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## **Patterns in War: Re-Investigating Wartime Rape as a Strategy of Ethnic Cleansing**

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### **Citation**

Calvin, R. (2024). *Patterns in War: Re-Investigating Wartime Rape as a Strategy of Ethnic Cleansing*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

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Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3628117>

**Note:** To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

**Patterns in War: Re-Investigating Wartime Rape as a Strategy of Ethnic  
Cleansing**

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S2753553

Civil Wars in Theory and Practice

Dr Schulhofer-Wohl

Word Count: 7338

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## 1. Introduction

During the civil war and subsequent genocide that took place in Rwanda from 1990 to 1994, estimates by the United Nations placed the number of rape victims at anywhere from 250,000 to 500,000 women and girls, aged anywhere between 13 and 50. In some cases almost all the women from a given area were subjected to mass rape and extreme levels of sexual violence (Sharlach, 2000). Within the same time period, some 50,000 women and girls would also be raped during the war in Bosnia, much of which occurred in the infamous rape camps in cities like Voca (Diken & Laustsen, 2005). What made these events so horrific was the scale and systematic pre-planned nature of the sexual violence that was committed during these conflicts. In 1998, following these appalling events, rape as a weapon of war was officially declared a crime against humanity under international law. In rulings by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) soldiers, officers, politicians, and civilians were convicted of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and acts of genocide for allowing or committing acts of rape or sexual violence against women for the first time in history (Farwell, 2004). Following this, the subject of wartime sexual violence has surprisingly only seen a marginal increase in attention and research. Most of the academic literature focuses on these two main cases, Rwanda, and more frequently, the former-Yugoslavia (Farewell, 2004). This focus has somewhat distracted many researchers from its occurrence elsewhere internationally. Despite increased awareness, very little academic research has actually been conducted on wartime sexual violence, and even fewer have used quantitative methods to analyse its causes and patterns (Wieselgren, 2022). The majority of academic literature attempting to explain cases of wartime sexual violence correlates it with instances of ethnic cleansing, however almost no studies have attempted to quantitatively identify a link. There are several reasons for this.

The majority of the previous research on analysing warfare has ignored wartime sexual violence as it was viewed by many to be a regrettable inevitability of war and nothing more (Koos, 2017). Data on wartime sexual violence is very difficult to source and due to its sensitive and traumatic nature, very few victims ever come forward. This is in large part due to a fear of social ostracization or victimisation if they do so, a problem for both female and male victims alike (Sivakumaran, 2007). Despite this, some data-heavy studies do exist such as Dara Kay Cohen's (2013) article, 'Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009)'. This study was the first of its kind to assemble a large cross-national dataset on wartime rape. In this article, Cohen asks, "*Why do some armed groups commit massive wartime rape, whereas others never do?*" (Cohen, 2013, p. 461). Cohens article will be the basis for this replication and extension study and thus will make use of the same research question.

Cohen poses eight different hypotheses which are theorised to be causes of wartime rape. Each of these hypotheses are categorised into four main arguments, 'Ethnic Hatred', 'Opportunism/Greed', 'Gender Inequality' and 'Combatant-Socialisation'. She attempts to find a link between these arguments and instances of wartime rape. Ethnic cleansing was a hypothesised cause of wartime rape under the broader argument of 'Ethnic Hatred', but had a negative association with wartime rape so was rejected as a cause. Cohens measure for ethnic cleansing was too broad and does not accurately cover the appropriate cases of ethnic cleansing which will be discussed in more detail at a later point. The imprecise measure was not chosen out of choice, but due to a lack of data on cases of ethnic cleansing that existed at the time of her study (Cohen, 2013).

This paper will extend upon Cohen's study by replacing her ethnic cleansing independent variable with a more suitable and accurate variable to prove a positive relationship exists between wartime rape and instances of ethnic cleansing. I do this by

creating a new variable of ethnic cleansing from the Targeted Mass Killings (TMK) dataset (Butcher et al., 2020) which will be discussed at a later point. Part of the extension includes a new hypothesis where I aim to prove that instances of ethnic cleansing are associated with increased conflict wide rape. This hypothesis will be expanded upon in later sections. In this paper I aim to accurately and comprehensively analyse the relationship between ethnic cleansing and the occurrence of wartime sexual violence as a strategy of war, filling an important gap in existing knowledge.

This paper will subsequently go on to examine the existing academic literature and its various differing perspectives, but also investigate the problems studies have faced previously regarding a lack of data. I will then focus on the conceptualization of ethnic cleansing and how it can be separated conceptually from genocide, whilst also discussing how Cohen defines wartime rape for her dataset. This section will also include conceptualise the new variable for ethnic cleansing. Following this, I will examine Cohen's research design, her measures, her results and what this study's extension will involve. This will be followed by a section discussing the replication of Cohen's original results, and then the results of the new variable. Finally, I conclude by discussing the limitations of the study, its implications and next steps for future research.

## **2. Literature Review**

### **Lack of Existing Data**

Literature on warfare has, for a very long time, not paid appropriate attention to wartime sexual violence despite its frequent occurrence throughout history (Diken & Laustsen, 2005). This is largely due to the long running assumption that wartime rape is simply an inevitable side-effect of conflict (Koos, 2017). Following the decisions by the ICTR and ICTY to classify wartime rape as a crime against humanity (Farwell, 2004), the

subject as a field of study has received somewhat increased attention, yet it is still often omitted from papers discussing warfare. Many scholars have also noted the lack of data on wartime sexual violence (Sivakumaran, 2007; Wieselgren, 2022; Wood, 2006) which most feminist scholars have attributed to the stigma surrounding rape victims. For example, Diken & Laustsen (2005) explain how the victims of wartime rape often perceive themselves as lesser or abject due to the social exclusion by family, neighbours and a wider patriarchal community, citing this as a second suffering in addition to the rape itself. They further explain this idea by highlighting how women in the former Yugoslavia were viewed as ‘incubators’ who served to birth the child of the male oppressor. Diken & Laustsen (2005) give an example of this stating “If an Albanian male rapes a Serb woman who then becomes pregnant and gives birth, then the child would be considered Albanian, even though genetically speaking it is ‘half Serb’” (p. 115). Diken & Laustsen argue that this patriarchal ideology explains the feelings of shame and reluctance many women felt about coming forward once they had been raped, which explains the lack of data on wartime sexual violence.

