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Sunday, Bloody Sunday: Under what conditions does state repression backfire? A case study of Bloody Sunday in 1972

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“Sunday, Bloody Sunday”

Under what conditions does state repression backfire? A case study of Bloody Sunday in 1972

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1. Introduction

On 30 January 1972, thousands of people marched through the streets of Derry in Northern Ireland. The march was organized by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) to protest against imprisonment without trial. The Prime Minister had prohibited marches earlier that year so it did not take long before the protesters came across British army barriers. The march's route was redirected by the organizers, but some protesters started rioting. Not much later British paratroopers opened fire against the protesters. That day 26 people were shot of whom 13 got killed by the British army. This day came to be known as 'Bloody Sunday'. The protesters had been violently repressed but this did not scare them away. In the aftermath of the event, the movement gained increased support as a result of the violent repression by the British Army (CAIN Archive, 2010; McLaughlin, 2014, pp. 14-16; Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume I, 2010).

What happened here was a case of repression backfire. This means that the repression by the state did not have the intended consequences: to deter protesters and decrease mobilization. In this case the repression was counterproductive and caused more people to mobilize and support the protest movement. This effect is called a 'backfire effect' (Hess & Martin, 2006). Repression, however, does not always backfire. State repression often deters protesters and demobilizes social movements. This provides a puzzle: what can explain when repression will backfire and cause increased mobilization? So far, research has focused on the general effect of repression on movement mobilization, but this has not provided conclusive answers. Rather, the focus should be shifted to the concrete conditions that facilitate a backfire effect of repression. That will be the core of this study and therefore the research question is as follows: *Under what conditions does state repression backfire?*

The backfire effect of repression will be studied by analyzing the case of Bloody Sunday in which repression backfired. This case will be used to test whether the conditions mentioned in literature are actually present and cause repression to backfire. It is important to study this because it might provide more clarity about when exactly repression is likely to backfire and when it is more likely to have its intended effect and cause movement demobilization. Hence, this is important for both theory and the real world. Also, the case of Bloody Sunday is still highly relevant because a former British soldier was charged with murder and attempted murder on Bloody Sunday in 2019 (Butler, 2021, p. 42).

In order to answer the research question, the following structure will be used. First, the current literature about the effects of repression on movement mobilization will be investigated. Second, the theoretical framework will outline the most prominent conditions for backfire and

these conditions are then phrased into a hypothesis to be tested in the case study. Third, the methods of this study will be discussed. This concerns the research design, operationalization, case selection and data selection. After the methods have been settled, the analysis will follow. The analysis will consist of two parts: first, the newspaper communication about Bloody Sunday will be investigated and second, the framing in newspaper articles will be analyzed. These findings are then summarized and intermediate conclusions are drawn. Finally, the discussion and overall conclusion are presented along with some limitations and recommendations for further research.

2. Literature review

As mentioned before, increased mobilization is not a self-evident effect of state repression. Existing research is highly divergent when it comes to repression and its effects on social movements (Davenport, 2007). This is also the case for research on the relationship between repression and movement mobilization. The major theories of social movement studies predict different outcomes of repression on mobilization (Honari, 2018; Opp & Roehl, 1990). The relative deprivation theory predicts that repression will raise political protest and has a radicalizing effect where movement mobilization increases (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 522). The resource mobilization theory predicts that repression causes demobilization of protest groups, but when social movements use litigation and civil disobedience they may increase mobilization again (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 522). The theory of collective action, however, takes a rational approach and predicts that repression is regarded as a cost and therefore will cause demobilization of a movement (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 522).

The findings of empirical research are broad and inconclusive as well (Anasin, 2016; Boykoff, 2007; Davenport, 2005a; Earl, 2011; Honari, 2018; Opp & Roehl, 1990). Boykoff (2007) mentions how there are different ideas about the shape of the relationship between repression and dissent, implying that the relationship is not linear (Boykoff, 2007, p. 283). To make the relationship between repression and mobilization more complicated, Carey (2006) argues that protest and repression are interdependent. Ellefsen (2021) argues that escalated policing, which is a form of repression, can have three types of outcome: it can create a worse situation for protesters, it can cause triggered radicalization, or it can have a so-called “chilling effect” on protest (p. 92). Mason and Krane (1989) find that repressive violence can be effective and cause demobilization when it is carefully targeted, but when the repression is more indiscriminate it can cause increased mobilization. The arguments of these scholars reflect the varying effects repression can have on movement mobilization.

Since there are such various outcomes, the focus should not be on what the effect of repression is on movement mobilization, but rather on what the underlying conditions are that facilitate a certain effect. One of the possible effects is that state repression is counter-productive and, instead of deterring protesters, mobilizes more people into protest. This phenomenon is referred to in the literature as a “backfire effect” (Hess & Martin, 2006). In this research the focus will be on the conditions explaining the backfire effect of repression. Therefore the research question will be as follows: *Under what conditions does repression backfire?*

3. Theoretical framework

3.1 Conditions for backfire effect

In the existing literature, one can find different conditions which are argued to be necessary for state repression to backfire and cause increased movement mobilization. In this section these conditions will be set out and explained in order to be tested in the case study.

3.1.1 Condition 1: Nonviolent discipline

Multiple authors have argued that an important condition for repression to backfire is the nonviolent discipline within a movement (Hess & Martin, 2006; Kurtz & Smithey, 2018; Sharp, 1973). The main line of thought is that repressive attacks by the state against nonviolent movements will be counterproductive because they are regarded as disproportionate and therefore create more support for the movement. Kurtz and Smithey (2018) refer to this through their ‘paradox of repression’. With this concept they argue that “in an asymmetrical conflict, when actors representing the status quo use force (...) to repress their opponents – especially those engaged in nonviolent movements – the use of coercion often backfires” (Kurtz & Smithey, 2018, p. 2).

3.1.2 Condition 2: Perception of repression as unjust

The nonviolent discipline of a movement alone, however, is not enough to explain a backfire effect. In literature, other conditions are also argued to be important for repression to backfire. Hess and Martin (2006) make a two-fold argument regarding the necessary conditions for repression to backfire. They argue that the following two factors need to be present in order for a repressive event to backfire: (1) there must be an audience which regards the event as unjust and (2) information about the event needs to be communicated to receptive audiences (Hess & Martin, 2006, pp. 250-251).

The first factor presented by Hess and Martin (2006) relates to a broader condition of triggered outrage which can also be found in the literature. This condition is more psychological and is related to emotions and transformative events. When a significant number of people find that something is unjust, wrong or inappropriate, the typical response is outrage. Kurtz and Smithey (2018) argue that repressive events that cause widespread shock and outrage in an oppressed movement can backfire against the state.

