



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Miranditus: Dutchmanship of Dutch nationals in Spanish concentration camp Miranda de Ebro, 1938-1944.

Gaarden, Joost van der

Citation

Gaarden, J. van der. (2023). *Miranditus: Dutchmanship of Dutch nationals in Spanish concentration camp Miranda de Ebro, 1938-1944.*

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master Thesis, 2023](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3633296>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Master thesis
Joost van der Gaarden
S2351412
1st July 2023
Supervisor: dr. Nadia Bouras

Miranditus: Dutchmanship of Dutch nationals in Spanish concentration camp Miranda de Ebro, 1938-1944.



Words: 18275

Contents

Introduction.....	3
1. Historical context: background of the camp and arrival of Dutch prisoners	11
<i>Changing conditions in Spain</i>	<i>17</i>
2. Release and evacuations, problems and complaints, Van Boeijen and Somer.....	22
<i>Home Affairs, Van Boeijen and Somer</i>	<i>30</i>
3. ‘Dutchmanship’ according to the Dutchmen.....	35
<i>Distance between swerved and detached officials.....</i>	<i>38</i>
4. ‘Dutchmanship’ according to the Dutch Legation and Ministers.	45
<i>‘Politically unreliable’</i>	<i>47</i>
<i>Behaviour and patience.....</i>	<i>51</i>
<i>Social care</i>	<i>53</i>
5. Conclusion	56
Bibliography	59
<i>Secondary sources.....</i>	<i>59</i>
<i>Primary sources</i>	<i>59</i>
Dutch National Archive, The Hague.....	59
Archivo Militar, Ministerio de Defensa, Guadalajara.....	67
Archive International Institute for Social History	67
Newspapers.....	67

Introduction

While Spain initially declared itself neutral from both the Allies and Axis countries during WWII, this was not a fixed position. While Franco's victory of the Spanish Civil War was partly due to the German and Italian support and Spain maintained friendly ties with Hitler and Mussolini, a formal alliance with the Axis countries never came through. The changing tides of WWII had a big influence on Spanish foreign policy, meaning the Spanish were neutral from September 1939, went to a non-aligned status from June 1940, and switched back to neutrality from November 1942 until the end of WWII. The Spanish support for the Axis in these periods differed. The opportunistic foreign policy of the Spaniards also heavily affected the foreigners that were trying to escape Europe through Spain, or those who already were stuck in Spain and needed repatriation.¹

The Dutchmen who were stuck in Spain earliest were those who served in the International Brigades as volunteers on the side of the Spanish Second Republic in the Civil War against Francisco Franco. While most of the Interbrigadist Dutchmen returned to the Netherlands even before the Civil War was over, some were captured as POWs and incarcerated. They were transferred to concentration camp Miranda de Ebro in 1941, when WWII already was in full swing. This was not a concentration camp resembling the Nazi extermination or death camps in Eastern and Central Europe, and even while prisoners had to work in the beginning years, it was rather a detention camp for illegals. Foreigners that entered Spain without permit were imprisoned here.² The Dutchmen were one of the smaller groups, while the Polish, French, Brits, Canadians, and Belgians took up the larger shares in Miranda. The Netherlands was represented by three different groups: the former Interbrigadists, those who hoped to join the military forces of the exiled Dutch government in London (the *Engelandvaarders*), and lastly the Dutchmen who aimed to seek refuge from the Nazi oppression. Archival sources show that the diversity of the different groups in both social background and in nationality caused confusion and difficulties in both material support and releases of the prisoners.³ Some of the men spent nearly four years in the camp.⁴

¹ E. Cuerda-Galindo, 'Physicians imprisoned in Franco Spain's Miranda de Ebro "Campo de Concentración"', *Medical History* 66 (2022) 264-279.

² H. Dankaa et al., *De oorlog begon in Spanje: Nederlanders in de Spaanse burgeroorlog 1936-1939* (Amsterdam 1986) 136.

³ Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

⁴ Admission forms Dutch prisoners camp Mirandam, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa: expedientes personales de ingreso: campo de concentración de Miranda de Ebro, expedientes 1-15233, cajas 305279-305382.

It is important to consider the German pressure on Spain, which aimed to prevent large scale releases of men of military age, former Interbrigadists, and Jews. The Francoist Spanish government was also hesitant in releasing the former Interbrigadists whom they previously fought against, and letting these 'red allies' go unpunished.⁵ However, because of the Civil War the Spanish did not have the capacities to shelter the increasing number of people crossing the Pyrenees, they were not in the position to differentiate between the groups because they believed this would delay releases further.⁶ The slowly deteriorating position of the Axis powers later in WWII allowed the Spanish more leniency in releasing foreign nationals.⁷

After WWII however, many *Engelandvaarders* and refugees blamed the lacking support, their slow releases from Miranda and other prisons, and sluggish evacuations, on the Dutch Legations in Madrid, manned by Legation officer Schuller tot Peursum and Legation secretary and council Van Panhuys. Consul-generaal De Bruyn Tengbergen was in reality responsible for the refugees in Spain, but he was often out of the picture. Baron van Harinxma thoe Slooten in Lisbon, commissioner for refugee affairs in Spain, France and Portugal was also held responsible.⁸

The Cleveringa Commission was designated to research the "attitude of Dutch consular officials regarding *swerved* Dutchmen" ('swerved' also referred to former Interbrigadists, but generally referred to the Dutch refugees and *Engelandvaarders*). The Commission heard the testimonies of witnesses, both *swerved* and officials, and the testimonies of the Dutchmen that were stuck and imprisoned in Spain show that they felt treated as a burden and not appreciated by the Dutch officials for serving the Dutch cause. The officials themselves were not unanimous regarding their efforts of caring for their nationals. Some claimed they were doing everything in their power to aid and release the imprisoned Dutchmen, while others underscored disinterest and others, especially the Dutch legation in Madrid, were accused of undermining the Dutch cause. The Cleveringa Commission concluded that the Dutch Legation in Spain did nothing to prevent the immediate arrests of Dutch nationals who reached Spain, just as the officials' disinterest caused

⁵ Dankaart, 139.

⁶ Dankaart, 141; Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80; Letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs on Dutch refugees in Spain, 22nd December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80; Letter Van Kleffens to Ministry of War, 28th March 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

⁷ L. Petram & S. Kruizinga, *De oorlog tegemoet: Nederlanders en de strijd om Spanje, 1936-1939* (Amsterdam 2020) 222-227.

⁸ 'Rapport Cleveringa gepubliceerd 'Geen gegronde redenen voor ernstige klachten'', *Het Vrije Volk*, 16th December 1947, 1.

releases and evacuations taking longer than necessary.⁹ However, foundation for the severe complaints was not found by the Commission.¹⁰

Dutch media felt the Commission was too easy on those responsible and blamed certain officials of damaging the Dutch prestige and cause.¹¹ Both in the media and in the witness testimonies themselves, 'Dutchmanship' or the interpretation of 'Dutchmanship' regarding the officials' disinterest and negligence towards the refugees and *Engelandvaarders* play a substantial role, especially in the complaints later filed against the responsible officials.¹² The people affected by the supposed negligence and the Dutch officials that were not directly affiliated with the Madrilene and Lisbon legations found that the responsible officials were distant, did not understand, and were not willing to understand those who were trying to support the Dutch cause. The negligence additionally caused distrust and increasing unwillingness to fight for the Dutch state or to rally behind it.¹³

The responsible officials in turn had an idea of what a 'good patriot' or Dutchman was supposed to be, and what characteristics belonged to a good Dutchman or a refugee.¹⁴ This raises the question of how 'Dutchmanship' regarding Dutch nationals in camp Miranda de Ebro was perceived by the Dutch officials, and how this subsequently influenced support, release, and evacuations of the different Dutch groups.

Regarding the Dutch group the historiography is rather limited and fragmentised, where Miranda itself only has little importance. The Miranda group is mostly mentioned in the light of the International Brigades' volunteers and the *Engelandvaarders* separately, but rarely on both together in one source, whereby the Dutch refugees are often only minimally mentioned. Hans Dankkaart et al.

⁹ Report Red Cross on allocation of aid to Dutch political prisoners in foreign countries, 1st December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 14, location 2.05.48.02; Hearing Henri Maas Geesteranus by Commission Van Rhijn, 25th January 1945, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 55, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁰ 'Het rapport-Cleveringa: Kribbige sfeer in Lissabon maakte samenwerken onmogelijk', *De Volkskrant*, 16th December 1947, 1-2.

¹¹ G. van der Leeuw, 'Onze buitenlandse dienst', *Nieuw Utrechts Dagblad*, 5th January 1948, 1.

¹² 'Nederlanders op Jamaica en in Spanje', *Amigoe di Curaçao: weekblad voor de Curaçaosche eilanden*, 24th August 1943, 3;

¹³ Petram & Kruizinga, 226; Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁴ Sidenote by Kleffens on letter from Robert Levisson to the Queen, 12th November 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9097A, location 2.02.14; Hearing Joseph Luns by Cleveringa Commission, 29th March (year unknown), Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 54, location 2.05.48.02; Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

followed the Interbrigadists from their departure to Spain to their statelessness and their regaining of citizenship. With regards to Miranda, of the more than 600 Dutch Interbrigadists that fought in Spain, only 24 remained in Spain and Miranda as POWs, so the concentration camp is only of minor importance in this work. Dankkaart et al. has shown that the Interbrigadists left in Miranda were in an interesting position when the Dutch government wanted to integrate these men in a Dutch brigade that was fighting the Germans. Their Dutchmanship, that they initially lost upon recruitment in a foreign army, had to be reviewed, while the Interbrigadists that returned to the Netherlands were regularly mobilised.¹⁵ Louis Petram and Samuel Kruizinga also mention this. However, they focused more on the Interbrigadists' loss of citizenship and its retrieving to enable joining the Dutch forces, while Dankkaart put more focus on the process of their evacuations.¹⁶

Allegiance and the meaning of Dutch citizenship of the Interbrigadists was researched by Romée Beaufort. Beaufort researched the attitude of the Dutch volunteers that fought in the International Brigades towards their Dutch nationality in what she named the *transnational environment* of the Spanish Civil War. The Dutch Interbrigadists remaining in Miranda unfortunately fall outside of her scope.¹⁷

The historiography on the *Engelandvaarders* also mentions Miranda. Often, more attention is given to the precarious position of the Dutch legations and consulates. This gives a better understanding of why support with regards with releases and evacuations from Miranda were lacking. Agnes Dessing wrote a broader history of the *Engelandvaarders*, where the situation in Miranda and Spain in general is briefly explained.¹⁸

Research with the strongest focus on the Dutch officials in Madrid was conducted by Meike Roem, where she tried to answer whether the Dutch officials, considering the complaints from the *Engelandvaarders* and the Spanish conditions, were executing their tasks properly. Roem looked at all the different factors that affected the functioning of the Consular and Legation members: the concessions the legation did to maintain itself, administrative chaos, social (aristocratic) background of the members, their own (economic) interests in Spain, and internal conflicts and distrust. Roem's

¹⁵ Dankkaart, 138-146.

¹⁶ Petram & Kruizinga, 222-227.

¹⁷ R. Beaufort, 'The Dutch Spainfighters: 'People who did not think solely on a national level, but also internationally': The role of national sentiments in a transnational environment (Researchmasterscriptie Politics, Culture and National Identities, Leiden University 2018).

¹⁸ A. Dessing, *Tulpen voor Wilhelmina. De Geschiedenis van de Engelandvaarders* (Amsterdam 2004).

research hence serves as very convenient work for this thesis to understand the background of the officials' positions when looking at their ideas of Dutchmanship.¹⁹

The first research that looked beyond nationalities and groups within nationalities was conducted in 2022 by Esther Cuerda-Galindo, where special attention was given to the prisoners who were physicians. The Dutchmen largely fall outside of this categorisation.²⁰

In all the historiography where Miranda is mentioned, a thorough analysis of what Dutchmanship meant to the Miranda group and the officials that were supposed to aid them is absent. I expect that, aside from the impact of possible neglect on one's position towards the Dutch state, the imprisonment and detention of the various groups together in one camp has a substantial possible impact on the Dutch sentiment, and differences in treatment by the officials. To understand the meaning of Dutchmanship, I ought it also important to look at possible different treatments (aid, release, and evacuation) between the groups by the Dutch government. This master thesis is focused on the meaning of the ideas of Dutchmanship of the Dutch prisoners in camp Miranda from 1939 to 1944. The research question I am to answer is the following:

What did 'good' citizenship mean to the Dutch officials and to the Dutch prisoners of camp Miranda de Ebro, and how did the lack of aid and slow releases and evacuations by the Dutch state during their imprisonment influence their idea and sense of Dutchmanship?

I do not refer to *Dutchmanship* as the legal implication of *citizenship*, but rather how citizenship is implied politically and culturally. Generally, the meaning of 'citizenship' beyond legal status also includes a form of political activity, and a form of identity and solidarity, that show how one practices citizenship. Dutchmanship is thus approached as a sense of citizenship, meaning what acts, characteristics, attitudes, or stances belong to 'good Dutchmanship', and understand what would then imply 'bad Dutchmanship'. In the sources 'good Dutchmanship' often refers to the understanding of the Dutch cause: how is the Dutch cause best served, and by whom, and what should this person be like?

Researching the practice of citizenship in this context also helps to see how detachment and distance between the prisoners and officials because of neglect would not necessarily mean a breach

¹⁹ Roem, M., 'Lakse diplomaten of een onmogelijke taak? De gebrekkige assistentie van Nederlandse ambtenaren in Spanje aan Engelandvaarders', *De Schakel: Stichting Genootschap Engelandvaarders* 38 (151) (January 2017) 9-17.

²⁰ Cuerda-Galindo, 'Physicians imprisoned in Franco Spain's Miranda de Ebro', 264-279.

of citizenship, but rather shows how attachment to the Dutch cause and nation works on different levels. Additional attention is given to what Dutchmanship culturally implied for the prisoners and officials, and how did they give meaning to this practically? Focussing on 'good' and 'bad' Dutchmanship also allowed to see certain preferences or prioritisations between the different prisoner groups, to which additional attention is given.

Camp Miranda serves as main focus because the different Dutch groups have previously been investigated separately, by choosing Miranda the scope enlarges to the entire Dutch group and can show the differences between the groups regarding their Dutchmanship and how this influenced their release and evacuation. Because the Dutchmen's complaints about negligence in Spain were the vastest in Miranda, I also expect the imprisonment in Miranda having had the largest possible influence on stances towards Dutchmanship.

The first two parts are both introductory chapters. In the first part, a general historical overview of Camp Miranda is given, with special attention to the time that Spain had Dutchmen interned here. It shows the backgrounds of the different groups of Dutchmen and their time in incarceration. It also pays attention to the position of the Dutch officials in the Spanish context and its position in WWII.

The second chapter continues to answer the question of what the causes of the slow releases and the problems within the Dutch administration were, and how this shaped the subsequent complaints about supposed negligence. This chapter aims to show the background and origin of the complaints, which are analysed according Dutchmanship in the subsequent chapter.

In the third chapter of this research tries to answer the question of how the Dutch prisoners interpreted their Dutchmanship and how they gave meaning to this. The sentiments of Dutch citizenship are approached from their perspective. This is done through testimonies and personal appeals the prisoners wrote about their release and evacuation during and after WWII (for the Cleveringa Commission). The testimonies also include the content of their complaints about the officials and show what meaning Dutchmanship has been given therein. This part also tries to see how the prisoners' ideas of citizenship and their positions towards the Dutch state changed during the incarceration, and especially if they started thinking differently due to the supposed negligence of the Dutch state with regards to their release.

The last chapter continues the analysis of the third part, but tries to answer this question from the perspective of the officials. Their ideas of Dutchmanship are analysed through the declarations

and testimonies they gave during the investigation by the Cleveringa Commission, that are mostly responses to the complaints filed by the prisoners. Their correspondence with the Ministries in London about the prisoners is also an important source.

This research is based on several archival sources, both Dutch and Spanish. The archive of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains the correspondence between Dutch officials in Madrid and Lisbon, the Dutch government in exile, royal emissaries of Queen Wilhelmina, the British government, several NGOs which supported the prisoners, Spanish and Portuguese officials that oversaw the evacuation and finally, 'spokespersons' for the different nationalities within the concentration camp. The correspondence includes discussions between the different entities about supporting the prisoners, repatriation, and evacuation (and to where), and finally the deliberation on whether to let the men become part of the allied forces after their evacuation.²¹

During a two-week stay in the Military Archive in Guadalajara, I had the opportunity to look at the archives of the Spanish Ministry of Defense, that contains the archival sources on Camp Miranda some personal records of all the prisoners, mostly admission forms. Data from the archives show that over the entire period Spain had internationals imprisoned in the camp, 278 of them were Dutch. The number is not entirely correct because some prisoners took up false nationalities hoping this would speed up their release.²² The number also includes the Dutchmen that were imprisoned in Miranda after WWII, but these men fall outside of this research.²³ While the documents in the Military Archive do not directly help answering the research question, they give a good insight in the (social) background of the Dutch prisoners in Miranda: where they came from, what their profession was and what final destination they aimed for. Importantly, in much of the correspondence, people are mentioned to be stuck in Spain, the archival sources in Guadalajara helped with checking whether this was actually in Miranda. The Spanish sources thus helped maintain the focus on camp Miranda.

