. Such argumentation is expected to be found in the article 100 letter sent to Parliament. The uniqueness of this data is high since the article 100 letter will only be present if the Cabinet engaged in the decision-making process and came to a decision on this specific issue. Any other article 100 letter, regarding a different mission or not to Uruzgan, would be irrelevant for the analysis. As the Cabinet is tied to the article 100 procedure, the expected data is a necessary and, therefore, certain element in the decision-making process. Regarding the dismissal of alternative hypotheses, the official reading of the decision could be used as a vehicle to achieve different political or personal goals. If data is found in support of such an alternative hypothesis, e.g., in the personal accounts of the key people involved, the certainty of the expected data will be undermined, consequently decreasing the confidence in the causal mechanism. In the situation where no data is found, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed.

For hypothesis six, the search for sufficient support in the Dutch Parliament by the Cabinet, the Cabinet is expected to gain a majority vote on its decision on the deployment by convincing opposition parties in Parliament. A majority vote in Parliament is formally not required for these decisions, but logically reasoned, the Cabinet will prefer this to maximize political support and avoid a no-confidence vote. The data that is expected from this hypothesis is account data of the Parliamentary debates and is expected to be found in the records of the General Parliamentary and Parliamentary Commission debates and media reports on the stances of the different parties in Parliament. This data is certain to some extent since the gathering of support is done both privately and publicly. Yet the expected data is specific as it is aimed at the decision regarding this specific deployment, but debate is not unique to this situation. If no expected data is found, the confidence in the hypothesis remains unchanged.

### 3.5 Data

The key to process tracing is the methodological approach to data gathering. Driven by the theory, data is deliberately sought, gathered, and selected so inferences can be made regarding the causal mechanism (Beach & Pederson, 2013). Besides the search for supportive data (*e*), data that is in favor of alternative hypotheses ( $\sim e$ ) is sought simultaneously. For every formulated hypothesis, different kinds of data will be needed for the weighing of evidence for the hypothesis.

Sources can be divided into primary and secondary categories. Primary sources are sources that are directly related to events or processes (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 132-133). Primary sources in this research are found in parliamentary documentation like documents relating to plenary

debates, commission hearings, and letters sent to Parliament. For the Bosnian case, the formal documents of the decision-making process are found in the publicly available Parliamentary dossier 22 181<sup>2</sup>. In addition, documents that are indirectly related to the process are sought in parliamentary dossiers 18 169, 21 132, 21 991, 22 327, 22 975, and 28 506. For the Uruzgan case, the formal documents on the decision-making process are found in dossier 27 925; documents that are indirectly related are sought in dossiers 26 900, 28 637, 28 676, and 29 202. Secondary sources are indirectly related to events or processes (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 132-133). Media reports, research reports, and Parliamentary inquiry reports are secondary sources used in this thesis. The Nexis database is used for finding media reports. A preliminary selection is made by using keywords and is limited to publication in the time frame of the case. The keywords used for the Bosnian case are ‘Bosnië’, ‘UNPROFOR’, and ‘MID’. For the Uruzgan case, ‘MIVD’ and ‘Uruzgan’ are used as keywords. The publication of the media reports is limited to the period between January 1993 and January 1994 in the Bosnian case and between January 2005 and January 2006 in the Uruzgan case. The reports have to be published in the national newspapers NRC Handelsblad, de Volkskrant, Trouw or Telegraaf in both cases. In addition to the media reports, research reports are used as well, taking note of possible biases and flaws that come with scientific and investigative work. In the Bosnian case, the voluminous NIOD (2002) report and the scientific works of Wiebes (2003), Both (2000) are used. In the Uruzgan case, the scientific works of Hazelbag (2009), Grandia Mantas (2014) and Kitzen (2018) are used. The data is coded with Atlas.TI, using an open coding procedure since the various ways the data operationalizes in the empirical world and, therefore, no single standardized coding procedure can be established.

## 4. Analysis

In this chapter, both the Bosnian and Uruzgan cases will be analyzed. The hypothesized causal mechanisms for both cases are depicted in appendices A and B, respectively. The analysis in both cases will start with some contextual background information so the case can be placed in context. Then the independent variable, Dutch strategic culture during the time of the case, is reviewed, followed by the analysis of the formulated mechanism. Lastly, the dependent variable, the outcome of the decision-making process, is reviewed.

### 4.1 The Bosnian case

The Dutch involvement in the Bosnian conflict began with its participation in the UNPROFOR mission. After the breakup of the Soviet Union during the late 1980s, the call for independence was firmly heard in the Balkan region (Duijzings, 2002; NIOD, 2002, pp. 35-36). The fall of communism left a vacuum in most of the eastern European countries that were formerly included in the Soviet

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<sup>2</sup> The dossiers are publicly available on the site [www.officielebekendmakingen.nl](http://www.officielebekendmakingen.nl), the official digital medium for Parliamentary announcements and documents.

Union, one being Yugoslavia. Home to multiple ethnic groups, nationalist tensions rose in Yugoslavia during this time, generally caused by the then dominant position of the Orthodox Serbians over Muslim Bosniaks and Catholic Croats (Duijzings, 2002; NIOD, 2002, pp. 35-36). On June 25, 1991, Slovenia declared its independence, separating itself from Yugoslavia after a short ten-day war with its previous ruler. Likewise, Croatia declared its independence as well but fell into a more violent and drawn-out conflict with mainly the Orthodox Serbs, sparking an armed insurgency throughout the region. The ethnic Serbians in Yugoslavia strongly opposed the disintegration of Yugoslavia and vocally rejected the dissolution of communism and the introduction of more capitalistic structures. The Serbians tied into historical and ethnical nationalism to lay claims on regions and cities in Yugoslavia in reaction to the separated states (Duijzings, 2002; NIOD, 2002, pp. 35-36). This mix of strong nationalistic and ethnic rhetoric, a political vacuum, and an uncontrolled supply of arms resulted in a civil war between the three majority ethnic groups in the region. In response to the violence and presumed human rights violations, the United Nations (UN) initially adopted a resolution for the formulation of the peacekeeping mission UNPROFOR to Croatia (Duijzings, 2002; NIOD, 2002, pp. 35-36; United Nations, 1993). As the fear rose that some ethnic enclaves in the region would be attacked by the Serbs, the UN expanded UNPROFOR's mandate to include the protection of the so-called *safe areas* with resolution 824 on May 6, 1993 (NIOD, 2002, pp. 964-965, 1247-1250; United Nations, 1993). From then on, the UN sought a troop contributor for UNPROFOR's new tasks, including the protection of Srebrenica.

## **4.2 Analysis of the causal mechanism in the Bosnian case**

### *4.2.1 Variable X – the Dutch Strategic Culture during the 1990s.*

Dutch strategic culture underwent some significant changes in its focus due to impactful events during the 1980s and 1990s. Originally, the strategic culture of the Netherlands was based on two notions: the pursuit of a stable world order through promoting the international rule of law and a strong Atlanticist political preference aimed at increasing the international political relevance of the Netherlands (Korteweg, 2011, pp. 233-237; de Ruiter, 2018, p. 49). These notions are deeply rooted in the foundation of the Dutch state, both codified in articles 90 and 97 of its constitution, respectively (Korteweg, 2011, p. 235; art. 90 Grondwet; art. 97 Grondwet). The notion of a stable world order and the promotion of the international rule of law can be traced back to the Dutch economic dependency on global trade relations and the pursuit of economic stability. The second notion ties into this, as Atlanticist relations would empower the international political relevance of the Netherlands as a medium sized power to create a stable environment.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 swiftly shattered the bipolar world into a multipolar one. The main shared opponent of the Netherlands and its NATO partners, the Soviet Union, dissolved. Resulting in a shift in focus away from traditional defenses and raising concerns about the military's overall goal (de Graaff, 2002; Korteweg, 2011; de Ruiter, 2018). As concerns about European stability

rose as the military interest of the US in Europe decreased, the Netherlands became a strong proponent of intensifying the shared European defense policy (de Graaf, 2002; de Ruiter, 2018). Together, these events caused a change in the primary tasks of the Dutch military, from classical territorial defense to a more expeditionary character:

*There is every reason to evaluate the in the spring of 1991 published Defensienota. The world is changed more rapidly and radically than we've then could've foreseen. The most important development is the disintegration of the Soviet Union. As a result, the previously direct military threat is dissolved. However, serious security risks originating from the tensions and conflicts in various regions have to be taken into account. The changing situation calls for a review of the focus and size of the military.... A return to a political-military situation as before 1989 is impossible.... Still, a conflict on large scale cannot be ruled out, although such a conflict would be of a whole different nature than we anticipated before 1989.<sup>3</sup>*

*Kamerstukken II 1992-1993 22975 nr. 2, p. 3*

Previously, with the standoff between the East and the West, the main justification for using force was a direct attack on either Dutch or NATO territory. The sudden end to this situation demanded a new form of justification: the international rule of law (de Graaff, 2002; Korteweg, 2011; de Ruiter, 2018). In addition to the disappearance of the Soviet Union as the main threat to Europe, it was thought that enduring deadlock in UN Security Council decision-making was equally resolved, making way for worldwide backed interventions (de Graaff, 2002; Korteweg, 2011; de Ruiter, 2018). When the Netherlands did participate in operations outside NATO territory, like in Korea (1955-1953) and Lebanon (1985-1989), UN resolutions justifying the intervention were required.

During the Cold War, when peacekeeping and enforcing missions mandated by the UN were more of an accessory task, they had now become the military's primary goal. It was reasoned that NATO would be the instrument through which the UN could achieve its ultimate goal of world peace and was sequentially posited as such. This led to NATO becoming a central element in the Dutch security policy, although the US remained the preferred protector of both Europe and the Netherlands (de Graaff, 2002; Korteweg, 2011; de Ruiter, 2018). By increasing the effort to keep NATO internationally active and relevant, the US could be incentivized to restore its interest in Europe (de Graaff, 2002; Korteweg, 2011; de Ruiter, 2018).