3.1.3 Condition 3: Communication to substantial audience

The second factor states that information about the event needs to be communicated to receptive audiences. Hess and Martin (2006) add to this that the audience needs to be “substantial enough that authorities must take their outrage into consideration” (p. 251). With this they mean that enough people must be informed about the event in order to create awareness. When there are only a few people who know about the repression then this will not bring about a change in the mobilization of the movement in response to the repressive events.

3.2 Bringing the conditions together

When we consider the conditions in pairs and apply basic reasoning it becomes clear that conditions 2 and 3 are crucial, whereas condition 1 is not. First, when condition 1 and condition 2 are present, a movement is nonviolent and the repressive events against it are considered unjust. But if the information about the repression is not communicated to enough people there will not be a substantial increase in support for the movement and the repression will not backfire. Therefore condition 3 (communication to substantial audience) is necessary for repression to backfire. Second, when condition 1 and condition 3 are present, a movement is nonviolent and the information about the repression is communicated to enough people. But if the audience does not perceive the events as unjust there will not be an increase in support for the movement and the repression will not backfire. Hence, condition 2 (perception as unjust) is necessary for repression to backfire. Third, when condition 2 and condition 3 are present, the repressive events against a movement are considered unjust and the information about the repression is communicated to enough people. This will cause the support for the movement to increase. The fact that the movement is not nonviolent is not necessary for there to be an increase in support for the movement. Therefore it can be reasoned that condition 1 (nonviolence) is not necessary in itself for repression to backfire. Consequently, it can be argued that the causal mechanism between repression and mobilization is that (1) the information about

the repressive event needs to be communicated to a substantial audience and (2) the audience perceives the repression as unjust (see Figure 1). Therefore, the hypothesis is as follows:

H1: When information about the state repression is communicated to a substantial audience which perceives it as unjust, the state repression backfires.

Figure 1: Visualization of the causal mechanism behind repression backfire



3.3 Conceptualization

The two most important concepts in this study are state repression and movement mobilization. In order to analyze these concepts and make claims, it is important to set some clear frames regarding the conceptualization of the terms.

State repression is a broad concept and widely referred to in social movement literature. Authors use different connotations when explaining state repression. The definition provided by Davenport (2005b) is most clear and extensive. He defines state repression as “actions taken by authorities against individuals and/or groups within their territorial jurisdiction that either restrict the behavior and/or beliefs of citizens through the imposition of negative sanctions (e.g., applying curfews, conducting mass arrests, and banning political organizations) or that physically damage or eliminate citizens through the violation of personal integrity (e.g., using torture, disappearances, and mass killing)” (Davenport, 2005b, p. 122). Since this definition includes the mentioning of physical damage as a form of state repression which will be important in this study, this will be used as the conceptualization.

In this study the term ‘backfire’ is often referred to. The backfire effect means that state repression has unintended consequences and instead of deterring protesters actually draws more support for the opposing movement. The underlying concept that is important here is movement mobilization. In the existing literature, mobilization is often not specifically defined. Instead, it is considered an established concept. McPhail and McCarthy (2005, p. 9) do write more explicitly about mobilization and mention two key aspects: the assembling of people and that they do something collectively. When looking up the meaning of mobilization in the dictionary it is defined as “the act of organizing or preparing something, such as a group of people, for a purpose” (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.a). Taking these findings together, movement

mobilization will be conceptualized as the assemblance of people as part of a social movement in order to collectively organize for a shared purpose.

4. Methods

4.1 Research design

For this research, a qualitative research design will be used. This is helpful to delve deeper into the factors which can explain how state repression can backfire. In order to do this, a process-tracing method will be employed. This method is used for identifying a mechanism that may be responsible for a certain outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2019a). Considering the research goal of this study, to investigate the conditions under which repression backfires, theory-testing process-tracing is most suitable. This design is employed to test whether a certain theorized causal mechanism is present in a specific case which links X and Y, in this case repression and mobilization (see Figure 1), and to investigate whether the mechanism functions as predicted by theory (Beach & Pedersen, 2019b). Hence, a single case study will be carried out.

4.2 Operationalization

To be able to analyze the backfire of repression, the main variables need to be operationalized into measurable observations. For that reason, state repression, which is the independent variable (IV), will be operationalized as protest policing. This refers to the actions of state police forces taken during protests of social movements. These are the type of actions which Davenport (2005b) described as those “that restrict the behavior (...) of citizens (...) or physically damage or eliminate citizens through the violation of personal integrity” (p. 122). More specifically, the forms of protest policing that will be focused on are: arrests, the use of torture and killing.

Movement mobilization, the dependent variable (DV), is operationalized as an increase in support for the movement which faced repression during a protest event. Support for a movement can take various forms, such as joining a protest, helping organize a protest or simply expressing one’s support for the movement to other people. Since it is hard to measure how many people express support for a movement, the focus will be on the number of people who join a protest. In order to measure the difference in support for the movement, and hence see whether the repression increasingly mobilized people, the number of people who joined the protest which got repressed will be compared to the number of people who joined the following protest after the repression has occurred.

The hypothesized mechanism through which repression backfires also needs to be operationalized in order to be able lay out the case-specific predictions of how the mechanism can be observed if it is present in the case study (Beach & Pedersen, 2019b). As explained before, the mechanism is two-fold: (1) the information about the repressive event is communicated to a substantial audience and (2) the audience perceives the repression as unjust. It is complex to establish what exactly a ‘substantial’ audience is since this is different in each case and depends on numerous factors. Along with that, it is difficult to measure if and when people find something unjust. So to be able to measure the causal mechanism, the use of communication on Bloody Sunday will be taken into account in combination with the way these communications frame the repressive event as unjust.

4.3 Case selection

According to Beach and Pedersen (2019b), when employing the theory-testing method, a case should be selected in which both X and Y are present. That means this should be a case in which state repression (X) backfired and caused increased movement mobilization (Y). The single case that has been selected is the event of ‘Bloody Sunday’ in Northern Ireland on 30 January 1972.

When it comes to the factor of state repression, this was certainly present in the case of Bloody Sunday. As the official report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry describes, a number of civilians were arrested by British soldiers (Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume I, 2010, p. 88). On top of that, 13 people got shot dead and 13 others were injured by soldiers of the British Army (CAIN Archive, 2010). These injuries were caused by shots, rubber bullets, batons and even by being run down by army vehicles. Hence the state repression was performed through killing, the use of torture and arrests.