Furthermore, similar arguments can be made for the even greater underreported wartime sexual violence that is committed against men (Sivakumaran, 2007). Sivakumaran argues that male cases of rape are often hard to prove. These cases are often assumed to be consensual and may, therefore, in many circumstances be liable to prosecution through local anti-homosexuality laws. Often, underreporting is due to shame and stigmatisation since suffering from sexual violence is not seen as compatible with traditional masculine values. Sivakumaran argues that victims of sexual violence are considered weak and helpless while masculinity is associated with characteristics such as strength and power, putting the two at odds (Sivakumaran, 2007). Other authors, like Baaz & Stern (2018), also acknowledge how

the lack of data on male victims furthers the perception that sexual violence is an exclusively heterosexual problem which does not affect men.

### **Ethnic Dimensions**

Much of the literature on wartime sexual violence largely focuses on cases such as Rwanda, or more often Bosnia, as case studies ( see Bell-Fialkoff, 1993; Diken & Laustsen, 2005; Petrovic, 1994; Salzman, 1998; Sivakumaran, 2007). Because large-N cross-national data has only existed until recently, case studies have been the main method of research thus far (Cohen & Nordås, 2014). This is especially true of large-N studies investigating links between ethnicity and wartime sexual violence (Wieselgren, 2022). However, ethnic conflict is often theorised as a cause for wartime sexual violence specifically because of cases like Bosnia, despite the lack of large-N studies to quantitatively substantiate such claims (Wieselgren, 2022). For many scholars, wartime rape is seen as an integral part of ethnic cleansing seeing as the aim of wartime rape is to inflict damage and shame on families and communities which will eventually demoralise them and force the ethnic group to capitulate and flee (Diken & Laustsen, 2005). Diken & Laustsen argue further that in Bosnia, this tactic was used to create clear distinctions between groups of Croats, Serbs and Muslims and to then remove these groups from an area using concentration camps, torture, sexual violence and mass rape. Diken & Laustsen highlight how rape was not only used to destroy social structures and communities of specific ethnic groups, but to also prevent reproduction among members of that ethnic group. This clearly demonstrates that wartime rape is used as an effective strategy of ethnic cleansing.

Using rape to prevent social reproduction is also highlighted by Salzman (1998), who again analyses the Bosnian conflict, but suggests that the sexual violence committed was done with the aim of violating the female body and destroying her reproductive capabilities in



order to create a religiously, culturally and linguistically homogenous nation through preventing reproduction. This suggests that wartime rape can be used as a strategy to create an 'ethnically pure' state as children born through rape are considered to be of the ethnicity of the perpetrator and not mixed ethnicity (Diken & Laustsen, 2005). This is reflected in Bastick et al., (2007) study where they argue war rape is used to punish or humiliate a group or community and in some cases is used to advance military objectives and strategies, such as clearing civilians from an area. Here, Bastick et al. suggest that wartime rape is used when ethnic cleansing needs to be conducted, suggesting a clear relationship between them. Furthermore, Farewell (2004) states in her study that militaries and armed groups have increasingly used rape as a weapon of war to systematically target an enemy group in order to advance political objectives. She gives examples such as territorial control, ethnically cleansing of a strategic area or genocidally eradicating an ethnic group. Farewell (2004) then argues rape is used as a weapon because it is able to taint the blood and genes of the target group and serve as a strategy of 'genetic imperialism'. These arguments also give evidence to claims made in further sections by Petrovic (1994) that ethnic cleansing and genocide are two different acts.

Other scholars have looked to demonstrate how wartime rape cannot always be explained as individuals acting alone on their own desires. Alison (2007) gives such an example by stating that rape during wartime is often used as a military objective and is thus not indiscriminate. She uses the example of Rwanda, highlighting how between 250,000 and 500,000 majority Tutsi women and girls were raped, many being held captive at the time. She goes on to criticise feminist scholars, arguing that not all women are targeted in conflicts, but specifically women belonging to a particular ethnic group. This argument once again suggests that wartime sexual violence committed during wars is likely done strategically as

part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing and is not merely a case of indiscriminate isolated incidents.

### **Other Explanations**

Ethnic cleansing is not cited as the only explanation of why wartime sexual violence occurs during conflict. Bell-Fialkoff (1993) states that rape may have been allowed in order to boost morale or as a reward for soldiers. He interestingly argues that ethnic cleansing may have been an unintended effect and was thus adopted as a tactic later in the war, when discussing its use during the Bosnian conflict. Baaz & Stern (2018) argue that violent or abnormal heterosexuality and masculinity among members of the military can produce rapists, citing the close ties between wartime sexual violence and the military's monopoly on violence. Wieselgren (2022) suggests during her study that rebel commanders may be unable to prevent or enforce rules against wartime sexual violence, as an explanation for its occurrence.

Alison (2007) also suggests specifically that wartime gang rape is used as a bonding tool through guilt and complicity for the group as opposed to its use as a tactic of ethnic cleansing and war. However, in doing so, she fails to explain the systematic targeting of men and women belonging to certain ethnic groups. She cites evidence of soldier-rapists expressing a sense of guilt during the Balkan wars. Nonetheless, she does more convincingly argue that wartime sexual violence serves as a way for men to communicate victory through women's bodies at the location of a battle or hard fought victory. She does acknowledge that theories based on rape as a product of misogyny and patriarchal gender relations fail to explain how sexual violence in many conflicts is targeted to ethnic groups. However, we have discussed that misogyny and patriarchal gender norms often enable wartime rape to take place (Diken & Laustsen, 2005). Arguments for gender and ethnicity should go hand in hand, as opposed to being separate.

