



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Money Talks: How Foreign NGO Funding Affects the Environmental Justice Movement in sub-Saharan Africa

Hagenström, Paul

Citation

Hagenström, P. (2023). *Money Talks: How Foreign NGO Funding Affects the Environmental Justice Movement in sub-Saharan Africa*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master Thesis, 2023](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3633852>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Leiden University: MA International Relations (Global Political Economy)

Master's Thesis

Money Talks: How Foreign NGO Funding Affects the Environmental Justice Movement in sub-Saharan Africa

Word Count: 14.995

06.06.2023

Paul Hagenström

Supervisor: Dr Christian Henderson, Second Reader: Dr Jonathan London

Table of Contents

- List of Abbreviations..... 0
- 1. Introduction 1
- 2. Literature Review 4
- 3. Methods..... 9
- 4. Analysis 12
 - 4.1. Quantitative Analysis..... 12
 - 4.1.1. Overview 12
 - 4.1.2. Involved groups and forms of mobilization: Explanatory power and limitations .. 15
 - 4.2. Qualitative Analysis 18
 - 4.2.1. Intra-movement dynamics in Kenya 22
 - 4.2.2. Intra-movement dynamics in countries with funding restrictions..... 30
 - 4.2.3. Implications and limitations..... 31
- 5. Conclusion..... 33
- Bibliography..... 35

List of Abbreviations

EJ	–	environmental justice
EJO	–	environmental justice organization
FOM	–	form of mobilization
LEJO	–	local EJO
LR	–	long-range activism
SR	–	short-range activism
SSA	–	sub-Saharan Africa

1. Introduction

“The tools of comparative politics inhere in the traditional conception of politics in the West. That by itself seems appropriate. But the tools sometimes appear dull from overuse and cry out for sharpening. Certainly, if we are to capture the spirit of African politics we must seek what is unique in them.” - Ekeh (1975)

Amid a range of environmental and ecological crises, it is an urgent question how experiences of their effects vary between people, grouped by nationality, class, gender or ethnicity. Within and outside academia, a term that is often used in this context is environmental justice (EJ), which was popularized by a social movement originating in the US and is today applied to cases of environmental distribution conflicts internationally. This transfer of concepts can be useful, and there are elements that older US cases share with cases from other countries, motivating an internationalization of the concept. An extensive EJ literature has concerned itself with these similarities between EJ conflicts around the world, painting a picture of grassroots resistance against cases of environmental injustice, connected to distribution of negative and positive effects, recognition and decision making processes, as it was seen in the US of the 1980s. Simultaneously, the internationalization of EJ comes with complications, as history can shape social, political, and economic characteristics in unique ways, introducing frictions between concept and reality. In Africa, colonialism and extractivism have had long-lasting and ongoing effects, necessitating a “sharpening of tools” (Ekeh, 1975), when transferring concepts that were shaped in the Global North to an African context. This thesis suggests that the literature on EJ needs some more of this sharpening. Intra-movement dynamics and how they are affected by historically shaped power dynamics are underrepresented questions, that is especially relevant in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where dependence on foreign NGO funding can complicate relations between the international, national, and local level. Understanding how these complexities shape the EJ movement in SSA is relevant, because it can give insights into how NGOs should operate between donors and the grassroots to make a positive contribution to environmental justice initiatives.

Deliberations on the topic originated in the US of the 1980s, where predominantly black communities organized against the unequal distribution of toxic contamination (Capek, 1993). Today, EJ has taken on a broader meaning as what social movement theorists consider a

master frame of collective action, that can be applied globally, and includes a range of justice interpretations (Schlosberg, 2009). The environmental justice (EJ) movement is considered to be global (Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2016), united by a shared vocabulary, similar issues and responses, with recent empirical efforts being collected in the Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas) (Temper, Bene and Martinez-Alier, 2015). While recent literature has discussed unifying elements (Temper, Bene and Martinez-Alier, 2015; Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2016; Scheidel *et al.*, 2020; Dell'Angelo *et al.*, 2021), relatively little attention has been paid to potential shortcomings of extending the EJ frame to countries across the Global South. Some studies have discussed dynamics surrounding NGOs and their actions between the international and the local level, often situated within a postcolonial context (Igoe, 2003; Sakue-Collins, 2021). No study has moved beyond a focus on a small number of cases and connected its analysis to the broader conceptions of the EJ movement.

To fill this research gap, this thesis will answer the research question how foreign NGO funding affects dynamics within the EJ movement in SSA. In doing so, it will discuss the caveats of extending the EJ frame to SSA, with a specific focus on intra-movement dynamics shaped by power relations between international and national NGOs and local people, often summarized as “the grassroots”. I will argue that the reliance on foreign funding that has been documented across SSA contributes to intra-movement complexities that differ from traditional understandings of the EJ movement. This argument is made in two steps. Using descriptive statistics, I show that local EJOs (LEJOs), which are often considered as part of the grassroots in the EJ literature, tend to be relatively independent from grassroots support in SSA, likely because of their reliance on foreign donors. This seems to be a significant difference from the “original” EJ movement in the US, a notion that I then interrogate using a qualitative approach. Through between-case analysis, I assess intra-movement dynamics in a subset of cases from Kenya and compare to cases from SSA countries that have introduced restrictions on foreign NGO funding, showing that Kenyan cases tend to include significant intra-movement conflict. Revolving around varied understandings of environmental justice, themes of intra-movement conflict in Kenya are identified, ranging from underrepresented diversity of opinion, conflicts surrounding nature conservation, complex historical contexts, resistance to achieve inclusion, to usage of shared EJ movement vocabulary, even when their applicability is questionable.