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<sup>3</sup> 'Er is alle aanleiding de in het voorjaar van 1991 verschenen Defensienota te evalueren. De wereld is sneller en ingrijpender veranderd dan toen kon worden voorzien. De belangrijkste verandering was het uiteenvallen van de Sovjet-Unie. Daardoor is de rechtstreekse militaire dreiging van voorheen verdwenen. Wel moet ernstig rekening worden gehouden met veiligheidsrisico's voortvloeiend uit spanningen en conflicten in verschillende regio's. De veranderde omstandigheden maken opnieuw een herijking nodig van de taken en de omvang van de krijgsmacht ... Een terugval naar de politiek-militaire situatie van vóór 1989 is onmogelijk .... Een conflict van grote omvang kan niet worden uitgesloten, hoewel een dergelijk conflict van geheel andere aard zal zijn dan waarmee wij vóór 1989 rekening moesten houden.' (Kamerstuk II 1992-1993 22975 nr. 2, p. 3)

*Both participation in the allied defense as well as participating in peacekeeping operations serve one and the same Dutch interest: the prevention of war and the promotion of peace and security in the world.<sup>4</sup>*

*Kamerstukken II 18169 nr. 2, 1983, p. 78*

#### 4.2.2 Hypothesis 1 - Dutch Cabinet formulating a vision regarding its use of the military.

During the 1980s, the ‘*Defensienota 1984-1993*’ was published, detailing a roadmap for the Dutch defense forces in the next decade (Kamerstukken II 18169 nr. 2). The plans and details were strongly based on the bipolar international landscape at that time (Kamerstukken II 18169 nr. 2). In response to the sudden changes in 1989, Dutch Minister of Defense Ter Beek published a revision of the roadmap in 1991 titled ‘*Prioriteiten nota 1990*’ (Kamerstukken II 21991 nr. 3). To maintain stability and avoid the effect of renationalization of European militaries, the new roadmap focused clearly on keeping NATO active and relevant in primarily Europe and secondary in the rest of the world (de Graaff, 2002; de Ruiter, 2018). In addition to large proposed cutbacks, both financial and in size, the task of peacekeeping and -enforcement operations under the auspices of the UN gained a significant place in the renewed vision (de Graaf, 2002; Kamerstukken II 21991 nr. 3).

*Especially since today’s security risks are of a more diffuse nature than before, it is important that the use of military force, if any reason thereto exists, is internationally legitimized. International organizations like NATO, the United Nations, the OSCE, and the WEU play a crucial role in the consultation and formulation of the position that form the basis on which, if desired, military force can be exercised. The input from the various fora has to be carefully aligned with each other. The aim is to develop the European aspects of our security policy within the framework of the WEU and the European Community. Still, the transatlantic dimension of our security policy should not be neglected. The Cabinet assesses the involvement of the United States in European security as essential.<sup>5</sup>*

*Kamerstukken II 22975 nr. 2, p. 9*

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<sup>4</sup> ‘Zowel deelneming aan de bondgenootschappelijke verdediging als deelneming aan vredesoperaties dienen immers één en hetzelfde Nederlandse belang: het voorkomen van oorlog en het bevorderen van vrede en veiligheid in de wereld.’ (Kamerstuk 18169 nr. 2 (Defensinota 1984-1993), 1983, p. 78).

<sup>5</sup> ‘Juist omdat de veiligheidsrisico's diffuser zijn dan in het verleden het geval was, is het belangrijk dat militair optreden, wanneer daartoe aanleiding bestaat, internationaal gelegitimeerd is. Internationale organisaties als de Navo, de Verenigde Naties, de CVSE en de Weu spelen een cruciale rol bij het overleg en de meningsvorming op grond waarvan desgewenst wordt overgegaan tot inzet van militaire middelen. De bijdragen van de verschillende fora dienen zorgvuldig op elkaar te worden afgestemd. Het streven is erop gericht de Europese aspecten van het veiligheidsbeleid in het kader van de Weu en de Europese Gemeenschap verder te ontwikkelen. De transatlantische dimensie van het veiligheidsbeleid mag echter niet worden verwaarloosd. De regering acht de betrokkenheid van de Verenigde Staten bij de Europese veiligheid dan ook onmisbaar.’ (Kamerstukken II 22975 nr. 2, p. 9).

Somewhat later in 1993, a second revision of the was published by Minister Ter Beek (Kamerstukken II 22975 nr. 2). Compared to the revision in 1991, the subtle switch in the order of the defense tasks was the most notable change, besides the significant size cutbacks. From now on, crisis management operations were the primary task of the military (de Graaff, 2002; Kamerstukken II 22975 nr. 2; Korteweg, 2011; de Ruiter, 2018). Furthermore, an explicit ambition for this task was formulated: to simultaneously deploy four battalion-sized deployments at the lower end of the conflict spectrum and a single deployment of brigade size at the higher end (de Graaf, 2002; Kamerstukken II 22975 nr. 2; Korteweg, 2011; de Ruiter, 2018).

Despite missing an official military doctrine, both *Prioriteiten nota's* show the adaptive capability of the Dutch military to rewrite its strategic culture and formulate tactical preferences in the revolving security environment. Although much uncertainty surrounding the future of NATO and the new role of the UN remained, this resulted in the explicit ambition to conduct international operations. These findings provide support for the formulated hypothesis, albeit the exclusion of alternatives is difficult based on the low uniqueness of the data.

#### *4.2.3 Hypothesis 2 – Dutch Cabinet officially announces it is exploring the possibility of a military deployment.*

On September 7, 1993, MoD Minister Ter Beek offered UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali a contribution of the new Dutch airmobile bigrade (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, p. 50; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1061-1062). This data supports the hypothesis, since a state will only explore opportunities that appear to be viable from the start, due to the scarcity of its resources. Furthermore, this data is unique since it is aimed at a specific contribution and only the minister of defense can make such a decision. The certainty of the data is not of such a degree that alternative hypotheses can be ruled out.

Already in the summer of 1993, a commitment to a Dutch contribution is found in a notice MoF Minister Kooijmans sent to the Dutch liaisons at the UN and NATO on June 16, instructing them to communicate that the Netherlands was prepared to offer a small logistical unit for the protection force of the declared safe areas (Both, 2000; Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, p. 50; NIOD, 2002, pp. 986-987). This offer was repeated by Dutch MP Lubbers during the EEC summit in Copenhagen on 21-22 June 1993 (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 5, p. 177; NIOD, 2002, pp. 988-990). This initial offer was primarily proposed since the concept of the safe areas was generally found flawed and not workable, yet some reaction from the international community to the call for contribution was expected. Dutch officials had repeatedly urged the international community to support intervention in Bosnia. Therefore, the Netherlands had to produce a proposal one way or another, in order to not lose face (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, pp. 50-52; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1055-1063). The MoD reasoned that because the ongoing talks on the Vance-Owen plan were at an advanced stage and a truce agreement

appeared to be within reach, the safe areas would consequently vanish, and the current offer could be transformed into supporting the agreement's implementation (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, pp. 50-52; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1055-1063). The Dutch MoF didn't agree with the view of the MoD regarding the actual goal of the peace implementation as they had multiple concerns with the plan and preferred to remain with the protection of the safe areas as it was internationally communicated (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, pp. 50-52; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1055-1063). As a result of this difference in view, a letter from MoD Minister Ter Beek with the offer of the Airmobile bigrade for specifically the peace implementation was blocked by the MoF at the end of August, without Ter Beek's knowledge. Thus, the UN only knew about the initial offer for the protection of the safe areas (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, pp. 50-52; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1055-1063). Meanwhile, the original Vance-Owen talks stalled as the plan was rejected over May and June and was later replaced by the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. All in all, Ter Beek's offer of September 7 was made under the assumption that it was aimed at the implementation of the upcoming Owen-Stoltenberg peace agreement. However, this was not explicitly stated, leaving the possibility that Boutros-Ghali thought that it was meant for the safe areas (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, pp. 50-52; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1055-1063). Meanwhile, at the end of August, the talks on the Owen-Stoltenberg plan stalled and was rejected as well. As a consequence, the initial offer aimed at the implementation of the peace agreement was now deployed for the protection of the safe areas (NIOD, 2002, pp. 1062-1063). And so, on October 21, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali formally requested the Netherlands for their troops (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, pp. 50-52; NIOD, 2002, p. 1071).

#### *4.2.4 Hypothesis 3 - Intelligence is gathered and consulted before a military advice is formulated.*

The expected sequence was initiated on September 13, 1993, with the reconnaissance mission by the Chief of Staff of the *Crisisstaff* of the Dutch Army, accompanied by commanders of the Airmobile Brigade (NIOD, 2002, p. 1067). The goal of this mission was to gather information on a possible location for deployment in Bosnia. The Dutch delegation met with the commanding French-Canadian colonel to evaluate the options for deployment, concluding that central Bosnia would be the most suitable location. Yet it remains unclear if Srebrenica was put forward as the presumed option by the local UN command during the mission. Evident is that no further information was gathered or requested on the town (NIOD, 2002, p. 1067-1068). MoD Minister Ter Beek visited Bosnia himself in early November, accompanied by top defense officials. Meanwhile, within the Dutch delegation, the opinions regarding the location saw Srebrenica as suitable (NIOD, 2002, pp. 1071-1074). Upon his return from Bosnia on the 11<sup>th</sup>, Ter Beek consulted with CDS van der Vlis and Army General Couzy. During this meeting, van der Vlis repeated the arguments opposing the deployment, including Srebrenica. However, Minister Ter Beek disagreed and approved the continuation of the reconnaissance, and the decision for the initial deployment of the Airmobile Bigrade was made the

next day during the Cabinet meeting. Still, the final location for the Dutch deployment remained undetermined by the UN at this time (NIOD, 2002, pp. 1074-1077).

Besides the visits of the political delegations, the gathering of intelligence remained very limited. On October 18, the individual intelligence departments of the Army and Airmobile Bigrade finalized an areal analysis on four potential areas of deployment, including Srebrenica (NIOD, 2002, pp. 1068-1069). During the conflict, the *Militaire Inlichtingen Dienst* (Military Intelligence Service, MID) published *sitreps*. In these situational reports, the location of Srebrenica was mentioned various times. As the sporadic bombarding of Srebrenica had increased significantly over October and November, the MID concluded that the Serbian forces' goal was to take Srebrenica by besieging it and that the current situation in the enclave didn't live up to its declaration as a safe area (NIOD, 2002, pp. 1070-1071). Furthermore, the MID independently communicated in 1993 a negative advice on the deployment to Srebrenica and concluded later that the armament of deployed troops was too 'light' (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, p. 60; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1118-1119; Wiebes, 2002, pp. 120-121).

The expected sequence ends on November 15, 1993, when the Dutch Cabinet formally decides to deploy the airmobile bigrade to Bosnia, although the UN remained undecided on the exact location of the deployment (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 64). The found data supports the formulated hypothesis, yet the data is neither unique nor certain. Therefore, confidence in the hypothesis isn't increased, and moreover, data supporting alternative hypotheses is found.

