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## **Blooming Resilience: The Serbian Protest Movement from 1996-1997 until 2000**

Stojsavljevic, Marko

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## **Blooming Resilience**

**The Serbian Protest Movement from 1996-1997 until 2000**



# Universiteit Leiden

Marko Stojsavljevic s2801027

Supervisor: Dr. Corinna Jentsch

Second Reader: Dr. Christoph Niessen

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## **1. Introduction**

On the 5<sup>th</sup> of October 2000, as protestors gathered on the streets of Belgrade, something changed in Serbian society. Following years of war, economic pressure and social unrest, the constant factor, President Slobodan Milosevic's regime, began to crumble (Vladislavljjevic, 2016, p. 46). After a decade in power, Milosevic's seemingly stable control over Serbia was suddenly challenged by the thousands of protestors demanding he step down from office (p. 46). Although not the first time that protests against Milosevic's rule transpired, this time it differed, both in size and demands. Therefore, after many attempts to challenge the regime, what explains the resilience of the Serbian protest movement leading up to the October 2000 revolution? This thesis analyzes the movement's resilience, by exploring internal changes within the movement and external factors outside the movement, which aided in the movement's success.

Firstly, the thesis examines previous literature's contributions on social movement threats, tactics and resilience. To clarify, this research defines resilience as the capacity to continue to function during or after severe shock or stress or at times of increasing instability (Jeppesen, 2016, p. 386). Next, the literature examines debates regarding the reason for the resilience and success of the Serbian protest movement. Following this, the focus shifts to discuss theories and concepts related to social movements. After which, the thesis provides a historical overview of the Serbian protest movement throughout the 1990s. Then, internal and external factors are explored to identify the determining factors of the movement's success. Lastly, a discussion and conclusion section is presented, offering an outline of the findings and possibilities for future research. The thesis includes a process tracing framework, focusing on the independent variable of internal movement adaptability and external assistance and the dependent variable of the Serbian protest movement resilience, leading up to the October Revolution.

## **2. Literature Review**

This section, reviews academic contributions and debates regarding social movement threats, along with external and internal factors which influence movement resilience. Lastly, a short overview examines debates regarding the resilience of the Serbian protest movement.

### ***2.1 Social Movement Resilience***

Social movements face various threats which challenge their success. Such challenges include, external threats, such as state repression, which can influence demobilization and increase participation costs (Nepstad, 2023, p. 2). Likewise, movements may become too dependent on

external assistance, decreasing the likelihood of collaborating with domestic partners and staying innovative (Jalali, 2013, pp. 60-62). Internally, movement threats include resource scarcity, leading to increased competition between movements (Della Porta, 2018, pp. 465-466). Control over the movement and its members (Horowitz, 1970, p. 114) and leadership struggles (Bob & Nepstad 2007, Gusfield, 1966) are other internal threats facing social movements. Movements' therefore must exhibit resilience to face these threats.

However, for movements to become resilient, they must continuously adapt. Oates (2006, p. 78) argues that social movements often attempt to find new ways to become effective and adapt to the changing political environment. Social movements face issues of attracting and keeping members, securing necessary resources to produce action, and framing issues to reach a broad audience (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 3). Thus, social movement resilience requires both external factors outside the movement, and internal factors inside the movement.

### ***2.1.1 External Factors***

One important way social movements can adapt over time and stay resilient is through external factors outside of the movements. Social movements can use and partner with opposition political parties to challenge the existing regime. Maguire (1995, p. 202) argues that together, the two actors can unite if their goals overlap. Therefore, by utilizing each other's resources, a mutually beneficial partnership could be formed (pp. 203-204). External partnerships could therefore be useful for social movement resilience.

Movement resilience is also influenced by external aid and funding. External donors select social groups or organizations in civil society according to specific criteria (Schmitter & Brouwer, 1999, p. 30). Through external aid, social movements can achieve their goals, if aid is given to groups with large membership or outreach programs. (Jalali, 2013, p. 59). The external aid could help movements by providing them with a more prominent voice in the public arena (p. 68). Besides the financial aspect, external aid includes the exchange of ideas and information, networking, and training services (p. 56). Nevertheless, for social movements to stay resilient, they should not become too dependent on foreign aid. Vincent (2006, p. 23) argues that external funding can be as high as 50 percent without creating dependency as long as the movement is "solid" and "well managed".

### ***2.1.2 Internal Factors***

Internal factors in movements are crucial for movement growth and resilience. Internally, to stay resilient, movements often have to have experience and deal with state repression. When faced with repression, the learning curve of the protestors and the movement matters and can be influential in shaping the outcome of the political struggle (Nepstad, 2023, p. 5). Social movement recruitment and organization during times of repression, allows for groups of participants loyal to the cause to join the movement, even if the consequences for joining are harsh. (Viterna, 2009, p. 967). Therefore during repressive conditions, trusted and committed activists, and previous experience with repression, can help movements stay resilient and adapt internally.