When it comes to movement mobilization, there are plenty of sources which argue that support for the civil rights movement and the IRA increased after the events on Bloody Sunday (Bowcott, 2015; Britannica, n.d.; Pringle & Jacobson, 2000). To measure whether there was an increase in mobilization after Bloody Sunday, the number of participating protestors at the Derry march on Bloody Sunday will be compared to the number of participating protesters at the first protest action that followed Bloody Sunday. There are no exact numbers available, but the most trustworthy account for an estimate of the number protesters on Bloody Sunday is the official government report of the Bloody Sunday inquiry. In this report it is mentioned that 10,000 to 15,000 people joined the march in Derry (Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume II, 2010, p. 78). The first protest action that followed Bloody Sunday was a protest on

2 February 1972 in Dublin. This action followed the funerals in Derry of the 13 protestors who got killed on Bloody Sunday. In Dublin, a crowd of approximately 20,000 to 30,000 people joined together on Merrion Square and burned down the British Embassy (BBC On This Day, 2003; CAIN Archive, 2010). Even though the numbers are approximations, it is clear that the protest following Bloody Sunday gained increased support after the march in Derry.

The case of Bloody Sunday fits the criteria of state repression and consequent increased mobilization. Therefore this case is a typical case because it is an example of the backfire effect which is under investigation in this study. There are numerous cases of social movements on which repression backfired. An important factor in determining the case selection was the feasibility. Many cases of social movement repression have occurred in countries of which the language is foreign, therefore it will be impossible to analyze documents and statements produced by those movements and the states involved. Along with that, not all cases of social movement repression have the necessary data available to analyze because either the primary data is not accessible or the secondary data is lacking since there has not been much prior research executed. In the case of Bloody Sunday a variety of sources is available, both primary and secondary sources, and since the documents are written in English they are comprehensible and suited for analysis.

4.4 Data collection

To analyze whether the causal mechanism for a backfire effect is present in the case of Bloody Sunday, the selected data should inform about (1) the communication of Bloody Sunday to a substantial audience and (2) the perception of the repression on Bloody Sunday as unjust. When it comes to measuring the communication about Bloody Sunday, an important source of data is newspapers. Newspapers are important means of disseminating information to a wide audience of people, even more so in the past when social media did not exist yet. Therefore, it will be investigated which newspapers reported on Bloody Sunday to check for condition 1.

When it comes to measuring the perception of the repression as unjust, it is hard to find data which directly reports on this. Another way to approach this is to see how this perception is formed. An important manner through which perceptions are formed is framing, which is defined as “the way that something is expressed, and the words that are chosen to do this” (Cambridge dictionary, n.d.b). As mentioned before, newspapers are important means of informing a broad variety of people. In their reporting, newspapers make choices about the way something is expressed and which words are being used for it. Because of that, newspaper articles are framed and hence influence the perception of the readers on the reported events.

Therefore, the framing of the newspaper articles reporting on Bloody Sunday will be used to check for condition 2.

5. Analysis

5.1 Historical background

To understand the context in which Bloody Sunday occurred, it is useful to provide historical background information. In 1921, Ireland was divided into two polities: Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. Northern Ireland was a semi-autonomous province within the United Kingdom (UK) established for the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland who were loyal to the British Crown (Bosi & De Fazio, 2017, p. 18). This resulted in a divided society in Northern Ireland: the Protestant majority saw itself as British subjects and wanted Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK, whereas the Catholic minority saw themselves as Irish and wanted Northern Ireland to rejoin with the Republic of Ireland (Beggan, 2006, p. 62). Important to mention is that the regime of Northern Ireland “basically embodied a confessional state with institutionalized partiality, without the necessary checks and balances to limit systemic excesses and biases and no oversight from the central British government” (Bosi & De Fazio, 2017, p. 18). This resulted in widespread discrimination against the Catholic minority.

In the mid-1960s, a group of activists demanded democratic reforms and was inspired by the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. This group later became the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). Their tactics consisted of non-violent civil disobedience and demonstrations (Bosi & De Fazio, 2017, pp. 18-19). In 1968, a civil rights march was banned by the government and enforced with disproportionate violence and indiscriminate use of force against peaceful protesters and bystanders. A wave of mass civil rights demonstrations started and immediately clashed with the Protestant majority, which soon led to extreme communal violence, the deployment of the British army in Belfast and Derry, and the emergence of the Provisional IRA (Bosi & De Fazio, 2017, p. 19). The situation became more unstable and by the 1970s the government resorted to more rigorous measures like internment and banning protest demonstrations. The NICRA organized a civil-rights march in Derry anyway to demonstrate against internment on Sunday 30 January 1972. This is the day that came to be known as ‘Bloody Sunday’ (McLaughlin, 2014, p. 14).

On that day, thousands of protesters marched towards the city centre in a festive mood (McLaughlin, 2014, p. 14). Their march, however, was rerouted when they came across an army barricade. Most of the protesters followed, but a small group continued their way along the planned route and started to clash with soldiers. These marchers threw stones and the soldiers

repulsed them with rubber bullets, CS gas and a water cannon after which they started chasing them on an 'arrest operation' (McLaughlin, 2014, p. 14). Not much later, the soldiers had shot 26 civilians of whom 13 were killed.

Bloody Sunday has had serious consequences. In March 1972, the British government put off the parliament of Northern Ireland (McLaughlin, 2014, p. 14). It is also argued that Bloody Sunday caused the decline of peaceful protesting and led to an increase in armed republicanism and violence in Northern Ireland (McLaughlin, 2014). The conflict would last many more years, until it formally came to an end with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in Belfast in 1998 (McLaughlin, 2014).

5.2 Analysis overview

The analysis will proceed in two steps. First, the available newspapers in Northern Ireland in 1972 will be listed and consequently it will be investigated which of these newspapers reported on Bloody Sunday by dedicating a front page article to the event. Front page articles have been chosen specifically because these are the articles that draw most attention and therefore will spread the information about Bloody Sunday to a broad and substantial audience (Pasternack & Utt, 1986). Second, the front page articles about Bloody Sunday will be analyzed in regard to their framing of the event as unjust. In order to do this, qualitative content analysis will be used. This means that the articles will be analyzed using a coding frame in which specific parts of the text will be assigned to a corresponding category. These categories are based on the condition of framing the event as unjust or just. After completing these steps the results will be discussed to be able to conclude whether the two conditions for a backfire effect were sufficiently present or not.

5.3 Newspaper communication about Bloody Sunday

To check whether the first condition was present in the case of Bloody Sunday, the available newspapers in Northern Ireland in 1972 will be investigated and listed. Next, for these newspapers it will be checked whether they published a front-page article about Bloody Sunday on the day after the event. Together, these findings will be used to conclude whether condition 1 was sufficiently present.