According to the accounts of its director, the MID wasn't consulted or included at all in the decision-making process (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, pp. 60-61; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1118-1119, 3148-3149; Wiebes, 2002, pp. 120-122). The MID independently produced the two previously mentioned risk assessments on the deployment and the armament. When the reports were communicated in the autumn of 1993, the decision-making process was at such an advanced stage that its concerns were "pushed to one side" (Wiebes, 2002, p. 121). In addition, no thorough risk or threat assessment was requested by the minister or the CDS or executed by either the MID or its Army counterpart during the decision-making process. The main argument for the lack of such an assessment is that it wasn't needed as the situation and risks were already known due to the, although limited, presence of Dutch troops in Bosnia (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, p. 57; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1119, 3148-3149).

#### 4.2.5 Hypothesis 4 - Final plan with the details of the perceived deployment is formulated.

The expected decision is formally documented in the Parliamentary letter sent by Ministers Kooijmans and Ter Beek on November 15, 1993 (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 64; NIOD, 2002, p. 1082). This decision is the product of the sequence of events as found with the previous hypothesis. In the letter, the Cabinet describes the deployment of 1,100 troops, reinforced with armored vehicles, for a period of 18 months starting in early 1994. The aim of the mission is primarily focused on humanitarian aid and preventing human rights violations, and additionally on enforcing the peace agreement due to the

presence of international troops (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 64; NIOD, 2002, p. 1082). Further, the letter states that at the time of writing, central Bosnia is the most likely region for the deployment. Still, this remained unclear as the protection of the safe areas was still a possibility. No specific analysis or measures are discussed regarding the security situation in either of the possible mission areas (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 64; NIOD, 2002, p. 1082). The presence of this letter is unique to the decision as hypothesized, increasing the confidence in the hypothesis. The presence of the data is not able to rule out any alternatives since this letter is not necessary for the decision to be taken.

#### *4.2.6 Hypothesis 5 – Cabinet’s motivations for decision and link with strategic goals are discussed.*

In the Parliamentary letter of November 15, 1993, Ministers Kooijmans and Ter Beek elaborate on the Cabinet’s decision (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 64; NIOD, 2002, p. 1082). The justification of the deployment is in line with the strategic goals of enforcing the international rule of law and protection of human rights. The primary argument for the deployment is to ensure humanitarian help can reach the conflict region, thus supporting the humanitarian mission in general. Second, the Cabinet assumes the protection of human rights due to deterrence through its military presence. A third motive is the assumed positive effect on establishing the necessary conditions for a peace agreement by the military presence, which is in the security interests of Europe as well (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 64, p. 6).

*First and foremost, in the light of the grave injustices’ that all in former Yugoslavia face, the Cabinet would maximize its effort to guarantee the timely access to the urgent and necessary humanitarian aid. In addition, the Cabinet is of the opinion that the presence of international forces has a certain inhibitory effect on the violation of human rights. Such an effect shouldn’t be overvalued due to the experiences in the last two years, but is locally still of meaning. At last, with the presence of international forces, a contribution can be made to the formation of the necessary conditions for concluding a peace agreement. Moreover, sustainable peace can only be achieved if all involved parties have the political will to do so. European security interests are served as well with such a peace agreement.<sup>6</sup>*

*Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 64, 1993, p. 6*

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<sup>6</sup> ‘In de eerste plaats wil de regering zich, in het licht van het grove onrecht dat velen in voormalig Joegoslavië is en wordt aangedaan, maximaal inspanssen om de zo dringend nodige humanitaire hulp tijdig te helpen waarborgen. Daarnaast meent de regering dat presentie van internationale eenheden een zekere remmende werking kan hebben op schendingen van de mensenrechten. Dit effect mag gegeven de ervaringen van de afgelopen twee jaar niet worden overschat, maar is daarmee plaatselijk bepaald niet onbetekenend. Tenslotte kan met de presentie van internationale eenheden worden bijgedragen aan het scheppen van de noodzakelijke voorwaarden voor de totstandkoming van een vredesregeling. Overigens kan een duurzame vrede alleen worden bereikt indien de betrokken partijen daartoe zelf de politieke wil hebben. Met een dergelijke vredesregeling zijn ook Europese veiligheidsbelangen gediend.’ (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 64, 1993, p. 6).

In the letter, several elements are either not clearly motivated or mentioned at all. Most notable are the missing details regarding the exact location of the deployment; the current security situation and accompanying threats in the region; the risks the troops face; or the measures to mitigate these risks. Any reference to account for the negative advices of the MID, Army intelligence services or the CDS is not found in either the letter or during the debates. As already became apparent with the third hypothesis, no thorough risk or threat assessment was done, as the CDS and ministers deemed this not necessary (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, p. 57; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1119, 3148-3149).

Although the found data is unique to the hypothesis, alternative explanations can't be ruled out, and thus the hypothesis cannot be confirmed. Supportive evidence is found for a second unmentioned motive for the deployment to Srebrenica. Key officials involved in the decision-making process point to the motive of the deployment as enabling the Netherlands to exercise influence in the international arena. The goal of protecting human rights and providing humanitarian aid was secondary to this (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, 1993, p. 30-34; NIOD, 2002, pp. 3133-3136). Furthermore, the ambition of being internationally relevant warranted the Netherlands to take responsibility as a strong proponent for intervening in Bosnia (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, 1993, pp. 30-34; Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 149, 1996, pp. 15-16; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1098-1099, 3133-3136). While other states within the UN and other international structures were hesitant and mostly unwilling to commit to an intervention, the Dutch tried to lead by example with a first contribution to UNPROFOR, often referred to as exercising the 'catalysator function' (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, 2002, pp. 30-34, 86-88; Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 149, 1996, pp. 8-9, 15-16; NIOD, 2002, pp. 986-991, 1098-1099). As this approach failed, the Netherlands became isolated in its commitment to contribute to UNPROFOR. As time passed, it became clear that the Netherlands couldn't generate the required force strength for the mission and simultaneously couldn't withdraw their commitment without losing face (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, 2002, pp. 86-88; Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 149, 1996, p. 17; NIOD, 2002, pp. 997-998, 1095-1099).

#### *4.2.7 Hypothesis 6 – Cabinet searches for majority support in Parliament for its decision.*

On November 16, 1993, Ministers Kooijmans and Ter Beek defend and discuss the Cabinets' decision to contribute to UNPROFOR with the permanent Committees on Defense and Foreign Affairs (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 67, 1993). In general, the Dutch Parliament agreed with the motives of the Cabinet to contribute troops to UNPROFOR. On the political left wing, the PvdA party raised concerns regarding the unknown location of the deployment and proposed postponing the debate and decision until this was clarified. This was strongly rejected by the rest of the parliament members. The SP party was outspoken against the deployment, yet they didn't participate in the committee debate, and therefore their objections were not taken into account. Further, the center-right party GPV was inclined to voice strong concerns against the deployment, but they switched to critically supporting the

deployment after internal deliberation. At the end of the debate, Parliament voted unanimously in favor of the deployment of the Airmobile Bigrade to the UNPROFOR mission, with the remark that the exact location would be communicated when known (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 67, 1993; Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, 2002, pp. 27-30; NIOD, 2002, pp. 1082-1085).

The found data supports the hypothesis, as this debate is unique to it. Yet an alternative explanation can be deduced regarding the unanimous parliamentary support. Already back in 1992, voices in Parliament rose in favor of military intervention in the Bosnian conflict. Especially after the reports in August 1992 of the presumed existence of concentration camps, the call for intervention increased (Kamerstukken II 28506 nr. 3, 2002, pp. 24-30; NIOD, 2002, pp. 3133-3135). Ever since then, both the Dutch Cabinet and Parliament, pressured by the extensive media coverage, sought ways for a robust international intervention in Bosnia. This resulted in fierce pressure on Minister Ter Beek to create or organize the capability for the Netherlands to play a meaningful role on the international level. The commitment to the implementation of the nearing peace agreement became an obligation to the contribution of troops for the safe areas when the peace talks stranded and the safe areas remained in place (NIOD, 2002, pp. 1095-1099). Long before the Airmobile Bigrade was offered to the UN, consensus in both the Parliament and Cabinet on intervening in Bosnia prevailed; only the how and when were yet to be found out.

#### *4.2.8 Variable Y – Positive decision on participation military mission.*

The positive decision on the participation in the UNPROFOR mission is the dependent variable in this case. As can be concluded from the previous hypothesis, the decision to deploy the airmobile bigrade was unanimously supported by the Dutch Parliament (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 64, 1993; Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 67, 1993). On December 2, 1993, the local UNPROFOR command communicated the formal location for the Dutch troops: Srebrenica. The next day, Minister Ter Beek informs Parliament of the final location by letter, where it only takes note of the information (Kamerstukken II 22181 nr. 66, 1993). In the following Parliamentary debates regarding the deployment, the location is not extensively discussed or mentioned (NIOD, 2002, pp. 1110-1113, 1161-1163).

### **4.3 The Uruzgan case**

The Dutch involvement in the Afghan province of Uruzgan finds its origins in the Afghanistan war, initiated by the US as retaliation for the attacks on the World Trade Center, New York on September 11, 2001 (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 8; Klep, 2011; p. 13-15). During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan, home to the Taliban organization. Being the de facto government of Afghanistan, it facilitated the terrorist organization and perceived suspect of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks Al-Qaida, led by Osama Bin Laden (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 8; Klep, 2011, p. 13). The Netherlands supported the actions against the Taliban that were loosely based on UN article 51.

Dutch contributions consisted mostly of logistical and support military troops, avoiding any direct involvement in offensive operations of the OEF. In early 2005, the Dutch cabinet decided to increase its involvement with the deployment of a Special Forces unit to the OEF mission (Klep, 2011, pp. 17-20). At the end of 2001, the US-led coalition defeated the Taliban forces and the UN mandated ISAF mission took over, focused on rebuilding and providing security to Afghanistan (Klep, 2011, pp. 15-17). The Dutch were more involved in ISAF, with a Provincial Reconstruction Team in the northern province of Baghlan in 2004. Later that year, NATO announced the next phase of the mission focused on South Afghanistan, ISAF III (Klep, 2011, pp. 20-21).