However, various factors, such as leadership within movements could influence resilience. McCarthy & Zald (2015, p. 206) argue that internal factors, are essential for movement organization, structure and mobilization. When it comes to movement organization, leadership is a crucial starting point. Leadership and its structure are contested concepts in the literature. According to Nepstad and Bob (2006, p. 15), leadership is crucial in dealing with repression and the repression of a leader can in some cases strengthen a movement. On the other hand, Morris and Staggenborg (2004, p. 188) argue that movements are more likely to succeed if they attract leadership teams with diverse backgrounds, skills and viewpoints, increasing quality decision-making. Sutherland et al. (2014, p. 774) support this view, emphasizing social movements with non-hierarchical leadership, with multiple leadership actors. The authors find that although individual leaders were absent, leadership still occurred, as the opportunity for leadership was distributed and the leadership position rotated among members (p. 775). Thus, movement leadership can be interpreted in various ways and influence movement resilience.

Nevertheless, organizing movements entails more than simply leadership. Within social movement literature, some argue that a well-formalized structure, with clear labor divisions maximizes mobilization. Others argue that decentralized movements, with minimum division of labor, less clearly defined roles and informal networks are more effective (Jenkins, 1983, p. 539). Furthermore, differences exist in movement organization in urban and rural areas. Nicholls (2008, p. 856) argues that urban cities are important as they allow for movement collaboration and easier access to resources between groups. Reed (2008, p. 217) argues that rural protests are also crucial as they highlight the growing diversity of voices. Von Holdt (2002, p. 297) further clarifies that, the rural population's experience adds to the collective identity in social movements. Social movement organization and inclusion can thus be highly influential for movement resilience, if citizens' voices are amplified.

In order to stay resilient, social movements must make use of tactics. Taylor and Van Dyke (2004, p. 263) argue that movements are sometimes more remembered for their tactics rather than for their goals. Social movement scholarship argues that movements that adopt new tactics in the face of their opponents' response are more likely to achieve protest success (Wang & Soule, 2016, p. 518). Finkel (2015, p. 341) highlights that experienced and resilient movements develop a "resister's toolkit" when dealing with the state's repressive actions, with tactics such as establishing secure communication channels and well-hidden meeting places. Because they lack institutional power, movements often rely on "the creativity of insurgents in devising new tactical forms." (McAdam, 1983, p. 736). Movement resilience is thus reliant on the adoption of new tactics and tactical innovation.

## ***2.2 Resilience and Success of the Serbian protest movement***

Regarding the Serbian protest movement, various authors offer an explanation of the movement structure and resilience. Jansen (2000, pp. 400-406) mentions multiple reasons for continued resilience, such as the victim motif, the nationalist representation of self and focus on non-violence. However, the article by Jansen was written in 2000 before the October Revolution, so there is no mention of newer protest movements or broader implications for what long term non-violent strategy implies.

On the other hand, the New York Times article by Cohen (2000) goes deeper into the experience of Otpor movement activists and their motivations for protesting. The article discusses Otpor's founding principles of removing Milosevic from power, spreading resistance to provinces and avoiding hierarchy. Although there is no in-depth analysis of the general Serbian protest movement, the article highlights how Otpor was able to redefine itself and learn from the failure of previous protest movements.

The article by Vladislavjevic (2016, pp. 42-46) discusses the protests in Serbia from 1992 until 2000. This article offers the most extensive overview regarding how the Milosevic regime dealt with protests and outside pressures successfully and why that changed in the 2000 revolution. However, the article does not discuss external factors, such as international pressure on the regime and or international support of the protest movement. Furthermore, the article does not specify all of the movement tactics, instead focusing more on the regime's response to the protests.

The literature mentioned explores the debates and interpretations from scholars regarding the threats social movements face and the factors necessary for movement resilience. The literature

also attempts to explain how the Serbian protest movement was structured and how it stayed resilient. Although the aforementioned literature contributed to the academic field, it did so by studying either the internal, or external factors. To provide a comprehensive analysis, of movement resilience, the Serbian protest movement is studied through both the internal and external factors.

### **3. Theoretical Framework**

As mentioned in the previous literature, social movement resilience can be influenced by both internal and external factors. To clarify this further, this section uses theories and concepts that can be useful to the research.

Internally, the concept of collective identity is crucial for social movement emergence, mobilization, and survival. According to Smithey (2009, p. 659), collective identity constitutes shared cognitions, beliefs and emotions among a group of people actively pursuing social or political change. In authoritarian regimes, shared grievances related to the anti-regime agenda are prominent, especially during early parts of the protest (Tertychnaya & Lankina, 2019, p. 297). In their formation, social movements credit their existence to collective identity and disruptive tactics. To survive, a movement should sustain the leverage it achieved through the continued use of those tactics (McAdam, 1983, p. 736). Thus, the identity and tactics associated with the movement, are pivotal to its emergence, mobilization and survival.

However, movements can be the subject of state repression. According to Davenport (2007, p. 2) state repression violates First Amendment-type rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom to boycott and peacefully strike, through penal threats and intimidation. Earl (2011, p. 262) argues, the purpose of political repression is to prevent or diminish non-institutional challenges to various forms of power, including political. Nondemocratic regimes also use repressive tactics, such as media manipulation targeting protestors and discouraging citizens from sympathizing with the movement (Tertychnaya & Lankina, 2019, p. 287). Hence, repression can entail harsh consequences for movements.

For the purpose of this research, the definition by Davenport is used, as it highlights which state imposed violations constitute state repression. In competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition forces use democratic means to contest and occasionally gain power. However, repressive measures such as electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources and other forms of harassment skew the “playing field” toward the incumbent regime (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 3). This research uses competitive authoritarianism to describe the Milosevic regime.