5.3.1 Available national newspapers in Northern Ireland in 1972

When analyzing newspapers it is important to establish the different types of newspapers. Broadly, two categories can be distinguished: the broadsheets, which are more serious and

intellectual, and the tabloids, which are known as ‘popular press’ and focus more on non-political reports (Wikipedia, 2023). The available newspapers in Northern Ireland in 1972 consist of British newspapers which were spread across the United Kingdom and (Northern) Irish newspapers which were national newspapers. In order to keep the analysis concise and within the limits of this study, local newspapers are not included. A list of the available newspapers in Northern Ireland in 1972 is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: List of British and (Northern) Irish national newspapers available in Northern Ireland in 1972

Newspaper title	Broadsheet or tabloid	Newspaper published on 31-01-1972 available	Front page article on Bloody Sunday
The Sunday Times	Broadsheet	N/A	N/A
The Times	Broadsheet	No, but via McLaughlin & Baker (2014)	Yes
The Daily Telegraph	Broadsheet	No, but via McLaughlin & Baker (2014)	Yes
The Sunday Telegraph	Broadsheet	N/A	N/A
The Observer	Broadsheet	No	N/A
The Guardian	Broadsheet	Yes, also via McLaughlin & Baker (2014)	Yes
Irish Examiner	Broadsheet	Yes	Yes
Irish Independent	Broadsheet	Yes	Yes
Irish Press	Broadsheet	Yes	Yes
The Irish Times	Broadsheet	Yes	Yes
The Irish News	Broadsheet	No	N/A
The Belfast Telegraph	Broadsheet	No	N/A
The News Letter	Broadsheet	No	N/A
The Sun	Tabloid	No, but via McLaughlin & Baker (2014)	Yes
Daily Mail	Tabloid	No, but via McLaughlin & Baker (2014)	Yes
Daily Express	Tabloid	No	N/A
Sunday Express	Tabloid	N/A	N/A
Daily Mirror	Tabloid	No, but via McLaughlin & Baker (2014)	Yes
Sunday Mirror	Tabloid	N/A	N/A
Sunday People	Tabloid	N/A	N/A
Morning Star	Tabloid	No	N/A

5.3.2 Newspapers with front-page article about Bloody Sunday

The next step is to check which of these newspapers actually dedicated a front page article to Bloody Sunday. Bloody Sunday happened on Sunday 30 January, so the newspapers will be checked whether they reported on it the next day: 31 January 1972. It has been decided to focus solely on reports on this day because Monday 31 January was the first day following Bloody Sunday, therefore it is most likely that newspapers would report on Bloody Sunday in their first possibility which was the following Monday.

There is, however, an issue with checking the listed newspapers on their front page reports on 31 January. Since the newspapers published on 31 January 1972 are more than 50 years old already, they are not all available in online databases. This impacts the analysis, because the newspapers that are not accessible online cannot be checked for their reports on Bloody Sunday and consequently the framing of the event. In Table 1, a column is included to denote for each newspaper whether the edition of 31 January 1972 is accessible or not. For some of the newspapers 'N/A' has been denoted, which means 'not applicable'. This is the case for newspapers which were only published on Sundays and therefore did not have a publication on Monday 31 January.

As noted in Table 1, there are six newspapers which are freely accessible. These are the following newspapers: The Guardian, Irish Examiner Irish Independent, Irish Press and The Irish Times. These have been highlighted in green in Table 1. It is striking that each of these newspapers published a front-page article about Bloody Sunday. Since it is unknown whether the other, unavailable newspapers published a front-page article about Bloody Sunday, no hard conclusions can be drawn. But the fact that six out of six of the available newspapers did report about Bloody Sunday on their front pages, does indicate a sense of the priority that the newspapers gave to communicating about Bloody Sunday.

McLaughlin and Baker (2014) undertook a newspaper analysis regarding Bloody Sunday and selected a cross-section of British newspapers which includes: the Daily Telegraph, the Times, the Daily Mail, the Guardian, the Daily Mirror and the Sun. Except for the Guardian, the other five newspapers are not freely accessible through online databases. According to McLaughlin and Baker (2014), all the newspapers included in their analysis "led with the Derry killings" (p. 30) on their front pages. McLaughlin and Baker (2014) might have had access to more databases and archives and hence were able to find these newspaper publications of 31 January 1972. These five newspapers have been highlighted in blue in Table 1. Note that the publication of the Guardian was accessible online but was also analyzed by McLaughlin and Baker (2014), therefore it is marked in yellow in Table 1.

5.3.3 Summarizing findings for condition 1

Since not all newspaper publications of 31 January 1972 could be found, it is tricky to draw solid conclusions regarding newspaper communication about Bloody Sunday. However, 10 newspaper publications of 31 January 1972 were available, either directly or indirectly via McLaughlin and Baker (2014). And each of those 10 newspapers reported about Bloody Sunday on their front pages. These newspapers represent a broad variety of readership. The newspapers selected in McLaughlin and Baker's (2014) analysis are "a cross section of Britain's leading newspapers according to readership and editorial outlook" (p. 11). Adding to that the four Irish newspapers provides for an even more varied and broader readership which was informed about Bloody Sunday. Despite the uncertainty regarding the publications of the 11 remaining unavailable newspaper publications, it can be concluded that the event of Bloody Sunday was widely and prominently communicated to a substantial audience on 31 January 1972 in Northern Ireland through newspaper articles. This means that condition 1 of the causal mechanism is sufficiently present in the case of Bloody Sunday.

5.4 Framing of Bloody Sunday in newspaper articles

To check whether the second part of the causal mechanism was present in the case of Bloody Sunday, the framing in the newspaper articles mentioned before will be analyzed. This will be done in two steps. First, the findings presented by McLaughlin and Baker (2014) will be clarified in regard to the framing of the newspaper articles they have analyzed. Second, the coding frame that has been set up for this study will be presented and consequently used to analyze the other five newspaper articles about Bloody Sunday. Together, these facets will provide the necessary information in order to conclude whether condition 2 was sufficiently present.

5.4.1 Framing in newspaper articles based on literature

In their analysis, McLaughlin and Baker (2014) analyzed the reports on 31 January 1972 about Bloody Sunday in the Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian, the Sun, the Daily Mail and the Mirror. They investigate the framing in the newspaper articles and whether they relied on the army's version of what happened on Bloody Sunday or the marchers' version.

The Times, the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail mostly relied on the army's statements and consequently framed Bloody Sunday as a 'battle', "a term that suggested some sort of military equivalence between unarmed demonstrators and highly trained soldiers and helped to dignify and legitimize the army's fatal actions" (McLaughlin & Baker, 2014, p. 31).

