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Welfare nationalism among mainstream parties: An analysis of six mainstream parties in Norway, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom from 2000 to 2017

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Welfare nationalism among mainstream parties

An analysis of six mainstream parties in Norway, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
from 2000 to 2017

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Introduction

Politics in Europe, and elsewhere, has seen a rise in populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in the past decades. The popularity of these parties has especially increased since the start of the 2015 European Migrant Crisis (hereafter referred to as: Migrant Crisis). Some examples of this are the Fratelli d'Italia in Italy, Alternative Für Deutschland in Germany and the Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden. The election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States and the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union are often seen as a general rise of populism in the Western World. Many of these parties and events emphasise the negative side of immigration and the risks that this brings to the local population, their job security and the persistence of the welfare state. Consequently, much research has been done on these populist parties and their stances on the relationship between immigration and the welfare state. These parties often press for welfare nationalistic policies that limit access to welfare for the 'them' while still providing welfare to the 'us' (Van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017, pp. 12-13). Research has shown that mainstream parties might take on similar policy preferences if a PRRP is expected to win over voters from the mainstream parties (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016, p. 309). This thesis will contribute to this expanding academic field by conducting a qualitative content analysis on mainstream parties' manifestos in Western Europe to find out whether these parties take on similar attitudes. This thesis will also investigate where differences among mainstream parties might come from.

This thesis answers the following research question: *'In what way has welfare nationalism developed in mainstream political parties?'* To this end, the thesis will provide an analysis of the main left-wing and right-wing political parties in three countries from 2000 until 2017. To answer the main research question, several sub-questions will have to be discussed and answered. The first sub-question looks at party differences and goes as follows: *'Do mainstream left-wing parties have different preferences regarding welfare nationalism than mainstream right-wing parties irrespective of regime type?'* The second sub-question looks at different welfare state regime types and asks *'Is a difference in attitudes towards welfare nationalism visible across welfare state regime types?'* Lastly, and importantly, this thesis will research if there have been times at which welfare nationalism among mainstream parties changed considerably. In the case of this analysis, the 2008 Financial Crisis or the 2015 Migrant Crisis. The last sub-question therefore asks *'Have attitudes towards welfare nationalism among mainstream parties changed in the period from 2000 to 2017?'* This thesis will aim to answer these questions by conducting a qualitative content analysis on the political parties' election manifestos. It will first provide a literature review of welfare chauvinism and nationalism. It

will then provide a conceptualisation of important terms, followed by a discussion of theories. Afterwards, the research methods and operationalisation will be laid out. Then, the thesis will present the findings in the analysis and results section. Lastly, the thesis will conclude and discuss its implications.

Literature review

This literature review will start by giving a brief history of the terms welfare chauvinism and welfare nationalism in academic debate. It will then provide a review of literature on these terms in relation to mainstream political parties in (Western-)Europe.

Welfare chauvinism

Welfare state chauvinism is a term first used by Andersen and Bjørklund in their 1990 article on the Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway. The Progress parties (DK: *Fremskridtspartiet*; NO: *Fremskrittspartiet*; FrP) are the main PRRPs in Denmark and Norway. The authors used the term to argue that the attitudes of the upcoming Progress parties were not anti-welfare (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990, p. 212). Rather, these parties were in favour of restricting welfare expenditure to ‘our own’, thereby creating an in- and out-group (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990, p. 214).

An out-group can take many forms but in the context of welfare chauvinism it mostly refers to ‘those who do not come from here’ - i.e. immigrants and sometimes also their children even when they are born ‘here’. In Europe this seems to be mostly targeted at Muslim immigrants and non-Western immigrants more broadly (Keskinen, Norocel & Jørgensen, 2016, p. 324).

Welfare nationalism in mainstream parties

The literature on welfare nationalism in mainstream parties is mostly focused on electoral explanations. Some excellent analyses have been conducted on whether (centre-)right parties change their attitude towards immigration and their access to the welfare state when confronted with possible electoral losses to populist right-wing parties. Somer-Topcu (2009) found that parties change their policy preferences more fundamentally after losing an election (p. 243). Analysing Dutch and Danish mainstream parties, Schumacher and Van Kersbergen (2016) find that mainstream parties might respond to electoral success of PRRPs. They have found that centre-right parties follow PRRPs in their scepticism towards multiculturalism and

their support for welfare (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016, p. 305). Centre-left parties also become more sceptical of multiculturalism, especially if they lost the previous election, but do not become more supportive of welfare (pp. 305-306). Some have researched the influence of welfare state regime types on public opinion on deservingness of welfare (Larsen, 2008), while others have researched their influence on support for welfare chauvinism more specifically (Van Der Waal, De Koster & Van Oorschot, 2013).

But electoral risks might not be the only reason for a mainstream party to adapt welfare nationalist policies. In some increasingly ethnically diverse countries, concern has arisen that this heterogeneity could undermine solidarity amongst the population and thereby undermine public support for the welfare state. This tension is often called the ‘progressive’s dilemma’ (Murard, 2022). It is also known under various names in the literature such as the ‘heterogeneity/redistributive trade-off’ and the ‘new liberal dilemma’ (Eger & Kulin, 2022, p. 230), but for consistency purposes, the term progressive’s dilemma will be used throughout this thesis.

Theoretical framework

Conceptualisation

The term welfare chauvinism has been widely used in academia to research attitudes similar to the Progress Parties’ in political parties all over Europe, but the concept has also received criticism. Carmel and Sojka (2021) have rightfully demonstrated the ambiguity of the term (pp. 647-648). Its ambiguity shows in the variety of ways in which the term is used in the literature. It originated as a term to refer to racist attitudes (Carmel & Sojka, 2021, p. 647). More recently, it is used to describe nativist arguments on the welfare state (Mudde, 2007, p. 132) with less focus – at least not explicitly – on ethnicity, but rather on nationality. Greve (2019) conceptualises welfare chauvinism as “support for welfare state policies that help in ensuring that natives have the best access to welfare benefits and services” (p. 33). Many authors have thus conceptualised the term differently, leading the term to become ambiguous. To move away from this ambiguity, Keskinen (2016) distinguished between *welfare nationalism* and *welfare chauvinism*. Welfare nationalism refers to “discourses and ideologies in which welfare and national identity are intertwined and welfare provision is based on national membership” (Keskinen, 2016, p. 355). It is this conceptualisation of the term welfare nationalism that this thesis will use. Welfare chauvinism, on the other hand, “frames welfare provision as reserved only ‘for our own’ in the sense that belonging or non-belonging is based on (ethno)nationalist, othering and often racialising criteria” (Keskinen, 2016, p. 355). Welfare

chauvinism is mostly, although not completely, absent in mainstream parties in Western Europe (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016, p. 309). This thesis will therefore use the term ‘welfare nationalism’ unless a distinction is made based on immigrants’ race or religion.

The concept ‘equality’ is used by the Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al., 2023). The simplicity of this concept has been criticised (Horn, Kevins, Jensen & Van Kersbergen, 2017). These authors state the importance of distinguishing between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome (Horn et al., 2017, p. 406). Other authors have suggested the opposite. They argue for a more simplified version of the Manifesto Project coding frame (Mikhaylov, Laver & Benoit, 2012, p. 90). Given these contradictory criticisms, their validity notwithstanding, this thesis will use the Manifesto Project’s own conceptualisation in its analysis. Its conceptualisation is taken from their codebook and is thus “Concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people” (Lehmann et al., 2023, p. 18).

‘Waiting time’ is a relevant concept in which rights to welfare depend not on nationality or meeting certain job requirements. Instead, an immigrant needs to have lived in a country for a certain amount of years before being eligible for unemployment benefits (Schnabel, 2020, p. 180). Although ‘waiting time’ is not a commonly used concept in the literature, it is a common type of policy used in various countries (Pennings, 2020, p. 323; Schnabel, 2020, p. 180; Vintila & Lafleur, 2020, p. 28) It is conceptualised as ‘the amount of years an immigrant is required to have been a resident of the country before they can claim unemployment benefits’.

