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Why can we observe a lack of commitment compared to third parties?**
Shaw, Maya

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Maya Shaw
s3379639

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The French government's knowledge-use on social discrimination: Why can we observe a lack of commitment compared to third parties?

Abstract

We notice the rise in activism, particularly towards social discrimination issues such as anti-racism, women's rights, and LGBTQ+ rights in Europe (insights YPulse, July 2020; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018). However, governments tend to publicly underweight these issues and activism remain (The Guardian, November 2020; France24, June 2020). Alongside, we notice non-governmental organisations often use, create, and disseminate knowledge on social discrimination (Datta & Baertl, 2020). Particularly, they target public powers and urge them to institutionalise more policies, based on this knowledge (runnymedetrust.org; rota.org.uk; tnova.fr; jean-jaurès.org). The lack of governmental response i.e. increase in public commitment, would predict a lack of interaction with this knowledge, as it has become increasingly visible and accessible with the rise of social movements. Accordingly, we aim to determine whether public powers and non-governmental organisations use different kinds of knowledges, and whether this can explain their differences in commitment. The literature predicts that organisational structures and/ or organisational ideologies can influence whether public powers and non-governmental organisations use the same knowledges (Stone, Daviter 2015). We aim to shed light on knowledge-use on social discrimination by interviewing five actors in the field of social discrimination in France. Notably, this inductive analysis is based on interviews from both governmental and non-governmental actors, to determine their respective knowledge-uses. This design considers the existing scientific claims while allowing us to uncover new influences with open-ended interview questions. This study finds that the French government and NGOs share the same ideology and can use the same knowledge. Instead, it is obstacles such as internal resistance, the political agenda, the NGOs' coalition levels, the level of political action, and coordination issues that could explain the lack of public commitment.

Contents

Introduction p.4

Theoretical Framework p.7

Methodology p.20

Results p.25

Discussion & Conclusion p.41

Introduction

We notice the increased polarisation of political debate in Europe (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018). Notably, this phenomenon is characterised by the rise of activism, particularly towards issues such as anti-racism, women's rights, and LGBT+ rights (insights YPulse, July 2020). For example, we can mention the international traction of the Black Lives Matter, an anti-racism movement (Inthesetimes.com, June 2015), as well as MeToo, a movement for sexual harassment awareness (foreignpolicy.com, March 2019). I will use the umbrella term 'social discrimination issues' to refer to these inquiries.

However, public powers tend to publicly underweight these issues and activism remain (The Guardian, November 2020; France24, June 2020). It is from this observation that this study can predict a lack of knowledge-use on social issues from public powers. Importantly, I will use Daviter's definition of knowledge-use in this study: "research, analysis, evaluation, data" (Daviter, 2015, p.493). For example, the UK's government Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities was set up after the Black Lives Matter movement gained international traction. However, its chair, Tony Sewell has claimed that the notion of systemic racism engenders victimhood (The Guardian, November 2020). Accordingly, delegating systemic racism as victimhood communicates the lack of understanding on the chair's behalf, as the term systemic racism has been defined as the embedment and sustenance of racism by our systems (Banaji et al. 2021, p.2). Indeed, an accurate comprehension of the concept would not put the locus on the individuals affected by institutional racism but, instead, would emphasize the history of colonialism, such that some repercussions remain. In other terms, Sewell's reaction predicts a lack of knowledge-use on systemic racism. This reaction can be observed in numerous contexts in Europe towards different kinds of social issues (France24, June 2020). In turn, this lack of knowledge-use could explain why the institutionalisation of new social discrimination policies is lacking, according to activists and non-governmental organisations (Begum et al., 2022). Even in cases where governments do communicate urgency, action is not necessarily taken. In the UK, the official response was that the government "accepted the arguments but rejected the solutions" (The Guardian, February 2021). In France, anti-racist movement have asked for a sector-wide police force reform to avoid further events of racist police brutality. Regardless of their mediatic coverage, governments have not answered to their request (France 24, June 2020; Elle, June 2020). Accordingly, the governmental responses are underwhelming in this regard, and can explain the persistence of activism.

Concurrently, non-governmental organisations often use, create, and disseminate knowledge on identity social issues while emphasizing the urgency in the institutionalisation

of more social discrimination policies (runnymedetrust.org; rota.org.uk; tnova.fr; jean-jaures.org). Organisations have even been built with this mission in mind. The Runnymede Trust for instance, is a British think-tank occupied with fighting against systemic racism in Britain, both through grassroots actions and by exerting pressure onto public organisations. For example, in 2020, the organisation released a report on racism in English secondary schools based on teachers' interviews across the country (Runnymede Trust, 2020). This research permitted the drafting of accompanying recommendations for the government to better protect children of colour in English secondary schools (Runnymede Trust, 2020). This data is an example of how knowledge can be created. The corresponding recommendations are an example of how this knowledge can be used.

The lack of institutionalisation of such recommendations, as well the sustained public underestimation of these issues, predict that public powers do not use the same knowledge as the relevant third parties. Indeed, if they did use the knowledge that third parties create and use on social discrimination, we can expect that they would publicly pledge their commitment, as well as institutionalise more relevant policies. We aim to uncover what kind, if any, knowledge is used by governments on social discrimination. It is also possible that public powers do use the same knowledge without using it as a motor for action. In that case, other factors than differences in knowledge-uses could be the cause for the lack of more social discrimination policies. This will likely become apparent through this study. Accordingly, we aim to elucidate the knowledge-use of both sides: governmental and non-governmental, which on a prima facie level seem to be different.

This study observes this relationship in France, as the current and last presidency posits no clear party alignment (enmarche.fr/lemouvement). Thus, it leaves more room for commitment to knowledge-use on social discrimination, compared to conservative governments for example. Indeed, the fight for social equality is often labelled as a leftist enquiry (Norberto & Allan, 1997). Accordingly, the French presidency would facilitate the government's use of third parties' knowledge. Using this context for this study isolates the main explanatory factor, as party ideology is likely to have a weak role.

Our research question is: *Does the French government not use knowledge on social discrimination created by third parties?*

Importantly, this study uses an inductive design for interviews. Accordingly, this analysis is also open to the fact that public powers do use knowledge created by third parties, such that a public lack of commitment and lack of institutionalisation is attributable to other reasons than a difference in knowledge-use. This will become apparent through the observation of knowledge uses.

Scientific relevance

This research fills the scientific gap by clarifying the empirical nuances lacking in the literature. The existing research maps a hierarchical picture of knowledge-use. Indeed, the idea of good and bad knowledge is relegated as a romantic notion, such that knowledge-use does not necessarily equate to better policy (Stone, 2002). Instead, knowledge is used to give legitimacy to a certain ideology (Stone, 2002; Laux, 2019; Dorren & Bohme, 2021). This view can be named the organisational ideology strand, such that it is claimed to directly determine knowledge-use. Accordingly, a difference in ideology between public powers and non-governmental organisations could predict a difference in knowledge-use.

Others argue that knowledge that contests the existing ideology can also be used within public organisations (Daviter, 2015; Head, 2013). Instead, it is the organisational structure that will determine whether and how this knowledge will be used. Accordingly, regardless of a difference in ideology, it would be possible for public powers to use third parties' knowledge on social discrimination. This line of thought can be named the organisational structure strand, such that it is claimed to directly determine knowledge-use. Thus, organisational ideologies and/or organisational structures are argued to determine whether some knowledge is used by public powers or not. Notably, these theories do not permit us to clearly predict whether public powers and non-governmental organisations use the same knowledge. Based on the literature, organisations could share the same ideology and use the same knowledges; they could differ in ideologies and use different knowledges; and they could differ in ideologies and still manage to use the same knowledges. For this reason, this research aims to determine whether there are differences in knowledge-uses. Additionally, this research observes knowledge-use in the specific context of policymaking on social discrimination such as anti-racism, gender equality, and LGBTQ+ rights. This specific focus fills the scientific gap on knowledge-use on policies against social discrimination. Indeed, we can find studies on anti-racism within specific policy fields, such as health or education. We can also find articles on knowledge-use in the policy cycle, in different policy areas. However, it is difficult to find studies on policy-wide knowledge use on social discrimination as an encompassing category.

Societal relevance

Lastly, this research answers to the resulting societal problems of the mentioned immobility regarding the public commitment on the fight against social discrimination, which predicts their lack of use of third parties' knowledge. In an age of increased social media activism, more and more individuals are touched by the understandings of social uproar. Indeed, many have been reached by educational content on femicides or less educational content on the 'curse' of radical feminists on platforms like YouTube, Instagram, or TikTok, for example

(Rotman et al., 2011). This surface-level information can make one feel helpless in a polarised world of problems, in which political opinions seem to lose more nuance every day. Especially as the prima-facie responsible actor, the government, seems to tolerate and even entertain this confusion as it underestimates the need for more policies against social discrimination. Accordingly, gaining an understanding of the reasons why governments do not increase their commitment, whether because of constraints or as a choice, can help civilians find clarity.

Lastly, this study also proves useful for third parties and governmental actors, to gain an understanding of each sides' motivation for their action. Indeed, this research can help both governments and third parties gain an increased understanding of each other and consider our results in their future collaboration.

In the first section we look at the theoretical understandings on the different types of knowledge, using Daviter's (2015) typology as a reference, on the knowledge that the relevant organisations use, and on their obstacles to knowledge-uses. In the second section we present our inductive and ethnographic design, as it allows us to account for both internal and external influences on phenomena. It also permits us to uncover it without being limited by the theoretical framework. In the third section, we discuss the results that rose from our interviews and the related conclusions.

Theoretical framework

I will use the existing literature to inform our understanding of the main phenomena we aim to study. First, we further develop on how knowledge can be used. Since we aim to observe the French government and non-governmental organisations' knowledge-use on social discrimination, it is important to determine whether this knowledge can be used in different ways; such that the term knowledge does not refer to simply one thing. In other terms, we discuss whether research, analysis, evaluation, and data can be used for different purposes. In that case, it would be possible that both public powers and third parties do not use the same knowledge or do but not for the same kinds of purposes. In our context, we use the definition of knowledge as a "provider of insights into the nature of social problems" (Daviter, 2015 p.493). Accordingly, in the case that French third parties and public powers use knowledge in different ways, it can lead to different visions of the social problem itself; rendering later stages of possible collaboration between the two sides complicated, as they define the issue differently. For that reason, we aim to clarify the ways in which these differences can arise.

Secondly, we develop on the relevant actors in our case, based on the understanding that mapping public powers and third parties as two sides of a binary is unrealistic. Accordingly, we need to understand the different types of organisations present on the continuum. Thus, this study discusses how these differing identities can influence their knowledge use. Ultimately, we find that the organisation's identity is likely to influence and even constitute internal obstacles to knowledge-use. The first section sheds light on the different kinds of knowledge organisations can create and use. This second section completes it by clarifying that organisational identities can influence what kinds of knowledge organisations will create and use (Stone, 2002). In other terms, this section predicts that, if the French government and the non-governmental organisations' ideologies are different, they are unlikely to use the same kinds of knowledges.

At last, we further expand on the potential obstacles to knowledge-use. This section expands on the potential restricting nature of organisational structures regarding knowledge-use. Whereas the second section presents organisational ideology as possible internal obstacles, this segment introduces organisational structures as external ones. Thus, research predicts that the relevant governmental organisation's structure can determine if, and how, French public powers use the knowledge created and used by third parties, regardless of the potential differences in ideologies.

The scientific gap becomes apparent at this stage as we remain unable to predict whether the French government uses the same knowledge as the relevant non-governmental organisations. In other terms, the theory section provides the rationale for the inductive design of this study. Namely, the lack of clarity in the literature motivates my choice to use it as a background framework, rather than a restriction for the research design.

The different types of knowledge

Knowledge can be built in different ways, from different sources and used for different ends. Accordingly, our first step is to clarify the kinds of knowledges and knowledge-uses we aim to observe in this research. We use Daviter's definition of knowledge: "research, analysis, evaluation, data' (Daviter, 2015, p.493). For example, in academic research, research designs are divided along two broad differences: qualitative and quantitative studies. Accordingly, qualitative data is built with words, whereas quantitative data is built with numbers. Explaining all the available differences in research designs is beyond the scope of this research. However, this example illustrate how knowledge can be created in different ways. Accordingly, it is possible that French public powers and third parties collect and

create knowledge while using different tools. We are more interested with how knowledge is used, considering that different ways of creating knowledge can create the same. For instance, one study could create numbers on the disparity in health complications between people of colour and white people. Another study could collect health-workers' testimonies and explain that they notice different strategies by co-workers when handling people of colour and white people. Both studies and datasets could point to the same phenomenon: the presence of systemic racism in the health sector, for example.

As well as different ways to collect and create knowledge, organisations can use this knowledge to different ends. Particularly, Daviter (2015) contextualises knowledge-use on two dimensions: Concrete or Conceptual use and Substantive or Strategic use. Accordingly, knowledge-use can be concrete and substantive: instrumental; it can be concrete and strategic: symbolic; it can be conceptual and substantive: enlightenment; and it can be conceptual and strategic: political (Table 1).

