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## **Organizing collective resistance while being internally displaced: The Communities of Population in Resistance during the Guatemalan civil war**

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***Organizing collective resistance while being internally  
displaced.***

***The Communities of Population in Resistance during the  
Guatemalan civil war.***

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## **Abstract.**

Among the groups of civilians caught up in civil war, internally displaced populations are often assumed to have little say about their courses of action. In particular, current theoretical accounts of civilian agency in civil war expect that, when facing high levels of violence, civilians can choose between staying or leaving their communities, and only if they stay, they can choose to resist against armed groups. This thesis challenges that these choices are always so clear-cut. Relying on secondary sources, it investigates how populations in northern Guatemala combined displacement and resistance during the most violent period of the Guatemalan Civil War.

More generally, this thesis proposes that short-time horizons (civilians' belief that displacement will be temporary), harsh living conditions that require cooperation during the early moments of displacement, and shared negative perceptions towards one or more armed groups, might lead civilian population towards the organization of collective resistance while being internally displaced.

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## **List of abbreviations.**

CPR: Comunidades de Población en Resistencia (*Communities of Populations in Resistance*).

EGP: Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (*Guerrilla Army of the Poor*).

IDPs: Internally displaced persons.

PAC: Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (*Civil Defense Patrols*).

# 1. Introduction.

Civilians living in war zones were long understood as passive bystanders devoid of agency. As such, they were mostly given attention insofar as scholars wondered under what conditions warring factors might target them (Azam & Hoeffler, 2002; Kalyvas, 2006) or how best to protect them (Chesterman, 2001). However, over the last decade, a growing body of literature has paid increasing attention to the various courses of action available to civilians in conflict settings and how civilians choose among them (Arjona, 2017; Barter, 2012; Jose & Medie, 2015; Kaplan, 2013; Krause, 2017; Masullo, 2021b; Schon, 2020). Today we know that civilians can choose either to leave or remain in a given territory (Adhikari, 2013; Moore & Shellman, 2004; Steele, 2009, 2017), they can collaborate with armed groups (Arjona, 2016, 2017; Wood, 2003), or undermine their efforts through different forms of resistance (Arjona, 2015; Jentsch, 2022; Masullo, 2021a; Schubiger, 2021). Thus, however limited by violence and control, civilians retain a considerable degree of agency, and what they choose to do has significant consequences not only for themselves but also for larger conflict dynamics and outcomes (Kalyvas, 2006; Verwimp et al., 2009).

In the growing literature on wartime civilian agency, however, the options of ‘leaving’ and ‘resisting’ have been often treated as mutually exclusive (Arjona, 2017; Masullo, 2021b; Steele, 2017). Civilians caught in the midst of violence are seen as facing a stark decision between fleeing or staying put. This has implications for how we understand other possible courses of action, since civilians are implicitly framed as being able to engage in resistance against armed groups only if they opt to stay but not if they decided to flee. In short, staying is assumed to be a pre-condition of resistance (Arjona, 2017; Masullo, 2021b). This study challenges this assumption and, theoretically and empirically, examines the possibility of combining leaving and resistance by attempting to answer the following research question:



*Why and how do some communities engage in collective resistance against armed groups while being displaced?*

Since this combination of displacement and resistance is poorly conceptualized and highly undertheorized, I have approached this research question through an in-depth case study of a positive case; this is, a case where the combination of displacement and resistance is present. The case selected has been the Communities of Population in Resistance (CPR), groups of civilians that, during the early 1980s, at the peak of the Guatemalan civil war (1960-1996), displaced into the mountains escaping from a scorched-earth campaign perpetrated by the Guatemalan army. These civilians, rather than seeking refuge in safer parts of the country or in neighboring Mexico as thousands of others did, stayed displaced in the mountains for over a period of 14 years, where they organized a campaign of collective non-violent resistance against the Guatemalan army's violence, authority, and control (CEH, 1999; EPICA & CHRLA, 1993; Stoll, 1993). This thesis has traced the process leading to the emergence of this displacement-resistance combination; working back and forth between theory and empirics, to identify the conditions and mechanisms that explain this outcome.

This thesis makes two core contributions to the literature on wartime civilian agency. First, by providing empirical evidence of how internally displaced populations remain trapped in conflict dynamics and how they devise alternative modes of organization to deal with them, it calls against the treatment of displacement in civil war as a one-shot event. Second, the theoretical contribution highlights the relevance of time horizons as one of the leading factors that civilians include in their evaluations for choosing among possible paths of action. Specifically, this thesis has found that (1) short-time horizons (civilians' belief that displacement will be temporary), (2) harsh living conditions that require cooperation during

the early moments of displacement, and (3) shared negative perceptions towards one or more armed groups, might lead previously disorganized civilians towards the organization of collective resistance while being internally displaced.

Addressing this gap is important for several reasons. Conceptually, existing frameworks artificially reduce the options available to civilians during civil war and, therefore, predispose researchers to pay attention to some courses of action but not others. Empirically, then, researchers will leave outside of their radar a subset of the civilian population and the unique strategies they use to navigate conflict, which has important implications for policy-making. On the one hand, developing a nuanced understanding of the self-protection strategies of internally displaced persons (IDPs) might strengthen external attempts to protect them (Jose & Medie, 2015). On the other, populations that engage in resistance while internally displaced are likely to experience war in consequentially different ways than most other communities, including those that resisted while staying put and refugee populations that largely disengaged from the conflict after displacement. Specifically, they are likely to adopt alternative modes of organization, undergo different socialization processes, and assume new strong collective and individual identities associated with the experiences in displacement. Disregarding this subset of communities and their unique set of needs, grievances, and expectations might introduce additional challenges for conflict negotiations, post-conflict reconstruction, and post-conflict resettlement projects (AVANSCO, 1992).