The concept of requirements is derived from the concept of ‘behavioural requirements’ (Clasen & Clegg, 2007). Central to this concept is the question “who should get what, and why?” (Van Oorschot, 2000). Clasen and Clegg (2007) identified three levels of conditionality. The first level concerns a recipient’s membership of a category, the second level consists of eligibility criteria (pp. 172-173). The third level regards “conditions of conduct”, which can be implemented through the policy levers of “tightening and loosening of behavioural requirements” (Clasen & Clegg, 2007, p. 174). In reality, immigrants’ welfare entitlement is often linked to employment or paid contributions (Vintila & Lafleur, 2020, p. 24). ‘Requirements’ is thus conceptualised as ‘certain conduct a party wants immigrants to follow in order to gain access to unemployment benefits’.

Lastly, politicisation is an important aspect (Vintila & Lafleur, 2020, p. 20). Of course, to analyse welfare nationalist attitudes in mainstream parties, it is essential to find out if parties find a possible link between immigrants and unemployment benefits worth mentioning. Politicisation is conceptualised as mentioning “migrants’ access to welfare”. Making this connection does not automatically mean a party supports welfare nationalist policies, however.

They could mention a connection while arguing for equal access to unemployment benefits for immigrants. This will be taken into account in the operationalisation section as well as the analysis. What follows next is a review of the relevant theories. They are discussed along the lines of the sub-questions of the thesis.

Party differences

Research on mainstream parties in the Netherlands and Denmark has shown that mainstream parties respond to the threat of electoral success for populist right-wing parties (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016). Centre-right parties might adopt policy preferences that are more pro-welfare and anti-multiculturalist if a potentially successful populist right-wing party promotes welfare chauvinistic ideas. Mainstream left-wing parties also become more sceptical of multiculturalism but do not become more pro-welfare. Nor do they adopt welfare chauvinistic policy preferences (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016, p. 309).

Murard (2022) found that support for welfare chauvinistic policies is larger among voters in the centre and right-of-centre than among those on the left side of the political spectrum (p. 128). Koning (2017), by analysing party manifestos from 15 European countries, came to a similar conclusion. He finds that conservative liberal parties are on average four times more likely to support welfare disentanglement for immigrants than social-democratic parties (Koning, 2017, p. 636). From the literature, the theoretical expectation is thus that *centre-left parties are less favourable towards welfare-chauvinistic policies than centre-right parties, irrespective of regime type*. The first sub-question is thus expected to be answered affirmatively.

However, as shown in the literature review, this seemingly obvious observation does not always hold. The progressive's dilemma could lead mainstream left-wing parties to choose to protect the welfare state at the cost of acceptance of immigrants. This presents a possible problem for social-democratic parties who have generally been favourable to both.

Welfare state regime types

This thesis will follow Esping-Andersen's original welfare state regime classification. Given its received criticism, this choice warrants some elaboration. A criticism of classifying welfare states into distinct regime types in general, comes from Kasza (2002). He argues that, since regime analysts have not been able to find any 'pure' cases, welfare state regime classifications should be looked at sceptically (Kasza, 2002, p. 284). Despite this, Kasza (2002) does not think classifications are inherently useless; they can still be used for comparing

particular policy fields (p. 284). This thesis will do exactly that, the use of a welfare state regime classification is therefore justified. Esping-Andersen's classification of welfare state regimes has been criticised for its Western bias (see: Yörük, Öker & Tafoya, 2022). The alleged Western bias is a fair criticism but since this thesis is focused on Western-European countries, this need not be a limitation.

In 2008, Larsen published an article in which he used an institutional approach to explain cross-country differences in public support for welfare policy. Van Der Waal, De Koster and Van Oorschot (2013) build on this institutional approach and by doing so argue that public support for redistributive policies aimed at immigrants is to a significant extent due to institutional differences between welfare state regime types. They indicate two worlds of welfare chauvinism (Van Der Waal et al., 2013, p. 175). One world consists of social-democratic welfare states in which natives are, overall, not welfare chauvinistic. The other world consists of both liberal and conservative welfare states since natives in these countries are similarly welfare chauvinistic – and more so than social-democratic natives (p. 175). The theoretical expectation for the second sub-question is thus that *mainstream parties in liberal and conservative welfare states have more welfare nationalistic attitudes than in social democratic welfare states*. Following Van Der Waal, De Koster and Van Oorschot (2013), it is expected that parties in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are more supportive of welfare nationalist policies than parties in Norway regardless of their ideology. For example, the British Labour Party is expected to look more favourably towards limiting immigrants' access to unemployment benefits than the Norwegian Arbeiderpartiet. Even though both are social-democratic parties.

Over time

Financial Crisis

The Financial Crisis of 2008 was followed by welfare retrenchment and other measures of austerity throughout Europe (Meuleman, Van Oorschot & Laenen, 2020, p. 4). The Financial Crisis hit hard in Europe and led to rising unemployment. This has an impact on citizens' opinions on the welfare state. Concerns about the negative effects of welfare redistribution on economic performance often arise in response to high levels of unemployment (Meuleman et al., 2020, p. 14). Although this regards a change in general welfare attitude and not in welfare nationalism, immigrants are often seen as the least deserving groups when it comes to welfare (Harell, Kymlicka & Banting, 2022; Van Oorschot, 2006). In fact, in all 23 European countries

included in Van Oorschot's (2006) research, immigrants are considered the least deserving (p. 37). They are at the so-called "bottom of the ladder of perceived deservingness" (Harell et al., 2022, p. 106). If general attitudes of welfare redistribution become increasingly negative due to the financial situation, and immigrants are already perceived to be the least deserving of this redistribution, we expect the public opinion to shift in the direction of welfare nationalism. Following party responsiveness theory, mainstream parties are expected to follow public opinion if the public opinion is moving away from their original policy position (Ferland, 2020). Interestingly, they do so not only if their own supporters shift in policy position, but also when the median voter does so (Ferland, 2020, p. 374).

Migrant Crisis

Eger, Larsen and Mewes (2020) show that exclusionist views among native population only grew in some Central- and Eastern European countries in the years after the start of the Migrant Crisis, while many Western European countries became slightly more inclusive (p. 186). However, Marx and Naumann (2018) showed that support for soft welfare chauvinistic – read: welfare nationalistic – policies increased significantly in Germany over a one year time period between 2015 and 2016 (p. 114). They also argue that this increase was not limited to voters of PRRPs (p. 114). It seems thus, that countrywide and individual level analyses are conflicted on whether welfare nationalistic attitudes have increased in size since the Migrant Crisis. However, the exclusionist views as researched by Eger, Larsen and Mewes (2020) are unambiguously welfare chauvinistic, not welfare nationalistic. When looking at less extreme exclusionary preferences, an increase in support for welfare nationalism after the Migrant Crisis is expected on the basis of the literature. Baláž, Nežinský and Williams (2021) came to the same conclusion as Marx and Naumann (2018) through a Europe-wide analysis using results from the Eurobarometer surveys. They found that negative attitudes towards non-EU immigrants spiked as a result of the Migrant Crisis (Baláž et al., 2021, p. 11). These authors also concluded that the Migrant Crisis had a larger role in this increase than the series of terrorist attacks in Europe (Baláž et al., 2021, p. 11). Again following Ferland's (2020) party responsiveness theory, mainstream parties are expected to become more welfare nationalistic when the general public becomes more favourable towards it. The third and last sub-question is thus expected to be answered affirmatively. *An overall increase in support for welfare nationalist policies is expected in the researched period.* Following the abovementioned theory of party responsiveness, such an increase is especially expected in the election periods right after the Financial Crisis and the Migrant Crisis.

Research design

Operationalisation

For the qualitative content analysis (QCA), a coding frame will be used to code the content of the selected data (Schreier, 2012, p. 58). The coding frame in this paper is partly theory-driven, while some aspects are inductive. The frame consists of four main categories; *equality* (EQU), *waiting time* (WAT), *requirements* (REQ), and *politicisation* (POL). These categories have several indicators, which will be operationalised in this section. Indicator and sub-category will be used interchangeably.

The concept of equality, as taken from the Manifesto Project, is a dichotomous category (Lehmann et al., 2023). In this analysis it is also operationalised as such and has two indicators. These are, following the Manifesto Project, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’. If a party states to want equal access to welfare for immigrants and natives, this policy preference will be coded as ‘equality: positive’ (EQU-POS). Inversely, if a party wants to limit immigrants’ access to welfare more than natives’ access, it will be coded as ‘equality: negative’ (EQU-NEG).