The archives of the Cleveringa Commission and the correspondence between the Consulates and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contain most of the personal testimonies of the officials and prisoners themselves. From these sources I aim to obtain a clear image of these men's visions and

²¹ Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

²² Admission forms Dutch prisoners camp Mirandam, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa: expedientes personales de ingreso: campo de concentración de Miranda de Ebro, expedientes 1-15233, cajas 305279-305382.

²³ Arend Bakker's camp admission form, 19th January 1946, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 623, caja 305283.

ideas of Dutchmanship and their feelings towards the Netherlands, and what role this played in the processes of imprisonment, releases, and evacuations, and this subsequently influenced their idea and meaning of Dutchmanship.

In the sources I looked for letters and documents that were about the officials or the prisoners themselves. Specifically, I searched for Dutch words that related to Dutchmanship or characteristics relating to this [*good citizen/Dutchman/patriot, the Dutch cause, attitude, traitor, weak, trustworthy, reliable, empathy, understanding, suspicious, useful, important*].

The research's scope and time and space constraints do not allow all components to be included. With regards to the Jewish refugees, while they were subjected to bad treatment, Spain officially did not have discriminatory legislation towards them and did not discriminate between Jews and non-Jews when granting visas for outward evacuation.²⁴ The sources showed no differentiation by Dutch officials between Jews and non-Jews either. Also considering the limited size of the research, I aim to treat the refugees generally as one group. However, the Jewish refugees and *Engelandvaarders* themselves did give meaning to their Judaism with regards to their Dutchmanship and understanding of the Dutch cause, so attention to this is paid in the second-last chapter.

As the research will show, also because they were only a small fraction of the Dutch group, the Interbrigadist group gradually moves to the background of the research. The Dutchmanship and the statelessness of the Interbrigadists regained importance in England, when the Interbrigadists are subdued to investigations to investigate their reliability and trustworthiness. However, because the focus of this thesis is Spain and specifically Camp Miranda, the Interbrigadists' time in England falls outside of the scope.

This does not mean that the Dutch officials in London are also outside of the research' scope. While the focus is Miranda and the officials on the Peninsula, London's directives did impact the release and evacuations of the prisoners, and the Ministries were finally responsible for them.

²⁴ J. Adams, 'Why Jewish Refugees Were Imprisoned in a Spanish Detention Camp while Fleeing Europe (1940-1945)', *Journal of Modern European History* 21 (2013) 110-132.

1. Historical context: background of the camp and arrival of Dutch prisoners

Miranda de Ebro is a rural town in the municipality of Burgos in the autonomous community of Castile & Leon and was assigned to become an important place for fibre processing in the Spanish industrialization project in the 1940s.²⁵ The town's concentration camp was set up by Franco's Nationalist Army for (Republican) POWs during the Spanish Civil War. The Dutchmen that fought in the International Brigades during the Civil War and stayed in Spain after Franco's victory were initially imprisoned by the victors in an abbey called San Pedro de Cardeña, close to Burgos. The 25 Dutchmen that were imprisoned here were captured in 1938. In November 1939, the Dutch POWs were moved to a labour battalion in Belchite, where one of the 25 detainees, Bennie Beuker, died from malnutrition and exhaustion.²⁶ Another Interbrigadist, Adrian Thomas, claimed that this was partly due to Legation member Van Panhuys', disinterest, and lacking material support from the Legation.²⁷

Until May 1940, all the help the Interbrigadists in Spain received came from Dutch commission 'Aid to War Victims' (*commissie Steun aan Oorlogs-Slachtoffers*, S.O.S.). This was a continuation of the Commission Aid to Spain (*Commissie Hulp aan Spanje*, CHaS) that was supporting the Dutch Interbrigadists and the Spanish Republic throughout the Civil War.²⁸ This support ended in May 1940. The Dutch government found the British International Brigade Association willing to support the imprisoned former Dutch Interbrigadists until they were transferred again.²⁹

In June 1941, the remaining 24 were moved to Palencia. Upon repeated and explicit request from the Dutch consul general all the POWs were transferred to concentration camp Miranda de Ebro in the following December.³⁰ Many internationals who entered Spain outside of the legal structures, meaning without visas and passports, were already imprisoned in Miranda, mostly from German occupied countries.³¹ The Interbrigadists were thus not the first group of Dutch nationals that were imprisoned in Miranda, but they were the first group being imprisoned in Spain. In addition

²⁵ 'Industrialisatie in Spanje. Vooral voor textile, chemicaliën, rubber, benzine en auto's', *Dagelijksche Beurscourant: de Nederlandse financier*, 7th January 1943, 1.

²⁶ Petram en Kruzinga, *De oorlog tegemoet*, 201.

²⁷ Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 18th November 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

²⁸ Commission Aid to Spain 1976, October 1976, Archive International Institute for Social History, Archive Documentatiecollectie Solidariteitsbewegingen in Nederland, inventory nr. 161B: Commissie Hulp aan Spanje, COLL00284, location 50074.2-7.

²⁹ Dankart, 137.

³⁰ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

³¹ Dankart, *De oorlog begon in Spanje*, 135-136.

to French, Belgians, Poles, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Moroccans, Germans and Italians, there were also nationals from Commonwealth countries imprisoned in Miranda.³²

The reason *Engelandvaarders* and refugees were also interned in Miranda was that according to Spanish legislation, foreigners that did cross the border without legal documents could be imprisoned.³³ It is also important to note the importance of the pressure on Spain from the Germans, who targeted Jews trying to escape Europe, and wanted to prevent people from military age reaching non-occupied territories to join the Allied forces.³⁴

Dutch nationals kept arriving in Spain throughout the 1940s, of whom not everybody went straight to Miranda. Some were under house arrest in Madrid (mostly the women and children), others were incarcerated in regular prisons, and Van Panhuys claimed that he even sheltered some of them himself. He estimated that some additional hundreds of refugees of people were hidden throughout Spain.³⁵

Many of the newly arrived persons in Miranda previously stayed in French refugee camps, these people were mainly refugees and a small number of *Engelandvaarders*.³⁶ They crossed the Spanish border because of the further deteriorating situation and unsafety in France after the Germans also occupied Vichy France. These people often stated that they were not 'planning to take up military service' for the Allies, especially when being of military age became crucial for the Spanish to provide exit visas, to increase their chances of quick release. Most of them also explicitly claimed to be 'refugios civiles' (civil refugees).³⁷ Among the newly arrived individuals, around 75% were

³² Camp admissions forms international prisoners Miranda de Ebro, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expedientes 1-15238, cajas 305279-305382

³³ Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

³⁴ Letter Schuller tot Peursum of Dutch Legation in Madrid, 28th April 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80; Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02; J. Maenhout, *Miranda de Ebro: een concentratiekamp op het politiek schaakbord van Franco* (Masterscriptie Geschiedenis, Universiteit Gent, 2019) 90.

³⁵ Summary of letter from Ernest van Panhuys, 10th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80; Appendix G of written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

³⁶ Report Baron F.C.A. van Pallandt for Cleveringa Commission, 9th January 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 58, location location 2.05.48.02.

³⁷ Camp admissions forms international prisoners Miranda de Ebro, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expedientes 1-15232, cajas 305279-305382; Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Jewish, who were in Miranda under false identities.³⁸ Some Dutchmen (but also Luxembourgish) faked Canadian or South-African nationalities as advised by Dutch consul Joop Kolkman in Perpignan to the individuals he himself deemed important enough for quick release and evacuation.³⁹ Faking the British or Commonwealth nationality meant they would be eligible for help and evacuation by the British.⁴⁰ The men who claimed British citizenship had a head start, because they were cared for by the British and transferred to England imminently, as Van Panhuys claimed.⁴¹ This led to the Canadians being the largest prisoner group in Miranda after the French and Polish, due to the other nationalities faking Canadian nationality.⁴² The British even referred to the 'Canadian-Dutch group'.⁴³ Gastmann, who took over the position of consul general from De Bruyn Tengbergen in 1944, explained that many Dutchmen were able to achieve quick release by faking English or Canadian nationality.⁴⁴ This was not always the case, however. The Dutch consulate did not interfere at all with the 'Canadian and South-African Dutchmen', so when the British could not or were not doing an effort in releasing them (sometimes men were rejected)⁴⁵, these men were sometimes forgotten about.⁴⁶

The camp admission forms of the Dutchmen who were imprisoned in Miranda show that many of them were students, the majority being mechanical or machinery students, which also included Rudolph van Stolk who later becomes the leader of the Dutch group in the camp.⁴⁷

³⁸ Report from Minister of Foreign Affairs E.N. van Kleffens to Queen Wilhelmina, 30th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80; A. Dessing, *Tulpen voor Wilhelmina. De Geschiedenis van de Engelandvaarders* (Amsterdam 2004) 140; Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

³⁹ Report from Schuller tot Peursum to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War on Camp Miranda, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive of Dutch Ministry of Defence/War in London, inventory nr. 2494, location 2.13.71; A. Dessing, *Tulpen voor Wilhelmina*, 140.

⁴⁰ Sidenote on letter from ambassador Schuller tot Peursum sent on the 7th of December, 9th of December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80; Letter Schuller tot Peursum about situation of Dutchmen in Camp Miranda, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of War/Defense in London, inventory nr. 2494, location 2.13.71.

⁴¹ Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁴² Maenhout, 96.

⁴³ Letter from secretary of British embassy in Madrid Michael Cresswel to Van Panhuys, 21st April 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁴⁴ Testimonial L.A. Gastmann, 8th April 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 45, location 2.05.48.02.

⁴⁵ Hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 7th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁴⁶ Report 'Dutchmen in Spain' by private B. Boers in Canada, 23rd May 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

⁴⁷ Rudolph van Stolk's camp admission form, 23rd October 1941, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 13483, caja 305370;

Mechanics and merchants ('comerciantes') were also overrepresented among the Dutchmen. The high number of students meant that many were in their beginning twenties', some even of the age of 17, while people of that age were generally not sent to Miranda. Some men faked a younger age to prevent being sent to Miranda, but this then seems a less solid tactic than thought.⁴⁸ The high number of students also meant that the Dutch minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen worked together with the Red Cross and the *Koningin Wilhelmina Fonds* in providing study books for the prisoners in Miranda.⁴⁹ He deemed education, development, spiritual care and relaxation essential to preserve the morale among the Dutch prisoners.⁵⁰ Not only the preservation of the morale was eyed, but also possible increase of moral was the reason for Van Boeijen to ask the *Koningin Wilheliman Fonds* for more financial aid to allocate care and materials to the Dutchmen.⁵¹

Schuller tot Peursum admitted that the 'mental care' for the Dutch prisoners lacked and was still lacking in spring 1943. He stated that the legation did support all the efforts (also financially) that the prisoners themselves undertook for the organising of classes, readings, contests etc., but that the heterogenous composition of the nationalities of all the camp prisoners caused that these attempts were abandoned at some point.⁵²

As expected, most of the men who are incarcerated in Miranda declared upon admission in the camp that they were civil refugees. Explicitly stating that one was planning on joining the allied forces could jeopardise 'quick' release. This does not mean that none of the Dutchmen did not state their wish to join the allied force, one Dutchman who did explicitly state this did not have a longer detention period.⁵³ Many Dutchmen who were interned in Miranda claimed to be prisoners of war and that they were previously imprisoned in the German Stalag POW-camps in e.g., Nuremberg.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ Elias Willem Zomerplaag's admission form Miranda de Ebro, 17th December 1942, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 15205, caja 305382.

⁴⁹ Letter Dutch Red Cross to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4th and 7th January 1944, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3632, location 2.05.80.

⁵⁰ Telegram Eelco van Kleffens, 13th September 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3632, location 2.05.80.

⁵¹ Letter Ministry Home Affairs to Foreign Affairs, 13th September 1943, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3632, location 2.05.80.

⁵² Report on situation in Miranda by Schuller tot Peursum, 25th March 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

⁵³ Camp admission form Franciscus Johannes van Neer, 20th October 1942, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expediente 10206, caja 305348; Camp admission form Adrianus Enrique Vroomen, 20th August 1944, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expediente 14524, caja 305377.

⁵⁴ Camp admission form Tom Minkhorst, 24th October 1943, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expediente 9742, caja 305345.

This was not necessarily true. Because POWs turned out to be released quicker many prisoners (not only Dutch) falsely claimed they were previously in German POW camps.

Food scarcity was widespread in Spain after the Civil War, let alone in the concentration camp.⁵⁵ On the 30th of December 1942, Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Kleffens reported to Queen Wilhelmina's cabinet that all Dutchmen in Miranda were suffering from malnutrition, and some of them had severe infections and stomach diseases.⁵⁶ The hygienic conditions, the filth, and lack of food and water provoked two main diseases among the prisoners, scabies and 'mirandite', a term used to refer to all the diseases involving diarrhoea.⁵⁷ The refugees and *Engelandvaarders* were previously in France, and their state had already deteriorated while in French camps.⁵⁸ Van Panhuys stated that despite the pollution, vermin, cases of typhus, eczema, and intestine disorders, one death because of otitis (all due to the bad water quality), the general health conditions of the Dutchmen was less bad than one would expect, 'probably because of the good air quality.'

The camp hospital was badly equipped, but medicants were allocated by the British, and there were many physicians among the prisoners that cared for the ill.⁵⁹ Regarding food parcel deliveries to the prisoners, Van Panhuys stated that all nationalities received the same amounts because of the British leadership in these operations. Discrimination, or supposedly less amounts to the Dutchmen was not the case according to Van Panhuys and Schuller tot Peursum.⁶⁰ The Polish did generally receive larger parcels because they had their own infrastructure regarding this support. From 1943 the Dutch organised their own parcel deliveries. Besides food, the Dutch prisoners received tools, soap, insect powder, lamps, petrol, playing cards, games, writing utensils, and blankets.⁶¹ The women

⁵⁵ Dankaaart, 137.

⁵⁶ Report from Minister of Foreign Affairs E.N. van Kleffens to Queen Wilhelmina, 30th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80

⁵⁷ Cuerda-Galindo, 'Physicians imprisoned in Franco Spain's Miranda de Ebro', 272.

⁵⁸ Report from Minister of Foreign Affairs E.N. van Kleffens to Queen Wilhelmina, 30th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80; Report from Schuller tot Peursum to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War on Camp Miranda, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive of Dutch Ministry of Defence/War in London, inventory nr. 2494, location 2.13.71.

⁵⁹ Cuerda-Galindo, 'Physicians imprisoned in Franco Spain's Miranda de Ebro', 264-279.

⁶⁰ Report from Schuller tot Peursum to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War on Camp Miranda, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive of Dutch Ministry of Defence/War in London, inventory nr. 2494, location 2.13.71.

⁶¹ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

and children among the refugees generally resided in Madrid 'in freedom.'⁶² Often the (Jewish) wives of men who were imprisoned in Miranda helped preparing the parcels in Madrid for their husbands.⁶³

While most of the Dutch officials denied that the Dutchmen received less than other nationalities and that there was no 'discrimination' between the groups, almost all personal testimonials of Dutchmen that were imprisoned in the camp state otherwise. With regards to larger quantities for the Polish the officials agreed, but according to the Dutch prisoners themselves also the Belgians and British generally received better rations, clothing and materials as sheets and razorblades.⁶⁴ While the Legation mostly denied that the Dutchmen received less than other nationalities, Schuller tot Peursum did state that not only the risk of comparing regarding releases and evacuations should be diminished, but also the risk of comparison regarding material allocation, presumably to prevent complaints about negligence by the Dutch officials.⁶⁵ From the sources it does seem that he was aware and believed the complaints about the Dutch receiving less materials and food. He stated it was 'desirable not to disadvantage the Dutchmen and try to provide them the same amounts.'⁶⁶

One former Miranda internee vividly described the camp in Antillean newspaper *Amigoe di Curacao*. In barracks of 25 meters long 100 prisoners were bedded, who had to sleep 'lap-in-lap', together with present rats. The camp's water pump was not functioning for most of the time. The food made most prisoners sick and many of them were suffering from malnutrition and anaemia, and some were transferred to hospitals for treatment of their tuberculosis.⁶⁷ Van Panhuys found that complaints about hunger and dying of malnutrition were greatly exaggerated. In Miranda, the weekly food packages sufficed to the most urgent needs, and the weekly pocket money of 50 pesetas was more than other nationalities received.⁶⁸

⁶² Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

⁶³ Hearing Cornelis van der Sluys by Cleveringa Commission, 29th March 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 68, location 2.05.48.02; Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02.