#### **4.4 Analysis of the causal mechanism in the Uruzgan case**

##### *4.2.1 Variable X – the Dutch Strategic Culture during the 2000s.*

The Dutch perspective on the purpose of the military and the use of force was still strongly linked to its international environment in the first decade of this millennium. The enforcement and fostering of the international legal order, as codified in the Dutch constitution, and the main military tasks remained unchanged from the '90's: the defense and protection of the integrity of both Dutch and NATO territory; the protection and fostering of the international legal order in the world; and supporting either national or international civil organizations in cases of disaster or humanitarian aid (Bomert, 2008, pp. 207-208 Kamerstukken II 26900 nr. 2, p. 53; NDD, 2005, p. 38).

Although justification of the use of force had to come from the UN's Security Council, the negative experience with the UNPROFOR mission broadened this view (Bomert, 2008, p. 208; Klep & van Gils, 2005). While the core objectives remain unchanged, the justification of the use of force has expanded to more ad-hoc coalitions led by NATO or large military nations like the US (Bomert, 2008, p. 208; Hellema, 2008, p. 202; NDD, 2005, p. 37, 39; Perre, 2018). The beginning of the '00 also marked the formulation of the first official military doctrine: *Nederlandse Defensie Doctrine 2005* (NDD). The doctrine states that the military is only one instrument to accomplish the set political goals of the state (NDD, 2005, p. 20). It is up to the political leadership which instrument or combination thereof is best suited to accomplish the state's strategic goals (NDD, 2005, p. 20). The doctrine explicitly mentions both the role of the military in relation to Dutch foreign affairs policy and the strong emphasis on its international action through organizations like NATO:

*The Dutch defense effort is aimed at the whole of security interests, the protection of the values and foreign political objectives. Our country has a significant interest in a stable and peaceful international environment, due to its high dependence on sound international relations and functioning security structures. The Netherlands executes an active peace and security policy. With this effort, our country*

*contributes to solutions to security issues in and outside of Europe, including remote places.*<sup>7</sup>

*Dutch Defense Doctrine, 2005, p. 36*

*NATO is the most important pillar of the Dutch security policy and embodies the transatlantic relationship. Positive transatlantic relations remain extremely important in the near future when our safety is concerned. ... The alliance is the crucial instrument in assuring our safety and security, including tackling any potential threat directly.*<sup>8</sup>

*Dutch Defense Doctrine, 2005, p. 37*

After the Second World War, the Netherlands participated in various military missions around the world exclusively operating under the banner of the UN (Klep, 2011, pp. 74-77). With missions to, e.g., Korea (1955-1953), Libanon (1985-1989) and Cambodia (1992-1993) the Dutch gained some experience with operating outside their own borders and in multi-state structures (Klep & van Gils, 2005). This changed after the UNPROFOR mission in the 1990's (Klep, 2011; Klep & van Gils, 2005; Wiebes, 2003). One of the fundamental issues of the UNPROFOR mission was the unclear, and consequently failing, mandate for UN troops to defend themselves, often attributed to the political complexities of the UN. This caused a change in the Dutch stance from preferably UN-issued missions to more pragmatic international ad hoc coalitions and international military organizations like NATO. The OEF and ISAF missions in Afghanistan endorse this new perspective.

#### *5.2.2 Hypothesis 1 - The Dutch Cabinet formulates its vision regarding the current international environment and documents how its military should preferably be used in a military doctrine.*

In the strategy document 'Defense Vision 2000' (Kamerstukken II 26900 nr. 2) preferences regarding the use of the Dutch military are clearly formulated. Primary goals are defending Dutch territory, international waters, and airspace; and second, the protection of human rights and the enforcement of international law and order. Generally, military action is seen as a last resort when other instruments like diplomatic or economic pressure have failed. If military measures are employed, the Dutch prefer to do this with NATO or European states, or for missions outside the European region, in the context

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<sup>7</sup> 'De Nederlandse defensie-inspanning is gericht op het geheel van veiligheidsbelangen, de bescherming van waarden en buitenlandse politieke doelstellingen. Ons land heeft groot belang bij een stabiele en vreedzame internationale omgeving, want het is in hoge mate afhankelijk van goede internationale betrekkingen en functionerende veiligheidsinstituten. Nederlands voert een actief vredes- en veiligheidsbeleid. Zo wil ons land een bijdrage leveren aan de oplossing van veiligheidsproblemen in en buiten Europa, ook op grotere afstand.' (NDD, 2005, p. 36).

<sup>8</sup> 'De NAVO is de belangrijkste pijler van het Nederlandse veiligheidsbeleid en belichtaamt de transatlantische band. Goede transatlantische betrekkingen blijven ook in de toekomst onontbeerlijk voor onze veiligheid. ... Het bondgenootschap is het belangrijkste middel om onze veiligheid te waarborgen en om in voorkomend geval elke dreiging in de kiem te smoren.' (NDD, 2005, p. 37).

of the UN. In addition, differentiation between the various international structures is done on the basis of the intensity of the mission, preferring NATO or an ad hoc coalition led by a substantial ally in higher levels of the intensity spectrum (Defense Vision 2000, p. 35-36).

*The Strategic concept, the political-military guide for the alliance, describes the new task as 'crisis management including crisis response operations'. This means, in particular, Europe and its direct environment. NATO shouldn't operate as the world's policeman. When initiating operations far from Europe, other international partnerships, like the UN or ad hoc coalitions, are more suited.*<sup>9</sup>

*Defense Vision 2000, p. 29*

International peace missions maintain a significant place in the defense policy of the Netherlands. The goal of upholding international law and protecting human rights ties into the preferred justification of the use of force as well. A military mission is justified when mandated by the UN with the goal of protecting international human rights or, in exceptional situations, to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. As is clearly formulated in the doctrine:

*Authorization by the Security Council is the preferred procedure, which is indisputable. Still, in certain situations, human rights are violated on such a large scale that an intervention by an ad hoc formed group of states has to be qualified as justified.*<sup>10</sup>

*Defense Vision 2000, p. 34*

Traces of the specific goals and justification are also found in the policy program of Cabinet Balkenende II, even formulating a military ambition (Defense Vision 2000, p. 42; Policy Program, 2003, p. 50). This ambition included providing troops for general defense of NATO territory as well as contributing troops to a maximum of four three-year peacekeeping missions (Defense Vision 2000, p. 42; Policy Program, 2003, p. 50).

The Dutch strategic culture is undoubtedly translated into specific military preferences. The predicted data of the military doctrine and strategy documents are indeed found in the empirical reality. Likewise, military preferences are formulated and documented. Consequently, it can be concluded that

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<sup>9</sup> 'Het Strategische concept, de politiek-militaire leidraad voor het bondgenootschap, omschrijft de nieuwe taak als «crisis management including crisis response operations». Dat betreft vooral Europa en onmiddellijke omstreken. De Navo moet zich niet als wereldwijde politieman opwerpen. Voor optreden ver van Europa komen andere samenwerkingsverbanden, zoals de VN of ad hoc coalities, meer in aanmerking.' (Defensie nota 2000, p. 29).

<sup>10</sup> 'Autorisatie door de Veiligheidsraad verdient de voorkeur, dat staat buiten kijf. Maar er kunnen situaties zijn waarin de rechten van de mens zó ernstig en massaal worden geschonden, dat ingrijpen op eigen gezag door een groep landen als gerechtvaardigd moet worden beschouwd.' (Defensie Nota 2000, p. 34).

support for the hypothesis is found. Although the presence of a defense doctrine and the policy program are unique to the hypothesis, it isn't strong enough to exclude alternative hypotheses.

### *5.2.3 Hypothesis 2 – The Dutch Minister of Defense sends the official notification to the Dutch Parliament.*

In line with the article 100 procedure<sup>11</sup>, Minister of Defense Kamp notifies the Parliament on June 16, 2005, of the Cabinets' willingness and exploration, together with the UK and Canada, to deploy troops to Uruzgan for the third stage of NATO's ISAF mission (Kamerstukken II 28676 nr. 22). As the Cabinet will not explore options for a mission that will not serve its interests, this notification implies state behavior aimed at the Dutch strategic goals. Furthermore, Minister Kamp is the only person in the position that has the authority to make such a decision and consequently report to the Parliament. Due to the high degree of uniqueness and certainty of the letter, it functions as strong evidence supporting the hypothesis and ruling out alternative hypotheses.

### *5.2.4 Hypothesis 3 – Intelligence is gathered by the MIVD before the military advice of the CDS is formulated as required by the "Toetsingskader 2001" framework.*

The details of the deployment and the cabinet's considerations regarding the deployment are specified in the military advice. The formulation process of the advice consists of three elements, as the NDD (2005) reads; the risk and threat analysis of the MIVD; the framework 'Toetsingskader 2001' (Kamerstukken II 23591 nr. 7); and the planning process of the CDS (NDD, 2005, pp. 42-43). As formulated in the doctrine, the analysis of the MIVD forms the basis of this process:

*At the grand strategy level, specific countries or regions are selected and prioritized that the MIVD has to monitor. By doing this, the MIVD fulfills a signaling function. In the conducted risk and thread analysis, the MIVD provides an overview of all the risks that are connected to the operation, like the terrain, the climate, and the consent of the involved conflicting parties with the operation. The conclusions of the analysis are used both while applying the Toetsingskader framework as well as in the operational planning of the operation<sup>12</sup>*

*Dutch Defense Doctrine, 2005, p. 42*

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<sup>11</sup> The article 100 procedure is introduced in 2000 by the *Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming Uitzendingen* (TCBU; or the commission Bakker named after its chair) after the Dutch experience in Bosnia. The procedure states that that Cabinet is obliged to inform Parliament of specific elements like the grounds and conditions by which its military are deployed if it's decided to do so. See Kamerstukken II 26 454.

<sup>12</sup> 'Op *grand strategy* niveau wordt vastgesteld welke landen of regio's met een bepaalde prioriteit door de MIVD gevolgd worden. In dit kader vervult de MIVD een signaalfunctie. In haar risico- en dreigingsanalyse geeft de MIVD een overzicht van alle risico's die verbonden zijn aan de operatie, als gevolg van onder meer de terreingesteldheid, het klimaat en de instemming door de betrokken conflictpartijen met de operatie. De uitkomsten van deze analyse worden zowel gebruikt bij het toepassen van het Toetsingskader als bij de operationele planning van de operatie.' (NDD, 2005, p. 42).

The procedure describes the chain of events that specifies the decision-making process. Starting with the intelligence analysis of the MIVD, the formulation of the operational needs of the operation are specified in the military advice. The NDD specifically states the responsibility of the CDS for the translation of the political goals into military goals and tactical planning (NDD, 2005, p. 20). Next, the decision should be formulated along the Toetsingskader 2001 framework. The framework provides specific pre-defined issues on which the Cabinet must motivate its decision, allowing Parliament to be kept informed of crucial matters. The CDS covers the military topics and operational details, policymakers detail the political issues like the justification relating to article 97, the mandate, other participating countries, and the possibility of influencing international decision-making (art. 100 Grondwet; Kamerstukken II 23591 nr. 7; NDD, 2005, pp. 42-43).