The waiting time category is derived from Schnabel (2020) and has two sub-categories that are inducted from the data. From a preliminary analysis of the sources, parties that want limited access to unemployment benefits for immigrants tend to favour a period of two, five or ten years. Since no earlier research has been conducted on this policy, the choice has been made to not use indicators for long or short waiting times. Instead, the paragraph will be coded as (WAT-) followed by the number of years this restrictive period should last. So, if a party wants to restrict immigrants’ access to unemployment benefits for a period of two years, it will be coded as (WAT-2). If a period of five years is preferred, it will be coded as (WAT-5). For ten years, it will consequently be (WAT-10). A separate indicator has been created for if a party wants to reserve full unemployment benefit rights exclusively for nationals. In this case the code (WAT-NAT) will be used. To maintain internal validity and mutual exclusiveness (WAT-NAT) will be used if the preferred waiting time period is the same as the amount of years a person needs to have been in the country in order to apply for the relevant nationality.

The third category is used if a party wants to set certain requirements for a migrant to be eligible for benefits. This category is grounded in the assumption that *benefit conditionality* increases the legitimacy of the welfare programme and diminishes the image of recipients being lazy or abusing the welfare programme, making them more ‘deserving’ of the benefits (Clasen & Clegg, 2007). This conditionality can be a requirement to show active integrating behaviour (REQ-INT) – e.g. a requirement to speak or actively learn the language of the country – or that

the benefits a migrant can receive are based on their contributions to the welfare state (REQ-CON) – e.g. paid social premiums by working.

The politicisation category is emergent from the data. From the preliminary analysis, it turned out that welfare rights are not always mentioned in relation to immigrants. If a connection is made but no preference for a welfare nationalist policy is mentioned, it will be coded as politicised positively (POL-POS). In the case where a connection is made, and a welfare nationalist policy preference arises from this connection, it will be coded as politicised negatively (POL-NEG). If no such connection is made, it is consequently coded as non-politicised (POL-NO).

The categories politicisation and equality might seem to overlap at first sight. This is not the case, however. The category politicisation only concerns whether a party makes a connection between immigrants and access to welfare and if it clearly judges this as a negative connection. This thus only refers to the connection, whereas the equality category refers to the policy preference that might stem from this observed connection. The equality category is only applied if the party's distinction is only made on the basis of an immigrant being an immigrant. If an immigrant's right to unemployment benefits is determined on the immigrant integrating – or being integrated – or their made contributions through previous work, it will be coded under the requirement category. In this way, the requirement of unidimensionality of the main categories is safeguarded (Schreier, 2014, p. 175).

The coding frame can be found in Appendix I.

Case selection

To investigate party preferences regarding welfare nationalism, this thesis employs a comparative diverse case study following Seawright and Gerring (2008). The cases have been selected out of a larger pool of possible cases with relevant characteristics. First of all, the cases had to be in Europe and part of the broad framework of EU/EEA institutions in order to put them in a larger context of immigration and welfare attitudes and events found in Europe. Related to this, all cases had to be so-called non-entry countries. Entry countries are EU member states where large numbers of migrants – especially asylum seekers – first enter the EU. For comparative reasons entry and non-entry countries should not both be included because fundamentally different political contexts and debates are likely to arise. Selecting only non-entry countries minimises the risk of political debates being strongly influenced by emotional appeals. This is not to say that this should not be analysed. It is, however, outside of the scope of this thesis. Still, we are left with some dozen possible cases.

For analytical purposes it is necessary to include cases with different welfare state regime types. Social-democratic Norway and the liberal United Kingdom are both prime examples of their respective regime types. The Netherlands is famously a ‘hybrid case’. Esping-Andersen classified the Netherlands as a social-democratic welfare state (1990; 1999). Whereas other authors classified it as a conservative welfare state together with countries like Germany, France and Austria (Bambra, 2004; Bonoli, 1997; Korpi, 2000). These authors have identified the Netherlands to be more similar to their continental neighbours based on levels of defamilisation (Bambra, 2004, p. 208; Bambra, 2007, p. 335), extent and way of social expenditure (Bonoli, 1997, p. 360), and (gender) inequality (Korpi, 2000, p. 168). Another study finds the Netherlands to be most similar to liberal welfare states in terms of policy, while resembling the social-democratic welfare states when it comes to policy outcomes (Korpi & Palme, 1998, p. 674). Bonoli (1997) used a two-dimensional approach of social expenditure and the percentage of social expenditure that is financed through contributions. Looking at the results of this two-dimensional approach, we find the UK, Norway and the Netherlands all in a different quadrant (Bonoli, 1997, p. 361). All countries in the fourth quadrant – with the exception of Switzerland – have regularly been referred to as Mediterranean or Latin Rim welfare states (Ferrera, 1996). Furthermore, most of these are entry countries. All things considered, the Netherlands is a good fit for a third case country. In addition, language ability constraints on the side of the researcher make the Netherlands a logical choice for a conservative welfare state. The same reasoning goes for Norway as a social-democratic welfare state.

The starting date of 2000 is chosen because this gives enough time before the Financial Crisis to enable a baseline measurement to control for cross-country differences already in place before the Financial crisis. The end date of 2017 is selected because it is the first election year for all three countries since the start of the Migrant Crisis. This way, the thesis is able to analyse if mainstream parties started to embrace welfare nationalistic policy preferences following the Financial Crisis – or perhaps already before – and whether there was difference before and after – or during – the Migrant Crisis. In the analysis, no distinction is made between refugees and other types of migrants. The analysis focuses only on migrants from outside the EU. This is because the EU has rules on intra-EU migration that are determined on an EU level. These rules also apply to EEA members – such as Norway.

Method of data collection

This thesis will conduct a small-N qualitative content analysis by using secondary sources. Specifically, it will analyse party manifestos for national elections. Analysing party

manifestos is not the only method to research policy positions of parties. One could for example conduct surveys with experts. Party manifestos are however better suited for estimating policy positions over longer periods of time than expert opinions (Pennings & Keman, 2002, p. 67). Firstly, conducting interviews with relevant party officials is outside the scope of this Bachelor thesis. Secondly, although analysing parliamentary debates is also a respected method to research party positions, within the scope and time constraints of this thesis, party manifestos are a better fit. Following Downs' (1957) framework that portrays political parties as actors seeking to maximize votes, manifestos are predominantly, if not solely, tailored to appeal to the party's potential electorate (Harmel, 2018, p. 130).

The party manifestos are - when available - taken from the parties' own websites. In Norway for example, both researched parties publish their old party manifestos on their websites. In the UK, however, neither the Labour Party nor the Conservative Party do so. For these manifestos, the Manifesto Project's database is employed. For the Dutch parties, the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen holds a repository of all election programs used by Dutch political parties (Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen). This repository will be used for both the PvdA and the VVD.

Method of data analysis

The recording unit of the analysis is paragraphs in party manifestos of the main centre-left and centre-right party in all three case countries (Halperin & Heath, 2022, p. 378). Qualitative content analysis (QCA) is the most suitable approach to analyse party attitudes through manifestos (Halperin & Heath, 2022, p. 376). Its unobtrusiveness lends for an accurate estimation of parties' true attitudes. Unlike for example survey or interview methods, in QCA the data is not affected by respondents' tendency to give socially accepted answers (Halperin & Heath, 2022, p. 374) which allows for easy replicability (Schreier, 2012, p. 30). The coded sources are presented in Appendix II.

Analysis and results

After having coded all 32 party manifestos it is in this section that the analysis and results will be presented. The results are visually presented hereunder in Table 1.

	<i>Norway</i>		<i>Netherlands</i>		<i>United Kingdom</i>	
Year	AP	Høyre	PvdA	VVD	Labour	Conservatives
2001	Red	Red	Grey	Grey	Red	Yellow
2002	Grey	Grey	Green	Yellow	Grey	Grey
2003	Grey	Grey	Yellow	Yellow	Grey	Grey
2004	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey
2005	Yellow	Yellow	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey
2006	Grey	Grey	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
2007	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey
<i>Start Financial Crisis</i>						
2008	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey
2009	Yellow	Yellow	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey
2010	Grey	Grey	Green	Green	Green	Yellow
2011	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey
2012	Grey	Grey	Yellow	Green	Grey	Grey
2013	Yellow	Yellow	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey
2014	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey
<i>Start Migrant Crisis</i>						
2015	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Green	Green
2016	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey
2017	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow

Table 1: Presentation of analysis results¹. Green = (mostly) favourable towards welfare nationalism; yellow = neutral / not mentioned; red = (mostly) unfavourable towards welfare nationalism; grey = no election.