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of how this project fits into the broader literature of civilian agency. Section 3 proposes a preliminary theoretical argument emphasizing the factors that could be missing in existing accounts. Section 4 presents the research design. Section 5 provides some contextual background necessary to understand the case study, while Section 6 analyses the empirical material to show how the factors and mechanisms identified in Section 3 work in the specific

case of the CPRs. Finally, section 7 concludes by restating the core contributions of this study, recognizing some of its limitations, and identifying some avenues for further research.


## **2. Literature review: Civilian agency, displacement, and resistance.**

### **Conceptualizing civilian agency in civil war: advancements and shortcomings.**

Scholars of conflict studies have increasingly acknowledged that civilians retain a significant degree of agency – however limited – when navigating conflict settings (Arjona, 2017; Baines & Paddon, 2012; Barter, 2012; Jentsch, 2022; Jose & Medie, 2015; Kaplan, 2013; Krause, 2017; Schubiger, 2021). In particular, the last decade has witnessed significant efforts to clearly delimit and conceptualize the set of available options that civilians can choose from (Arjona, 2017; Jose & Medie, 2015; Masullo, 2021b). While current conceptual frameworks have successfully guided research towards the development of a nuanced understanding of civilian decision-making in civil war, they also introduce some limitations. Specifically, precisely because these frameworks are used for guiding the research questions that researchers ask, they might artificially limit research on the broader spectrum of civilian agency if they happen to overlook some possible courses of action or combination between them.

This is the case of ‘displacement’ and ‘resistance’. As clearly depicted in Arjona’s (2017) “menu of civilian choices” (Figure 1 below), current conceptual models often place civilians as facing a stark choice between leaving and staying, and only those who decide to stay appear to be able to engage in resistance against armed groups.

**Figure 1: Arjona's menu of civilian choices.**



*Source: Arjona (2017).*

A partial exception to this stark distinction is Barter (2012), who recognizes that individuals can choose to combine forms of ‘exit’, ‘voice’, and ‘loyalty’. He explicitly notes that “[a]fter fleeing, and with the relative security of distance, civilians may speak out even more” (Barter, 2012, p. 561). However, neither an empirical example is provided nor any serious attempt to develop a theoretical explanation of possible combinations has been offered. Thus, the possibility of combining ‘leaving’ and ‘resistance’ has remained largely underexplored among scholars interested in civilian agency in general, as well as among those focusing on displacement or resistance.

### **Theoretical and empirical accounts of displacement and resistance.**

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate this possibility in a subset of possible cases: internally displaced populations, whom, even if relatively ‘safer’ from a distance, might still be subject to the presence and influences of armed groups, including the threat and the use of violence. This section will briefly discuss in further detail how the previous literature on displacement, resistance, and to some extent, their combinations, has failed to address non-violent resistance to armed groups while being internally displaced.

### *Civilian resistance during civil war.*

The literature on civilian agency provides a detailed understanding of the strategies that those who stay use to navigate violent conflict, with increasing attention to collective forms of resistance both, violent (Jentsch, 2022; Schubiger, 2021) and non-violent (Masullo, 2021b), and to how civilians choose between them (Jentsch & Masullo, 2022). While the desire to engage in collective resistance can be largely explained by armed groups' behaviour, the capacity to do so is often attributed to the type and strength of previous local institutions (Arjona, 2016; Kaplan, 2013) and the availability of clear local leadership (Masullo, 2021a). Because under high levels of violence displacement might seem like the only possible option, this literature has focused on explaining why and how communities manage to stay put (Kaplan, 2013). However, by doing so, they have missed the possibility that civilians that undergo displacement at a given moment can also engage in collective resistance while being displaced.

While the extent to which existing theoretical explanations of civilian resistance while staying put help explain the displacement-resistance combination is an open empirical question, there are reasons to believe that they may fall short. Specifically, current explanations emphasize factors that are physically tied to the local setting - e.g., previous local institutions, (Arjona, 2016)-, or community-level characteristics that hinge on people staying together- e.g., levels of trust and reciprocity (Kaplan, 2013) or the availability of leadership (Krause, 2017; Masullo, 2021a). Displacement, however, entails leaving your hometown behind, which means not only abandoning the territory of your community but also the protection of its institutions as well as losing access to previous social networks. Similarly, displaced populations are often composed of a complex mix of individuals from different communities, and sometimes even different religions, political inclinations, or ethnic groups. As such, they are likely to lack both

the necessary long-accumulated levels of trust and reciprocity and a set of leaders whose trust and legitimacy extends to the broader group of displaced civilians. This combination makes collective action of displaced populations extremely difficult (Clarke, 2018), since the factors outlined above are likely to hamper collective action in a situation of high uncertainty and high stakes, and therefore a strategy of resistance while being internally displaced and thus still vulnerable to violence, defies current theoretical expectations.