The thesis proceeds as follows: First, a literature review will lay out relevant concepts from social movement theory, postcolonial scholarship, and EJ literature. Second, I will shortly introduce the methods used in the analysis. Third, the quantitative part of the analysis will discuss a large sample of EJ conflicts from the EJAtlas (Temper, Bene and Martinez-Alier, 2015). Fourth, a between-case analysis will take a closer look at a subset from the original sample. Lastly, a conclusion will synthesize takeaways from both parts of the analysis and discuss limitations.

2. Literature Review

The EJ movement emerged in the context of conflicts surrounding the unequal distribution of toxic contamination in US communities in the 1980s and 1990s (Capek, 1993). Since, its ideas and values have spread, amounting to what some perceive as a global movement (Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2016), revolving around cases of resistance against ecological distribution conflicts, where externalities from environmental interventions are unequally distributed, often to the detriment of marginalized populations. While many of the conflicts are local, Martinez-Alier *et al.* (2016) argue that they fit into classes, reappearing globally, with similar reasons for and types of mobilization, as well as a common vocabulary. The EJAtlas (Temper, Bene and Martinez-Alier, 2015) catalogues these cases, providing an overview over the extent of the movement. The following section will lay out the theoretical foundations of discussions surrounding the EJ movement, point out shortcomings connected to intra-movement dynamics, and highlight possible improvements. First, the EJ literature will be situated within a literature on social movements, that has identified environmental justice as a collective action frame (Capek, 1993; Benford and Snow, 2000). Conceptions of EJ will be discussed, both from a justice theory standpoint (Schlosberg, 2009), and in empirical studies of the EJ movement (Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2016; Dell'Angelo *et al.*, 2021). It will become clear that the existing literature has shortcomings in its treatment of intra-movement heterogeneity and power asymmetries, that inhibit its ability to analyse relations between grassroots actors, NGOs, and foreign donors, especially in an African context. An inclusion of a postcolonial perspective on African civil society (Ekeh, 1975; Igoe, 2003; Ferguson, 2006; Osaghae, 2006; Sakue-Collins, 2021), and "senses of justice" from political ecology (Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2020) should alleviate these concerns. Lastly, I will explain how this paper will use these suggestions to analyse the interactions of grassroots actors, NGOs, and foreign donors in environmental conflicts, to provide a more nuanced picture of the EJ movement in SSA.

The EJ movement is a social movement, a term that comes from an extensive literature in sociology, often called social movement theory. The literature identifies three key characteristics of social movements, which I will use to illustrate the cornerstones of the EJ movement: conflictual issues, collective identity, and networks between a plurality of actors (Diani, 1992, p. 17). Firstly, the main conflictual issue for the EJ movement is ecological distribution, for example connected to mining, fossil fuel extraction or land conflicts

(Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2016). While distribution is central, other understandings of justice matter. Schlosberg adds recognition, procedural justice, and capabilities to form a broad understanding of what justice signifies in the context of the EJ movement (Schlosberg, 2009). Recognition means who is given respect and whose interests are recognized as important, while procedural justice is concerned with who has influence on the decision-making process (Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2020). Connected to Sen and Nussbaum (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2003), a focus on capabilities captures the extent to which those affected by environmental interventions can live lives that they deem valuable.

Secondly, a collective identity is reflected in a common vocabulary, that has evolved since the 1980s (Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2016). The movement has produced concepts and slogans itself and picked up others from academia. Common concepts are “environmental racism”, “ecologically unequal exchange”, or “energy, water and food sovereignty”. Within the social movement literature, the production of such a collective identity is often called framing. Framing can be understood as “meaning work” that social movements do, to produce “action-oriented sets of beliefs that legitimate activities and campaigns” (Benford and Snow, 2000). The outcome of this process is a collective action frame (COA), which is sometimes very limited in scope, but other times has broader appeal. COAs with especially broad appeal are called master frames, and Benford and Snow identify the environmental justice frame as one of them. As a master frame, environmental justice emerged during the foundation of the original EJ movement in the US and has been extended to a multitude of other local and global cases, where similar problems are met with similar concepts and slogans.

Lastly, the EJ movement includes networks between a wide range of actors. The EJ frame is often attributed to grassroots effort, such as in Capek’s discussion of the US EJ movement, where affected local people claimed their rights in line with their grassroots interpretation of events (Capek, 1993). Similarly, Martinez-Alier *et al.* (2016) identify LEJOs as the main mobiliser in conflicts listed in the EJAtlas. These EJOs are generally treated as bottom-up network-based organizations, in theory including both professionalized NGOs and more informal organizations (Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2014). Of course, non-grassroots actors are involved, ranging from trade unions to religious groups and international EJOs. Social movement theory concedes that a multitude of involved actors means that there is significant variation of interpretation within master frames (Benford and Snow, 2000). From a justice

theory perspective, Schlosberg (2009) tries to accommodate this by adopting a broad and open understanding of environmental justice. While the empirical literature surrounding environmental justice is aware of the wide range of involved actors, the EJ movement is portrayed as relatively homogenous in their actions and motivations (Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2020). Martinez-Alier et al. (2016) mention connections between local and international EJOs, but the discussion is limited to grassroots organisations connecting themselves internationally to strengthen their campaigns and does not mention potential power asymmetries.

This simplification of a complex social movement suggests an understanding of civil society that is puzzling given the literature's closeness to critical theory. As Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2020) point out, environmental justice shares "a history of pluralism and an openness to integrating new theoretical insights" with political ecology, another important critical approach to socio-environmental analysis. The approach that is apparent in some of the environmental justice literature seems closer to liberal conceptions of civil society, that see it as an inherently good and necessary third sector between individual and state (Lewis and Kanji, 2009). There is little discussion of frictions within the movement, where grassroots organisations cooperate with national and international NGOs, that might have other understandings of environmental justice. A critical, Gramscian approach would seem more fitting, where civil society is seen as a space that is defined by competing interests, allowing for power asymmetries between civil society organisations (Lewis and Kanji, 2009, p. 127). Such a sensitivity is often missing in the environmental justice literature, even though power is clearly not distributed equally amongst actors that count themselves as part of the EJ movement (Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2020).