### 3. Theoretical Framework

#### Cohen's Dataset and Variables

Before conceptualising and discussing my new measure for the ethnic cleansing variable, it is important to first establish how Cohen (2013) gathered her own data and how she codes the variables that are relevant to this study. Cohen compiled a completely original dataset from several existing sources due to a lack of large-scale data sets documenting cases of wartime rape at the time. Her data includes 86 major civil wars between the years 1980 and 2009. These cases were based on existing definitions of civil wars outlined by (Fearon & Laitin, 2011).

For wartime rape, Cohen analysed the United States' State Department Human Rights Country reports. Cohen determined the severity of rape per year using a four point scale of qualitative descriptors from the U.S. State Department reports, based on the number of victims and how widespread wartime rape was. With 0 indicating no mention of rape or sexual violence related to the conflict and 3 indicating that rape was widespread and intentionally used in relation to the conflict. She then coded for cases of rape committed on a conflict-level by year, rape committed by insurgents by year and rape committed by state-actors by year for the years 1980-2009.

Cohen then takes these cases of '*Rape*', her dependant variable, and separates them into three main categories as follows. "I coded the highest levels of rape perpetrated (1) by insurgent groups and (2) by state actors in each conflict-year; (3) I created a variable reflecting the highest level of rape in the conflict-year, using the maximum coded level by either actor type in the conflict-year" (p. 466). These three categories of '*Rape*' form three separate dependant variables; '*svconflict*' for conflict wide rape, '*svreblev*' for insurgent perpetrated rape, and '*svgovlev*' for state perpetrated rape. These three ordinal dependant

variables will be used separately across five different statistical models. This will be discussed in further detail in the 'Research Design' section.

It is important to note, that due to the use of U.S. State Department reports, a coding of zero means no rape was reported, not that no rape occurred. Furthermore, no precise measure of the number of victims exists, so coding is based on descriptors such as isolated reports or widespread occurrences. Biases can also occur, as mentioned previously in the literature, due to under or overreporting or depending on where U.S. interests and budgets lie. These cases were coded with a country that had experienced a civil war during this time, alongside the actor type. Cohen (2013) uses a four-point scale to reflect the magnitude of wartime rape in any given civil war as mentioned previously. She points out that the four-point scale does permit inferences about the severity and magnitude of the rape.

Cohen's imprecise measure of ethnic cleansing (*'eth\_secess'*) is a dummy variable of *'Conflict Aim'*, which categorically measures what the aim of the conflict was and the *'Ethnic War'* variable which measures on a binary scale if the war was ethnic (1) or not (0). Cohen then takes cases where *'Ethnic War'* is equal to 2 (ethnic wars) and cases where *'Conflict Aim'* was equal to 3 (secessionist aims) in the hopes to cover cases of ethnic cleansing. These variables can be viewed in Tables 1 and 2. This measure of ethnic cleansing is not accurate for the following reasons. Take, for example, a case of state perpetrated ethnic cleansing during a civil war. The state is not seeking secession from its own territory but is ethnically cleansing an area of an ethnic group. This case would not have been included due to Cohen's criteria as her measure does not take into account cases of state perpetrated ethnic cleansing. Conceptualising a replacement variable for ethnic cleansing will be discussed in the following section.

## **Conceptualisation of Ethnic Cleansing**

The replication and extension of Cohen's (2013) article in this paper aims to replace her ethnic cleansing variable with a more suitable and precise measure made up from the TMK dataset (Butcher et al., 2020). As part of doing so, it is important to outline ethnic cleansing as a concept. Petrovic (1994) attempts to do this in his paper, offering several compelling definitions of ethnic cleansing, looking at how the concept fits into international law. The author primarily uses the wars in the former Yugoslavia as examples. This is because the term 'ethnic cleansing' first emerged during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, but the practice has existed long before then. Petrovic (1994) also highlights the difficulties in separating ethnic cleansing from acts of genocide, but does argue that the two can be considered different. Indeed genocides seek the total destruction of a group, whereas ethnic cleansing aims to disperse a group from a particular area, rather than total eradication. He does state that certain acts of ethnic cleansing can be considered genocidal. Thus, Petrovic (1994) indicates that ethnic cleansing is a separate phenomenon serving as a strategy of expulsion rather than a method of total eradication, something which the literature suggested earlier.

Similarly, Schabas (2003) states that genocide is aimed at the intentional destruction of a group, while ethnic cleansing entails the expulsion of a group to be tolerated elsewhere. The aim of ethnic cleansing is to render an area ethnically homogenous by using mass expulsion which can result in the death of part of the group (Schabas, 2003). In sum, ethnic cleansing can be difficult to establish conclusively. The strategy of ethnic cleansing does include some acts which constitute genocide, but not all acts are genocidal. Thus, I use a definition outlined by Petrovic: "Ethnic cleansing may be equated with the systematic purge of the civilian population based on ethnic criteria, with the view to forcing it to abandon the territories where it lives" (Petrovic, 1994, p. 351). This definition best encompasses what has

been discussed above, with reference to the use of mass violence and repression to force an ethnic population to leave a particular area.

### **Targeted Mass Killings Dataset**

In order to better encompass cases of ethnic cleansing, a new variable will be formed from the Targeted Mass Killings (TMK) dataset (Butcher et al., 2020) which enables the isolation of events that targeted specific groups deliberately and allows their data to be used for studying patterns in genocide, ethnic cleansing and similar atrocities. Butcher et al., (2019) broadly define a TMK incident as “the direct killing of non-combatant members of a group by an organized armed force or collective with the intent of destroying the group, or intimidating the group by creating a perception of imminent threat to its survival. A targeted group is defined in terms of political and/or ethnic and/or religious identity” (p. 2). A TMK incident is neither genocide nor ethnic cleansing, but broadly all killings of non-combatants. For cases of ethnic cleansing specifically, the data will need to be sorted and refined to certain criteria which this dataset allows. These criteria will be discussed in the following section. For a TMK to be coded as such, a minimum of 25 deaths per year must occur. The data spans from 1946 to 2017 and identifies 201 TMK episodes with information on the intent, severity, target group and various other measures that allow for the construction of new indicators for specific phenomena, such as cases of ethnic cleansing (Butcher et al., 2020).