The Daily Mail admitted that British soldiers had done most killing, but then blamed the NICRA leaders for executing the illegal march (McLaughlin & Baker 2014, p. 31). The Daily Telegraph's article referred to Bloody Sunday as 'a riot', which implies that the marchers were responsible for the disturbance and violence. The Times did frame the army's actions as more aggressive in the article's headline: "13 civilians are killed as soldiers storm the Bogside" (McLaughlin & Baker 2014, p. 32). But meanwhile, the army's claim about a "brief but fierce gun battle" (McLaughlin & Baker 2014, p. 32) was also accepted in the article. Along with that, the article puts the blame for the killings on Bloody Sunday with the marchers because they knew what the consequences would be.

Contrary to these newspapers reflecting the army's statements about Bloody Sunday were the stories that emerged in the Guardian, the Sun and the Mirror. These articles were more based on the marchers' experiences. The Guardian reflected anxiety about the actions of the army (McLaughlin & Baker, 2014, p. 32). In the article, Bloody Sunday was referred to as both a 'riot' and 'Sharpeville' (McLaughlin & Baker, 2014, p. 33). These terms do not carry the same meaning because 'riot' implies that the blame lies with the marchers and 'Sharpeville' relates to the event in 1960 when police opened fire on black anti-Apartheid demonstrators. Therefore the reference to Sharpeville implies that the blame for Bloody Sunday lies with the army's soldiers. The Sun used the word 'massacre' to describe Bloody Sunday and the Daily Mirror wrote 'another Sharpeville' in its sub-heading (McLaughlin & Baker, 2014, p. 33). These choices of words point out the disproportionate use of violence by the army and put the blame with the paratroopers. These articles also took a more personalized approach by including eyewitness accounts of Derry residents.

To summarize the main findings presented by McLaughlin and Baker (2014), it can be concluded that the articles about Bloody Sunday in the Times, the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail presented Bloody Sunday as an equal conflict between the marchers and the army in which the army had acted violently as a result of the marchers' illegal protest and their actions. These articles relied mostly on the army's statements and put the blame for the outcome of Bloody Sunday with the organizers of the march. So these newspapers did not frame the repression as unjust. The other three articles by the Guardian, the Sun and the Mirror, however, presented a different picture. These newspapers took a more personalized approach and focused on the marchers' accounts of Bloody Sunday. Bloody Sunday was framed as an unequal conflict in which the army used a disproportionate amount of violence. Hence, these newspapers did frame the repression on Bloody Sunday as unjust.

5.4.2 Coding frame

In Table 2, the coding frame is presented. This coding frame has been used to analyze the five front-page newspaper articles about Bloody Sunday on 31 January 1972 which were available through online databases. The coding frame has been created inductively, which means that the categories have been set up while analyzing the newspaper articles and looking for overall commonalities to form these categories. This has led to the creation of four categories: reference, blame, judgement and violence performance. These categories have each been divided into two sub-categories, where the upper sub-categories each relate to the framing of repression as just and the lower sub-categories point to the framing as unjust. In Appendix A, the applied coding frames for each newspaper article can be found in which the extracts from the article have been placed into the corresponding sub-category. Next, a summary of the findings for each category will be presented and analyzed.

Table 2: Coding frame

Dimensions	Description	Sub-categories	Indicators
Reference	The way that Bloody Sunday is referred to	- Equal conflict	Battle, conflict, riot
		- Unequal conflict	Massacre, slaughter
Blame	Expression of who is to blame for Bloody Sunday	- NICRA and/or IRA	Marchers, civil rights movement, IRA
		- Northern Irish government	British Army, soldiers, paratroopers
Judgement	Statement about whether actions were (un)just	- Just	Just, fair, proportionate
		- Unjust	Unjust, excessive, disproportionate, unfair, indiscriminate
Violence performance	Describing violent actions by an involved subject	- Violence perpetrated by marchers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by marchers
		- Violence perpetrated by soldiers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by soldiers

5.4.3 Reference to Bloody Sunday

The first category includes extracts which refer to Bloody Sunday with a certain choice of words. The Irish Times presents Bloody Sunday as “the trouble” (Soldiers kill 13 in Bogside, 1972, p. 1) and the Guardian as a “riot” (Winchester, 1972, p. 1). These terms imply that there was some sort of equal conflict in which both sides caused disturbance. The Guardian, however, also compares Bloody Sunday to Sharpeville and the Irish Independent does so too. This carries a completely different meaning. As explained before, Sharpeville was a famous incident in

which the police fired disproportionately at black protesters and killed many. Hence, using this analogy frames Bloody Sunday as an unequal conflict in which the army used excessive violence. The Irish Examiner, Irish Independent and Irish Press present Bloody Sunday as a “massacre” (Brennan, 1972, p. 1; Ellis, 1972, p. 1; Gill, 1972, p. 1) which clearly frames the repressive actions as disproportionate and the conflict as unequal.

5.4.4 Expression of blame for Bloody Sunday

The second category includes extracts which reflect statements about who is to blame for the events on Bloody Sunday. All five newspaper articles include both statements by army officials blaming the marchers and eyewitness reports blaming the paratroopers. The included army statements all argue that the paratroopers only started firing after they had been fired upon first by some snipers from the crowd. In each article, these statements are in some way questioned by including eyewitness statements which argue that the paratroopers fired first. The newspapers do not clearly put the blame for Bloody Sunday on one side, but they all first mention the army’s statements which are then countered by eyewitness reports. This sequence is also a way of framing because it seems like the army’s statement is the one that is incorrect and is then corrected by the statements of eyewitnesses who put the blame with the army.

5.4.5 Judgements about actions on Bloody Sunday

The third category includes statements which judge actions on Bloody Sunday. In each of the five newspaper articles there are only adjectives which describe the events as unjust, and there are no statements which justify the events. Each article mentions the “indiscriminate” (Brennan, 1972, p. 1; Ellis, 1972, p. 1; Gill, 1972, p. 1; Soldiers kill 13 in Bogside, 1972, p. 1; Winchester, 1972, p. 1) firing by the paratroopers. This implies that the army randomly shot into the crowd of marchers and therefore this portrays the army’s actions as unjust. The Irish Press also highlights that it was a “peaceful march” (Gill, 1972, p. 1) and the Irish Times mentions that “killings by army are widely condemned” (Soldiers kill 13 in Bogside, 1972, p. 1). These statements again work to judge the events as unjust since the marchers did not use violence themselves and including that the killings are widely condemned also helps to convince readers that the killings were unjust.