⁶⁴ Report on conditions in Miranda de Ebro from Jacques Snijders, 4th April 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

⁶⁵ Letter to Schuller tot Peursum, 21st April 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

⁶⁶ Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Van Kleffens, 9th February 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location. 2.05.80.

⁶⁷ 'Nederlanders op Jamaica en in Spanje', *Amigoe di Curaçao: weekblad voor de Curaçaosche eilanden*, 24th August 1943, 3.

⁶⁸ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Changing conditions in Spain

Van Panhuys distinguished three separate periods in the Spanish stance with regards to release and evacuation of the Dutch nationals. The first period was from after the annexation of the Netherlands until around November 1942. The second period was from November 1942 until the end of the African campaign in May 1943. The last period lasted from May 1943 until the end of the war.⁶⁹

In the first period, until November 1942, there were not a lot of difficulties besides the administrative and organisational troubles, but these were regarded normal.⁷⁰ In July 1940, when the Interbrigadists were not yet in Miranda and the numbers of Dutch refugees crossing the border was still low, legation officer Schuller convinced the Spanish government to admit 200 refugees (including 60 Jews) that were held up at the border. The Dutch government had to assure that there were 'no red elements' among these 200 people, and that the Dutch government would do a very strict selection to assure this.⁷¹ The advance of the Germans to the Spanish border brought more Dutch Jews to the Spanish border from France. The border crossings in the first half of 1940 had a sporadic and unorganised character. Later larger groups of mainly Jews crossed the border, but the number of *Engelandvaarders* was still limited. In this period, releases and evacuations of larger groups to Curacao or Suriname occurred, generally consisting of roughly 1000 men and women.⁷² It is also in this period that a Spanish ship from Vigo departs to Curacao via Trinidad with 50 individuals in July 1942, mostly refugees, but also with 9 former Interbrigadists, in change for allowing the Spanish to tank oil in Curacao.⁷³ The Spaniards were initially hesitant to evacuate the Dutchmen with their own ships, because if these were men of military age, they were threatened with torpedoing by Nazi-Germany.⁷⁴

In the second period, from November 1942 to May 1943, the situation complicated. However, the number of *Engelandvaarders* crossing the Spanish border increased, with many coming from Switzerland. Van Panhuys claimed that the Spanish position changed from 'neutral' to 'non-

⁶⁹ Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 28th June 1940, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

⁷² Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁷³ Dankart, 144.

⁷⁴ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

belligerent.” The course of WWII was still mostly in favour of Germany, and German pressure on Spain increased, with the chance of German invasion in Spain ‘continuously present’. The German pressure in Spain thus also influenced the admission of foreigners in Spain, in their disadvantage, especially the Jewish.⁷⁵ Schuller committed himself personally in preventing the Spanish handing over people without passport to the Germans, because in reality this was targeted at Jewish individuals.⁷⁶

In Van Panhuys’ report about the difficult position of the Dutch Legation during WWII, he stated that the Spanish did not even recognise the Dutch government in London⁷⁷, meaning that, especially until the third phase, Spanish entry visas were not provided anymore to official Dutchmen, Dutchmen were not allowed to be granted British visas, and Curaçao was not officially recognised as Dutch territory anymore.⁷⁸

If releases took place, all potential evacuation destinations still came with many difficulties. According to Van Panhuys, England was unwilling to accept non-military or non-civil servants, so also no wives of *Engelandvaarders*.⁷⁹ These people and the refugees were often shipped to Curaçao and Suriname.⁸⁰ However, this meant that the *Engelandvaarders* among the evacuees, were also sent to Curacao, but used the island a transit and were subsequently transferred to England.⁸¹ The Ministry of Colonies under Minister Huib van Mook was not happy with the arrival of refugees in the Dutch West-Indies. While Curacao mostly served as a transit place, he hoped that there would be an assurance that these people had subsequent visas ready. The reason for this was the housing and food scarcity on the island, and that there was no police force to observe any possible ‘dangerous elements’ among the group.⁸²

In the second phase most of the evacuations went through Portugal, and from there to England or the West-Indies. However, there were many delays in the providing of Portuguese visas.

⁷⁵ Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁷⁶ Hearing Schuller tot Peursum by Cleveringa Commission, 4th December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 65, location 2.05.48.02.

⁷⁷ Hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 7th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁷⁸ Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁸¹ Dankaart,

⁸² Letter from Minister of Colonies Van Mook to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15th September 1942, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Dutch prisoners in Miranda were only allowed to leave Miranda and go to Madrid if there was an assurance that they would be transferred to Portugal within a certain period.⁸³

However, because sometimes the presence of certain Dutch individuals was unknown to the Legation, they could only apply for Portuguese visas when they were released and in Madrid. Sometimes the Spanish demanded that inmates from Miranda were released only when they had their Portuguese visas in possession. 'This sometimes became an unsolvable complication.'⁸⁴ Thus, the Spanish only issued 'salidas' when the Dutchmen were in possession of Portuguese transit visas⁸⁵, while the Portuguese in turn only issued those when the Dutchmen had British visas.⁸⁶ Obviously, Portugal also wanted to know who they would be admitting on its territory, but they also received only minimal information about the Dutchmen that left Spain and were sent to Portugal to be evacuated, seemingly without becoming a problem for the Dutch Legation.⁸⁷ The British were often hesitant too, because the Dutch legation in Madrid could give only little information about who these men were.⁸⁸ Van Panhuys was responsible for estimating whether someone would 'be useful for England'⁸⁹, but in the beginning years there was no capacity to execute investigations of people. A more thorough 'reliability' investigation was conducted in Portugal⁹⁰, but to be in Portugal a *swerved* already needed its British visa and needed to be transferred to Great Britain within 60 days, as the Portuguese demanded.⁹¹ In addition, the Portuguese only accepted prisoners from Miranda when others had left Portugal for England. This came down to 20 men per month.⁹²

⁸³ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁸⁴ Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁸⁵ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁸⁶ Note regarding evacuations by CI from and through Spain from Van Bylandt, 5th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

⁸⁷ Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02.

⁸⁸ F. Visser, *De schakel: een documentaire uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog: een selectie authentieke verhalen van Nederlandse Engelandvaarders aan de hand van dagboeken, rapporten, brieven en uitgebreide persoonlijke interviews* (Baarn, 1976) p. 11.

⁸⁹ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁹⁰ Testimony W.M.L. Sanson to Cleveringa Commission, 10th July 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 63, location 2.05.48.02.

⁹¹ Note regarding evacuations by CI from and through Spain from Van Bylandt, 5th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02; Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

⁹² Testimonial L.A. Gastmann, 8th April 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 45 location 2.05.48.02.

According to Van Panhuys, sometimes remaining in Miranda was safer than coming to Madrid to prepare for repatriation. In 1941, there was still the risk that nationals of countries that were in war with Germany were taken to the French border and transferred to the Germans, or just reinterned in Miranda. There were also chances of being reinterned in Miranda when the Dutchmen were stuck so long in Madrid due to their visas being expired due to delays, or when men were caught for disturbances or suspicious (communist) activity, as happened to Miranda internee Jan Jetten.⁹³ Some *Engelandvaarders* that got stuck in Madrid were the centre of complaints from Spaniards because of their neglect of prescribed behaviour and anti-Spanish rhetoric, which further delayed their documentation.⁹⁴ The delays in releases and evacuations also became a focal point of the criticism from the *Engelandvaarders* and blamed on the Legation's disinterest and negligence.⁹⁵

Van Panhuys did not include a description of the third period that lasted from May 1943 until the end of the war, but it presumably begins when the German pressure diminishes as their chances in WWII decreased.⁹⁶ In the beginning of 1943 an exodus out of Miranda commenced, as Van Panhuys called it. It was the Polish who initially profited from this, who had 700 men imprisoned in Miranda. The exodus concerned 300 Poles, but this were mostly the ill and non-militaries. Van Panhuys claimed that there was no discrimination, because the Dutch prisoners were eventually all released in March 1943.⁹⁷ In reality, Dutch nationals kept arriving in Miranda throughout the first half of 1944, and the last are released in the second half of 1944.⁹⁸ The third phase is also characterised by the transfer of responsibility over the care of the refugees in Spain and non-consular individuals helping with solving the problems in Spain.

It is clear that the officials were not really aware of the seriousness of the situation within the camp. However, the political situation in Spain did also not allow the officials to act as adequately as necessary. The next chapter explains this further and focuses on the complaints that were filed

⁹³ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁹⁴ Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁹⁵ Hearing Henri Maas Geesteranus by Commission Van Rhijn, 25th January 1945, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 55, location 2.05.48.02

⁹⁶ Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁹⁷ Appendix L of written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

⁹⁸ Camp admission forms international prisoners Miranda de Ebro, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expedientes 1-15238, cajas 305279-305382

against the Dutch officials by *Engelandvaarders* and refugees surrounding slow release and evacuations, low material support and negligence.

2. Release and evacuations, problems and complaints, Van Boeijen and Somer

In this chapter I aim to give a clear view on what the foremost problems in Spain regarding the release and evacuation of Dutch nationals were, and how the Dutch government responded to solve them.

The first attempt of large-scale release by the Dutch government began with the request to transfer the former Interbrigadists to Camp Miranda. The transfer to Miranda was requested by the Dutch government to speed up the release of all Dutch prisoners, through equating the Interbrigadists with other Dutchmen without documents (refugees and *Engelandvaarders*). Upon arrival in Miranda the Dutch government started treating them in the same way as the other Dutch prisoners, either refugee or *Engelandvaarder*.⁹⁹ Minister of Foreign Affairs Eelco van Kleffens was also convinced that the Polish and Belgian governments that did not discriminate between their Interbrigadists and refugees in Miranda were about to achieve favourable results.¹⁰⁰ Separating them to prevent the other Dutch prisoners from being infected by their 'radical leftist views' would delay things further, because this meant different prisons and different categories, while their release, according to the Dutch legation in Madrid, was imminent.¹⁰¹

While the 'equalisation' enabled the allocation of food and clothing for the Interbrigadists like the other Dutch groups¹⁰², Schuller later stated that the 'equalisation' of the different Dutch prisoner groups rather complicated the release of all the Dutchmen. It would not be in the interest of the 'civil' Dutch internees to link their release to the release of the Interbrigadists (probably because of their 'red' image), and he thus vowed for the continuation of separate negotiations per individual.¹⁰³

Van Panhuys initially feared that the 'incarcerated Dutch nationals of good calibre' (meaning *Engelandvaarders*) would be 'infected by the radical leftist views' of the Interbrigadists. Therefore, he then presumably put more effort in having the Spain veterans released than in the *Engelandvaarders*, to take away the danger of 'red elements'.¹⁰⁴ Regarding the release, this would

⁹⁹ Dankkaart, 137.

¹⁰⁰ Letter Van Kleffens to Ministry of War, 28th March 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

¹⁰¹ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁰² Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 21st August 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

¹⁰³ Letter Schuller tot Peursum of Dutch Legation in Madrid, 28th April 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

¹⁰⁴ Petram en Kruizinga, 223.

then be in the favour of the Interbrigadists in comparison to the other prisoners, but in reality, the Interbrigadists were imprisoned until July 1942, some until August 1943.¹⁰⁵

After WWII, Van Panhuys concluded that the slow release of the Interbrigadists was because of the stances of the Dutch and the Spanish governments. He stated that until 1939 the Dutch government had no interest in supporting the Interbrigadists.¹⁰⁶ Schuller tot Peursum seemed more nuanced and stated that not everyone among the Interbrigadists was a communist, and that some of them joined the Brigades because of unemployment. He found their approximate 3-year captivity enough punishment for their political beliefs and mistake of going to Spain, and their anti-fascist views were 'enough assurance that they did not have sympathies for the Netherlands' enemies.'¹⁰⁷ Schuller additionally did not seem to care much whether these men were stateless or not to help them, in contrast to the Government in London.¹⁰⁸

From February 1942 the government's stance changed. Van Kleffens saw the Interbrigadists as a fine addition to the *Prinses Irenebrigade*, a military brigade that the Dutch government was setting up in London and Canada, to show that it was continuing its battle against the Germans. Both Schuller and Van Kleffens were convinced that 'the past should be forgotten, and the question of statelessness rested', also to speed up their release.¹⁰⁹ Van Kleffens secretary Van Bylandt wrote that the members of the Legation in Madrid after several visits ascertained that these men were 'good patriots' [*goede vaderlanders*] that wanted to continue their fight against fascism with the Dutch military.¹¹⁰

The other ministers were less convinced: the general notion was still that everyone who fought in Spain were enhardened communists, and this would negatively influence the Dutch army, and subsequently the prestige of the Dutch government. A thorough check of every individual case was deemed necessary before the men could be integrated in the *Prinses Irenebrigade*, and

¹⁰⁵ Admission forms Dutch prisoners Camp Miranda, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expedientes 1-15232, cajas 305279-305382

¹⁰⁶ Appendix K to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁰⁷ Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Van Kleffens, 16th October 1941, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

¹⁰⁸ Second page of letter from Schuller tot Peursum, date unknown, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

¹⁰⁹ Letter Schuller tot Peursum of Dutch Legation in Madrid, 28th April 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80; Petram en Kruizinga, 224; Letter Van Kleffens to Ministry of Justice, 29th December 1941, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

¹¹⁰ Letter Van Bylandt to Ministry of Justice, 29th December 1941, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 2788, location 2.09.06.

everybody who would be rejected after this check could still contribute to the forces through other tasks, because they were all schooled and craftsmen.¹¹¹ While he at first was afraid of 'extremist elements' negatively influencing the Brigade, Minister of War Van der Vijver eventually agreed to approach all cases individually, but only if this would not jeopardise the release of the whole group.¹¹² That was not the end of the matter, however.

The Interbrigadists got the impression that they also would gain their citizenship back upon joining the forces. The Dutch Ministers had decided against this in the summer of 1943. When it became clear that Dutch citizenship was essential for people to join the Dutch military, and that the Dutch constitution only let people regain Dutchmanship through renaturalisation, the government had decided in June 1944 that there was no time to wait for the *Tweede Kamer* (which had to formally give a verdict on naturalisations, but was not functional after the Nazi-occupation¹¹³) to decide upon this, and that the recovery of citizenship had to happen fast.¹¹⁴

A solution was a *voluntary association act*, in which the Interbrigadists as non-citizens were 'associated' with the Netherlands' forces, which all Interbrigadists refused to sign because they did not want to fight for a country that would treat them as aliens again when the War was over.¹¹⁵ Minister of War Otto van Lidth de Jeude was finally able to convince his colleagues in June 1944 to naturalise the 'very useful and experienced forces' of Interbrigadists. To prevent future parliaments to call this a 'surrender to communism', it was decided that all stateless former Dutchmen that worked in the army or the (merchant) navy were to be naturalised after an (additional) reliability investigation.¹¹⁶

Van Kleffens found that because of the Interbrigadists eligibility for the allied forces, their positions were equated with other prisoners, and he emphasised that the Interbrigadists should not be discriminated anymore.¹¹⁷ This meant that in Spain, until they arrived in England and were subdued to 'reliability investigations', they were generally treated as the other *Engelandvaarders*.

¹¹¹ Petram & Kruizinga, 224; Letter Van Kleffens to Ministry of War, 28th March 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

¹¹² Letter from Minister of War and Lieutenant-General Van der Vijver to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 8th August 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

¹¹³ Petram & Kruizinga, 225-226.

¹¹⁴ Letter from Minister of Justice Van Angeren to Van Kleffens, 22nd June 1944, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

¹¹⁵ Letter dr. Flaes to Foreign Affairs, 7th September 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80; Petram & Kruizinga, 226.

¹¹⁶ Petram & Kruizinga, 226.

¹¹⁷ Letter Van Kleffens to Schuller tot Peursum, 4th May 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Especially in the beginning of WWII, the Spanish government was not very keen on releasing the men they accused of ‘crimes against the common good’, with the risk that they would end up at the Eastern Front with the Soviets, fighting the Germans and the Spanish Blue Division.¹¹⁸ Not only the Interbrigadists were affected by the German pressure on Spain. While their releases and evacuation were less of a discussion between the Legation and the government in London, the releases of the *Engelandvaarders* and refugees were also dependent on the growing or decreasing willingness of the Spaniards, that was in turn highly dependent on German pressure.¹¹⁹ Next to the decree to not provide exit visas anymore to men of military age who could possibly join the allied forces, at the height of the German pressure on Spain, Franco could not give the impression to the Axis leaders that Spain was letting conscript men use Spain as a gateway to the Allied territories.¹²⁰ However, because the number of people crossing the French-Spanish border increased, and the Spanish did not have the capacity to shelter all of them after the destructive Civil War, they wanted foreign internees as soon as possible off of Spanish soils again.¹²¹ Spain did not want to differ between the different Dutch groups to prevent further delays and complexities in the process, meaning that they also, when requested by the Legation, did not allow one group to be released and others not.¹²²

In this phase, the Spanish were supposedly trying to diminish German influence as much as possible but instead received far more ‘spasmodic’ (stricter) German surveillance, with even Gestapo surveillances in Miranda, that were also trying to repatriate Dutchmen to German-occupied areas.¹²³

¹¹⁸ Letter Schuller tot Peursum of Dutch Legation in Madrid, 28th April 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80; Appendix K to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹¹⁹ Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹²⁰ Petram en Kruizinga, 225; Letter Schuller tot Peursum of Dutch Legation in Madrid, 28th April 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80; Maenhout, 90.