Movement perseverance requires various tactics. Non-violent tactics are one such example. According to Sharp (1973, p. 69) non-violent tactics could include withdrawing social, political and economic cooperation to eliminate a source of power through non-violent means. Movement tactics also often employ both global and local elements. This requires a negotiation where the local part uses elements of the global considered useful, but relies on local strategies in order to retain its identity (Koutsogiannis & Mitsikopoulou, 2004, p. 86). Global and local activities are combined and used by movements that pursue change (Waisanen, 2013, p. 159).

Considering the academic and theoretical contributions, this research focuses on the resilience of the Serbian protest movement leading up to the October 2000 revolution. The research introduces two causal mechanisms that explain how the Serbian protest movement was able to stay resilient. Firstly, the internal adaptation pathway argues the movement stayed resilient due to past experience with repression, leadership and movement organization and adopting new tactics. The external assistance pathway argues the movement stayed resilient by uniting with the political opposition and receiving resources from external partners.

Although both causal mechanisms are expected to play a role and influence one another, the hypothesis is that both mechanisms should be analyzed together to provide a logical explanation regarding the resilience of the Serbian protest movement until the October 2000 revolution. The second part of the hypothesis argues that the causal mechanisms will help in building a generalizable theory explaining movements resilience in competitive authoritarian regimes.

#### **4. Methods**

The thesis considers both internal and external movement factors to explain why and how the movement survived and adapted to challenges over time.

##### ***4.1 Research Design***

The research design of this thesis, is a within-case analysis using process tracing. The independent variable (IV) focuses on the internal movement structure, previous experience, tactics, and the role of external actors in assisting the movement. The dependent variable (DV) focuses on the resilience of the Serbian protest movement leading up to the October 2000 revolution. Due to the nature of the identified causal mechanisms, process tracing is the most suitable method for this research.

Process tracing includes theory-building, theory-testing and explanatory outcomes (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 11). This research combines the explanatory and the theory-building

outcome. The explanatory outcome focuses on single-outcome studies, where the causes of specific outcomes are explained in a single case (Gerring, 2006, p. 716). The theory-building outcome focuses on building a mid-range theory that describes a causal mechanism generalizable to outside cases (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 16). Although the explanatory and theory-building outcome overlap, the key difference is that theory-building aims to build a theory generalizable to other cases, whereas the explanatory outcome wishes to build a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome in an individual case (p. 16). This combination is suitable for the Serbian protest movement, as one case is analyzed in depth, looking for suitable explanations. However, there is also an attempt to evaluate the factors influencing movement resilience in competitive authoritarian regimes, that can be generalized to outside cases.

#### ***4.2 Case Selection***

This research primarily focuses on the Serbian protest movement from 1996-1997 until October 2000. Protest movements transpired throughout the 1990s but, the 1996-1997 protests were more significant in scale and organization than previous movements. However, the protests had not successfully challenged the Milosevic regime until October 2000. The selected case-study examines how the movement evolved from unsuccessful results in 1997 to success and removal of Milosevic in October 2000.

#### ***4.3 Data Collection***

The research uses secondary sources, such as previous interviews with movement members and other organizations conducted by various authors. Furthermore, policy reports, academic articles and news sources are used, interpreting why and how the movement displayed continued resilience. Therefore the research could explain the movement's resilience through first-hand accounts of those involved or affected by the movement and previous research on the topic.

### **5. Analysis**

#### ***5.1 Background on the Serbian protest movement***

In the early 1990s, nationalism, war and economic pressures devastated Yugoslavia, as tensions rose in Serbian society. During 1991-1992 various anti-war and anti-regime protests were held in Belgrade, the Serbian capital (Jensen, 2001, p. 36), to express rising discontent

toward the policies followed and adopted by the Serbian authorities and the competitive authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milosevic (Vladislavljevic, 2016, p. 42).

Furthermore, following the introduction of sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1992, students began to protest, demanding the disbanding of the Serbian Parliament and government, the resignation of Milosevic, the formation of a new government, and the scheduling of elections (Popadic, 1999, p, 153). The 1992 student protest was organized by the democratic opposition movement in Serbia, DEPOS who boycotted the elections and called for anti-regime resistance, leading Milosevic to appoint a new federal president and prime minister and promise presidential and parliamentary elections (Vladislavljevic, 2016, p. 42). The protests did have some success as authorities failed to break the student resistance and many students had a chance to freely express their feelings and demands (Popadic, 1999, p. 164). However Milosevic's popularity and manipulation alongside a fragmented opposition (Vladislavljevic, 2016, p. 42) meant that the protestor's demands were not fully met.

November 1996 brought a new wave of protests against the regime. Following the victory of the opposition coalition "Zajedno" (Together) in a majority of councils in various Serbian cities and towns, including Belgrade, the Serbian Socialist Party (SSP) of President Milosevic was revealed to be tampering with the election results (Dragicevic-Sestic, 2001, p. 76). The electoral fraud led to a massive protest wave coordinated by the Zajedno coalition and the student councils of Serbian universities (Jansen, 2000, p. 395). The students, who were the dominant group in the protest movement had three main demands: Recognition of the electoral results, replacement of the university rector and replacement of the student-vice-rector (Popadic, 1999, p. 154). The number of protestors was between 100 000 and 200 000, and tens of thousands of students would participate in daily marches (Prosic-Dvornic, 1998, p. 126). The protesters would also throw eggs, hold their noses and use other forms to publicly channel their rage and rebellion (pp. 126-127).