¹ If integration is made compulsory for (unemployed) immigrants, this will only be coloured as ‘(mostly) favourable towards welfare nationalism’ in case consequences to the immigrant’s right to welfare are mentioned. If an immigrant’s access to welfare is not dependent on following integration or language courses, this is not welfare nationalism.

Before getting to the main research question, we first turn to the sub-questions. The first sub-question is *‘Do mainstream left-wing parties have different preferences regarding welfare nationalism than mainstream right-wing parties irrespective of regime type?’*. Scholars generally agree that welfare nationalist policies are more likely to be supported by voters on the right side of the political spectrum (Murard, 2022, p. 128). Koning (2017) found that parties seem to follow their supporters on this issue. Conservative liberal parties are four times more likely to limit immigrants’ access to welfare than social-democratic parties (Koning, 2017, p. 636).

The results of this analysis only slightly match the literature in this regard. The differences between mainstream left- and right-wing countries found in the analysis are rather small. Only in the Netherlands a real difference is detected. In fact, in 2010 in the UK, the Labour Party supported a welfare nationalist policy in which they increasingly wanted to reserve access to benefits for British citizens and permanent residents. Both a British citizenship and permanent residency can only be acquired after having lived in the UK for a period of 5 years with a work visa, or 10 years in other circumstances (UK Government, 2021). In the same election year, the Conservative Party did not mention any link between immigrants and rights to benefits. In Norway, there is no real difference between Arbeiderpartiet and Høyre. Both parties mentioned a requirement to integrate once, Arbeiderpartiet in 2017 and Høyre in 2013. It must be noted here that Høyre did not mention any sanctions in case of non-compliance, just that Norwegian language training should be compulsory for unemployed immigrants. It thus seems that the conclusions of both Murard (2022) and Koning (2017) do not apply regardless of regime type. With this, the theoretical expectation of centre-right parties being more favourable to welfare nationalism than centre-left parties irrespective of regime type, proved to be incorrect.

This brings us to the second sub-question *‘Is a difference in attitudes towards welfare nationalism visible across welfare state regime types?’*. The theory followed here is the two worlds of welfare chauvinism (Van der Waal et al., 2013). The analysis shows two worlds of welfare nationalism. Firstly, in line with Van der Waal, De Koster and Van Oorschot (2013), the social-democratic regime type is the least welfare nationalistic. Both mainstream parties in Norway rarely even mention a connection between immigrants and unemployment benefits and if they do, both parties propose policies to enable immigrants to find a job more easily. Restricting an immigrant’s access to unemployment benefits is only mentioned once. In its 2017 manifesto, Arbeiderpartiet supported a policy which would stop an immigrant from receiving financial support if they turn down a job on religious or cultural grounds. A substantial –

seemingly cultural – difference between Norway on the one hand and the Netherlands and the UK on the other is that in Norway, making sure immigrants get a job is portrayed by both Arbeiderpartiet and Høyre as a joint responsibility for the immigrant, the state, and employers. This is in stark contrast with the Netherlands and the UK, where it is mostly portrayed as the immigrant’s own responsibility.

When taking a closer look at the Netherlands and the UK, however, we find that there is a difference between the extremes in both countries. The analysis shows that the Dutch centre-right VVD is much more supportive of welfare nationalist policies than the British Conservative Party. Inversely, the Dutch centre-left PvdA is less supportive of similar policies than the British Labour Party, although with a smaller difference than the right-wing. Both British parties thus find themselves in-between the Dutch mainstream parties on a welfare nationalism scale. This will be elaborated upon more in the discussion segment of the thesis. Regarding this sub-question, the results show that, as Van Der Waal, De Koster and Van Oorschot (2013) suggested, there are two worlds of welfare nationalism. One world with little to no welfare nationalism in social-democratic welfare states, and one world consisting of conservative and liberal welfare states in which there is more welfare nationalism as well as within-country differences between political parties.

The last sub-question is the most important one to answer the research question. ‘*Have attitudes towards welfare nationalism among mainstream parties changed in the period from 2000 to 2017?*’. Meuleman, Van Oorschot and Laenen (2020) wrote that high levels of unemployment tend to lead to increased concerns among citizens about the negative aspects of welfare redistribution on the economic performance (p. 14). Combining this with the widespread low ranking of immigrants on the ‘deservingness ladder’ (Harell et al., 2022) and Ferland’s (2020) party responsiveness theory, the expectation was that welfare nationalism would gain more support in the elections following the Financial Crisis. We do in fact see a rise in support for welfare nationalist policies in the British Labour Party and the Dutch PvdA and VVD in the 2010 elections. How ‘nationalistic’ the policies they proposed were varies greatly. The PvdA supported a policy in which labour migrants would only start to build up entitlement to benefits “over time” (PvdA, 2010, p. 39), a policy they no longer mention in their 2012 manifesto. The British Labour Party would for the first time in the analysed period support a policy that increasingly restricts access to unemployment benefits to British citizens and permanent residents (see above). The VVD underwent a considerable shift towards welfare nationalism. In the 2006 election, the VVD supported a policy where people would be sanctioned if they were not learning Dutch while being unemployed. In 2010, however, they

promoted a policy where immigrants who do not successfully complete the Dutch language exam would lose (a part of) their benefit or could even be deported. They wanted to limit access to all welfare benefits for immigrants, with no right to the most basic (unemployment) benefit for any immigrant until they have lived in the Netherlands for ten years (VVD, 2010, p. 34). In Norway, both mainstream parties did not mention a connection between immigrants and unemployment benefits in the 2009 election. Høyre did make this connection in 2013, but linked no repercussions in case of noncompliance to this compulsory Norwegian language training.

Marx and Naumann (2018) observed an increase in support for welfare nationalist policies in Germany in 2016 compared to levels of support in 2015. They found this increase not only among PRRP voters, but also among more moderate voters (Marx & Naumann, 2018, p. 114). This rise in scepticism towards non-EU immigrants was widespread in Europe as a result of the Migrant Crisis (Baláž et al., 2021). As a result of this, an increase in support for welfare nationalist policies among the mainstream parties was expected in the elections following the Migrant Crisis (Ferland, 2020). Perhaps surprisingly, this happened only to a limited extent. In the British 2015 general election, both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party supported such policies. For the Labour Party this was mostly a continuation of their 2010 stance, except that in 2015, they softened their previous preference for limited access to benefits. Earlier, immigrants were to receive benefits upon gaining British citizenship or permanent residence status (5 years), in 2015 they prefer a policy where immigrants cannot claim benefits in the first two years after arrival. Interestingly, both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party did not mention the connection between immigrants and benefits in the subsequent 2017 election. Neither did the Dutch PvdA and the Norwegian Høyre. The Norwegian Arbeiderpartiet did mention the connection and – as mentioned before – wanted to not provide benefits to people who deny a job offer because of religious or cultural reasons. Only the Dutch VVD clearly favoured welfare nationalist policies in this election. The VVD wanted to only provide unemployment benefits to immigrants if they actively integrated by learning Dutch and completing the national integration course. Immigrants with a temporary right to stay – up to five years – would only be able to claim partial benefits (VVD, 2017, p. 36). The answer to the last sub-question is thus as follows. Positive attitudes towards welfare nationalism have generally become more prevalent among mainstream parties in the researched period. The exception here is Norway, where no such increase in welfare nationalism has been detected. Welfare nationalism only really caught on after the start of the Financial Crisis in 2008. The Migrant Crisis had less impact on the total increase than expected from the literature.