¹²¹ Report from A. and J. Citroen on their experiences in camp Miranda, 12th February 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location. 2.13.71; Hearing Jacobus Lips by military in London, 18th July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.48.02.

¹²² Dankart, 141; Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 10th March 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80; Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80; Letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs on Dutch refugees in Spain, 22nd December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80; Letter Van Kleffens to Ministry of War, 28th March 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80;

¹²³ Dessing, *Tulpen voor Wilhelmina*, 140; Letter from Panhuys to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 17th July 1942, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80; Report from A. and J. Citroen on their experiences in camp Miranda, 12th February 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location. 2.13.71; Letter dr. Flaes to Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Lips, Smeets and Willigers, 28th September 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location location 2.05.48.02; Hearing

As the position of the Axis Powers deteriorated over the course of WWII, this allowed the Franco administration more leniency in the release and evacuation of foreigners.¹²⁴ Regardless, the Spanish stance towards the release of the internationals remained characterised by arbitrariness.¹²⁵ Consul-general from 1944, Gastmann declared that because of the Spanish own situation the conditions changed continuously. Something that was possible, became impossible a week later and the other way around.¹²⁶

The slow releases and evacuations were blamed on the willingness and (dis)interest of the Dutch legations in Madrid and Lisbon. Internees and *Engelandvaarders* Gerard Hazelzet and brothers Joseph and Abraham Citroen declared that the discontent about the Legation's efforts was high enough for some men to turn to the German officers for repatriation. While the other nationalities experienced weekly releases, visits, and food and clothes from their governments, the Dutch were supposedly visited only annually, and releases rarely occurred.¹²⁷

Hazelzet declared that the material support that the Dutch received came mostly from the British (but was financed by the Dutch consulate in Madrid). Other materials were sent by fellow Dutchmen who lived in Spain. Hazelzet stated that Van Panhuys admitted to him, after his release, that the consulate had indeed not done any effort for him during his imprisonment and that consul general Bruyn van Tengbergen was entirely unaware of the precarious conditions in the camp.¹²⁸

The prisoners knew that from mid 1942 the Spaniards hardly released people from military age because of the German pressure. The sentiment among the remaining Dutch prisoners was that releases before this decree did not occur in larger numbers because of the Dutch officials' neglect and lack of interest. Hazelzet and others were convinced their release came about entirely through British efforts.¹²⁹ Van Panhuys stated that this was a common misconception, and that the released were generally unaware of the steps the officials took before the Dutch prisoners were picked up

Jacobus Lips by military in London, 18th July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.48.02.

¹²⁴ Petram en Kruizinga, 225; Letter Schuller tot Peursum of Dutch Legation in Madrid, 28th April 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80; Maenhout, 90.

¹²⁵ Dankkaart, 139, 141, 144.

¹²⁶ Testimonial L.A. Gastmann, 8th April 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 45, location 2.05.48.02.

¹²⁷ Report from A. and J. Citroen on their experiences in camp Miranda, 12th February 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location. 2.13.71; Report by Gerard Hazelzet on his imprisonment in Miranda, 24th January 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location 2.13.71.

¹²⁸ Report by Gerard Hazelzet on his imprisonment in Miranda, 24th January 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location 2.13.71.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

from Miranda by the British Military Attaché.¹³⁰ The release forms of the camp itself also indicated otherwise. Almost all forms state that the Dutch prisoners were picked up by a representative of the Dutch consulate.¹³¹ Especially in the final months of Dutch presence in Miranda, J.C. Davids was the one who picked them up for their release.¹³²

The Hazelzet and the Citroen experiences were reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. After these reports the involvement of the Dutch governmental institutions grew, with most importantly the Ministry of Home Affairs taking leadership over refugee matters later in 1943.¹³³ Ambassador Schuller denied the points made by Hazelzet and Citroen in a report he sent to the Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs. He stated that Van Panhuys' visit to the camp was restricted because they were only allowed to speak to Dutch leader Van Stolk¹³⁴, while some internees were sure that officials of other nationalities were allowed into the camp and talk to the prisoners.¹³⁵

The morale among the men was high, however, because of Van Stolk's leadership over the group, 'given to him by Panhuys.'¹³⁶ Because of the intensive contacts between the two, Van Panhuys stated that visits by himself to Miranda were less necessary.¹³⁷ Van Panhuys also gave Van Stolk the authorisation and means to bribe a camp officer to change the ages, names, and nationalities to speed up the release of Dutch prisoners whenever Van Stolk expected favourable results. He did not do this for himself because Van Panhuys and he saw his presence in the camp as highly useful.¹³⁸ This

¹³⁰ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02; Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹³¹ Admission forms Dutch prisoners Camp Miranda, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expedientes 1-15232, cajas 305279-305382

¹³² Admission forms Dutch prisoners Camp Miranda, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expedientes 1-15232, cajas 305279-305382

¹³³ L. de Jong, en Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Dl. 9: Londen: tweede helft. (Den Haag 1979) 607-608; Delsing, 141.

¹³⁴ Report from Schuller tot Peursum to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War on Camp Miranda, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive of Dutch Ministry of Defence/War in London, inventory nr. 2494, location 2.13.71.

¹³⁵ Report from A. and J. Citroen on their experiences in camp Miranda, 12th February 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location 2.13.71; Report by Gerard Hazelzet on his imprisonment in Miranda, 24th January 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location 2.13.71.

¹³⁶ Report from Schuller tot Peursum to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War on Camp Miranda, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive of Dutch Ministry of Defence/War in London, inventory nr. 2494, location 2.13.71.

¹³⁷ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹³⁸ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02;

also gave the prisoners possibilities: leader Van Stolk had the possibility to request releases of Dutch prisoners himself.¹³⁹

According to Schuller, it was mostly the Spanish unwillingness that caused the supposed absence of mental contact from the Dutch officials with the prisoners. For some, this led to feelings of grudge and vengeance towards the Dutch officials. 'To this group belonged undoubtedly Gerard Hazelzet, whose claims about Van Panhuys' and Bruyn Tengbergen's neglect of the Dutch prisoners of were both factual falsehoods and impeachments.'¹⁴⁰ While Van Harinxma thoe Slooten, government commissioner for refugee affairs in Lisbon, could not prove that the officials in Madrid were doing everything in supporting the Dutchmen in Miranda, he was sure the accusations of disinterest were unfounded, and most of the complexities surrounding the prisoners came from the Spanish unwilling stance regarding them.¹⁴¹

The Cleveringa Commission, assigned to research the efforts of the Dutch officials regarding fleeing nationals or *Engelandvaarders*, also concluded that the low interest of the Dutch authorities in Madrid and Lisbon caused releases and evacuations to take so long.¹⁴² The Commission concluded that the Dutch authorities in Spain did nothing to prevent the immediate arrests of Dutch nationals who reached Spain, just as they did nothing to accomplish release and evacuation. Negligence in evacuating the Dutchmen residing in Madrid after being released from Miranda, resulted in reimprisonments. Evacuations sometimes took so long that the Spanish imprisoned them again because their exit visas expired.¹⁴³ Also after evacuations were finally cared for and the prisoners were transferred to Portugal, the complaints from the *Engelandvaarders* and refugees persisted. Dutchmen had to wait for their subsequent evacuation to Engeland or the West Indies in a camp west of Lisbon, called Praia das Maças, and this often took very long. While it seems most of the complaints

Hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 7th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹³⁹ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁴⁰ Report on situation in Miranda by Schuller tot Peursum, 25th March 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

¹⁴¹ Report Red Cross on allocation of aid to Dutch political prisoners in foreign countries, 1st December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 14, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Hearing Henri Maas Geesteranus by Commission Van Rhijn, 25th January 1945, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 55, location 2.05.48.02

were centred around the Madrilene consulate,¹⁴⁴ Lisbon did not stay clear from accusations, from both other officials as *swerved*, either.¹⁴⁵

Van Panhuys was convinced that the Dutch administration in Lisbon, and probably Van Harinxma thoe Slooten and the C.I. especially, did not support the Madrid consulate enough to make sure things ran smoothly. If Lisbon had tried to support the Madrid consulate, rather than provoking and making quarrel, matters had probably turned out differently.¹⁴⁶ The support that Lisbon promised to the Madrid consulate regarding the prisoners in Miranda was not received either, as Van Panhuys claimed.¹⁴⁷ Van Harinxma, the Dutch government commissioner for refugee affairs in Lisbon, responded to this accusation by stating that the care and the release of the Dutch prisoners in Miranda were entirely the responsibility of the Dutch consulate in Madrid, he was only responsible for the evacuation out of Spain and the care for evacuees in Portugal.¹⁴⁸

While Van Panhuys claimed that he always provided the *Engelandvaarders* with cooperation when they claimed to know a clandestine way themselves¹⁴⁹, *Engelandvaarders* who proposed this at the Madrid consulate stated that Van Panhuys was either 'uninterested' in these roads, or simply refused to believe that these existed.¹⁵⁰ The Legation in Madrid and Van Harinxma were very reluctant in setting up clandestine evacuation operations, something that was also the centre of complaints from the *Engelandvaarders* because it gave them the impression the Legations were weak and unwilling to do larger efforts for quick releases and evacuations.¹⁵¹ However, because of the concessions the Legation in Madrid had to make to maintain themselves, illegal operations would endanger the maintenance of the Legation's presence on the peninsula. The Legations additionally

¹⁴⁴ Report Cornelis Fock from Central Intelligence in Lisbon, 12th March 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 44, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁴⁵ Report Red Cross on allocation of aid to Dutch political prisoners in foreign countries, 1st December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 14, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁴⁶ Appendix H to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁴⁷ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁴⁸ Report Red Cross on allocation of aid to Dutch political prisoners in foreign countries, 1st December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 14, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁴⁹ Appendix G of written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁵⁰ Letter from witness Louis Boas for investigation by Cleveringa Commission, 17th April 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 41, location 2.05.48.02; Testimonial Robert Levisson, 3^d August 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 51, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁵¹ Roem, 11.

did not want to put the future legal evacuations of others at stake.¹⁵² In that sense, the long-term risks weighed heavier than the advantages of clandestine operations.

The C.I. and leader of the Legation in Lisbon Van Pallandt sometimes undertook clandestine evacuations in cooperation with Rudolph van Stolk who worked for the C.I. after his release, regardless of the Madrilene objections. These were evacuations of people that had no documents at all, they had to be waited for at the Spanish-Portuguese border and picked up by the C.I. to be transported to Lisbon or Praia das Maças, (without legal permission from the Portuguese¹⁵³), thus outside of the responsibility of the Dutch consular authorities in Madrid.¹⁵⁴ Schuller stated that one of the failed illegal evacuations caused the officials in Madrid many problems with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that was greatly appalled by these undertakings. Schuller stated that especially the second clandestine evacuation, set up by C.I. Chief Maas Geesteranus and Van Stolk, was not secret at all, but rather open, annoyingly and childishly open.¹⁵⁵ The C.I. did not see the problems that the (failed) clandestine operations subsequently caused in Spain as part of their responsibilities.¹⁵⁶

Failed illegal evacuations also affected the cooperation with the British. When requesting British visas, Van Panhuys had to estimate whether someone 'was useful for England' to enhance their evacuation to the UK. Out of displeasure about the failed clandestine evacuation, the British withdrew cooperation temporarily by rejecting visas to the people Van Panhuys recommended.¹⁵⁷

Home Affairs, Van Boeijen and Somer

Naturally, the cabinet in London became aware of the administrative chaos in Madrid and Lisbon, especially after the first released *Engelandvaarders* arrived in London and the vastness of their complaints became clear.¹⁵⁸ The complaints gave the impression that the care for the prisoners was

¹⁵² Report Baron F.C.A. van Pallandt for Cleveringa Commission, 9th January 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 58, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁵³ Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁵⁴ Note regarding evacuations by CI from and through Spain from Van Bylandt, 5th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁵⁵ Hearing Schuller tot Peursum by Cleveringa Commission, 4th December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 65, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁵⁶ Note regarding evacuations by CI from and through Spain from Van Bylandt, 5th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁵⁷ Hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 7th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁵⁸ Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02.

mostly absent.¹⁵⁹ They varied from not enough financial and material support, to slow and bad communication with the consulates, resulting in longer than necessary imprisonments in bad conditions.¹⁶⁰ According to Van Panhuys, the complaints would probably be no exception for other states and places, and would all have very little foundation. 'It is quite obvious that ignorance of the real situation in Spain is at the bottom of this all [...].'¹⁶¹

Minister Hendrik van Boeijen initially declared to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he wished not to carry responsibility but became involved anyway when the care of refugees was transferred to Home Affairs in April 1943, which was the reason for his visit to Lisbon in March 1943.¹⁶² Van Boeijen understood from the respective Dutchmen that there was contradiction and confusion among the officials, eventually leading to cancellations of evacuations; personnel of the Consulate treated the Dutchmen as a burden; disinterest from the consulate to get the Dutchmen out of Miranda; and decreasing trust in the Dutch government from the *Engelandvaarders* as they were nearing England. Even though these complaints could have been unfounded, it showed how the Dutchmen thought of their situations and the Dutch administration's inadequacy, hence showing the crucial need for measures to be taken by the government.¹⁶³

Trying to grasp the problems, Van Boeijen stated there was no particular fund for the support and care of refugees, financing the support to refugees was done through private funding.¹⁶⁴ Van Boeijen was convinced that there was a total lack of instructions and directives with regards to the support and aid to the refugees because the responsible institutions (referring to the Dutch consulates in Spain and Portugal) saw it as problem that was *entirely* Spanish. Every case was looked at individually, lacking a general refugee policy. The consul-general Van Bruyn Tengbergen and

¹⁵⁹ Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁶⁰ Report from A. and J. Citroen on their experiences in camp Miranda, 12th February 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location 2.13.71; Report by Gerard Hazelzet on his imprisonment in Miranda, 24th January 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location 2.13.71.

¹⁶¹ Letter Van Panhuys to Michael Creswell, 11th April 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁶² Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁶³ Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁶⁴ Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

Schuller maintained that following a fixed policy line was very difficult in Spain. However, they admitted that there were 'certain possibilities' when Van Boeijen made specific wishes clear.¹⁶⁵

During his visit to Lisbon and Madrid Van Boeijen concluded that the Dutch administrative chaos on the Iberian Peninsula, besides the Spanish stance towards the Dutch administration, was due to a lack of directives from the government in London: consuls and envoys in Madrid and Lisbon and the head of the Central Intelligence Maas Geesteranus were all unsure which persons and which Ministries in London were responsible for the care and support for the Dutch refugees in Spain. Above all, in the beginning phases it was entirely unclear where and how many Dutchmen were imprisoned in Spain and that efforts to find them were completely lacking. Dutchmen had to wait for long periods of time in prisons before they were contacted by consular officials and received support. Officials were depending entirely on the efforts of the institutions of other nationals, that were obviously prioritising their own nationals first.¹⁶⁶

It needs noting that the Dutch were one of the only countries that had a legation or consulate left in Spain after the Civil War. Representatives of most other European countries either left after the Francoist victory in 1939, or were pressured to do so later due to German annexation. The Dutch legation had to do many concessions to maintain itself in Spain, something that probably did not work in their favour in the carrying out of their tasks with regards to the Dutch refugees and *Engelandvaarders*.¹⁶⁷ Schuller stated that the Germans did everything to make the Dutch legation disappear.¹⁶⁸ The concessions also meant that new personnel for the Dutch legation and consulates was not admitted anymore, something the officials often blamed for their limited capacity and the subsequent complaints from the *Engelandvaarders*.¹⁶⁹ Bruyn van Tengbergen was merely an honorary consul, who had not completed any schooling on this task, and was additionally suffering from intestinal cancer. Van Panhuys claimed that when his and Kriens' requests for the admission of more Dutch personnel was granted, many problems could have been solved and prevented. The

¹⁶⁵ Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Dankkaart, pagina.

¹⁶⁸ Hearing Schuller tot Peursum by Cleveringa Commission, 4th December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 65, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁶⁹ Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02; Hearing Schuller tot Peursum by Cleveringa Commission, 4th December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 65, location 2.05.48.02.

