Growing Dissent in the Council's Voting Behaviour: Consensus within the Council remains the Norm

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January 2023

Leiden University
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs
MSc Public Administration – International & European Governance

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Master thesis
Legislative Politics in the European Union
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Abstract

This thesis looks at the effects politicization has on the voting behaviour of the Council of the European Union since the migration crisis of 2015. Three different levels of the chain of delegation are investigated: the popular level, the domestic political-party level and the Council level. The analysis is based on different datasets from 2010 until 2019. In the analysis, it becomes clear that it is unable to conclude from the data whether Euroscepticism has increased among EU citizens. Furthermore, within political parties, dissent has, in general, not increased and the position on European integration has not become more Eurosceptic. This thesis confirms that within the Council's voting behaviour, dissent has increased. Nonetheless, according to their voting behaviour, consensus within the Council remains the norm. The future might be fragile and might show more Eurosceptic parties entering the Council and projecting their dissent towards European integration.

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Introduction

Reading the newspapers nowadays, we can always find an article written about the European Union (EU). Being it a news article about new policy developments, or a public opinion article. Especially after the multiple crises we have experienced in Europe in the last decades (Eurozone, migration, Brexit and Covid crisis), negative opinions about the EU have increased and dissent towards the EU has become more visible. This dissent, which is often expressed in the form of Euroscepticism, is also visible in domestic politics.

Domestic Politics

Political parties without previous government experience, also called challenger parties, have been on the rise across the EU and have reshaped politics. An example of an EU member state where challenger parties have gained success is France. During the 2017 presidential elections Macron's newly-formed La Republique En Marche! And Marine Le Pen's radical right party Rassemblement National (previously named Front National) made it to the run-off instead of the mainstream Socialist Party or Conservative Party. France is not the only member state where far-right populist parties have entered the political arena. In Spain, VOX won a quarter of the votes during the 2019 elections. In Italy Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) won over the centre-left Democratic Party in 2018 (De Vries & Hobolt, 2020). Additionally, Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy) has been challenging the Italian parliament since the elections of 2013 (Donà, 2022). Nonetheless, the EU citizens and political parties have always been pro-European overall, and there are cases where Eurosceptic parties actually lost electoral popularity. German far-right Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland is faced with the lowest voter popularity levels since the previous German federal elections in 2017 (De Vries & Hobolt, 2020).

EU Citizens

Since the 1990s, affairs and issues in, and about, the EU have become politicized and have left the era of permissive consensus behind and entered the era of constraining dissensus (See Hooghe & Mark, 2008). It is by now acknowledged that further European integration will depend on the support from the EU citizen and is not solely determined by the political elite (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). A term that has gained prominence over the years with politicization is that of 'Euroscepticism,' which expresses the aversion towards the EU and European integration (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). It is concluded that citizens' attitudes towards

the EU are a base to understand voting behaviour in European politics, be it at the domestic level or at the EU level (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010)(Kneuer, 2018). One of the first examples of politicization in the EU where dissent was expressed towards European integration was the draft of the European Constitution in 2005 that failed to get adopted. The Constitution was introduced to legitimise the EU. By politicizing and democratizing the EU the political leaders tried to give the EU citizens a feeling that they were part of the EU. The introduction of the European Constitution eventually failed because the French and Dutch populations did not vote in favour of the European Constitution in de referenda held in 2005. Some of the reasons for the failure did not even have to do anything particular with the content of the Constitution according to Moravcsik (2006) who wrote that immigration could have been one of the reasons for voters in France and the Netherlands to have voted against the referendum. Moravcsik (2006) predicted that immigration could also play a role in the future of European integration. Nowadays the issue of immigration is high on the political agendas in the member states and Brussels. Especially since the migration crisis of 2015, when member states had to allocate large numbers of refugees with culturally different backgrounds, it caused a rise in support of nationalist parties that tend to be Eurosceptic and against immigration.

Public Opinion

Since the 1990s, and the beginning of politicization, EU citizens' public opinion has changed. Research has shown that the position of political parties on European integration heavily depends on the support of its citizens. Consequently, voting behaviour in the Council of the European Union (hereafter called the Council) is also influenced by public opinion. (Hosli et al., 2011)(Hoeglinger, 2015). The Council always has been portrayed as a fortress in Brussels where decisions are being taken behind closed doors. Nonetheless, the Council is a crucial step in the decision-making process, which means that the way they vote on EU legislation determines EU policy outcomes and thus influences the daily lives of its citizens (European Union, n.d.). Since the 1990s politicization has been taking place and policy issues have become more dependent on support from EU citizens. At the same time, during the last decade, multiple crises took place in Europe which have worked as a catalyser for far-right Eurosceptic parties to mobilise public opinion in their favour of them (Hooghe & Marks, 2009)(Kneuer, 2018).

Research Question

Euroscepticism can be seen as a threat to further European integration and is therefore important to research. The research question for this thesis is, therefore:

What are the effects of politicization on council voting behaviour since the migration crisis of 2015?

To investigate what the effects of politicization are on the Council level, this research first started at the domestic level investigating citizens' support towards the EU. This is because the citizens are the voters who determine what political actors get elected and eventually end up in government representing the member state in the Council.

Why this research focused on the time of the migration crisis is because of multiple reasons. First, the migration crisis, with its peak in 2015, is chosen over the Eurozone crisis because the latter resulted in the deepening of European integration and depoliticization in some respects, whereas the migration crisis did not lead to any deepening of integration (Schimmelfennig, 2018). Secondly, data and research are more available on the migration crisis than on, for example, the Covid pandemic. Lastly, Brexit did not affect every member state on such a broad scale as the migration crisis. The migration crisis is not discussed in detail in this thesis but takes a role as a catalyser for the mobilisation of public opinion.

Furthermore, the terms Euroscepticism and dissent are used interchangeably since in some cases it is too complicated to determine whether political actors are positioning themselves as Eurosceptic or for other reasons. With dissent, we understand any form of internal division within political parties on European integration. In voting behaviour, this can be expressed as voting against a decision or abstaining from the vote (Gabel & Scheve, 2007).

This research made use of quantitative data sets to assemble data on public opinion on the citizen level, EU positioning on the domestic political level, and finally, on voting behaviour in the Council. With the help of the data, the proposed hypotheses are confirmed or rejected. It needs to be made clear that the scope of this research does not go further than to see whether it is visible from the data whether dissent is increasing in Europe because of politicization. This research has not taken a closer look at specific member states but, instead, wanted to see if the general trend in the EU shows that it is becoming more Eurosceptic on the domestic and European level.

The structure of this research is as follows, first, the academic debate on the topics involved is set out. This is followed by the theoretical framework where the elements necessary are defined and conceptualised. In the second chapter, the research design is explained and the operationalisation of the concepts. The third chapter gives an extensive analysis of the data found and either confirms or rejects the hypotheses. Lastly, the conclusion gives a brief overview of the whole research and gives answers to the research questions. The conclusion will also articulate the limitations of this research.

Chapter 1 Literature Review & Theoretical Framework

1.1 Literature Review

The three main theories used in the literature on European integration are neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). The years before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, are often called as the years of *permissive consensus*, where the elite determined the route of European integration. From the 1990s onward, the years might be described as *constraining dissensus*, where EU affairs entered mass politics and became dependent on the support of EU citizens. The terms permissive consensus and constraining dissensus come from Hooghe and Marks (2008) article on *"A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration"*. In this article, they develop the school of postfunctionalism which gives a new perspective on studying European integration. After the publishing of this article, many scholars have used this work in their studies and based their work solely on this theory, arguing that intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism do not reach far enough to explain the concept of politicization (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, 2019)(Schmitter, 2008) (Boomgaarden et al., 2011)(Börzel & Risse, 2018) (Kuhn, 2019). Consequently, because the article by Hooghe and Marks (2008) is seen as the founding article of postfunctionalism, most articles published after 2008 on postfunctionalism, base their theory on the same work which can be seen as weakly argued. Furthermore, when investigating the literature, it is noticeable that many scholars use the same sources to support their theories, which means that eventually, one is researching the same literature and data and no new data or insights are added.

Politicization is arguably one of the most researched and discussed concepts in the literature on the EU today (Hurrelmann et al., 2015). EU affairs are not an issue of exclusively the elite anymore, but rather have entered mass politics. European integration now depends on the support of EU citizens in order to achieve policy outcomes. In the literature, the study of politicization and public attitudes concerning European integration has gained importance. This has gone hand in hand with increased awareness of the significance of public opinion for the legitimacy of European integration (Boomgaarden et al., 2011)(Schmitter, 2008)(Kuhn, 2019).

Boomgaarden et al. (2011) argue that studying the attitudes towards the EU is important to understand voting behaviour in relation to the EU and national politics. De Wilde (2014) even goes as far as to say that European integration has become more controversial over time and that this causes the elite to feel more pressure. Before, European integration was a process

done by the political elite who were driven to seek autonomy and policymaking by isolating the EU institutions and policies that came from bottom-up (Schimmelfennig, 2020). Nowadays this has changed. For example, Hagemann et al. (2017) found that governments are more inclined to oppose legislation on the EU level when the issue is gaining salience in domestic politics.

Where Schmitter (2008) argues that one cannot ignore that politicization has occurred since the late 1980s, do Hurrelmann et al. (2015) and Schimmelfennig (2020) agree that politicization did happen and that a growing amount of literature on researching the EU argues that European integration has become politicized among EU's population. However, they argue, that it might not have reached everyone in society, and might have not reached further than the political and societal elites. Moreover, they ask to what extent politicization is the same phenomenon substantively and geographically. Politicization is often times researched as either being present or absent in the EU, or either beneficial or problematic for European integration (Hurrelmann, et al. (2015) (Schimmelfennig, 2020). Therefore, this thesis will research whether politicization has increased in the last years as research by Rauh and Zürn (2016) suggests. Furthermore, the theory of postfunctionalism has formed the definition of politicization as being a domestic level process constraining actors on the EU level. It is therefore also mostly analysed on the domestic level (Schimmelfennig, 2020). Literature on postfunctionalism and politicization usually takes a bottom-up perspective and focuses only on one side of the politicization of European integration within the agencies of EU-level actors (de Wilde & Zürn, 2012)(Schimmelfennig, 2020). Recent literature focuses more on individual EU actors, certain stages in the policy-making process, or particular issues.

Hurrelmann et al. (2015) voice critique arguing that most existing literature on politicization is not clear in distinguishing the arenas politicization may occur, and which member states experience more politicization in domestic politics. They argue that politicization has been limited to certain fundamental European integration questions and only has achieved moderate saliency among the broader EU citizenry.

To fill this gap in the literature, this thesis researched the standpoint of the EU citizens on the EU, whether they think the EU is something good, bad, or neither. Furthermore, it researched whether dissensus regarding EU affairs has increased in domestic politics and if Eurosceptic populist parties have gained votes.

Older literature, before the theory of postfunctionalism, on European integration makes use of the term "support in the European Union" (Duch & Taylor, 1997), whereas in recent years,

studies refer to Euroscepticism when studying attitudes towards the EU (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010)(Kneuer, 2018). However, in the literature, EU support and Euroscepticism are terms that are used interchangeably which can cause confusion and can be misleading (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). Hooghe and Marks (2007) research the sources of Euroscepticism. Unfortunately, their research does not examine Euroscepticism within institutions of the EU; only externally. The next part of this thesis elaborates more on the notion of Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic political parties.

In addition, in the earlier days of European integration, identity politics and cultural identity did not play a significant role as it does now since the integration process was elite-driven, unpoliticised and isolated from the masses (Kuhn, 2019). This has changed nowadays, and theory shows that within postfunctionalism, collective identities are a centre topic which is used to research the causes and consequences of European identity and integration (Kuhn, 2019). Kuhn, (2019) argues that Eurobarometer data shows that the share of people with exclusively a nationalist identity slowly decreases over the past few years. This data, however, only goes up to 2017. Kneuer (2018) researched whether populist-Eurosceptic parties gained votes after the crises in the EU. Her conclusion about the effect of the migration crisis is limited by the availability of data at that time. Therefore, the current thesis repeated part of her research since more data is readily available as more elections have taken place since 2015.

A last aspect of this research is the timeframe of this study, which is around the migration crisis of 2015. In the last couple of years, there have been multiple researchers studying the crises (Euro crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic) that took place in the EU in the past decades, and more importantly, how this affected integration and politicization within the EU (Börzel & Risse, 2018)(Kuhn, 2019)(Pirro et al., 2018)(Kneuer, 2018)(Schimmelfennig, 2014, 2018).

Börzel and Risse (2018) explain how the theories of liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism can explain the outcomes of more integration during the Eurocrisis. They are, however, unable to explain the failure of further European integration during the migration crisis with its peak in 2015. Furthermore, they argue that the reason member states have not been able to find a common solution is because of the constraining dissensus and the increase of politicization propelled by Eurosceptic populist right parties. On the other side, postfunctionalism cannot account for the increase in integration during the Eurocrisis. Rauh and Zürn (2016) show that politicisation has indeed been on a steady incline since 1990.

However, their data does not go beyond the year 2012, meaning that they miss out on several important events for European integration, such as the Greek bailout, the migration crisis and Brexit. Therefore, this thesis tried to close this gap and show that the trend of increasing politicization of EU affairs continued after 2012.

Pirro et al. (2018) ask the question of whether populist Euroscepticism is also an endogenous factor within the EU since they only research the relationship between populism, Euroscepticism, and crises from outside of the EU. Dissent within the EU is not been extensively researched, however, research by Taggart (1998) and Edwards (2007) explains what reasons for intra-party can be with the help of different models and Gabel and Scheve (2007) researched what effect intra-party dissent has on their supporters. Overall, it seems that there is still a norm of consensus within the Council, but this could change in the future according to Hosli et al. (2011). During current research, it is noticed that this is indeed a gap in the literature. There is hardly any research done on measuring Euroscepticism within EU institutions. This thesis has, therefore, tried to research if there has been a noticeable increase of dissensus in the Council's voting behaviour.