The reasons for choosing this dataset are largely out of necessity, as few other datasets exist that allow for such precise filtering and collection of cases. Little quantitative data on large scale genocides or mass killings exist in such a form. The ability to choose cases that were committed during a civil war, that were pre-planned or that were targeting a specific group, allows for the refinement of cases to encompass the characteristics of ethnic cleansing as set out by Petrovic (1994).

## **New Ethnic Cleansing Variable**

The main variable used to measure ethnic cleansing will be '*tmk.ordinal*' which is an ordinal scale of TMK cases from the dataset. These events are scored on a scale of 1 to 8 in terms of severity which is based on the number of deaths and whether the killings were either pre-planned, organised, or both (Butcher et al., 2019). This variable was then recoded into '*ethclean*' where deaths of 25+ per year that were pre-planned and/or organised, and that occurred during a civil war were counted as 1 and all other cases were counted as 0. As ethnic cleansing does not seek to explicitly destroy an entire group like genocide does (Schabas, 2003), a much smaller threshold of deaths per year was justified. With this criteria, and given Cohens dataset only looks at cases of civil wars, this best encompasses all cases of ethnic cleansing. This refinement of ethnic cleansing actually reduced the number of cases of ethnic cleansing that Cohen (2013) had with her original variable from 359 to 241 cases with the new measure. A more precise measure of ethnic cleansing has refined the number of cases demonstrating its better accuracy. This variable along with the '*conflict-code*' which paired the TMK cases with a conflict, were merged with Cohen's original dataset.

## **4. Research Design**

Cohen's study, *Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009)* (2013) aims to analyse the patterns of wartime rape during civil wars. Cohen outlines several competing causal explanations as to why war rape occurs. To analyse this, she makes use of an original dataset compiled from various sources. She finds evidence that wartime rape is used as a form of group socialisation for armed units that have recruited members by force or abduction. She conducts a case study of the conflict in Sierra Leone to further support her argument.

## **Cohen's Hypotheses**

Cohen's (2013) causal explanations for wartime rape total eight individual hypotheses which can be broadly grouped into four main arguments. The first argument is one of 'Opportunism/Greed' which implies that when a state collapses the concomitant breakdown of laws increases opportunities for both state-actors and insurgents to perpetrate rape (*H1*). A reliance on material resources is also theorised to be a cause of insurgent-perpetrated rape (*H2*). Cohen theorises that access to material resources can attract violent-prone recruits. A reliance on material resources in turn reduces accountability to a civilian population, allowing abuses to take place.

The second main argument is for 'Ethnic Hatred', with ethnic civil wars, a subset of civil wars, being hypothesised to be a cause of conflict-wide wartime rape due to ethnic cleavages (*H3*). State-actors or insurgents who perpetrate genocide are hypothesised to be more likely to commit war rape than those who do not perpetrate genocide (*H4*). Finally, ethnic cleansing is associated with insurgent-perpetrated rape (*H5*). However, in the study ethnic cleansing is measured as cases of secessionist ethnic wars as an estimate.

The third argument refers to 'Gender Inequality' and covers only one hypothesis, which states that gender inequality is associated with rape due to the status of women, a lack of women's rights and men perceiving rape as acceptable or justifiable (*H6*).

The final argument refers to 'Combat Socialisation' and forms two separate but related hypotheses. Cohen (2013) argues strongly in favour of this explanation, arguing that gang rape is used as a method to bond military units, particularly those with low social cohesion. She states that it also serves as a reward for armed groups that use recruitment methods like insurgent abduction (*H7*), or states that recruit through pressganging or forced conscription (*H8*).



## Cohens Method of Analysis and Results

To analyse her data and obtain results, Cohen “estimated a series of ordered probit regressions, with the standard errors clustered by conflict to account for the fact that they are not statistically independent of each other” (2013, p. 469). Her reasons using this statistical method are due to the ordinal measure of the dependant variables, ‘*svconflict*’, ‘*svreblev*’, ‘*svgovlev*’. Her independent variables also consist of binary, categorical, ordinal and continuous variables which are another reason for choosing a probit regression. These variables can be seen in Tables 1 and 2. Cohen makes use of five models in her analyses, each of which consist of different dependant and independent variables.

Model 1 uses ‘*svconflict*’ as its dependant variable to establish a relationship with the conflict-wide independent variables; ‘*Ethnic war*’, ‘*Magnitude of state failure*’, ‘*Conflict Aim*’, ‘*Fertility rate*’, and ‘*Extrajudicial Killings*’. These independent variables measure causes of wartime rape at the conflict level, not at either insurgent or state levels.

Models 2 and 3 make use of the ‘*svreblev*’ dependant variable which measures rebel-perpetrated rape to establish a relationship with the insurgent independent variables such as, ‘*Genocide*’ (by insurgents), ‘*Contraband*’ funding, . Model 2 uses ‘*Abduction*’ as its measure of rebel recruitment methods, whilst Model 3 uses ‘*Forced recruitment*’ instead as a recruitment method measure.

Models 4 and 5 use the ‘*svgovlev*’ dependant variable measuring state-actor perpetrated rape to establish a relationship with the state-actor independent variables; ‘*Genocide*’ (by governments), and ‘*Troop quality*’. Model 4 uses Government ‘*Pressganging*’, as its measure of government recruitment methods whilst Model 5 uses ‘*Conscription*’.