Table 1: Dimensions of knowledge-use

	Dimensions of knowledge use	
	Substantive	Strategic
Concrete	Instrumental	Symbolic
Conceptual	Enlightenment	Political

Daviter, 2015 p.496

Particularly, Daviter (2015) differentiates between concrete and conceptual uses of knowledge as the main differences in how knowledge can be used. The author explains that, historically, knowledge was used to clarify a relationship between means and ends in a concrete and empirical way. The idea that knowledge could also be conceptual was only developed later. Daviter (2015) argues that the role of conceptual knowledge-use is to change underlying assumptions rather than produce an established relationship between means and ends. In addition, he claims that conceptual knowledge-use will not imply immediate effects like instrumental knowledge-use.

Interestingly, the author does not expand on symbolic knowledge-use and tends to refer to concrete uses of knowledge as a whole. On the other hand, he significantly expands on the differences between conceptual uses of knowledge. This choice can be related to the author's view that conceptual uses of knowledge are particularly impactful in the policy-making realm (Daviter, 2015). Thus, according to the writer, the nuances between concrete

knowledge-uses are not the most relevant in policymaking. Instead, he expands on the distinction between conceptual uses, namely enlightenment and political uses.

Enlightenment knowledge-use is defined as using knowledge for dogmatic change, and is diffuse, long-term and therefore hard to observe (Daviter, 2015 p. 493). Enlightenment knowledge-use can be relevant in our case, as we could predict that the relevant actors aim to subvert the dogmatic assumptions about on social discrimination. However, considering that this analysis is not conducted over time, I do not predict that this kind of knowledge-use will arise. Instead, further research could aim to reproduce this study to potentially capture enlightenment as a knowledge-use across longer periods of time. Particularly, it is said to be observable in periods of five or ten years (Daviter, 2015 p.493).

In particular, the author is interested with one type of conceptual knowledge and its impact on policymaking: political knowledge. Indeed, he contends that conceptual use is not simply diffuse and difficult to observe, like enlightenment knowledge. It can also be observable in its effects, which is the case with political knowledge.

Political knowledge is defined as conceptual because it is ideological (Daviter, 2015).

Namely, it is knowledge on underlying assumptions of good practice, whether that supports the status quo (Laux, 2019; Dorren & Bohme, 2021) or challenges it (Daviter, 2015). It is not immediate in the way that concrete knowledge can be, because of its ideological nature.

However, it is more observable than enlightenment knowledge, as the latter is knowledge on dogma and therefore relates to deeper and larger assumptions than political knowledge.

Particularly, political knowledge is qualified as strategic, such that will be used with a political end in mind. On the other hand, enlightenment knowledge is said to be substantive, such that it does not refer to any strategy and fosters dogmatic understandings as such. Because of its observable and ideological nature, Daviter (2015) qualifies it as more impactful than concrete knowledge.

Indeed, in this article, Daviter (2015) focuses on political use of knowledge. According to him, this type of knowledge has been misunderstood and understudied; compared to other kinds. He attributes this gap by the broad academic beliefs that politics constrains the use of knowledge. He counters the literature that claims barriers to new knowledge-use are political, as political knowledge is claimed to be used to support pre-existing political ideology (Laux, 2019; Dorren & Bohme, 2021). Instead, Daviter (2015) claims it is administrative and organisational barriers that prevent new and dissenting political knowledge from being used by governments (Daviter, 2015). Thus, political knowledge's role is not simply to support previously made decisions and opinions, as it has been argued by Laux (2019), Dorren & Bohme (2021). It can also contest existing authority(Daviter, 2015). Accordingly, thinking about political knowledge as political ammunition encompasses both

scenarios. This notion of knowledge-use as a political contest is also supported by Head (2013) who explains policy decisions rarely emerge from strictly concrete knowledge. Instead, it is the contest of different conceptual understandings that will lead to the emergence of a policy decision, according to him. In simpler terms, Head (2013) claims conceptual knowledge-use is more likely to influence the policy-making process than concrete knowledge-use. Thus, the authors argue that conceptual use is more likely to arise in the policy-making realm than concrete knowledge use. In particular, it is not conceptual knowledge as a whole but political knowledge that will be the most influential for Daviter (2015).

Accordingly, we understand knowledge can be defined in different ways. I recognize that this knowledge can also be used in different ways, such that using different kinds of knowledge-use can be strategic and dependant on contexts. Based on this understanding, I predict to find conceptual and particularly political knowledge-use within public institutions, as it is argued to influence the policy-making process in ways concrete knowledge does not (Head, 2013, Daviter, 2015).

After having analysed the different ways in which knowledge can be used, we further develop on the different kinds of actors that can use knowledge on social discrimination.

Actors and their knowledge-use

The idea of two distinct atomistic bodies, namely governments and third parties, is a simplistic idealisation of the lived reality. Instead, third parties can be research centres, think-tanks, ONGs, as well as government-affiliated advisory bodies. The fact that the latter is directly affiliated with public bodies provide a relevant example of the continuum that exists between governments and non-governmental organisations and their related differing levels of governmental affiliation. These organisations can both exhibit significantly different goals and a strong overlap in their missions. According to Laux (2019), the organisations' mission statements, i.e., their purposes, goals and intended reach, will provide an insight on their organisational ideology. In other terms, he claims that the goals of organisations shape the rules, values, and norms of each organisation, which make up the organisation's ideology (Laux, 2019). Consequently, looking at the relevant organisations and their mission statements allows us to understand the differences in their organisational ideology. France Stratégie's goals, a government-affiliated consultancy firm, are: "to animate the public debate and enlighten collective choices. It also produces evaluations of public policies at the request of the government. These results are targeted to public powers, civil society, and citizens" (strategie.gouv.fr). Since the government is one of their main end-users, Laux's

(2019) understanding predicts that this organisation's ideology is based on the belief that the creation of knowledge should be readily understood and easy to implement by policymakers. Namely, this knowledge will likely account for political pressures and understandings of the policy-cycle (Daviter, 2015). Citizens are also one of their targets, which predict that these results will still be created in an accessible way for non-politicians.

This view is developed and supported by Stone (2002) as she claims that the differences in organisational ideologies between third parties and public powers are the reason why we can observe a lack of cooperation between both. Interestingly, Laux's (2019) view adds onto this argument by claiming that we can observe these differences in ideologies within third parties as a group; as well as between third parties and public powers. In other terms, governmental advisory organisations, think-tanks, research centres and NGOs are likely to exhibit different understandings on what is deemed as appropriate levels of knowledge-use, and what knowledge is defined as. Indeed, organisational ideology is likely to influence which research is considered, created, and legitimised in the first place (Stone, 2002). Accordingly, we predict to find a correlation between ideology and knowledge-use within this study. Particularly, Stone (2002) presents three scopes: supply, demand, and context that all exemplify these differences in ideologies.

Stone's supply-side reasons

Stone's supply side reasons refer to her claim that the third parties' lack understanding of the policy cycle (Stone, 2002). Indeed, Stone claims there is an insufficient amount of existing research focused on policy planning, i.e., political knowledge, from third parties. She argues that an increased supply of such research will, in turn, trigger demand from policymakers and facilitate their cooperation i.e., their use of third parties' knowledge (Stone, 2002). Another of the authors' interpretation is that there is policy content created, however, not in an open and accessible way, such that this knowledge stays guarded by the research community. Following Laux's (2019) argument, this can be attributable to different understandings of the rules on knowledge creation, such that academics often consider other academics as their main targets, minimising accessibility for other potential users, such as public powers. This line of argument claims that, since academics are in connection with other academics, research centres have likely internalized specific rules for knowledge-use that reflect their main targets. Accordingly, even if academic journals analyse phenomena that affect non-academics, they root their knowledge creation in prior academia and will use similar theoretical understandings (Laux, 2019; Stone, 2002). In turn, this knowledge will prove less attainable for non-academics (Laux, 2019; Stone, 2002).

Lastly, Stone (2002) claims that content that does account for political and policy context is not marketed towards policymakers. Indeed, organisations do not necessarily consider reaching national governments as their first target and are likely to structure their knowledge-use differently and according to their specific rules. For example, SOS Racisme is aimed at aiding and monitoring the reporting of discriminatory acts (Sos-racisme.org). Considering that, for such action, citizens are their main end-users, as they aim to provide support to victims of racism, they are likely to create knowledge in an attainable way and based in daily realities rather than complex theoretical understandings. In other terms, they are more susceptible to use concrete and empirical knowledge, over conceptual knowledge, to be more accessible for non-academics. We can observe this as they explain racism in terms of individual events. For example, Theo's was a victim of police brutality. His story was used by SOS Racisme as a rally for group manifestation against systemic racism within the French police (Les Propositions de SOS Racisme Pour l'Amélioration Des Rapports Police-Population | SOS Racisme). Indeed, using an individual case, especially one which has received significant mediatic coverage as this one, allows civilians to readily know what, and who, they are fighting for without using additional knowledge. We can imagine that if SOS Racisme organised manifestations that rallied against systemic racism, it would trigger less involvement as civilians would need prior documentation on what is systemic racism to feel responsible and concerned by the phenomenon, since it's a conceptual understanding of lived reality.

Understandably, this organisation also bridges their action with public powers by aiming to get their attention with public gatherings and engage politicians in the signing of their petitions. Here, we see a different way knowledge is used, as SOS Racisme created 26 propositions of new public policy to fight against racism and racial discriminations in France (26 Propositions de SOS Racisme Pour Lutter Contre Le Racisme et Les Discriminations Raciales En France, SOS Racisme). Indeed, this format clearly considers the policy-making process and the existing laws and structures, as these propositions can be implemented by public powers as such, without the need of additional drafting. For example, their first proposition mentions the 1997 McPherson commission model, implemented in the UK as a possible replacement of the exiting French Vigouroux commission which is, according to them, not efficient (26 Propositions de SOS Racisme Pour Lutter Contre Le Racisme et Les Discriminations Raciales En France, SOS Racisme). This proposition involves, among others, the implementation of controlled receipts for all police controls to allow follow-ups and avoid abuse of power or racially motivated controls. At the very least, the implementation of these receipts would permit accountability in those cases, which is why SOS Racisme argues in its favour.

Stone (2002) claims that accounting for the political and policy context in this way is often lacking in the supply side of collaboration between third parties and governments. Namely, she explains that researchers can address policy-relevant issues while omitting the political and policy context, such that the content created is not readily applicable for policymakers (Stone, 2002). However, SOS Racisme shows the different ways knowledge can be used, as we see they make use of concrete knowledge to mobilize civilians and political knowledge to mobilize public powers. Interestingly, political knowledge can also be concrete as it was in this case with the mention of the relevant political institutions and agreements. This predicts some overlap in Daviter's (2015) categories, who clearly differentiated concrete from conceptual uses of knowledge. Accordingly, knowledge-use is likely to depend on the target, so that each actor can act within their expertise. This line of argument predicts that organisational ideologies can directly influence knowledge-use.

Think-tanks are another example of an organisation with a precise organisational ideology. Influencing the public powers is often mentioned as one of their goals but are not appointed as such, contrary to governments organisations. Interestingly, Stone (2002) qualifies think-tanks as intermediaries, rather than third parties. Indeed, they are claimed to bridge the worlds of research and other third parties with the public powers. Jean-Jaurès for example is a French think-tank. According to Stone (2002), their role as a think-tank would be to disseminate, make accessible and raise awareness on the knowledge created by research bodies, such as research centres, universities, NGOs, and consultancy firms (Stone, 2002). In turn, their aim is for national governments to benefit from a simplified version of the findings.

This vision is also supported by Laux (2019) who defines think-tanks as hybrid organisations that market knowledge both for public powers and citizens, as well as other organisational spheres. It is for this reason that think-tanks need to embody many qualities and are likely to use different kinds of knowledge to fulfil their different goals. Indeed, according to Laux (2019) they use concrete and political knowledge. Accordingly, think-tanks exhibit a diversified organisational ideology to reach their different targets. Consequently, a good functioning of think tanks would involve the bridging of the ideological gap between third parties and politics worlds, claims Stone (2002). However, if think-tanks fulfil this role, it is still unclear why public powers still do not express commitment to the fight against social discrimination, as thinktanks would make the relevant knowledge accessible to them. In other terms, this argument predicts that this lack of commitment is either a failure from think-tanks that swayed from their original function as marketeers or the result of a dysfunction

from the governments' side which prevents think-tanks from exerting their coordinating power.

Stone's demand-side reasons

It is based on the latter assumption that Stone (2002) developed the second scope, i.e., demand side reasons, to explain the differences in organisational ideologies and lack of cooperation of third parties and public powers. This lens refers the broad preference of politicians for the proximity of knowledge, such that they prioritise in-house research and experts. Related interpretations include the timing component, as politicians often do not have the time to scan existing research and, rather, will prioritise the ones in proximity (Stone, 2002). This is echoed by Boswell (2009), who found that senior policymakers prioritise governmental and politically influential (rather than influential in different groups like research or third parties) sources so as not be charged with inefficiency. Particularly, he claims sources that are more representative for non-academics than academic sources, or conceptual knowledge, are likely to trigger support as a result, as well as feelings of accountability from the civilians, as they can better understand the knowledge in the first place (Boswell, 2009). This argument is based on the belief that civilians are likely to not understand and feel represented by academic papers or conceptual research. It is with this understanding that policymakers use knowledge from organisations who consider the policy process or civilians as intended targets, rather than academics, for instance. This culture involves anti-intellectualism and the rejection of research over 'pragmatic' or more simplistic knowledge (Stone, 2002). Indeed, the in-depth analysis and discussion over nuances in terminology that we can often find in scientific research can feel inaccessible for people outside these circles. According to Stone (2002) it is because politicians aim to gain support that they often reject this intellectualism to avoid alienating voters and, instead, make them feel represented. This line of argument predicts that politicians are likely to avoid using conceptual knowledge to choose concrete knowledge instead. Interestingly, this claim clashes with Head (2013) and Daviter's (2015) understandings that conceptual knowledge is more significant within the policymaking realm. One way to bridge both claims would be admitting that politicians are likely to reject using conceptual knowledge to fulfil representativeness needs, whereas conceptual knowledge would birth a more impactful policy.