### *Displacement in civil war.*

Scholars that study displacement during civil war have addressed, first and foremost, under which circumstances civilians choose to leave their home behind (Adhikari, 2013; Davenport et al., 2003; Melander & Öberg, 2007; Moore & Shellman, 2004). Additionally, this literature has also paid some attention to how civilians approach decision-making beyond the initial decision to displace. Specifically, previous research has addressed how civilians choose among possible destinations and how they resettle (Steele, 2009, 2017), as well as how both, IDPs (Uffelen, 2006) and refugees (Omata, 2013; Sydney, 2019) adopt decisions to return. While this literature provides a glimpse into the subsequent choices of those who left, the choice of ‘leaving’ has been largely treated as a unique one-shot event in which civilians, once they have left their place of origin, are largely assumed to ‘exit’ conflict dynamics. This not only obscures the fact that those who leave, either to become IDPs or refugees, do not necessarily disengage fully from conflict, but also prevents researchers from considering that strategies that have been studied as discrete – displacement and resistance – can in fact be combined.

*The oppositional agency of displaced populations.*

Other bodies of literature have explored more directly how displaced populations do not necessarily disengage from conflict. For instance, research on diaspora and conflict has found that migrant populations abroad play a central role in influencing conflict dynamics and broader political processes within the home country. Interestingly, they have been associated with both, increasing the likelihood and intensity of conflict by financially supporting insurgencies, but also with improving the prospects for peace and stability by reducing incentives to militarize for economic gains due to their key role in sustaining livelihoods in conflict-affected areas (Brinkerhoff, 2011). Similarly, diaspora remittances have also been linked to the emergence of self-defence militias because they facilitate the means to pursue collective action by decreasing their reliance on armed actors (Ley et al., 2021). This body of literature, however, has treated diasporas as an external variable that influences the actions of civilians that remained in conflict settings and, therefore, it does not take us far in explaining the endogenous processes and motivations that internally displaced populations themselves might undergo when organizing collective resistance.

Research on refugee militarization, this is, the mobilization of refugees for military purposes such as fighting for a rebel group, provides further evidence about how displaced populations can still be direct participants in conflict dynamics. The main body of this literature has focused on structural factors that facilitate refugee militarization, including the characteristics of receiving states (Whitaker, 2002), the characteristics of refugee camps (Johnson, 2011), or the role of humanitarian aid (Lischer, 2005). Alternatively, other studies have approached militarization from the side of the recruiter by analysing armed groups' strategies to identify potential recruits (Haer & Hecker, 2019).

An exception that directly investigates refugee's own perspective in the recruitment process is Lebson's (2013) comprehensive study, which analyses refugees' political and economic motivations to militarize. While this literature provides an increasingly nuanced understanding of refugees' engagement in conflict, it does not help much in explaining the combination of displacement and resistance to armed groups while being internally displaced. An additional limitation for the purpose of this thesis – interested in explaining a case of non-violent resistance - is that, by focusing on refugees' violent courses of action, it precludes the possibility that refugees could engage in non-violent responses as well, such as organizing collectively to prevent recruitment attempts.

Finally, a variety of articles explores the broader oppositional agency of displaced populations (Clarke, 2018; Khoury, 2017). However, these studies approach refugees' capacity to organize only in regard to individuals' acts of activism geared towards relieving humanitarian crises within their home-country (Khoury, 2017), or collective organization of protests to improve their living conditions (Clarke, 2018), but do not address any instances of resistance against armed groups.

In short, civilian's decision to leave and civilian's decision to (stay and) engage in resistance have received increasing scholarly attention during the last decade. What is specifically missing in the literature is a thorough empirical and theoretical investigation of possible combination of both. This research attempts to begin filling this gap by starting to analyze and theorize about civilians' collective resistance while being displaced.



### **3. A theory of displacement-resistance in civil war.**

In this section, I propose a theory to start unpacking how forced displacement might, under certain circumstances, lead to the establishment of collective forms of resistance. I specify a path to organizing resistance while being internally displaced in which an initial strategic decision to displace nearby is rendered ineffective due to rapidly changing conflict dynamics. In this context, I outline how civilians from different communities might start working together and choose to organize resistance while being displaced, despite the availability of other courses of action such as displacing further into safer and more definite locations<sup>1</sup>.

I argue that when civilians experience high levels of collective or indiscriminate violence, the combination of short time horizons (the expectation that it will be possible to return home soon), the need for collective action to survive in displacement, and shared experiences of violence can lead groups of initially disorganized civilians to engage in organized forms of collective resistance against armed groups while being displaced. In this section, I will unpack these key factors in further detail and I theorize how they might work as to lead us to the outcome.

#### **Time horizons and civilian strategies in civil war.**

Several scholars have argued that time horizons influence actors' behaviour in conflict settings (Arjona, 2016; Dvir, 2021). For instance, Arjona (2016) has found that rebel groups are more likely to invest in the efforts necessary for developing a social contract with their ruled-to-be

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<sup>1</sup> This thesis recognizes that there might be other paths to the displacement-resistance outcome, but theorizing them goes beyond its scope. For example, when civilians become trapped in conflict zones and are therefore unable to displace further, we could see similar forms of resistance while being displaced. The main difference with the theory presented here would be the prevalence of short time horizons as an explanatory factor that motivates civilians to not to displace further, since civilians literally trapped by conflict might directly lack the choice to pursue further displacement.

populations when they have long-time horizons, resulting in some degree of social order. I argue that, although often overlooked in the literature on wartime civilian agency, time horizons are also central to how civilians approach decision-making in conflict settings and have a significant influence on the courses of action that they eventually take.

In the case of civilian agency, I understand time horizons as civilians' expected duration of specific trends or phases of the conflict, such as a specific episode of violence. When evaluating among different paths of action, this information becomes essential as it allows to estimate for how long any of the strategies under consideration will need to be used, and therefore it makes some courses of action appear better equipped to deal with specific threats than others. In other words, similar to Dvir's (2021) understanding, time horizons influence the selection of strategies by shaping the size and composition of the set of available – or preferred – courses of action.