Finally, we get to the research question itself: *‘In what way has welfare nationalism developed in mainstream political parties?’* The first notable development of welfare nationalism in mainstream political parties is, as discussed above, the lack thereof in Norwegian mainstream parties. Neither the Financial Crisis, nor the Migrant Crisis have brought about tangible changes in the extent to which welfare nationalism is accepted by the two biggest parties. Compared to the mainstream parties in the Netherlands and the UK, welfare nationalism seems to be mostly absent in both Arbeiderpartiet and Høyre. In Norway, integration of immigrants is portrayed as a joint responsibility between immigrants and the local population. Both parties emphasise the role of the state, employers, employees and labour unions in this process. This is perhaps best illustrated by the following quote: “Employers, employees and their organisations have a joint responsibility to counter discrimination in working life. Arbeiderpartiet will particularly emphasise the responsibility the public sector has for recruiting broadly from the entire population.” (AP, 2001, p. 77). In Norway, both mainstream parties believe that working is the best way for immigrants to integrate into Norwegian society. Two aspects are essential to this. Firstly, the expectation that immigrants learn Norwegian. And secondly, that there is no discrimination on the labour market hindering immigrants to take jobs.

Contrastingly, in the Netherlands, there is no consensus on this among the two analysed mainstream parties. The VVD sees integration as the sole responsibility of the immigrants themselves. They have done so from the start date of the analysis, however, the extent and nature of this belief has changed. Until 2006, the VVD wanted to require immigrants to integrate with sanctions put in place in case of non-compliance. Since the Financial Crisis, however, their policy preferences have shifted to target immigrants as such, regardless of their integration efforts. Since the 2010 election, the VVD, in their manifestos, consistently calls for policies limiting immigrants’ access to welfare, including unemployment benefits. The Dutch PvdA also proposed such policies in their 2010 manifesto but did not continue to do so in subsequent elections. This is similar to the British Labour Party wanting to restrict immigrants’ rights to unemployment benefits in the 2010 and 2015 elections but not in the 2017 elections. This indicates that the progressive’s dilemma, as Murard (2022) suggests, might not be the result of immigration as such (p. 129). Instead, the results implicate financial hardship plays a larger role in progressives’ restraint to share welfare with immigrants than immigration does.

Discussion and limitations

From the analysis, it turned out that the conservative Netherlands is more welfare nationalist than liberal UK. A possible explanation for this can be found in the different parliamentary and electoral systems both countries have. The Dutch electoral system is proportional, while the UK has a First Past the Post system. This results in a de facto two party system in the UK, whereas the Netherlands usually has more than fifteen parties in parliament. Some of these parties are PRRPs, most notably PVV from 2006 onwards. Schumacher and Van Kersbergen (2016) have shown that mainstream parties – especially centre-right parties – often shift their policies towards those of PRRPs if these parties are expected to win over centre-right voters (p. 309). In a system like the Dutch, there is more competition between parties. In this electorally competitive situation, VVD might take on some of the PRRPs' stances such as welfare nationalism. The inclusion of countries with different electoral systems is a limitation of this thesis. Despite this limitation, the results from the analysis provide a basis as well as a call for further research on the role electoral systems play in facilitating mainstream acceptance of welfare nationalism. A lot of research has been done on how mainstream parties might (proactively) react to the success of PRRPs (Meguid, 2005; Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016), as well as on the effects of issue entrepreneurship in multi-party systems (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012) but further research should reveal how this works in different electoral systems.

With regards to the analysis on what impact the Financial Crisis might have had on welfare nationalism in mainstream parties, Norway might not be the best selection of a case. Due to its sizable incomes from fossil fuels it sustained a healthy economy throughout the Financial Crisis. Despite this, the other two Scandinavian countries Sweden and Denmark, also maintained a budget surplus in the crisis (Meinander, 2021, p. 23).

The FrP – originally a libertarian anti-tax party – has been the primary populist party in Norway since the 1970s. Its status as a PRRP is disputed. Mudde (2007), for example, classifies it as a neoliberal populist party but also highlights the party's welfare nationalist attitudes (p. 47). Despite this welfare nationalism being present in the third biggest party in Norwegian parliament, Høyre does not follow Schumacher and Van Kersbergen's (2016) conclusion that centre-right parties follow PRRPs in their welfare nationalism if these PRRPs.

As argued in the results section, financial hardship might lead left-wing parties to adopt welfare nationalist policy preferences in an attempt to 'save the welfare state'. This might explain partly why the Labour Party was more welfare nationalist than the Conservative Party

in 2010. Either way, the Labour Party being more welfare nationalist in that election can be seen as a manifestation of the progressive's dilemma. The Financial Crisis showed the constraints of the welfare state. But perhaps more importantly, Labour's traditional voter-base, the working-class, became increasingly sceptical of immigration, already in the mid-2000s (Diamond, 2022, p. 53). The UK Independence Party (UKIP) convinced working-class voters that strict immigration controls was in their best interest (Diamond, 2022, p. 54). It is thus impossible to say that the Financial Crisis was the main factor in the Labour Party's acceptance of welfare nationalism (for an overview, see Diamond, 2022).

Conclusion

As discussed in the analysis and results section of this thesis, welfare nationalism has developed differently in the researched mainstream parties. Welfare nationalist policies were not at all preferred in the early 2000s, since the Financial Crisis, however, they have been normalised in the Dutch centre-right VVD and to some extent in the British Labour Party. This means the first sub-question is answered negatively and the theoretical expectation is thus rejected. Mainstream right-wing parties are not by definition more accepting of welfare nationalism than mainstream left-wing parties. Contrastingly, in the UK, the Labour Party is often more favourable towards welfare nationalist policies than the Conservative Party. The Dutch PvdA and the British Labour Party were in favour of policies limiting immigrants' access to unemployment benefits after the Financial Crisis while they did not mention any type of welfare nationalist policy in their manifestos after the Migrant Crisis. This should be seen as a confirmation of Murard's (2022) argument that the progressive's dilemma does not arise as a result of immigration. Rather it is a phenomenon that can be triggered if a welfare state finds itself in a weak economic situation. The almost complete absence of welfare nationalism in the mainstream parties of social-democratic Norway while becoming prevalent among mainstream the Netherlands and the UK is a confirmation of the two worlds of welfare chauvinism as proposed by Van Der Waal et al. (2013) and with that, an acceptance of the theoretical expectation of the second sub-question. The theoretical expectation of the third sub-question is also accepted. Overall, acceptance of welfare nationalism among mainstream parties has grown over the researched period. But this answer simplifies the results of the analysis. Significant differences have been detected both cross-countries and cross-parties. Norwegian mainstream parties have remained stable in their non-acceptance of welfare nationalism, while the VVD has particularly embraced it.

The final conclusion is then that welfare nationalism has developed differently among mainstream parties in the analysed countries. There are two main worlds of welfare nationalism. A social-democratic one – in which welfare nationalism remained absent in mainstream parties, and one consisting of liberal and conservative welfare states. In this second world, cross-party differences are larger than the cross-country differences. These differences have especially grown since the Financial Crisis, which also seems to have played a larger role than the Migrant Crisis in mainstream acceptance of welfare nationalism. Further research is needed to determine what role electoral systems play in the normalisation of welfare nationalist policies.

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Appendix I: Coding frame

Coding frame			
<u>Main category</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Reference</u>
Equality (EQU)	The party wants equal rights for immigrants	EQU-POS	(Lehmann et al., 2023)
		EQU-NEG	
Waiting time (WAT)	The party wants to limit access for a short period (5 years or less)	WAT-...	Inductive
		WAT-NAT	
Requirements (REQ)	The party wants immigrants to meet certain requirements to be eligible for benefits	REQ-INT	(Clasen & Clegg, 2007) (Vintila & Lafleur, 2020)
		REQ-CON	
Politicisation (POL)	The party mentions welfare rights in relation to immigrants	POL-POS	Inductive
		POL-NEG	
		POL-NO	

Table 1: Coding frame

Appendix II: Coding

This appendix shows the coding. The tables are ordered firstly alphabetically by country, then by party (left-right) and then chronologically. For the Norwegian data, an extra column is added to the tables in which concise translations to English are provided. Full translations of used paragraphs are presented in appendix III.