The next section elaborates on some of the concepts mentioned by using a funnel strategy, beginning with explaining the theory of the school of postfunctionalism, which then leads to the notion of politicization and then dissensus. Hereafter public opinion on European integration, explanations for dissent within parties and the norm of consensus within the Council are explained.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

1.2.1 Postfunctionalism

Within European integration, three main theories were designed: neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism. Each of these theories, or as Hooghe and Marks (2019) call it, "schools" explain the course of European integration from a unique perspective. This thesis will elaborate extensively on the school of postfunctionalism and try to narrow it down to the scope of this thesis.

Postfunctionalism is a theory that has been developed by Hooghe and Marks in *"A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration (2008)"*. The theory detaches itself from the functionalist idea of whether administrations that are created, are efficient or not. Postfunctionalism does share with neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism that regional integration is caused by a gap between authority and efficiency. However, postfunctionalism does not assume that the outcome will show functional pressures, rather political conflict engages cultural identities and make a difference. (Hooghe & Marks, 2008)

Hooghe and Marks (2008) argue that neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism have become less efficient theories for research in the EU. These two theories were an improvement of the theory of functionalism, which was the main theory on political integration which arose during the inter-war period from the persistent concern that the state as a form of social organisation was becoming obsolete (Hooghe & Marks, 2008)(Khara, 2020). Functionalism, in the social sciences, is a theory based on the idea that all aspects of society, being norms and values, institutions, roles etc., need to serve a purpose and thus be functional for the long-term survival of society (Khara, 2020). The theory slowly lost popularity over the last decades since the theory was too static and could not explain the social changes. The theory of neofunctionalism emerged in the mid-fifties which combined the strong elements of functionalism with additional paradigms that developed an improved critical perspective (Khara, 2020). Neofunctionalism is a theory of regional integration which tries to explain the process of European integration. One of the core characteristics of neofunctionalism is the spillover effect. Spill over occurs whenever countries agree to cooperate in a certain sector and this cooperation creates incentives to let this cooperation spill over to other related sectors. Furthermore, non-state actors are crucial for further integration according to neofunctionalism, since transnational interest groups see benefits in further integration, such as problem-solving. The integration process can therefore

be seen as driven by the self-interest of interest groups rather than by the feeling of a shared identity. Lastly, in contrast to postfunctionalism, neofunctionalism takes a somewhat elitist approach. Even though interest groups play a role in the integration process, integration tends to be driven by technocratic and functional desires. There is a minimal role for democratic governance and is based on permissive consensus (McCormick, 2016).

The other 'rival' theory that explained European integration is intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism takes a state-centric perspective and thus takes priority for the role of the state and its state actors. There are costs and benefits to the involvement of European cooperation which have to be taken into account while protecting national interests. Furthermore, it rests on the idea that common problems need to be solved by common solutions while sovereignty remains with the member states (McCormick, 2016).

Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism agree on two matters. First, both theories envision preferences as economic. Where neofunctionalists argue that demands for improving regional integration cause Pareto to improve economic benefits, which would push nation-states in a European direction, intergovernmentalists argue that preferences of European integration mirror the distribution of economic profits among nation-states (Hooghe & Marks, 2008)(Börzel & Risse, 2008).

Second, both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism have a focus on distributional negotiating, or bargaining, among interest groups. Neofunctionalism sees interest groups operating at the supranational and national levels. And intergovernmentalism images interest groups pressuring within national arenas since this is the most direct path to have political influence in EU decision-making (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). What Hooghe and Marks (2008 & 2019) want to make clear in their research on postfunctionalism is, that one must look further than the economic preferences of interest groups to understand the direction of European integration and that postfunctionalism sees European integration as a conflictual process coming from belief systems that do not work together.

Academics argue that the combination of globalisation and European integration creates a stage for conflict in the EU. Furthermore, they argue that this problem has spilled over to the public sphere and thus beyond interest group bargaining. Therefore, Hooghe and Marks (2008) argue that it does not seem sensible to see functional economic interest groups as inherently decisive for European integration, but rather under certain decisions and that a possible outcome of postfunctionalism is also disintegration (Hooghe & Marks, 2019) (De Wilde, 2011).

For the first thirty years of European integration, public opinion was practically dormant, and decisions were made by the elites. This can be described as the period of '*permissive consensus'.* The period after the beginning of the 1990s is, by contrast, described as one of '*constraining dissensus'* by mass politics (Hooghe & Marks, 2008).

Research gives three reasons why European integration was not an issue for the public before the nineties. First, the public did not have strong opinions on European integration which led to political parties not positioning themselves strongly on this topic. Second, salience on the issue of European integration was low, and therefore, had minimal influence on competition between parties. Last, since the issues posed in European integration are unique to the domain of European integration, it was not related to the mainstream conflicts that structure political competition (Hooghe & Marks, 2008) (Börzel & Risse, 2008). Until the 1980s researchers did not take public opinion on European integration seriously. However, from the mid-nineties onwards, research has shown that each of these assumptions does not hold and that European integration is in fact present in the public sphere, affects national politics and is related to the mainstream conflicts in politics. Public opinion on European integration entered the field of interest of the political elite in the competition for political power. European integration has entered national politics and at the same time, national politics has been put to the foreground in the decision-making on the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 2008).

1.2.2 Politicization

One of the main aspects of postfunctionalism is the aspect of politicization. Politicization can be described in one sentence as "*the mobilisation of public opinion with regard to European integration*" (Schmitter, 2008 p. 211). Furthermore, politicization is also the increase in issue salience on European affairs and the increased level of polarisation within the EU and its institutions and policies (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Politicization makes issues part of politics and with that involves multiple political actors in the process (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2008).

What is interesting, is that neo-functionalists were the ones that predicted that the mobilisation of mass public opinion would occur one day. However, what they did not predict was that this mobilisation could threaten integration and even cause disintegration. Neo-functionalists thought that the opposite would happen, they expected political spillover where the mass public opinion would support the *acquis Communautaire* and protect it from nationalist politics in the member states (Schmitter, 2008)(De Wilde, 2014)(Börzel & Risse, 2018). For postfunctionalists, politicization is a constraining factor of European integration instead of a driving factor and mass politics can even cause crises which constrain the extent to

which national sovereignty can be delegated to the EU level by the member states (Börzel & Risse, 2018).

Whether an issue gets politicized and picked up by mass politics depends on whether a political party picks up the issue. Whenever mass politics and interest-group politics come both into play, mass politics will dominate, since interest-group politics are most effective whenever they act alone in the political arena. In these cases, interest group lobbying might result in counter-productivity (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). Politicians seem to politicize an issue whenever they see an electoral advantage in doing so. Hooghe and Marks (2008) find three (dis)incentives why a party leader would seek to politicize an issue: (1) When a political party see potential in increasing its electoral popularity via an issue, they are more willing to debate against other parties. (2) The party's ideological reputation is also a factor. Party leaders should think of their reputation and ideology. This can limit strategic positioning of the party since politicians also need to execute what they promised their voters. (3) Political leaders are less eager to bring an issue into mass politics whenever it threatens to divide the political party and reduce its electoral popularity (Hooghe & Marks, 2008)(De Wilde, 2011).

A turning point in European integration was the enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Börzel & Risse, 2008). It had become clear that the European Community had ignored popular support, and the new treaty was to deal with the democratic deficit (Christiansen, 1997). The treaty laid the foundation of the EU as we know the institution today. It resulted in more cooperation between the member states on different levels. New areas included a common foreign and security policy, European citizenship and Justice and Home Affairs to ensure the safety and security of the EU citizens (European Central Bank, 2017). Since the signing of the treaty, the positioning of citizens and political parties on European integration has increased in relevance (Hooghe & Marks, 2006). Since then, EU affairs have been strongly politicized if one follows the conceptualisation of politicization above (Börzel & Risse 2018).

1.2.3 Constraining Dissensus

Since it is acknowledged that European integration now depends on the support from the EU citizens in the era of constraining dissensus, the term Euroscepticism has entered the arena of EU affairs. Euroscepticism refers to the disapproval of the EU by EU citizens and political actors (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). Even though Euroscepticism and populism might have overlapped and have been colliding together the last couple of years, not every Eurosceptic

party is by default populist, and not every populist party is by default Eurosceptic. Although the number of politically left Eurosceptic parties is diminishing, they do exist (e.g. Dutch Socialist party (Socialistische Partij))(Pirro & Taggart, 2018)(Pirro et al., 2018)(Kneuer, 2018).

Euroscepticism mostly focuses on three factors. First, the economic effects and performance such as inflation rates, unemployment rates and economic growth. Second, the identity factor refers to EU citizens' attitudes towards the EU. And last, the institutional factor referring EU citizens' distrust and dissensus towards national and EU institutions (Kneuer, 2018). Studies on populism also focus on economic and cultural factors, which again shows that there is overlap (Kneuer, 2018).

For this research, the focus will be more on far-right Eurosceptic populist parties since the number of right Eurosceptic populist parties is growing in the EU during this period of uneasiness in public opinion (Kneuer, 2018).

1.2.4 GAL/TAN Cleavage

Political left/right conflict over EU issues is not the same as left/right conflict over national policies and issues according to Hooghe and Marks (2008) and Schmitter (2008). This is because the political left and right usually represent different economic factors and put those against each other. Within the EU the scope for economic redistribution is restrained. Therefore, the left/right conflict at the EU level is not about redistribution, but rather about social regulation, (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). Hooghe & Marks (2008) found at the beginning of the 2000s that national parties in the member states are not divided among the left/right line when asking their stance on European integration, however, they were divided from green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditionalism/authority/nationalism (TAN). TAN parties usually oppose European integration on the grounds that it weakens national sovereignty, diffuses self-rule by creating illegitimate supranational systems of governance and is a threat to cultural homogeneity. GAL, on the other hand, expresses weaker negative attitudes towards European integration. Nonetheless, for left parties on the GAL side, European integration remains a dilemma between favourable GAL policies and unfavourable market liberalism. (Hooghe & Marks, 2008)(Pirro et al., 2018).

Looking at this cleavage, one can see that TAN parties reject European integration for the same reasons they reject immigration; it threatens national sovereignty and undermines the national culture (Hooghe & Marks, 2008)(Börzel & Risse, 2018). Examples of TAN parties in the member states are the French Rassemblement national (Front national) and the Dutch Partij

voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom). Conservative parties can also be placed on the TAN side since they also defend national sovereignty and national culture against immigrants, multiple territorial identities, and other international regimes. Overall, the TAN segment is more likely to strengthen the constraining dissensus (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Börzel & Risse (2008, 2018) argue that the GAL/TAN cleavage is about the difference in collective identities people might have.

1.2.5 EU Identity and Public Opinion

In the first forty years of European integration, the focus was mostly put on economic cooperation and market integration. Consequently, most studies on public support for European integration in the nineties were based on a utilitarian explanation of how an individual cost-benefit analysis would result in support for European integration. The simple thought in these studies was, that trade liberalisation in Europe will benefit its citizens with higher income and this will, in turn, make them support European integration. (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). Over time, as the EU developed from an international organisation focused on trade liberalisation and market integration to an economic and political union, the academic literature also transitioned their attention to other explanations for EU support. One of them is identity (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016).

People oftentimes have multiple identities and identify themselves with territorial communities on different scales. This can be on a national, regional, or even local scale. It has resulted from research that territorial identification plays a significant role in the attitudes towards European integration. Börzel and Risse (2008) argue that EU citizens' territorial identification is even more important for their attitude towards European integration than economic interests or utility calculations. Humans have an inborn ethnocentric tendency, which means that they put their group before others. However, this does not necessarily mean that they express hostility or aversion towards other groups. What is decisive is how different group identities are connected to each other and not with which group one identifies (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). One can have a strong national feeling, but at the same time be in favour of European integration. The question here is whether that individual sees her identity as exclusively national or also inclusive of another territorial identity. In the European Union, the governments of the member states and the EU are assembled in one system of multilevel governance where in specific policy areas national sovereignty is delegated to the EU level. The level of European integration makes it sometimes even difficult for national governments

to pursue their national preferences since it may undermine their national self-determination (Hooghe & Marks, 2005).

Moreover, multiculturalism is strengthened by European integration and fades the harsh distinction of 'us' and 'them' that exists since the creation of the European nation-states (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). It may, therefore, be that citizens have multiple identities, for example, Basque, Spanish, and European. The national identity and European identity may then reinforce each other. However, it also turns out that parties oppose European integration and frame it as a defence of the nation-state from the control of 'Brussels' (Hooghe & Marks, 2005).

But how do the right populist parties influence the degree of support of the EU citizen? Research by Kritzinger (2003) has shown that the nation-state is the principal actor in increasing or decreasing support for the EU. Since citizens' attitudes are formed in the cultural context of their nation-state, they can constrain the support of the EU. It turned out that EU citizens do not distinguish between the European level and national level when it comes to assessing the performance of both (Kritzinger, 2003). European integration is too complex and too far away from the average daily life of most EU citizens for them to be interested and aware enough to base their attitudes on how they asses the results of European integration (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). In its place, they use national proxies when they express their attitudes towards the EU to fill in the shortcomings of information. An example of an information source for citizens is the news media. But national political parties do also play a role as a type of proxy. The political elite frame public support for the EU and it results that people who support pro-EU parties, also are more likely to support European integration (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016)(Hooghe & Marks, 2005).