When civilians engage in displacement, time horizons are especially relevant for two distinct outcomes. First, having either long or short time horizons at the moment of displacement significantly influences the selection of the location of displacement. For instance, when civilians have the perception that they will be displaced for a long period of time (or when they have no clear indication of the duration of displacement), they are likely to be more predisposed to search for destinations where they can be accommodated long-term (Steele, 2009). By contrast, when they believe that the duration of displacement will be short, this is, that they will be able to return home soon, they might have incentives to choose temporary locations – often close to home – that are sufficient to allow them to escape a specific threat without fully leaving their communities behind. This type of thinking can be seen in strategies of temporary flight or hiding to avoid episodes of intense violence (Storm, 2015) or attempts at forced recruitment (Baines & Paddon, 2012).

Second, time horizons remain essential for choosing the subsequent set of strategies adopted while being displaced. Thus, time horizons should remain short-term during the early moments of displacement for resistance to become available as a course of action. By contrast, independently of the desire to return home, if time horizons grow sharply during the early moments of displacement, civilians are likely to abandon their hopes of returning home any time soon and therefore are likely to follow individual or small group strategies aimed at reaching safer locations for long-term displacement. In this regard, initial short-time horizons are essential for civilians' likelihood to remain close to home as well as their willingness to endure difficult situations with the expectation to return home soon.

**Survival agency in displacement: the need of acting together.**

For civilians to remain in displacement rather than returning home, quickly changing conflict dynamics must prevent them to do so. When previous expectations about immediately returning home are shattered, civilians are pressed to quickly devise alternative ways of dealing with the new situation. How they do so depends on how safe the location initially chosen for temporary displacement remains. Specifically, mere survival alone or in small groups is perceived as highly unlikely in specific settings. In these situations, civilians might undergo the activation of an urgent need for collective survival. This is, the perceived impossibility to survive in small numbers when they experience extremely harsh conditions in specific settings activates the need for collective action.

In the context of internally displaced populations, this sense of urgency could be activated by living conditions in specific locations. For instance, civilians displaced into locations with no access to secure networks or even sources of food (such as the jungle) will have a high necessity for collective agency for increasing their chances of staying alive. Alternatively, civilians displaced into camps are likely to have their most immediate survival

needs relatively met, reducing the immediate need for collective action for survival. Interestingly, some scholars have noted that populations displaced into camps tightly managed by humanitarian organizations are driven into a state of passivity and experience a sharp reduction of individual and collective agency (Branch, 2008). This could mean that, while some settings introduce barriers to collective action, others in which the need for collective survival is present might introduce conditions that press people to work with others.

While the mechanism outlined above is sufficient to explain the need for working together in specific settings, it does not fully explain their capacity to do so. In this regard, even in situations that press people to work together, civilians that have previous experiences of collective action might be more likely to organize collective action successfully. This is because they might have both the necessary know-how to work along collective lines and a conviction that working towards a common goal is possible and beneficial.

### **Shared negative perceptions towards armed group(s).**

This section outlines how shared negative perceptions towards one or more armed groups, shape collective action towards resistance. By shared negative perceptions towards armed group(s) I understand a shared clear identification of the actor or actors responsible for their current situation, due to similar experiences of violence in their communities of origin. Shared negative perceptions orient collective action towards resistance by (1) increasing other-regarding considerations towards the group of civilians displaced by the violence and (2) creating a desire not to cooperate with the armed group(s) blamed for displacement.

First, collective violence has been often linked with increasing other-regarding social preferences towards the members of the same group (Masullo, 2017). However, less studied is the effect that these common experiences of violence have in shaping the understanding of who belongs to this group to begin with. In this regard, I contend that similar experiences of violence

attributed to the same actor(s) create shared grievances that accentuate common characteristics, including the sense of being unjustly targeted, while reducing the significance that civilians attach to differences between them, such as ethnicity or religion. Consequently, when people from different original communities come together during displacement, a shared understanding of violence which includes a clear identification of the armed actor(s) blamed for displacement, might extend other-regarding considerations to the broader population of those displaced by the same armed group(s).

This violence-originated sense of groupness, however, is not value-free but rather has a strong normative component associated with the perceived situation of injustice. In this regard, shared negative perceptions are likely to activate a strong desire not to cooperate with these armed group(s), including not pursuing any strategy that might be perceived as benefiting them. In other words, strong shared negative perceptions will shape the form that collective action will eventually adopt by limiting the preferred path of collective action to those understood as being in opposition to the goals of these armed groups.

This argument has outlined how shared negative perceptions towards armed groups might create in displaced civilians a desire to engage in sustained campaigns of collective resistance, but does not explain why civilians might choose violent or non-violent methods. In this regard, other authors have studied in detail the factors that led civilians to choose between violent or non-violent resistance when resistance becomes available as a course of action, including prior experiences of collective action, normative commitments, and the role of political entrepreneurs (Jentsch & Masullo, 2022).

To sum up, this theory outlines a process that might lead displaced civilians to organize collective resistance while being displaced. First, short time horizons at the time and during the initial period of displacement, might make people more likely to displace only as far as

necessary to return and more willing to endure difficult situations with the expectation to return home soon. Second, extremely harsh conditions in the early moments of displacement are likely to force people to rely on collective action to ensure survival. And third, shared negative perceptions towards one or more armed groups might make these groups of displaced civilians more likely to shape this nascent collective action towards the development of sustained campaigns of collective resistance while being displaced.