Spanish just did not allow this.¹⁷⁰ Only in the last phase, when Jan Somer became chief of the C.I in London and set up a 'political reliability bureau' in Madrid in early 1944, the administrative mess in Madrid was straightened out. He initially went to Madrid to find out why *Engelandvaarders* were experiencing so many delays in Spain, but Somer stated that this 'great clean up' eventually helped solving the 'refugee misery' quickly.¹⁷¹ J.C. Davids was of great help in 'cleaning up the mess' in Spain by finding all the Dutchmen left in Spanish prisons and having them released. He became involved when he was recommended by Van Panhuys to Somer, who came to Madrid to 'solve the refugee chaos.'¹⁷² Despite Somer's appreciation for Davids' efforts and his demonstrable success in releasing a large share of Dutchmen from Miranda¹⁷³, Schuller believed Davids was endangering the coming evacuations due to his 'imbalanced' manner of working and would only be chasing personal glory.¹⁷⁴

This chapter has shown the Dutch part of the reasons behind the slow releases of the Interbrigadists also lay with the government in London. Van Kleffens and Lidth de Jeugde wanted the Interbrigadists in London as soon as possible, but not all Ministers were supportive of this. As explained, Minister van Kleffens in London wanted no more discrimination between the Interbrigadists and the *Engelandvaarders*, to which the Legation seemed to agree with. The equalisation, to treat the Interbrigadists the same way as the other prisoners, made the Interbrigadists eligible for the material support they initially did not receive. The 'positive discrimination' would also have been favourable regarding release, when Van Panhuys feared these red elements would influence the other prisoners, so he put more effort in getting the Interbrigadists out of Miranda. However, the admission forms in the Spanish archive do not show that the Interbrigadists were released quicker, releases occurred gradually alongside the other groups, who were all dependent on the Spanish policies and the Legation's efforts. The Dutchmen in Spain were not convinced by the Legation's efforts and, that finally led to Van Boeijen and Somer coming to Madrid to solve the mess. The Interbrigadists' citizenship becomes of importance again upon their

¹⁷⁰ Hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 7th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁷¹ Hearing Jan Somer by Cleveringa Commission, 29th March 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁷² Letter Dr. Somer to Foreign Affairs, 25th December 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80; Hearing Jan Somer by Cleveringa Commission, 29th March 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁷³ Admission forms Dutch prisoners Camp Miranda, Archivo Militar Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expedientes 1-15232, cajas 305279-305382

¹⁷⁴ Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 17th September 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

arrival in England. Because the scope of this research reaches up to the evacuation of the respective Dutchman out of Spain, the Interbrigadists are approached as one group with the other *Engelandvaarders* in the next sections.

3. 'Dutchmanship' according to the Dutchmen.

During WWII, but especially after, it becomes clearer what the complaints from the imprisoned Dutchmen in Spain to the Dutch officials were regarding support, release, and evacuation. In August 1946, the Cleveringa Commission officially started their investigation. From the many witness statements that the Commission received, one can see how the imprisonment in Camp Miranda influenced the Dutchmen's idea of 'Dutchmanship', and what role this played in the prisoners' perception of the officials in the complaints.

Van Boeijen reported that the stance of the Dutchmen who were imprisoned in Spain towards the Dutch authorities was characterised by resentment and contempt for the authorities; Dutchmen felt unequally treated because other nationalities were booking far better results; and finally distrust in the Dutch government that was supposedly just 'letting things run their course.' Van Boeijen reported that the Dutchmen in Spain felt treated as a burden by the Legation. Refugees believed that the Legation had no interest to release Dutchmen from Miranda; *Engelandvaarders* stated that as they were nearing England, they increasingly lost their trust in the Dutch government and were dreading to have to rally behind this government.¹⁷⁵

This does not mean that all Dutchmen that were stuck in Spain thought the same about negligence.¹⁷⁶ To invalidate the statements about the bad circumstances in Miranda sent in a report to Minister van Kleffens by internee Jacob Fruin, Schuller tot Peursum inquired with former Miranda internee Herman Cornelis Hey about the conditions in Miranda. Hey had previously been in French and Swiss camps and stated that Miranda's conditions were far better than camps in other countries. The attitude of the officers and military and the Guardia Civil was 'exceptionally correct' and the personnel was appointed with care. It was mostly the drinking water that made the inmates ill because of the chlorine.¹⁷⁷ The housing in the barracks was dirty 'because of the French inmates.' According to Hey, there was no reason for the average Dutchmen to complain. 'Of course, the life in a concentration camp is not pleasant, especially for those with a weak stomach or liver, but the food

¹⁷⁵ Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁷⁶ Letter from Engelandvaarder A. Ringel to Van Panhuys, 4th November 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 61, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁷⁷ Letter from Schuller tot Peursum to Van Kleffens about report from internee De Bruin about Miranda, 27th December 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

was exceptional, and the internees were given the exact same food as the Spanish guards: steak on Sunday and wine on holidays.’¹⁷⁸

During the Cleveringa investigations after WWII as well, Van Panhuys called upon testimonies of people he aided during their time in Spain to support him in denying the accusations made to him about negligence.¹⁷⁹ Besides Cornelis Hey mentioned above, these people did not spend time in Miranda. Van Panhuys and his witnesses denied that the Dutch prisoners in Miranda received less than other nationalities. The Dutchmen received the same amounts of food and clothing as the British.¹⁸⁰ J.C.E. Jaenecke, one of the refugees that was aided by Van Panhuys in Madrid, stated that among the refugees ‘we really encountered riffraff, that were treated better than they deserved.’ Jaenecke stated that these men were lazy, showed beastly behaviour, and they dishonoured their nationality, that caused shame and disgrace upon the ‘decent Dutchmen.’¹⁸¹

Many *Engelandvaarders* and swerved that ultimately did not file complaints against the legation and consulate stated that the ones who did, had a wrong image of what they would encounter in Spain. Many Dutchmen had the prospect of a neutral country that would give them much freedom, which generally turned out differently.¹⁸² J.J. Roggen stated that in many cases the Dutch legation often did not receive understanding from several *Engelandvaarders*, and in some cases even had to combat actions that were conducted out of incomprehension of the *Engelandvaarders* who were in conflict with their own and others interests. Roggen was convinced that Van Panhuys and Schuller used their best patriotic senses possible in supporting the Dutchmen in Spain.¹⁸³

A man called Bensink was rather grateful for the ‘skilled efforts’ done by Van Panhuys to keep him out of the camp in Miranda de Ebro. Bensink was sure that most of the *Engelandvaarders*, mostly consisting of young men ‘full of impatience to serve the Dutch cause’, were unaware of the frail position the Dutch administration had in Spain and did not understand this was hampering the quick

¹⁷⁸ Letter from Schuller tot Peursum to Van Kleffens about report from internee De Bruin about Miranda, 27th December 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁷⁹ Correspondence between Sophie Mok and Van Panhuys, 28th April 1948-1st May 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁸⁰ File with testimonies of witnesses that were helped by Van Panhuys in Spain, 1st March 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁸¹ Letter from J.C.E. Jaenecke to Van Panhuys, 23^d September 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁸² Letter J.J. Roggen to editors of Dutch newspaper Trouw, 8th December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 62, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

journey to England. In addition, Bensink was convinced that many of the *Engelandvaarders* had a misguided notion of the task they had with regards to the Dutch cause, 'seeing themselves as heroes and saviours of the state, were criticising everyone and everything and had swollen heads', eventually contributing to their aggrieved stance. Bensink hereby wanted to prevent the Cleveringa Commission from believing unfounded accusations.¹⁸⁴

Dr. Reijnier Flaes was chargé d'affaires in Lisbon after Baron van Pallandt. In a letter to the Cleveringa Commission, Flaes stated that he asked the refugees and *Engelandvaarders* that arrived in England from Portugal if there were any complaints that they would like to speak about with him. Under the impression that there were none, since nobody took the opportunity to file them, he was outraged when it turned out that some had filed a report with complaints about Flaes to Minister Van Boeijen, presumably instigated by Maas Geesteranus. Dr. Flaes claimed that 'if the future of The Netherlands was depending on young people with such views, he was very worried.' Dr. Flaes additionally claimed that all the complaints, that he would be one of the major hindrances to the smooth evacuations from the Iberian Peninsula, that were filed against him in an article published in *Trouw*, all came from Maas Geesteranus' henchmen.¹⁸⁵

Maas Geesteranus was as the chief of the Central Intelligence very committed to helping the refugees and *Engelandvaarders*. In a report he stated that in collaboration with chargé d'affaires Baron van Pallandt (who led the Lisbon Legation), he aided the *Engelandvaarders* and provided them with materials without hesitation, to protect the prestige of the Dutch government, that was being jeopardised by the absence of any decent evacuation and aid from the Dutch authorities in Spain, in contrast to other nationalities stuck in Spain. He found that this was his natural task as the head of the Central Intelligence.¹⁸⁶ Maas Geesteranus and Van Pallandt as chargé d'affaires in Lisbon were as discontented as the *Engelandvaarders* about the supposedly minimal efforts of the Madrid legation and Van Harinxma thoe Slooten (it is then not so strange to believe Maas Geesteranus instigated the complaints from *Engelandvaarders* whom he met and sometimes evacuated himself). While Van Pallandt did not doubt Van Harinxma his capacities and *vaderlandsliefde* (patriotism), he did not

¹⁸⁴ Letter from witness G.J. Bensink for investigation by Cleveringa Commission, 10th November 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 40, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁸⁵ Letter Dr. Flaes to Cleveringa Commission, 2nd January 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 43, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁸⁶ Response by Henri Maas Geesteranus to report from Commission Van Rhijn, 17th May 1945, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 55, location 2.05.48.02.

admire him in his position as Commissioner for Refugee Matters, where he lacked the personal interest to properly execute this humanitarian task.¹⁸⁷

While Van Boeijen was convinced that Van Harinxma did everything to favour the evacuation of refugees from Spain, he also found Van Harinxma unable to show enough empathy to the refugees that were held up in Portugal due to his 'unwarm nature' or lacking 'social skills.'¹⁸⁸

Head of the Lisbon Legation Van Pallandt obviously became aware of the complaints of the Dutchmen who were waiting for evacuation Portugal. Van Pallandt stated that the men in Portugal generally were not in worse circumstances than the nationals from other countries. The complaints would be filed due to the character and the temper of the many refugees. 'It is just not pleasant to be a refugee and Dutchmen like grumbling [kankeren].'¹⁸⁹ While Van Pallandt generally chose the side of the prisoners against the Madrid Legation, he dismissed similar criticism in his territory as typical Dutch character.

Distance between swerved and detached officials

Another complaint was the mentality of the Dutch representatives. Besides the refugees and *Engelandvaarders* themselves, also the officials that saw things differently from the Legation members noted the 'distant' attitude of the officials responsible towards their nationals.

Engelandvaarder and later chief of the C.I Jan Somer, stated that the Dutch officials in Madrid just lived too long in Spain to 'be Dutch.' 'They were Dutchmen, that lived for twenty or thirty years in Spain. They were more Spaniard than Dutchmen.' Kriens in Barcelona had no idea what was needed, he had no idea what the swerved Dutchmen had experienced, and he had lost all contact with the occupied Netherlands. Somer proposed to Van Kleffens to replace Kriens with someone else, Kriens was 'only good enough for a bicycle store or garage.' Somer additionally called Schuller tot Peursum a silly man, and both him and his brother totally unsuitable to represent the Netherlands abroad. 'The whole atmosphere of Schuller, De Bruyn Tengbergen and Van Panhuys was no good.'¹⁹⁰

Van Boeijen stated that he found Schuller and Van Panhuys were not in 'connection with the Dutchmen'. This meant that they did not understand the Dutch mentality and the desires the

¹⁸⁷ Report Baron F.C.A. van Pallandt for Cleveringa Commission, 9th January 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 58, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁸⁸ Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁸⁹ Report Baron F.C.A. van Pallandt for Cleveringa Commission, 9th January 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 58, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁹⁰ Hearing Jan Somer by Cleveringa Commission, 29th March 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

refugees had after coming all the way from the Netherlands, and not understanding the consequences that the sluggish release and evacuation had on the refugees. According to van Boeijen, the incompetence of Van Panhuys and Schuller derived from incomprehension, rather than unwillingness.¹⁹¹ He expected that incompetence, to properly inform the refugees on their chances and opportunities for release and evacuation, was common among most of the Dutch diplomats and officials present in Portugal and Spain. Much of the problems and therefrom deriving complaints could be solved if the refugees and *Engelandvaarders* were informed properly. This view of Van Boeijen was not limited to the officials in Madrid. Dr. Flaes (Van Pallandt's successor as head of the Lisbon Legation) was found incompetent by Van Boeijen because he 'had spent too little time in the Netherlands to understand the people.' Van Harinxma would be incapable of empathising with others, due to his lacking social nature. According to Van Boeijen, this trait would be applicable to the whole staff in Lisbon, except for Van Pallandt.¹⁹²

One example of the Madrilene Legation's incomprehension that subsequently caused feelings of detachment are Van Panhuys' visits in Miranda. Once he presumably told the Dutch prisoners, who defied dangers to reach Spain and were now in a concentration camp with minimal information from the officials, 'not to worry' because they would be leaving soon, but it still took months. The prisoners became discontented and thought that it was self-evident that if one arrived in the camp earlier than another, he should also be released earlier.¹⁹³ A second time, when Van Panhuys his activities and efforts had such little success, he told the Dutchmen that they also had the possibility to turn to the Germans when his next scheduled effort would turn out fruitless too, leaving the prisoners utterly discontented. He advised them that upon return in the Netherlands, they could retry crossing the borders and reach Spain, but as Canadians, because this was far easier. Van Panhuys stated that this caused wrong interpretations: Adrian Thomas, whom Van Panhuys called 'a communist', utilised this mistake by claiming that Van Panhuys recommended the Dutch prisoners to do this, rather than merely informing them about the possibility.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

¹⁹² Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02; 'Het rapport Cleveringa: kribbige sfeer in Lissabon maakte samenwerking onmogelijk', *De Volkskrant*, 16th December 1947, 1.

¹⁹³ Testimonial L.A. Gastmann, 8th April 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 45, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁹⁴ Hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 7th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Engelandvaarder Willem Melius stated that he found the fact that many officials adhered to a pre-war mentality very striking, especially to people that lived under the German annexation and had the vision to 'liberate the occupied fatherland from the yoke people are suffering from.'¹⁹⁵ The lack of empathy from the officials in Spain and Portugal that he *swerved* felt, can partly be blamed on the detachment of the officials with The Netherlands. They spent too long in other places that they 'lost connection with the Dutchmen and their nature.' In addition, many of the officials in Spain and Portugal came from aristocratic Dutch circles, and even royal titles, and thus had entirely different social backgrounds than the *Engelandvaarders* and refugees.¹⁹⁶ It is then questionable whether the officials would have grasped the sentiments of the *Engelandvaarders* (many of young age and not necessarily high social backgrounds) even if they had lived in The Netherlands longer and also experienced the Nazi-occupation like the prisoners had.

Not only the Legation in Madrid was thought to be too distant from the refugees when it proved difficult to convince the Ministry of Colonies to have people evacuated to either the East- or West-Indies. According to van Boeijen, this was because they could not empathise with the shape and conditions of the refugees. While personal contacts between the refugees and the Ministry of Colonies possibly could have overcome this problem, there was supposedly 'less willingness in Portugal to facilitate this.'¹⁹⁷

In the summer of 1943, the British had evacuated around 200 Dutchmen to Jamaica. Some of them awaited entry onto Curaçao, for the authorities to screen them on some conditions before they could be admitted onto the island: whether they were of use as labour force, if there was a possibility to shelter or house them, and the payment of 100 guilders of travel fee (and 380 guilders deposit). The strict conditions were criticised in an Antillean newspaper for being contradictive to the sense of *Groot-Nederlandschap* ('Great Dutchmanship'). While the British were mostly lenient in their rules in offering asylum to Dutch evacuees, the civil servants in the Dutch West-Indies had supposedly done everything to eliminate responsibility over these evacuees by adhering to prescribed refugee policies and regulations from before 1940. The criticism was first published in magazine *De Knickerbocker* (aimed at Dutchmen who emigrated to the US), and later in the Antillean newspaper *Amigoe di Curacao*. The author of the article had expected the state to be more receptive and welcoming

¹⁹⁵ Lifecycle report W.C. Melius, 13th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.48.02.

¹⁹⁶ Roem, 12.