It results that individuals who exclusively identify themselves with their national identity, see European integration as a threat and are more susceptible to Euroscepticism if they are also made to believe that nationalism is incompatible with European integration (Kriesi & Lachat, 2004)(Hooghe & Marks, 2008) (Hooghe & Marks, 2019) (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). This is often part of the discourse of populist right parties. It results that the stronger the party is, the more probable it is that individuals with exclusively national identity are Eurosceptic. In turn, this means that individuals with inclusive identities are not as susceptible to the discourses of populist right parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). In addition, individuals with ambivalent views of the EU may be pulled to the Eurosceptic parties by strong parties (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2015).

1.2.6 Link to the Migration Crisis

Researching the migration crisis from a postfunctional perspective, one turns to identity politics. By the end of 2015, immigration was the number one issue in almost all EU member states. The migration crisis touched upon the point of national identity asking EU citizens to allocate culturally different people in their countries (Börzel & Risse, 2018)(Hooghe & Marks, 2019). Support for nationalist parties rose and this made it more difficult for national governments to make deals on the European level since the politicization of the issue limited the options for national parties to seek an EU-wide response to solve the crisis (Hooghe & Marks, 2019).

EU citizens with exclusive nationalist identities, who mostly belong to the TAN side, have a strong opinion towards migration and tolerance toward foreigners. They can be even hostile and show xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Those who have more than one territorial identity and identify with the European identity, hold a more positive stance towards immigrants.

Eurosceptic populist parties have managed to mobilise EU citizens with exclusive national identities (TAN) since the EU has become more politicized over the last decades (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Börzel and Risse (2018) write that there is plenty of empirical evidence that shows that support for right-winged Eurosceptic and populist parties in the EU are driven by people with exclusively nationalistic identities and anti-immigrant attitudes. Kuhn (2019), however, researched that the percentage of 'exclusive nationalists' has only been decreasing over the last few years.

It is often assumed that populist parties thrive in times of crises, or as Pirro and Taggart (2018) put it *"in times of accelerated social and cultural change"* (p 257). The concept of crises has over time become a sign of change towards something better, worse, or at least, different from before. The European crises may have brought changes at various levels in the institutions. Although, as Pirro and Taggart (2018) argue, crises might also settle within single organisations such as populist parties, affecting their discourses. A different concept of crises is that crisis is a *'transformative events'* (Pirro & Taggart, 2018, p258). This refers to that crises, as transformative events, happen in a brief period of time, characterised by disruptiveness. The transformative event eventually leads to changes in the allocation of resources, emergences of new power configurations and shifts in cultural schemas. It offers a window opening in the mainstream discourses to introduce counter-discourses such as populist ones (Pirro & Taggart,

2018)(Moffitt, 2014). A last interpretation of crises can be in the terms of 'focusing events.' Here an event can put the focus on certain issues and identify unfamiliar problems which would usually be overlooked or downplayed in mainstream politics. The migration crisis of 2015 might be recognised as such a focusing event, where Eurosceptic and populist parties took the opportunity to use the crises to push their Eurosceptic and populist discourses (Pirro & Taggart, 2018)(Pirro et al., 2018). Moreover, they took the events as a chance for electoral mobilisation rather than an ideological transformation. This is because the crises did not lead to a unified Eurosceptic/populist response or a complete change of the Eurosceptic populist discourses. Instead, Eurosceptic and populist parties have increased the salience of, in their eyes, existing problems (Pirro et al., 2018).

The Eurozone crisis resulted in a substantial deepening of European integration, at least for the Eurozone. First of all, no member state exited the Eurozone during or after the crisis. Moreover, to prevent the fall of the Eurozone, member state governments set up a new set of supranational institutions and mechanisms, such as the European Stability Mechanisms and the Banking Union which deepened European integration in the fiscal and financial arenas (Börzel & Risse, 2018)(Schimmelfennig, 2018). The member states wanted to save the Eurozone. However, at the same time, politicization prevented policy outcomes that would grant the EU more redistributive authority. In the end, the member states had to transfer fiscal competencies to the EU level to preserve the Euro (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Nonetheless, the member states attempted to reduce conflict and depoliticise controversial issues that resulted in the deepening of European integration, rather than politicization (Börzel & Risse, 2018)(Schimmelfennig, 2014).

The migration crisis, in contrast, has not resulted in deepening integration. Several member states that are part of the Schengen area introduced border controls during the peak of the migration crisis. Furthermore, the Dublin agreement was not reformed by a system of shared responsibility a reallocation. And lastly, the agencies AESO and Frontex received substantially more financial resources, however, they did not enjoy any new supranational competencies. This shows that the migration crisis has not led to any deepening of European integration and the member states failed to agree on strengthening the capacity of the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2018).

As argued above, there are two explanatory paths in the literature, event-driven and structural (economic, cultural, and institutional factors). These two paths do not necessarily contradict

each other but the argument made is that the European crises work as a catalyser mobilising the public opinion and potential for political conflict that has been present in EU societies since the shift from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus (Hooghe & Marks, 2009)(Kneuer, 2018). This leads us to the first hypothesis of whether the migration crisis indeed worked as a catalyser on the demand side in the EU for populist right Eurosceptic parties. Using the theory above, one can conclude that citizens' attitudes are influenced by the nation-state. Over the years the support for the EU became dependent on its EU citizens. Their attitudes are influenced by, for example, national political parties. With growing politicization, there has also been an increase in the popularity of right-populist parties. Citizens who have exclusively a national identity also tend to be on the TAN side of the cleavage and tend to be more Eurosceptical. Therefore, my first hypothesis is:

H1: EU citizens have become more Eurosceptic.

1.2.7 EU Support from Political Parties

We now shift from politicization on the citizen level to the level of domestic political parties. How does politicization play a role within the political elite? As mentioned before, political parties play a significant role in the politicization of Europe. They decide whether a political issue enters mass politics by picking up the issue as a party. There are three ways a political party can politicize an issue. First, a party can adopt a position opposing the majority position of the rest of the political parties to increase the polarisation of the issue at stake. Second, whenever a party sees an electoral advantage in an issue, they will try pushing it onto the political agenda and cause intensification of the debate. Third, political parties might participate in framing the issue to mobilise citizens (Hooghe & Marks, 2008) (Hoeglinger, 2015).

The first way to politicize an issue might be the most important in this research. To voice dissenting attitudes towards European integration, political parties can politicize an issue and adopt a position that is different from the majority. Since in the EU, a pro-European attitude has triumphed for the last decades, it means that a party needs to take a Eurosceptic position to distance itself from the rest of the political elite. This way, one would assume that political parties would position themselves as close to their targeted voters to maximise votes. If one would follow a rational choice perspective, one would assume that parties can freely adopt the position they want to (Hoeglinger, 2015). However, the cleavage theory of Rokkan and Lipset, developed in 1967, plays a role in the positioning of political parties. It assumes that citizens are divided by structural divisions in culture and society and that these divisions shape

collective identities which cause political conflict once the issue is politicized. These citizens with similar collective identities usually form blocs and are tied to parties which represent their collective identities (Hoeglinger, 2015) (Marks et al., 2021).

Hooghe and Marks (2008) argued that the closed social bubbles people lived in, that tied them to a particular political group or party, have burst. The social ties citizens had to their parties have been loosened up since the decline of religion, the greater mobility, and the diversification of work and social life. They argued that the cultural and political divide has changed in a transnational cleavage where citizens and the political elite position themselves among the GAL/TAN divide (Marks et al., 2021). This would mean that political parties are restricted by ideological constraints of their party ideology and their prospective voters' views. Therefore, they are not completely free in the choice of the position they want to adopt. However, on the other hand, since European integration is of a multifaceted nature, it gives substantial leeway for the political elite to think about how they want to express their position on an issue along the lines of the GAL/TAN cleavage (Hoeglinger, 2015). Consequently, since European integration is of multifaceted nature and the EU is a multi-level governance system, the political conflict on European integration is also multi-dimensional and is not just an issue of how much European integration one wants or how much Euroscepticism there is (Hoeglinger, 2015).

Hoeglinger (2015) writes in *Politicizing European Integration* that there are three models that explain how political parties structure their position towards European integration. The first one is the ideological model which follows the lines of the national political conflict and is affected by group ideologies and interests. For example, if there is an issue of politico-cultural aspects of European integration on the political agenda, then the attitudes would be formed along the GAL/TAN cleavage. The more the political elite is affiliated with the TAN side, the more it is presumed that they oppose the deepening of integration and might even be Eurosceptic.

The second model is the institutional strategic model which assumes that attitudes towards European integration are based on whether the political party is in government or in the opposition. The opposition of the government is in this case pivotal in the forming of attitudes towards European integration in parties since it is strategic competition among the political elite that is the most crucial element the shaping attitudes. Hoeglinger (2015) argues that mainstream parties tend to be more pro-European, albeit implicitly. This is to avoid intra-party tensions. By contrast, challenger parties often take an obvious Eurosceptic stance to

challenge the mainstream parties. Therefore, in this model, opposing European integration is based more on strategic than ideological grounds.

The third, and last, model is the geopolitical model. This model argues that the differences in attitudes towards European integration are influenced by a member state's nationality, national interests, institutions, collective identity, and economic preferences. Thus, the political elite would all have similar views on Europe. As argued before, cultural identity plays a significant role in the shaping of attitudes and is, therefore, also a crucial source of differences between member states (Hoeglinger, 2015). An example of a Eurosceptic country is the UK, which eventually also left the EU by holding the Brexit referendum. Their Eurosceptic tendency is argued to come from their imperial past which shaped a feeling among the population of being different from Europe. The fear of losing their national identity and giving up their sovereignty to the EU was one of the main arguments of the 'Leave' side. On the other hand, Germany has had in general a pro-European attitude which reflects the guilt of the Second World War and Spain also projects support for European integration since they saw the EU as a chance for democratisation and modernisation (Hoeglinger, 2015)(Hooghe & Marks, 2005).

1.2.8 Dissent within Political Parties

Even though mainstream parties might openly support European integration, there exists intra-party dissent about the matter. Most parties are not united on European integration and the degree of dissent has increased in the last decades (Gabel & Scheve, 2007). Dissent can be formulated as: *"Dissent, as traditionally used in the literature, refers to internal divisions within political parties on the issue of European integration."* (Gabel & Scheve, 2007, p40).

Data by Steenbergen and Marks (2007) show that dissent within political parties is not uncommon, which means that parties do not have a unified opinion on European integration.

Edwards (2007) tried to explain multiple reasons why there might be dissent within political parties. She argues that the electoral system plays a role in the degree of dissent. Depending on the electoral system there can be higher intra-party dissent. The type of electoral system influences the costs to exit the arena. In a plurality system, where there are two parties competing, there is a great disincentive for political actors to exit their party since it is costly to set up a new party. The consequence is that political actors stay in the party where they are which in the end causes more differing interests and preferences within the party and causes higher internal conflict. In a proportional representation system, on the other hand, the exit costs are significantly lower, which makes it easier for a political actor to split from his party. Political

conflict is here thus externalised. Furthermore, proportional representation systems tend to promote multi-party systems. These parties tend to be smaller and narrower in their political programmes than in political systems with only two political parties and where they need to have broad constituencies to speak to the voters and therefore are less susceptible to dissent (Edwards, 2007).

A second explanation for intra-party dissent is the strategic actions of political parties that set mainstream parties against the minor/challenger parties. Three phenomena may occur. First, political parties that are located on the extremes of the political spectrum tend to be less susceptible to dissent since they do not have to protect the status quo, unlike mainstream political parties. Parties that are on the periphery might benefit from giving the existing party system a shock, and an issue such as European integration might be suitable for that. However, this is only effective if the political party is unified on the matter. Second, party size can also influence intra-party dissent. It is expected that parties with a large share of votes experience higher degrees of dissent. This is because the party needs to adhere to a broader spectrum of interests and preferences from its voters which can lead the party to be more divided on certain issues. Last, as mentioned before, governing parties tend to have a lower degree of dissent since they tend to be more pro-European, governing parties need to cue their supporters on European issues, and governing parties have a seat in Brussels to fill, which obligates them to have a coherent opinion on the EU issues (Edwards, 2007)(Gabel & Scheve, 2007).

The third argument is that party positioning changes cause more dissent within political parties. Reasons for a shift in positioning can be of all sorts but tend to be reasons like economic conditions, the number of parties in parliament and the type of electoral system. Why a party changes its position is beyond the scope of this research but would be interesting to research. Whenever there is a change in position, it is expected to cause internal division.

This thesis tried to show different models and arguments what the reasons for political parties are to position themselves towards the EU as they are, and why there might be dissent within a party. Thus, in light of the migration crisis and the politicization of EU affairs, two hypotheses are formulated:

H2: There is growing dissent within member states' political parties on European integration.

H3: There is growing dissent in the position of member states' political parties on European integration.

1.2.9 Politicization in the Council

The decision-making process in the EU can be considered complex and has been changed multiple times with the signing of new treaties. Depending on the policy area, different voting procedures take place.

The decision-making procedure starts at the Commission which proposes new legislation. Hereafter, the European Parliament (EP) and Council review the proposal and can produce possible amendments. After this, the three institutions can either agree on the amendments, if not, the Council can overrule the objection by unanimous decision, or the Commission can withdraw their proposal. A second reading takes place when the institutions cannot agree on a common final text. During the second reading, the EP and Council can again propose amendments and the EP can block the proposal if an agreement with the Council cannot be met. If both EP and Council agree on the amendments, the proposal will be adopted (European Union, n.d.). The Council either takes decision by simple majority (14 member states in favour), qualified majority voting (QMV, 55% of member states, representing a minimum of 65% of the EU population vote in favour), or unanimous vote (all vote in favour) (European Council – Council of the European Union, 2022).