Following months of protests, The protesters' main demands were met, Zoran Djindjic a member of the Zajedno coalition, became the mayor of Belgrade and the rector and student vice-rector of the university resigned (Bogdanovic et al., 1999, pp. 228-230). However, the protests again did not fully challenge the Milosevic regime's hold on power. The regime persevered due to a clear power imbalance between it and the opposition. The regime also responded to student protests by introducing a law that effectively removed the autonomy of the universities (Bieber, 2003, p. 90). Furthermore, external factors such as Milosevic's role in ending the war in Bosnia and the end of United Nations (UN) sanctions improved his

electoral prospects. However, growing frustration in Serbian society and animosity towards the regime became more prevalent. (Vladisavljevic, 2016, p. 44).

In March 1999, a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) led 11-week bombing campaign occurred against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, over the war in Kosovo (Vladisavljevic, 2016, p. 45). Following the war's end, in August 1999, protests and daily marches started again (p. 45). The war and the bombing damaged Milosevic's image, and the country's economic performance damaged the regime's ability to increase its legitimacy through economic means (Thompson & Kuntz, 2004, p. 165). The protests, however came to a relatively quick end in December 1999, as demonstrators lost faith in the efficacy of street protests (p. 166) and many were still suffering from the war's effects (Vladisavljevic, 2016, p. 45).

September 2000 brought another round of protests throughout Serbia. The motivation behind this new round were the elections for the Presidency on the 24th of September 2000 (D'Anieri, 2006, p. 341). Following previous protests, which failed to challenge Milosevic's regime, the opposition sought new ways to create a joint front. They got their chance when Milosevic changed the federal constitution to elect the presidency directly and called for elections in September 2000 (Vladisavljevic, 2016, p. 46). Although his term would last until July 2001, Milosevic felt his opponents were weak and that he could rely on support from certain segments of Serbian society and secure another election victory (Thompson & Kuntz, 2004, p. 166).

However, the opposition was better prepared this time. Firstly, Otpor (Resistance), a protest movement that emerged in 1998, following the law which removed universities' autonomy, had 30 000 to 40 000 activists in various branches by June 2000 (Bieber, 2003, p. 84). Furthermore, the broad coalition of opposition parties, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), presented a presidential candidate, meaning that with a strong political candidate and help from Otpor, the regime could finally be challenged (Vladisavljevic, 2016, p. 46). Following a DOS victory in the elections and Milosevic refusing to concede defeat and leave office, massive protests occurred on the 5th of October 2000, with thousands of protestors converging outside of the Federal Assembly, taking control of the building and triggering the collapse of the regime and its influence over Serbian society (p. 46).

Following various attempts, the 5th of October protests finally challenged the regime and removed Milosevic from power. However, which factors influenced this change? According to

the literature internal factors inside the movement and external factors outside the movement can offer an explanation.

## ***5.2 Internal Adaptation***

The first causal mechanism explored focuses on the internal aspect of the movement to explain how the movement stayed resilient despite previous challenges. The literature highlighted in previous sections mentions how, internally, three aspects within the movement are crucial for movement resilience. These include past experience with movement repression, movement leadership and organization, and tactical innovation.

### ***5.2.1 Past Experience with repression***

As evident from the previous section, the Serbian protest movement was active throughout the 1990s. Repression was a prominent way the regime dealt with the protestors. The 1992 student protests were a crucial example of how the state's repressive power can impact and damage even the most willing of protestors. According to one organizer: *"When you have force, the media and power, and you do not have an organized opposition, with that you cannot fight"*. (Sekulovic, 2022).<sup>1</sup> The repressive state apparatus and as Finkle (2015) and similar authors argue, lack of prior experience with repression meant that the movement was not sufficiently prepared for long term protests against the regime. However, the following protests, allowed the movement to gain experience. During the 1996-1997 protests, the regime once again tried to silence the protestors through tactics such as a media blockade, hoping that would insulate the countryside areas where the regime enjoyed the most support, from the protests in urban Serbia (Thomas, 1999, p. 290). Following the media blackout, the regime turned to label the protestors as "pro-fascist groups" and claimed that the student protestors are "manipulating children" (p. 291), using the nondemocratic manipulation strategies highlighted by Tertytchnaya & Lankina (2019, p. 287), to keep citizens from sympathizing with the movement. However, the protestors were not alarmed by these intimidation tactics and the protests continued (Thomas, 1999, p. 292).

Despite the protestors' determination not to give in to the regime's intimidation, the 1996-1997 protests were primarily concentrated in the urban cities of Serbia and particularly Belgrade (Jansen, 2001, p. 38). This centralization of protests allowed the police to continuously disrupt and interfere with the protests by stopping the march and only allowing

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<sup>1</sup> Sources in the Serbian language were translated by the author.

certain protestors to continue (Dragicevic-Sestic, 2001, p. 78), beating protestors, and blocking areas of the city, where the protests and marches were supposed to take place (p. 79). This intimidation was a prominent issue, as with such a large protest, the movement had no prior experience regarding the extent of the regime's efforts to silence it.