5.4.6 Descriptions of violent actions on Bloody Sunday

The fourth category consists of statements that describe violent actions on Bloody Sunday, either perpetrated by the marchers or the army. Each of the newspaper articles include mentions

of acts of violence by both marchers and paratroopers. The mentioned violence perpetrated by marchers includes throwing stones, injuring soldiers, and the firing of one or multiple shots. In the articles, those acts are mentioned one to three times throughout the article. The extracts including violent actions by the army number much higher with 9 to 11 mentions in the Irish Examiner, the Irish Independent and the Irish Press. The Irish Times and the Guardian include fewer statements about the army's. The type of violence by the army that is reported includes the firing of rubber bullets, CS gas, use of a water cannon, shooting and killing.

5.4.7 Summarizing findings for condition 2

To summarize, each newspaper article has framed Bloody Sunday in a certain way. As found by McLaughlin and Baker (2014), the front-page articles in the Times, the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail focused on the army's account of Bloody Sunday and therefore did not portray the state repression as unjust. The articles in the Guardian, the Sun and the Daily Mirror relied more on personal accounts by eyewitnesses and therefore the repression on Bloody Sunday is framed more as unjust.

For the other five newspaper articles which were analyzed using the coding frame, the following findings are important. Four of the newspapers framed Bloody Sunday as an unequal conflict, by referring to it as a 'massacre' and 'Sharpeville'. Only the Irish Times framed it as a more equal conflict by relating to it as a 'riot'. In the article of the Guardian, Bloody Sunday is both referred to as a 'riot' and 'Sharpeville' and therefore the framing of Bloody Sunday as just or unjust is not as clear. When it comes to assigning blame of Bloody Sunday, each of the newspaper articles were quite objective as both statements by the army and statements by marchers and eyewitnesses are included. There is, however, still a slight framing through the ordering of the statements because the marchers get the last word and therefore are subconsciously presented to be correct. This means that there is a slight framing of the army and paratroopers as being to blame for Bloody Sunday. When analyzing the judgements about actions on Bloody Sunday in the articles, adjectives were important parameters. All five articles included adjectives which framed the related action as unjust. Finally, each of the articles included descriptions of violence by both the army and the marchers. These are more like factual accounts used to report on the sequence of violent actions. Still, this frames the report of Bloody Sunday because the higher the number of mentions of violence by one side, the more likely the reader is to see that side as the party being most violent and the culprit.

It is hard to draw solid conclusions about the framing of repression as unjust in the newspaper articles. Not all findings point to a clear overall framing as unjust, but most of the

articles framed the events in a way that showed the doubtful acting of the paratroopers and included eyewitness accounts to counter the official army statement that the paratroopers had only acted according to the violence perpetrated against them by the marchers. Accordingly, it can be concluded that there was substantial framing of the repression as unjust and therefore the second condition was to a sufficient extent present as well in the case of Bloody Sunday.

6. Discussion

As explained earlier in the theoretical framework, the two conditions for repression to backfire are connected. This is important to discuss again, because having only one of the two conditions present would not have caused the repression on Bloody Sunday to backfire. If there was a broad communication about Bloody Sunday to a substantial audience but no perception among the audience of the repressive actions as unjust, then the support for the civil rights movement would not have grown. And if there was a perception of the repression on Bloody Sunday being unjust but only among a small group of people because of a lack of communication to a broad audience, then the support for the protest movement also would not have grown. Therefore, it is necessary to regard these conditions as twofold.

Also, it should be noted that other factors might have played a role in the backfire of state repression on Bloody Sunday. These can be more long-term and systematic factors, like social ties, grievances and political opportunities (Earl, 2011; Hess & Martin, 2006). For the scope of this research the focus has been purposefully put on the theorizing and testing of the causal mechanism. But it is important to keep in mind that there are always systemic factors which play an important role in bringing about changes in the support for a movement.

7. Conclusion

7.1 Summary

The aim of this research was to investigate the conditions under which state repression backfires. By studying literature, these conditions were found and consequently theorized into a causal mechanism in order to explain the process in which state repression backfires. Two conditions were argued to make up this mechanism, which were: (1) the communication of the repression to a substantial audience and (2) the perception of the repression as unjust. This causal mechanism was then tested to check whether the two conditions were present in the case of Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland in 1972.

The first condition was sufficiently present, since all of the available newspapers, either directly or indirectly, published a front-page article about Bloody Sunday on 31 January 1972.

These newspapers represent a substantial audience because their readership varies and covers a broad diversity of readership. The second condition was more tricky to analyze since it relied more on interpretation rather than fact-checking as was done for the first condition. The findings of McLaughlin and Baker (2014) about the framing of Bloody Sunday in six newspaper articles were reported and analyzed and five newspaper articles were analyzed with the help of a coding frame. The results were not totally unambiguous and there were differences in framing among the articles. Three newspaper articles clearly relied on the army's statement about Bloody Sunday and therefore did not frame the repression as unjust. The other seven newspaper articles presented both statements by the army and eyewitness reports and in that sense tried to remain impartial. Through their way of ordering these statements and the frequency of mentions of violence by the army versus marchers, however, the newspapers framed the events on Bloody Sunday as more unjust than just. Along with that, the use of certain adjectives enhanced the framing of the army's repressive actions as unjust. Therefore, the second condition was also found to have been sufficiently present in the case of Bloody Sunday. As a consequence, it can be concluded that the hypothesis about the two conditions for a backfire effect of state repression can be accepted.

7.2 Limitations and future research

Even though this study has sought to go through the process of researching in the best way possible, there are some limitations that should be noted. First, a single case study has been conducted. This caters for a thorough analysis but on the other hand it is difficult to draw general conclusions because the analysis is case-specific and the underlying conditions for repression backfire might be different in other cases. Second, this study dealt with a limitation in feasibility. Due to a lack of cognition of some languages and the limited time and scope of this study, the range of possible cases to analyze was confined. Third, due to the restricted availability and accessibility of data about the newspaper articles, the analysis and conclusions are not as extensive as preferred.

This study complements and builds on the large amount of literature on social movements and repression by focusing solely on the underlying conditions for backfire and theorizing that into a causal mechanism to be tested in a single case study. For future research it would be recommended to combine the causal mechanism with an analysis of the more systemic factors that could play a role in the process of repression backfire, and to analyze how these conditions and long-term factors influence each other and how that affects the outcome of repression in relation to movement mobilization.