#### **4. Research design.**

This thesis aims at understanding why and how communities combine displacement and resistance in civil war. Specifically, it studies both the desire and the capacity of communities to flee and engage in resistance while being displaced. Since this combination of displacement and resistance is poorly conceptualized and highly undertheorized, I have approached this research question through an in-depth case study of a positive case; this is, a case where the combination of displacement and resistance is present.

The outcome of this thesis, therefore, is constituted by two distinct contributions: an empirical section (section 6) and a theoretical one (section 3). The empirical part of the analysis has focused on building a sufficient explanation of the outcome of this case, paying attention to both variables and mechanisms (Fairfield & Charman, 2019; Falletti, 2016). For this, I have worked backwards from the outcome to uncover every step in the causal path leading to it, following an iterative process between theory and empirics (Fairfield & Charman, 2019; Falletti, 2016). Finally, using the insight acquired from this case, I have proposed a theory that

could help to explain other instances where similar combinations of displacement and resistance exist<sup>2</sup>.

### **Case selection.**

The case selected has been the Communities of Population in Resistance (CPRs) in Guatemala, as they constitute, perhaps, the best-known example of a combination of displacement and resistance. Despite a wealth of previous studies and rich available online data, the case has not yet been approached with the aim of providing an explanation of the outcome - combination of displacement and resistance-, let alone theorizing the phenomenon beyond it. In other words, the CPRs represents a positive case for which a breath of available data that has allowed to look into the process by which this outcome came to be. Tracing the origins of this collective response presents an ideal case for starting to approach how changes in preferences, contextual factors, and civilians' capacity for collective action interacted for these communities to opt to create combinations of displacement and resistance.

This approach constitutes an ideal choice for this study for two reasons. First, due to the nuanced level of analysis that can be accomplished through case studies make them an ideal research method for identifying the key factors leading to a given outcome (Gerring, 2004). Further, analyzing a positive case provides unique tool for approaching the process of theorizing understudied outcomes, by allowing to identify variables and mechanisms that could be present in similar cases (Beach & Pedersen, 2018).

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<sup>2</sup> This theoretical effort represents the first step in the long process of theorizing, and the theoretical insight acquired from this approach will require further refinement through the use of comparative case studies to distill what factors provide a sufficient explanation for the outcome in a larger population of cases.

## **Data.**

The body of evidence for this study, therefore, has come from a systematic analysis of secondary sources. These documents include previous academic studies, which mainly use ethnographic methods and provide thick descriptions of the CPRs, journalistic documents, and reports from governmental and non-governmental organizations. First, a variety of these sources have been useful to understand the background and history of these communities previous to the displacement into the mountains. Second, a wealth of documents, specifically truth commissions' reports (e.g., CEH, 1999; REMIH, 1998; Rothenberg, 2012) provide a detailed timeline of the conflict's broader dynamics as well as a nuanced description of specific episodes of violence and displacement in the early 1980s, and were instrumental to double-check the sequencing of events. Finally, several ethnographic studies have been used to evaluate in more detail the specific processes tied to emergence of the CPRs, including the process of coming together in the mountains, their evolving perceptions and understandings of the conflict's actors and dynamics, their relation to the EGP, as well as processes of identity formation due to these experiences. In short, a detailed analysis of previous studies and other secondary documents, including access to some primary materials used in these studies such as interviews extracts, has been fruitful to uncover the factors and processes, both endogenous and external to these civilian populations, that help to explain why and how the CPRs combined displacement and resistance.

## **5. Background: cooperatives, guerrilla, and repression in Quiché.**

The history that preceded the formation of the CPRs starts in the 1960s in the Guatemalan regions of the Ixil and the Ixcán, both located in the North of the department of Quiché (See figure 2). This area, which was hostile for growing crops and extremely difficult to access, was



largely unpopulated until the mid-1960s (Muñoz, 2008). In the mid-1960s, however, catholic organizations – the Maryknoll priests and Acción Católica, at times with the support of the Guatemalan government, started large projects to populate this area by creating cooperatives of campesinos. Individuals from different parts of the country moved into the area to take part in these projects (Falla, 2015).

**Figure 2: The Ixil and the Ixcán regions in the department of Quiché, Guatemala; approximate location CPRs**



*Source: Author, based on (AVANSCO, 1992).*

These projects attempted economic reorganization by restructuring the land tenancy in northern Guatemala and by placing the capital in the hands of the population (AVANSCO, 1992). Specifically, they provided previously poor campesinos with some entitlement to land and the capacity to sell their crops (Falla, 2015). Additionally, these organizations led efforts of training community leaders, funded projects in the areas of health and education, and encouraged the democratic participation of the population (AVANSCO, 1992). Through these cooperatives, campesino communities achieved high degrees of self-sufficiency and self-

organization and became active participants in collectively improving their life prospects (Hurtado, 2011).


In 1972, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP - Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres), a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movement formed at the time by a small contingent of 15 guerrilleros, started its activities in the Quiché region (Payeras, 1980). They made use of the existing community institutions, including the campesino cooperatives and the Catholic church, for approaching the residents of these areas, present their political goals, and understand the needs of the civilian population (Falla, 2016; Payeras, 1980). The EGP's message found strong resonance within these campesino communities, and even though the guerrilleros were initially met with distrust, their presence was largely tolerated by most residents, some started to provide them with food, and a very small number of committed individuals even joined their ranks (Falla, 2016; Stoll, 1993).