This notion of accountability, i.e., the public powers' desire to use influential sources in the policymaking realm, is also mentioned by Lundin & Oberg (2013). Particularly, they claim that expert (i.e., influential) knowledge-use is particularly common in cases of high public

attention and political disagreements by (Lundin & Oberg, 2013). In fact, they claim that such expert knowledge is not critically assessed and therefore mostly used for accountability claims, rather than to solve policy problems. This conclusion echoes the sum of Boswell (2009) & Stone (2002) as well as Head (2013) & Daviter (2015) claims. According to the authors, this tendency to overweight representativeness and proximity is a flaw.

This propensity is supported by Stone (2002). The author claims that, for public powers, scanning research would imply bridging the different concepts and opinions within research, as, often the literature is built in an interactive way, rather than bridging at a unilateral conclusion. According to the author, this discrepancy is likely to be rejected for being too time and effort demanding. Instead, policymakers are likely to make a political choice and pick the claim which triggered their attention the most (Stone, 2002), which is likely informed by the opinion they already hold, according to Dorren & Bohme (2021). Whether this translates in concrete or conceptual use of knowledge is unclear.

In addition to Laux (2019) and Stone's (2002) understanding that this behaviour can be attributed to organisational ideology, Boswell (2009) claims that public powers also exhibit a risk-averse behaviour as they are under constant duress from media observation.

Accordingly, we can predict they are less likely than other organisations to diversify their knowledge-use because of this risk-averse tendency. Interestingly, Laux (2019) claims that, as a response to the fact that governments prioritise in house and expert knowledge, think-tanks have emphasized their image as unbiased, skilled, and expert to legitimize and portray their knowledge-use as the kind public powers habitually use. This is especially the case in France, as think-tanks have aimed to distance themselves from a grassroots ideology to mirror the traditional relationship between scientific policy advice and politics (Laux, 2019). Interestingly, this transition further exemplifies that organisations can shift their ideologies to adapt to their targets; a behaviour which think-tanks seem to showcase.

Stone's policy currents reasons

Going back to Stone, her third framework of explanations for the lack of cooperation between public powers and third parties are contextual reasons, or 'policy currents' (Stone, 2002). This framework summarises the discrepancy between the research and policy-making cultures (Stone, 2002). Indeed, the author claims that each organisational culture is such that builds specific groupthink and ivory towers. In other terms, each side's main aim is not to communicate with one another and, by extension, can omit to do just that.

Interestingly, Stone (2002) also mentions that this tendency is sustained in cases of collaboration between public powers and third parties, but towards the public. Accordingly, communication contains one challenge and the reflection of civil interests in their actions is

another (Stone, 2002). Additionally, she claims that even in cases of cooperation, choices over policy choices are rarely corresponding (Stone, 2002). In other terms, even in cases of communication and cooperation, ideologies are likely to stay latent in their value judgement on which policy is best. Correspondingly, Stone (2002) emphasises that the goal is not making both worlds simply co-operate, as they do not use the same framework and background for their knowledge use in the first place, and knowledge involves different roles for both worlds. Accordingly, it is the strive for a bilateral understanding of ideologies and organisational culture rather than simple cooperation that is needed for a true meshing of both worlds (Stone, 2002). Stone (2002) uses terms such as 'world view' and 'regimes of truth' rather than knowledge, which would imply a universal definition. Importantly, she emphasises that governments do create knowledge, just not the one deemed appropriate by relevant third parties (Stone, 2002). This discussion points to the prediction that public powers use different knowledges than non-governmental organisations.

We have theorized on the background ideology of the knowledge that governments create, which depends on organisational ideology, such as targets and needs for representativeness. According to this view, public powers and non-governmental organisations exhibit different ideologies, which can explain why they do not use the same knowledge. Thus, this literature predicts we will observe different ideologies and uses of knowledge between the French government and third parties. Based on this understanding, we aim to observe and compare ideologies in governmental contexts as well as non-governmental ones to look at the empirical interaction of both knowledge uses.

In this next section, we develop another literary strand that claims ideology is not the main predictor in knowledge-use, such that public powers can use knowledge from organisations with different ideologies. Instead, looking at the organisational structure will allow us to predict how and if third party's knowledge is used by public powers.

Obstacles to new knowledge-use

Public organisations are often prosecuted with inefficiency, a result of the many barriers they face, such as political pressure, hierarchy, and bureaucracy (Heimann et al., 2019), as well as the lack of financial competition. Indeed, without financial competition it becomes unclear what drives public institutions to stay efficient and 'competitive' (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999). Interestingly, political pressure, often associated with inertia, provides an incentive for knowledge-use and corresponding implementation in our case. Namely, political pressures for social change in France have been substantial as citizens have expressed nation-wide discontent (Elle, June 2020). We can also observe the existence of international authority

and their alignment to these complaints, which provide additional incentives for the French government to third parties' knowledge on social issues. Indeed, the UN pressures its member states to improve their social equality through cyclical assessment (OHCHR | UPR Mid-term reports).

However, it is possible hierarchy and bureaucratic pressures overweight political ones. It is upon that understanding that Daviter's (2015) analysis of organisational structure can clarify our discussion. Indeed, Daviter (2015) claims political knowledge that opposes the existing ideology can arise within public organisations. He is concerned with political knowledge, as it is based on changing underlying assumptions, rather than produce an established relationship between means and ends like concrete uses of knowledge. Accordingly, he claims this type of knowledge can create wide change in a way that concrete knowledge-use cannot (Daviter, 2015). This echoes his overall argument that conceptual uses of knowledge are more impactful in the policymaking realm. He explains that political knowledge that challenges pre-existing ideology can be used in two ways. It can either be used within the existing structures, which he qualifies as a knowledge creep, or it can also be used to transform the existing structures and change the organisational structure, which he calls a knowledge shift.

The author is particularly concerned with the notion of knowledge shift, which involves the use of knowledge to contest existing hierarchy and organisational structure within the policy process. This knowledge shift is said to provide a new framing of a policy issue, for example, which is why the author claims that a political use of knowledge is not necessarily restricted to the support of a pre-existing ideology. On the other hand, the notion of knowledge creep was introduced alongside the enlightenment model, namely the notion that conceptual knowledge-use is diffuse, slow, and hard to observe. Indeed, according to Daviter (2015), knowledge creep involves the use of dissenting knowledge within existing structures in a 'diffuse, slow and hard to observe' way, much like enlightenment uses of knowledge. It is for these similarities that enlightenment knowledge-use was claimed to arise as a knowledge creep (Daviter, 2015). In this article, Daviter (2015) specifies under which circumstances dissenting knowledge can be used.

Indeed, Daviter (2015) claims that, whether knowledge is used as a creep or as a shift depends on organisational administrative structures. Namely, in a context of high flow of information, such as the policy realm the organisational structure will filter their knowledge use (Daviter, 2015). The degree of administrative specialisation, the rigidity of departmental boundaries and the degree of overlap of responsibilities, all influence how contesting knowledge will be used: as a knowledge creep or as a knowledge shift (Daviter, 2015). In a department that is strongly specialised for instance, allegiance to the specific organisational ideology is likely to arise, increasing the odds of knowledge creep. Accordingly, we see how

the organisational structure can influence the organisational ideology. In these cases, knowledge will be introduced within these structures, rather than as a challenger of them. Particularly, the author claims this rise will be slow and hard to observe. Some organisations, by nature of dealing with “ill problems” or changing circumstances, need to stay open to competing knowledge. According to the author, this facilitates the possibility of knowledge shift and the sustenance of the existing structure as no structural change is needed for this knowledge to be absorbed (Daviter, 2015). Furthermore, Daviter (2015) predicts that an organisation with a rigid organisational ideology will be more prone to knowledge creeps than knowledge shifts. If I develop our earlier understanding that think-tanks have presented a flexibility in ideology in ways that public powers have not, I can predict to find knowledge creeps within public organisations and knowledge shifts within think-tanks, according to this argument.

Indeed, in cases of strong overlap and interdependencies of different sectors, knowledge shifts which contest the current administrative structure and push for a new one are more likely to arise according to the author (Daviter, 2015). Thus, Daviter (2015) uses the example of homelessness and mental illness as two distinct departments. They overlap in the sense that both departments are likely to have some similar responsibilities towards the people affected by homelessness and mental illness. Accordingly, one could easily present knowledge that argues for a correlation in between the two, i.e., contesting the actual separation of these departments. This knowledge would be used as a shift by contesting this type of structure and pushing for a new one: a public health program that encompasses both, for instance (Daviter, 2015). In turn, this shift will have changed the organisational structure and introduced a dissenting knowledge regarding the status quo. This example shows how political knowledge is not necessarily restricted to confirm existing authority (Dorren & Bohme, 2021; Laux, 2019), but can also be used to contest existing knowledge (Head, 2013; Daviter, 2015). Indeed, in this case, political knowledge-use secured this very outcome, such that other uses will have not. Indeed, it has challenged underlying assumptions about departmental differentiations and introduced a strategic picture of an alternative: one encompassing department. We understand that other knowledges would have not secured the same alternative. For example, enlightenment knowledge contends dogmatic change, which is a deeper and larger scale of change than political knowledge, which, on the other hand, simply challenges the existing assumptions, without protesting dogma. Additionally, concrete knowledge would not contend organisational change in that way, as it is not used to challenge assumptions and simply to present a concrete correlation between cause and effect. For example, in this case, concrete knowledge would have highlighted the fact that homeless people tend to be mentally ill, without challenging the current state of departments. Visibly, this example also presents the compatibility of different

knowledges. Indeed, we can imagine that this concrete knowledge was the base knowledge for the political knowledge on the need to challenge existing organisational structures for better results.

In our context, it becomes interesting to look at the overlap and the separation of policy organisational structures in each department of the French government and whether this implies the possibility of a knowledge shift or knowledge creep. In other terms, regardless of the ideological natures of both organisations, the government could use third parties' knowledge. Concurrently, Daviter (2015) adds onto Stone's (2002) interpretation of knowledge-use as an ideological frame by explaining that internal delimitations can be supported by external ones i.e., not only could public powers and third parties exhibit different ideologies, they could also use different knowledges because of their respective organisational structure.

Thus, the literature sheds light on the recurring theme of the hierarchical component of knowledge, such that ideological and structural legitimacy can define which knowledge is deemed relevant and which is not. Accordingly, our line of questioning is whether knowledge on social justice is on top of public powers' hierarchy of knowledges. Specifically, we find different interpretations on the process that delineates how knowledge can be given power. We have observed the different ways in which knowledge can be acquired and used, depending on the actor's objectives. From this literature, we could predict conceptual knowledge and particularly political knowledge to be used by third parties and concrete knowledge by public powers in impactful policies. Concurrently, such knowledge could be rejected for representativeness goals and concrete knowledge could be prioritised instead. We have mentioned how, according to authors, public powers and third parties significantly differ in organisational ideologies and objectives, such that they would tend to create and use different knowledges. However, they could also exhibit similar ideologies. Regardless of their potential opposition, dissenting knowledge could also be used by public powers. Notably, this knowledge would be political, rather than concrete, which joins the claims that conceptual knowledge permits more impact on policies (Head, 2013). Concrete knowledge, on the other hand, is unlikely to be used in cases of opposed ideologies. Accordingly, at this stage, it is still unclear which actors use which knowledge. Thus, our research question is: "Does the French government not use third parties' knowledge on social discrimination?"

Methodology

We have looked at the theoretical understandings on the different types of knowledge that have been observed to exist, on the knowledge that the relevant organisations are claimed to use, and lastly on their potential obstacles to new knowledge-use. Accordingly, we use these claims as a background for our questions, while leaving them open-ended to determine whether we can find differences in knowledge-use on these policies.

We have explained how the French context corresponds to the puzzle we aim to observe. Namely, we are interested in understanding why, regardless of the proximity (via think-tanks) and accessibility of knowledge, as well as political pressure, a liberal government does not use and implement third parties' knowledge on social policies. The literature has informed our line of questioning by explaining that French public powers are prone to not understand the different ideologies and types of knowledges that are used by non-governmental parties. Without gaining a better understanding of each other's ideologies, the French government is likely to keep exhibiting a low level of third parties' knowledge-use. However, we have observed that think-tanks for example have, within their goals, been able to make their knowledge accessible to public powers, such that understanding different ideologies is possible and happens in that case.