However, during the next round of protests, previous experience made the movement more prepared. Seeing as one of the main concerns during previous protests was the role of the state security in weakening the protests and coming into direct contact with the protestors, the movement decided that they should approach building a relationship with the security forces. Regarding the armed forces, the Otpor movement appealed to them, claiming that the protest movement was not undermining Serbia for other groups' interests but was instead showing the will of the Serbian people and appealed to the military to listen to it instead of the ruling regime (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006, pp. 417-418).

Regarding local police, Otpor viewed that instead of harsh language and insults, it was essential to convince the law enforcement agencies their cause was legitimate (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006, p. 420). Following regime-ordered police arrests, Otpor believed that during the interrogation process, they would be able to convince the police of their cause and goals and have the police begin to question the regime's motives (p. 420). The tactic proved successful. As Otpor grew and member arrests increased, so did the communication between Otpor members and the police (pp. 420-421).

### ***5.2.2 Movement Leadership and Organization***

The second aspect explored within the movement is the movement's leadership and organizational structure. According to Nepstad and Bob (2006), Morris and Staggenborg (2004) and Sutherland et al. (2014), leadership and movement organization are crucial aspects in movement resilience. The 1996-1997 protests were organized hierarchically. The opposition coalition Zajedno organized protests, however two other protesting groups also emerged, the students and the university professors, with all three movements working relatively close together (Cohen, 2001, p. 206). The head of the student protests was the Initiative Board, with 11 members and one chairperson, with the board passing decisions (Blagojevic, 1999, p. 118). The protest leadership was public, with the protest leaders making statements such as: "*We wish to finish this protest as the winners and the regime wants to deny us that....*" (Gojgic, 1997). Hierarchical leadership and structure proved problematic for the protest movement. Internally, decision-making was complicated by lengthy discussions,

over marching routes, speakers, symbolic actions (Marović, 2017). Furthermore, some protestors seeking moderate change, such as increased transparency and free and fair elections disagreed with the group having a leader who “everyone would obey”, unlike protestors who were seeking radical change such as the overthrow of Milosevic (Cvejic, 1999, p. 67).

The 2000 protest movement, learning from the experience of former movements, chose a different leadership approach. According to Slobodan Djindovic, one of Otpor’s founding members: “*A lesson that we learnt from 1996 was that it is important not to have visible leaders.*” (Nikolayenko, 2012, p. 150). Instead of a hierarchical structure, Otpor adopted a horizontal leadership structure, where spokespeople would rotate every two weeks without compromising the political message. This tactic strengthened the movement, as authorities could not repress opposition leaders in this case. (p. 151). Furthermore as time passed and newer spokespeople appeared, the perception of the movement’s strength and size grew, as it encouraged the belief that anybody could be a leader (p. 151). When Otpor members were arrested, the movement had a system working to produce a press release, provide legal help to the arrested member and gather activists in front of the police station (York, 2002). One early movement member emphasized: “*The idea was, cut off one Otpor head, and another 15 heads would instantly appear.*” (Cohen, 2000).

The student protests and the prior protest movements had, as mentioned above, focused almost exclusively on the urban cities of Serbia and particularly Belgrade. Although Belgrade has important symbolic, political, and economic ties to the regime (Vujovic, 1999, pp. 197-198), the regime enjoyed the most support from the rural parts of Serbia (Thomas, 1999, p. 290). Therefore despite the regime’s effort to keep it centralized, taking Belgrade would not be enough for the opposition movements to truly challenge the regime.

Otpor took note of this and, alongside its horizontal leadership structure, decided not to centralize the movement in Belgrade. This supports the findings of authors such as Von Holdt (2002, p. 297), who argue that rural populations add to the movement’s collective identity. The movement still had a main office in Belgrade, however, it also had autonomous cells in more than 130 Serbian towns (Nikolayenko, 2012, p. 151). Otpor made important strategic decisions in Belgrade, however the cells had a high degree of autonomy and could develop their own scripts for action (p. 152). Dejan Randic, one of Otpor’s original members highlighted this point: “*We told Otpor activists that in each city they had their own Milosevic... That person should be a target too. But each cell had a total autonomy. If you create something good, put it on the market... In other organizations, everything needs to be*

controlled. In *Otpor*, it didn't happen that way. We in Belgrade didn't try to control activities in other cities." (p. 152). The implementation of other towns besides Belgrade paid off, as on the 5<sup>th</sup> of October 2000, the massive demonstration against Milosevic in Belgrade included several hundred thousand protestors arriving from various parts of Serbia to join the protests (Vladisavljevic, 2016, p. 46).

### **5.2.3 Tactical Innovation**

The last aspect explored within the movement, to explain its resilience, is the movement adopting new tactics. The previous literature mentions various tactics that movements have at their disposal and their importance, as movements can sometimes be remembered more for their tactics than for their goals (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004, p. 263). For example, during the 1991 protests, a clash occurred between protestors and the state police forces, which led to protestors retaliating with violence and the protests crushed, with tanks patrolling the streets of Belgrade (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006, p. 413). The protests of 1996-1997 tried a different tactic, employing a non-violent character despite the occasional violent response by the police forces (Jansen, 2001, p. 44). However, the peaceful nature of the protests was not due to internal organization or movement control, but rather the self-control of each individual participant based on their support of peaceful democratic values (Cvejic, 1999, p. 68).