In 1975, the EGP moved beyond peaceful propaganda and started to organize small-scale attacks and *ajusticiamientos* (executions) of big landowners. The Guatemalan army quickly reacted and launched a campaign of *selective violence* targeting community leaders in the areas of influence of the EGP (CEH, 1999; REMIH, 1998). In Ixcán, 28 Acción Católica leaders were disappeared that year (EPICA & CHRLA, 1993) and between 1976 and 1977, 168 leaders of cooperatives were killed in the regions of Ixcán and Ixil (González, 2011), p. 197). This targeted violence severely damaged the leadership structures of these communities by eliminating key figures and prompting many others to flee (REMIH, 1998).

Starting in 1981, and intensifying with the arrival of General Rios Montt to the government in 1982, a more radical approach towards eliminating the 'bases of support' of the guerrilla was adopted. The army launched a *scorched-earth campaign* in the north of the country, with special emphasis on the department of Quiché (Rothenberg, 2012); to see the


extent of these campaign see Figures 3 and 4 below). Some of these attacks, such as the massacre in Cuarto Pueblo on March 14th, 1982, where 324 campesinos were brutally assassinated, left a deep mark in the collective memory of these communities (Falla, 2016). This campaign led to massive episodes of temporary and permanent displacement which resulted in up to 150.000 refugees in Mexico and around 1.5 million of internally displaced people, equivalent to 20% of the total population of Guatemala at that time (CEH, 1999).

**Figure 3. Number of arbitrary executions perpetrated by the army in the 5 most targeted departments**



*Source: (CEH, 1999).*

Figure 4. Number of army-led massacres<sup>3</sup> in the 5 most targeted departments.



Source: (CEH, 1999).

Following these large-scale attacks, the army established military bases in the abandoned communities, created “model villages” (Aldeas Modelo) to forcefully relocate those displaced by the conflict to areas under strict Army control, and forced male campesinos to participate in the Civil Defense Patrols (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil - PACs).

Among the large number of people who fled, around 50000 chose to stay in hiding in the mountains, refusing to submit to the army’s control but simultaneously refusing to abandon completely their land. These groups of people increasingly collaborated with one another, started to collaborate with the EGP for protection in the jungle, and defined their struggle as a peaceful and unarmed resistance aimed at retaining their autonomy from military control (Bastos & Camus, 1993). For this, they created a complex horizontal organization structured

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<sup>3</sup> Massacres account for the killing of more than five people during the same operative (CEH, 1999).

around a network of small camps, solidified their strategies for survival – including emergency evacuations and patrols -, developed systems of health and education, and adopted a model of deliberative democracy (Bufacchi, 2012; Muñoz, 2008). In 1984, they chose to formalize their resistance and their willingness to stay in the jungle by officially establishing the CPR Ixcán and CPR de la Sierra.

Starting in 1990, and increasingly becoming a political actor independent from the EGP, the CPRs decided that their populations no longer desired to live hiding in the jungle and that they wanted to be publicly recognized as civilian population and be allowed to return to their lands (EPICA & CHRLA, 1993). With increased international pressure and oversight, the CPRs were crucial organizations for negotiating agreements with the government that allowed those displaced into the mountains to resettle peacefully in different parts of Guatemala (Itzamná, 2018). In the aftermath of the conflict, many of the communities that resulted from resettlement, continue to be active participants in Guatemalan political life, promoting communitarian land governance and organizing to ensure basic services for their communities (Itzamná, 2018).

## **6. Explaining the emergence of the displacement-resistance combination in the CPRs.**

This section thoroughly evaluates the processes that led populations in the northern regions of Guatemala to flee from their villages and organize collective resistance while being displaced in the mountains of Quiché. It pays special to the factors outlined in the theory, how they interact with each other, and how they guide decision-making.

### **PHASE 1: Avoiding violence through ‘temporary’ displacement.**

The first decision to flee into the jungle followed the activation of an immediate survival mechanism in the face of an attacking army that was increasingly perceived as unable or unwilling to differentiate between supporters of the guerrilla and civilians with other or no political affiliations (Muñoz, 2008). However, choosing to flee from violence does not only entail the mere act of leaving, but includes the subsequent decisions of ‘to where’ and ‘for how long’. For doing so, most civilians relied on known repertoires of action. This is, during previous episodes of violence, civilians had chosen to seek temporary refuge from the imminent threat of the army and wait, hidden at a safe distance, until the situation improved and the army left. In the words of a participant:

Whenever we saw that the soldiers were coming, the best thing we could do was leave our homes, go to the mountains, go to the ravines, go to the rivers, so that they could not see us, so that they could not kill us. (Testimony in REMIH, 1998, p. 149)

This choice of fleeing and hiding nearby was based on the assumption that they have appropriate knowledge of two things (1) what to expect from the behaviour of the army (attack and retreat) and consequently, (2) the expected duration before they could return to their villages. I argue that believing that they could come back to their villages after days or weeks (Muñoz, 2008) - short time horizons at the moment of displacement - was one of the key determinants of the initial decision of remaining nearby rather than initially trying to flee to other alternative locations. In other words, it was the belief that it would be a temporary strategy, what led civilians to flee only as far as necessary to avoid the current episode of violence, with the hope that they could return home soon afterwards. As a participant put it:

In the 82, we went to the mountains in small groups. When we left, we brought only what we could carry since we thought that we would be out for one or two nights, but [we did] not [expect] how the repression was. (Testimony in Velásquez, 2001, p. 51)