Negotiations within the Council are well known for being held behind closed doors and statistics and voting results have only become available since 1995. Within the Council, coming to a consensus seems to be the norm, and they usually keep bargaining until there is a consensus (Heisenberg, 2005)(Hosli et al., 2011). Whenever the member states come to an agreement, they usually claim one by one that they have reached a great policy success in the national interest. However, it is impossible for individual governments to negotiate their preferred policy outcome without any support from other member states' governments. This is because they find themselves in negotiations with other EU institutions such as the European Parliament. It is remarkably simple, governments cannot just force their interest and preferences onto other member states, therefore, they will almost all of the time have to compromise. It is conventional for Council members to support each other in addressing potential sources of issues in domestic politics which can hamper the pursuit of European integration. It is therefore also why Council members are more fruitful when they position themselves near the positions of their colleague Council members instead of taking an extreme (read Eurosceptic) position. Since it is more advantageous to form coalitions with like-minded Council members, it is easier for pro-European governments to gain a majority to push policy proposals forward in the process or achieve better outcomes, since the number of Eurosceptic governments is lower (Mariano &

Schneider, 2022). Since public opinion on European integration influences the position of political parties on European integration, it will influence their voting behaviour on the European level. Governments with pro-European citizens will tend to agree more with the majority and be less persuaded to vote against or abstain. Contrary, governments with a Eurosceptic public might feel the obligation to demonstrate to their citizens that they can go against the EU status quo and vote against the majority (Hosli et al., 2011).

However, since EU affairs have become more salient and Euroscepticism and overall dissensus is increasing since the 1990s it is worth researching if this is still the case. Moreover, since the negotiations are usually behind closed doors we do not know what negotiations take place. Therefore one also does not know whether Council members vote Eurosceptic or are just opposing or abstaining because they cannot find a common ground (Mariano & Schneider, 2022). This leads to the last hypothesis:

H4: dissensus in the Council of ministers has increased after 2015.

Chapter 2: Research Design

This study tried to research what the effects of politicization have been on Council voting behaviour. To find the data to answer the research question, quantitative data from multiple data sets were used, depending on the hypothesis. The data, and the subsequent analysis, tried to explain why the hypothesis is valid or not. Furthermore, each hypothesis is a logical step towards a justified answer to the main research question. Answering the hypotheses shows possible Euroscepticism and the effects of politicization at various stages of the chain of delegation: at the citizen level, within domestic political parties, and the Council. The datasets used in this research are results from multiple Eurobarometer surveys, the 1999-2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) trend file, data from ParlGov and datasets on Council voting by Simon Hix (VoteWatch Europe)(Hix et al., 2022)(Jolly et al., 2022)(Döring et al., 2022). Even though there have been some critical notes made on the use of Eurobarometer data (e.g. Hobolt & de Vries, 2016), it remains one of the few surveys that capture public opinion toward European integration over the years and allows illustrating temporal and contextual trends.

The CHES trend file includes data from over 270 political parties from all the EU member states. This survey is held by experts six times between the years 1999 and 2019. The data allows the creation of a time series of the position, salience of and internal dissent on European integration from domestic political parties. Data on political parties that could not be provided by the CHES data are provided by the ParlGov dataset. ParlGov includes data from elections (including European Parliament elections) and cabinets from most OECD member states. The data by Simon Hix includes the votes cast by the Council ministers during the voting rounds between 2009 and 2022.

The timeframe chosen for this research is from 2010 until 2019. The reasoning behind this is that the CHES data is collected for the years 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2019 (Jolly et al., 2022). Here, 2010 is the data set from closest before the migration crisis. The datasets from the year 2019 are the most recent ones after the migration crisis. As one would also expect some delay in public opinion and opinions of parties to show up in the data. Data from 2014 may show changes that are caused by the Eurozone crisis around 2010.

For the operationalisation of hypothesis 1 (H1), the main independent variable being Euroscepticism among EU citizens, this thesis investigated public opinion on the EU by making

use of the multiple Eurobarometer surveys from 2010 until 2022 as well as Chapel Hill Expert Survey and ParlGov data for voting percentages. To answer the hypothesis, the data collection was divided into three parts. First, the EU citizens' territorial identity was researched. These data were taken from the Standard Eurobarometer surveys from 2010 until 2019 (Standard Eurobarometer 73, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91). The data were divided into '[nationality] only', '[nationality] and then European,' 'European and then [nationality], and 'exclusively European'. As explained in the theoretical framework, EU citizens with exclusively national identities, tend to be more susceptible to Euroscepticism and find themselves on the TAN side of the cleavage (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Thus, an increase in the percentage of EU citizens with exclusively national identities would suggest a possible increase in Eurosceptic EU citizens and a decrease in support for European integration. One might ask if it would be correct to assume that the identity of a citizen causes the degree of support, and not reverse. Researchers (Kritzinger 2003, Hooghe & Marks 2005, Hobolt & de Vries 2016) have shown that factors on the domestic level shape the public attitudes toward European integration, rather than the other way around. Putting identities before support/opposition to a political system, such as the EU which is felt like at distance to most people, in the causal chain seems therefore plausible. The national identity of citizens is more embedded in their minds than their attitude towards European integration. Therefore, it makes sense to position national identities before support/opposition to a political system in the causal chain (to the extent that one can find an association between the two variables) (Kritzinger, 2003)(Hooghe & Marks, 2005). The empirical findings are visualised in a linear graph (see Figure) which can be found in Chapter 3.

As a consequence, the sensible second step in the investigation of this hypothesis was, then, to look at EU support. This was done by retrieving data from Eurobarometer 97 of the Summer of 2022 (European Commission, 2022). The Eurobarometer survey asked the question of whether the EU conjures a very positive, fairly, positive, neutral, fairly negative or a very negative image for the EU citizen. This question has been used frequently to measure EU citizens' opinions on European integration (Hagemann et al., 2017)(Winzen, 2020)(Boomgaarden et al., 2011). The data from Eurobarometer shows a cross-temporal dynamic of the perceived image of the EU from citizens from 2006 until 2022. As explained in the theoretical framework, people who identify exclusively with their nationality tend to be more opposed to European integration which would mean that they would answer the EU as conjuring a negative feeling for them. The percentages of 'very positive' and 'fairly positive,' as well as 'very negative' and 'fairly

negative', were therefore joined to investigate this hypothesis by showing the trend of how the EU citizen sees the EU in time. A rise in negative feelings would in turn be a plausible reason for the increase in Eurosceptic feelings or dissent towards the EU. These findings have been mapped in Figure which can be found in the chapter on empirical findings (Chapter 3).

The last step to answer the first hypothesis was to take a look at EU citizens' voting behaviour. The way EU citizens can make their opinions visible is by making use of their voting rights. A way to see the increase in Euroscepticism would show an increase in votes for Eurosceptic parties in the EU member states after 2015. Therefore, this research made a systematic categorisation of the percentage of the votes the Eurosceptic parties received per EU member state. As a benchmark for the voters' support, the party must have gained parliamentary representation by taking part in elections within the timeframe. The selection of Eurosceptic parties is based on the variable 'EU position' from the CHES dataset. According to the CHES dataset, a party is said to be Eurosceptic whenever it lies below the middle of a 1-7 EU support scale in CHES (1 = strongly opposed and 7 = strongly in favour, thus 1-3.5 is considered Eurosceptic). The effect of the voters' support was measured by the gains and losses in percentages of votes for Eurosceptic parties. CHES data from the years 2010, 2014 and 2019 were used. Since this investigation is more focused on right-populist parties, (radical) left parties are excluded from the parties considered Eurosceptic. This is done by only looking at the parties that belong to the party family 'radical right' or 'conservative,' as conservative parties also are considered to be on the TAN side of the cleavage. To determine this, ParlGov data were used.

To assess the second hypothesis, on the level of dissensus within domestic political parties, CHES data sets have been used once more. Now, a different variable is used which shows the degree of dissent on European integration within political parties. The data from 2010, 2014 and 2019 is again used. The degree of dissent on European integration is given on a point scale, where zero means that the party was completely united on EU policy issues and ten means that a party is extremely divided. A higher degree of dissensus within political parties can lead to member states not having a united opinion about European integration when they need to represent their country at the Council level.

For the third hypothesis, which is closely related to the second one, the data set of CHES of the same years was used, except for 'the position of the party leadership' which is the overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration. The scale here was as follows:

1 = Strongly opposed
2 = Opposed
3 = Somewhat opposed
4 = Neutral
5 = Somewhat in favour
6 = In favour
7 = Strongly in favour

The lower the score is, the more Eurosceptic a party is. The data is projected in 28 small graphs that show the average trend of EU positions in the member states over the years (see Figure 3 in Chapter 3).

For the fourth and final hypothesis, this thesis turned to the EU level. To investigate the Council voting behaviour, this research made use of the database by Simon Hix and VoteWatch Europe, which have been tracking the voting behaviour of the European Parliament and the Council from 2004 until 2022. These data sets show the votes cast by the member state governments in the Council of the EU between 2009 and 2022. For this research, a look at the timeframe from 2010 until 2019 is taken. Since one cannot determine if a member state voted against because of Eurosceptic reasons, measuring Euroscepticism is too difficult to define when looking at voting behaviour only. Therefore, current research took dissent as the variable. To measure the dissent within the Council, it was necessary to investigate the voting results of all definitive legislative decisions and see if, at least, one member state abstained from voting or voted against the legislation. Importantly is to keep in mind that the Council does not vote on the same number of legislative acts every year. Therefore, the relative percentage of dissent in the Council is calculated and compared throughout the years and put in Table 2.

Chapter 3: Empirical Findings

This chapter demonstrates the empirical findings following the research design explained in the previous chapter (2). Tables with the complete data can be found in the Appendix of this thesis.

The Eurobarometer surveys from the years between 2010 and 2019 asked EU citizens about their identity. The options given to the surveyed EU citizens were whether they felt [nationality] only, [nationality] and then European, European and then [nationality] or exclusively European. Figure shows the change in the percentage of EU citizens' identities over time. The data visualises the percentages from the years 2010 until 2019 and shows a steady increase of people identifying as their country's nationality first and then European. One can notice that there is no data point for 2011, this is because the Eurobarometer of 2011 (76.3) did not include the question of how the EU citizens see themselves (European Commission, 2011).

The percentage of EU citizens who only identify as exclusively national is declining, except for a small upsurge in 2016, just after the peak of the migration crisis. Moreover, it is visible that in 2010 the percentage of [nationality] only was higher than [nationality] and European.



Figure 1: Proportion of national and/or European identification. Data from Eurobarometer waves 73.4, 77.3, 79.3, 81.4, 83.3, 85.2, 87.3, 89.1, 95.1

Figure shows the trend of the EU citizens' image of the EU from 2010 until 2019. The table with the specific percentages and percentual changes over these years can be found in Appendix 1. At first glance, Figure shows that the trend over time of a total positive-, as well as a total negative image of the EU, has large variations. Even between the summer measurements and the winter measurements for a particular year, there was an increase or decrease visible, whereas the percentage of EU citizens who have a neutral image of the EU remains stable over and within the years. One can see an opposite trend when looking at the positive and negative lines. The positive and negative lines mirror each other while the neutral line and the 'don't know' line show far less variation.

A rise in the negative image of the EU is visible from the Summer of 2011 until the summer of 2013. This can be explained as a reaction to the Eurozone crisis. At the same time, the positive image of the EU is declining in the same period. A rise in positive views on the EU is noticeable after the Eurozone crisis and precedes to increase until the summer of 2015 when the peak of the migration crisis is reached. At that same time, the negative view of the EU increases again.



Figure 2: EU citizens' image of the EU. Data from Standard Eurobarometer 97 Summer 2022.

Table 1 shows the percentage of votes that went to Eurosceptic parties in the particular member states. The percentage consists of the vote percentages received by the Eurosceptic parties accumulated in the national elections preceding closest to the years the CHES data was collected (2010, 2014, 2019). The national parties were considered Eurosceptic whenever they belonged to the party family radical right or conservative. To determine whether a party is considered Eurosceptic, a look at the party's positioning towards European integration was taken. On this scale from 1 to 7, 1 is considered to be strongly opposed and seven strongly in favour. Therefore, every party that ranked 3.5 or lower was considered to be Eurosceptic in this research.

Taking a first look at the data in Table 1, it is visible that the average of the EU 28 has increased over the years. Member states, such as Hungary and the UK (the data collected before the UK officially left the EU), who are known for being Eurosceptic, also receive a high percentage of votes in their national elections. What also stands out is that the percentages of some member states differ vastly between one election year and the next election year. This is, for example, in the case of Poland. An explanation for this is that the right-wing populist party PiS, which is the biggest party in Poland, had a score higher than 3.5 for their positioning in the EU in 2014. This caused the party to not be classified as Eurosceptic in 2014 and therefore there is a substantial difference between 2010 and 2014 and 2014 and 2019 when PiS was classified as being a Eurosceptic party. Furthermore, different EU member states do not show any data since, according to the classification, they do not have Eurosceptic parties present that gained enough votes to gain a seat in parliament. An example is Portugal, which is also a member state which has had a pro-European government and parliament.

Country	2010	2014	2019
EU-28	7,88%	10,53%	12,71%
Belgium	8,27% (2010)	5,2% (2014)	11,95% (2019)
Denmark	13,9% (2007)	12,2% (2011)	11,09% (2019)
Germany	-	1,3% (2013)	12,6% (2017)
Greece	5,63% (2009)	16% (2012)	6,63% (2019)
Spain	-	-	15,08% (2019)
France	5,9% (2007)	13,83% (2012)	14,37% (2017)
Ireland	-	-	-
Italy	-	23,6% (2013)	21,74% (2018)
Netherlands	15,5% (2010)	10,1% (2012)	14,9% (2017)
UK	41,1% (2010)	39,2% (2010)	45,74% (2019)
Portugal	-	-	-
Austria	28,24% (2008)	24% (2013)	16,2% (2019)
Finland	4,1% (2007)	19,1% (2011)	17,5% (2019)
Sweden	9,25% (2010)	12,9% (2014)	17,5% (2018)
Bulgaria	9,4% (2009)	11,8% (2014)	5,33% (2017)
Czech Republic	20,2% (2010)	14,6% (2013)	10,64% (2017)
Estonia	-	-	17,8% (2019)
Hungary	16,67% (2010)	59,7% (2014)	49,28% (2018)
Latvia	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	7,3% (2012)	-
Poland	32,11% (2007)	1,1% (2011)	36,45% (2019)
Romania	-	-	-
Slovakia	5,1% (2010)	13,2% (2012)	23,31% (2016)
Slovenia	5,4% (2008)	-	4,17% (2018)
Croatia	-	3% (2011)	-
Malta	-	-	-
Luxembourg	-	6,6% (2013)	-
Cyprus	-	-	3,71% (2016)

Table 1:Percentage of total votes by Eurosceptic parties. Data from CHES and ParlGov. Data sets.