An important reason for power asymmetries within civil society is the funding that many civil society organisations rely on to finance their activism. An especially large reliance on foreign funding exists in SSA, and specifically East Africa. In Kenya, 86 % of funds for NGOs come from foreign countries, mostly from Europe or the US (NGOs Co-ordination Board (NCB), 2020), which influences how NGOs can operate. Ferguson (2006) points out that civil society is especially influential in many African countries, empowered by neoliberal initiatives to promote civil society in developing countries (Ferguson, 2006, p. 96), and strong demand for its services in the absence of large state capabilities (p. 103). These special characteristics of

civil society in many African states have been analysed by postcolonial scholars (Ekeh, 1975; Osaghae, 2006; Sakue-Collins, 2021). A study of a Tanzanian pastoralist land-rights movement shows how community based social movements, that are relatively uncoordinated and operate in a way that is familiar to local populations, can evolve into professionalised NGOs, that are more coordinated, international and foreign-funded (Igoe, 2003). Importantly, this transformation led to decreased downward accountability to their communities, instead turning the NGOs into gatekeepers between Western donors and local populations. In a similar, broader criticism, Sakue-Collins (2021) argues that because of their large reliance on foreign funding, NGOs in Africa often are relegated to being “ideological foot soldiers”, promoting western ideals and models.

The environmental justice literature has failed to fully incorporate these complexities and has shown a tendency to portray the movement as somewhat homogenous (Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2020). The EJAtlas and connected studies such as Martinez-Alier et al. (2016) or Dell’Angelo et al. (2021), list a broad range of mobilising groups, but they do not discuss power asymmetries between them. Schlosberg (2009) acknowledges that different understandings of environmental justice exist within the movement, but contention is only analysed as among academics, and vis-à-vis a collective EJ movement. Whether foreign funding makes EJOs more accountable downwards towards the grassroots and local people, or upwards towards donors is usually not discussed. These shortcomings mean that discussions of the environmental justice movement in East Africa are failing to recognise key insights from postcolonial scholars that have described African civil society as shaped by colonialism, neoliberalism and heavily influenced by foreign funding.

This paper will attempt to fill this research gap by including insights from postcolonial scholars and political ecology. In line with conceptions of master frames from social movement theory, Martinez-Alier et al. (2016) convincingly argue that a global environmental justice movement exists, seen in recurring classes of EJ conflicts and a shared vocabulary among actors within the movement. Studies have discussed this, theoretically and empirically but intra-movement power relations, especially brought on by foreign funding deserve more attention. In their discussion of recognition and procedural justice within the EJ movement, Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2020) argue for an inclusion of “senses of justice” and political ecology theory of power to improve the understanding of heterogeneity within the movement. Establishing

senses of justice means capturing as exactly as possible how the people directly affected by an intervention interpret events. This is important, because in EJ conflicts, dominant and critical narratives can emerge that instrumentalise local concerns instead of recognising them at face value (Pellow, 2017). Inspired by political ecology, Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2020) argue that discussions of EJ should include power theory, focusing on how individual actors exercise power inside the movement, how structural power functions across scale and space, and how discursive power shapes narratives.

With these suggestions in mind, this paper will answer the research question how foreign funding affects power dynamics among actors in the SSA EJ movement. The environmental justice literature and the EJAtlas highlight the important role of grassroots actors but have paid little attention to how these grassroots actors interact with local, national, and international NGOs. In a SSA context, a more nuanced discussion of how these interactions are affected by foreign funding is necessary.

3. Methods

Leading into this methods section, I want to discuss my positionality, and how it has affected the choice of methods. I did not grow up in the study area, and my personal experience with the region is limited to a 1-year stay in Tanzania. During this time, I developed scepticism towards the activities of some NGOs, which has motivated me to investigate the position of NGOs in the EJ movement. While my time in Tanzania gave me some insights into the dynamics between NGOs and local people in Tanzania and some of the neighbouring countries, I do not have first-hand experience with the topic in most of the countries discussed in this study. As a White German, I also have no personal experience with the full extent of racial dynamics surrounding this topic, that links largely white international NGOs and donors with largely Black local populations. Because my knowledge of any single case is limited, this study leads with a broad quantitative approach and uses a more detailed, but still relatively broad and comparative approach for the qualitative part of the analysis. It is impossible for me to speak for the people involved in the cases of EJ conflict that are a part of the analysis, and assessments of their positions, or senses of justice are based on the work of others. Where possible, I have used a broad selection of sources for this purpose, that reflects the broadest spectrum of standpoints that I could find evidence of. Still, my ability to fully grasp all nuances of any case is limited. I go into this study not with the claim of being able to present a complete picture, but with the goal to point out shortcomings of existing representations, and their implications for understandings of the EJ movement in SSA.

The analysis is split into a quantitative and a qualitative part. Using descriptive statistics, the quantitative part analyses a sample of 434 cases from SSA catalogued in the EJAtlas (accessed 25.01.2023). This sample represents all cases from SSA, excluding those with insufficient data for the relevant characteristics. For this paper, the focus will be on explicitly listed environmental justice organizations (EJOs), involved groups and forms of mobilization (FOM). To answer the research question, two important adjustments are made to the data. Firstly, FOM are categorized into “short-range” and “long-range” mobilization (see table 1). “Short-range” (SR) includes all FOM that necessitate significant involvement of local populations/grassroots groups, such as street protests, land occupation, refusal of compensation or blockades. “Long-range” (LR) includes types of activism that are further removed and could also be employed by a coalition that does not include a mobilized local

population. Through this clustering, the existence of SR can be interpreted as evidence for “true” grassroots engagement. On the flipside, absence of SR must not mean a lack of grassroots involvement. Since the existence of SR contains more information than the existence of LR, the analysis will focus on the former.