However, according to the literature, there are external obstacles to governmental use of new knowledge on social needs such that public organisations do not exhibit the same freedom to broaden their goals in the way that think-tanks did. Instead, it is claimed that knowledge-use within public organisations is highly constrained by the organisational structure. In other terms, even if think-tanks include the specific ideology of public powers in their knowledge, these powers do not always have the liberty to implement it. This new knowledge is more likely to be implemented in highly interdependent sectors than in departments ruled by a vertical hierarchy, according to Daviter (2015).

According to this, the French government could use third parties' political knowledge, regardless of their respective ideologies.

Case

The current president, Emmanuel Macron, won with a liberal party 'En Marche' and united both the political left and right (enmarche.fr/lemouvement). Indeed, the party's website clearly exhibits that: " The purpose of La République En Marche! Is to reunite all people of good will around a positive ambition for our country. Regardless of whether they come from the left, the right, the centre, ecology or elsewhere." Emmanuel Macron is also the youngest French president in history. Both these facts could have translated into a high dynamism in

the relationship between NGOs and the government, and accordingly, presented French voters with hope of progress. However, on the social side, Macron does not show progressive traits, as he has been more likely to condemn social movements than attend to it. For example, the Yellow Vests movement has gained international traction as the leader ignored the financial discrimination lower social classes were experiencing as a direct result of one of his reforms (Yahoo news, April 2019).

Accordingly, our questioning gains significance in this context in which the president could have secured a second mandate by working towards social justice, as well as improved France's standing in the United Nations. In this context, it is organisations such as SOS Racisme, LICRA, Fondation Jean-Jaures and others that create knowledge and solutions on social injustice. By extension, we will observe the empirical collaboration between French public powers and non-governmental organisations by interviewing both kinds of actors. We interviewed three civil servants and two members of non-governmental organisations.

Design

To fulfil our goal, this study will use an inductive design. Namely, we will use a bottom-up approach as we will rely on our observations of empirical realities and dynamics to formulate a generalizable hypothesis on whether we can observe differences in knowledge-uses on social discrimination. In other terms, our analysis is highly reliant on the data itself, which will determine the codes and the prevalent themes. Understandingly, which themes arise will be influenced by our theoretical understanding and is not completely objective. However, we are interested in uncovering different or contradictory phenomena rather than use the literature as a limit for our observations. For the same reasons, we choose a semantic approach in which we rely on the participants' words first to uncover patterns in empirical content. Only secondly will we analyse and interpret these patterns according to our theoretical understandings (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

We use a thematic analysis of the data set as a whole, since we are interested in uncovering the main themes across contexts and actors and shed light on the actors' views and behaviours, as they are difficult to predict as it is (Braun & Clarke, 2006). These were chosen depending on their organisations and their role within it. We identified the most prominent organisations that explicitly worked towards social justice. For public powers, we contacted the relevant public organisations occupied with equality and diversity promotion. Three respondents were civil servants and two respondents worked for third parties. The aim is to compare answers among the different types of organisations. Particularly, we are interested in third parties' vision on public powers and the other way around, as this will

allow us to empirically observe the literature's understanding on ideological differences. This will then be compared to the answers mentioning actual levels of cooperation.

To study actual behaviours and conditions for the implementation of social discrimination policies in France, we used an ethnographic research design. This implied observing both intentions and value judgments as well as actual behaviours. This has been named the zooming in and zooming out method (Nicolini 2009 in Visser & Kruyen, 2021). Zooming-in involves observing detailed aspects of work activities and actual actions. Zooming-out permits distancing the research from these specific actions by observing their connection to broader intentions and value judgments (Nicolini 2009 in Visser & Kruyen, 2021). This larger context allows us to observe the workers' vision, whether that is on these specific actions, the individual's position within the organisation, or the organisation goals and mission.

This way of drafting the interview questions allows us to depict a complete picture of ideologies, as well material influences. It also provided us the security that we were not simply observing idealised behaviour and prevents the distortion that individual perception could have on lived reality.

Tangibly, this meant that our questions asked about the participants' visions on the optimal amount of collaboration, as well as the real levels of this cooperation, for example. We used semi-structured questions as we aim to observe many interacting influences in a few questions and gain significant information in a short time.

Interview Questions

All the interview questions and their purposes are classified in the Table 2. We started by asking about the respondent's seniority and daily responsibilities to understand their role within the organisation and get a close-up on the details of their activities. This is the zooming-in approach, which allows the offsetting of potential idealisation in the first questions and creates a more complete picture.

We then ask about the organisation's as well as the department's mission to capture the organisational ideology. As we mentioned prior, the literature explains that the organisational ideology exerts a strong influence on the kind of knowledge that each organisation will use as well as the gap between each of those consequently. Particularly, I ask about their definition and perceived responsibility towards social justice as we are likely to witness different answers depending on the organisational ideology. This is a zooming out perspective as we intend to grasp their value judgments and perceptions and the broader context of their activities. Particularly, this will allow us to observe the differences in ideologies between public powers and non-governmental organisations.

The third section of the questions combines both zooming-in and zooming-out scopes as we ask about the participants' visions on the optimal amount of collaboration with the other side of the spectrum, as well as the real levels of this cooperation. Namely, civil servants will be asked about collaboration with third parties and third parties will be asked about collaboration with civil servants. In the case in which cooperation is deemed too low, I also ask about their opinions on what are the obstacles to their ideal level of cooperation. This question is based on the respondents' practical experience but will be inevitably tainted by their subjective interpretation.

Then, I ask about the different uses of knowledge, whether this involves institutionalisation or mere interaction with the knowledge. We also ask about their specific use of knowledge and whether that is concrete or conceptual use. Asking about knowledge-use in last allows the clear establishment of the relationship between ideology, actors' influence, and the use of knowledge this interaction fosters.

Lastly, I also ask about the specific organisational structure at this point to map the relationship between individual behaviour, organisational ideology, and the role of structure. Asking this question after learning the respondent's uses of knowledge allows us to observe the relationship between organisational structure and knowledge-use; as the literature predicts that vertical hierarchy will facilitate knowledge creep and horizontal hierarchy eases the rise of a knowledge shift (Daviter, 2015).

Table 2: Interview Questions and their related categories

Themes	Questions
Zooming in: Empirical realities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can you briefly describe your daily professional activities? • What is your level of seniority in this position? • To civil servants: To which frequency do you implement social justice public policies? OR • To NGOs: To which frequency do you fight for the implementation of social justice public policies? • To which frequency and how does cooperation take place? • What are the obstacles for this cooperation?

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do you use the knowledge made available by your co-operators? • Can you describe the hierarchical structure of your department?
Zooming out: Value judgments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is your department's mission? • How would you define the term 'social justice' and what would you say is your department's responsibility towards this social justice as you define it? • According to you, what is the ideal level of cooperation between your organisation and others? I.e., between public powers and NGOs for public powers and between NGOs and public powers for NGOs.

The five Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim in French. I have translated the quotes and interpreted the words in French into themes in English. Therefore, some meaning can have been lost in translation. As a binational, I hope to be familiar to each cultural sensitivity and how to best translate one language's meaning into another; compared to someone removed from English and French culture, for example.

Results

Within the participants' answers, seven main themes arose (Table 3), and can explain the empirical realities of cooperation on social discrimination policies between the French civil servants and the non-governmental organisations' employees. Namely, we found the recurrence of the large agenda for action with which these organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, are faced with (Theme 1). However, participants highlighted the differences in goals (Theme 2) and in perceptions about the appropriate scale for action (Theme 3). Yet, I noticed similarities in their answers regarding their organisational ideologies (Theme 4). The sum of these characteristics can explain the fifth recurring theme, which is the complementarity of these organisations (Theme 5). Particularly, their differences

can explain the divergences in knowledge-uses (Theme 5), whereas the similarities in ideology can be a factor in the perceived complementarity in these utilisations (Theme 5). Additionally, these differences can also partly explain the lived obstacles in the cooperation between the organisations (Theme 6). Lastly, some broader societal obstacles to the fight against social discrimination were also identified (Theme 7).

Table 3: Themes

Themes	
<p>1. A large agenda for action 5 stories</p>	<p>“Even the elected cannot do everything.” (P4) “It’s hard to lead a global policy on discrimination, as they are so many.” (P1) “We can choose to do a thousand things, because there’s so much to do.” (P1) “I’m frustrated, there’s not enough done.” (P5) “I am not sure I will succeed but I will have done my share.” (P4) “We cannot change everything but we can at least try to balance things out.’ (P1)</p>
<p>2. The differences in goals 5 stories</p>	<p>“We always use knowledge as a motor for action.” (P1) “Our goal is to influence public policies and impact the law.” (P2) “The main idea is to give back a power of action at the individual scale.” (P3) “We ensure the respect of the anti-discrimination laws.” (P4) “We work on two axes: encourage a culture of equality and raise awareness on all types of discriminations.” (P5)</p>
<p>3. The difference in perceptions on the appropriate scale 5 stories</p>	<p>“We could consider that it is the state’s role to tackle inequalities. Except, in reality, it is not always the case since the inhabitants turn to us very easily, which is normal since we are the house of the people.” (P1) “It is crucial that the voices of the individuals directly affected reach the highest functions of the state.” (P3) “It has to come from above, our mayors’ office motto is the French motto - Freedom, Equality</p>

	<p>and Fraternity. So I think there is a sovereign power, at the assembly we vote laws so it has to come from above.” (P4)</p> <p>“We have to be conscious that some laws can be put on the table, whereas for others it’s more complicated; solely because they do not fall within the national level but the European one.” (P2)</p> <p>“I more so follow the European orientations, as well as national ones, to try to bring them here.” (P5)</p>
<p>4. The similarities in ideology</p> <p>5 stories</p>	<p>“For me, social justice is the commitment to the fact that some individuals are less privileged than others and that we should offset this.” (P1), “Social justice is so that no one is left on the side of the road.” (P2 & P4), “For me it is the reduction of inequalities.” (P3) “I think it is not simply living together, since we are doomed to live together, but it is doing together.” (P4), “For me it is the inclusion of all minorities. If it a group of three people then it’s three people, we still need to take their interests into account.” (P5).</p>
<p>5. The complementary of different knowledge-uses</p> <p>5 stories</p>	<p>“One cannot live without the other.” (P4) “We don’t struggle to get them involved.” (P1)</p> <p>“Everyone brings their own contribution.” (P5)</p> <p>“We cannot say that we are not listened to, because that’s not true, we are.” (P2)</p> <p>“Most of our devices are funded by the government. I do find it important to have these people involved. For me it is an asset.” (P3).</p>
<p>6. The obstacles to optimal cooperation</p> <p>3 stories</p>	<p>“We have to be conscious that some laws can be put on the table, whereas for others it’s more complicated; solely because they fall not within the national level but the European one.</p>

	<p>For consultancy we have to use the appropriate target.” (P2)</p> <p>“It also much easier to carry a proposal when we’re fifty NGOs than on our own.” (P2)</p> <p>“If a problem is not treated today it is because it is not on the political agenda at the minute. So timing is very important.” (P2)</p> <p>“I notice that, at the departmental scale, there is a difficulty to link partners among themselves and to coordinate actions.” (P3)</p> <p>“Often I am told that what I am proposing is too conceptual.” (P5) “Colleagues have told me that people would not understand the terms, that we have to simplify. Except, if we remove words the meaning is no longer the same.” (P5)</p> <p>“Our question every day is how to reach a maximum of people.” (P5)</p> <p>“As a public service, this authority posture skews a little. The associative groups are not super comfortable.” (P5)</p> <p>“It would not further the cause because the media would harm the victims.” (P5)</p>
<p>7. Larger obstacles to social justice</p> <p>1 story</p>	<p>“As humans we struggle to see the very long-term and, paired with the desire for absolute conformity, we want to keep status quo.” (P3)</p> <p>The entirety of my beneficiaries do not know about the ‘Défenseur de droits’ (existing laws and services to protect against discrimination) and they do not that they can be supported. This fatalistic attitude is also fed by this lack of knowledge on the existing institutions that can help them.” (P3)</p>

A large agenda for action: The requirement for adaptability and numerous skills

Regardless of the organisational belonging, i.e., governmental, or non-governmental, respondents highlighted the impossibility to fulfil the entirety of their goals, as the agenda for action is too large. Interestingly, this perception does not seem to be correlated to the scope of the organisation. For example, P1 works in a very local public institution, focused on a specific area of the city. However, this does not seem to minimise their agenda. In fact, she emphasizes that, as a district town hall, their role in the fight is important. Accordingly, this scale does not remove the sense of responsibility for this organisation who was qualified as 'the house of the people' by this interviewee.

However, this respondent explains how tackling all discriminations, which are legally counted as 25 in France, makes it hard to do everything, even at the scale of the mayors' office area. She explains they often must choose discriminations for projects, as it is 'hard to lead a global policy on the subject' (P1). Particularly, they tend to choose LGBT phobia and ethnic discrimination. This civil servant clearly grasps that they cannot cover all discriminations but can, at the very least, try to offset inequalities as they are.

P3, a gender equality specialist for a think-tank, also experiences having to select projects in this way: "We have to be conscious that some issues will be put on the table and others will not." "Sometimes we have to be patient and carry a project for five years." (P2). Accordingly, working against social discrimination does require patience, as, visibly, not everything can be tackled at once.