Norway:

Arbeiderpartiet:

Arbeiderpartiet election manifesto 2001:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Short translation	Notes
p. 76	<p>“Innvandrerbefolkningen i Norge er en sammensatt gruppe, bestående av mennesker med ulik bakgrunn og ulike livserfaringer.</p> <p>Arbeiderpartiet ønsker integrering, forstått som at alle skal ha de samme rettigheter og de samme plikter som samfunnsborgere.</p> <p>Ingen skal diskrimineres og hindres i å delta.</p> <p>Arbeiderpartiet vil hindre at det vokser fram dype sosiale skillelinjer basert på etnisk opprinnelse.”</p>	EQU-POS	Arbeiderpartiet wants integration understood as everyone having the same rights and the same duties as citizens.	
p. 77	<p>“Flyktninger og innvandrere har de samme plikter og</p>	EQU-POS	Refugees and immigrants have the same duties and	

	<p>rettigheter som andre i arbeids- og samfunnsliv.</p> <p>Men realiteten er at mange ikke får anledning til å delta, fordi de møtes av diskriminering eller uforstand. Noen får ikke jobb fordi de mangler kunnskap om språket og samfunnet.</p> <p>Arbeidsledigheten er høyere blant de med innvandrerbakgrunn enn i befolkningen for øvrig, og mange er overkvalifiserte for arbeidsoppgavene de utfører.</p> <p>Dette hindrer deltakelse og integrering, og det er sløsing med verdifulle ressurser.</p> <p>Derfor vil vi forbedre opplegget for godkjenning av utdanning og gi bedre mulighet til å bygge på den utdanningen man har med seg.</p> <p>Språkopplæringen skal styrkes.</p> <p>Fadderordninger som gir kontakt med og innpass i arbeidslivet, må oppmuntres og stimuleres.</p>		<p>rights as others in working and social life.</p>	
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	<p>Arbeidsgivere, arbeidstakere og deres organisasjoner har sammen et ansvar for å motvirke diskriminering i arbeidslivet.</p> <p>Arbeiderpartiet vil spesielt understreke ansvaret offentlig sektor har for å rekruttere bredt fra hele befolkningen.”</p>			
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Arbeiderpartiet election manifesto 2005:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Short translation	Notes
	...	POL-NO		

Arbeiderpartiet election manifesto 2009:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Short translation	Notes
	...	POL-NO		

Arbeiderpartiet election manifesto 2013:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Short translation	Notes
	...	POL-NO		

Arbeiderpartiet election manifesto 2017:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Short translation	Notes
p. 16	“Gjennomgå ordningene for yrkesskader for norske arbeidstakere, og innføre en ordning som sikrer at utenlandske arbeidstakere ikke blir stående helt uten forsikringsdekning ved arbeidsskader i Norge. ”	POL-POS EQU-POS	Create legislation to ensure that foreign workers will have insurance cover in case of occupational injuries in Norway	
p. 81	Arbeiderpartiet vil “At personer som har religiøs eller kulturell begrunnelse for å ikke delta i aktivitet eller arbeid, ikke skal få økonomisk støtte av det offentlige”	REQ-INT	People who deny an activity or job on religious or cultural grounds will not get economic support from the public	

Høyre:

Høyre election manifesto 2001:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Short translation	Notes
p. 11	“Høyre har de samme mål for politikken overfor innvandrere som for nordmenn for øvrig. Ethvert individ skal ha muligheten til å realisere	EQU-POS	Høyre has the same policy goal for immigrants as for Norwegians in general. Every individual shall have	

	seg selv og sine evner, være selvhjulpen og i stand til å forsørge seg og sin familie, og ha muligheter for aktiv deltakelse i arbeids- og samfunnslivet.”		the possibility to realise themselves and their abilities, be self-reliant and be able to take care of themselves and their family, and have possibilities for active participation in work and social life.	
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Høyre election manifesto 2005:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Short translation	Notes
	...	POL-NO		

Høyre election manifesto 2009:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Short translation	Notes
	...	POL-NO		

Høyre election manifesto 2013:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Short translation	Notes
p. 83	“gi arbeidsinnvandrere mulighet til å styrke sin kompetanse gjennom plikt til norskopplæring når de er arbeidsledige”	REQ-INT	Give labour migrants the opportunity to strengthen their competence through compulsory	

			Norwegian training when they are unemployed	
p. 88	<p>“Deltakelse i arbeidsliv og gode norskkunnskaper er nøklene til inkludering i det norske samfunnet. Arbeid gir tilhørighet, fellesskap, nettverk og mulighet til selvhjulpenhet. Arbeidsinntekt gir også mulighet for å komme inn på det ordinære boligmarkedet. En forutsetning for å kunne få jobb vil i de fleste tilfeller være gode norskkunnskaper. Høyre vil derfor bygge sin integreringspolitikk på kunnskap og kvalifisering, mulighet for arbeid og tilgang til boligmarkedet.</p> <p>Mennesker som har fått lovlig opphold i landet, skal møtes med forventninger om å bidra og å delta i det norske samfunnslivet.</p>	POL-POS	<p>People who have been granted legal residence in the country, must be met with the expectation to contribute and participate in the Norwegian social life.</p>	<p>Expectation to participate but no consequences mentioned</p>

Høyre election manifesto 2017:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Short translation	Notes
	...	POL-NO		

The Netherlands:

PvdA:

PvdA election manifesto 2002:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
pp. 22-23	<p>“Van de nieuwe Nederlanders wordt verwacht dat zij inburgeren. Maar als zo'n 20% van de nieuwkomers en 60% van degenen die hier al langer zijn, de inburgeringcursus niet afrondt, gaat er nog veel mis. Bijvoorbeeld omdat de cursussen niet aansluiten op de individuele situaties, zoals op de werktijd van degenen die al een baan hebben. De overheid zorgt voor voldoende aanbod, variëteit en kwaliteit opdat mensen daadwerkelijk in staat zijn de inburgeringcursus te volgen en af te ronden. Het afronden van de inburgeringcursus is een voorwaarde voor het eventueel gebruik van de sociale zekerheid. Gemeenten houden</p>	POL-NEG REQ-INT	

	daarop strakker toezicht en passen zonodig sancties toe.”		
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PvdA election manifesto 2003:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	

PvdA election manifesto 2006:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
pp. 67-68	<p>“Dat ongedeelde Nederland ontstaat alleen als we zorgen voor sterke en gevarieerde buurten, waarin iedereen wil wonen en waaruit men niet wegtrekt als het even mogelijk is. Daarom moeten er voorzieningen zijn. Voor jong en oud. In de steden en op het platteland. Sterke buurten vragen om voldoende goede en betaalbare woningen. De aanpak van de woningnood kan niet wachten.</p> <p>Hetzelfde geldt voor de integratie. In veel steden zijn de spanningen de laatste jaren toegenomen. Het voelt als een tijdbom, waarbij het kabinet vooral heeft uitgeblonken in harde woorden terwijl de resultaten uitbleven. Duidelijkheid is geboden, maar die duidelijkheid is alleen effectief als er een</p>		

	<p>dialogoog is tussen en met de verschillende bevolkingsgroepen in Nederland. Het onnodig kwetsen van bepaalde groepen draagt daar niet toe bij, want dat overbrugt niet, maar vergroot juist de maatschappelijke tegenstellingen. Integratie is niet gebaat bij grote woorden en gemakkelijke oplossingen.</p> <p>In een ongedeeld Nederland hebben alle bevolkingsgroepen een volwaardige positie in de samenleving en werken met elkaar aan een gezamenlijke toekomst. Helaas zijn we nog niet zo ver. Emancipatie is en blijft van belang.”</p>	EQU-POS	Talks about integration but not explicit if this is also about immigrants without Dutch citizenship
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PvdA election manifesto 2010:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
p. 39	<p>“De PvdA is voor het selectief toelaten van arbeidsmigranten. De situatie van de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt, nu en in de nabije toekomst, is het uitgangspunt. Arbeidsmigratie kan een antwoord zijn op specifieke tekorten op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt. De nadelige gevolgen voor ontwikkelingslanden van migratie (de zogenaamde braindrain)</p>		

	<p>moeten worden beperkt en de voordelen ervan bevorderd (geldovermakingen, investeringen, kennisoverdracht).</p> <p>Arbeidsmigranten bouwen pas na verloop van tijd recht op sociale zekerheid op. Daarnaast moet er meer aandacht komen voor de sociale gevolgen voor de wijken waar nieuwe arbeidsmigranten zich vestigen.</p> <p>Het inzetten van illegale werknemers haalt ook de solidariteit van onze sociale verzekeringen en de werking van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten onderuit.”</p>	<p>POL-NEG</p> <p>WAT-?</p> <p>EQU-NEG</p>	<p>Labour migrants, not specifically from EU</p>
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PvdA election manifesto 2012:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	