During the 2000 protests, Otpor embraced a non-violence strategy. The training programs by the movement emphasized Gene Sharp's non-violent methods of opposing the regime's power not through physical violence, or weapons chosen by the regime but through alternative means (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006, p. 416). Using non-violent tactics as a strict method by the movement, rather than a choice left to the individual protestors, benefited Otpor in various ways. Firstly, it provided a clear separation of the movement and the regime. According to Srdja Popovic, one of Otpor's founding members: "*We couldn't defeat Milosevic by force. NATO couldn't do it, so how could we?*" (Nikolayenko, 2012, p. 147). Furthermore, the strict adherence to non-violence helped the movement broaden its reach, as it appealed to a more citizens who might have been against the regime but were unwilling to engage in violent demonstrations. Non-violence also helped Otpor gain legitimacy in the international community (p. 147).

Otpor also chose to adopt more humorous tactics during the protests. During the 1996-1997 protests, the students and other protestors would respond to the regime's threats and comments seriously, making statements such as: "*We are not afraid*", "*This threat certainly*



*does not move us.*” (Thomas, 1999, p. 292). Although these statements were good for mobilization and showing the protestors’ commitment, they did not work to challenge the regime. On the other hand, Otpor protestors would use humorous language to respond to the regime’s threats. For example, when the regime called Otpor a neo-fascist group and a terrorist organization, the movement responded by doing a public satirical theatre in the street, where they presented themselves as “terrorists” to an audience of citizens and other protestors, highlighting the ridiculousness of the regime propaganda. (Sombatpoonsiri, 2015, p. 99).

Humorous tactics against Milosevic directly were tried in the 1996-1997 protests, when a protestor carrying a doll resembling Milosevic in a prison uniform, during one of the student walks, was arrested and sentenced to 25 days in prison (Helsinki Report, 1997, p. 205). Otpor tried a different tactic. Otpor placed an empty petrol barrel on the street, with an image of Milosevic, a target symbol surrounding him, a stick, and next to it instructions that read: “*If you put dinars (the Serbian currency) inside [the barrel], you can use the provided stick to beat Milošević’s picture... If you don’t have any coins because of Milošević, hit [the barrel] harder.*” The action was popular, people would line up to hit the barrel and express their anger towards the regime. If the people were not hitting it, then most likely they would be intrigued by the noise and watch as others showed their dissatisfaction towards the regime in this way (Sombatpoonsiri, 2015, p. 100).

According to Randic: “*The sound [of hitting the barrel] was astounding. After a couple of Otpor activists did it, 15–20 people lined up. It was working by itself. We were just sitting in the nearby café and watching. The secret police didn’t know what to do. They couldn’t arrest us because we looked like spectators of the street action. Then they just arrested the barrel. And journalists were there to report it. Then we reproduced this action in several cities. So the following headlines appeared in the media, ‘The second barrel was arrested,’ ‘The third barrel was arrested.’ We’ve got a lot of publicity without spending a lot of resources.*”

(Nikolayenko, 2012, p. 148). Therefore by expanding and adapting the humorous tactics to include the citizens, instead of a few protestors, Otpor increased outreach and successfully challenged the regime’s propaganda.

#### **5.2.4 Internal Adaptation summary**

Summing up, some conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, previous experience with repression allowed the movement to learn how the regime handles protests and how it can adjust.

Following the first serious extended protest in 1996-1997 which were harmed by harsh police and security force presence, the protest movement learned not to respond violently to the security forces, but instead try to get them to understand and empathize with the movement. Furthermore, following issues regarding the hierarchical structure and organization of the previous movements, the movement adapted to include a horizontal leadership structure and mobilize and include citizens from all over Serbia. The movement emphasized its non-violent tactic, from placing the responsibility on the protestors, to being a vital feature of the movement strategy. Lastly, the adaptation of humorous tactics to a wider scale challenged the seriousness of the regime's propaganda and made the protest movement more noticeable and accessible to the Serbian public.

With all of these factors in mind so far, it can be said that for movements to stay resilient in competitive authoritarian circumstances, they must learn and adapt from previous repressive actions and organize in a way that leadership opportunities and mobilization is available to a wide audience. However, the movement must still hold itself to certain principles, such as non-violence and humor to allow for higher mobilization and not trigger harsh reactions from the regime and build sympathy for the movement.

### ***5.3 External Assistance***

The second causal mechanism explored, focuses on the external aspect outside of the movement and explains how assistance by outside parties affected the resilience of the movement in the lead up to the October revolution. The external aspect focuses on uniting with the political opposition, and receiving external resources.

#### ***5.3.1 Uniting with Political Opposition***

During the 1996-1997 protests, the Zajedno coalition and the student protest movement seemingly joined together in demanding the removal of Milosevic. This partnership seemingly supported the arguments made by Maguire (1995, p. 202) of social movements and political opposition working together. However, that partnership was not built on solid grounds, as 86 percent of students believed that the student protests should remain as independent as possible from the protests of the Zajedno coalition (Popadic, 1999, p. 159). The weak partnership soon drifted away following the regime's recognition of the opposition's electoral victory. According to Tanja Azanac, a program coordinator for a Belgrade-based NGO: "*The 1996–97 student protests were not supported by political parties, they were used by politicians... None of the political parties reacted to the 1998 Law on*

*Universities.*” (Nikolayenko, 2012, p. 148, 150). Following the recognition of the opposition’s election results, the opposition called off its demonstrations and the students continued to protest alone until March 1997 (p. 150). The fragmentation in the protest movement between the students and the opposition provided Milosevic with an opportunity to divide the opposition further and avoid a direct challenge to his rule.