*The Toetsingskader (2001) Framework is used by the Cabinet and Parliament and encompasses several concerns that have to be reviewed in order to decide on the participation or deployment of Dutch troops to crisis control operations.<sup>13</sup>*

*NDD, 2005, pp. 42-43*

*Simultaneously with the review of the formulated goals, risks and other aspects of the operation, the Defense staff will – in case of a positive decision – see to the details of the Dutch deployment. The CDS's planning process yields a military advice to the Cabinet on the units, personnel, and material that can be offered.<sup>14</sup>*

*NDD, 2005, pp. 42-43*

With the available data, the sequence of events as formulated in the Toetsingskader 2001 framework can be established. The sequence is initiated with the notification letter of June 16, 2005 (Kamerstukken II 28676 nr. 22). The contents of this notification are brief yet sufficient to comply with the article 100 procedure. Next, the CDS will specify the operational planning by matching the intelligence conclusions and the available needs for the mission. On October 19, the MIVD sends an intelligence report on the security situation in the province of Uruzgan to the MoD (Grandia Mantas, 2015, pp. 130; Hazelbag, 2009, p. 15). This intelligence report sketched a critical and “alarming” picture of the security situation in Uruzgan (Grandia Mantas, 2015, pp. 130-131; Hazelbag, 2009, p. 15). Later, on November 17 that year, a second intelligence report was issued by the MIVD. This

<sup>13</sup> ‘Het Toetsingskader (2001) wordt gebruikt door de regering en Tweede Kamer en bevat een aantal aandachtspunten om te kunnen besluiten tot een deelname door eenheden van de Nederlandse krijgsmacht aan een crisisbeheersingsoperatie.’ (NDD, 2005, pp. 42-43).

<sup>14</sup> ‘Gelijktijdig met de toetsing van de doelstellingen, risico’s en andere kenmerken van de operatie wordt door de Defensiestaf bezien hoe – in het geval van een positief besluit over deelname – de Nederlandse bijdrage gestalte dient te krijgen. Het resultaat van het planningsproces CDS voor operaties is een advies van de CDS over de Nederlandse deelname aan de operatie: de eenheden, personeel en materieel, die kunnen worden aangeboden voor inzet.’ (NDD, 2005, pp. 42-43).

report summarizes analyses and conclusions of foreign intelligence partners (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 23; Kamerstukken II 27925 nr. 199, p. 1; Kitzen, 2016, pp. 363-364). Together, the two reports make up the general analysis of the MIVD, describing a general trend of a deterioration of the already dangerous security situation. With protecting the rebuilding operations and creating order and security in the region, casualties had to be expected (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 15). Initially, CDS Berlijn presented his military advice to the MoD Minister Kamp on October 27, qualifying the mission as “challenging, but feasible and justified” (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 15). The military operational plan is eventually incorporated into the final article 100 letter of December 22, 2005 (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 23; Kamerstukken II 27925 nr. 193):

*It is concerning a mission with real military risks. It has to be noted that the armed forces gained significant experience with and knowledge of dangerous missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which they completed successfully. Although the risk of Dutch casualties cannot be ruled out during the mission, the Cabinet is of the opinion that with the gained knowledge and experience, the structure and size of the Dutch detachment, and the reassurances regarding NATO's support and effort, these risks are reduced to such an extent that they justify the mission. Stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan is of great importance to expanding the international rule of law and the fight against international terrorism, which threatens Europe as well, specifically in the south as the birthplace of the Taliban. The Cabinet deems the risk to be acceptable, considering in particular the latter concern.*

*Kamerstukken II 27925 nr. 193, p. 3<sup>15</sup>*

With the article 100 letter, the sequence of events is completed. The four different events are sequenced accordingly to what is to be expected if the hypothesis were to be true. Yet the hypothesis is not exclusively supported by the given evidence and is not able to rule out any alternative hypotheses. Various data that supports alternative hypotheses is found. Already before the letter of notification of June 16th, 2005, certain limitations were communicated regarding a maximum of approximately 1,100 deployed troops, a maximum estimated budget of 320 million euros, and a preferred period of involvement of about two years (Grandia Mantas 2015, p. 125). Moreover, a

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<sup>15</sup> ‘Het betreft een missie met reële militaire risico’s. Daarbij dient te worden opgemerkt dat de krijgsmacht veel kennis en ervaring heeft opgedaan met riskante missies in onder meer Irak en Afghanistan en deze missies succesvol heeft uitgevoerd. Ofschoon niet kan worden uitgesloten dat bij de uitvoering van deze missie aan Nederlandse kant slachtoffers vallen, meent de regering dat met de opgedane kennis en ervaring, de opbouw en omvang van het Nederlandse detachement, en de verkregen verzekeringen inzake bijstand en inzet van de NAVO, deze risico’s zodanig zijn teruggebracht dat de missie verantwoord is. De stabilisering en wederopbouw van Afghanistan, in het bijzonder het zuiden waar de Taliban haar oorsprong vindt, is van groot belang voor de bevordering van de internationale rechtsorde en de bestrijding van het internationale terrorisme dat ook Europa bedreigt. Gezien vooral dat belang acht de regering deze risico’s aanvaardbaar.’ (Kamerstukken II 2005-2005 27925 nr. 193, p. 3)

discrepancy in the sequence is found between the notification letter of MoD Kamp dated June 16, 2005, and the conclusions of the first ‘fact finding mission’ (FFM) on June 14, 2005 (Grandia Mantas, 2015, pp. 126-127; Hazelbag, 2009, pp. 14-15; Klep, 2011, p. 22). Although the aim of this mission was to “gather information about the most desirable province for the deployment of Dutch troops”, the Dutch Commander of Operations (DOPS) Cobelens seemed conclusive in his preference for Uruzgan even before the FFM took place (Grandia Mantas, 2015, pp. 124-125). One source is found, stating that already in May 2005, the Dutch flag was seen pictured on a strategic map of the Uruzgan province at the ISAF headquarters in Kabul (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 14).

In addition, the operational planning of the mission had already started nearly nine months before the notification letter of June 16, 2005. In the fall of 2004, DOPS Cobelens received information that the UK had intentions of committing to a mission to the southern provinces of Afghanistan joined by “likeminded nations” (Grandia Mantas, 2015, p. 116). Following this, the DOPS started informal and explorative multilateral talks with the US, UK, and Canada on the possibilities of deployment in the southern provinces (Grandia Mantas, 2015, pp. 116-117; Willis, 2012, pp. 988-990). On January 20, 2005, the Steering Group Military Operations (SMO)<sup>16</sup> of the Dutch MoD was officially informed by DOPS on the ongoing talks with the British and the Canadians (Grandia Mantas, 2015, p. 117; Hazelbag, 2009, p. 11; 2016, pp. 141-142; Klep, 2011, pp. 20-21). On February 10, the talks concluded with an agreement between the Netherlands, UK, and Canada to explore the potential of a joint commitment to the ISAF Stage III (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 11; Grandia Mantas, 2015, p. 117). During this phase, the DOPS was in contact with one of the top MoF officials, Director of Political Affairs Siblesz, to reassure the ‘informal’ political backing (Grandia Mantas, 2015, pp. 118-119). It is important to note that these talks were executed on the states’ own behalf. While all being long-term members of NATO, the organization wasn’t involved in this stage of the planning (Grandia Mantas, 2015, p. 117).

After Ministers Kamp and Bot, MP Balkenende, the SMO and other high-level governmental officials involved met twice on May 3 and 24 to discuss a possible mission to Afghanistan, any commitment remained out (Grandia Mantas, 2015, p. 123; Hazelbag, 2009, p. 13). Instead, it was decided that, with the experience of the political tensions that rose with the parliamentary vote on the contribution of Dutch Special Forces to the OEF<sup>17</sup>, Minister Bot would probe within the Dutch Parliament for possible political backing (Grandia Mantas, 2015, p. 123; Hazelbag, 2009, p. 13). Unexpectedly, a broad political basis was found, prompting PM Balkenende and Ministers Kamp and

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<sup>16</sup> The Stuurgroep Militaire Operaties is a weekly intergovernmental meeting with the MoD, MoF and ministry of General Affairs, including the CDS and Directors of Political Affairs. This steering group is focused on the ongoing military operations and provides the ministries with advice on strategy and proposals on (ongoing) military operations (AIV, 2009, p. 39; Hazelbag, 2009, p. 11; Matthijssen, 2014, p. 234).

<sup>17</sup> One of the larger parties in the Parliament, the PvdA, unexpectedly voted against the contribution of the troops, (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 13; Klep, 2011, p. 22). In order to avoid such loss of face with the upcoming mission certain parties were probed for their support (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 13; Klep, 2011, p. 22).

Bot to decide on June 8, 2005, to continue the planning for a Dutch contribution (Hazelbag, 2009, pp. 13-14; Klep, 2011, p. 25). In addition to this, the conclusions of the first MIVD report were leaked to the press in November 2005 (Trouw, 18 November 2005; NRC Handelsblad, 18 November 2005). The reason for leaking this sensitive information could be that the MIVD was trying to get their conclusions known to the larger public as decision makers initially disregarded or neglected it. The MIVD could use the attention of the public and media to pressure the decisionmakers to take note of their conclusions and force them to incorporate them into the decision or article 100 letter.

From this evidence, a sequence of events can be reconstructed that significantly contrasts the hypothesized and expected sequence. It comes forward that before the decision-making procedure formally began, certain choices or preferences were guiding the process instead of the gathered intelligence. Regarding the ‘informal’ talks, the degree of ‘informality’ can be debated since the talks were executed at such a hierarchical prominent level that pure informality cannot be spoken of (Grandia Mantas, 2015, p. 117, note 20). With evidence supporting both the expected as well as alternative hypotheses, the hypothesized part of the mechanism cannot be confirmed.