Another respondent, elected as the mayor's deputy, admits that 'Even the elected cannot do everything'. Instead, they understand that the small scale of their organisation necessitates being satisfied with case-by-case actions and doing 'their share' (P4). Interestingly, in this case, the respondent clarifies that the limitations do not simply pertain to individuals that work against social discrimination in non-governmental organisations. Indeed, we could expect to find a higher confidence in acting power within elected representatives. However, this participant emphasizes the universality of the experience, as government officials face the same obstacles. P2, who works for a Société cooperative, also emphasised the necessity to be satisfied with individual cases and action, rather than focus on the agenda. "Obviously there is a structural component within discrimination, but, at least, our idea is to give back a power of action to individuals" (P3). In other terms, for this organisation, working against social discrimination necessitates thinking about the individuals, rather than systems. As it is echoed by other interviewees, this perspective does seem to allow workers to see their productive impact, rather than focusing on what still remains to be done.

However, another civil servant outwardly expresses discontent with these limitations: 'I'm frustrated, there's not enough done.' (P5) and declares that 'sometimes it is better to not do anything than do them on the cheap.' (P5). Again, the size of the agenda is looming in all actions: "Obviously you have the delusion of grandeur when you look at this world and what there is to be done but when I conduct a project, I give myself as a goal to conduct it as well as possible, for everyone to feel comfortable and safe. So maybe we are doing better than nothing, but I am not satisfied with it. That's for sure." Again, this respondent highlights her focus on individual projects. Nevertheless, this scale seems to be disappointing. Accordingly, the respondents express that working against social discrimination involves managing their expectations, or being disappointed, such that the fight itself is tremendous and can be overwhelming.

Understandingly, a large agenda can predict the need for a large number for actions and, in other terms, variability. Indeed, respondents have used similar words when declaring the rhythm of their work: "Every day we work for the institutionalisation of policies against social discrimination " (P2), "Each month we have a new project" (P1) "Even in quiet times we do advocacy" (P3). In other terms, tackling the agenda of social discrimination seems to require a very active rhythm for the workers. Interestingly, this is regardless of the organisations' scale. Thus, P1, an employee from a district town hall, and P2, an employee for a nationwide think tank exhibit similar experiences.

Notably, the social justice agenda requires adaptability to numerous contexts and various skills. For P1 "It's never the same everyday". Indeed, we notice the interconnectedness of actors, action groups, and objectives across testimonies. For this participant, who is occupied with discriminations within her district town's hall, transversal meetings with other teams are recurrent. Indeed, since 'everything is connected' she says, these appointments are needed for the teams to work across sectors.

This complementarity of actions is repeated by P4 and P5, both local civil servants. In particular, they emphasize the need for interconnectedness between the different institutional levels, their service, and the existing associative environment. Indeed, P4 explains her insistence on recurrent meetings with all the existing local NGOs, such that all their respective area of interest can be included in the political plans. Alongside, she also emphasizes the application of national law as one of their main responsibilities. Therefore, this entity needs to coordinate actions with different types of organisations. P5 also underlines the diversity within NGOs, such that working with them does not correspond to solely one type of action. Instead, NGOs can be highly focused on one part of

the inhabitants only, as well as foster professionals and academic interests instead. Therefore, this coordination requires flexibility between the needs of these organisations. Even for workers occupied with one separate mission, which for P3 is gender equality, she ends up using an intersectional stance in her workshops, based on the understanding that every discrimination is connected, making it difficult to isolate only one. Thus, regardless of the original mission, this participant ended up having to be comfortable with tackling many kinds of issues.

Furthermore, I have noticed that this work requires cooperation with many actors for all participants, regardless of their belonging to governmental or non-governmental organisations. For example, P3 is a Société cooperative's employee, and works with citizens in sensitive areas, as well as workers in high hierarchy such as direction committees; but also with the three levels of government: local, national, and parliamentary. This multiplicity requires comfort with different kinds of languages to make the content accessible to people from different backgrounds, and therefore with different expectations and base knowledge. This desire to impact many population brackets is reflected in the act of consultancy and raising awareness. P2 works for a think-tank, and declared that, whereas their goal is to impact legislation and therefore mainly target the relevant ministries and parliamentarians, they also need to reach professionals and citizens. Based on the different profiles, consultancy will have to be done differently, and therefore requires flexibility in the creation of the different consultancy formats.

For P5, who works for a mayor's office, this strive for large scale impact is their everyday goal. Indeed, as a political body, they need to make the entirety of their constituents feel represented. Similarly, that involves reaching professionals, standard citizens, but also the individuals not impacted by discrimination. Indeed, she explains that their main goal is to reach the people who are not already mobilized. Indeed, the ones who are aware of the need to act against social discrimination do not need to be impacted. Particularly, she describes this inquiry as very complex, as often, talking about discrimination makes the majority feel challenged and therefore not represented. Accordingly, large scale representation needs to be achieved to create large scale diffusion and broaden the current reach of action against social discrimination.

Thus, the first recurring theme can already shed light on the existing network on social discrimination, such that all issues are connected and therefore make for: a large agenda for action; that such agenda translates in the need for variability and adaptability on the behalf of the workers; that all organisations are connected and therefore need to adapt their communication tactics to the members of this network.

However, in this second theme, I develop on the clear differences in organisational goals, such that this interconnectedness does not equate to similarities in organisational goals. These differences were predictable, as we have discussed the range of differences across organisations on the spectrum between governmental and non-governmental organisations.

The differences in goals: consultancy, legislation, and individual empowerment

The second recurring theme in the respondents' answers is the variation in goals across organisations. Regardless of their apparent connection, the different organisations that work against social discrimination all exhibit different and clear goals. According to the think-tank's employee (P2), their ultimate goal as an organisation is to impact the law on social justice. For this reason, they always intend to exchange with the groups that vote for these laws, namely ministries and parliamentarians. Of course, they are also quiet times, in which rather than the voting of new laws, this think-tank actively works towards consultancy. Thus, when the time comes to vote, the relevant institutions are influenced by the consultancy work that was done prior. For this reason, the respondent claimed that they cannot underestimate the importance of patience and to consider long-term decisions. However, this is always done with the legislation in mind.

P1, claims that her work in the district town hall is always aimed at public use, short or long-term. Accordingly, she consistently works towards new projects, whether they are cultural, material or consultancy projects. Thus, this organisation goal is for the citizens to benefit from the projects.

P4 also works within a local government. However, here, as an elected representative, she claims their main goal is to apply national law. Indeed, if new laws are regularly voted nationally, local officials need to make sure they are respected and applied at their scale. In order to keep an eye on everyday practices regarding the legislation P4 claims they heavily rely on the local NGOs which transmit the daily practices.

For P3, her work within the cooperative company is to educate and empower individuals on the resulting biases on social discrimination, i.e. 'making conscious the subconscious biases'. This goal is achieved in two ways. First, they train the individuals affected by discrimination to recognize the biases that can be put on them by others, such as their employers. In turn, this knowledge will allow them to redirect the conversation and emphasize their individual characteristics, rather than being solely perceived through

unconscious stereotypes. This practice prevents them from giving-in to deterministic and fatalist opinions on their discrimination and gives them agency, according to the interviewee. Secondly, the same training is done within public services and other powerful groups that could, through their bias, discriminate. However, according to P3 “the more you climb social classes, the harder it is for people to recognize their biases”. Thus, higher power translates in increased responsibilities according to this respondent.

Thus, these trainings are two-fold and aim to influence individuals, rather than systems or laws, for example. She also explains that, as a territorial community, they aim to coordinate the public policies at the region level so that all actors cooperate efficiently.

Lastly, the last respondent (P5) qualified the goals of her local authority as raising awareness on a large scale. Particularly, their aim is to ‘encourage a culture of equality and raise awareness on discrimination’. Here the main organisational goal is to raise the awareness of civilians on the existence of social discrimination, as well as encourage them to prioritise an equality mindset, over divisiveness. Concurrently, their democratic aim is to represent all citizens through this inquiry.

Accordingly, regardless of their sharing of the same agenda on the fight against social discrimination, we can see that each organisation answers to different goals of action. Indeed, these results can be relayed to the claims on organisational culture, which are varied on the spectrum between governmental and non-governmental organisations.

The appropriate scale: a national or a local agenda?

The third recurring theme in the respondents’ answers were the variations in perceptions on the appropriate level of action for the fight against social discrimination. Some claimed the agenda to be better tackled locally, others emphasized it as a national enquiry.

P1 works in the most local organisation in this study. As a town hall, the respondent describes it as the ‘house of the people’, such that the locality of the organisation implies a significant closeness to the civilians they represent. Accordingly, the interviewee portrays the organisation’s increased responsibility to represent its people. Interestingly, she claims that this closeness involves more concreteness than a bigger-scale administration, for example. In turn, she emphasizes that this concreteness makes it easier to tackle social discrimination. Particularly, she opposes the pre-conception that social justice is a national

inquiry: “As a district town hall, our role is more important than we could think, because we could consider that it is the state’s role to tackle inequalities. Except, in reality, it is not always the case since the inhabitants turn to us very easily, which is normal since we are the house of the people.” (P1)

The third respondent agrees with the primacy of a local scale, over a larger one. Whereas her organisation works to raise awareness on the human biases that result from our systems, they act for individuals and give them tools to regain agency within our discriminatory systems. Interestingly, this scale of action is paired with the knowledge that the individual testimonies should reach national powers. Indeed, this respondent claims that social discrimination will never be erased from a top-down approach. Instead, public officials need to listen to testimonies as a base for their public policies i.e., use a bottom-up approach instead. Thus, this organisation believes in the coordination of scales, such that change should be implemented nationally but with the use of individual testimonies to reach sustainability. Concurrently, this service focuses on individuals to retain this knowledge, as well as help them make conscious their biases, and empower the discriminated.

For P4, the role of her organisation (a town hall) is to apply national law. Accordingly, this interviewee reiterates the ‘sovereign right’ that law makers have. Thus, we would need them to vote these laws in the first place, only to apply it locally at a later stage, she claims. Furthermore, she insists that this national power permits the country’s uniformity and indivisibility via the universality of the laws. “Without these national laws, we would be divided” she says.

Interestingly, she adds that these laws can also be voted because of local movements, as it has often been the case. Accordingly, the nationals have the sovereign right. However, it needs to be informed by the local needs, she claims, which ultimately draws a two-way relationship.

P2 and P5 mention another scale, omitted up until now. Indeed, P2 explains that the think-tank’s goal is always to influence the law. However, they need to stay aware of their targets. Indeed, some laws can only be influenced at the European level, rather than nationally. Thus, for this respondent these two scales take primacy over the local one.

Interestingly, P5’s work is mostly focused on local scale projects to raise awareness. However, she is heavily influenced by European orientations, as this allows her to further open solutions. Indeed, she explains that, as a large Metropole, this town hall is quite self-sufficient. Yet, for innovation’s sake, she makes an effort to go beyond this network to be inspired by the solutions elsewhere and create new solutions.

Thus, I was able to observe through this theme how perceptions on the appropriate scale for social justice can vary, such that we can observe a variety of answers across respondents and organisations. Interestingly, this perception was not defined by the scale of the organisation itself.

The similarities in ideology

The fourth recurring theme across answers was the similarity of ideologies between organisations. Whereas definitions of social justice were built in different ways it became clear all respondents shared the same commitment to it : “For me, social justice is the commitment to the fact that some individuals are less privileged than others and that we should offset this” (P1), “Social justice is so that no one is left on the side of the road” (P2 & P4), “For me it is the reduction of inequalities” (P3) “I think it is not simply living together, since we are doomed to live together, but it is doing together” (P4), “For me it is the inclusion of all minorities, if it a group of three people then its three people, we still need to take their interests into account” (P5). Interestingly, most respondents emphasize the vastness of social justice as a definition, which echoes the first theme: the significance of the agenda for action.

Noticeably, their answers were all built on different understandings on what should be done to offset social discrimination. For example, P2 presented social justice as an ideal built on three pillars: economic, educational, and militant activities. The economic pillar permits that no one is excluded, and everyone can live up to their aspirations. The educational pillar requires a good school that remains free and allow individuals to be faced with equal chances. She claims this institution should carry values of republican universalism, without being blind to social determinism. The last pillar is the fight for inclusion and against discrimination, which allows the sustainability of the second pillar, according to her. Indeed, she claims that nothing is every guaranteed in terms of social rights. She mentions the overturn of the Roe v Wade case in the United-States¹ as the prime example that our rights can be removed at any moment. Thus, she claims that whereas the universal pillar of republican values is fundamental, we need to improve it via militant activities that shed light on existing equalities, and mostly give solutions. Particularly, P3 emphasizes the need for militantism to foster solutions as the main responsibility of consultancy organisations. Indeed, fighting is important, but NGOs should always carry solutions, ready to be

¹ The Roe v Wade case protected the national right to abortions. It was overturn on June 13th 2022, making the legality of abortions a state issue.

institutionalised at any moment: “If the bill is voted tomorrow, you already have the text ready made in your hand” she claims.

According to P4 the ideal of social justice merges with the French slogan: “Freedom, Equality and Fraternity”. Particularly, she claims that social justice is the equilibrium of right and duty, which is what the slogan exemplifies. “Duty to apply the laws, right to respect, duty to accept the other, and to open the doors of possibilities with the other”. Since this kind of equality is social, she says, it is primordial that it brings people together. Interestingly, in this answer, P4 emphasizes the power of ideals which are motors for change: “without ideals we cannot change the world”. Particularly, as an elected representative, she recognizes the possibility to influence and inspire. For that reason, this passion and these ideals carry the workers within the political fight, which she claims can be energy-consuming. Indeed, P3 mirrors this idea with her claims that working against social discrimination requires a pre-existing commitment and convictions on a daily basis.