Table 1: Variables and Descriptors

Variable	Definition	Source
Conflict-wide Wartime Rape	Level of rape during a particular conflict-year ( <i>svconflict</i> ), the highest value is used	Coded from United States State Department Human Rights reports
Insurgent-perpetrated Wartime Rape	Level of rape by insurgent forces during a particular conflict-year ( <i>svreblev</i> ), the highest value is used	Coded from United States State Department Human Rights reports
State-perpetrated Wartime Rape	Level of rape by government forces during a particular conflict-year ( <i>svgovlev</i> ), the highest value is used	Coded from United States State Department Human Rights reports
Ethnic Cleansing (Cohen)	Indicator serving as an approximation of ethnic cleansing from 'Ethnic War' (2) and 'Conflict Aim' (3) variables	'Ethnic War' and 'Conflict Aim' variables taken from Fearon and Latins (2015) dataset on civil war
Ethnic Cleansing (New)	Did an instance of ethnic cleansing occur? Either Yes (1) or No (0)	Variable created from TMK dataset (Butcher et al., 2019)
Ethnic War	If a war has ideological, mixed or ethnic aims	Taken from Fearon and Latin (2015) dataset on civil war
Conflict Aim	If war was aimed at the centre, mixed/ambiguous or autonomy/secession (Varies by conflict not year).	Taken from Fearon and Latins (2015) dataset on civil war
Fertility Rate	The fertility rate of country by year	World Bank Development Indicators
Extrajudicial Killing	Government sponsored extrajudicial killings, coded as either no killings, killings occasionally or killings frequently	From CIRI data
Genocide (By Insurgents)	Indicator for whether insurgents committed genocide or politicide, either yes (1) or no (0)	Coded based on narratives provided in PITF GenoPoliticide 2014 dataset
Contraband	Indicator for whether insurgents used contraband materials to fund the conflict (varies by conflict not year).	Taken from Fearon and Latins (2015) dataset on civil war
Abduction	Indicator for whether insurgents used abduction during the war, either yes (1) or no (0)	Cohen (2013)
Forced Recruitment	Indicator for whether insurgents used forced recruitment during the war, either yes (1) or no (0)	Cohen (2013)
Genocide (By State)	Indicator for whether governments committed genocide or politicide, either yes (1) or no (0)	Coded based on narratives provided in PITF GenoPoliticide 2014 dataset
Troop Quality	Continuous measure for Troop Quality	Coded from variables of the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset, version 4

Table 2: (Cont.)

Pressganging	Indicator for whether the government used pressganging as a tactic of recruitment during a conflict year, either yes (1) or no (0)	Cohen (2013)
Conscription	Indicator for whether the government used conscription as a tactic of recruitment during a conflict year, either yes (1) or no (0)	1980-2001 used data from Pickering (2010), missing data was filled in from Horowitz and Stan (2014), then the last years used data from Karim (2015)
Polity2	Polity scores measuring degree of autocracy or democracy (scale of -10 to +10)	Data from the Polity IV dataset
Duration	Total duration of the war as of 2009	Cohen (2013)
Year	Year of the Conflict	Cohen (2013)
Population	Population (logged) in thousands	Log of population variables used by Fearon and Latin (2015)

Cohens results find strong support for the ‘Combatant Socialisation’ hypotheses as the coefficient for abduction is positive and statistically significant, supporting her argument that insurgent groups who abduct recruits are more likely to commit insurgent-perpetrated rape. She does not find support when looking at the broader level of insurgent forced recruitment (p. 469). When looking at state pressganging, she also similarly finds significance and a positive relationship (p. 469). Overall, these results suggest that harsher forms of recruitment such as abduction and pressganging are associated with wartime rape, but weaker forms like coercion and conscription are not. Her results for the ‘Opportunism/Greed’ arguments are not relevant to this thesis. For ‘Gender Inequality’, she found no statistical significance between wartime rape and lower levels of gender inequality, measured with ‘*Fertility Rate*’ variable. This result is surprising given the strong support by feminist scholars who argue that a patriarchal society will increase the chances of wartime rape should a conflict break out (Alison, 2007).

Interestingly, Cohen (2013) finds little evidence that would suggest ‘Ethnic Hatred’ is related to rape during conflicts. ‘*Ethnic War*’ was shown to have a negative non-significant

relationship with conflict-wide levels of wartime rape. The negative coefficient even suggests ethnic war even reduces the likelihood of occurrence. This shows that Ethnic wars are likely to reduce levels of conflict-wide wartime rape compared to other types. Furthermore, the relationship between insurgent perpetrated genocide and insurgent perpetrated rape is not statistically significant and has a negative relationship, indicating genocide may decrease levels of wartime rape. This result is mirrored for state perpetrated genocide and state perpetrated wartime rape. Cohens original measure for ethnic cleansing has a statistically significant negative relationship, suggesting ethnic cleansing during a conflict reduces levels of insurgent-perpetrated wartime rape. Cohen does state however that “This may reflect the possibility that ethnic/secessionist wars are not a precise measure of ethnic cleansing” (2013, p. 471). These results come as a surprise given the strong evidence for a relation between both wartime rape and ethnic cleansing in the literature (see Bell-Fialkoff, 1993; Diken & Laustsen, 2005; Petrovic, 1994; Salzman, 1998; Sivakumaran, 2007).

### **Proposed Extension**

The aim of this paper to replicate and extend upon Cohens study. This mainly revolves around replacing Cohens variable for ethnic cleansing with a new and improved one. This new variable will make use of the TMK dataset to create a variable for ethnic cleansing from data that was not available during when Cohen wrote her paper. Creating a variable from actual instances of civilian killings and refining the cases to fit the conceptualisation of ethnic cleansing stated earlier means a more accurate measure and better suited variable due to improved data. The measure for ethnic cleansing Cohen used originally was too broad a measure and because of its coding, missed out on crucial cases of ethnic cleansing. Cohens original variable was also only tested against the rebel-perpetrated dependant variable of rape, excluding instances of state-perpetrated ethnic cleaning. This was done because Cohen coded instances of ethnic cleansing as ethnic wars of secession, an estimate which doesn't

cover state-perpetrated ethnic cleansing. The new ethnic cleansing variable will still remain binary.