The second modification is a collection of all grassroots groups in one cluster. “Grassroots” in this case means all groups that are not fully professionalized (international EJOs, scientists or other professionals) or institutionalized (e.g., trade unions or religious groups) (Scheidel *et al.*, 2020). Grouping these actors together should not be seen as a suggestion that they are homogenous in their positions or actions; the clustering is simply done to gain insights into the relations between “outside” NGOs and actors that are directly affected by a conflict. Justified by evidence laid out above that professionalization of NGOs, especially in African countries, can lead to a disconnect between NGOs and the grassroots, LEJOs are excluded from the grassroots cluster. Motivated by my research question, they instead become one of the main units of analysis. Besides the above-mentioned literature, some justification for this decision can also be found in the data, as will be discussed later.

The qualitative part of the analysis builds on the outcomes of the quantitative analysis and provides examples of how intra-movement dynamics are affected by foreign funding in practice. A subset of 30 cases (see table 2) will be used to assess whether NGOs in SSA are more independent from grassroots support when foreign funding plays a larger role. Within this subset, 19 cases are from Kenya, where relatively detailed accounts of NGO funding exist (NGOs Co-ordination Board (NCB), 2020) and in 2019/20, 86 % of NGO funds came from foreign sources. Comparing this sample to the complete sample from before reveals that there are no significant differences in the shares of constellations or FOM, making Kenya a useful sub-sample that should be relatively representative regarding the relation between NGOs and the rest of civil society in the EJ movement. From 38 initial Kenyan cases, 19 had to be removed because of insufficient literature besides the EJAtlas entry.

As negative cases, I use a subset of all cases from countries where NGOs’ foreign funding is restricted, after the year in which the relevant legislation was introduced. The list of the countries that also appear in the EJAtlas for SSA and corresponding years includes Benin (law adopted in 2003), Cameroon (1999), Sierra Leone (2009), Sudan (2006), Uganda (2009), Zimbabwe (2004), as well as Ethiopia (2009) (Dupuy, Ron and Prakash, 2015; Dupuy and

Prakash, 2022). Again, cases with insufficient literature were removed from the sample. In table 2, positive cases, so cases from Kenya, are visible as green and negative cases as yellow. In the last column, “IMD” stands for intra-movement diversity of opinion, within grassroots groups and between the grassroots and NGOs. “0” means that the EJ movement in this case is relatively united. Some degree of intra-movement diversity of opinion most likely still exists, but judging from the literature it is less significant than elsewhere. “1” means that significant IMD exists, and is acknowledged by NGOs/EJAtlas, while in cases with a “2”, IMD is not fully acknowledged or even misrepresented by NGOs/EJAtlas. A “3” signifies that within a case there is open conflict between grassroots groups and NGOs. For the purposes of this analysis, a “2” or “3” is interpreted as the existence of intra-movement conflict, and potentially problematic for an EJ movement that is identified as a grassroots movement. The sources that these assessments are based on usually include ethnographic studies or reports with direct or indirect quotes from local people as well as surveys, indicating how the people who are directly affected perceive the conflict. The stances of local, national, or international NGOs are assessed through NGO documents, reports, and through the EJAtlas, which presents itself as an “activist knowledge base” (EJOLT, no date d), and can be seen as one representation of how EJ conflicts are interpreted by international observers.

4. Analysis

4.1. Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative part of the analysis will focus on a large set of SSA cases from the EJAtlas. Motivated by contradictions between the empirical EJ literature, portraying the EJ movement in SSA as relatively homogenous, and critical and postcolonial scholars, who highlight power asymmetries produced by civil society's dependence on foreign funding, I will take a close look at how actors interact with each other and what insights can be gained from the EJAtlas into how local, national, and international EJOs relate to local populations.

4.1.1. Overview

Looking at the distribution of FOM and involved groups, the following section will provide an overview over the dataset and show why NGO activity within the EJ movement in SSA is relevant. The sub-sample of the EJAtlas used in this paper consists of 434 cases, with the earliest starting in 1911 and the most recent in 2022. Most cases are recent, with 75 % starting after 2003. Old cases were not removed, because all of them are or were ongoing long after. The sample covers 42 countries, with most cases coming from Nigeria (85 cases), South Africa (61), Kenya (38), Madagascar (18), and Mozambique (18).

Table 1: Forms of mobilization

Form of mobilization	count
<i>Involvement of national and international NGOs</i>	279
<i>Development of a network/collective action</i>	217
<i>Official complaints/petitions</i>	211
<i>Media based</i>	190
<i>Creation of alternative reports/knowledge</i>	183
Street protests	177
<i>Public campaigns</i>	171
<i>Judicial activism</i>	146
<i>Community-based participative research</i>	101
<i>Development of alternative proposals</i>	96
<i>EIA objections</i>	76

<i>Appeals against valuation of environment</i>	60
Blockades	55
Occupations of land/public spaces	42
<i>Arguments for rights of mother nature</i>	36
Strikes	36
Property damage	35
Sabotage	27
Threats to use arms	25
<i>Artistic/creative action</i>	16
Refusal of compensation	13
<i>Boycotts of official procedures</i>	12
<i>Boycotts of company products</i>	10

italic: long-range; bold: short-range

Table 1 shows FOM that appear at least ten times. LR activism (420 cases) is overall more frequent than SR (221). Most cases involve more than one form of mobilization, sometimes only from the LR category (49.1%), sometimes from both LR and SR (47.7%) and seldomly only SR (3.2 %). Among specific forms, networking – nationally and internationally – seems to play an especially large role.

The importance of networks can also be seen when looking at the EJOs that appear across the most countries in the sample. The most prominent NGOs such as Friends of the Earth (FoE), Greenpeace, Nature, the WWF, the Oakland Institute or one of their regional versions all appear in cases from over 10 countries and in at least 18 cases overall. FoE, together with their Nigerian version Environmental Rights Action (ERA) appear in 136 cases overall, including all cases from Nigeria. Some EJOs might be under- or overrepresented, but large transnational NGOs are clearly an important part of the EJ movement in SSA, linking cases across the continent and distributing the movement’s “common vocabulary” (Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2016).