Interestingly, this ideal of equality is criticized by P5, which often witnesses the binary it can foster. As an example, she mentions the gender equality organisations and their tendency to see this equality through the lenses of heterosexuality. In turn, gay women’s experiences are excluded from the discourses, for example. Indeed, P5 explains that, within the social justice discussions, there is a whole pan of realities we do not mention. For example, chem-sex is a real issue for the LGBTQIA+ community, which often is not discussed within public services and needs to be de-demonized, according to her. Thus, she promotes the ideal of justice, equality, and rights for all beyond this binary. As a public service, she emphasizes the need for total inclusion, of all minorities that go beyond the current binary, since they need to represent all constituents’ interests. “If it a group of three people then its three people, we still need to take their interests into account. That would be social justice” she says.

The complementary of different knowledge-uses

The fifth recurring theme across answers was the complementarity of knowledge-uses between organisations. Namely, interviews made apparent that organisations used different knowledges. However, rather than resulting in a clash, it permits cooperation between companies, such that we can observe an exchange of different knowledge-uses in between actors.

Firstly, we can look at the respondents P1, P4 and P5 as they are all civil servants. We will then observe P2, and P3's answers. Looking at the actors in two times allow us to better notice the cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors that arises from the answers.

Indeed, P1, P4 and P5 all clearly shed light on the cooperation they experience between their public service and non-governmental actors: "We have a good number of associative partners. We don't struggle to get them involved" (P1), "The interconnectedness is essential, one cannot live without the other" (P4), "Every time we solicit a new NGO, we integrate them in terms of inter-complementarity and interdependence. Everyone brings their own contribution" (P5). Accordingly, there is no restraint regarding the complementarity of both sides. We find similar answers on behalf of the non-governmental actors: "We cannot say that we are not listened to, because that's not true, we are" (P2), "Most of our devices are funded by the government. I do find it important to have these people involved. For me it is an asset" (P3).

Interestingly, this cooperation does not translate in similar knowledge-uses. P1 is highly satisfied with current levels of cooperation between the town hall and the local NGOs. Indeed, she states that they need each other, as they possess different knowledges and need to exchange it to act appropriately. The respondent explains that her office creates ideas that are inherently political, since they need to have a good balance sheet at the end of the mandate. On the other hand, she claims that the NGOs that collaborate with her organisation provide them with concrete knowledge on the local experiences, needs and particularities. Indeed, she explains how NGOs last longer than mandates, and therefore can directly witness the local evolutions over long periods of time. For this reason, it is important for this town hall to use the NGOs' significant experience to conduct projects, according to P1. Notably, this collaboration is said to be reserved to the local NGOs only. Indeed, the public service was said to rarely be exchanging with other types of organisations, such as think-tanks and private firms, especially on the themes of social discrimination. However, this could be attributed to the scale of government, as P2's work in a think-tank heavily relies on cooperation with national and European elected representatives.

As P4 joins P1 in her experiences of interconnectedness with NGOs, she adds that these organisations also need local powers to promote them, as well as fund them. In turn, the town hall perceives them as 'carriers of knowledge' that, from a bottom-up approach, echoes the local needs to the representatives. Because of this closeness to the people, P4 expresses that we might think of them as more active than representatives. P5 complements this idea by clarifying that, as a public service, this complementarity is more than an ideal, and contends their responsibility, as NGOs represent the public. Furthermore, P4 expresses

deep respect for the commitment, as these organisations are non-lucrative. Accordingly, the idea is to “accompany them, not beg them” she says. Indeed, their cooperation is very important for this representative that insists on constant cooperation and ‘round tables’ twice a year. For P4, the NGOs they cooperate with exhibit a range of profiles. Accordingly, they can provide the town hall with empirical and concrete knowledge, as well as more conceptual, academic knowledge if that is their specialty. P5 mirrors this distinction, while emphasizing the role of concrete knowledge for public institutions. Indeed, she explains that this cooperation allows her to avoid building projects in a ‘laboratory’ and above ground. Her perception on what is the state of progress can be thwarted, she says, and therefore consult NGOs to know if the project matches the current level of awareness, or if they need an inferior step, for example.

Notably, the variability in profiles of NGOs implies some freedom of choice, as well as caution, on which organisation to solicit according to projects.

Interestingly, when looking at the respondents from non-governmental organisations we can see a clear divide in knowledge-uses. P3 works for a cooperative company, and she mirrors the earlier claims that these organisations provide concrete knowledge. Indeed, she claims that social discrimination policies can only be efficient if they are based on the individual testimonies of discrimination experiences. Accordingly, P3 emphasizes the importance of testimonies, i.e., concrete knowledge, for public powers.

On the other hand, P2 prioritizes conceptual knowledge. Indeed, according to her, the think tank’s role is to influence conceptual understandings of governments and give them new ideas. Indeed, she voiced dissatisfaction with the current ‘prism’ used for the building of public policies. As an example, she mentioned the public commitment to bridging the wage gap. However, this is often done by encouraging women to go into men-dominated jobs such as the re-labelling of scientific fields as ‘girly’. Instead, she says that it is women-dominated jobs wage grids that need to be reviewed, as there is currently mass underestimation of the arduousness of these jobs. Via re-estimation of the wage grids, salaries could match arduousness and participate in the bridging of the wage gap. Thus, P2 claims that her job is to provide new ideas on issues that are deemed wicked and impossible to move. “We need to look at the problems differently to find new solutions” she says.

Furthermore, she emphasizes that consultancy in this way should always provide accompanying solutions, rather than simply provide a new lens to look at the problems.

Interestingly, P1 mentions that each organisation expects the other to not go beyond the use of their specific knowledges. Indeed, public actors clearly state the independence that each organisation should retain, such that they should focus on their respective area of expertise: “We don’t necessarily have the means to act but we can be in contact with people who are

working on these issues”(P1) “We have an exchange of good practice, and a transfer of expertise” (P4). In this case, P1 explains that entails they never exchange different kind of knowledges. For example, they never discuss and exchange on conceptual definitions of the problems they aim to tackle. This translates in the perception that rather than egalitarian, organisations are complementary and therefore neither should take the upper hand on the other. (P1) P4 explains that this provides an equilibrium so that “We don’t step on each other’s toes”.

However, I noticed the clear knowledge that this independence can only be to an extent, as P1 explains that NGOs are subsidized by governments and therefore rely on them for their finances. P5 clarifies that this funding can make NGOs feel limited in their militant actions, such that they become affiliated with politics. In turn, this coverage can also give them needed political impulse.

Furthermore, P4 explains the organisations agree with this independence, as they are claimed to want to stay in their prerogative. Thus, this relationship of complementarity seems to be convenient on both sides. Nonetheless, For P5, the current state of collaboration is sub-par, as she deems her organisation could be more daring in the organisations and knowledge it chooses to promote. Indeed, she often finds herself being limited to the same practices and projects, such that some social issues are not deemed to be within the scope of a public service. She disagrees.

We can find a similar dissatisfaction within P3’s answers, who expects a more bottom-up approach from governments. Whereas I observed consensus in the importance of complementarity, levels of satisfaction differ.

The obstacles to optimal cooperation:

The political agenda, the NGOs’ coalition levels, the level of political action, coordination issues, the politicization of NGOs and internal resistance.

The sixth recurring theme across the respondents’ answers were the obstacles to optimal cooperation. Regardless of the consensus on the need for complementarity across answers, it is predictable to find obstacles that determine the levels of cooperation. I found that the obstacles to optimal levels of cooperation were: the political agenda, the NGOs’ coalition levels, the level of political action, coordination issues, the politicization of NGOs and the resistance within the service.

P2 develops on the first three obstacles. Indeed, she explains that some issues will trigger immediate action from political representatives, whereas others can be carried for years

without impacting the legislative framework. Particularly, this outcome will depend on the political agenda, such that if an issue is already a political priority, the representatives will actively listen to the solutions provided by NGOs, as they are open and looking for these solutions in the first place. She explains that, for example, the legislative framework on domestic violence has considerably grown in the last five years because it was a priority. Thus, she claims that political timing is the main determinant to what knowledge is going to be used.

The second determinant of public knowledge use is the appropriate targeting of political action, according to P2. Indeed, it is primordial to consult at the most appropriate level, depending on policies. For example, climate law is largely determined at the EU level, such that advocating to EU parliamentarians will be much more effective than national ones. Lastly, P2 explains that the coalition of NGOs can be very impactful for consultancy. Indeed, consultancy is said to be much more efficient when done by fifty NGOs, rather than one.

P3 also notices some coordination issues. She often notices repetitions: “Some actors have to repeat the same story over and over to different actors. They are tired.” According to this respondent, there is an apparent lack of coordination at the territorial level, which slows down the process and lowers efficiency.

Finally, P5 also mentions two obstacles to optimal cooperation: politicization and internal resistance. She explains that, as a political instance, their relationship with NGOs can bias them and ends up doing a disservice to the NGO’s original commitment. Indeed, not only do local governments fund NGOs, but they also bring them political coverage. In turn, this can bias NGOs that are not comfortable with this authority, such that they can omit the original commitment to the cause and strive for funding and political coverage instead. For this reason, the political institution is responsible in their choices of NGOs such that they do not end up harming the people they are trying to help, in the first place.

Secondly, P5 sheds light on the internal resistance she can be faced with. Indeed, she explains her personal strive to deconstruct and elevate the existing language and ‘taken for granted’ pre-conceptions to build better policies. However, she explains this does not fit the expectation of her colleagues and superiors, as this inquiry is rejected as ‘too conceptual’. This rejection of intellectualism is triggered by the prioritizing of representation, such that these concepts are feared for not being accessible for civilians. Indeed, P5 develops on the difficulties of working against social discrimination, such that the project often makes a large portion of the population feel challenged. Accordingly, in this case, the service prioritises the strive for representativeness. Correspondingly, P5 echoes P2’s call for a shift in prism. She explains that many inquiries within social justice need to be deconstructed. For example, P5 demonstrates the tendency to put the locus of gender equality onto women. Instead of fighting for women’s rights and ask for funding in this way, she advocates for the

acknowledgement that men's delinquency is very costly. In this way, she wishes for a shift in narrative to find new solutions.

Larger obstacles to social justice:

Human biases and ignorance of the existing laws

The seventh recurring theme across participants is the larger obstacles to optimal cooperation and better policies against social discrimination. Particularly, P3 provided two contextual obstacles: human biases and ignorance of the existing laws.

Firstly, the respondent explain that human biases affect all humans and therefore all levels of governments and nongovernmental organisations. Particularly "as humans we struggle to see the very long-term and, paired with the desire for absolute conformity, we want to keep status quo". Indeed, she particularly emphasizes of the desire for conformity, such that it often fosters fatalism and inertia, both for victims of discrimination and others: "Well I am black, it is what is, I will always be discriminated against", "Well sexism is the way it is". Particularly, she observes that conscientizing this bias is particularly difficult in higher socio-professional classes. She attributes this phenomenon to education levels, such that, often, this group will already have some understanding of the issues, and therefore perceive themselves as tolerant. In turn, this perception is said to block deconstruction and learning. Particularly, P3 emphasizes that a heterogenous group can foster great exchange between members from different groups, and bias can be more easily uncovered in this way.

In her answers, P3 develops on a second contextual obstacle: the ignorance of the existing laws. Indeed, she claims that the entirety of her beneficiaries do not know about the existing institutions that protect them and help them fight in cases of discrimination. In turn, her trainings make visible the existing legal framework. Importantly, she defends the idea that fatalism is also reinforced by this ignorance of the support that already exists.

Thus, we uncovered seven themes across answers: A large agenda for action, the differences in goals, the difference in perceptions on the appropriate scale, the similarities in ideology, the complementary of different knowledge-uses, the obstacles to optimal cooperation and the larger obstacles to social justice.

In this next section, the results of this study will be juxtaposed to the literature section and will allow us to answer the research question.

Discussion & Conclusion

Discussion

This section observes the convergences between the study's results and the literature section. Thus, I have built the discussion section in three parts. The first two parts are: organisational ideology and organisational structure, as these were the two main strands of literature. The third section enumerates the different knowledge-uses I observed. Lastly, I will close this analysis with the reiteration of all potential obstacles to equal commitment between NGOs and public institutions.

I – Organisational ideology

Per the first literary strand, it was predicted that this study would highlight a clear difference in ideology between governmental and non-governmental actors. Indeed, it was argued that governmental and non-governmental organisations expressed clear differences in ideologies and did not seem to be able to bridge their worlds to exchange knowledge (Stone, 2002). To re-iterate, Stone's (2002) arguments was built on the two sides of the continuum: demand-side and supply-side reasons for this lack of cooperation. Mainly, demand side reasons referred to the policymakers' desire to access quick, efficient, and representative knowledge. Supply-side reasons involved the researchers desire to improve policies, and to better reach policymakers.

However, this ideological gap was unfounded in the respondents' answers. Indeed, they all emphasized similar understandings of social justice, similar commitments to cooperation with the other side, and mostly satisfaction with current levels of cooperation.