As shown in the literature review, wartime rape serves as an effective strategy of ethnic cleansing. Wartime rape has been described as a strategy to expel a specific ethnic group of people from an area, usually with the goal of creating an ethnically homogenous region. Furthermore, previous sections of this paper have shown just how important and strong the link between wartime rape and ethnic cleansing are. The new variable for ethnic cleansing created from the TMK dataset has also proved to be a more refined and precise measure. I theorise that instances of ethnic cleansing are associated with higher levels of conflict wide wartime rape. It is for these reasons that I amend Cohen's hypothesis on ethnic cleansing to; *H5: Ethnic cleansing is positively associated with conflict-wide wartime rape.*

## **5. Results**

### **Replication**

For the purpose of this study, a baseline replication of Cohen's study was done in order to test replicability and reliability of Cohens method. It also serves as a baseline test to which my results can be compared. The results of this replication can be found in Table 3. Firstly, the replication of Cohen's results were a success, exhibiting only a few minor differences. The values for the coefficients and robust standard errors clustered by conflict are mostly the same, with only a few values differing by some decimal points. It is to be expected that I would find the same outcomes as Cohen does, which is largely the case. However there are some variables that have obtained noteworthy differences and will be discussed below.

Table 3. Rape during Civil War: Ordere3d Probit Results – Replication

	Conflict- Level Rape (1)	Rape by Insurgents (2)	Rape by Insurgents (3)	Rape by State Actors (4)	Rape by State Actors (5)
Ethnic War	-0.14 [0.122]	0.24 [0.169]	0.21 [0.154]	-0.14 [0.118]	-0.16 [0.123]
Magnitude of state failure	0.04 [0.105]	0.24** [0.077]	0.20* [0.081]	0.03 [0.077]	0.01 [0.078]
Conflict Aim	-0.14 [0.110]	-0.22*** [0.127]	-0.29 [0.155]	-0.09 [0.120]	-0.09 [0.117]
Fertility Rate	0.11 [0.072]	0.07 [0.115]	0.07 [0.118]	0.02 [0.086]	0.02 [0.087]
Extrajudicial Killings	0.27* [0.114]				
<b>Insurgents</b>					
Genocide (by Insurgents)		-0.33** [0.05]	-0.83** [0.050]		
Contraband		0.54* [0.234]	0.76** [0.246]		
Abduction		0.64* [0.276]			
Forced Recruitment			0.33 [0.296]		
<b>State Actors</b>					
Genocide (by governments)				0.14 [0.268]	0.26 [0.270]
Troop quality (log)				-0.09 [0.111]	-0.11 [0.115]
Pressganging				0.50* [0.192]	
Conscription					-0.01 [0.166]
<b>Controls</b>					
Polity2	-0.01 [0.019]	-0.01 [0.140]	-0.02 [0.014]	-0.00 [0.189]	-0.01 [0.021]
Duration	-0.00 [0.007]	-0.07 [0.009]	-0.01 [0.009]	-0.00 [0.007]	-0.00 [0.007]
Year	0.09** [0.000]	0.10** [0.001]	0.10** [0.001]	0.09** [0.001]	0.09** [0.001]
Population (log)	0.19** [0.068]	0.05 [0.106]	0.07 [0.113]	0.23** [0.067]	0.18** [0.062]
Intercept 1	184.43**	210.45**	216.02**	194.65**	197.50**
Intercept 2	185.37**	211.01**	216.57**	195.57**	198.41**
Intercept 3	186.58**	211.98**	217.51**	196.83**	199.63**
Observations	855	869	869	692	692
Pseudo R-squared	0.17	0.25	0.23	0.15	0.13

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by conflict, in brackets;  $p < 0.01^{**}$ ,  $p < 0.05^*$ ,  $p < 0.10^{***}$

In my replication results showed the relationship between insurgent-perpetrated ‘*Genocide*’ and insurgent perpetrated wartime rape was found to be statistically significant despite the coefficient value being the same, which is different to Cohens non-significant result. Given the similarity in coefficient values and robust standard errors, this change in the results is puzzling and might have come from a slight difference between the dataset Cohen used and the dataset provided to me for this study, although this seems unlikely. Despite the significance, the negative relationship stays the same indicating that rebel-perpetrated ‘*Genocide*’ may decrease the levels of wartime rape as found by Cohen in her results. It is important to note that whilst Cohen’s ethnic cleansing variable was not included in her main regression, she did test for it and found statistical significance in Models 2 and 3, but it wasn’t in the hypothesised direction suggesting that a civil war in which ethnic cleansing occurs was associated with lower levels of rebel-perpetrated rape. Cohen did not test ethnic cleansing in Model 1 which looks at conflict wide levels of wartime rape, or Models 4 and 5 which measures state-perpetrated wartime rape due to the variables conceptualisation. The rest of the relevant results remain the same as mentioned earlier and will not be discussed here.

### **Extension**

Considering that the replication was a success, the addition of the new conflict-wide variable measuring ethnic cleansing was done and found positive statistically significant relationship with wartime rape in the first three Models (Table 4). The addition of the new ‘*Ethnic Cleansing*’ variable also changed the values and significance of other variables which will be discussed, despite their irrelevance to my study. In Model 1, ‘*Ethnic Cleansing*’ was found to have a statistically significant relationship with conflict-wide wartime rape at the 95% confidence interval ( $p < 0.05$ ) which is a highly significant result. As ethnic cleansing increases by 1 unit, the likelihood and severity of conflict-wide wartime rape increases by

0.37 percentage points. This means that we can expect a conflict with a campaign of ethnic cleansing to exhibit more severe levels of conflict-wide wartime rape than a conflict that does not. This statistically significant relationship between the occurrence of ethnic cleansing and conflict-wide levels of wartime rape means the hypothesis (*H5*) can be accepted.