#### *5.2.5 Hypothesis 4 - The Cabinet sends the article 100 letter to inform Parliament of its decision.*

On December 22, 2005, the article 100 letter was sent to the Cabinet by the Ministers Kamp and Bot (Kamerstukken II 27925 nr. 193). This parliamentary document is the actual account of the letter that is the expected and logical product that marks the end of the decision-making process. Therefore, the presence of the letter, including the military advice, causes the confidence in the hypothesis to increase. In the letter, the main motives and arguments that are brought forward to justify the participation in the ISAF mission are the contribution to the international war against terrorism and the dismantling of the Taliban. Such ambition also constituted one of the spearheads in the foreign policy of the Dutch cabinet (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 12), so the deployment is in line with the political and strategic goals of the Netherlands. Regarding the troop numbers, the article 100 letter states that 1,200 soldiers will be deployed.

#### *5.2.6 Hypothesis 5 – The Cabinet will motivate its decision and link it to the Dutch strategic goals.*

In the article 100 letter, the Cabinet provides multiple arguments for the Dutch participation in the ISAF mission. Overall, improving the security situation, reestablishing the local authorities, and providing the local people with a prosperous outlook are the given grounds for the deployment. The strategic goals of a stable legal order and the fight against international terrorism are explicitly linked with the motives for the deployment:

*The stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, specifically in the southern regions where the Taliban originates, is of great importance for the improvement*

*of the international rule of law and the fight against international terrorism that threatens Europe as well. With respect to this particular concern, the cabinet deems the risks acceptable.*<sup>18</sup>

*Kamerstukken II 27925 nr. 193, 2005, p. 3*

Intelligence isn't explicitly mentioned, but concluding from the military advice, the decision seems to be taken on an informed basis. The cabinet presumes that the Dutch military is capable and equipped enough to deal with the anticipated dangers, deeming them acceptable. Yet, several agreements with different allied states have been made for the provision of reinforcements or support:

*Although no guarantee can be given that no casualties will arise on the Dutch side, the Cabinet believes that with the gained experience, the size and structure of the Dutch detachment, and the received reassurances regarding reinforcement and the commitment of NATO, the risks are reduced to such a degree that it justifies the mission.*<sup>19</sup>

*Kamerstukken II 27925 nr. 193, 2005, p. 3*

The justification of the mission is coupled with the Dutch strategic goals of enforcing the world's rule of law and fostering the fight against international terrorism. Based on the available intelligence, the required resources are estimated and insight is provided regarding the relation between the means and the ends of the mission. This conclusion provides support for the formulated hypothesis being true, as the provided arguments are both unique and certain for the hypothesis. Yet, evidence supporting the alternative hypotheses is also found, which undermines the certainty of the expected evidence.

The different motivations for the deployment, found in the personal accounts of key officials involved, are not found in the article 100 letter. Since the end of the Cold War, the Dutch military apparatus has been transformed into a smaller expeditionary force (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 12; Klep, 2011, p. 24). The MoD argued the mission would pose an excellent opportunity for the Dutch military to gain experience in intense and risky environments. Although some experience with this new structure had been gained with missions to Bosnia and Iraq, the ISAF mission provided the possibility to conduct a "high operations" mission and, in addition, gain international commanding experience (Grandia Mantas, 2015, p. 119; Hazelbag, 2009, p. 12; Klep, 2011, p. 21). Furthermore, the MoD feared that the Dutch military would face new financial cutbacks driven by upcoming elections now

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<sup>18</sup> 'De stabilisering en wederopbouw van Afghanistan, in het bijzonder het zuiden waar de Taliban haar oorsprong vindt, is van groot belang voor de bevordering van de internationale rechtsorde en de bestrijding van het internationale terrorisme dat ook Europa bedreigt. Gezien vooral dat belang acht de regering deze risico's aanvaardbaar.' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2005 27925 nr. 193, 2005, p. 3).

<sup>19</sup> 'Ofschoon niet kan worden uitgesloten dat bij de uitvoering van deze missie aan Nederlandse kant slachtoffers vallen, meent de regering dat met de opgedane kennis en ervaring, de opbouw en omvang van het Nederlandse detachement, en de verkregen verzekeringen inzake bijstand en inzet van de NAVO, deze risico's zodanig zijn teruggebracht dat de missie verantwoord is.' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2005 27925 nr. 193, 2005, p.

that the SFIR mission in Iraq had ended and no new mission was planned. Although Minister of Defense Kamp explicitly denied this to be a motive (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 12).

Furthermore, the idea lived with the MoF that, from an international relations perspective, the mission could be used as a vehicle to advance Dutch foreign policy. It was thought that if its efforts in Afghanistan failed, the consequences would have been severe for both the continuation and effectiveness of NATO and for the Netherlands due to its strong international dependency (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 12). In addition, participation in the mission was seen as an opportunity to use it as leverage in (other) international diplomacy and negotiations (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 12). The MoF primarily stressed the importance and the positive impact on the relations due to the cooperation with states like Canada, the UK, and the US (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 13). By operating side by side with these states, the Netherlands presented itself as a trustworthy and reliable ally, and thereby gaining some international leverage, or by setting conditions for the Dutch contribution (Grandia Mantas, 2015, p. 114; Hazelbag, 2009, pp. 12-13; Klep, 2011, pp. 31-32).

*For the ministry of Foreign Affairs, different motivations regarding the mission, like geopolitics, the war against international terrorism, the diplomatic leverage potential of the commitment, and the multinational character of the mission, played a role. It must be noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was hesitant to commit to the deployment; more information was needed. In addition, ministerial officials questioned what implications the idea of 'not going' would inflict on the Dutch international relations with the US, the United Kingdom, and NATO, and the position of NATO Secretary-General J. de Hoop Scheffer.<sup>20</sup>*

*Hazelbag, 2009, pp. 12-13*

Concerning the security situation and assessment of the Uruzgan province, some discrepancies come forward supporting the alternative hypothesis. In the article 100 letter, the following is stated about the security situation in the province and the risks that Dutch troops would face:

*The risks that are related to the mission are substantial. It concerns a deployment in an area where the Dutch troops will encounter OMF [Opposing Military Forces]. Attacks aimed at patrols or logistical supply through the air or by road*

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<sup>20</sup> 'Voor Buitenlandse Zaken speelden dan ook andere beweegredenen zoals geopolitiek, de oorlog tegen het internationaal terrorisme, het hefboomeffect op internationaal niveau en het multilaterale kader van de missie. Opgemerkt moet worden dat Buitenlandse Zaken zich niet te snel aan de missie wilde committeren, eerst was meer informatie benodigd. Tevens vroegen functionarissen van Buitenlandse Zaken zich af wat 'niet gaan' voor consequenties zou kunnen hebben voor de Nederlandse betrekkingen met de VS, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de NAVO en de positie van secretaris-generaal van de NAVO J. de Hoop Scheffer.' (Hazelbag, 2009, pp. 12-13).

*and at bases of ISAF units have to be taken into account. ... the possibility that victims will fall on the Dutch side can't be ruled out.*<sup>21</sup>

*Kamerstukken II 27925 nr. 193, 2005, p. 12*

During the decision-making process, the security situation in the Uruzgan province deteriorated rapidly. The known intelligence report forecasted this and saw a continuing trend for the near future. Although the risks would potentially be greater than anticipated, no extra troops were made available. To remain within the a priori borders on troop numbers and budget but anticipating the situation, Ministers Kamp and Bot, together with CDS Berlijn, arranged multiple guarantees with NATO partners. For the plan to be successfully presented to Parliament, Minister Kamp formulated a list of sixteen mission critical conditions and requirements that had to be guaranteed, amongst them a continuing US presence and guaranteed NATO reinforcements (Grandia Mantas, 2015, p. 131; Hazelbag, 2009, pp. 17-18). It's not until the NATO summit on 8 December in Brussels and the visit of US Defense and State officials to the Hague on 30 November that all the formulated conditions and requirements are met and NATO partners are committed (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 19). The extra security reassurances provided by partners are only briefly mentioned in the article 100 letter.

Concluding, evidence supporting the fifth hypothesis has been found. The presence of the motives in the article 100 letter is unique to the formulated hypothesis, yet the certainty of the motives is unsettled. Evidence supporting alternative hypotheses reveals some misalignment between the reported intelligence and the military advice. After the intelligence warned of the security risks of the operation, the advice didn't change significantly, besides the external mitigating measures. Although the motives are unique to the hypothesis, the critical intelligence assessment; the unchanged military advice; and the intensive search for security guarantees strongly undermine the certainty of the data supporting the formulated hypothesis. Therefore, the hypothesis of the causal mechanism cannot be confirmed.

#### *5.2.7 Hypothesis 6 – The Cabinet maximizes parliamentary support by convincing opposition parties.*

The process of debating and gathering parliamentary support for the mission has already been initiated before the article 100 letter is sent to Parliament. It is 16 December, as the Cabinet's center-left party D'66 openly rejects the mission directly after Parliament is confidentially briefed by the CDS and Minister Kamp, undermining the supposed consensus in the Cabinet (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 20; NRC Handelsblad, 17 December 2005). After this, the opposition parties in Parliament assume the cabinet

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<sup>21</sup> 'De risico's die zijn gemeoid met deze missie zijn aanzienlijk. Het betreft een uitzending naar een gebied waar de Nederlandse troepen te maken zullen krijgen met de OMF. Rekening moet worden gehouden met aanvallen, zowel op patrouilles, als op de logistieke aanvoer door de lucht en over de weg, en op de bases van de ISAF-eenheden. ... [er] kan niet worden uitgesloten dat bij gevechtshandelingen aan Nederlandse zijde slachtoffers vallen.' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2005 27925 nr. 193, 2005, p. 12).

will not present any plan for the participation in the ISAF mission (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 20; NRC Handelsblad, 17 December 2005). In the following weeks, Minister Bot is tasked with convincing D'66 and regaining consensus. This results in a grammatical change in the article 100 letter as the procedure doesn't state that the word 'decision' has to be mentioned (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 21). On December 22<sup>nd</sup>, Parliament received the article 100 letter. The opposition was surprised and critical since the letter only stated the intention to participate and not the expected Cabinet decision (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 21-22; Klep, 2011, p. 24-25). This ambiguity becomes the main subject in the procedural parliamentary debates that follow. During the debates, the center-right CDA party successfully files a motion demanding the mission be approved by a two-thirds majority vote in the Parliament (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 22). After the December holidays, the permanent Committees on Defense and Foreign Affairs declare on January 17, 2006, the start of the final phase in the decision-making process, providing Parliament the possibility to debate and critically review the proposal for the mission (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 23). In addition to the regular consultations between the Permanent Committees and both ministers and the subsequent general debate (AO)<sup>22</sup>, a final hearing including a confidential briefing is scheduled to inform the Parliament of the risks of the mission and security measures taken (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 23). This extra briefing is not deemed sufficient for Parliament to make a weighted decision. As a result, it demands access to the military advice and the classified intelligence report via the permanent Committees. Hesitant to provide direct access to the reports, MoD Minister Kamp proposes several alternatives, like a closed-door briefing by the CDS and the MIVD and access through the oversight organ CTIVD<sup>23</sup> (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 23-24; Kamerstukken II 27925 nr. 198; nr. 199, p.1). After these unsuccessful attempts, Kamp informs the Parliament that the intelligence reports will be shared in an edited form to be inspected in confidence, together with a closed-door briefing of the Permanent Committee on Defense by the MIVD's director, the CDS, and Kamp himself on January 26, 2006 (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 23-24). In the final days of the decision-making process, Parliament receives a confidential briefing on the rules of engagement, interviews various experts and key people like former ISAF commander Py and the Afghani ministers of State and Defense during the final public hearing, and gathers with Ministers Kamp, Bot, and newly involved Minister of Development Cooperation van Ardenne for the AO to get its last questions answered (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 25-26). In the final vote, the majority approved the mission while only a small group voted against, including Cabinets' party D'66 (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 27; Kamerstukken II 27925 nr. 207, p. 2, 10-11, 15, 18-20).