Figure 1: Constellations

Networks are also common within cases. Figure 1 shows case counts for each group and all possible constellations. 407 out of 434 cases include at least one grassroots group, 304 cases include local and 217 cases international EJOs. The EJ movement in SSA, as represented in the EJAtlas, is clearly grassroots-dependent. While there are some cases where a group is not accompanied by at least one of the others, alliances are common. Overall, the broadest constellation – international, local, and grassroots – is most frequent (149 cases). Together with the two most frequent FOM representing some type of networking, this suggests that groups tend to look for allies both nationally and internationally, which has been documented elsewhere (Edwards, Hulme and Wallace, 1999).

Regarding the possible impact of foreign funding on intra-movement relations, this subsection has revealed two relevant characteristics of the EJ movement in SSA, as documented in the EJAtlas. Firstly, grassroots groups are a part of most cases, and they tend to be included in alliances that can include both local and international NGOs. Secondly, NGOs matter. They are part of most cases, and especially large transnational NGOs are linking cases across SSA.

While this section has not yet answered the research question, it has highlighted that within SSA, grassroots, local and international EJOs all play a significant role and are interdependent within and across cases, making further investigations into their actions within the EJ movement relevant.

4.1.2. Involved groups and forms of mobilization: Explanatory power and limitations

To gain insight into the interactions between NGOs and local people in an environment shaped by foreign funding, I will now analyse the relationship between the different group constellations and the FOM that appear in each case. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it can help validate the clusters. If grassroots groups are more likely to employ short-range activism than the other groups, then the chosen clusters are probably reasonable. Secondly, if SR is closely related to grassroots groups, but not others, then SR can be seen as evidence that grassroots groups play a significant role within a case. If the types of activism associated with each group vary, then this might be an indication that there are differences between groups that are reliant on foreign funding and groups that are not. Limitations remain, which mean that any takeaways will be interpreted with caution. A more detailed discussion of the limitations of the EJAtlas for the analysis of intra-movement dynamics will follow later.

Figure 2 gives an overview over constellations and their choice of FOM in percent out of all relevant cases. Firstly, LR exists in nearly all cases, meaning that “SR only” is very rare. There is some variation, and “SR only” seems the likeliest when grassroots groups act without any support from international or LEJOs. Secondly, grassroots groups are perfectly capable of LR activism, as even when only grassroots groups are active, a large majority of cases involve LR activism. Thirdly, when grassroots are not involved, there is no SR activism, except in one case. This validates our clustering, and together with the preceding point suggests that SR can be seen as evidence of engaged grassroots groups. Clearly, SR is more closely associated with grassroots groups than it is with international and local EJOs. For international EJOs, this is unsurprising, but even LEJOs seem to not be as closely tied to local people as suggested by the literature, and in most cases likely represent professionalized NGOs, rather than other types of informal EJOs (Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2014).




Figure 2: involved groups (I – international EJOs, L – LEJOs, G – grassroots groups) and their choice of FOM.

Overall, there are 221 cases involving short range activism, 14 of which are “SR only” and 207 that involve both types of activism. As mentioned, except for one case, they always involve at least one grassroots group. SR is most likely when there is a broad coalition (“ILG”), as nearly 60 % of cases include either “sr only” or “lr+sr”. SR activism is not just more likely when at least one grassroots group is involved, but even more likely when involved grassroots groups are numerous. Excluding the cases with no grassroots involvement, the mean of the number of involved grassroots groups is 3.9 when no SR is documented and rises to 4.7 when it is. This could mean that a broader coalition of grassroots groups have more power vis-à-vis the EJOs.

The data suggests that international and importantly also LEJOs within the EJ movement function differently from grassroots groups. For international EJOs this is unsurprising, but it seems that LEJOs should be separated from the grassroots too. Caution is still necessary, especially because the likelihood of one group appearing in a case can be correlated to the appearance of another. Because LEJOs often appear together with at least one grassroots

group, it is difficult to say whether the choice of FOM within a case is driven by the EJOs or by the grassroots. To get a more robust answer, it would be helpful to see which FoM groups choose when they are isolated. Unfortunately, the sample size for this is small, as can be seen in Figure 3. Out of all grassroots groups and LEJOs, there are only 5 groups that appear without other grassroots groups at least once. LEJOs appear without any grassroots groups the most, and farmers are the only group that appears alone more than twice. That LEJOs seem to be the most independent is interesting because in the US and Canada, where the kind of funding power asymmetries discussed within SSA are not documented, LEJOs never appear without grassroots support. Reliance on foreign funding is of course only one difference between SSA EJOs and North American EJOs, making inference difficult. Additionally, it is possible that differences can be explained by variation in methodology between different contributors to the EJAtlas.




Figure 3: Isolated groups and FOM

Out of the 15 cases where LEJOs appear without a grassroots group, only one involves SR activism. Despite the small sample size, the evidence from Figure 3 points in the same

direction as the preceding data. Out of all groups that could be argued to have strong downwards accountability, LEJOs are the most independent, and when isolated they seldomly employ SR activism. This evidence, weakened by a small sample size, becomes more robust when compared with cases from North America, where EJOs never appear without grassroots support. Foreign funding could be one of the reasons for these circumstances, which would be in line with postcolonial literature. If LEJOs depend on foreign funds for survival, it is intuitive that they would be more accountable towards foreign donors, and less towards local people. Nevertheless, given the correlations between different groups and small sample size that some pieces of evidence are based on, takeaways from a strictly quantitative approach based on the EJAtlas should be taken with a grain of salt. Additionally, the evidence presented up to this point does not fully answer my research question. It has provided cautious confirmation of my initial hypothesis that LEJOs are somewhat disconnected from grassroots groups, and that some power asymmetries exist between grassroots groups and EJOs. It remains unclear how this disconnect affects power relations within the EJ movement in practice. Given these limitations, the next section will analyse a small subset of cases, complementing the quantitative analysis up to this point with a qualitative approach.