Furthermore, the addition of the ethnic cleansing variable has also increased the level of significance for the '*Extrajudicial Killings*' variable, with it now being significant at the 99% confidence interval ( $p < 0.01$ ). To further investigate the effect of the ethnic cleansing variable, it was tested against rebel and state-actor perpetrated wartime rape to varying degrees of significance.

In Model 2, '*Ethnic Cleansing*' was also found to be significant, however only at the 90% confidence interval ( $p < 0.10$ ). This means that as '*Ethnic Cleansing*' increases by unit, rebel-perpetrated wartime rape will increase by 0.26 percentage points. So, we can expect a conflict with a campaign of ethnic cleansing to exhibit more severe levels of rebel-perpetrated wartime rape than a conflict that does not. In Model 3, '*Ethnic cleansing*' also has a significant relationship with insurgent-perpetrated wartime rape at the 90% confidence interval ( $p < 0.10$ ), with the same implications as before, but with a coefficient value of 0.30. Furthermore, the variable for '*Abduction*' in Model 3 is now not statistically significant at any level despite holding significance in Cohen's original model, possibly suggesting it was a weak measure to begin with. Furthermore, in this model, '*Conflict Aim*' loses a level of significance and is now also only significant at the 90% confidence interval ( $p < 0.10$ ).



Table 4. Rape during Civil War: Ordered Probit Results – Extension (Ethnic Cleansing)

	Conflict- Level Rape (1)	Rape by Insurgents (2)	Rape by Insurgents (3)	Rape by State Actors (4)	Rape by State Actors (5)
Ethnic Cleansing	0.37* [0.185]	0.26*** [0.158]	0.30*** [0.164]	-0.07 [0.174]	-0.00 [0.187]
Ethnic War	-0.13 [0.117]	0.23 [0.166]	0.20 [0.153]	-0.14 [0.119]	-0.16 [0.124]
Magnitude of state failure	0.01 [0.101]	0.23** [0.076]	0.19* [0.080]	0.04 [0.079]	0.01 [0.078]
Conflict Aim	-0.13 [0.101]	-0.21*** [0.127]	-0.27*** [0.156]	-0.09 [0.120]	-0.10 [0.117]
Fertility Rate	0.12 [0.069]	0.08 [0.115]	0.08 [0.119]	0.01 [0.084]	0.02 [0.084]
Extrajudicial Killings	0.28** [0.107]				
<b>Insurgents</b>					
Genocide (by Insurgents)		-0.24** [0.053]	-0.70* [0.050]		
Contraband		0.53* [0.231]	0.73** [0.246]		
Abduction		0.61 [0.271]			
Forced Recruitment			0.29 [0.290]		
<b>State Actors</b>					
Genocide (by governments)				0.14 [0.267]	0.26 [0.271]
Troop quality (log)				-0.09 [0.111]	-0.11 [0.114]
Pressganging				0.51** [0.194]	
Conscription					-0.01 [0.165]
<b>Controls</b>					
Polity2	-0.01 [0.016]	-0.00 [0.014]	-0.01 [0.014]	-0.00 [0.182]	-0.01 [0.020]
Duration	-0.00 [0.007]	-0.08 [0.009]	-0.01 [0.009]	-0.01 [0.007]	-0.00 [0.007]
Year	0.09** [0.000]	0.11** [0.001]	0.11** [0.001]	0.09** [0.001]	0.10** [0.001]
Population (log)	0.18** [0.069]	0.04 [0.108]	0.05 [0.115]	0.24** [0.067]	0.18** [0.061]
Intercept 1	190.60**	214.96**	221.85**	193.71**	197.49**
Intercept 2	191.56**	215.53**	222.41**	194.64**	198.41**
Intercept 3	192.79**	216.52**	223.37**	195.90**	199.63**
Observations	855	869	869	692	692
Pseudo R-squared	0.18	0.25	0.24	0.15	0.13

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by conflict, in brackets;  $p < 0.01 = **$ ,  $p < 0.05 = *$ ,  $p < 0.10 = ***$

Similarly to Models 4 and 5 in Cohen's study, only government '*Pressganging*' is significant, however in the replication results its significance increases to a 99% confidence interval ( $p < 0.01$ ). However the '*Ethnic Cleansing*' variable was not significant which suggests that state-actor perpetrated rape is not linked to instances of ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, the relationship is negative thus reducing the likelihood of wartime sexual violence occurring when there is ethnic cleansing present during the conflict. This comes as a surprise considering that the literature suggests that governments attempting to expel an ethnic group from a particular area were said to have committed wartime rape as a tactic (Salzman, 1998).

## **6. Discussion**

### **Analysis of Main Effect**

In Model 1, '*Ethnic Cleansing*' was found to be statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ) which suggests that for conflict-wide rape, there is a strong and positive relationship between instances of ethnic cleansing and wartime rape. It shows that as when ethnic cleansing occurs, wartime rape will occur and increase in levels of severity. This clearly supports my hypothesis (*H5*) and the claims made by the literature in earlier arguments which suggests that wartime rape is used as a strategy of ethnic cleansing. The result provides evidence that wartime rape is used as a strategy of ethnic cleansing, with the goal of inflicting harm and destruction upon a community of people and forcing them to flee (Diken & Laustsen, 2005). It also disproves the argument that wartime rape occurs at random during a war or because it provides convenient opportunity (Cohen, 2013). It instead suggests that mass wartime rape is used as a planned and organised strategy considering that the variable for ethnic cleansing only accounts for cases of planned or organised killings. This result provides some of the first

cross-national empirical evidence of a link between conflict-wide wartime rape and instances of ethnic cleansing.