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<sup>22</sup> Algemeen Overleg (AO) is the most common type of committee meeting. In this meeting a minister or state secretary deals with certain aspects of the policy proposal at hand. Members of the committee provide questions to the responsible minister, who has to respond. See <https://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/committee-meetings>

<sup>23</sup> Commissie voor Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten is the governmental oversight body tasked with auditing the operations of both Dutch intelligence services. See <https://www.ctivd.nl/over-ctivd>.

Concluding the last part of the causal mechanism, the debate regarding the mission did take place in Parliament. The Cabinet did search for majority support for their decision. The exchange of arguments between the Cabinet and the opposition parties resulted in enough confidence from various parties in Parliament to support the decision. The certainty and uniqueness of the data confirm the formulated hypothesis.

#### *5.2.8 Variable Y – Positive decision on participation military mission.*

The dependent Y variable is the positive decision regarding the Dutch participation in the ISAF mission to the Uruzgan province. As is shown with the previous hypothesis, the Dutch Cabinet decides positively on the mission with even the two-thirds majority vote that was demanded by the CDA party in the Cabinet. The debate with the positive conclusion is found in the record of the final debate on February 2, 2006 (Handelingen nr. 45, 3013-3035).

## **5. Conclusion**

With the analysis of the evidence found in the two cases, the confidence in the presence of the hypothesized mechanism can be assessed. This starts with the analysis of the theorized assumptions of the mechanism in each case. This is followed by the answering of the four sub questions, explaining these gaps in the mechanism. In turn, these will lead to the answering of the main research question. Then some limitations of this thesis will be noted and discussed, ending the chapter with some proposals for future research.

The causal mechanism in the Bosnian case experiences tension with the majority of the hypotheses, except for the first and fourth. The confidence in the presence of the other hypotheses can't be raised, mainly due to the existence of evidence supporting alternative hypotheses. Therefore, it can't be stated that the causal mechanism irrefutable took place as theorized, and rejection is more apt. Important for the research question, strong evidence is found supporting the alternative hypothesis on the consulting of intelligence. The presumed missing of the risk and threat analysis has a great impact on the confidence that intelligence was adequately included in the decision-making process.

The mechanism of the Uruzgan case experiences only tension with the third hypothesis, the sequence leading to the military advice, and the fifth, the justification of the mission. With the former hypothesis, the specific necessary sequence of events is found. Alternative evidence reveals events before and after this sequence that undermine the hypothesis. The defined limitations that were set prior to the start of the sequence consequently disqualify the goal and effectiveness of intelligence. The confidence in the latter hypothesis can't be assessed as evidence is found for alternative justification and motivation of the mission. Like the third hypothesis, gathered and disseminated intelligence isn't able to generate any real change in the final military advice, causing a misalignment

between the means and end. Due to the unconvincing evidence supporting the formulated hypotheses, the proposition that intelligence was adequately included in this decision-making process is weak.

## **5.1 Dutch strategic culture and intelligence culture**

### *5.1.1 How can the strategic culture and the strategic preferences of the Netherlands be described during the time of the selected cases?*

The strategic culture of the Netherlands in the selected cases developed along with the changing international relations. With the end of the Cold War, the strategic environment of the Netherlands suddenly changed significantly, calling for a reorientation of its international role and position. Mainly due to the destruction of its capabilities after WWII, Europe leaned heavily on the military capability and protection of the US during the Cold War. In terms of the Netherlands' strategic culture, this resulted not only in its economic reliance on its international environment, but also in the protection and advancement of its own interests. With the dissolution of a shared enemy, this reassurance by larger military powers like the US disappeared. The Netherlands was again bound to stand on its own feet.

Overall, the Dutch prosper from stable international relations. As a relatively small power in the larger environment, achieving and maintaining such an environment is demanding. As they are constitutionally bound to the protection of human rights, the Dutch see themselves as the protagonists of the international rule of law but are hesitant to pick up the glove themselves due to their limited capabilities compared to larger powers like the US, UK, France, or Germany. This makes the Netherlands an active player on international forums like the UN, NATO, EEG, and WEU, often calling for action and appealing to the proclamation and protection of human rights. Moreover, this can be summarized as the preferred manner in which the Dutch exercise their power. The human rights argument is used to gain weight against larger powers, preferably of Atlanticist nature, leveraging their capacities to secure or protect Dutch interests, at the cost of a smaller Dutch effort.

### *5.1.2 How was intelligence considered and assessed by the involved decisionmakers in the selected cases?*

As both cases are of the most-likely kind, the similarities ought to be vast, yet various nuances in the utilization and appreciation of intelligence during the decision-making process are found. The most obvious difference is either the presence or lack of intelligence in the decision-making process. In the Bosnian case, intelligence was only marginally involved in the military planning and general decision-making, whereas in the Uruzgan case, the MIVD actively played a role in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the majority of the intelligence used in the Bosnian case was produced by various departmental intelligence services, which had a more narrow focus on their specific domain. The central MID service, tasked with creating and organizing an overall integrative intelligence capability, lacked its own sources, means for gathering regional intelligence, and enough skilled personnel to produce qualitative analysis for decisionmakers. In the Uruzgan case, the MIVD

produced reports of sufficient quality, assessing the risks and threats accompanied with the deployment and mission.

Another noteworthy difference is the reach of the services and their products. In the Uruzgan case, the reports of the MIVD reached the CDS and all the way up to the ministers, being directly used in the decision-making process. The intelligence products in the Bosnian case, produced by the departmental services, were solely communicated to the CDS and the military officials. Key political officials like the Minister of Defense did receive intelligence reports on a regular basis, yet no specific assessment on the mission ever reached this echelon of the decisionmakers. The intelligence reports that the MID produced got stranded halfway through the hierarchical lines, either due to bureaucratic turf wars with the departmental intelligence services or because they simply never were sent to the decisionmakers.

Additionally, intelligence was appreciated differently in both cases. Both the top military officials and the Minister of Defense in the Bosnian case stated that intelligence was of limited use and had marginal impact on their perspectives and the overall decision-making process. The quality of the assessments was rated as being poor. Accompanied with a disapproving stance towards the use of intelligence in UN mandated missions, this resulted in the reports being marginalized. In the Uruzgan case, intelligence played a more significant role and achieved more impact on the decision-making process, although it wasn't appreciated by the decisionmakers. Before the formal decision-making process started, specific limitations on the deployment were formulated. The MIVD's assessments that followed strongly questioned these preliminary limitations, complicating the ongoing decision-making process as the Dutch had already communicated a far-reaching commitment to the deployment within these boundaries. Furthermore, the foreseen risks and threats by the MIVD confirmed the concerns roaming Parliament and the Dutch media. Yet a thorough follow-up on the MIVD's assessment with appropriate measures would likely extend the demand over the available resources. Intelligence was gathered and consulted, yet the impression that was left that this was done only to check the checkbox in the process and not to fine tune the requirements of the deployment, as this would exceed the formulated limitations. Considering the case's timeline, the intelligence reports slowed down the decision-making process. The Cabinet was faced halfway with political and public pressure not to take risks, due to the leaked intelligence assessments. On the other hand, international partners pressured them to hold up the Dutch end of the bargain. Eventually, in the military advice given by the CDS and final decision by the MoD, the majority of the security concerns raised in the intelligence assessments were either mitigated with guarantees from other involved states or toned down. Now the Cabinet was able to stay committed to the deployment and its international partners, not losing too much face with their own citizens by having paid attention to the mentioned risks and threats, and remaining within the set boundaries.

### *5.1.3 How did intelligence assessments compare to the influence of other factors in shaping Dutch decision-making to deploy military force in the selected cases?*

In the decision-making process to exercise military force, various factors are at play that influence the outcome of the process. Besides the role of intelligence, the current balance of the civil-military divide plays a clear role. In both cases, the civil side of the divide had the primary initiative, setting the policy priorities and selecting military force as the right vehicle to accomplish goals, including the degree of force used. In the Bosnian case, the initial incentive for the mission was both the political and societal pressure to ‘do more’ in Bosnia, mainly caused by the presumed reported human rights violations. From the evidence, it becomes clear that the military element was subject to the civil side of the leaders. The military had issues with the UN mandate and goal of the mission as a whole, arguing a more robust deployment was necessary to be successful. Furthermore, the Netherlands continually called upon the international community to increase its intervening efforts as human rights were violated. When it came to the UN’s call for troops, it had to practice what it had preached. Primarily driven by the MoF, the Netherlands had to step up as an example for other states, as declining would result in losing political face as such a strong proponent of intervention. Here, the policy goal of being internationally relevant, connected to the stabilization of the world order, is placed first, even surpassing the goal of the protection of human rights, although this seemed to provide a sufficient argument to justify the deployment.

In the Uruzgan case, the civil side dominated the decision-making process similarly. The MoF and MoD, although the latter in more nuanced form, saw an opportunity to gain international leverage by commanding the ISAF mission. By acting at this level, the Netherlands could demonstrate its reliability and relevancy to larger powers and former protectors like the US and UK. Still, the mission was sold as a reconstruction mission, focused on rebuilding general society and infrastructure in the province. This ties into the strategic goal of striving for a stable economic environment, especially as the Western world faced a new terrorist threat since the September 11th attacks. It was unclear if the advised military plan was able to provide the necessary security to enable any reconstructing activities as the security situation in the province deteriorated. The already set limitations to the deployment, before any intelligence or assessment of the mission area and goals were made clear, show the policy domination over the decision-making process. This becomes even more clear when the intelligence reports of the MIVD urge significant changes in the proposed deployment plan and this information is seemingly neglected. The extra guarantees that are asked from the partners, notably the US, do not cost the Dutch anything extra, besides some political leverage or trust.