PvdA election manifesto 2017:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	

VVD:

VVD election manifesto 2002:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes

p. 44	<p>“Vreemdelingen die in Nederland zijn toegelaten wordt snel mogelijk geleerd Nederlands te spreken en inzicht gegeven in Nederlandse regels en wetten.</p> <p>Daartoe wordt hun een inburgeringscursus aangeboden waar deelname aan verplicht is. Wie die verplichting niet nakomt, wordt door een sanctie getroffen. Dat gebeurt ook als zogenaamde oudkomers die een uitkering hebben en beschikbaar zijn voor de arbeidsmarkt of oudkomers die kinderen opvoeden hun inburgeringscursus niet afmaken.”</p>	<p>REQ-INT POL-NEG EQU-NEG</p>	
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VVD election manifesto 2003:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	

VVD election manifesto 2006:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	
p. 2	<p>“Niemand in onze samenleving hoeft in armoede te leven. Dat is een kwestie van beschaving.</p> <p>Daarom hebben wij in Nederland een prima sociaal vangnet voor</p>		

	<p>mensen die echt niet (meer) kunnen werken.</p> <p>Veel mensen die jarenlang als ‘onbemiddelbaar’ wegstoffen in de kaartenbakken van de sociale diensten zijn daar uitgekomen. Sociaal beleid moet daarom altijd gericht zijn op het vinden van werk, stage of opleiding: weg uit de uitkering. <i>Als mensen zich daarvoor onvoldoende inzetten, de taal niet leren of frauderen, passen sancties.</i></p>	REQ-INT	
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VVD election manifesto 2010:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
p. 34	<p>“De VVD waardeert en erkent mensen die erin slagen op eigen benen hun weg in onze samenleving te vinden en te integreren. En dat zijn er veel. Het is echter niet de overheid die integreert, dat doen mensen zelf. De VVD verwacht dan ook dat iedereen die de keus maakt om in Nederland te komen wonen zelf verantwoordelijkheid neemt om volwaardig mee te draaien in de samenleving. Allochtonen zijn niet zielig. Zij kunnen gewoon worden aangesproken op hun verantwoordelijkheid, net als</p>		

	<p>iedere andere Nederlander.</p> <p>Daarbij past geen overheid die via talloze projecten en integratiesubsidies de eigen verantwoordelijkheid van hun schouders neemt. Dat wél doen, lijkt sympathiek. Maar daarachter gaat een diep neerbuigende, stigmatiserende houding van zieligheid schuil. De overheid is geen plaatsvervangende geluksmachine die alle problemen oplost. De VVD wil daarom een einde maken aan de gesubsidieerde integratie-industrie. De inburgeringscursussen zijn te bureaucratisch geworden. De kosten ervan - die op de samenleving worden afgewenteld - zijn te hoog, de opbrengsten te laag. Inburgeraars moeten wel de Nederlandse grondrechten kennen en accepteren. Het examenonderdeel (van het inburgeringsexamen) ‘Kennis van de Nederlandse samenleving’ moet hierop worden toegespitst. Omdat de VVD beheersing van de Nederlandse taal cruciaal vindt voor succesvol inburgeren, wordt het examen Nederlandse taal gehandhaafd. Inburgeraars gaan</p>		
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	verblijfsvergunning worden ingetrokken. Migranten die de Nederlandse taal niet goed beheersen, hebben wat de VVD betreft geen recht op bijstand.	REQ-INT	
Pp. 34-35	<p>“De termijn voor het verkrijgen van een permanente verblijfsvergunning wordt opgerekt naar tien jaar. Dat voorkomt onder meer de zogenoemde repeteerhuwelijken, waarbij oneigenlijke huwelijken worden ingezet om een verblijfsvergunning te krijgen. Inkoop van AOW geschiedt op basis van een reële kostprijs. De export van kinderbijslag buiten de EU wordt gestopt. <i>Jongeren onder de 27 jaar kunnen geen aanspraak meer maken op bijstand.</i> Deze maatregelen voorkomen dat er oneerlijk aanspraak wordt gemaakt op onze sociale voorzieningen en bieden een goed uitgangspunt om te integreren door middel van arbeidsparticipatie. Iedereen die van de bijstand leeft, is ten minste de Nederlandse taal machtig, op straffe van een korting op de uitkering.”</p>	REQ-INT	Same as natives

VVD election manifesto 2012:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
p. 7	<p>“Zonder kennis van de Nederlandse taal hebben migranten geen kans om hier een eigen bestaan op te bouwen. Het leren van de taal is een verantwoordelijkheid van migranten zelf – en gaat dus op eigen kosten. Wie geen Nederlands spreekt, krijgt geen bijstanduitkering”</p>	<p>POL-NEG REQ-INT</p>	
p. 50	<p>“Migranten die werkloos raken willen we stimuleren om terug te keren naar het land van herkomst. Bovendien moeten ze beperkte toegang krijgen tot sociale zekerheid. De VVD wil naar een Europees ingroeimodel, waarbij uitkeringen worden gebaseerd op daadwerkelijk in de diverse lidstaten betaalde premies. Tegen huisjesmelkers, malafide uitzendbureaus en anderen die misbruik maken van Midden- en Oost Europeanen moeten we hard optreden.”</p>	<p>POL-NEG EQU-NEG WAT-NAT</p>	
p. 51	<p>“Inkoop van AOW geschiedt op basis van een reële</p>		

	<p>kostprijs. We maken een eind aan de export van kinderbijslag buiten de EU.</p> <p>Jongeren onder de 27 jaar kunnen als het aan de VVD ligt voortaan geen aanspraak meer maken op bijstand. Deze maatregelen voorkomen dat mensen onterecht aanspraak maken op onze sociale voorzieningen en stimuleren dat mensen integreren door middel van arbeidsparticipatie.</p> <p>De VVD wil de Europese richtlijn voor gezinshereniging wijzigen. De leeftijds- en inkomenseis moeten omhoog. Als dit niet lukt moet Nederland een opt-out bepleiten zodat Nederland deels zijn eigen regels kan bepalen.”</p>	<p>EQU-POS</p> <p>POL-NEG</p>	
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VVD election manifesto 2017:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
p. 20	<p>“Inburgering van nieuwkomers zorgt ervoor dat zij zo goed mogelijk hun weg vinden in onze samenleving. De taal leren. Aan de slag kunnen. Dat voorkomt hoge druk op onze sociale</p>	POL-NEG	

	<p>voorzieningen. Wij kunnen het ons niet veroorloven dat grote groepen nieuwkomers niet kunnen meekomen in onze maatschappij en bijvoorbeeld in een uitkering terechtkomen. Aan nieuwkomers mogen daarom eisen worden gesteld. En als zij zich niet aan die eisen houden, willen we dat daar ook consequenties aan worden verbonden. Nieuwkomers die verwijtbaar niet voldoen aan hun inburgeringsplicht, laten zien dat zij geen deel uit willen maken van onze samenleving. Wij vinden het logisch dat dit consequenties heeft. Zoals het verliezen van de verblijfsvergunning, geen sterkere verblijfsstatus kunnen krijgen, geen Nederlander kunnen worden of geen uitkering meer krijgen.”</p>	REQ-INT	
p. 20	<p>“Wie de Nederlandse taal beheerst, heeft een betere kans om een bestaan in ons land op te bouwen. Wij vinden het daarom vanzelfsprekend dat nieuwkomers er zelf voor zorgen dat zij Nederlands leren spreken, verstaan, lezen en schrijven. Wie geen inspanning levert om onze</p>	POL-NEG REQ-INT	

	taal te leren, krijgt geen bijstandsuitkering.		
p. 36	<p>“Immigranten met een tijdelijke verblijfsvergunning moeten niet meer direct volledige aanspraak kunnen maken op de gehele Nederlandse sociale zekerheid. In de praktijk betekent dit dat zij gedurende het tijdelijke verblijf in Nederland (maximaal vijf jaar) geen volledige bijstandsuitkering (inclusief toeslagen) meer kunnen aanvragen. In plaats daarvan, ontvangen zij gedurende deze periode een uitkering in natura en beperkt zak- en leefgeld. Dit is conform het bijstandsniveau van mensen die in Nederland in een asielzoekerscentrum verblijven. Om dit mogelijk te maken, moeten internationale verdragen worden aangepast.”</p>	POL-NEG EQU-NEG	Immigrants with a temporary right to stay (up to five years)