4.2. Qualitative Analysis

The following section has two goals, namely testing the takeaways from the quantitative part and providing a qualitative illustration of how intra-movement diversity takes shape in practice. I will test the hypothesis that NGOs in SSA are less dependent on grassroots support when large shares of foreign funding are involved by employing a between-case analysis. A subset of Kenyan EJAtlas cases that is small enough to take a closer look at individual cases, and where there is clear evidence that foreign funding plays a crucial role will be compared to cases in SSA countries that have imposed restrictions on foreign funding of NGOs. Along the way, by identifying key themes of intra-movement conflict across the sample's cases, I will illustrate how foreign funding affects dynamics between actors within the EJ movement, especially regarding the connection between varying interpretations of environmental justice that have been identified in the literature, and senses of justice that occur in practice.

Table 2: Subset from Kenya/other SSA countries

Case	Country	Type	Groups	Target	Sources	IMD
Kinangop Wind Park, Nyandarua County	Kenya	Fossil Fuels and Climate Justice/Energy	G	UK company + State Company + international funds	(Reuters, 2016; Pueyo, 2018; Renkens, 2019)	0
Titanium Mining in the Kwale District	Kenya	Mineral Ores and Building Materials Extraction	G	Companies (Canada, China, Australia)	(Abuya, 2013, 2016; Chelagat, 2015; Omedo <i>et al.</i> , 2022)	2
Lake Bogoria Game Reserve evicts Endorois communities	Kenya	Biomass and Land Conflicts	IG	State	(Lynch, 2012; MRGI, 2014; Little, 2016)	1
Standard Gauge Railway Project Phase 1 Mombasa to Nairobi	Kenya	Infrastructure and Built Environment	IG	Chinese company	(Wang and Wissenbach, 2019; Alden and Otele, 2022)	2
Lake Turkana Wind Power Project	Kenya	Fossil Fuels and Climate Justice/Energy	IL	Companies and funds from different countries (Norway, UK, South Africa etc.)	(Sena, 2015; Cormack and Kurewa, 2018; Olsen and Westergaard-Kabelmann, 2018)	0
Amboseli National Park; downgrading to a game reserve	Kenya	Biodiversity conservation conflicts	ILG	Government Institutions	(Okello <i>et al.</i> , 2011; Unks <i>et al.</i> , 2021)	3
Yala Swamp, Large scale farming	Kenya	Biodiversity conservation conflicts	ILG	US company	(Kinari, 2008; Githiora-Murimi <i>et al.</i> , 2022; Maua <i>et al.</i> , 2022)	2
Tarda agricultural farming in Tana River Delta	Kenya	Biodiversity conservation conflicts	ILG	Kenyan Company	(Smalley and Corbera, 2012; Neville, 2015)	0

Threats facing the Tana River Primate Reserve	Kenya	Biodiversity conservation conflicts	ILG	State Institutions	(Moinde-Fockler <i>et al.</i> , 2007; Mulu, 2011)	1
Biofuels plantation farming in Dakatcha	Kenya	Biomass and Land Conflicts	ILG	Italian Company	(ActionAid, 2011; ClientEarth, 2011; A Rocha Kenya, no date)	0
Bedford Biofuels Jatropha, Tana Delta	Kenya	Biomass and Land Conflicts	ILG	Canadian company	(Hunsberger, 2010; Smalley and Corbera, 2012; Krijtenburg and Evers, 2014)	2
Enchroachment on Mau Forests Complex	Kenya	Biomass and Land Conflicts	ILG	Government, "Encroachers"	(Langat <i>et al.</i> , 2016; Mutune <i>et al.</i> , 2017; Albertazzi <i>et al.</i> , 2018; Chabeda-Barthe and Haller, 2018)	2
Lamu Port and related infrastructure	Kenya	Infrastructure and Built Environment	ILG	Companies (Korean, Chinese)	(Nunow, 2012; Chome, 2020; Kamau and Khsiebi, 2022; Save Lamu, no date)	2
Floriculture on Lake Naivasha	Kenya	Biomass and Land Conflicts	LG	Companies (Kenya, Canada, India)	(Kuiper, 2017; Styles, 2019)	3
Illegal Logging in Chuka Forest	Kenya	Biomass and Land Conflicts	LG	Illegal loggers	(Kimani, 2007; Mugambi, 2019)	0
Exploration of Oil in Block 10BB and Block 13T, Turkana	Kenya	Fossil Fuels and Climate Justice/Energy	LG	Companies (Canada, UK)	(Enns and Bersaglio, 2015; Johannes, Zulu and Kalipeni, 2015; Mkutu <i>et al.</i> , 2019; Mkutu and Mdee, 2020)	0
Isiolo Airport	Kenya	Infrastructure and Built Environment	LG	Kenyan State Companies	(Kibugi, Mwathane and Makathimo, 2016; Economic and Social Rights Centre (Hakijamii), 2017)	0
Sand mining and related violence in Makeni County	Kenya	Mineral Ores and Building Materials Extraction	LG	Government/Illegal miners	(Muthomi <i>et al.</i> , 2015; Daghar, 2022)	1
Lead acid batteries recycling factory in Mombasa	Kenya	Waste Management	LG	Indian Company (with Kenyan partner)	(Miller, 2015; Watts, 2020)	0