In Appendix 2 one can find the tables with the data on the degree of dissent within political parties on European integration for all member states for the years 2010, 2014 and 2019. The average degree of dissent of every member state is also included in Appendix 2, however, this does not tell you much since the numbers may vary depending on the party. The degree of dissent is translated into a number between 1 and 10, where 1 means that the party was

completely united on European integration, and ten is completely divided. An increasing degree of within dissent does not necessarily mean that a party has become more Eurosceptic. It is the interparty division that exists within a party on the issue of European integration. This means that there are Eurosceptic political parties who are perceived to be Eurosceptic, but internally may be very divided on the matter. An example is the Conservative Party in the UK (average dissent 5,76), on the other hand there are pro-European parties who score high on the degree of dissent, Centre Party of Finland (average 5,26). However, there are also Eurosceptic parties who seem to be very united in how they think about European integration. An example is the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands which scores an average of 0,57.

Figure displays the trend of the overall position of the party leadership towards European integration for every member state in 2010, 2014 and 2019. The blue line indicates the mathematical average trend of the EU-28 and the red line is the trend for that particular member state. The tables with the exact data can be found in the Appendix. The scale of the overall orientation goes from one, being strongly opposed to European integration, up to seven, being strongly in favour of European integration. In this research, everything under 3,5 can be seen as Eurosceptic. Again, these graphs illustrate the average position of the member states, consequently, it appears that all member states score on average higher than 3,5, suggesting that overall the member states tend to be pro-European. However, within member states, it is possible that the extremes lay far away from the average. An example is Greece, which is the member state with the lowest score on the EU position in the years 2010-2019, with an average score of 3,6. Nonetheless, when one looks at the data, one can see that Greece has parties who score a 6,09 (PASOK), positioning themselves as very pro-European, and parties that score a 1 (KKE) and position themselves as Eurosceptic.



Figure 3: EU position towards European integration. EU-28



Continuation of Figure 3: EU position towards European integration. EU-28

Year	Against/Abstain	Total voting rounds in year	%dissent
2010	27	85	32%
2011	34	106	32%
2012	24	78	31%
2013	42	114	37%
2014	53	155	34%
2015	13	57	23%
2016	17	57	30%
2017	25	81	31%
2018	37	95	39%
2019	67	127	53%
Total	339	955	35%

Table 2: Percentage of dissent in Council voting behaviour.

Table 2 shows the percentage of dissent in Council voting behaviour. Between the years 2010 and 2019, the Council completed 955 procedures followed by voting. In 339 of the voting rounds at least one member state abstained from voting or voted against. The first column shows the number of Council voting rounds where there was at least one member state that voted against or abstained from voting, and thus expressed dissent. The second column shows the total voting rounds in the specific year and the last column shows the percentage of dissent of the total number of voting rounds to make sure the percentages are proportional to the number of total voting rounds in a year. This is important since one can see that the total voting rounds in a year vary broadly. Taking a glance at the last column, one can see that the percentage of dissent in Council voting rises after 2012 but goes down until 2016, after which the percentage of dissent maintains to increase every year. In Chapter 4 on analysis, a possible explanation will be given regarding the increase in dissent.

Chapter 4: Analysis

This chapter provides an analysis of the results presented in the previous chapter. The analysis tried to explain the phenomena that is visible in the data based on the theoretical framework and has either confirmed or rejected the hypotheses.

4.1 EU Citizen Level

4.1.1 Identity

To see whether the first hypothesis can be confirmed, or not, the data of Figure get first analysed, which shows the percentage of EU citizens surveyed how they identify. One can see that in 2010 '[nationality] only' still scored higher (46%) than '[nationality] and then European' (41%). The reasoning for the '[nationality] only'-line being higher than the mixed identity one can be explained by the fact that previous to the Eurozone crisis in 2010, EU citizens did not have direct personal experiences with the EU. In addition to that, the knowledge on the European Union was in general incredibly low (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). Not only did EU citizens lack knowledge on the EU, but they were also not fully aware yet of the political system of the EU. Therefore, it is easier for citizens to associate with their own nationality whenever they were not familiar with the European identity.

Noteworthy is that the data from the 2011 Eurobarometer (76.3) was not available for the question of how EU citizens feel. This is one of the disadvantages of making use of Eurobarometer surveys, the questionnaire exists of sets of very generic questions which may vary over time. Furthermore, the Eurobarometer results present one specific moment in time, which means that the results may be different some time after the survey is performed. Nonetheless, it remains to be the best source to capture public opinion towards European integration. In this case, it is unfortunate that the crossing of the two lines '[nationality] only' and '[nationality] and European' takes place somewhere between 2010 and 2012 which causes it to be unable to determine in which year it happened.

In Figure 1, the line '[nationality] only' and '[nationality] and European identity' are the most important since it seems like these two lines mirror each other. The other three lines for 'EU and [nationality]', 'European only' and 'none' are quite consistent over the years. Whenever someone would let go of only identifying with their nationality, it would make sense that this person would still continue putting their nationality first, and then their European identity because of their ethnocentric tendencies (Hooghe & Marks, 2008).

A possible explanation for the rise in '[nationality] and European identity' is the effects politicization had during the Eurocrisis on the deepening of European integration. The Eurozone countries set up different new supranational institutions and mechanisms during the crisis, examples are the European Stability Mechanisms and the Banking Union. During and after the Eurozone crisis is when citizens actually noticed the presence of the EU. This could have led citizens to not only identify themselves with only their nationality, but also with the EU.

For this research, the important years are the years before, during and after the migration crisis. The peak of the migration crisis was in 2015, and as we can see in the graph, after the Eurozone crisis the percentage of '[nationality] and European identity steadily' increases over the years until 2016. For one year there is an increase of 3% of the EU citizens who exclusively identify with their national identity.

By the end of 2015, immigration was considered the most prominent issue in almost all EU member states. Governments were pushed to shelter people with culturally different identities from the EU citizens, this triggered the point of national identity (Börzel & Risse, 2018)(Hooghe & Marks, 2019). This may have led to the aversion towards the EU which led people to let go of their EU identity and only consider themselves to have a national identity. Since Eurobarometer are just a snapshot of public opinion, it is hard to say whether the migration crisis was the only reason for the rise in exclusively national identification.

After 2016, one can see a trend of EU citizens only identifying with their nationality declining and '[nationality] and European identity' rising. Reasons for this can be that multiculturalism is strengthened by European integration and because politicization has made the 'normal' EU citizen aware of the existence of a European identity. Furthermore, the nation-state plays a crucial role in the support of citizens towards European integration (Kritzinger, 2003). Citizens of member states where the political elite is overwhelmingly pro-European might therefore identify more with Europe than solely their nationality. However, to research, this one should research the political climate of the member states and research the data of Figure per member state. Lastly, literature shows that individuals who exclusively have a national identity are more susceptible to Euroscepticism and believe that nationalism is not compatible with European integration (Kriesi & Lachat, 2004)(Hooghe & Marks, 2008, 2019)(Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). A decreasing line of '[nationality] only' would then suggest that fewer citizens are susceptible to Euroscepticism, though, we cannot prove that association based only on this graph.

4.1.2 View on the EU

This leads to Figure , which shows a cross-temporal trend in EU citizens' image of the EU. As explained in the chapter on the research design, is it correct to assume that the identity of citizens causes the degree of support, and not reverse. Without looking at the data, this would mean that in the years when citizens also tend to have an European identity, there would also be more support for the EU. And, thus, a more positive image of the EU.

Focusing on Figure . What strikes, is that the lines of 'total positive' and 'total negative' have visible greater ups and downs than the lines in Figure for the same years. This would indicate that citizens' image of the EU is more susceptible to change than their identity. This makes sense since the feeling of belonging to a particular territory is part of one's identity, whereas an opinion of an external institution might not be and therefore also will not take a lot of consideration to change. Furthermore, the lines of 'don't know' and 'neutral' are not affected much over the years. This indicates that EU citizens who do have an opinion, vary between positive and negative. Citizens with a neutral stance on European integration might not feel close enough to the EU to form an opinion or are not affected in their opinion by their identity and/or political actors and events in the EU. One can, thus, see here again that two lines alternate and mirror each other over time, as in Figure . We can observe clear opinion changes around the crises in the EU.

Noteworthy is that during the Eurozone crisis, the percentage of '[nationality] only' decreased and '[nationality] and European' increased, which would indicate that citizens might support the EU more. However, Figure shows that EU support dropped to all-time lows from Summer 2011 until Winter 2013. Although, when one looks at the years around the migration crisis, one can see that during the peak of the crisis, mid-2015, negative attitudes towards de EU increased again, which can lead to more Eurosceptic tendencies. This is in line with the slight increase in citizens with exclusively national identity in Figure . However, the change in Figure is not as substantial as in Figure . This would suggest that individuals who did have a change in how they viewed the EU, did not change the way they felt about the EU. Nonetheless, the changes in citizens' identity could have partly also influenced the change in the image of the EU. After the migration crisis, the positive line increases again, suggesting that since citizens tend to think positively about the EU, they are less susceptible to Euroscepticism.

4.1.3 Voting Behaviour on Eurosceptic Parties

The last step to confirm or reject the first hypothesis is to see if there has been a change in voting behaviour among EU citizens regarding Eurosceptic parties. Table 1 shows the total

percentage of votes that went to Eurosceptic parties in each EU member state. The data is retrieved from CHES which conducted the expert survey in 2010, 2014 and 2019. The percentages of the member states are from the elections most prior to the year of the survey. Analysing the data, a couple of aspects draw your attention. First, there are member states with relatively low percentages (e.g. Slovenia and Bulgaria) and member states with relatively high percentages (e.g. the UK and Hungary). Therefore, the average of the EU-28 does not depict a clear image of Eurosceptic voting behaviour in the EU.

An (old) member state that scored highest overall is the UK. The UK was known for being Eurosceptic which eventually led them to hold the Brexit referendum and leave the EU. This showed that even though a small, majority of the Brits did not support the EU and wanted to leave. Resulting in the most significant step of disintegration since the beginning of European integration (Hoeglinger, 2015)(Hooghe & Marks 2005). Germany on the other hand has always been pro-European and one can see in that the percentage of votes is also below the EU-28 average.

Although Table 1 might give a nice overview of the percentage of votes Eurosceptic parties receive, there are a couple of limitations to this data which causes why these results are not representative for this research. First of all, the EU-28 average does not give a representative image of the member states. In 2010, the average was 7,88%, however, the lowest percentage in a member state was 5,1% in Slovakia (not counting the member states without any Eurosceptic parties), and the highest is the UK with 41,1%. These two extremes are far apart which causes the average to not represent the EU as a whole very well. Second, concerning the specific years the data was taken from. This research looks for the effects of politicization around the time of the migration crisis. However, for some countries, the used data does not capture well the peak of the crisis. For example, Denmark had elections before the migration crisis in 2011, and after, in 2019. This makes it difficult to see any effects the migration might have had on EU support. Third, the criteria used to calculate the percentages might have caused some deviations in the data. Looking at Poland, for example, one sees that in 2010 and 2019 the percentages were 32,11% and 36,45% respectively, however, in 2014 the percentage suddenly dropped to 1,1%. The reason for this is that Poland's biggest party, PiS, is often labelled as Eurosceptic but did not meet the criteria for being considered a Eurosceptic party in 2014 (EU position needed to be 3,5 or lower). Consequently, Poland's percentage for 2014 is extremely low since the voting percentages of PiS did not count for that year. On top of that, only parties belonging to the radical right and conservative political family, according to CHES,

were taken into account, which might have left out certain political parties which do indeed identify as Eurosceptic but do not belong to a certain political family (e.g. AfD in Germany for 2010). Because of these criteria used for the data collection, it seems for certain member states as if they do not have any Eurosceptic parties. This is because of the criteria used. Eurosceptic left parties are also not included in the data. A different reason can be that there do exist Eurosceptic parties but they never made it into the parliament which means they were not included in the data. A final argument is that there can also be a lack of non-Eurosceptic parties, as in England (see the graph of UK). By lack of better options, one might vote for an Eurosceptic party without being Eurosceptic.

A last remark is a question of whether citizens' support towards the EU influences their voting behaviour or rather the political parties influencing the voter. There is substantial evidence that says that political actors play a significant role in shaping the voter's support towards the EU. However, to know this with certainty, one should research the political parties' discourses to know whether they are indeed Eurosceptic and in what ways they try to influence the voter, but that is beyond the scope of this research.

In sum, EU citizens' identity suggest that they are heading towards more of a mixed identity which includes their nationality and European identity, rather than only national. Furthermore, even though EU citizens' view of the EU has fluctuated in the past during the crises, it seems as if the positive view will continue. The first two Figures would thus suggest that EU citizens are less likely to adhere to Eurosceptic calls. The data on voting percentages gives a somewhat different image with the EU average increasing over time suggesting that Eurosceptic parties are gaining popularity. However, for the reasons stated above, this data resulted not to be adequate in demonstrating whether Euroscepticism indeed has increased among EU citizens. Therefore hypothesis one will be rejected.