The next round of protest presented a new opportunity for the movement and the opposition to unite. Protests against the regime could not survive with only Otpor protesting, as one Otpor member highlighted in March 2000: *“In the last three or four months Otpor provided the only real work against the regime... The opposition still hasn’t taken concrete action and their entire activity focuses on interparty agreements, which are good, but are not action.”* (Cohen, 2001, p. 350). Otpor realized that for the protest movement to be successful at challenging the regime, they needed to unite the political opposition and challenge the regime together. In the words of Popovic: *“Initially, 40 percent of our campaign efforts were spent on making the opposition unite. Until the opposition parties were blackmailed, until they realized that they were losing their supporters, they wouldn’t unite.”* (Nikolayenko, 2012, p. 148). The pressure eventually did work, as 18 political parties united to form DOS and present Vojislav Kostunica as their presidential candidate (p. 143).

In September 2000, following an election called by Milosevic, the regime began going back to its old tricks, with Milosevic preparing to falsify and delay the election and the results to deny Kostunica a victory (Bujosevic & Radovanovic, 2003, p. 5). Following claims that election manipulation occurred, Otpor began organizing protests against the regime (York, 2002). DOS called for a strike, leading miners from the Kolubara strip mine near Belgrade to strike and stop mining and the people of Serbia to start heading towards Belgrade, showing their dissatisfaction with the regime (Bujosevic & Radovanovic, 2003, pp. 6-8).

The unification of the political opposition with the protestors was an important in explaining the resilience and success of the Serbian protest movement. Otpor worked to energize younger people and the rest of the citizens through non-violent and innovative tactics (Vladislavjevic, 2016, p. 46). However, for the protest movement to endure and challenge the regime, the unification of the opposition from previous unsuccessful and fragile coalitions, , to a joint presidential candidate who could personify a challenge to Milosevic, and energize the workers was crucial in motivating the rest of the undecided citizens. Together, Otpor and DOS worked to shift the rest of the Serbian society against Milosevic.

### ***5.3.2 External Resources***

Lastly, the focus is on the external resources that influenced the movement's resilience. Despite previously mentioned sanctions and other measures implemented by Western countries towards Milosevic, direct and consistent foreign support of the protest movement began with Otpor and the 2000 protests. Prior to 1999, western diplomats saw Milosevic as an integral figure in promoting peace in the region. However, following the 1999 NATO military campaign, Western countries shifted their policy against Milosevic, highlighting that his regime should come to an end (Carothers, 2001, p. 1). This harsh reaction towards the regime meant that foreign aid was now available to various Serbian organizations, including the opposition parties, the civil advocacy sector, independent media and opposition-controlled municipalities (pp. 2-3). Prior to the shift in Western policy, in 1998-99, Otpor built a network of activists without relying much on foreign funding (Nikolayenko, 2012, pp. 148-149). This initial network supports the argument made by Vincent (2006), that even with large external donations, organized and well-managed movements do not become reliant on external funding.

Otpor and the protest movement did, however benefit from the external funding. Otpor members would use the donations to print over 2 million stickers and purchase spray paint to portray anti-regime messages and emphasize resistance across Serbia (Waisanen, 2013, p. 167). According to Donald L. Pressley, the assistant administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, several hundred thousands of dollars were given to Otpor to be used for "*demonstration-support materials like T-shirts and stickers*" (Cohen, 2000).

External assistance however, as stated by Jalali (2013, p. 56) does not include only foreign funding, but training and information as well. In addition to using ideas related to non-violence from Sharp's book, Otpor activists also participated in a workshop organized by an institute supported by the United States (US) Government in Budapest, where they received a seminar from Robert Helvey, a former US colonel and proponent of Sharp's ideas. (Nikolayenko, 2012, pp. 150-151). Furthermore, regarding the political opposition, US polling firms would commission opinion polls which would not only give ratings on Milosevic's popularity, but also on the opposition candidates, leading DOS to decide on Kostunica as their presidential candidate (Dobbs, 2000). Alongside Otpor, the polls were crucial in getting the opposition to unite, as its results showed that a united opposition had a chance to truly challenge Milosevic's regime (Dobbs, 2000).

However, as mentioned previously, movements pursuing change can combine both global and local elements to stay resilient (Waisanen, 2013, p. 159). When receiving Western foreign aid Otpor and DOS had to mask their funding in communication with local audiences (p. 160), due to the recent NATO bombings and fear that this would turn the popular sentiment against them and back towards Milosevic. They instead justified it as money coming in from the Serbian diaspora (Hockenos, 2003, p. 173).