Agricultural land investment deal in Djidja	Benin	Biomass and Land Conflicts	ILG	Companies (China, Italy, Nigeria, Benin)	(Nonfodji, 2017)	0
Plantation de Haut Penja	Cameroon	Biomass and Land Conflicts	G	Cameroonian affiliate of French company	(Pemunta, 2014; Tiafack and Winslace, 2021)	0
Ruchi Agri Soybean operation in Gambela	Ethiopia	Biomass and Land Conflicts	I	Indian company	(Rowden, no date; <i>Grabbing Gambela</i> , no date)	0
Gambela agri-export land dispossessions	Ethiopia	Biomass and Land Conflicts	IG	Indian and Saudi Companies	(Horne, 2012b; Oakland Institute, 2013; Adeto and Abate, 2014)	0
MIDROC Gold Mine, Lege Dembi	Ethiopia	Mineral Ores and Building Materials Extraction	IG	Saudi Company	(Jima, 2021; Regassa and Tadesse, 2021; Regassa, 2022)	0
Lower Omo Valley irrigated agriculture development	Ethiopia	Biomass and Land Conflicts	ILG	Companies (Ethiopia, India)	(Horne, 2012a; Kamski, 2016; Gebeyehu and Abbink, 2022)	0
Sierra Leone Agriculture (SIVA Group) biopalm project in Port Loko	Sierra Leone	Biomass and Land Conflicts	ILG	Companies (Sierra Leone, Malaysia, Singapore, India)	(Baxter, 2011, 2013; Menzel, 2015; Podder, no date)	0
Addax Bioenergy bioethanol project in Makeni	Sierra Leone	Biomass and Land Conflicts	ILG	Company (China/Switzerland)	(Baxter, 2011; Wedin <i>et al.</i> , 2013; Fielding <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	1
Gold Mining	Sudan	Mineral Ores and Building Materials Extraction	G	Companies (Sudan and elsewhere)	(Elhashmi, 2017; Ille, 2018)	0
Ethanol Fuel Plant Land Conflict	Zimbabwe	Industrial and Utilities conflicts	LG	Zimbabwean Companies	(Konyana and Sipeyiye, 2015; Matondi and Rutherford, 2021)	1
DTZ OZGEO Gold Penhalonga	Zimbabwe	Mineral Ores and Building Materials Extraction	LG	Company (Zimbabwe/Russia)	(Chimonyo and Mupfumi, 2012; Chipangura, 2019)	0

Legend: IMD = intra-movement diversity of opinion (0 – low IMD, 1 – acknowledged IMD, 2 – underrepresented/neglected IMD, 3 – open conflict; see section 3 for detailed explanation); I = international EJOs; L = local EJOs; G = grassroots groups

Source (columns 1-5): (Temper, Bene and Martinez-Alier, 2015)

4.2.1. Intra-movement dynamics in Kenya

The upcoming section will focus on Kenyan EJAtlas cases, aiming to establish whether the patterns identified in section 4.1. are observable, and how they take shape in practice. Identifying five themes, I will show that intra-movement relations in Kenya are often more complicated than expected, paving the way for a comparison with cases from countries with funding restrictions.

Out of the 19 Kenyan cases listed in table 2, ten show relatively low IMD. Of course, smaller disagreements likely exist, but NGOs and grassroots groups seem to work together as a somewhat united social movement. For some, the reasons for this are immediately clear. In the case of a “Lead batteries recycling factory” in Mombasa, pollution stemming from the factory seriously threatened local people’s health (Watts, 2020), meaning that significant nuances of opinion within the local population and the EJ movement seem unlikely. In other cases, differences between local people’s perception of the conflict and NGOs’ priorities exist but are acknowledged by the EJAtlas. In Tana River Primate Reserve protecting endangered primates must be balanced with the interests of local Pokomo people, that have had problems with primates raiding their crops and attacking livestock (Mulu, 2011), but these complexities are acknowledged by the EJAtlas and finding a solution for local people is presented as a goal, along with protecting endangered species (EJOLT, no date h). This acknowledgment of nuance is necessary if NGOs, or other actors that self-identify as part of the EJ movement and are not directly affected by a conflict want to ensure the grassroots character of the movement does not appear as only performative.

There are nine cases that include intra-movement conflict. Mostly, diversity of opinion is not fully acknowledged, while in two cases, there is open intra-movement conflict. Interesting themes can be identified, illustrating how foreign funding, NGOs depending on it, and INGOs produce a complex picture of the EJ movement in SSA. These themes will now be discussed in more detail, revolving around some of the main interpretations of environmental justice identified in the literature.

Theme 1: Diverse opinions among local people are sometimes under- or misrepresented.

In cases with some degree of intra-movement conflict, diversity of opinion among local people is met with varying strategies. Especially larger international NGOs seem to try to include

direct quotes from local people, carry out broad surveys (ActionAid, 2013), suggesting an awareness that they need to appear legitimate in their activism, and try to do so by demonstrating representativeness (Atack, 1999). There are, however, cases where this diversity is not acknowledged or underrepresented, if it does not align with the agenda of the NGOs that are active in the case. This might not be problematic in the case of local organizations, that are closely connected to the grassroots themselves, but becomes more questionable when done by international or national NGOs who are further removed.

In the case of Titanium Mining in Kwale County, local resistance against the project, that has displaced many, clearly exists, as is portrayed in the EJAtlas (EJOLT, no date i). Simultaneously, views on the project are diverse, with some seeing job creation and improvements of infrastructure as positive (Chelagat, 2015). The case of Lamu Port gives further insights. As part of the Lamu Port and South Sudan Ethiopia Transport corridor, the Kenyan government planned to construct a modern port in Lamu County, which was met by resistance, organized under the umbrella organization “Save Lamu” (Chome, 2020; Save Lamu, no date). Concerns with the project range from unjust land acquisitions, over access restriction for fishermen, to lacking compensation (Nunow, 2012). “Save Lamu” advocates for awareness of the challenges affecting the region, and recognition of social identity and natural resource rights (‘About Save Lamu – Save Lamu’, no date). What seems like straight-forward grassroots resistance against injustice in line with dominant EJ narratives, is more complicated at closer range. While clearly, grassroots groups are engaged and perceive the project as potentially negative, “Save Lamu” does not represent the views of all local people who might be affected by the project. Other studies report that views of the project are differentiated along lines of gender, ethnicity and class, leading to a diverse set of expectations and corresponding opinions (Chome, 2020). It is not surprising that “Save Lamu” does not discuss these nuances extensively, but neither does the EJAtlas (EJOLT, no date g), suggesting a picture of a homogenous local population, working to stop the project.