4.2 Domestic Political Parties

4.2.1 Intra-Party Dissent

We now turn to the domestic political level. Edwards (2007) gave multiple reasons why there might be dissent within political parties. The first reason is that the electoral system plays a role. In a plurality system, exit costs are higher with the consequence that political actors stay in the party and end up causing more different interests and preferences within the party and calling for higher internal conflict. Furthermore, plurality systems need to speak to a broader

voters spectrum and are therefore also more susceptible to internal disagreement. Two European countries who make use of the plurality electoral system are the UK and France. In the case of the UK it depends to what party you are looking at. The mainstream parties, Labour, and the Conservative Party (Scottish National Party and Liberal Democrats in lesser form) have high degrees of intra-party dissent, average 5,1 and 5,8 respectively. Euroscepticism became a topic of high prevalence within the Conservative Party, and eventually split the line in within the party in between in or out of the EU, which explains the high degree of inter-party dissent (Smith, 2012). In the case of France we can also see that the average degree of dissent for 2019 is above the average of member states with a proportional representation system, 3,9 and 2,4 respectively.

The second explanation of intra-party dissent are the strategic actions of political parties. It is said that political parties who position themselves on the outside of the political spectrum (extremes of left/right, or not belonging on the GAL/TAN axis), tend to experience lower degrees of dissent since they do not have to maintain the status quo unlike mainstream political parties. Whenever a minor party is unified on the issue of European integration it can benefit them to give the party system a shock. An example of a challenger party is the French extreme right party Rassemblement National (before named Front National), during the French presidential elections in 2017 the final run-off was between RN and Macron's newly-formed La Republique En Marche! (LREM), and not between the mainstream parties the Socialist Party and Conservative Party. In Appendix 2, France shows that RN and LREM had degrees of dissent lower than the average of France, and the Socialist and Conservative party higher.

However, when one takes a look at the data from Spain, one can see that mainstream parties like the Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Popular Party (PP), have quite low degrees of dissent, and challenger parties Podemos and VOX have higher degrees. An explanation for this is that parties that are in government, tend to have lower degrees of dissent since they need to form a coherent opinion on EU issues when going to Brussels.

These are just a few examples that could explain the degree of intra-party dissent towards European integration. Although for some member states there has been an increase in the degree of dissent between the data from 2014 and 2019, this is not generalisable for all 28 (27) EU member states. There are many external variables which can also cause for intra-party dissent. Controversies within a party, falling apart of a party, disaster in the member state and so on. The data now suggest that there is no growing dissent within member states' political parties on European integration and therefore hypothesis two can be rejected. Comparative case

research should be conducted to compare the trends and discourses within a member state, political family or political party. Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this research.

4.2.3 EU Positioning

Internal party dissent can be explained by a change in party position on European integration. Elaborating on why a political party changes its party position is beyond the scope of this study, nonetheless, a couple of reasons can include economic conditions within the EU or member state, type of electoral system, number of parties in the electoral system and the relations to socioeconomic groups (Edwards, 2007)(Adams et al., 2004). Figure shows a graphical illustration of the change in party positioning on European integration. The EU-28 average sees a slight increase towards a more favourable position towards European integration, whereas most member states do not follow this upward trend. Estonia, for example, sees a trend of growing opposition towards European integration, whereas Austria, on the other hand, has become more positive towards European integration and even scores higher than the EU average.

Since voters have become aware of EU affairs, there have been periods where public opinion has taken a more critical stance on Europe (read: less favourable of the EU) (see Figure), it could be expected that political parties alter their EU positions to meet the position of the voters (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2015). This would mean that both challenger parties, who tend to be more Eurosceptic, and mainstream parties will also turn to have more Eurosceptic positions. One can see in the graphs that thirteen out of the twenty-eight member states score lower in their position towards the EU in 2010 than in 2014. And eleven out of twenty-eight from 2014 to 2019. This can be explained because public opinion suffered from the Eurocrisis and migration crisis as is visible in Figure . However, results from research by Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2015) shows that mainstream parties do not change their position on EU supports. The main reason for this is that they have established their reputation in the mind of their voters and changes in their party positioning can damage their reputation and credibility. On the contrary, challenger parties emphasize their political stance by taking a more extreme position to set themselves apart from mainstream parties. In addition, it is argued that new Eurosceptic parties tend to position themselves to be more extreme than the already established Eurosceptic parties, in order to gain seats in parliament. Adams et al. (2004) also found that political parties tend to shift their position in response to a shift in public opinion. However, this is only when public opinion shifts in a direction disadvantageous to the political party.

Since this research only takes a general look at the data for the EU and does not go into detail about what the reasons are for specific domestic political parties, it would be interesting for future research to look into this. Furthermore, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2015) also argue that there can be found differences between West-European political parties and Central- and Eastern-European political parties on the matter of European integration. For future research, it would be interesting to see if those differences are nowadays still measurable.

Taking a look at the data in Figure and the tables in the Appendix, one can see that for several member states governing parties tend to have pro-European positions (3,5 or higher) and maintain to score the same over the years. Spanish political parties PSOE and PP, which have been the governing parties and alternating the presidential title since the abolishment of the dictatorship of Franco, score high on EU positioning and do not change their position significantly over the years (La Moncloa, n.d.). Alternatively, far-right populist party VOX entered the Spanish political arena in 2013 with their newly-formed party and won a significant percentage of the votes, positioning themselves as a Eurosceptic party, scoring significantly lower than the rest of the parties in Spain (VOX España, n.d.). Even though VOX does not position itself as opposing European integration as strongly as other parties, it is significantly below the member state's average, 3,3 and 5,6 respectively in 2019.

Another challenger party that has managed to enter the government with a Eurosceptic position is Debout la France (DLF) with a score of 1,4 in comparison to France's average of 4,5. Surprisingly, DLF positions itself to be just a little less Eurosceptic than Rassemblement National in 2019.

Even though there are some cases where challenger parties have newly entered the parliament with more Eurosceptic positions than the mainstream and governing parties, and several member states have fluctuating EU positions over the years, it is to say that the (small) majority of member states have favourably changed their EU position towards European integration between 2014 and 2019. In addition, the average position has also increased over the years. Therefore, H3 cannot be confirmed. Here again, further research is necessary to investigate the underlying reasons for every member state and see if this trend continues in the future or might change.

4.3 Council Voting Behaviour

The Council consists of the government ministers of each member state, according to the policy field that is discussed. It is clear that the Council has multiple actors to take into account when taking decisions. Apart from the Commission and European Parliament, the Council also needs to think of their domestic political situation and supporters. Hosli et al. (2011) argued that public opinion not only influences the position of political parties on the domestic level but also influences voting behaviour in the Council. Since the majority of EU citizens have a positive view (see Figure), the average political party is pro-European. There is an unwritten rule that Council members will try to come to a consensus, we can see that for every year between 2010 and 2019, the majority of legislation gets passed by the Council without any dissent in the voting rounds. After 2012, we can see an increase in the percentage of legislation that gets voted against or abstained by at least one member state. In 2015, this decreases but takes off again after 2016 and continues to do until 2019. These results are in line with Figure on the citizens' image of the EU. We see in 2011 and 2015 a decrease in EU support, at the same time we can see in Table 2 that in the years after 2011 and 2015, the percentage of dissent in Council voting behaviour increased as well. Whereas we can see that after 2014 dissent decreased, we do not see this after 2016. Even though public support for the EU seems to increase if we follow Figure , the percentage of dissent increases in the last couple of years.

Although this data does not show us how many member states abstained or voted against, it seems as if the norm to come to a consensus is disappearing. Especially in 2019, almost half of the voting rounds resulted in at least one member state showing dissent. The Council members usually form coalitions to gain a majority and to get a policy through the voting round (Mariano & Schneider, 2022). Usually, this is done by Council members coming from mainstream political parties since they tend to be pro-European, and it is easier to find like-minded Council members. However, Eurosceptic parties have been gaining more votes over the years and it might be possible that, slowly, Eurosceptic Council members are also trying to form coalitions to show dissent. We cannot conclude from this data whether member states were alone in projecting dissent or working together with other member states, only that, in percentage, the dissent does have increased and therefore hypothesis 4 can be confirmed. Nonetheless, as Marianao and Schneider (2022) also concluded in their work, the culture to come to a consensus in the Council is still dominant and limits the influence of Eurosceptic parties. By forming coalitions and supporting like-minded council members in legislative outcomes, Eurosceptics did not gain the support of the Council to push the legislative outcomes their way. Yet, this

does not say anything about the future, which might see more Eurosceptic parties get elected and get into government coalitions and change the dynamics within the Council.

Conclusion

It is generally known that the years of permissive consensus were left behind back in the 1990s when we entered the era of constraining dissensus. The theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism did not reach far enough to explain the current phenomena in the EU. Instead, postfunctionalism explained how EU affairs got politicized and mobilised public opinion. European integration is not a matter for only the political elite anymore but entered mainstream politics and now depends on the support of the EU citizens. Political actors politicize an issue whenever they see an electoral advantage in doing so. With the politicization of EU affairs, the term Euroscepticism also entered the political arena. In this thesis, Euroscepticism and dissent were mostly researched in linkage to far-right populist political parties because of the growing number of existing parties that are identified as Eurosceptic and far-right populist.

This thesis tries to give an answer to the research question: what are the effects of politicization on Council voting behaviour since the migration crisis of 2015? This is done by dissecting the investigation into three levels of politics and by finding quantitative data from data sets that support the analysis. First, the popular level was investigated to find out whether Euroscepticism had increased among EU citizens. Since the 1990s EU affairs get politicised and thus enter mass politics. This resulted in European integration becoming (more) dependent on the attitudes and support of the EU citizens. In the EU, political orientations are not divided among the left-right axis, but rather that there is a cleavage between GAL (Green/Alternative/Libertarian) and TAN (Traditionalism/Authority/Nationalism) identities and political parties. TAN parties usually are more prone to oppose European integration on the grounds that it may threaten their cultural homogeneity and weaken national sovereignty, and therefore express more dissent towards the EU. The cultural identity one might have, may, thus, determine their position on European integration. It results that citizens' cultural and territorial identification are more important for their attitude towards the EU than economic interests. Individuals might have an exclusively national identity or exclusive European identity, or both. Exclusively nationalist individuals tend to be more prone to Euroscepticism because they are made to believe that nationalism is not compatible with European integration. These EU citizens who tend to have exclusive nationalist identities, usually find themselves on the TAN side of the cleavage and have strong opinions towards migration. Consequently, the migration crisis of 2015 worked as a catalyser for Eurosceptic parties to mobilise citizens on the TAN side.

Eurosceptic populist right parties gained votes by using the migration crisis as a catalyst to mobilise voters to take a critical stance towards European integration. Therefore, this thesis first investigated whether Euroscepticism had increased among the EU population. The data showed that this is not the case since. Data on citizens' identity over the years, presented in Figure on showed that, over the years, EU citizens' identities become more [nationality] first and then European instead of [nationality] only.

Second, even though there was a short period where negative views of the EU increased, like the period just after the peak of the migration crisis, the percentage of EU citizens with a positive view of the EU increased as can be seen in Figure . Last, the percentages of votes Eurosceptic parties tend to show that Eurosceptic parties have increased their popularity among the voters and gained more ground. However, as said in the analysis, does the scope of this research does not reach far enough to investigate every member state individually to underpin this tendency. The limitations of the data collected, with the criteria used, cannot confirm the increase in Euroscepticism among the EU citizens, even though the percentage of votes on Eurosceptic parties in the EU-28 has risen.

The second level of this research was on the domestic political level. There are multiple reasons why there might be dissent within political parties in the individual member states. The type of electoral system and the strategic actions of political parties are two explanations of intra-party dissent. Mainstream parties tend to have higher degrees of dissent since they need to speak to a broader range of voters than challenger parties who do not have to maintain the status quo. On the other hand tend governing parties to have lower degrees of dissent since they need to have a unified stance when going to represent their member state in Brussels. Data used in this thesis show that for some states the degree of dissent had indeed increased after the migration crisis. However, since there are too many possible external variables, it can not be confirmed that dissent within member states' political parties on European integration grew. The same counts for hypothesis 3, the EU-28 average position on European integration has become more favourable, however, looking at the member states individually, there are a lot of variations between the member states.

Politicization has made the voter more aware of European integration which made the public also more critical. Political parties tend to alter their position on European integration to meet the position of the voters. It is seen that in some member states this happened after the Eurozone crisis and migration crisis. Moreover, the data showed that governing parties maintain the same position over the years, as the theory suggested, but that politicization and the crises

did not mobilise public opinion enough to create more dissent against European integration within political parties.

The last level of the analysis concerned the EU-Council level. Data showed that the majority of legislation gets passed without any dissent from member states. This is explained by the fact that within the Council there is a norm to reach a consensus and most governing parties still remain to be pro-European forming coalitions among their other Council members to pass legislation. Public opinion does not only influence domestic-level politics but transcends also to the European level. The data showed that since the crises in Europe, public opinion also became more negative and Eurosceptic and the dissent within the Council has increased, even though the positive image of the EU seems restored. As said in the analysis, it cannot be concluded from the data whether member states that show dissent are working alone or in coalitions. Nonetheless, dissent has increased in the Council and even though there is still a culture of consensus, the future might be fragile and might show more Eurosceptic parties entering the Council and projecting their dissent towards European integration.

This research has given a short overview of the effects of politicization on the popular, political domestic, and Council level, with a focus on the right-wing and Eurosceptic political identities. To predict what the long-term effects of politicization will be in the future, and whether the EU is becoming more Eurosceptic, more and detailed research is needed. It is suggested that in further research every level should be researched more extensively. It will be worthwhile to look into member states and to do a comparative analysis to see if there are differences between member states. One can think of a division of the North-South, East-West, or net–payer–net receiver division in the research scope. Furthermore, this research showed that only looking at data is not sufficient to draw firm conclusions and that qualitative research on the discourses of political parties is needed. Lastly, an opportunity that could have been taken into account in this research is the level of the salience of European integration. In future research, this should be taken into account since EU salience is closely linked to the EU position and the degree of dissent.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Table of percentages of EU citizen's identity from 2010-2019. Data graphically displayed in Figure 1.