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9. Appendix A: Applied coding frames

Table 3: Applied coding frame for front page article the Irish Examiner 31-01-1972

Dimensions	Description	Sub-categories	Indicators	Data
Reference	The way that Bloody Sunday is referred to	- Equal conflict	Battle, conflict, riot	-
		- Unequal conflict	Massacre, slaughter	“Massacre in Derry”
Blame	Expression of who is to blame for Bloody Sunday	- NICRA and/or IRA	Marchers, civil rights movement, IRA	“The commander of land forces in Northern Ireland, General Ford, said that his men had come under attack from snipers firing from behind the rubble of a deserted house” “The army say that they were only acting against snipers”
		- Northern Irish government	British Army, soldiers, paratroopers	“but if this is so they will have to prove that a 15-year-old boy, a man of 60 and at least two women were in action against them”
Judgement	Statement about whether actions were (un)just	- Just	Just, fair, proportionate	-
		- Unjust	Unjust, excessive, disproportionate, unfair, indiscriminate	“soldiers of the Parachute Regiment appeared to open fire indiscriminately on a crowd of about 3,000 demonstrators” “But this, even if true, could never justify the response of the paratroopers under his command”
Violence performance	Describing violent actions by an involved subject	- Violence perpetrated by marchers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by marchers	“Another of the wounded was a soldier” “The commander of land forces in Northern Ireland, General Ford, said that his men had come under attack from snipers firing from behind the rubble of a deserted house” “about 200 youths ignored the order, however, and began jeering and throwing stones at the troops”

		- Violence perpetrated by soldiers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by soldiers	<p>“13 civilians shot dead by troops”</p> <p>“At least 12 men were killed and 17 others wounded by gunfire in Derry yesterday when soldiers of the Parachute Regiment appeared to open fire indiscriminately on a crowd of about 3,000 demonstrators gathered at Free Derry corner in the Bogside”</p> <p>“soldiers using a water cannon, rubber bullets and C.S. gas”</p> <p>“run over by an army vehicle”</p> <p>“They stood at the far end of Rossville Street, firing their automatic weapons at a civilian crowd”</p> <p>“other soldiers were seen crouched with their rifles pointed at the mass of people below, and occasionally they fired”</p> <p>“One nurse working in the Order was herself fired upon when going about her work of helping the injured”</p> <p>“Immediately, rubber bullets began smashing into the demonstrators, and a water cannon was called up to spray them with purple dye”</p> <p>“Snatch squads rushed into the front ranks and began dragging as many away as they could”</p>
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Table 4: Applied coding frame for front page article Irish Independent 31-01-1972

Dimensions	Description	Sub-categories	Indicators	Data
Reference	The way that Bloody Sunday is referred to	- Equal conflict	Battle, conflict, riot	-
		- Unequal conflict	Massacre, slaughter	<p>“13 civilians massacred as British fire on meeting”</p> <p>“The shooting at Free Derry Corner was described as “a cold-blooded massacre” by M.P.s Ivan Cooper and John Hume”</p> <p>“Bernadette Devlin said last night: “It was our Sharpeville, and we will never forget it. It was mass murder by the British Army””</p> <p>“One eye-witness, Rev. Edward Daly of St. Eunan’s Cathedral, described the killings as a “pre-planned, cold-blooded massacre””</p>
Blame	Expression of who is to blame for Bloody Sunday	- NICRA and/or IRA	Marchers, civil rights movement, IRA	<p>“15,000 marchers had defied the Stormont parade ban”</p> <p>“The Commander of the Parachute Regiment, Lt.-Col. Derek Wilford, said: “Our men came under automatic fire as they went in””</p>
		- Northern Irish government	British Army, soldiers, paratroopers	<p>“The paratroopers advanced behind three Saracen armoured cars and then, according to eyewitnesses, fanned out and began firing”</p> <p>“This was flatly denied by Civil rights leaders and independent eye-witnesses”</p>

Judgement	Statement about whether actions were (un)just	- Just	Just, fair, proportionate	-
		- Unjust	Unjust, excessive, disproportionate, unfair, indiscriminate	<p>“The Taoiseach said he was appalled and stunned that British troops could shoot indiscriminately into a crowd of civilians”</p> <p>“Civil Rights workers said the troops fired indiscriminately into the crowd – at Red Cross personnel and at people waving white handkerchiefs”</p> <p>“the soldiers, who ran behind them, began opening fire indiscriminately, cutting people down like nine-pins, he said”</p>
Violence performance	Describing violent actions by an involved subject	- Violence perpetrated by marchers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by marchers	<p>“The Commander of the Parachute Regiment, Lt.-Col. Derek Wilford, said: “Our men came under automatic fire as they went in””</p> <p>“stone-throwing”</p>
		- Violence perpetrated by soldiers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by soldiers	<p>“13 civilians massacred as British fire on meeting”</p> <p>“Priest tells of ‘point-blank’ shots at trapped boys”</p> <p>“13 young men were shot dead by British paratroopers”</p> <p>“16 more lay injured with bullet wounds”</p> <p>“they came under heavy fire from the British troops”</p> <p>“The paratroopers advanced behind three Saracen armoured cars and then, according to eyewitnesses, fanned out and began firing”</p>

				<p>“The Taoiseach said he was appalled and stunned that British troops could shoot indiscriminately into a crowd of civilians”</p> <p>“Civil Rights workers said the troops fired indiscriminately into the crowd – at Red Cross personnel and at people waving white handkerchiefs”</p> <p>“three Saracen armoured cars, which had been parked on waste ground in Little James’s Street, suddenly sped towards the crowd, he said”</p> <p>“Several were knocked to the ground by the vehicles”</p> <p>“the soldiers, who ran behind them, began opening fire indiscriminately, cutting people down like nine-pins, he said”</p> <p>“the soldiers opened fire into them, killing two of their numbers”</p> <p>“he was running with a 15-year-old boy alongside him when the soldiers fired again and the youth fell with blood spouting from his chest”</p> <p>“another young boy was shot down”</p>
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Table 5: Applied coding frame for front page article the Irish Press 31-01-1972

Dimensions	Description	Sub-categories	Indicators	Data
Reference	The way that Bloody Sunday is referred to	- Equal conflict	Battle, conflict, riot	-
		- Unequal conflict	Massacre, slaughter	“Derry massacre”
Blame	Expression of who is to blame for Bloody Sunday	- NICRA and/or IRA	Marchers, civil rights movement, IRA	“the Stormont Prime Minister, Mr. Faulkner, blamed the IRA for the deaths”
		- Northern Irish government	British Army, soldiers, paratroopers	“At no time did any of our [Provisional IRA] units open fire on the British army” “”The British army murdered innocent civilians in Derry today”
Judgement	Statement about whether actions were (un)just	- Just	Just, fair, proportionate	-
		- Unjust	Unjust, excessive, disproportionate, unfair, indiscriminate	“after a peaceful anti-internment meeting in the Bogside yesterday” “the Taoiseach, Mr. Lynch, described the action of the British soldiers as “unbelievably savage and inhuman””
Violence performance	Describing violent actions by an involved subject	- Violence perpetrated by marchers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by marchers	“And, as the last of the bodies was being taken to hospital, Provisionals opened fire on the soldiers and sporadic gunfire lasted for an hour and a half” “One shot – the only civilian shooting I heard at this time – was fired at the army”
		- Violence perpetrated by soldiers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by soldiers	“13 killed, 17 wounded in city of terror” “the killing by British soldiers of 13 men and the wounding of 17 others, including two women when they fired straight into a crowd of several thousand people”