It could be argued that the variety in their goals is a counterexample to this finding. Indeed, some organisations prioritised consultancy actions, others focused on giving individuals agency, and others again aimed to impact the laws. These differences could explain the disparity across their methods of action and knowledge uses. Indeed, different goals translate in different methods. I also observed some variations in perceptions of the appropriate scale of action. However, their long-term target and, ultimately, ideology rejoined for the fight for social justice. Indeed, within the obstacles to perfect cooperation, respondents never blamed the other organisations as perpetrators, whereas the literature predicted a clear clash between sides (Stone, 2002). Instead, these were attributed to human biases, politicization issues and coordination issues, which were mostly understood as being natural obstacles, rather than the organisations' fault. Interestingly, the only obstacle within which blame was readily attributed was internal resistance. Thus, the sole

criticism I was able to observe was targeted at their own organisation, rather than opponents, or different structures.

Notably, P3 emphasized the power of individual testimonies as a basis for policies. Even in this case, the interviewee more so emphasized her work, rather than point overt blame to public institutions.

The only mention of real clashes between the two types of organisations was the politicization of NGOs, such that they can become biased when they are faced with potential funding and political impulse. Even then, the respondent expressed no criticism. Rather, she emphasized her responsibility in choosing organisations mature enough to not be badly affected by political exposure. Thus, even in a case in which this tendency to bias could have been denounced, the respondent did no such thing.

Thus, ideologies do not seem as opposed as it was claimed in the literature. Notably, this finding could be explained by the fact that all actors worked against social discrimination. Indeed, this pre-existing commitment could explain the lack of gap between organisations, which could be found in other policy areas.

One of Stone's claim however, was mentioned by one of the interviewees. Indeed Stone (2002) and Boswell (2009) mentioned the rejection of intellectualism, inherent in public services. Thus, public institutions were claimed to prioritise in-house knowledge and proximity as risk averse tendency, as well as to answer to democratic claims of representation. This opinion was accompanied by the thought that governmental organisations would be prioritising more concrete and empirical knowledge over more conceptual knowledge, to make it accessible to their constituency. In turn, it was also argued that concrete knowledge be less impactful than conceptual knowledge and therefore could create a flawed policy as a response to representation claims (Head, 2013; Boswell, 2019). Interestingly, I was able to observe this exact phenomenon within this study. One of the respondents (P5), explained the limitations that representation imposed on her projects, such that new concepts were rejected for being inaccessible to citizens. Interestingly, Head (2013) and Boswell's (2019) claim that this phenomenon prevents public policies from being as impactful as possible was also supported by this interviewee. She explains that prioritising representation protects the status quo. Thus, she was unable to deconstruct existing bias via innovative projects, as they were said to be fostering the exclusion of certain citizens, who would not grasp the new concepts. Based on this phenomenon, she expressed clear discontent with the lack of 'daring' from her service, and frustration from the state of improvement.

II- Organisational structure

The second literature strand emphasized that even in cases of different ideologies between third parties and public institutions, third parties' knowledge could be used by the latter. In particular, they could use political knowledge, through knowledge shift or knowledge creep. In cases of horizontal hierarchy, knowledge shifts were claimed as most likely. Indeed, these organisations are used to cooperate with different sectors and therefore are more open to contesting political knowledge.

We have found similar ideologies between both sides. Therefore, we do not find that this strand was verified in this study. Particularly, I was able to observe a satisfying stream of exchange of knowledges. Thus, this common ideology does transfer into a healthy exchange and is not solely surface level.

One respondent did express criticism towards her own public service, such that they tend to be resistant to new conceptual knowledge, as it clashes with their current political strategy. Because of this subversive component, we could imagine a scenario in which this worker would be interested with using dissenting political knowledge. Namely, she could argue for a challenge in current assumptions that public services should prioritise representation over 'too conceptual' content, which challenges current understandings of social discrimination. Interestingly, the think-tank's employee, who is particularly occupied with transferring subversive conceptual knowledge to public institutions did not express dissatisfaction. This could point to the fact that national governments are more open to new knowledge than local governments. She also expressed the fact that this responsiveness depends on the political agenda. Thus, P5's view on resistance to new knowledge could also be experienced because this conceptual knowledge is not on her service's current political agenda. Thus, in the case in which we would want to theorize on the possibility of using dissenting political knowledge, looking at the service's structure could give us a clue on how this would arise. Particularly, the same respondent voiced that the metropole is self-sufficient. This could point to the fact that a knowledge creep is most likely in this case, as this organisation is quite secluded and therefore exhibits a vertical hierarchy. Indeed, according to Daviter (2015) in a department that is strongly specialised for instance, allegiance to the specific organisational ideology is likely to arise, increasing the odds of knowledge creep.

Interestingly, I mentioned the complementarity of actors in this study, as well as the variance in their actions as a result. Thus, this interconnectedness could also explain the healthy exchange of knowledge, such that all organisations exhibit prior openness to new knowledge. Indeed, according to Daviter (2015), some organisations, by nature of dealing with "ill problems" or changing circumstances, need to stay open to competing knowledge.

According to the author, this facilitates the possibility of knowledge shift and the sustenance of the existing structure, as no structural change is needed for this knowledge to be absorbed (Daviter, 2015). Thus, this would predict knowledge shifts as more likely than knowledge creep in our contexts and can explain the comfort with different kinds of knowledge-uses. Indeed, most interviewees emphasised the role of interconnectedness within their service. A trait which P5's service does not seem to exhibit.

III- Knowledge-uses

Based on Stone's (2002) argument, similar ideologies would translate in similar knowledge-uses. Based on Daviter's (2015) argument, different political knowledges could be used in different ways, depending on the organisational structure. However, this study observed similar ideologies between governmental and non-governmental organisations. Thus, Daviter's (2015) argument loses relevance. Based on Stone (2002), we could develop the counter-argument that similar ideologies permit similar knowledge-uses. Interestingly, each organisation seemed to focus on their respective knowledge-use, dependant on their expertise. However, since all the organisations are interconnected and share ideology, these different knowledges were complementary, rather than secluded. Particularly, respondents mostly expressed satisfaction with this division of labour. Thus, knowledges do not seem as guarded and territorial as it was claimed in the literature.

However, one respondent (P5) expected more enlightenment knowledge-use by her organisation, since she encourages the use of a new prism for policy. P3 also emphasized the need for more concrete knowledge-use from public institutions to build better policies. Thus, I noticed the room for improvement, such that this stream of exchange could be further refined.

In this last section, I will further develop on the different knowledge-uses that were found in this study. The knowledge-uses and the organisations that used them were categorized in Table 4.

Table 4- Different knowledge uses by organisations

Knowledge- use	Organisations
Concrete	P1- local NGOs P3- regional NGO

	P4- local NGOs P5- local government
Enlightenment	P2- think-tank P4- local NGOs P5- local government- with internal resistance P5- local NGOs
Political	P1- local government P2- national government

Concrete knowledge

In this study, all civil servants declared they used their local NGOs' concrete knowledge: P1, P4 and P5. For example, P5 explained how this cooperation with NGOs allows her to avoid building projects in a 'laboratory' and above ground. Her perception on what is the state of progress can be thwarted, she says, and therefore consults NGOs to know if the project matches the current level of awareness, or if they need an inferior step, for example.

P4 perceives NGOs as 'carriers of knowledge' that, from a bottom-up approach, echoes the local needs to the representatives. Because of this closeness to the people, P4 expresses that we might think of them as more active than representatives

In addition, P1 also collaborates with the local NGOs. She explains that they provide them with concrete knowledge on the local experiences, needs and particularities. Indeed, she explains how NGOs last longer than mandates, and therefore can directly witness the local evolutions over long periods of time.

Lastly, P3 also used concrete knowledge for anti-bias trainings, such that she used individual testimonies of individuals impacted by discrimination. In turn, these testimonies provided her with the basis for anti-bias trainings for other groups with high responsibilities, who were trained to prevent bias in their employment practices. She also emphasized the importance of these testimonies; such that public institutions should use them as a background for new policies.

Enlightenment knowledge

Particularly, conceptual knowledges were put under this category when they did not answer to a political strategy, and instead carried the assumptions as such. Interestingly, I predicted to not find enlightenment knowledge uses in this study, as it was claimed to be long-term

and diffuse (Daviter, 2015). However, different respondents claimed using knowledges not for their political power, but because they allowed the furtherment of their ideology: social justice. Thus, I was able to observe enlightenment knowledge-use in this study.

Interestingly, P5 goes against the political status-quo in her department, and therefore rejects the actual political strategy. It is based on this understanding that this conceptual knowledge-use can be qualified as enlightenment knowledge-use, rather than political. Indeed, she emphasized the need for a different prism to look at social discrimination policies. Thus, she aimed to use this knowledge to challenge dogma on what is social discrimination as well as what better policies could be. However, this use was resisted as not being representative. Instead, the service pushes for concrete knowledge-use.

P5 and P4 both emphasized how the NGOs they cooperate with can provide them with enlightenment knowledge, as well as concrete. Indeed, P5 expresses the variety of profiles within NGOs, such that some present enlightenment i.e. new definitions, and others offer concrete knowledge based on empirical experiences.

Interestingly, P4 explains that some NGOs do not want to be politicized and can reject the cooperation as such. Thus, I cannot categorize this conceptual knowledge as political, since it is not strategic. It is based on this, that I qualify their conceptual knowledge use as enlightenment rather than political.

Lastly, P2 explains how her think-tank constantly provides policymakers with new prisms on existing problems. However, this is always done within the political agenda, such that this organisation does not fight for new political priorities, and therefore does not seem to be strategic in that sense. For this reason, I categorize this knowledge use as enlightenment knowledge-use, rather than conceptual.

Political knowledge

Political knowledge was said to be used both by local and national governments. Indeed, P1 works for a town hall and claimed that her office creates ideas that are inherently political, since they need to have a good balance sheet at the end of the mandate. Namely, this knowledge-use is strategic as they focus on how to implement projects that are well received. Thus, they already have underlying assumptions about the best way to use concrete knowledge provided by the NGOs. Interestingly, this same respondent also explained that she never has conceptual exchanges on definitions of problem itself with these NGOs. Thus, in this case, we observe a strictly binary exchange of knowledge: concrete from NGOs and political from this local government.

Additionally, P2 explained how her think-tank's conceptual knowledge is only received when it fits into the ministries and parliamentarians' political agenda. Thus, we can clearly observe the strategic knowledge-use of national governments in this case.

Thus this research showed that the French government does use knowledge on social discrimination created by third parties. To bring this analysis to an end, I will now develop on the found obstacles across answers which could explain why regardless of an apparent similarity in ideologies, the French government expresses lower commitment to social discrimination than third parties.

Using the obstacles mentioned in the results, I have categorized them in two categories: political constraints and coordination constraints.

Political constraints

Within the category of political constraints, I noticed internal resistance, the political agenda, and the politicization of NGOs.

Indeed, P5 explained the resistance she was faced with regarding the use of challenging enlightenment knowledge. She voiced her personal strive to deconstruct and elevate the existing language and 'taken for granted' pre-conceptions to build better policies. However, she explains this does not fit the expectation of her colleagues and superiors, as this inquiry is rejected as 'too conceptual'. This rejection of intellectualism is triggered by the prioritizing of representation, such that these concepts are feared for not being accessible for civilians. Indeed, P5 develops on the difficulties of working against social discrimination, such that the project often makes a large portion of the population feel challenged. Accordingly, in this case, the service prioritises the strive for representativeness. Thus, we can understand how this resistance to a shift in prism can translate in a lack of public commitment. Indeed, it is likely that using this subversive knowledge could present them with more affordable and efficient policy solutions.

Addedly, P2 explained that some issues will trigger immediate action from political representatives, whereas others can be carried for years without impacting the legislative framework. Particularly, this outcome will depend on the political agenda, such that if an issue is already a political priority, the representatives will actively listen to the solutions provided by NGOs, as they are open and looking for these solutions in the first place. Correspondingly, we understand how the political agenda can limit public commitment to a pre-defined number of issues. Furthermore, this finding begs the question of what determines the political agenda in the first place.

Lastly, P5 also mentioned that, as a political instance, their relationship with NGOs can bias them and ends up doing a disservice to the NGO's original commitment. Indeed, not only do local governments fund NGOs, but they also bring them political coverage. In turn, this can bias NGOs that are not comfortable with this authority, such that they can omit the original commitment to the cause and strive for funding and political coverage instead. Thus, we understand how this bias can distract NGOs and their prima-facie commitment against social discrimination. In turn, this can slow down their work and could explain the diminished commitment of public institutions.

Coordination constraints

The second group of obstacles to public commitment was found to be coordination constraints such as: appropriate target of action, NGOs coalition levels, and regional coordination issues.

Indeed, P2 emphasised the importance of consulting at the most appropriate level, depending on policies. For example, climate law is largely determined at the EU level, such that advocating to EU parliamentarians will be much more effective than national ones. Accordingly, we understand that if NGOs do not appropriately target their consultancy practices, this could lower public commitment to social discrimination.

In addition, P2 explains that the coalition of NGOs can be very impactful for consultancy. Indeed, consultancy is said to be much more efficient when done by fifty NGOs, rather than one. Thus, NGOs also need to take this into account if they want to secure maximum amounts of public commitment to social discrimination.