Year	Nationality only	Nationality + EU	EU + nationality	EU only	None
May-10	46%	41%	7%	3%	1%
May-12	38%	49%	6%	3%	2%
May-13	38%	49%	7%	3%	1%
May-14	39%	51%	6%	2%	1%
May-15	38%	52%	6%	2%	1%
May-16	41%	51%	5%	1%	1%
May-17	37%	53%	6%	2%	1%
Mar-18	35%	54%	7%	2%	1%
Jun-19	33%	55%	8%	2%	1%

Appendix 2

Tables of domestic political parties with degree of dissent for the years 2010, 2014, 2019 of EU-28.

Belgium	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2019)
VB	2.7	1.5	2.8
SPA	3.0	3.3	2.5
LDP	2.8		
PvdA	2.5	2.0	2.7
VLD	2.5	2.0	1.5
CD&V	2.3	1.5	2.5
CDH	2.3	1.5	2.3
AGALEV;Groen	2.2	3.0	2.5
PS	2.5	3.0	2.8
VU;NVA	2.5	3.5	3.8
Spirit	3.7		
ECOLO	2.2	1.7	2.5
MR	2.3	1.3	2.0
FN	3.1		
FDF		1.7	
PP		1.5	
Average	**2.6**	**2.1**	**2.5**

Denmark	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
EL	1.5	1.8	4.0
Folk B	1.0	0.2	
LA	1.8	1.9	3.9
SF	5.7	5.0	3.9
DF	0.9	1.1	1.4
RV	1.1	1.1	1.1
V	2.4	3.1	4.3
KF	2.5	3.9	3.3
SD	3.2	3.7	3.1
NB			2.0
A			2.6
Average	**2.2**	**2.4**	**3.0**

Germany	2010 (elections in 2009)	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2017)
CDU	3.4	2.3	2.6
Grunen	3.0	3.0	1.5
LINKE	3.3	4.9	5.1
SPD	2.9	2.8	2.4
FDP	2.9	5.3	3.7
CSU	4.4	3.5	3.6
NPD		0.8	
AfD		1.3	2.1
Die Tier		3.0	0.0
Piraten		5.4	0.0
Average	**3.3**	**3.2**	**2.3**

Greece	2010 (elections in 2009)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2019)
LAOS	2.0	2.9	
OP	1.7		
SYRIZA	7.0	7.1	4.7
DIKKI	1.4		
PASOK	4.5	1.9	1.8
ND	5.5	2.6	1.8
KKE	0.1	0.7	0.2
DIMAR		4.0	
XA		0.4	0.8
Potami		2.3	
ANEL		3.4	
MR25			1.0
KIDISO			1.5
EL			1.4
Average	**3.2**	**2.8**	**1.6**

Spain	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
PSOE	0.9	0.7	1.6
PP	1.4	0.6	2.2
ERC	2.3	2.8	3.9
IU	2.9	3.3	3.9
UPyD	0.8	0.9	
EdP-V	1.0		
CiU	1.5	1.3	
BNG	2.1	2.6	2.0
CC	1.3	1.3	2.8
CpE	1.3		
EA	1.6	2.0	
CHA	1.5		
PNV	1.5	1.5	2.3
IC		2.9	
Cs		0.9	2.3
Amaiur		2.2	
Podemos		2.7	3.3
Pais			2.6
EHB			1.3
PdeCat			3.6
VOX			2.0
Average	**1.6**	**1.8**	**2.6**

France	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2017)
PCF	2.3	2.9	3.7
PS	5.4	6.8	5.3
PRG	3.6	3.0	
VERTS;EELV	3.3	3.6	3.7
NC	0.0	2.4	
UMP	4.4	5.8	6.7
MPF	1.7	0.7	
MODEM	1.6	1.8	2.7
FN;RN	1.3	1.1	2.7
PRV		2.0	
PG		1.7	
Ensemble		4.0	
AC		1.3	
FI			6.5
LREM			3.0
DLF			1.3
Average	**2.6**	**2.9**	**3.9**

Ireland	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2016)
FG	3.1	2.2	1.7
FF	4.1	3.1	2.0
SF	1.7	1.7	1.0
LAB	3.4	2.8	1.3
SP	2.4	1.8	
GP	5.0	2.4	1.3
PBPA		1.3	3.0
DS			2.0
I4C			0.0
RI			2.0
Average	**3.3**	**2.2**	**1.6**

Italy	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2018)
VERDI	1.8		
PSI	2.3		
UDC	1.6	1.2	
SD	1.8		
SL	3.0	2.0	5.0
PdCI	0.0		
PD	1.9	2.9	1.6
RC	3.2	2.0	
PDL	4.5		
MpA	1.0		
SVP	1.3	1.0	0.5
LN	2.0	0.9	2.8
AN	3.6		
IdV	1.5		
SC		0.6	
VdA		1.5	
FI		5.9	4.1
FDL		1.0	0.6
M5S		2.4	5.5
CD		1.3	
NCD		2.0	
RI			1.3
Average	**2.1**	**1.9**	**2.7**

Degree of dissent on European integration ranging from 0-10.

0 = Party was completely united

10 = Party was extremely divided

Netherlands	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2017)
CU	1.8	1.4	3.0
CDA	2.9	3.8	2.0
PvdD	1.8	2.0	1.0
VVD	3.5	4.3	3.0
PvdA	4.7	5.0	1.7
D66	1.5	1.7	0.7
SP	1.5	2.0	4.3
GL	2.2	2.4	1.3
PVV	0.8	0.9	0.0
SGP	0.0	1.2	2.0
50PLUS		1.0	3.5
FvD			1.0
DENK			1.0
Average	**2.1**	**2.3**	**1.9**

UK	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2010)	2019 (elections in 2019)
UKIP	0.9	0.7	0.3
LAB	3.6	3.6	8.0
SNP	2.6	3.0	1.5
CONS	5.4	7.3	4.6
LibDem	1.9	2.0	1.3
PLAID	2.6	3.0	1.2
BNP	1.5		
GREEN	2.5	4.0	0.9
BREXiT			2.0
Average	**2.6**	**3.4**	**2.5**

Portugal	2010 (elections in 2009)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
PS	1.5	3.7	3.0
PSD	2.2	3.1	5.7
BE	1.8	3.6	1.0
CDS-PP	2.0	2.3	5.7
CDU	0.8	0.3	0.3
MPT		2.5	
PCP			0.3
PEV			0.3
PAN			4.0
Average	**1.7**	**2.6**	**2.5**

Austria	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2019)
GRUNE	2.5	2.4	2.1
SPO	3.5	2.8	3.5
BZO	2.8	3.9	
FPO	2.3	1.7	2.5
MARTIN	1.3		
OVP	2.4	1.9	6.5
TeaStronach		3.6	
NEOS		2.2	1.5
Average	**2.5**	**2.6**	**3.2**

Finland	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
SDP	3.9	3.8	3.5
KESK	5.9	5.0	4.9
KOK	1.5	2.6	2.2
VIHR	1.8	3.0	1.8
VAS	4.6	4.6	4.3
PS	1.0	0.9	1.8
KD	4.0	2.7	3.6
SFP	2.3	2.9	1.8
Average	**3.1**	**3.2**	**3.0**

Sweden	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2018)
FP	1.4	1.4	1.3
V	2.7	1.6	3.7
PIRAT	2.5	2.5	
JL	1.5		
MP	4.8	4.0	3.5
C	4.1	4.3	2.7
KD	3.7	3.1	2.2
MP	2.3	2.5	2.0
SD	1.9	0.9	2.3
SAP	5.1	4.8	3.3
FI		3.4	
Average	**3.0**	**2.8**	**2.6**

Bulgaria	2010 (elections in 2009)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2017)
NOA	2.0	1.9	1.9
L	7.0		
KzB	3.6	5.3	4.6
RZS	4.4		
ODS	0.7	1.2	
DSB	0.9	1.3	1.8
BNS	2.0		
DPS	2.8	2.1	1.4
GERB	0.5		2.2
NDSV	1.8		
VMRO-BND		2.1	
ABV		3.2	
DBG		1.3	
NFSB		2.1	2.0
BBT		3.5	
Volya			2.2
Slavi Trifonov			1.0
DB			1.8
Average	**2.6**	**2.4**	**2.1**

Czech Republic	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2017)
KDU-CSL	1.7	1.4	2.2
TOP09	2.0	1.5	1.3
VV	2.4		
ODS	5.2	3.6	2.9
KSCM	2.1	3.2	2.5
CSSD	1.7	2.9	4.2
SZ	1.1	2.2	
USVIT		2.4	
SVOBODNI		0.8	
ANO2011		3.0	2.8
Pirates			3.1
STAN			1.3
SPD			1.1
Average	**2.3**	**2.3**	**2.4**

Estonia	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
ER	1.3	2.3	1.5
IRL	1.4	1.8	2.5
EK	3.6	4.3	3.8
EER	2.8	2.5	
ERL	4.4		
SDE	1.4	2.0	2.0
EVE		2.8	
E200			1.3
EKRE			2.3
Average	**2.5**	**2.6**	**2.2**

Hungary	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2018)
SZDSZ	1.6		
MDF	2.9		
KDNP	3.2		
JOBBIK	3.4	1.7	4.3
LMP	1.2	2.8	4.2
MSZP	2.0	2.7	1.5
Fidesz-M	3.0	2.7	1.6
DK		1.9	0.2
E14		1.9	0.0
MM			0.9
Average	**2.5**	**2.3**	**1.8**

Latvia	2010 (elections inn 2011)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2018)
ZRP	5.3		
ZZS	5.6	5.0	4.7
V	5.1	1.4	1.3
SC/SDPS	5.8	3.7	3.8
NA	5.3	3.9	4.5
LKS		3.5	3.2
NSL		5.0	
LRA		4.7	3.4
AP!			1.2
KPV LV			4.7
JKP			3.3
Average	**5.4**	**3.9**	**3.3**

Lithuania	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2016)
LRLS	4.4	1.2	3.7
NS	5.1		
LLRA	2.6	1.3	2.7
TS-LKD	4.8	3.6	4.3
TT	3.6	6.0	4.3
TPP	3.4		
LSDP	3.7	1.9	2.7
LVLS	3.4	4.0	3.7
LiCS	4.1		
DP	3.1	3.3	3.3
FRONT	3.5		
DK		4.9	
LCP			3.0
LZP			3.5
VKM-AMT			1.5
Average	**3.8**	**3.3**	**3.3**

Poland	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
PO	2.1	2.6	2.2
SD	3.1		
SD	3.3		
PiS	2.8	3.3	3.0
SLD	2.0	2.0	2.2
LPR	1.7		
PSL	3.1	3.9	3.6
SDPL	2.0		
KNP		1.3	
SP		2.8	
PR		3.1	
RP		2.4	
Wiosnia			1.1
Konfederacia			2.2
Kukiz			3.0
Nowo			1.1
Lewica Razem			2.0
Average	**2.5**	**2.6**	**2.3**

Romania	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2016)
PDL	2.3	2.5	
PRM	2.1		
PSD	2.5	3.1	4.3
UDMR	1.9	2.1	4.3
PC	2.7	3.0	
PNL	2.8	2.3	3.4
PMP		1.7	2.3
PP-DD		2.6	
PLR		1.5	3.0
UNPR		2.2	
USR			2.9
PRO			2.8
Average	**2.4**	**2.3**	**3.3**

Slovakia	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2016)
SNS	1.6	3.0	2.7
SF	1.2		
KSS	1.2		
SMK	1.5	1.6	3.8
KDH	2.8	2.4	2.8
LS-HZDS	1.9		
Smer	1.4	1.5	4.7
SaS	1.7	3.8	4.5
Most	3.1	1.9	1.5
SDKU-DS	2.3	1.4	
NOVA		2.5	
Siet		1.8	1.0
OLaNO		5.4	5.3
LSNS			1.0
ZaLudi			2.7
PS			2.8
Sme Rodina			4.2
SPOLU			3.0
Average	**1.9**	**2.5**	**3.1**

Slovenia	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2018)
Zares	2.3		
DeSUS	1.8	2.5	3.1
NSI	1.6	2.4	2.1
SNS	1.7		1.9
SD	2.5	3.2	2.3
SLS-SMS	2.1	2.5	
LDS	2.4		
SDS	1.6	1.7	2.1
ZL		1.2	3.3
ZaAB		2.5	2.3
PS		3.0	
SMC		2.1	2.3
LMS			2.7
Average	**2.0**	**2.3**	**2.4**

Croatia	2010	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2016)
HSLS		1.0	1.5
ORaH		1.0	
HSP		1.8	
HDZ		1.6	3.1
HDSSB		1.2	3.7
HSS		1.7	2.5
HSP-AS		4.0	
HL-SR		1.8	
HNS		1.1	1.5
SDP		1.2	1.6
IDS		0.7	0.6
Most			3.9
HKS			2.2
SDSS			1.6
ZZ			3.3
HSU			1.0
NSR			2.0
MB			2.3
Average		**1.5**	**2.2**

Columna1	2010	Columna3	Columna4
Malta		2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2017)
PL		3.0	0.8
PN		1.3	1.3
Average		**2.1**	**1.0**

Luxembourg	2010	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2018)
GRENG		3.0	2.0
ADR		1.3	3.0
LSAP		3.7	2.0
DP		2.7	2.0
CSV		2.3	2.0
DL		1.3	3.0
PPLU			2.0
Average		**2.4**	**2.3**

Cyprus	2010	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2016)
KOP		1.5	0.0
DISY		1.0	0.0
DIKO		1.5	0.0
EVROKO		1.0	
EDEK		1.5	1.0
AKEL		2.5	2.0
SYM			0.0
KINHMA			0.0
ELAM			0.0
Average		**1.5**	**0.4**

Appendix 3

Tables of EU position for every domestic political party in the years 2010, 2014, 2019 of EU-28.