United Kingdom:

Labour:

Labour election manifesto 2001:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
p. 34	We will also help those granted refugee status to integrate into the local community, supporting them	POL-POS	

	so they can come off benefits and into work.		
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Labour election manifesto 2005:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	

Labour election manifesto 2010:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
p. 42 (5:6 in document)	“Because we believe coming to Britain is a privilege and not a right, we will break the automatic link between staying here for a set period and being able to settle or gain citizenship. In future, staying will be dependent on the points-based system, and access to benefits and social housing will increasingly be reserved for British citizens and permanent residents – saving the taxpayer hundreds of millions of pounds each year. We will continue to emphasise the value we place on citizenship, and the responsibilities as well as rights it brings, through the citizenship pledge and ceremony, and by strengthening the test of British values and traditions.”	POL-NEG EQU-NEG WAT- NAT	Both for citizenship and permanent residency, an immigrant needs to have been in the UK for 5 years

Labour election manifesto 2015:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
p. 50	“We need to strengthen our social integration and ensure that migrants can play their part in British society. People working in public services, in public facing roles, will be required to speak English. Those who come here will not be able to claim benefits for at least two years , and we will stop child benefit being sent to families living abroad.”	POL-NEG EQU-NEG WAT-2	

Labour election manifesto 2017:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	

Conservatives:

Conservatives election manifesto 2001:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	

Conservatives election manifesto 2005:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	

Conservatives election manifesto 2010:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	

Conservatives election manifesto 2015:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
p. 30	“Tougher tests for migrants before they can claim benefits”	EQU-NEG POL-NEG REQ-INT	Not explicitly about EU or non-EU migrants

Conservatives election manifesto 2017:

Page (if applicable) or chapter	Text	Code	Notes
	...	POL-NO	

Appendix III: Translations

This appendix presents the analysed paragraphs from Norwegian party manifestos in the original text and an English translation. The translations are ordered chronologically and alphabetically for sources from the same year. All translations are done by the author and have been checked and verified by at least one native speaker.

Original texts	Translation	Source text
<p>“Innvandrerbefolkningen i Norge er en sammensatt gruppe, bestående av mennesker med ulik bakgrunn og ulike livserfaringer. Arbeiderpartiet ønsker integrering, forstått som at alle skal ha de samme rettigheter og de samme plikter som samfunnsborgere. Ingen skal diskrimineres og hindres i å delta. Arbeiderpartiet vil hindre at det vokser fram dype sosiale skillelinjer basert på etnisk opprinnelse.”</p>	<p>The immigrant population in Norway is a complex group, consisting of people with different backgrounds and different life experiences. Arbeiderpartiet wants integration understood as everyone having the same rights and the same duties as citizens. No-one shall be discriminated or prevented from participation. Arbeiderpartiet will prevent the development of deep social divisions based on ethnic origin.</p>	<p>AP (2001) p. 76</p>
<p>“Flyktninger og innvandrere har de samme plikter og rettigheter som andre i arbeids- og samfunnsliv. Men realiteten er at mange ikke får anledning til å delta, fordi de møtes av diskriminering eller</p>	<p>Refugees and immigrants have the same duties and rights as others in working and social life. But the reality is that many do not get the opportunity to participate because they are faced with discrimination or misunderstanding. Some do</p>	<p>AP (2001) p. 77</p>

<p>uforstand. Noen får ikke jobb fordi de mangler kunnskap om språket og samfunnet.</p> <p>Arbeidsledigheten er høyere blant de med innvandrerbakgrunn enn i befolkningen for øvrig, og mange er overkvalifiserte for arbeidsoppgavene de utfører.</p> <p>Dette hindrer deltakelse og integrering, og det er sløsing med verdifulle ressurser.</p> <p>Derfor vil vi forbedre opplegget for godkjenning av utdanning og gi bedre mulighet til å bygge på den utdanningen man har med seg.</p> <p>Språkopplæringen skal styrkes.</p> <p>Fadderordninger som gir kontakt med og innpass i arbeidslivet, må oppmuntres og stimuleres.</p> <p>Arbeidsgivere, arbeidstakere og deres organisasjoner har</p>	<p>not get a job because they lack knowledge of the language and society.</p> <p>Unemployment is higher among those with a migration background than in the general population and many are overqualified for the work they do.</p> <p>This hinders participation and integration and is a waste of valuable resources.</p> <p>Therefore, we will improve the system for approval of education and give better opportunities to build on the education one already has.</p> <p>Language education will be improved.</p> <p>Mentorship arrangements that provide contact with and integration into working life must be encouraged and stimulated.</p> <p>Employers, employees and their organisations have a joint responsibility to counter discrimination in working life.</p> <p>Arbeiderpartiet will particularly emphasise the responsibility the public sector has for recruiting</p>	
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<p>sammen et ansvar for å motvirke diskriminering i arbeidslivet.</p> <p>Arbeiderpartiet vil spesielt understreke ansvaret offentlig sektor har for å rekruttere bredt fra hele befolkningen.”</p>	<p>broadly from the entire population.</p>	
<p>“Høyre har de samme mål for politikken overfor innvandrere som for nordmenn for øvrig. Ethvert individ skal ha muligheten til å realisere seg selv og sine evner, være selvhjulpen og i stand til å forsørge seg og sin familie, og ha muligheter for aktiv deltakelse i arbeids- og samfunnslivet.”</p>	<p>Høyre has the same policy goals for immigrants as for Norwegians in general. Every individual shall have the possibility to realise themselves and their abilities, be self-reliant and be able to take care of themselves and their family, and have possibilities for active participation in work and societal life.</p>	<p>Høyre (2001) p. 11</p>
<p>“gi arbeidsinnvandrere mulighet til å styrke sin kompetanse gjennom plikt til norskopplæring når de er arbeidsledige”</p>	<p>Give labour migrants the opportunity to strengthen their competence through compulsory Norwegian training when they are unemployed</p>	<p>Høyre (2013) p. 83</p>
<p>“Deltakelse i arbeidsliv og gode norskkunnskaper er nøklene til inkludering i det norske samfunnet. Arbeid gir tilhørighet, fellesskap, nettverk og</p>	<p>Participation in working life and good Norwegian language skills are the keys to inclusion in the Norwegian society. Work provides belonging, community,</p>	<p>Høyre (2013) p. 88</p>

<p>mulighet til selvhjulpenhet. Arbeidsinntekt gir også mulighet for å komme inn på det ordinære boligmarkedet. En forutsetning for å kunne få jobb vil i de fleste tilfeller være gode norskkunnskaper. Høyre vil derfor bygge sin integreringspolitikk på kunnskap og kvalifisering, mulighet for arbeid og tilgang til boligmarkedet.</p> <p>Mennesker som har fått lovlig opphold i landet, skal møtes med forventninger om å bidra og å delta i det norske samfunnslivet.</p>	<p>network, and the opportunity to self-reliance. Earnings also provide an opportunity to enter the regular housing market. A prerequisite for being able to getting a job is in most cases a good knowledge of Norwegian. Høyre therefore wants to build its integration policy on knowledge and qualification, opportunity to work and access to the housing market. People who have been granted legal residence in the country must be met with the expectation to contribute and participate in Norwegian social life.</p>	
<p>“Gjennomgå ordningene for yrkesskader for norske arbeidstakere, og innføre en ordning som sikrer at utenlandske arbeidstakere ikke blir stående helt uten forsikringsdekning ved arbeidsskader i Norge.”</p>	<p>Review the schemes for occupational injuries for Norwegian workers, and introduce a scheme that ensures that foreign workers are not left without insurance cover in the event of work injuries in Norway.</p>	<p>AP (2017) p. 16</p>

<p>Arbeiderpartiet vil “At personer som har religiøs eller kulturell begrunnelse for å ikke delta i aktivitet eller arbeid, ikke skal få økonomisk støtte av det offentlige”</p>	<p>Arbeiderpartiet wants "That people who have religious or cultural reasons to not participate in activities or work should not receive financial support from the public"</p>	<p>AP (2017) p. 81</p>
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