¹⁹⁷ Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

towards the refugees now that Curacao had become wealthier since the outbreak of the Second World War. The author consequently criticised the need for the interference of an American committee to shelter Dutch refugees in Suriname, and wonders about the absence of a national pride with regards to helping these refugees.¹⁹⁸ In 1940 Suriname and the Antilles refused to shelter refugees entirely.¹⁹⁹

During his imprisonment in Miranda, Jos Carrée wrote to the Consulate that he wanted to work as medic with the Allied forces. After his release he was housed in a pension with three other Dutchmen who were not evacuated with the other transports to England. Carrée thus suspected that something was wrong with these men, and upon inquiring he found out that they had fought for the German military. Carrée was not willing to live with them and inquired whether it was possible to live independently, to which he received no response. Instead, he maintained good ties with his other roommates, whom Carrée found far more decent than the ‘supposedly good Dutchmen’, who frequently had encounters with the Spanish police due to misconduct. It is unclear what nationality his other roommates had (at least one other was also Dutch with the name Huibert Leek). While he himself worked as a barber for the Germans, actually fighting for the German military was one step too far and was at the expense of good Dutchmanship. In addition, Carrée felt his evacuation was taking far too long, but received no response upon complaining about this to the consulate. He felt the Dutch consulate was not doing any effort to help him and evacuate him from Spain. Eventually, Carrée is sent back to Miranda for 9 months, suffered from typhus and received no support from outside. Carrée stated that the treatment he received from ‘supposedly good patriots’ damaged him badly.²⁰⁰

A distance from the officials was also felt by the refugees. The Gitter family was fortunate enough to leave the Peninsula but felt obliged to notify the Queen of the people that were still in camps in France and Spain. The Gitters claimed that the majority of this group were willing to ‘serve our country.’ They felt it was their duty to notify the Queen of the mistakes that were victimising their fellow countrymen, ‘which could be solved by providing the necessary visas or documents’, but the consulates found this impossible. The Gitters could not believe this was perceived impossible, so

¹⁹⁸ ‘Nederlanders op Jamaica en in Spanje’, *Amigoe di Curaçao: weekblad voor de Curaçaosche eilanden*, 24th August 1943, 3.

¹⁹⁹ Dankart, 142.

²⁰⁰ Report J.F. Carrée about incarceration in Miranda and stay in Spain, date unknown, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 50, location 2.05.48.02.

they asked the Queen to intervene. The Gitters found that the officials' appeals on patience was unjust because the refugees were in danger continuously. The consulates' efforts just were not adequate enough, they needed to adopt a more understanding character if they wanted to prevent failing their nationals.²⁰¹

The appeal from R. Levisson to the Queen about his slow release and evacuation also showed how discontent about the Legation's negligence did not damage his patriotism. He wrote Queen Wilhelmina about the rebuilding of the 'Jewish Netherlands' after the war, to wait for this until after WWII would be too late. To work on the rebuilding of the Jewish Netherlands after the War, people who personally experienced the war from a Jewish perspective were crucial, like himself. After fleeing Camp Westerbork, Levisson tried to reach England to discuss Jewish matters with the Queen's cabinet. It should thus be of royal concern to evacuate him from Spain as soon as possible. He was convinced that the priority of the Dutch government seemed to lie with getting Engelandvaarders out of Sweden rather than out of Portugal and Spain.²⁰²

In May 1944, one of the inmates in Miranda was able to smuggle maps out of the camp, that another inmate had drawn. In return of bread and cigarette rations the smuggler was able to acquire the drawings, that he sent to the Queen directly. Most important is the final sentence of his letter, where he declares that he offers the drawings with 'respectful admiration' to the Queen, whom the prisoners 'hoped and desired for all this time.'²⁰³

The cases above show that despite the *Engelandvaarders'* and refugees' detachment or distance from the officials and governments did not harm their 'Dutchmanship' with regards to the *Dutch cause*. The attachment with the Queen, seen as *the mother of the Engelandvaarders*²⁰⁴, to have remained intact despite the lacking care, slow releases, many delays and disinterest the Dutchmen encountered in Spain. The attachment to, and hope for Queen Wilhelmina did resemble their fortitude in chasing the Dutch cause.

²⁰¹ Letter from Gitter family to Queen Wilhelmina, 5th October 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of the Kingdom's General Warfare, inventory nr. 6666, location 2.03.01.

²⁰² Letter Robert Levisson to Queen Wilhelmina, 30th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9097A, location 2.02.14.

²⁰³ Letter from Sgt. Gielis/photographer intelligence bureau to Queen Wilhelmina, 4th May 1944, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9094D, location 2.02.14

²⁰⁴ Visser, *De Schakel*, 8, 428.

Baron van Pallandt left Lisbon after he had arranged more clandestine evacuations. C.I. chief Maas Geesteranus in Lisbon stated this was accomplished with the arrival of 29 *Engelandvaarders* in Praia das Maças on 15th June 1943. Maas was notified by 'his confident' that the Dutchmen that were still in the Spanish concentration camps and prisons were 'too unimportant' for the warfare to be eligible for help from the Central Intelligence.²⁰⁵ While Maas often seemed to be more committed to the Dutchmen than the Legations, he still prioritised the persons who could fight, and others, probably refugees or non-conscripts, were unimportant. It should be clear that the officials who did not work for the Madrilene Legation often did differ between the groups of Dutchmen: Van Boeijen, Van Kleffens, Van Pallandt and Maas did emphasise the prioritisation of men who were useful for warfare. While the Madrilene Legation generally treated all the swerved Dutchman the same, Van Panhuys

It is interesting then that some *Engelandvaarders* felt rather equalised with the refugees, and not prioritised. Levisson complained that the Dutch officials did not differentiate between refugees and *Engelandvaarders*. He thought people that defied dangers to arrive in Spain to eventually join the Allied Forces needed to be differentiated from people who fled the Netherlands to solely 'save their *vege lijf*' (a Dutch expression referring to saving the 'body in life danger') and took for granted the first neutral country they could find. Levisson stated there was a total absence of empathy for the *Engelandvaarders*. He claimed that neither the Dutch officials in Spain nor London really understood the *Engelandvaarders*, which gave him the impression that everybody saw them as hotheads and called them one-sided ('eenzijdig') and subjective. Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Kleffens once called them *uit het lood geslagen elementen* ('elements knocked out of whack') and the officials in London spoke about the '*Engelandvaarders*-problem.'²⁰⁶

Regarding his fellow Dutchmen, Levisson stated he personally never encountered anyone 'politically unreliable' and that an investigation by the Cleveringa Commissie would be unnecessary. He did hope that the Commission's investigation would lead to 'fresh blood' in the Foreign Dutch Representations and that this would result in 'a better advocacy of the Dutch case.'²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ Letter from Maas Geesteranus to Major Somer in London, 15th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

²⁰⁶ Testimonial Robert Levisson, 3^d August 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 51, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁰⁷ Testimonial Robert Levisson, 3^d August 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 51, location 2.05.48.02.

Levisson's discontent about the absent differentiation between the *Engelandvaarders* and the refugees does not show solidarity with the other Dutchmen, while he was also discontented about the lack of empathy and understanding the *Engelandvaarders* received from the officials.

The most important effect of the presence of different nationalities was probably that the Dutchmen (aggrievedly) compared their situation with the other foreigners. There was solidarity between the nationalities. Jaques Snijders described how, around the 3rd or 4th January 1943, the Polish prisoners started a hunger strike to speed up the release procedures and protest against the bad sanitary conditions: on 3500 prisoners, three showers and faucets for drinking water, clogged toilets, dirt and vermin causing infections and diseases and the additional lack of medical personnel. The Dutch, and all the other nationalities joined the strike. The strike took 7-8 days, until many prisoners could not stand on their feet anymore and started fainting. Snijders attributed his and others' releases to the strike.²⁰⁸ In contrast to what Snijders claimed, Schuller stated that the strike did all but contribute positively to the willingness of the Spanish authorities, and additionally negatively impacted the health of the already weak prisoners, even causing one death.²⁰⁹

Summarising, the prisoners felt increasing detachment from the government due to their long imprisonments and slow releases, and even reluctance to rally behind it. The perception of the swerved themselves on Dutchmanship mostly concerned the felt distance with the officials and their misunderstanding regarding 'serving the Dutch cause.' Neglect and ignorance sometimes resulted in questioning the 'good patriotism' of the officials. The distance was also felt by the refugees, while these generally did not file complaints.

While usefulness for warfare generally meant prioritisation, this was not enough for e.g., Levisson, who felt that equalisation with the refugees meant misunderstanding the Dutch cause. Investigating Dutchmanship among the prisoners themselves showed that solidarity between the groups was not straightforward, as the testimonies of Van Panhuys witnesses also show. These witnesses were satisfied with the Legation's efforts and had negative perceptions on the *Engelandvaarders* that later filed complaints. This concerned overestimation and bad behaviour, and damaging the image of the 'decent Dutchmen'. As chapter four will show, these opinions were very similar to the visions of the officials themselves, affecting the credibility of these testimonies.

²⁰⁸ Report on conditions in Miranda de Ebro from Jacques Snijders, 4th April 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

²⁰⁹ Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 9th February 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

4. 'Dutchmanship' according to the Dutch Legation and Ministers.

From the officials' testimonial accounts in the Cleveringa Commission and the correspondence between Madrid, Lisbon, and the Ministries of Home and Foreign Affairs, it becomes clear that the Dutch officials did have a certain idea of the exemplary Dutchman and refugee, and how he should behave in the light of the 'Dutch cause.' This chapter further investigates how the Dutch officials perceived the Dutchmanship of the prisoners, with regards to their care, release, and evacuation.

The witnesses Van Panhuys called upon to prove he provided enough care to the Dutchmen in Spain, found the *Engelandvaarders* heavily overestimating themselves, remarks very similar to the officials' own visions. Van Panhuys called the unbalanced criticism from the *Engelandvaarders* indicative of the mentality of men who far overestimated their own importance.²¹⁰ Joseph Luns, who led the Lisbon Legation from 1941 after Flaes became ill, explained that he found the mentality of the Dutch refugees remarkable, they thought of themselves as the *vader des vaderlands* ('father of the fatherland/nation'), or at least as a very important person.²¹¹

Van Boeijen visited 'Praia das Maçãs', where the Dutch *Engelandvaarders* and refugees waited for their evacuation to England and other countries. He declared the complaints about the Portuguese camp's conditions unfounded. The conditions in Praia das Maçãs were 'up to reasonable standards' according to him, but he admitted that the people in Praia das Maçãs were in bad shape. They had defied many dangers to get into Portugal, found their passage onwards locked off, and had to wait in the camp for too long for their evacuation ('due to the insufficient efforts by the officials responsible'). It was then logical that they would complain, he stated.²¹²

There seemed to be a differentiation made between the evacuees: some were housed in expensive hotels, and not in the camp in Praia das Maçãs. Van Boeijen stated that this caused an 'unnecessary and supposedly unjust distinction between the Dutchmen.'²¹³ Certain distinctions were not limited to Portugal. Van Boeijen found out that there were many wives of the men in Miranda waiting for their husbands' releases so they could be evacuated. It was unclear why these women were not eligible for the evacuation of the wives of conscript men to the Dutch colonies. The Dutch

²¹⁰ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

²¹¹ Hearing Joseph Luns by Cleveringa Commission, 29th March (year unknown), Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 54, location 2.05.48.02.

²¹² Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

²¹³ Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02.

officials unknowingly created a situation whereby some refugees were treated differently than others with regards to the reunion with their families. Now, it would be impossible to ask the prisoners' wives to be evacuated without their husbands, after waiting for 8-10 months for their releases.²¹⁴ While it is not clear what the basis of this distinction was, it is clear that the Dutch government and Legations deemed some Dutchmen more important than others. Some were advised to fake British or other nationalities to speed up their releases²¹⁵, but were also prioritised in the evacuations. While the Madrilene Legation generally stated not to differentiate because this worked inefficiently, Schuller tot Peursum stated that he was happy that he received a list with the names of Dutchmen in Spanish prisons and in Camp Miranda, so the 'important Dutchmen' could be prioritised for their transfer to Portugal.²¹⁶ The 'important Dutchmen' were the ones who could fight: men who were previously mobilised in the Dutch (East Indies) army. Luns explained that the people who were not eligible for the military in England, were evacuated from Praia das Mações to the West-Indies. The men who could join the Allied Forces in England were given priority.²¹⁷ One source has shown that *Engelandvaarders* or refugees who were mechanics or had a relevant background were additionally preferred, because the Dutch forces were in urgent need of those.²¹⁸ It could be that the distinctions in Praia and between the women in Madrid were based on 'usefulness' regarding their contribution to the Dutch cause.

For Minister Van Boeijen himself, but the British also demanded this, it was important that the refugees would be thoroughly checked before they were evacuated to England.²¹⁹ Van Panhuys himself also had to estimate in Spain whether someone was 'useful for England', so the British would issue them visas. The 'real reliability investigation' of *Engelandvaarders* happened in Portugal.²²⁰ Miranda internee Hans Sanson confirmed that the officials in Madrid were not in the position to

²¹⁴ Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

²¹⁵ Report from Schuller tot Peursum to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War on Camp Miranda, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive of Dutch Ministry of Defence/War in London, inventory nr. 2494, location 2.13.71; A. Dassing, *Tulpen voor Wilhelmina*, 140.

²¹⁶ Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 20th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

²¹⁷ Hearing Joseph Luns by Cleveringa Commission, 29th March (year unknown), Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 54.

²¹⁸ Correspondence C.I. and Ministry of War about exemption F. Stijger, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of the Kingdom's General Warfare, inventory nr. 6666, location 2.03.01.

²¹⁹ Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

²²⁰ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

‘clear’ the Dutch group from imposters and spies but were only unmasked in Portugal.²²¹ This also meant that people who faked the Dutch nationality sometimes slipped through.²²² This shows that the Madrilene Legation really did not have the capacity to conduct everything that was needed for the process, even after the approval of evacuations.

The ‘reliability investigation’ was conducted by the Central Intelligence in Lisbon. Van Kleffens secretary Van Bylandt stated that this sometimes caused many difficulties, because the investigation of the *evacuees* took very long, so the legation could not guarantee their 60-day maximum stay in Portugal.²²³ The reliability investigation was a crucial link in the process of exiting Portugal, because the British demanded the men were checked before evacuation. There were two categories: conscripts and non-conscripts. The conscripts were granted British visas when they turned out ‘reliable’. Their investigations thus had to run quickly, because ‘British summons and inspection was depending on this.’ The pace of the investigation of the non-conscripts mattered even more because they were also only allowed on Portuguese territory for 60 days, and their destinations were decided by Foreign Affairs based on their backgrounds, which required consultations from other departments.²²⁴

‘Politically unreliable’

Former internees and *Engelandvaarders* Joseph and Abraham Citroen declared that because of the high feelings of resentment among the Dutchmen in Miranda towards the Dutch consulate in Spain some men asked for German repatriation.²²⁵ While Van Panhuys was convinced that this was limited to several *zwakke broeders* (weak fellows)²²⁶, these cases demanded much attention from the officials, and additionally showed how the officials thought about the nature of the prisoners.²²⁷

²²¹ Testimony W.M.L. Sanson to Cleveringa Commission, 10th July 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 63, location 2.05.48.02; Camp file Sanson, 5th October 1944, Archivo Militar de Guadalupe, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 12389, caja 305362.

²²² Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02.

²²³ Note regarding evacuations by CI from and through Spain from Van Bylandt, 5th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Report from A. and J. Citroen on their experiences in camp Miranda, 12th February 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location. 2.13.71.

²²⁶ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

²²⁷ Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

From his correspondence with Rudolph van Stolk, leader of the Dutch group in Miranda, Van Panhuys was informed of the presume high morale and 'exceptional health' among the Dutch prisoners, in contrary to the other nationalities. However, Van Panhuys urged Van Stolk to keep a close eye on the persons that tried to approach the patrolling Gestapo officers in the camp to have themselves repatriated to the Netherlands with German help.²²⁸ Van Panhuys had given Van Stolk the authority to execute sanctions like withholding pocket money and food from other Dutchmen that were unreliable, like Gerard van Bijnen, who stated that because he disagreed with Van Stolk's fanatical political ideas he was excluded from food and social contact, finally leading him to request German repatriation.²²⁹

Van Stolk sent weekly reports to Van Panhuys about the Dutch prisoners, and the correspondence of Dutchmen with Van Panhuys and the outside world went through Van Stolk, so the officials saw what the prisoners wrote to their families.²³⁰ The consulate became aware of Wilhelmus Melissen his repatriation request to the Germans through this and found out he changed his mind about the repatriation because his father wrote him that this was an utter shame, and he subsequently hid from the Gestapo officers that came to pick him up from Miranda, he even already received his passport for this.²³¹

Schuller stated that most of the people that were in touch with the Germans for repatriation showed remorse for this, but that there were more in Miranda that were in contact with the Germans. These men were Louis Seepers, Hubertus van Bijnen, Herman de Jong, Bernard de Groot, Cornelis van Gend, Fons Willigen and Theo Smeets. All were initially seen as politically unreliable, but it later appeared that the men could not be measured with the same standards, as Schuller stated. Smeets and 'pureblood Nazi' De Groot had actually been members of the Dutch national-socialists,

²²⁸ Hearing Jacobus Lips by military in London, 18th July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.48.02.

²²⁹ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02; Letter Gerard Hubertus van Bijnen to German embassy, 19th October 1942, Archivo Militar Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 1340, caja 305288.

²³⁰ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02; Summaries of letters about the trustworthiness of Dutchmen in Spain, dates vary, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02; Reports from Pieter Six and Felix Vigeveno about Gestapo agent Knipa and henchman Frits van Bijnen, 19th July 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 66, location 2.05.48.02.