Belgium	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2019)
VB	2.6	2.6	2.3
SPA	6.1	6.0	6.0
LDP	3.5		
PvdA	2.4	3.4	2.7
VLD	6.7	6.6	6.8
CD&V	6.7	6.6	6.6
CDH	6.6	6.4	6.4
AGALEV;Groen	6.2	6.2	6.6
PS	6.2	6.0	6.1
VU;NVA	5.3	5.0	4.3
Spirit	5.3		
ECOLO	6.0	6.3	6.6
MR	6.7	6.4	6.5
FN	2.6		
FDF		6.4	
PP		2.5	
Average	**5.2**	**5.4**	**5.5**

Denmark	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
EL	1.7	1.8	2.4
Folk B	1.3	1.1	
LA	6.1	3.8	4.1
SF	4.5	4.6	5.1
DF	2.4	1.9	2.0
RV	6.8	7.0	6.9
V	6.1	5.8	5.8
KF	5.9	5.5	5.7
SD	5.9	6.0	5.1
NB			1.8
A			5.4
Average	**4.5**	**4.2**	**4.4**

Germany	2010 (elections in 2009)	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2017)
CDU	6.0	6.4	6.3
Grunen	6.0	6.2	6.8
LINKE	3.3	3.0	4.7
SPD	5.9	6.4	6.5
FDP	6.0	5.7	5.8
CSU	4.9	4.8	5.7
NPD		1.7	
AfD		1.6	1.9
Die Tier		4.0	5.0
Piraten		4.7	6.5
Average	**5.4**	**4.5**	**5.5**

Greece	2010 (elections in 2009)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2019)
LAOS	3.3	3.3	
OP	5.6		
SYRIZA	2.2	3.4	5.0
DIKKI	1.8		
PASOK	6.1	6.6	6.9
ND	5.3	6.6	6.9
KKE	1.0	1.1	1.1
DIMAR		5.8	
XA		1.1	1.2
Potami		6.0	
ANEL		2.2	
MR25			4.6
KIDISO			6.2
EL			2.1
Average	**3.6**	**4.0**	**4.3**

Spain	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
PSOE	6.8	6.7	6.8
PP	6.0	6.8	6.5
ERC	5.3	5.6	5.5
IU	4.8	4.6	5.3
UPyD	5.3	6.7	
EdP-V	5.5		
CiU	6.1	6.3	
BNG	4.8	5.0	5.5
CC	5.6	6.4	6.4
CpE	5.0		
EA	5.0	6.4	
CHA	5.0		
PNV	5.7	6.4	6.4
IC		4.8	
Cs		6.7	6.7
Amaiur/EHB		4.7	4.5
Podemos		4.4	5.3
Pais			5.9
PdeCat			5.1
VOX			3.3
Average	**5.4**	**5.8**	**5.6**

France	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2017)
PCF	2.8	2.6	3.0
PS	6.1	5.8	6.1
PRG	6.2	5.8	
VERTS;EELV	6.1	6.2	6.4
NC	6.3	6.2	
UMP	6.0	5.4	5.5
MPF	1.5	1.2	
MODEM	6.7	6.6	6.7
FN;RN	1.2	1.2	1.4
PRV		6.0	
PG		1.7	
Ensemble		3.3	
AC		6.6	
FI			2.9
LREM			6.8
DLF			1.4
Average	**4.8**	**4.5**	**4.5**

Ireland	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2016)
FG	6.5	6.4	6.3
FF	6.4	5.6	6.1
SF	2.6	2.8	3.7
LAB	5.9	5.9	6.1
SP	2.4	2.2	
GP	5.0	4.4	5.9
PBPA		2.3	2.0
DS			5.0
I4C			3.7
RI			3.2
Average	**4.8**	**4.2**	**4.7**

Italy	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2018)
VERDI	5.9		
PSI	5.8		
UDC	6.3	6.1	
SD	5.8		
SL	4.5	3.1	5.3
PdCI	3.8		
PD	6.6	6.6	6.8
RC	3.3	2.0	
PDL	4.7		
MpA	4.7		
SVP	6.4	5.7	5.9
LN	2.7	1.1	1.7
AN	5.8		
IdV	6.1		
SC		6.9	
VdA		5.3	
FI		3.4	4.9
FDL		2.2	1.9
M5S		1.4	3.5
CD		5.8	
NCD		5.7	
RI			6.8
Average	**5.1**	**4.3**	**4.6**

The overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration.

1 = Strongly opposed
2 = Opposed
3 = Somewhat opposed
4 = Neutral
5 = Somewhat in favour
6 = in favour
7 = Strongly in favour

Netherlands	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2017)
CU	3.8	3.4	4.0
CDA	5.3	5.5	5.3
PvdD	3.6	3.7	2.6
VVD	3.9	5.2	5.1
PvdA	5.3	5.5	5.9
D66	6.6	6.8	6.9
SP	2.4	2.1	2.8
GL	6.2	6.5	6.5
PVV	1.4	1.1	1.3
SGP	3.0	2.6	2.9
50PLUS		4.8	3.9
FvD			1.1
DENK			4.7
Average	**4.2**	**4.3**	**4.1**

UK	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2010)	2019 (elections in 2019)
UKIP	1.0	1.1	1.0
LAB	4.8	5.6	4.0
SNP	5.1	6.3	6.6
CONS	2.3	3.1	1.5
LibDem	6.0	6.7	6.8
PLAID	5.0	6.0	6.2
BNP	1.2		
GREEN	4.7	5.2	6.7
BREXiT			1.9
Average	**3.8**	**4.9**	**4.3**

Portugal	2010 (elections in 2009)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
PS	7.0	6.4	6.8
PSD	6.7	6.9	6.8
BE	3.7	3.1	3.8
CDS-PP	5.5	6.1	5.9
CDU	3.0	1.9	2.4
MPT		3.4	
PCP			2.8
PEV			3.0
PAN			4.2
Average	**5.2**	**4.6**	**4.4**

Austria	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2019)
GRUNE	6.1	6.5	6.5
SPO	5.3	6.0	6.1
BZO	2.4	2.7	
FPO	1.9	1.9	2.3
MARTIN	3.8		
OVP	6.4	6.7	5.0
TeaStronach		2.9	
NEOS		6.3	6.7
Average	**4.3**	**4.7**	**5.3**

Finland	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
SDP	5.9	5.6	5.9
KESK	5.4	4.5	4.9
KOK	6.4	6.6	6.4
VIHR	6.1	5.9	6.5
VAS	4.1	4.3	5.1
PS	1.7	1.6	1.6
KD	3.8	3.9	3.9
SFP	6.3	6.4	6.4
Average	**5.0**	**4.8**	**5.1**

Sweden	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2018)
FP	6.9	6.9	6.9
V	2.0	2.1	3.2
PIRAT	3.8	3.7	
JL	2.3		
MP	3.4	4.4	5.1
C	5.7	5.4	5.9
KD	5.9	5.9	5.8
MP	6.3	6.4	6.1
SD	1.6	1.3	2.2
SAP	6.0	5.3	5.8
FI		3.2	
Average	**4.4**	**4.5**	**5.1**

Bulgaria	2010 (elections in 2009)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2017)
NOA	2.5	1.5	2.2
L	4.0		
KzB	6.0	5.3	5.1
RZS	4.2		
ODS	6.7	6.6	
DSB	6.5	6.6	6.8
BNS	6.0		
DPS	5.8	6.0	6.3
GERB	6.7	6.8	6.6
NDSV	6.5		
VMRO-BND		3.3	3.8
ABV		5.6	
DBG		6.0	
NFSB		3.0	3.9
BBT		4.5	
Volya			3.5
Slavi Trifonov			4.4
DB			6.8
Average	**5.5**	**5.0**	**4.9**

Czech Republic	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2017)
KDU-CSL	6.1	6.5	6.2
TOP09	5.8	6.7	6.7
VV	4.9		
ODS	3.0	2.9	3.8
KSCM	2.5	2.7	2.4
CSSD	6.2	6.1	5.7
SZ	6.7	6.6	
USVIT		2.3	
SVOBODNI		1.3	
ANO2011		5.2	4.5
Pirates			6.1
STAN			6.5
SPD			1.5
Average	**5.0**	**4.5**	**4.8**

Estonia	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
ER	6.8	6.9	6.6
IRL	6.5	6.5	5.1
EK	5.3	5.0	5.5
EER	5.8	2.5	
ERL	4.6		
SDE	6.6	6.9	6.6
EVE		6.2	
E200			6.8
EKRE			2.1
Average	**5.9**	**5.7**	**5.4**

Hungary	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2018)
SZDSZ	6.6		
MDF	5.9		
KDNP	4.9		
JOBBIK	2.4	1.2	3.8
LMP	6.5	5.3	5.5
MSZP	6.6	6.1	6.5
Fidesz-M	5.4	2.7	3.1
DK		6.7	6.9
E14		6.6	6.4
MM			6.5
Average	**5.5**	**4.8**	**5.5**

Latvia	2010 (elections inn 2011)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2018)
ZRP	6.0		
ZZS	4.1	5.0	4.8
V	6.2	6.8	6.8
SC/SDPS	3.1	4.2	5.5
NA	4.4	5.7	4.7
LKS		2.9	4.3
NSL		4.2	
LRA		5.1	5.3
AP!			6.6
KPV LV			5.1
JKP			5.7
Average	**4.8**	**4.8**	**5.4**

Lithuania	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2016)
LRLS	6.4	6.5	6.6
NS	6.2		
LLRA	5.6	4.2	4.5
TS-LKD	6.7	6.5	6.8
TT	4.6	3.6	4.3
TPP	5.6		
LSDP	6.5	6.6	6.7
LVLS	5.1	4.7	5.5
LiCS	6.1		
DP	5.5	5.1	5.1
FRONT	2.7		
DK		3.1	
LCP			3.8
LZP			6.1
VKM-AMT			6.8
Average	**5.5**	**5.1**	**5.6**

Poland	2010 (elections in 2007)	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2019)
PO	6.6	6.5	6.7
SD	6.7		
SD	3.3		
PiS	2.9	3.8	3.0
SLD	6.6	6.6	6.6
LPR	1.7		
PSL	5.1	5.5	5.1
SDPL	6.7		
KNP		1.1	
SP		3.0	
PR		4.0	
RP		6.7	
Wiosnia			6.9
Konfederacia			1.4
Kukiz			3.1
Nowo			6.9
Lewica Razem			6.6
Average	**4.9**	**4.6**	**5.1**

Romania	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2016)
PDL	6.4	6.6	
PRM	3.7		
PSD	6.1	5.8	4.0
UDMR	6.5	6.3	6.1
PC	5.5	5.4	
PNL	6.3	6.5	6.3
PMP		6.5	5.7
PP-DD		4.5	
PLR		6.3	5.4
UNPR		5.6	
USR			4.0
PRO			5.4
Average	**5.7**	**6.0**	**5.3**

Slovakia	2010 (elections in 2010)	2014 (elections in 2012)	2019 (elections in 2016)
SNS	3.1	2.3	3.1
SF	5.6		
KSS	2.6		
SMK	5.8	6.1	6.1
KDH	4.5	5.0	5.2
LS-HZDS	5.1		
Smer	5.9	6.1	5.2
SaS	4.5	2.9	4.1
Most	5.9	6.4	6.4
SDKU-DS	5.2	6.4	
NOVA		4.3	
Siet		5.2	6.1
OLaNO		3.0	4.8
LSNS			1.3
ZaLudi			6.5
PS			6.9
Sme Rodina			3.1
SPOLU			6.9
Average	**4.8**	**4.8**	**5.1**

Slovenia	2010 (elections in 2008)	2014 (elections in 2014)	2019 (elections in 2018)
Zares	6.4		
DeSUS	4.9	5.8	5.5
NSI	4.9	6.5	6.0
SNS	3.0		1.9
SD	6.5	5.8	6.5
SLS-SMS	4.7	6.1	
LDS	6.5		
SDS	5.8	6.4	5.1
ZL		3.7	4.1
ZaAB		6.6	6.4
PS		6.1	
SMC		6.4	6.5
LMS			6.0
Average	**5.3**	**5.9**	**5.3**

Croatia	2010	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2016)
HSLS		6.3	6.5
ORaH		6.1	
HSP		2.9	
HDZ		6.2	6.7
HDSSB		4.8	3.9
HSS		5.0	6.4
HSP-AS		3.6	
HL-SR		5.6	
HNS		7.0	6.6
SDP		6.6	6.6
IDS		6.8	6.9
Most			3.8
HKS			2.6
SDSS			6.2
ZZ			1.8
HSU			5.8
NSR			6.4
MB			4.8
Average		**5.5**	**5.4**

Columna1	2010	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2017)
Malta		5.599999	6.142857
PL		7.0	6.6
PN		6.3	6.4
Average		**6.6**	**6.5**

Luxembourg	2010	2014 (elections in 2013)	2019 (elections in 2018)
GRENG		6.3	6.0
ADR		3.0	4.0
LSAP		6.3	6.5
DP		6.3	6.5
CSV		7.0	6.5
DL		3.7	4.0
PPLU			4.5
Average		**5.4**	**5.4**

Cyprus	2010	2014 (elections in 2011)	2019 (elections in 2016)
KOP		5.5	5.0
DISY		6.8	6.0
DIKO		5.5	6.0
EVROKO		6.0	
EDEK		5.8	5.5
AKEL		4.5	5.0
SYM			5.0
KINHMA			5.0
ELAM			3.5
Average		**5.7**	**5.1**