## **PHASE 2: From scattered to organized survivors.**

As the testimony provided above starts to uncover, the expectations that informed the initial decision to remain nearby were quickly shattered. When civilians were hiding near the villages, they began to realize that the army was adopting a new set of strategies which included burning villages and crops, killing the cattle, and even persecuting those who fled into the jungle (Falla, 2016). In this regard, the quickly changing dynamics of the conflict made civilians realize that the current strategy of temporary nearby displacement was no longer successful neither for fully avoiding violence nor for returning home soon. In a state of shock and paralysed by the experience of recent trauma, they saw their options suddenly diminished and were forced to quickly re-evaluate their situation. While civilians tried to figure out what to do next, they found themselves exposed to the extremely hostile environment of the jungle as well as to the continuous threat posed by the army's incursions into the mountain. As a participant recalls: "After one or two weeks we no longer had what to eat, [...], we did not have experience of living in the mountain, even less so when the winter started" (Testimony in Velásquez, 2001, p. 52).

In this context, and hoping still to be able to return but unsure of whether this will be possible, ensuring immediate survival became a priority and a condition for adopting any long-term strategy. The harsh conditions in the mountain activated a need for collective survival, which not only encouraged individuals to rely on collective action within the scattered groups

in which they had initially fled, but even to go and seek other survivors to make immediate survival easier. In other words, they quickly realized that by coming together in larger groups they could share the tasks necessary for survival (EPICA & CHRLA, 1993, p. 147). This included getting organized to take care of the production of food but also to mount watch patrols (*vigilancia*) that would ensure that groups displaced in the jungle could be aware of the location of the army and move to another location as soon as the army approached:

Little by little people start looking for others, to get to know each other [...]. We came together under the mountain. Around 30 communities of 8, 10, 15 families. These communities were abandoned, dispersed. They came together to organize their own *vigilancia*. (Testimony in Velásquez, 2001, p. 55)

In the case of the CPRs, not only the harsh conditions for surviving in the mountain generated an early need for collective action over individual or small group strategies, but most of these civilians had previous experiences of collective action. This significantly increased their capacity to act together when the need to do so arrived. First, these experiences back home provided the necessary knowledge about how to organize collective work successfully. In this regard, civilians trying to survive in the jungle underwent a process of reappropriation of previous experiences of collective action since the experience of working in the cooperatives back home was put into the service of a new goal: ensuring immediate survival (Bastos & Camus, 1993). This experience proved fruitful in a variety of ways. First, civilians displaced in the mountains directly mimicked the structures and models of organization of the cooperatives (Muñoz, 2008). Second, even in the absence of formal leaders, those with more experience in organizing collective action quickly adopted positions that required some degree



of leadership in these smaller groups settings (Falla, 2016). Additionally, these previous experiences do not only provided the necessary know-how, but also the belief and motivation that collective action can work successfully and reassures civilians that they have the capacity to work collectively (Falla, 2016). As a participant summarizes this process:

During that year as we hid from the army, we often bumped into other groups of families. They had fled from different communities and were also trying to survive in the forest. Since we all had experiences in cooperatives, we tried living together. (Testimony in Taylor, 2007, p. 192)

Once scattered groups started to organize collectively, however, a variety of different paths of action remained possible. What is more, with safer options available such as seeking refuge in Mexico, choosing to remain displaced in the mountains seems a high-risk option even if getting further away from home meant risking to lose their lands completely. I argue that, after the initial perception that return would be immediately possible was shattered, a new updated mid-term time horizon was key for choosing to remain in the mountains. This new horizon originated from conversations with the guerrillas in the mountains and a majority of displaced civilians was led to believe that the guerrilla would win the war in the coming months (Cabanas, 2000). In this regard, believing that return home was still in the near future and that displacing to Mexico meant risking to lose their lands completely, many of these civilians choose to endure the precarious situation in the jungle to secure their return. In other words, this redefinition of time horizons as mid-term (months), had a significant influence in limiting the availability of preferred courses of action, and led many to reject once again alternative options such as seeking refuge into Mexico. In the words of a participant:

We could no longer return (to the plots in the cooperatives). Then, we started to see what we could do to organize better to be able to stay in the mountains. Until the guerrilla triumphs, we said. (Testimony in Velásquez, 2001, p. 52)

The processes outlined above led to the establishment of a common strategy to be adopted as they chose to organize collective action around ensuring collective strategies of survival until they could return home. During this initial phase of collective action, the main organizational concerns revolved around developing collective strategies for surviving the attacks of the army - hiding, surveillance, exploration, and mobility - and for surviving in the jungle - strategies for collectively growing hidden crops- (Muñoz, 2008).

### **PHASE 3. Defining collective action as resistance.**

As small groups started to grow bigger for survival needs, they encountered people from a large variety of different communities in similar situations. This often meant that they came from different ethnic groups, spoke different languages, had different local attachments and experiences, and even different political and religious inclinations (Falla, 2016). In other words, these groups lack the levels of regular interaction and the strong social ties that are often understood as a necessary condition for collective action (Tilly, 2005).

As they started to share stories of what had happened in their communities, the common experiences of violence perpetrated by the army seems to provide part of the answer to how they were able to bridge this barrier. Shared experiences of violence had two simultaneous effects. On the one hand, they attenuated differences attending to ethnicity - ladinos vs indigenous - and religion - Catholics vs Protestants - that could have been a significant

impediment to pursuing collective action. In the words of the participants themselves: “The repression united us, it showed us even more the need of organization of our people[...] we managed to largely overcome the divisions between religions, ethnic groups, and cultures” (Testimony in Bastos & Camus, 1993, pp. 90–91). On the other hand, common experiences of violence made explicit common characteristics and shared grievances such as being the target of unjustified violence, the common experiences of hardship in displacement, or similar experiences as members of cooperatives back home. As another participant recalls from this period: “We came all together in one place, and there, people were no longer classified for who they were, because we were all affected and we no longer had where to live” (Testimony in Chanquín-Miranda, 2007, p. 76).