The effects of the diplomatic and economic measures taken by the UN, EU, and NATO to stop the violence remained out. The strategic preferences in both cases say the use of force should only be used as a last resort. This preference, combined with the civil domination in the decision-making process, resulted in the policy goals prevailing over the military arguments against the proposed deployment. Especially in the Uruzgan case, this comes to the forefront in the discussion on the nature

of the mission: it being a rebuilding or fighting mission. Furthermore, the shift in the military's primary tasks from territorial defense to expeditionary deployment is intertwined with interventionist dominance in both cases. As a result, the use of force becomes a more logical vehicle for civil interventionist policies than for military realpolitik proponents.

#### *5.1.4 How does the strategic culture or the strategic preferences of the Netherlands influence the way intelligence is viewed?*

In both cases, decisions about participating in and deploying troops to an international mission are guided by strategic culture and preferences. Instead of supporting the decision-making process, intelligence is often seen as a hindrance, complicating the accomplishment of strategic goals. In addition, intelligence is often seen as only spotlighting inabilities instead of providing information on possible weaknesses in policy or future plans. With such insights, plans can be fine-tuned to be more effective, preventing expected threats and avoiding potential disasters.

In the analyzed cases, intelligence isn't placed in a position to support the decision-making process. In the Bosnian case, the intelligence, as little as it was, was viewed as only reflecting the lack of capacity of the government and its military forces to react to the violations of human rights and international law. By pointing out issues and risks in the military operation and appealing for more resources than available at the time. Such action was expected by the international community due to the supporting statements and consequently demanded by Parliament. As the strategic goals of the Netherlands called for the military deployment to Bosnia, intelligence wasn't used to optimize and fine tune the decision-making process in terms of needed resources and optimizing the means to the ends of such a mission.

In the Uruzgan case, intelligence was seen as well as the bearer of bad news. Similar to the Bosnian case, the Dutch capabilities for the proposed mission fell short compared to the required capabilities for successfully completing the mission. In this case, the maximum available resources were already set before any requirements based on the actual risk and threat assessments could be formulated. It was thought that the Dutch would 'get a seat at the table' by taking and successfully executing a leading role in the ISAF mission. When the intelligence services were consulted, they pointed to significant threats to the goals of the rebuilding mission. The proposed resources wouldn't be sufficient to complete the mission as portrayed. As the intelligence assessments advised negatively on the initial plan, the Dutch had to either back out of their commitment or significantly use more resources, with the consequent potential of political and/or public disapproval. In short, with the current deployment plan, the mission wouldn't succeed in what it was communicated to be aimed at. Therefore, it is questionable if the mission was ever aimed at the strategic goals at all.

### *5.1.5 Dutch strategic culture and the role of intelligence*

With the previous observations, the main research question can be answered. The strategic culture of the Netherlands has a clear international focus, aiming at creating and maintaining a stable international environment that promotes Dutch economic prosperity. As a small power compared to the international community, the Netherlands could achieve and maintain relevancy through strong ties with larger powers. In particular, the Atlanticist relationship is important when it concerns security. Other notable elements of the strategic culture are the constitutional obligations for the protection of human rights and the enforcement of world order, both of which tie into this international focus. The Dutch prefer to achieve their strategic goals by nonviolent or nonmilitary means, yet if all alternative options are exhausted, the use of force could be used as a last resort.

In both cases, the military deployments are exercised as vehicle for policy that is aimed at the achievement of the strategic goals. It can be stated in both cases that reaching these strategic goals became the aim in itself, rather than the process of how to achieve them. This is the result of ‘moving too quickly’ on the policy side and surpassing the capacity, ability, or availability of the Dutch military. In both cases, the intelligence assessment called for more resources, conflicting with the actual capacity: the lack of available troops in the Bosnian case and the prematurely set policy constraints in the Uruzgan case. Intelligence is included in both decision-making processes, though it comes late to the party. In the process, intelligence is not posited as such, that its insights are the initial outset of the planning or even, in the ideal situation, the exploration of possibilities for a mission. This belated inclusion of intelligence can be credited to civil policy domination over the decision-making process.

As a consequence of this, intelligence in both cases is not received and used for the alignment of the available means and perceived goals. This comes distinctly forward in the Bosnian case. First, the military leaders, more or less, look down upon the received intelligence. Mainly due to the quality of the reports, which is attributed to the lack of capabilities and sources of the MID and the competition with the departmental intelligence services. Still, the military leaders, just like the intelligence services, agreed on the unfeasibility of the mission. Second, the policymakers continued planning and organizing the deployment without taking into account the consequences and needs that flowed from the undecided location of the mission and without ordering a thorough risk assessment. Although the Uruzgan case differs from the Bosnian case, mainly due to the lessons learned with the latter mission, intelligence still wasn’t able to live up to its ability. Whereas the military leaders and intelligence in the Bosnian case did somewhat agree on the main conclusion, the military leaders and intelligence in the Uruzgan case differed more. The general plan for the mission was concluded before the decision-making process formally started, illustrating the civil domination as the motivations for the mission were presumably driven by the policy goals of the MoF. Notable in this case is the role of key military leaders included in the decision-making process that, contrary to the more operational military leaders, followed the pace of the civil leaders. With the general limitations in both length,

numbers, and funds set for the mission, intelligence got locked out of both its input and its function. Although the MIVD was more distinctly included in the process, the civil leaders judged its output as complicating the decision-making process. The initial limitations on the mission remained set, and with regard to the intelligence reports, guarantees were sought with other actors instead of maintaining ownership over the risks and needed measures.

On the question of to what extent the Dutch strategic culture influenced the role of intelligence, it can be stated that it had a significant influence. Specifically, the achievement of the formulated strategic goals in the studied cases, reflecting the strategic culture, prevailed over how these goals are about to be achieved. As a result, intelligence was not posited, adopted, and valued as it should be in a decision-making process for it to be effective. In both cases, the intelligence services were placed on the military side of the civil-military divide, where the civil domination caused intelligence's voice to get lost or suppressed by the fact that the military had to execute the mission by the policy standards. When intelligence later in the process did come into the picture, its input was either neglected, as in the Bosnian case, or seen as a complicating factor, like in the Uruzgan case.

To summarize, the strategy element of Dutch intelligence culture can be described as having a strong influence on how intelligence is seen, done, received, and used. With a clearly international strategic culture accented by the Atlanticist relationship; a strong interventionist preference regarding the use of force; decision-making processes dominated by civil policy; and the placement of intelligence within the military apparatus, Dutch intelligence is often too late included in the decision-making process to be seen as a welcome participant, and its output only mediocly included in the military planning.

### **5.3 Limitations**

Although the current research provides insights into the relationship between Dutch intelligence and strategic culture as part of this intelligence culture, some limitations have to be taken into account when interpreting the results. As with intelligence studies research in general, the issue of secret information is present in this thesis as well. The sources that form the basis of this research are public or declassified governmental data. Some data from primary sources may or could not be included in the research since these documents or accounts are still classified. When this data becomes public or accessible, possibly the results, relations, or consequences stated in this thesis are falsified. Although further confirmation could be possible as well, complete reliability of the results remains a subject of critical review in research in this field.

A second note on this research is the generalization of the results. As already mentioned, the method of process tracing at a within-case level doesn't produce results that can be generalized across different cases. The main focus of this thesis is testing the hypothesized mechanism of the influence of strategic culture on intelligence as one element of intelligence culture, thereby opening the black box

of the relation between these concepts. The results of this research do say something about the included cases, but no overarching conclusions can be drawn.

A third limitation is the choice not to conduct interviews with key figures in each case. Written sources like official governmental documents, personal accounts, and scientific literature provide a wealth of data, information, and insights. Still, by using only one kind of data, potential valuable data might be missed or lost. As the method of process tracing is a qualitative kind of research, conducting interviews with key figures can provide a significant amount of data. Many discussions, choices, deliberations, and motivations are not documented in the official records. Such information could provide more insights, providing a more detailed and nuanced view of the events and actions that compose the relationship studied here.

#### **5.4 Future research**

This research is an attempt to shed more light on the relation between strategic culture and intelligence culture. This relationship is relatively understudied, despite being frequently mentioned as an influential and foundational factor of both state behavior and, above all, intelligence culture. The mainly theorized role of intelligence is empirically tested in the Dutch context by tracing two decision-making processes regarding military deployment. In addition, its relation with strategic culture as an element of its intelligence culture, is deconstructed as well. Continuing this research, a more in-depth approach with interviews and full access to the classified documents and information would be able to find more subtle details and provide more nuanced results.

Further research into the strategic culture-intelligence link is needed, specifically from a Dutch perspective. Primarily, since the Netherlands has a strong international strategic focus, joined by its history with intelligence. Placed in the current strategic timeframe, with a shift in the balance of international power and an increase in multinational action, both concepts are in the spotlight. Furthermore, a longitudinal study of the Dutch intelligence culture could provide more clarity on the different factors that influence it, its degree of presence, and its pace of change and adaptation. Such an approach could also be applied to military decision-making processes in order to find any characteristics of intelligence culture that influence these processes.

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
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## Abbreviations

CDS	Chief of Defense ( <i>Commandant der Strijdkrachten</i> )
CTIVD	Commission on the Supervision of the Intelligence and Security ( <i>Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten</i> )
DOPS	Director of Operations, Ministry of Defence ( <i>Directeur Operaties, Ministerie van Defensie</i> )
EEC	European Economic Community ( <i>Europese Economische Gemeenschap</i> )
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ( <i>Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa</i> )
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MP	Minister President or Prime Minister ( <i>Minister President</i> )
MIVD	Military Intelligence and Security Service ( <i>Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst</i> )
MoD	Ministry of Defence ( <i>Ministerie van Defensie</i> )
MoF	Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( <i>Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken</i> )
NIOD	NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide studies ( <i>NIOD Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies</i> )
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( <i>Noord Atlantische Verdrags Organisatie</i> )
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OMF	Opposing Military Forces
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
SMO	Steeringgroup Military Operations ( <i>Stuurgroep Militaire Operaties</i> )
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations ( <i>Verenigde Naties</i> )
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union ( <i>West-Europese Unie</i> )

# Appendix A



## Appendix B