²³¹ Camp file Wilhelmus Melissen, no date, Archivo Militar Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 9480, caja 305343.

and Willigen was a weakling that did everything Smeets told him to.²³² Van Gend and De Jong were initially deemed politically unreliable by Van Stolk but they declared to fully commit to the Dutch Legation after their release from Miranda. They were separated from the other Dutchmen. But were not left to their own devices because of the risk of being reimprisoned or ending up in German hands.²³³

Jacobus Lips declared that a month after his arrival in Miranda he wanted to be repatriated by the Germans due to his bad health and his fear that he would not survive his imprisonment in the camp. He aimed to try to return to Spain again after he would have been brought back to Nazi-occupied Netherlands (what Van Panhuys actually recommended to the camp's prisoners two months earlier!).²³⁴ However, when suddenly more men were being released from Miranda, Lips withdrew his request with the Germans because he was convinced that his release would not take much longer. Lieutenant A. Wolters heard Lips his testimony upon his arrival in England and characterised Lips as entirely lacking character, a maladjusted and weak youngster, but not necessarily politically unreliable.²³⁵ Van Boeijen stated Lips did not have the '*vaderlandsche instelling*' (patriotic attitude) that was 'expected from a refugee.' According to Van Boeijen, Lips was 'wrong' from the start, and not the long wait would have been the reason from him to eventually turn to the Germans for repatriation.²³⁶

Pressure and exclusion from food and other necessities was the presumed reason behind Lips' German 'conversion.' This did negatively influence the perception on the Dutch inmates. Similar to when he questioned the Interbrigadists' reliability regarding their joining of the allied forces, Van Panhuys wondered whether it was wise to have the Miranda men join the troops because of their apparent weak morale, referring to Lips' conversion. In both cases he seemed to have feared

²³² Hearing Jacobus Lips by military in London, 18th July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.48.02; Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 26th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80; Summary of letter Schuller tot Peursum to London, 26th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02; Summary of letter Schuller tot Peursum to London, 21st July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

²³³ Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 26th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

²³⁴ Letter dr. Flaes to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.80; Lifecycle Jacobus Lips, 11th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.80.

²³⁵ Hearing Jacobus Lips by military in London, 18th July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.48.02.

²³⁶ Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

‘unreliability’ to be infectious for other prisoners.²³⁷ To the Dutch administration, the *Engelandvaarders* thus needed to possess certain characteristics to defy Nazi pressure and sustain camp imprisonment. It also seems as if the incarceration of the *Engelandvaarders* in Miranda served as a check to see whether these men could positively contribute to the allied forces.

Hendrik Danser was interned in Miranda and transferred to Praia das Mações. He had been in German military service but had not told the officials in Portugal this, afraid this would jeopardise his evacuation. Besides his lying, Dutch officials found him ‘not suitable for England’ because of his political unreliability so his passport was taken from him. Thus, he was stuck in Portugal. He reapproached the officials with his true lifecycle, admitting his German military service, but his passport was still not returned to him. He changed his plan and was hoping to go to the US instead, but still had no proof of his ‘Dutchmanship’.²³⁸

Because Suriname had already been sheltering former NSB members (the Dutch national socialist party), Cornelis Fock (Maas Geesteranus’ successor in Lisbon) hoped The British would transit Danser to Suriname. The British were hesitant in receiving him and issuing transit visas for his passage to Suriname, so upon his arrival in England, he was thrown in jail.²³⁹ ‘Danser was indeed a suspicious and dangerous individual [...], sending him to England to be incarcerated there was the only adequate solution to make Danser harmless’.²⁴⁰

Louis Seepers was the centre of many complaints by the other Dutchmen in Miranda and the officials. Van Panhuys called him coercive and annoying, and that he became ‘asocial’ because of his homosexuality. While he was harmless, he gave the Dutch legation a bad image because he posed himself as one of the members of the Legation during his time in Praia das Mações.²⁴¹ Other Dutch prisoners called him ‘extremely unfavourable’ and ‘highly unreliable’, and nicknamed him ‘Marietje’ for his homosexuality.²⁴² He spent much time in the camp prison due to homosexual activity and

²³⁷ Letter from Panhuys to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 17th July 1942, Dutch National Archive, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

²³⁸ Correspondence Dr. Flaes about Hendrik Danser’s lifecycle and evacuation, 27th July to 4th August 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 43, location 2.05.48.02.

²³⁹ Report Cornelis Fock from Central Intelligence in Lisbon, 12th March 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 44, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁴⁰ Response dr. Flaes on complaints from C.I. against him, 15th September 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 43, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁴¹ Hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 7th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁴² Complaint by H. Velthoen in Praia das Mações, 19th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02; Summary of letter from Van Boeijen, 30th July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

straperlo, and during the hunger strike in Miranda in January 1943 he resold bread for 'fantastic' prices. Via his family in Madrid, he was in contact with the German representation, upon which he was 'deleted' from the Dutch list, meaning he was not supported by the Dutch legation and did not apply for his visas. Van Boeijen called him not even intelligent enough to work for the Germans.²⁴³ While Seepers himself stated he was not willing to join the forces, Van Panhuys also found him completely incapable of doing so.²⁴⁴

Behaviour and patience

It happened more often that 'asocial' behaviour was linked to homosexuality. The *Engelandvaarders* who were misbehaving in Madrid were described as 'nasty elements from the passing groups, fighting with each other and difficult to restrain. There are traitors, scammers, and homosexuals among them.'²⁴⁵ Schuller stated in July 1943 that the number of 'unfavourable elements' among the swerved Dutchmen was increasing. While at first it was mostly scams, thefts, and demolishing, now the politically unreliable elements had manifested themselves. Threatening the director of the chancellery if he did not pay a certain amount of money, many cases of scamming by repeatedly invoicing receipts for the same articles to the Legation, thefts at the consular office, demolishing of furniture, bringing the communist salute in cafés by Dutchmen, and maintaining correspondence with the Germans about repatriation.²⁴⁶

While the *Engelandvaarders* were not always exemplary of good behaviour, it is clear that the Officials did not have a good image of the Dutchmen from the start. Even when men consulted the Germans for repatriation (something Van Panhuys even recommended them) due to health concerns, they were seen as weak and unreliable. Lips' case, who turned to the Germans out of health concerns and because Van Panhuys recommended this, showed that the officials also had an idea of what the Dutchmanship of a refugee should be.

The refugees that just arrived in Spain first turned to Dutch consul J. Kriens in Barcelona, to apply for a visa to get them out of Spain, and onwards to England. Kriens complained to Schuller that

²⁴³ Complaint by H. Velthoen in Praia das Maças, 19th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02; Summary of letter from Van Boeijen, 30th July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁴⁴ Hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 7th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁴⁵ Roem, 12.

²⁴⁶ Summary of letter Schuller tot Peursum to London, 21st July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

the refugees spent all their weekly 'pocket money' in just a couple of days and then tried to get more money in all kinds of ways from the Consulate. Because Kriens stated he 'adhered to the prescribed instructions', the refugees supposedly filed complaints about him out of revenge and to hinder him. Kriens claimed he could not do his work, focusing on consular matters, anymore, and requested Schuller to install other people that would commit themselves with refugee matters, for he would be forced to resign otherwise. He had too little personnel, and he did not see his work appreciated and only led to unfounded complaints, to which the Dutch government gave more attention than to the reports that Kriens wrote himself. The assistance Kriens received from the consulate in Madrid was so little, he did not see the cooperation as noteworthy anyway.²⁴⁷

Even the Queen was made aware of the 'behaviour' of the refugees. Minister of Foreign Affairs Kleffens reported to the Queen that the complaints made by the refugees about the Dutch officials' efforts to support them were unfounded. The refugees were unfamiliar with the Spanish conditions and were too optimistic about receiving visas for Portugal and England. Van Kleffens did not want to justify the Legation's lacking efforts but wanted to make the Queen aware of the fact that, among the refugees, there were persons that tried to create an image that would underestimate the efforts and commitment of the Dutch representatives.²⁴⁸

Engelandvaarder in camp Miranda Robert Levisson did an appeal directly to Queen Wilhelmina, concerning the slow release of him and his mates. Because mail from Miranda went through the consulate in Madrid, consul Schuller was able to add an explanation to the letter. He explained that Levisson belonged to the group of 'impatient *Engelandvaarders*', and that Levisson could expect no special treatment, but that Schuller saw no opportunity to dissuade Levisson from his demands. Schuller explained that he was already doing everything to release and evacuate Levisson and his 'very impatient mates' to Portugal through legal ways. He lastly warned the Queen and the cabinet that because of the bad sanitary conditions in camp Miranda, complaints about the slow release would only increase.²⁴⁹ From Schuller's reports it seems as if Levisson was demanding

²⁴⁷ Letter Kriens to consul Schuller tot Peursum about behaviour Dutch refugees, 25th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9107A, location 2.02.14

²⁴⁸ Letter from Kleffens to Queen Wilhelmina on Kriens' report, 12th November 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9107A, location 2.02.14

²⁴⁹ Sidenote by Kleffens on letter from Robert Levisson to the Queen, 12th November 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9097A, location 2.02.14.

in his letter, but to the contrary, most of his 4 paged letter was about the recovery of the Netherlands for its Jewish population and showed visible admiration for Queen Wilhelmina.²⁵⁰

Social care

While Schuller did not stay entirely clear of accusations either, Levisson declared that Van Panhuys was especially guilty of neglect and disinterest in supporting the refugees. While the adequacy to help the swerved Dutchmen was also lacking from Schuller, he and his wife provided their house upon request from Jewish *swerved* for the celebration of Sukkot/Feast of Tabernacles, while this was legally forbidden in the Spanish law.²⁵¹ When it became public that Schuller was being investigated by the Cleveringa Commission, people that he worked with in Spain stated that despite the difficulties he encountered in Spain, he always took the matter of the Dutch refugees to heart, and made sure that the refugees felt at home, by organizing meetings and parties, and sporting events, all to alleviate their worries and keep them busy.²⁵² It was not only the celebration of the Jewish holiday Sukkot he committed himself to, it was also the Dutch holidays Saint Nicholas, New Years' and the birthday of the Royal Family that he invited the Dutch *swerved* in Madrid for.²⁵³ After one gathering he noticed the disappearance of two golden snuffboxes, trinkets and other display case objects. Upon this, Schuller stated that 'except for about a hundred great guys, the true, old, tough Netherlands never passed through Spain. The real Dutchmen would never complain about a piece of chocolate or sugar, they would be ashamed deeply to do this!!'²⁵⁴

After Van Boeijen his visit to the Peninsula, he found that the Dutch officials, besides the 'material caring', did nothing for the refugees socially and ethically. He believed that people who are left to themselves need all support to sustain their morale. 'Entertainment, reading, etc. were untouched.'²⁵⁵

²⁵⁰ Letter Robert Levisson to Queen Wilhelmina, 30th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9097A, location 2.02.14.

²⁵¹ Testimonial Robert Levisson, 3^d August 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 51, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁵² Testimony letter De Jongh to Cleveringa Commission, 9th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 65, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁵³ Hearing Schuller tot Peursum by Cleveringa Commission, 4th December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 65, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁵⁴ Hearing Schuller tot Peursum by Cleveringa Commission, 4th December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 65, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁵⁵ Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

One witness supported Van Panhuys in the accusations against him by stating he organized film screenings for his 'swerved' and provided them with literature. Van Panhuys himself claimed that it was hard in a city as Madrid with its limited possibilities to look after the 'social care' of the refugees.²⁵⁶ Van Panhuys would have selected movies that had a 'Dutch tendency', and he generally translated the text for the Dutchmen.²⁵⁷ Besides the film screenings, he was able to arrange athletics and swimming for them. Just as Schuller enabled the celebration of Sukkot, Van Panhuys saw the importance of Christmas and Dutch holidays. While the complaints told otherwise, Van Panhuys could not imagine that the Dutchmen in 1941 received no extra packages during Christmas, because it was normal for the Dutchmen to receive extra packages during Dutch holidays.²⁵⁸ For Christmas 1940 at least, the Dutchmen in Miranda received the remnants of provisions purchased by Van Panhuys in Argentina.²⁵⁹ For Easter 1943, out of frustration because his release requests were rejected, Van Panhuys sent massive quantities of food to Miranda: sausage, cake, jam and a dozen eggs per Dutchman. The lorries transporting this were welcomed with cheers and applause.²⁶⁰

This chapter has shown that not only the consular and legation officials responded spasmodic to possible complaints. Van Boeijen and Van Kleffens both claimed complaints unfounded, and Van Boeijen found it 'logical' that the men would complain about the conditions in Praia. When Dutchmen complained about the inadequate help, this was also dismissed as impatience. The insistence on patience and behaviour also related to the necessary characteristics of the Dutchmen, but also reemphasise the distance felt by the refugees as shown in chapter three.

Most importantly, focusing on Dutchmanship from the perspective of the officials has shown that the officials did differ between the Dutchmen in Spain. While it cannot be proven that this was entirely due to London's directives, also the Legation members in Madrid differed between the groups: men useful for warfare could count on prioritisation regarding release and evacuation. Dutchmanship in that sense was seen in the light of the Dutch cause. The prioritisation could have also been at the basis of the negligence in evacuating the prisoners' women who were stuck in Madrid.

²⁵⁶ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁵⁷ Hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 7th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁵⁸ Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁵⁹ Appendix I to written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

²⁶⁰ Visser, 45.

Turning to the Germans was always seen as the wrong patriotic attitude, thus more relating to the nature and characteristics a 'good fleeing Dutchman' should have. Logical, if one considers that the Dutchmen in Spain fled the Netherlands because of the Germans in the first place. Possible unreliability also affected the other prisoners, whose trustworthiness now also came under question.

The social care and attention for the religious traditions would contradict the fact the point made in chapter 3, that the Legation members had no connection with the Netherlands due to spending too long outside of their country.

A last important component in understanding the reasons behind the officials' fierce responses on the accusations of neglect, was the lack of personnel. In all the sources the responsible officials emphasised the lack of personnel as one of the major reasons of possible insufficient help. It cannot be proven that the Legation would have improved with more personnel, while Van Boeijen and Somer's involvement did show radical changes, but the fierce officials' responses are more understandable in case they had indeed done everything in their power and received ungratefulness in return. Many officials also believed C.I. chief Maas Geesteranus instigated the Dutchmen to file as many complaints as possible.

5. Conclusion

This research has shown that the perspectives on 'Dutchmanship' for the Dutch officials and prisoners in Spain were mostly reactive. Emphasising either good or bad Dutchmanship was often in response to neglect or disinterest for the prisoners, and in response to complaints and unreliability for the officials. The most important components of Dutchmanship regarding the men in Spain were the Dutch cause and solidarity.

The prisoners often felt disinterest from the Legation and felt that the officials were not willing to understand what they had been through and how they were serving the Dutch cause. This often led to detachment from the government, but not from their Dutchmanship. While some claimed they felt increasing reluctance to fight for the government, their attachment with e.g., Queen Wilhelmina and their steadfastness in serving the Dutch cause showed that this detachment did generally not mean a breach in their Dutchmanship. The officials neglect and distant attitude resulted in questioning the 'good patriotism' of the officials. The distance was also felt by the refugees, while these generally did not file complaints.

The neglect and little interest from the officials would not imply solidarity with their fellow Dutchmen aiming to reach England. However, the bad behaviour by some of the *Engelandvaarders* also made others question their Dutchmanship, which they were dishonouring and causing shame upon decent Dutchmen. The men questioning the Dutchmanship of the *Engelandvaarders* did generally not spend time in Miranda however, meaning they were not conscripts (making it unlikely they were to join the Allied forces). Their testimonies tell that the Dutchmen in Madrid also felt that the *Engelandvaarders* saw their releases and evacuations as more important regarding the Dutch cause. Solidarity from the *Engelandvaarders* with the refugees was neither self-evident, when the equalisation between the two groups was seen as misunderstanding the Dutch cause and its pursuers.

Researching Dutchmanship in the light of the Dutch cause, has shown that a person's usefulness for the war meant prioritisation in release and evacuation over refugees. The hesitant evacuation of *Interbrigadists* is to be blamed on fear of communism and a possible damaged image of the Dutch government. However, the prioritisation meant that while the *Interbrigadists* were initially seen as the least likely to be good Dutchmen, their equalisation to get them out of Miranda as soon as possible (whether this was to prevent them of influencing other prisoners or to recruit them in the forces) meant that they were treated the same as the *Engelandvaarders*. In that sense

they eventually maybe even had an advantage over the Dutchmen that were not useful for the forces. The prioritisation was not visible in the releases. Only a minimal number was honest to the Spanish about their intentions to join the allied forces, and almost all prisoners declared to be 'refugio civil', so from Miranda's archive it is unclear whether these men were indeed released faster than the 'real' refugees.

For the officials the characteristics belonging to good Dutchmanship were the ability to defy Nazi pressure within the camps despite health concerns. It is striking that so many officials saw requesting German repatriation as a sign of 'bad patriotism' when one of the officials had once recommended this to later return to Spain under a false nationality. Considering The Netherlands' situation in WWII, it is logical that people who turned to the Germans or had worked for the Germans in the past were seen as unreliable and bad Dutchmen.