In addition, external resources did not damage the legitimacy or influence the movement. Although foreign aid helped Otpor realize its ideas, the movement could not rely on foreign tactics, as they felt they were better positioned to develop effective local ones. One Otpor member highlights this with his statement: *“Americans advised us to do a door-to-door GOTV campaign. But they didn’t take into account the extent of political intolerance in Serbia at that time. It was impossible to campaign from door to door. Some Milosevic supporters could have attacked us.”* (Nikolayenko, 2012, p. 149). The movement would come up with tactics and slogans, such as the famous “Gotov je” (He’s finished) slogan locally, with Dejan Randjic, Otpor’s head of marketing saying: *“It was very simple, very powerful. It focused on Milosevic, but did not even mention him by name.”* (Dobbs, 2000). However, the movement would use foreign aid in printing and receiving the stickers, which would be placed all over Serbia and become a symbol of resistance to the regime (Dobbs, 2000).

### ***5.3.3 External Assistance Summary***

In essence, some conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, to stay resilient, the Serbian protest movement needed to unite with the political opposition. Previous attempts featured either separate protests or protests linked through a weak partnership. Only once, when the protest movement and the political opposition formally joined forces and worked together to challenge the regime, did they make the most progress. Secondly, the protest movement stayed resilient partly, due to the foreign aid it received through funding, training and polling information, which successfully informed the opposition politicians and Otpor. However, the movement still needed to develop tactics locally to ensure legitimacy and increase outreach.

With these factors in mind, it can be added to the theoretical section that for movements to stay resilient in competitive authoritarian circumstances, they must work together with other forces with similar goals. If possible movements should use external assistance, both in financial and non-financial aspects. Importantly, movement reliance on foreign aid should not be too high, as there is a risk to lose local support and appear externally imposed.

#### *5.4 Discussion of the Mechanisms*

Evidently, both internal and external causal mechanisms are important in evaluating movement resilience, but it should be noted that they should not be examined individually.

The main distinction between the two mechanisms is that one focuses on what the movement could do within to stay resilient, and one focuses on what the movement could do outside to stay resilient. The internal adaptation pathway argues the movement changed and learned from previous mistakes, adapted its leadership and organizational structure and implemented new tactics to stay resilient until the October revolution. The External assistance pathway argues the movement had to unite with opposing political parties and use funding and resources from external actors. Factors such as past experience with repression, movement organization and leadership structure, and tactical innovation, need to be commonly viewed, with factors such as uniting with the political opposition and using external aid to promote tactics on a larger scale. Only when examined and evaluated together, is it possible to see how the protest movement managed to stay resilient until the October 2000 revolution.

The mechanisms share similarities, strengths and weaknesses. Both mechanisms highlight the importance of tactics, especially locally, as crucial for gaining members and challenging the regime. Furthermore, both mechanisms emphasize the importance of collaboration when it comes to decision-making. The internal mechanism's strength is highlighted through its emphasis on movement endurance and how the protests survived repression and fragmentation from 1996-1997 until October 2000. However, the mechanism is unclear in examining how the movement should deal with similar groups, or use external aid. The opposite is true for the external mechanism, its strength lies in explaining how movements can use a united opposition and newly allocated funds and resources to stay resilient. However, when it comes to reaching decisions and deciding when and how to mobilize people and use those resources, the mechanism is unable to provide a sufficient explanation, without considering the internal one.

Furthermore, to understand and theorize about movement's resilience in competitive authoritarian circumstances, both mechanisms need to be examined to offer a sufficient explanation. Therefore the theoretical contribution suggests that for movements to stay resilient, they must learn and adapt from previous repressive actions, organize the movement so that leadership opportunities are available to a wide audience and implement humorous and non-violent tactics to gain sympathy and prevent further repression. Furthermore, the

movements should also collaborate with groups that have similar goals and use external aid if possible, ensuring that the movement maintains its local element and does not rely too much on the aid.

## **6. Conclusion**

This research aimed to answer what explains the resilience of the Serbian protest movement leading up to the October 2000 revolution. To answer this, the research first introduced an overview of the academic debate regarding internal and external aspects facing social movements and previous explanations regarding the resilience of the Serbian protest movement. After the literature review, the theoretical framework introduced theories and concepts relevant to the analysis and defined concepts relevant to the research. The research then incorporated a process-tracing analysis, including two causal mechanisms. The first one, internal adaptation, explained the resilience of the protest movement through internal changes and adaptations. The second causal mechanism, external assistance, explained the resilience of the protest movement through help from external actors.

The hypothesis that both causal mechanisms provide a logical explanation for the resilience of the Serbian protest movement is accepted. The analysis and discussion find that the two mechanisms are interlinked and must be studied together to explain movement resilience. One factor cannot provide an independent explanation.

The causal mechanisms and the analysis contributed to the theory-building aspect of the research, which focused on protest movement resilience in competitive authoritarian regimes. The research used both mechanisms to form a generalizable theory focusing on how movements in competitive authoritarian regimes can stay resilient.

The second part of the hypothesis, regarding the causal mechanism providing help in building a generalizable theory for movement resilience in competitive authoritarian regimes can be accepted, as the mechanisms did provide insight into how movements can use both internal and external factors to stay resilient. Future research should use this theory in other competitive authoritarian regimes to test its strength.

However, despite these conclusions, several limitations are present in this research. Firstly, this is a single within-case study of one protest movement. Further tests across different case-studies might lead to different results and should be explored. Furthermore, the research was

constrained in its focus. Future research could examine the 1992 protests, in order to broaden the understanding of the 1990s Serbian protest movement.



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