P3 also notices some coordination issues. She often notices repetitions: "Some actors have to repeat the same story over and over to different actors. They are tired." According to this respondent, there is an apparent lack of coordination at the territorial level, which slows down the process and lowers efficiency. Thus, she encourages for better cooperation tactics, such that it could secure added efficiency when mobilizing public institutions and could increase their commitment.

Conclusion & Limitations

The literature claimed that non-governmental and governmental organisations exhibited different ideologies and knowledge-uses. However, it also claimed they could use contesting political knowledge that bridges both. This study made evident that this ideological gap is not present in the French context of social discrimination policies. Instead, it is political and

coordination constraints that could explain the differences in commitments between the organisations.

Limitations

This study only interviewed local civil servants for lack of accessibility to national civil servants who did not reply to my inquiry or did not follow through. By proxy to other respondents' answers, I was able to get some insight on national governments. However, further studies could juxtapose these findings with national government's' answers. This research also relied on a small number of interviewees for feasibility concerns. Indeed, further studies could observe answers across longer time periods and collect a larger number of answers.

Additionally, this research only interviewed workers within social discrimination and equality sectors. Additional studies could use a larger scale to observe the ratio of government officials that share this commitment, compared to those who don't. Indeed, we can predict to find more variability across ideologies for organisations that are not occupied with social discrimination. Thus, further studies would broaden their scope of interviews to also observe answers from different departments.

However, this study is difficult to repeat within short time periods, as I witnessed very long delays to get interviews, both for civil servants and members of non-governmental organisations. This could be attributed to cultural differences, such that French actors are harder to interview and require a closer contact to begin with to trigger their involvement.

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Annex

Example of an interview transcript:

P1- Pouvoirs publics locaux

Interviewer :

- Pouvez-vous décrire brièvement vos activités quotidiennes professionnelles ?

C'est un petit peu dur à résumer. C'est pas du tout tous les jours la même chose parce que vu que je travaille en mairie d'arrondissement, ducoup en cabinet politique, les activités elles varient beaucoup en fonction de l'actualité et du contexte et des moments aussi de l'année parce qu'il y a des périodes qui sont différentes, on va dire, et ou ducoup il se passe pas forcément la même chose, il y a des temps forts, des moments calmes etc. donc c'est un peu difficile de résumer quotidiennement mais si on devait le faire il faut savoir que je traite quand même un bon nombre de mail par jour, que ce soit des mails de ma structure ou de mes habitants parce qu'on reçoit énormément de sollicitations, des habitants, forcément vu qu'on est une mairie. Donc voilà forcément il y a un bon nombre de mails à traiter. On a pas mal de réunion transversale d'équipe, assez régulières, parce que moi je suis en charge de certains sujets mais j'ai des collègues qui travaillent sur d'autres thématiques mais on travaille beaucoup en transversalité parce qu'en réalité tout se recoupe. Et après des réunions avec des partenaires extérieurs qui sont associatifs dans la majeure partie des cas et plus rarement des entreprises ou d'autres institutions publiques. Puis après c'est aussi travailler sur l'avancement des projets qu'on veut mener en lien avec la volonté du maire et des élus, c'est beaucoup du suivi de projets et après la dernière partie ce serait tout ce qui est accompagnement du maire lorsqu'il se déplace à droite à gauche dans l'arrondissement et qu'il faut l'accompagner parce qu'il va visiter une association et c'est aussi lui faire des notes pour qu'il soit bien au courant de tel rendez-vous tel projet qu'il ait une vue d'ensemble on lui fait souvent de façon régulière es petites notes pour qu'il soit bien au courant de tout.

- Quelle est votre niveau d'ancienneté dans cette position ?

Ça fait trois ans

- Quels sont vos différents sujets/missions globales de votre département ?

L'égalité Femmes/ Hommes, droit des femmes au sens très large mais aussi tout ce qui est des violences faites aux femmes, violences sexistes et sexuelles donc la dessus on organise surtout des moments de sensibilisation autour de certains temps forts, on a plusieurs partenaires associatifs qui font des choses sur les sujets. On va essayer de travailler avec les établissements scolaires, on anime un réseau de lutte face aux violences faites aux femmes, ensuite je m'occupe de la lutte contre les discriminations, qui on va dire est un peu différent dans le sens ou les discriminations y en a 25 sortes différentes donc c'est difficile de mener une politique globale sur le sujet, même si il faut rester attentif mais on essaie généralement de cibler sur une ou deux discriminations précises que ce soit la LGBTphobie ou les discriminations liées à l'origine ethnique donc la pareil on a pas mal d'acteurs associatifs qui travaillent sur le sujet, on a pas trop de mal à les mobiliser pour organiser des actions dessus et une grosse partie aussi dont je m'occupe c'est l'handicap donc vaste sujet pas toujours évident à Paris parce que il y a des questions d'accessibilités pour toutes les personnes qui ont un handicap moteur ou les solutions ne coulent pas

forcément tout de suite mais aussi les autres types de handicaps- psychiques etc qu'ils faut prendre en compte même **si nous ont on a pas forcément les moyens d'actions mais au moins on peut être en lien avec les acteurs qui travaillent sur ces sujets** et après c'est aussi à nous d'imaginer ce qu'on peut faire. On est en train de travailler avec une entreprise qui a développer un GPS pour personne à mobilité réduite plutôt que d'utiliser comme on fait souvent Google Maps ça permet à ces personnes de faire leurs trajets sauf que ça évite les obstacles tel que escaliers ça les fait contourner ce que ne fait pas le GPS classique. Je donne cet exemple là parce **qu'on peut choisir de faire milles trucs parce qu'il a pleins de choses à faire** mais nous on est une mandature qui à les jeux olympiques donc les paralympiques donc forcément il ya beaucoup de choses qui se passe à ce niveau-là et c'est tant mieux.

Après j'ai l'accès au droit qui la aussi peut **être très divers**, on a des institutions qui s'occupent pas mal de d'accès au droit mais ca peut être des fois juste remplir ces démarches en ligne pour faire ses déclarations d'impôts ou régularisation de papiers pour une personne migrante donc c'est **assez large**.

- Comment définiriez-vous le terme 'justice sociale' et, d'après vous, quelle est la responsabilité de votre département vis-à-vis de cette justice sociale comme vous la définissez ?

Oh C'est pas évident comme question ! C'est vrai que **justice sociale ça peut couvrir pleins de facettes différentes mais pour moi c'est compenser le fait que des personnes qui sont moins favorisés que d'autres, ou discriminer c'est compenser ces différences-là**. J'aime pas trop le mot différence mais allons-y utilisons le, cette différence la **par le biais d'action** pour justement rétablir une égalité entre ces deux populations ou ces deux personnes et c'est contrebalancer les faits que yes des personnes qui aient ces avantages et d'autres non ducoup **nous en tant que mairie, notre rôle à jouer là-dessus, en vrai il est plus important que ce que l'on pense parce que on peut considérer que ce serait en réalité le rôle de l'état de s'en occuper de pouvoir compenser des inégalités, sauf que en réalité ce n'ai pas toujours le cas** et que les personnes et les habitants ils se tournent très facilement vers la mairie d'arrondissement ou mairie tout court d'ailleurs, cqui est normal parce que c'est la **maison du peuple** c'est **forcément quelque chose de plus concret qu'une entité nationale** donc on as des personnes qui veulent favoriser la justice sociale et elles se tournent vers nous et elles ont raison parce que justement nous on as des personnes qui sont laisés par un certains nombres de choses et évidemment **on changera pas tout mais si on peut essayer un minimum de contrebalancer ca on peut essayer de le faire**.

- A quelle fréquence implantez vous de nouvelles politiques publiques de ce genre ?
œuvrez-vous pour l'implémentation institutionnelle de ce type d'action ?- On implante de nouvelles politiques publiques –

De façon **très régulière**, fin si on est d'accord sur la définition , parqu'on a quand même des rythmes très marqués en mairie avec des conseils d'arrondissements d'environ 8 fois par an donc presque tous les mois ou des élus vont voter telle ou telle idée ou projet et après a nous de les mettre en place une fois qu'ils sont votés et c'est pas le seul moyen de décision, bien évidemment, après le maire et son équipe municipal peuvent décider de mettre en place tel ou tel projet mais jdirais qu'en soi yen a chaque semaine c'est **très très fréquent**. Je prends l'ensemble de cque peut faire une mairie, pas juste mes sujets à moi. Sur mes

sujets à moi, uniquement j pense que ce serait **une fois par mois** peut être, si je dois faire la moyenne.

- D'après vous, quel serait le niveau idéal de coopération entre votre organisation et les organisations non-gouvernementales (ONGs, think-tanks et autres) ? Est-ce que le niveau actuel est suffisant ?

Oui je pense. Je vais prendre l'exemple des associations puisque c'est avec elles qu'on travaille majoritairement, faut bien garder en tête **qu'une mairie ou une association publique est complémentaire de l'associatif, l'un ne doit pas prendre le pas sur l'autre c'est hyper important.** C'est important aussi que les associations, même si elles sont tenues de respecter certaines conditions posées par une mairie, parce que c'est aussi ce qui conditionne les subventions qui sont versées c'est **important aussi qu'elles gardent leurs indépendance on va dire** mais après au niveau des coopérations, vu que pour moi c'est vraiment **deux entités complémentaires**, forcément **cette coopération elle doit être très forte**, mais nous dans l'état actuel des choses on a une très bonne coopération parce que **c'est les associations qui sont installées depuis longtemps, dans tel ou tel quartier, qu'elles ont vues les quartiers évoluer, les gens évoluer et qui sont restés là**, puisque ce sont des assos assez ancienne, ya pas que ça évidemment, mais **du coup forcément on a de bonnes relations parce que ça perdure.**

- Et qu'en est-il de la coopération avec d'autres organisations telles que think-tanks et autres ?

Non, pas tellement. Des entreprises ça peut arriver mais c'est plus rare, c'est sur un autre modèle c'est **plus de la prestation**. C'est nous qui faisons appel à des entreprises pour réaliser telle ou telle chose. C'est de la coopération mais sous forme de **prestation c'est pas on va mettre ensemble nos idées et décider de faire si ou ça.**

- Pourquoi y a-t-il ce type de relation d'après vous ?

Encore plus rare sur mes thèmes ; plus sur des sujets coûteux financièrement- culture, voirie puisqu'on ne peut pas faire nous. Ça arrive sur nos sujets avec les entreprises

- Un exemple ?

Hésitation – C'était uniquement pour des questions logistiques, transport de matériel, ce genre de choses

- Jamais de coopération/ appel prestataire vis-à-vis des connaissances ? Plus sur le contenu que la logistique ?

Non, pas sur mes sujets.

- Tant avec ces entreprises qu'avec les assos ? Ou différence ?

Pour le coup avec assos ya quand même une méthode de réflexion commune ou les idées des assos sont souvent les bienvenus parce que acteur de terrain aussi –

-Égalitaire comme échange ?

Je sais pas.. C'est vrai que je disais complémentaire mais pas forcément égalitaire parce que différent . L'une attend pas forcément la même chose de l'autre et vice versa.

- Vous pouvez développer sur la différence d'attente ?

Assos ont un pov de terrain , de connaissance de ce qui se passe en réalité, de concret, alors que nous on va émerger des idées qui sont très politiques- ca veut pas dire quelles sont forcément éloigné de la réalité mais elles ont un but au final qui est que les idées et projets mis en place ont pour but qu'à la fin du mandat il y est un bon bilan.

- En fonction de quel type d'interaction avec la recherche et les connaissances créés et communiquées par les organisations non-gouvernementales diriez-vous que votre département à 'utilisé' ces connaissances ? // Comment est ce que vous définiriez 'l'utilisation de ces connaissances – juste une interaction ou une implémentation plus importante ?
 - Quelle est l'utilisation que vous faites de ces connaissances ?

Très divers, elles nous servent de contenu pour dresser un constat de ce qui se passe à quel endroit, quartier pour quelle catégorie de personnes, et si positif tant mieux as de changements et si négatif on va juste mettre en place une action – court terme ou long terme pour résoudre un problème – peut être action culturelle ou des choses matérielles , sensibilisation, très varié.

- Toujours utilisation moteur d'action ?
Oui

-Très concret, jamais apport théorique sur la définition du problème en soi ?
Non

- Pouvez-vous décrire la structure organisationnelle de votre département

On est une entité à part, d'arrondissement, la ville c'est une grosse machine. Si on prend tout en haut ya l'hôtel de ville ,avec la maire de Paris, et ses adjoints, ou va y avoir ensuite des directions des services administratifs, les mairies d'arrondissements sont pas des mairies de pleins exercice, en lien constant avec l'hôtel de ville, et mairie arrondissement – nous plusieurs charges de missions sur différents sujets, assistants administratifs et direction de cabinet – directeur adjoint ,
Pas forcément un lien hiérarchique psq même si nous avons le fin mot on as aussi des services administratifs donc plus de proximité avec qui on a des échanges de façon très courante.

Des directions centralisées qu'on connait pas forcément après nous petit noyau

-Niveau d'indépendance ?

Vrai indépendance- nous permanence politique alors qu'autre services administratifs – techniquement ils sont censés mettre en ordre ce qu'on leur dis de faire – pas du tout la même manière de travailler.