The officials' attention for the proper behaviour and patience of the Dutchmen further underscored the distance felt by the prisoners and evacuees. It felt unjust to them that they were told to behave and be patient when many of them did a great effort in reaching Spain and were thrilled to contribute to the Dutch cause. The officials' distance from understanding the Dutch cause and the prisoners cannot be blamed on one sole component.

Due to the personnel shortage and the German pressure on Spain that did not allow new personnel to support the officials, the Legation in Spain did not have the best position to cope with a chaotic situation as this. The efforts by Schuller to maintain the Legation in Spain cost many concessions, which also negatively affected the potential adequacy the Legation members would have in negotiating with the Spanish. The initial concessions also made that clandestine evacuations were a great risk to the already precarious position of the Legation. This meant that failed clandestine operations would heavily jeopardise the minimal position they still had. It was only when the tides of WWII were turning that Van Boeijen and Somer had the opportunity to solve the refugee chaos in Spain.

Another likely reason for the felt distance, and the subsequent accusations of bad Dutchmanship, was the social background of the officials and the *swerved*. The aristocratic background that many of the officials had, could have caused them to look down on the *Engelandvaarders* that were ill informed of the situation they would encounter in Spain. The Legation members spent their time in higher social environments and even other officials emphasised their detachment from the Netherlands due to their consular jobs in other countries.

The archives in Spain on camp Miranda showed that the prisoners generally did not have such backgrounds. They had regular jobs as merchants or mechanics or were students that felt responsible for doing everything in their power to reach England. The different backgrounds also made that the officials were generally regarded as having not enough social skills to deal with the *swerved*, something that was also blamed on disinterest. The social care on the other hand, while often lacking to most, showed that the officials still maintained a cultural connection with the Netherlands in their understanding of the Dutch traditions and their attention for this regarding the care of the *swerved* Dutchmen.

What this research adds to the historiography is that it gives more understanding of how the situation in Spain and the slow releases and evacuations influenced the perceptions on both parties. Feelings of neglect caused the *Engelandvaarders* to question the Dutchmanship of the officials, to which the officials responded with discontent about the behaviour of the *Engelandvaarders* and their overestimation of their importance to the Dutch cause. Researching the role of '(good) Dutchmanship' for both the *Engelandvaarders* as the officials, enabled showing how the two parties viewed each other and how their social backgrounds and the chaotic situation in Spain further aggravated this. While it was already clear in the historiography that the parties were not on the same page, researching Dutchmanship has shown how and where these differences (in vision) were expressed.

Furthermore, looking for 'good' and 'bad' Dutchmanship also allowed to find out that the government held preferences between the different groups regarding their release and evacuations, and that disinterest regarding at least one group of the Dutchmen, the refugees, could be proved.

It needs acknowledging that while focusing on Miranda, this research question required a broader scope. Visions on Dutchmanship played a role in care, release, but also evacuation, for which a broader Spanish/Iberian scope was needed. However, maintaining the focus on the camp has shown that the solidarity among the refugees and *Engelandvaarders* (and Miranda internees versus non-Miranda internees) was not straightforward.

The time constraint in my visit to Guadalajara did not allow me to look into other files than the admission forms of the Dutch prisoners. Further research could focus more on the contacts that were held between the different nationalities, and if this also influenced their ideas of citizenship. Researching the international environment within the camp was my initial goal. Increasing research on camp Miranda hopefully allows this in the future.

Bibliography

Secondary sources

- Adams, J., 'Why Jewish Refugees Were Imprisoned in a Spanish Detention Camp While Fleeing Europe (1940–1945)', *Journal of Modern European History* (2022).
- Beaufort, R., *The Dutch Spainfighters: 'People who did not think solely on a national level, but also internationally': The role of national sentiments in a transnational environment* (Researchmasterscriptie Politics, Culture and National Identities, Leiden University 2018).
- Cuerda-Galindo, E., 'Physicians imprisoned in Franco Spain's Miranda de Ebro "Campo de Concentración"', *Medical History* 66 (2022) 264-279.
- Dankaart, H., J. Flinterman, F. Groot & R. Vuurmans, *De oorlog begon in Spanje: Nederlanders in de Spaanse Burgeroorlog 1936-1939* (Amsterdam: Van Gennep 1986) 132-
- Dessing, A., *Tulpen voor Wilhelmina. De Geschiedenis van de Engelandvaarders* (Amsterdam 2004).
- Eiroa San Francisco, M., 'Refugiados extranjeros en España: el campo de concentración de Miranda de Ebro', *Asociación de Historia Contemporánea (Ayer)* 57 (2005) 125-152.
- Jong, L. de, en Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Dl. 9: Londen: tweede helft* (Den Haag 1979).
- Maenhout, J., *Miranda de Ebro: een concentratiekamp op het politiek schaakbord van Franco* (Masterscriptie Geschiedenis, Universiteit Gent, 2019)
- Petram, L. & S. Kruizinga, *De oorlog tegemoet: Nederlanders en de strijd om Spanje, 1936-1939* (Amsterdam 2020).
- Visser, F., *De Schakel: een documentaire uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog: een selectie authentieke verhalen van Nederlandse Engelandvaarders aan de hand van dagboeken, rapporten, brieven en uitgebreide persoonlijke interviews* (Baarn, 1976).
- Roem, M., 'Lakse diplomaten of een onmogelijke taak? De gebrekkige assistentie van Nederlandse ambtenaren in Spanje aan Engelandvaarders', *De Schakel: Stichting Genootschap Engelandvaarders* 38 (151) (2017) 9-17.

Primary sources

- Dutch National Archive, Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Commissie Cleveringa.
- Dutch National Archive, Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken in Londen.
- Dutch National Archive, Archief Kabinet der Koningin;
- Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa: expedientes personales de ingreso: Campo de Concentración de Miranda de Ebro, expedientes 1-15233, cajas 305279-305382.

Dutch National Archive, The Hague

Hearing Joseph Luns by Cleveringa Commission, 29th March (year unknown), Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 54.

Summaries of letters about the trustworthiness of Dutchmen in Spain, dates vary, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02

Report J.F. Carrée about incarceration in Miranda and stay in Spain, date unknown, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 50, location 2.05.48.02.

Second page of letter from Schuller tot Peursum, date unknown, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 28th June 1940, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 19th May 1941, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Van Kleffens, 16th October 1941, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Letter Van Kleffens to Ministry of Justice, 29th December 1941, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Letter Van Bylandt to Ministry of Justice, 29th December 1941, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 2788, location 2.09.06.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Van Kleffens, 9th February 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location. 2.05.80.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 23rd February 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 10th March 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

Letter Van Kleffens to Ministry of War, 28th March 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum of Dutch Legation in Madrid, 28th April 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

Letter Van Kleffens to Minister of Colonies and Minister of War, 11th July 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Letter from Panhuys to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 17th July 1942, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80

Report Maas Geesteranus on articles about escape routes in media, 31st July 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of War: inventory nr. 6666, location 2.03.01.

Letter from Minister of War and Lieutenant-General Van der Vijver to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 8th August 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

Letter from Minister of Colonies Van Mook to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15th September 1942, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs Kleffens to Ministry of Colonies on sea line between Spain and Curacao, 17th September 1942, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Letter from Gitter family to Queen Wilhelmina, 5th October 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of the Kingdom's General Warfare, inventory nr. 6666, location 2.03.01.

Letter Gerard Hubertus van Bijnen to German embassy, 19th October 1942, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expediente 1340, caja 305288.

Correspondence about exemption F. Stijger, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of the Kingdom's General Warfare, inventory nr. 6666, location 2.03.01.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum about situation of Dutchmen in Camp Miranda, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of War/Defense in London, inventory nr. 2494, location 2.13.71.

Report from Schuller tot Peursum to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War on Camp Miranda, 7th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive of Dutch Ministry of Defence/War in London, inventory nr. 2494, location 2.13.71

Sidenote on letter from ambassador Schuller tot Peursum sent on the 7th of December, 9th of December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80

Summary of letter from Ernest van Panhuys, 10th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80

Letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs on Dutch refugees in Spain, 22nd December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80

Report from Minister of Foreign Affairs E.N. van Kleffens to Queen Wilhelmina, 30th December 1942, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80

Report by Gerard Hazelzet on his imprisonment in Miranda, 24th January 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location 2.13.71.
Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 9th February 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

Report from A. and J. Citroen on their experiences in camp Miranda, 12th February 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Defense/War in London, inventory nr. 204: 88, location. 2.13.71

Report on situation in Miranda by Schuller tot Peursum, 25th March 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Report on conditions in Miranda de Ebro from Jacques Snijders, 4th April 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Letter to Schuller tot Peursum, 21st April 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Letter Van Kleffens to Schuller tot Peursum, 4th May 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Report 'Dutchmen in Spain' by private B. Boers in Canada, 23rd May 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Lifecycle report W.C. Melius, 13th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter from Maas Geesteranus to Major Somer in London, 15th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

Report Van Boeijen on his visit to Lisbon and Madrid, 28th June 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02;

Hearing Jacobus Lips by military in London, 18th July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.48.02.

Summary of letter Schuller tot Peursum to London, 21st July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Correspondence about Hendrik Danser lifecycle and evacuation, 27th July to 4th August 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr.

Summary of letter from Van Boeijen, 30th July 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 21st August 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 6th September 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Letter dr. Flaes to Foreign Affairs, 7th September 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Telegram Eelco van Kleffens, 13th September 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3632, location 2.05.80.

Letter Ministry Home Affairs to Foreign Affairs, 13th September 1943, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3632, location 2.05.80.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 17th September 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

Letter dr. Flaes to Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Lips, Smeets and Willigers, 28th September 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.48.02

Note regarding evacuations by CI from and through Spain from Van Bylandt, 5th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

Letter dr. Flaes to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.80

Lifecycle Jacobus Lips, 11th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 53, location 2.05.80.

Complaint by H. Velthoen in Praia das Maças, 19th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 20th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Letter Kriens to Schuller tot Peursum about behaviour Dutch refugees, 25th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9107A, location 2.02.14

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 26th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Summary of letter Schuller tot Peursum to London, 26th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter Robert Levisson to Queen Wilhelmina, 30th October 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9097A, location 2.02.14.

Letter from Kleffens to Queen Wilhelmina on Kriens' report, 12th November 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9107A, location 2.02.14

Sidenote by Kleffens on letter from Robert Levisson to the Queen, 12th November 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9097A, location 2.02.14.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 18th November 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Letter Schuller tot Peursum to Foreign Affairs, 30th November 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3555, location. 2.05.80.

Letter Dr. Somer to Foreign Affairs, 25th December 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3555, location 2.05.80.

Letter from Schuller tot Peursum to Van Kleffens about report from internee De Bruin about Miranda, 27th December 1943, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter Dutch Red Cross to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4th and 7th January 1944, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, inventory nr. 3632, location 2.05.80.

Letter from Sgt. Gielis/photographer intelligence bureau to Queen Wilhelmina, 4th May 1944, Dutch National Archive, Archive Kabinet der Koningin, inventory nr. 9094D, location 2.02.14

Letter from Minister of Justice Van Angeren to Van Kleffens, 22nd June 1944, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inventory nr. 3552, location 2.05.80.

Hearing Henri Maas Geesteranus by Commission Van Rhijn, 25th January 1945, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 55, location 2.05.48.02.

Response by Henri Maas Geesteranus to report from Commission Van Rhijn, 17th May 1945, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 55, location 2.05.48.02.

Testimony W.M.L. Sanson to Cleveringa Commission, 10th July 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 63, location 2.05.48.02.

Testimonial Robert Levisson, 3rd August 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 51, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter from J.C.E. Jaenecke to Van Panhuys, 23rd September 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Hearing Henri Maas Geesteranus by Cleveringa Commission, 12th November 1946, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 55, location 2.05.48.02.

Report Baron F.C.A. van Pallandt for Cleveringa Commission, 9th January 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 58, location 2.05.48.02.

Hearing former Minister of Home Affairs Van Boeijen by Cleveringa Commission, 25th February 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 42, location 2.05.48.02

Report Cornelis Fock from Central Intelligence in Lisbon, 12th March 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 44, location 2.05.48.02

Hearing Cornelis van der Sluys by Cleveringa Commission, 29th March 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 68, location 2.05.48.02

Hearing Jan Somer by Cleveringa Commission, 29th March 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 69, location 2.05.48.02

Letter Van Panhuys to Michael Creswell, 11th April 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter from witness Louis Boas for investigation by Cleveringa Commission, 17th April 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 41, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter from secretary of British embassy in Madrid Michael Cresswell to Van Panhuys, 21st April 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 7th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Appendix G of written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Appendix H of written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Appendix I of written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Appendix K of written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Appendix L of written addition to oral hearing Van Panhuys by Cleveringa Commission, 15th October 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter from Engelandvaarder A. Ringel to Van Panhuys, 4th November 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 61, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter from witness G.J. Bensink for investigation by Cleveringa Commission, 10th November 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 40, location 2.05.48.02

Report Red Cross on allocation of aid to Dutch political prisoners in foreign countries, 1st December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 14, location 2.05.48.02

Hearing Schuller tot Peursum by Cleveringa Commission, 4th December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 65, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter Dr. Flaes to Cleveringa Commission, 2nd January 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 43, location 2.05.48.02

File with testimonies of witnesses that were helped by Van Panhuys in Spain, 1st March 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Testimonial L.A. Gastmann, 8th April 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 45, location 2.05.48.02.

Correspondence between Sophie Mok and Van Panhuys, 28th April 1948-1st May 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Testimony letter De Jongh to Cleveringa Commission, 9th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 65, location 2.05.48.02.

Response from Van Panhuys on Engelandvaarders report by Cleveringa Commission, 13th July 1948, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 59, location 2.05.48.02.

Letter J.J. Roggen to editors of Dutch newspaper Trouw, 8th December 1947, Dutch National Archive, Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Commissie Cleveringa, inventory nr. 62, location 2.05.48.02.

Archivo Militar, Ministerio de Defensa, Guadalajara

- Arend Bakker's camp admission form, 19th January 1946, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 623, caja 305283.
- Adrianus Enrique Vroomen camp admission form, 20th August 1944, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 14524, caja 305377.
- Camp file Sanson, 5th October 1944, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 12389, caja 305362.
- Franciscus Johannes van Neer camp admission form, 20th October 1942, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 10206, caja 305348
- Rudolph van Stolk's camp admission form, 23rd October 1941, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 13483, caja 305370.
- Tom Minkhorst camp admission form, 24th October 1943, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 9742, caja 305345.
- Elias Willem Zomerplaag's camp admission form, 17th December 1942, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, expediente 15205, caja 305382.
- Camp file Wilhelmus Melissen, no date, Archivo Militar de Guadalajara Archivo Ministerio de Defensa, Direccion General de Reclutamiento y Enseñanza Militar, expediente 9480, caja 305343.

Archive International Institute for Social History

Pamphlet from Commission SOS on Dutch prisoners in Spanish concentration camps, Archive International Institute of Social History, 15th January 1940, Archive Institute for Social History, Archive Documentatiecollectie Solidariteitsbewegingen in Nederland, inventory nr. 161D: Spanje, COLL00284, location 50074.2-7.

Commission Aid to Spain 1976, October 1976, Archive International Institute for Social History, Archive Documentatiecollectie Solidariteitsbewegingen in Nederland, inventory nr. 161B: Commissie Hulp aan Spanje, COLL00284, location 50074.2-7.

Newspapers

'Industrialisatie in Spanje. Vooral voor textile, chemicaliën, rubber, benzine en auto's', *Dagelijksche Beurscourant: de Nederlandse financier*, 7th January 1943, 1.

'Nederlanders op Jamaica en in Spanje', *Amigoe di Curaçao: weekblad voor de Curaçaosche eilanden*, 24th August 1943, 3.

'Hulp aan de gevangenen is onvoldoende geweest. Formalisme en bureaucratie oorzaak dat duizenden Nederlanders het leven verloren', *Provinciale Drentsche en Asser courant*, 2nd December 1947, 1.

‘Engelandvaarders strandden in Spanje: Door onze consulaire ambtenaren met politie bedreigd’, *De Maasbode*, 29th November 1947, 3.

‘Muur van bureaucratie kostte duizenden het leven. Ned. Rode Kruis ontbrak het aan moed en initiatief’, 2nd December 1947, *De Gooi- en Eemlander*, 3.

‘Het rapport-Cleveringa: Kribbige sfeer in Lissabon maakte samenwerken onmogelijk’, *De Volkskrant*, 16th December 1947, 1-2.

‘Rapport Cleveringa gepubliceerd ‘Geen gegronde redenen voor ernstige klachten’’, *Het Vrije Volk*, 16th December 1947, 1.

G. van der Leeuw, ‘Onze buitenlandse dienst’, *Nieuw Utrechts Dagblad*, 5th January 1948, 1.