As this violence-originated groupness started to solidify, it led to the emergence of a strong shared negative perception of the army and a frontal refusal to collaborate with them or submit to their rule. Especially, the nascent normative commitment towards justice claims for the groups of displaced people, make civilians increasingly committed to refuse to be displaced further to Mexico and to stay in the mountain until they allowed to return to their lands as civilians. With this increasing willingness to resist and as the end of the conflict promised by the EGP failed to arrive, civilians experienced a final redefinition of time horizons towards an indeterminate period: “They no longer believed that they would be in the jungle for the short term; they now saw that they would be there for an undefined period that could last ten or fifteen years” (Goldman et al., 2004, p. 58). This final change in time horizons led to a redefinition of collective action strategies geared towards staying in the mountain in order to launch a long-term campaign of resistance aimed at maintaining their autonomy from the army while refusing to leave their lands to its control. Further, this campaign adopted a broader political meaning as they started to build a new model of society in opposition to the army’s ‘model villages’ (González, 2011). For this, they developed their own systems of health and

education and adopted a model of deliberative democracy (Bufacchi, 2012; Muñoz, 2008). Members of the CPRs summarized the goals of this campaign of collective resistance in the following way:

Our struggle is one of resistance against capture, persecution, bombardment, strafing, and the imposition of militarization by the army. We are in resistance here, creating a new way of living in liberty and equality, until in all our communities and the whole country true democracy is constructed (Coordinating Commission CPR de la Sierra, 1991, in Stoll, 1993, p. 146).

As a result, this commitment to long-term collective resistance resulted in the formalization of their aims by establishing the Communities of Population in Resistance of Ixcán and de la Sierra in 1984. The CPR of Ixcán and the CPR de la Sierra were two distinct organizational bodies located in two different areas of the department of Quiché, around which nearby communities of displaced civilians choose to organize, but that increasingly coordinated with each other in order to facilitate common non-violent resistance during a sustained period of time.

**Additional factor: external support.**

Finally, while it is unclear whether the support of external actors – specifically armed groups - is a necessary condition for civilian organization of resistance from displacement, and therefore is not included in the theory, the EGP was an important actor in facilitating the emergence of the CPRs. Specifically, the EGP provided some direct protection to civilians by pushing soldiers away from the location of groups displaced in the jungle. However, due to the large

number of civilians in the mountains, the direct effect of EGP protection is likely to have remained rather limited, and the large majority of civilians relied exclusively on self-protection strategies.

## **7. Conclusion, limitations, and further research.**

This thesis has aimed to start analysing, empirically and theoretically, why and how civilians caught up in civil war organize collective resistance against armed groups while being displaced. This task has been approached through an in-depth case study, the Communities of Population in Resistance during the Guatemalan civil war. The empirical part of this research has used secondary sources to trace the process leading to the emergence of the displacement-resistance combination in the specific case. Further, this study has identified key factors that could be common to other similar cases, in order to start providing a theoretical explanation for this outcome.

The results of this study are twofold. Empirically, this thesis has provided direct evidence that displacement does not necessarily disengage civilians from conflict, but might place them in unique situations that call for alternative strategies of survival and organization. Specifically, it has shown that civilians that decide to flee as a first strategic choice can still engage in complex forms of collective resistance against armed groups. Theoretically, this thesis proposes that short-time horizons (civilians' belief that displacement will be temporary), harsh living conditions that require cooperation during the early moments of displacement, and shared negative perceptions towards one or more armed groups, might lead civilians towards the organization of collective resistance while being internally displaced.

However, despite the insight gained about the processes of organizing collective resistance while being displaced, this research has important limitations. Specifically, while

analyzing secondary sources has been useful for starting to outline key factors leading to this outcome, further research would benefit greatly of the use of semi-structured interviews specifically designed to tap more directly into the changes and decisions experienced by these communities in the early moments of displacement. Moreover, by focusing strictly on the displaced populations that chose to remain in the jungle to eventually become CPRs, this study lacks a serious analysis of non-participants: this is, those who decided to leave for Mexico or who, after initial displacement, chose to surrender to the areas controlled by the army. Analysing both participants and non-participants is a necessary step to help determine the specific relevance that variation in the factors identified in the theory has for establishing resistance while being displaced. Finally, this theoretical effort represents the first step in the long process of theorizing, and the theoretical insight acquired from this approach will require further refinement through the use of comparative case studies to distill what variables and mechanisms provide a sufficient explanation for this outcome in a larger population of cases.

More generally, this thesis recommends that researchers of wartime civilian agency should establish a more direct dialogue between the largely disconnected literatures of displacement and resistance, and should be mindful of how clear-cut conceptual distinctions might lead researchers to overlook a subset of civilian strategy in civil war. As this thesis has shown, displacement is rarely a one-shot event, and the experiences of leaving are likely to produce important changes in civilians' identities, motivations, and sense of groupness that could activate a willingness to engage in resistance while being displaced. Future research on wartime civilian agency would benefit from paying closer attention to the strategic choices of internally displaced populations in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the complex ways they use to navigate violent conflict.

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