Moreover, the results in the next four models provide further insight into which side is perpetrating wartime rape during times of ethnic cleansing. In Models 2 and 3, there is also a positive and statistically significant relationship between insurgent perpetrated rape and instances of '*Ethnic Cleansing*'. Whilst the result is only significant at the 90% confidence interval ( $P < 0.10$ ), it still shows a positive relationship. This relationship suggests that during a campaign of ethnic cleansing, insurgent forces commit wartime rape as a strategy of ethnic cleansing which further supports the claims made earlier. This could, for example, be true for cases of insurgents fighting for regional autonomy, whilst also seeking to establish an "ethnically pure" area (Diken & Laustsen, 2005). This would require a campaign of ethnic cleansing which we have proved is significantly likely to involve wartime rape.

It is also relevant to note that the variable for rebel perpetrated genocide is statistically significant but not in the hypothesised direction, suggesting that genocide may decrease the chances of wartime rape, something which was also observed in the replication of Cohen's (2013) original study. This supports the claim made by Schabas (2003), that genocide and ethnic cleansing are separate phenomena and have distinct causes. Indeed, we would otherwise observe a positive significant relationship similar to that of the ethnic cleansing variable. Evidence such as this supports claims that wartime rape is not used to eliminate an ethnic group, but rather to strategically expel them from an area of land. This also reinforces the claim that wartime rape is used to contaminate ethnic identities through the forced impregnation of women (Diken & Laustsen, 2005). This line of argument applies to both Models 2 and 3 which have a positive and significant relationship with ethnic cleansing, but not with genocide suggesting the two concepts are indeed distinct.

Interestingly, for state-perpetrated wartime rape the '*Ethnic Cleansing*' variable was not statistically significant and even had a negative coefficient, suggesting that the presence of ethnic cleansing decreased the chances of wartime rape occurring. This may indicate that when states are conducting a campaign of ethnic cleansing, they use more conventional methods to expel a group from a given area, such as the use of lethal force instead of wartime rape or sexual violence. It may also be the case that soldiers are less willing to commit acts of wartime rape or sexual violence against their own compatriots? Another explanation could be that victims are less willing to come forward about suffering from rape when it was perpetrated by their own state's military as they may fear retaliation for such an accusation.

The positive, but not significant, relationship between state perpetrated genocide and wartime sexual violence in Models 4 and 5 might also suggest that in a civil war, states are more likely to commit acts of genocide as opposed to ethnic cleansing. It is also relevant to note that in both the original study by Cohen (2013) and my extension study, the only significant relationship was between government '*Pressganging*' and wartime rape.

## **7. Conclusion**

Existing research on wartime sexual violence has had very little concrete data to draw its assumptions from, often relying on case studies of either Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia to support its claims. Despite much of the literature agreeing that ethnic cleansing is a definite cause, wartime sexual violence is an undeniably complex issue with many other mechanisms at play. This thesis makes a meaningful contribution by presenting a clear relationship between ethnic cleansing and wartime rape.

Of course, there are some limitations to this study, which mainly revolve around the lack of reliable data on the victims of wartime sexual violence. As I have previously discussed, there are major problems with collecting quantitative data on wartime sexual

violence largely due to many victims not coming forward. There are likely many more victims that have suffered from wartime sexual violence than outlined in Cohens (2013) dataset. This is reflected in the dataset on wartime rape that Cohen uses because there is no precise number of victims, only qualitative descriptors. These ordinal descriptors referring to the severity can have differing meanings or be too broad and inaccurate. Cohen also raises similar concerns, but also mentions potential sources of bias in the collection of data, stating that the US reports may have been written to appear favourable towards its allies. A further limitation is by the cases used by Cohen. By only looking at cases of wartime rape in civil wars, we neglect larger inter-state wars that may also have their own unique mechanisms behind the occurrence of wartime rape not examined in this paper. Future research may want to examine a wider range of cases not limited to civil wars.

Despite these concerns, this paper rests on solid grounds to refute the conclusions reached by Cohen (2013) that wartime rape is not part of a military strategy or plan. I set out to find evidence contradictory to this as cases such as Bosnia and Rwanda pointed in the opposite direction to these findings. Having created a much more precise measure of ethnic cleansing, I found results which provide strong support for that theory. I found that planned or organised ethnic cleansing campaigns during civil wars are significantly correlated with wartime rape. Whilst we cannot rule out that some few cases of wartime rape are committed on an individual basis, the hard truth that wartime rape serves as an effective and highly destructive weapon of ethnic cleansing, but also of warfare, cannot be ignored.

Having answered one question, are many more that are left unanswered. For instance, why do the results suggest that state perpetrated rape is reduced during a campaign of ethnic cleansing? On another hand, I also discussed the inferior position of women in patriarchal societies, which contributes towards the acceptability of rape. How can governments and organisations work towards dismantling these attitudes? How can policy or network support

from governments and organisations help victims come forward with their experiences? How can the networks of support be improved for male victims who rarely, if ever, come forward? Discussions surrounding post-war reconciliations between perpetrators and victims also must be had, such as appropriate punishments for individual perpetrators and their officers, commanders, or the country's politicians. Until patriarchal views about the positions of women in society change and the ostracization of victims stops, there can be little hope of better understanding acts of wartime sexual violence.

More attention and resources need to be given to the subject, which some are beginning to do. It would not be fair to conclude this study without extending my gratitude to Dara Kay Cohen herself who kindly gave me much of the resources and data necessary to make this replication study possible. She has made major contributions to the study of wartime sexual violence, most notably, the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts (Cohen & Nordås, 2014) project which aims to provide accurate numbered quantitative data on incidents of wartime sexual violence across many different conflicts and spanning several decades. Projects such as this and others like it, have undoubtedly made a huge difference with new data emerging constantly and with it, better understanding. Studies like mine aim to research this phenomenon of wartime sexual violence with newer and more accurate data in the hopes of preventing such atrocities from occurring in the future. I hope to have contributed to that goal.

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