				<p>“Men, women and children raced screaming in terror through Rossville Street after British troops fired a hail of bullets at them”</p> <p>“When the army shooting died down, several people lay dead on the streets, while many others lay with blood pouring from bullet wounds”</p> <p>“Three people shot in the courtyard of the Rossville Street high flats lay helpless for quarter of an hour after a man waving a white handkerchief was shot while attempting to rescue them”</p> <p>“a soldier armed with a rifle shot a man at point blank range as the man crawled on the ground after being wounded”</p> <p>“The British Army shooting began without warning after troops, backed up by armoured cars, advanced from William Street towards the Rossville Street flats”</p> <p>“the army’s C.S. gas canisters and rubber bullets”</p> <p>“A man and a boy were shot in William Street”</p> <p>“Troops had erected barbed wire barricades across William Street and stood with pointed guns as the massive crowd walked up to them”</p> <p>“Then troops fired volley after volley of CS gas”</p>
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Table 6: Applied coding frame for front page article the Irish Times 31-01-1972

Dimensions	Description	Sub-categories	Indicators	Data
Reference	The way that Bloody Sunday is referred to	- Equal conflict	Battle, conflict, riot	“The trouble”
		- Unequal conflict	Massacre, slaughter	-
Blame	Expression of who is to blame for Bloody Sunday	- NICRA and/or IRA	Marchers, civil rights movement, IRA	<p>“Thirteen people were shot dead in Derry yesterday after a confrontation between a banned civil rights march and British paratroopers”</p> <p>“The British Army claimed that their men opened fire only after they had been fired on by snipers”</p> <p>“while the Stormont Prime Minister, Mr. Faulkner, said that the blame must rest on the I.R.A. and on those who had organised the illegal march”</p>
		- Northern Irish government	British Army, soldiers, paratroopers	<p>“but eyewitness reports claimed that the paratroopers opened fire first indiscriminately into the large crowd”</p> <p>“Mr. Liam Cosgrave, Mr. Neil Blaney and Mr. Kevin Boland were also among those who condemned the shootings”</p> <p>“Mr. Lynch, Cardinal Conway, and many Northern political and religious leaders issued statements condemning the shootings”</p>

Judgement	Statement about whether actions were (un)just	- Just	Just, fair, proportionate	-
		- Unjust	Unjust, excessive, disproportionate, unfair, indiscriminate	<p>“Killings widely condemned”</p> <p>“but eyewitness reports claimed that the paratroopers opened fire first indiscriminately into the large crowd”</p>
Violence performance	Describing violent actions by an involved subject	- Violence perpetrated by marchers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by marchers	“stonethrowers”
		- Violence perpetrated by soldiers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by soldiers	<p>“Soldiers kill 13 in Bogside”</p> <p>“Thirteen people were shot dead in Derry yesterday after a confrontation between a banned civil rights march and British paratroopers”</p> <p>“Those killed were 12 men and a youth”</p> <p>“At least sixteen others were injured by gunfire and the British army made over 50 arrests”</p> <p>“one of the 13 men shot dead by British troops yesterday”</p>

Table 7: Applied coding frame for front page article the Guardian 31-01-1972

Dimensions	Description	Sub-categories	Indicators	Data
Reference	The way that Bloody Sunday is referred to	- Equal conflict	Battle, conflict, riot	<p>“riot”</p> <p>“fierce rioting”</p> <p>“a fierce tussle”</p>
		- Unequal conflict	Massacre, slaughter	<p>“Sharpeville”</p> <p>“Mr John Home said it was “another Sharpeville””</p>
Blame	Expression of who is to blame for Bloody Sunday	- NICRA and/or IRA	Marchers, civil rights movement, IRA	<p>“illegal protest march”</p> <p>“The army’s official explanation for the killing was that their troops had fired in response to a number of snipers who had opened up on them from below the flats”</p>
		- Northern Irish government	British Army, soldiers, paratroopers	<p>“But those of us at the meeting heard only one shot before the soldiers velocity rifles”</p> <p>“Mr Michael Canavan, of the Derry Citizens’ Central Council said “It was impossible to say who fired first. Personally I am sure it was the army, but it doesn’t really matter”</p> <p>“An Army statement at 7 30 pm said that after an hour of heavy stoning, men of the 1st Battalion the Parachute Regiment moved into the William Street and Rossville Street areas from behind the units who were manning barricades. “They went in to arrest people in the crowd and chased and caught several men who were running away,” the statement said. “While this operation was in progress, gunmen opened up from rubble at the base of the</p>

				Rossville Flats and soldiers returned the fire.”
Judgement	Statement about whether actions were (un)just	- Just	Just, fair, proportionate	-
		- Unjust	Unjust, excessive, disproportionate, unfair, indiscriminate	<p>“And, while it is impossible to be absolutely sure, one came away with the firm impression, reinforced by dozens of eye witnesses that the soldiers, men of the 1st Battalion the Parachute Regiment, flown in specially from Belfast, may have fired needlessly into the huge crowd”</p> <p>“What was so terrible and so tragic was that the soldiers fired into a huge crowd of people, and fired indiscriminately at that”</p>
Violence performance	Describing violent actions by an involved subject	- Violence perpetrated by marchers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by marchers	<p>“The army reported two military casualties”</p> <p>“heavy stoning”</p> <p>“a single shot was fired in William Street, presumably by an IRA man”</p>
		- Violence perpetrated by soldiers	Violence, shot, dead, killed, hurt by soldiers	<p>“soldiers, firing into a large crowd of civil rights demonstrators, shot and killed 13 civilians”</p> <p>“Fifteen more people, including a woman, were wounded by gunfire and another woman was seriously injured after being knocked down by an armoured car”</p> <p>“opening up on the mob with CS gas and a dozen hefty shots from a large water cannon, drenching hundreds of marchers and journalists in purple, indelible dye.”</p> <p>“Huge quantities of gas and hundreds of rubber bullets were fired at this</p>

				stage and many of the rioters were injured.”
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