Diversity of opinion always exists but is often underreported by stakeholders within these cases. This is not surprising, as neither grassroots groups, nor NGOs claim to be unbiased observers. Opinions that do not fit into an agenda might be picked up by academic work but are unlikely to gain the support from national or international NGOs, which depend on funding from abroad, and are less reliant on broad grassroots support. This underrepresentation of

certain stances within the directly affected community distorts the picture of the sub-Saharan African EJ movement that reaches the broader public outside of the local area where the conflict takes place. The automatism of “injustice leads to grassroots resistance” cannot be generalized across cases in SSA, where diversity of opinion is as prevalent as anywhere else. For the EJ movement, this means that environmental justice is not something that can always be easily achieved, because varying views on fair distribution, recognition, processes, or appropriate improvements of capabilities (Schlosberg, 2009) exist within affected local populations. Themes 2 and 3 provide examples of where these varying views can come from and how they might be framed by NGOs and observers.

Theme 2: Resistance to Achieve Inclusion

In some cases, actors mobilize to achieve inclusion instead of outright stopping a project. In other words, grassroots resistance is often motivated by a desire to accrue a larger share of the benefits, and not by a desire to stop the target project. This theme is documented for cases in Kenya (Cormack and Kurewa, 2018) and countries with funding restrictions alike (ActionAid, 2013), but in Kenya there seem to be more cases where the EJAtlas or NGOs present the case in a way that suggests that local people want to stop the project. The EJAtlas in the case of Lamu Port writes of “community resistance” and a “petition to stop the project”, but no mention is made of nuanced opinions that are documented elsewhere, for example fishermen not categorically opposing the project, but just expecting larger benefits (Chome, 2020; Kamau and Khsiebi, 2022). In the case of Titanium mining in Kwale County, a study reports that, while local people were unhappy with their displacement due to the mining operation, the focus of resistance was insufficient compensation and corporate social responsibility projects, and not the existence of the project (Abuya, 2013), which is not mentioned in the EJAtlas (EJOLT, no date i). Undoubtedly, actors that aim to stop the project exist, but so do actors who seek recognition of their point of view, distribution of benefits, and effective mitigation of negative consequences.

Again, what local people see as environmental justice varies across and within cases. Distributive justice is not limited to an unequal distribution of negative environmental effects but can take the form of receiving economic benefits as a compensation for negative environmental or social outcomes, such as pollution, displacement, or access restriction. Varying interpretations of environmental justice are a foundational piece of definitions of

environmental justice in the literature (Schlosberg, 2009), but the cases in Kenya show that this variation can be underreported, if the viewpoint of some actors is not in line with the motivations of NGOs or activists which are most capable of reaching a wider audience when reporting on or mobilizing for a particular case.

Theme 3: Conservation as a source of intra-movement conflict

Differences of opinion between NGOs and local people sometimes stem from disagreements around conservation. Conservation does not have to be connected to environmental justice, as its primary concern is the protection of the natural environment. Of course, this protection usually happens in areas that are also used by humans, introducing complex problems, surrounding displacement, animal-human conflict, and community-based conservation initiatives. Many of the cases with intra-movement conflict in the subset above include an element of conservation, even if their primary conflict type listed in the EJAtlas is different. This seems intuitive. Local people in these cases are often relatively poor, meaning that if there is a perceived trade-off between developmental opportunities and conservation, priorities might diverge from those of NGOs, some of which have a specific focus on conservation.

Participative approaches, that try to include local people in conservation efforts try to mitigate this problem, with varying success. Conservation initiatives in Amboseli National Park have been met with scepticism by local Maasai, who feel that their view has not been included in community-based conservation efforts, leading to resentment towards conservation NGOs (Unks *et al.*, 2021). In Yala swamp, the academic literature suggests community-based conservation as a promising solution to sustainably manage the swamp ecosystem, that benefits both conservancy and local people (Maua *et al.*, 2022). The local population is shown to be interested in participating in sustainable wetland management, but intra-movement dynamics complicate effective implementation. Another study shows that conservation experts value the ecosystem services provided by the swamp significantly higher than local fishermen and farmers (Githiora-Murimi *et al.*, 2022), complicating the cooperation between conservancy NGOs and local people that would be required for community-based conservation. Finding a workable compromise between different positions is further hindered by an unwillingness of conservation NGOs to compromise on environmental protection to achieve economic benefits, local people not being represented in environmental NGOs, and

polarization among local people, which is reinforced by this uncompromising stance (Kinaro, 2008, p. 40).

Conservation itself does not fit into the usual definitions of environmental justice, but questions surrounding distributive and procedural justice often directly arise from the impacts of conservation initiatives on local populations. In cases such as Amboseli National Park, benefits from conservation are promised, but are then not distributed according to the expectations of affected local people, leading to conflict. Some cases show local people and conservancy NGOs to be on one side of the conflict, even if motivations are different. Here, EJ conflicts revolve around the distribution of benefits or the fair inclusion of grassroots groups in management schemes, generally called procedural justice in the EJ literature (Schlosberg, 2009). Sometimes however, NGOs and some parts of local populations end up on opposite sides, as in the case of encroachment on the Mau Forest Complex, where a range of conservation NGOs try to protect forest resources, that are still being used by local people (Mutune *et al.*, 2017; Albertazzi *et al.*, 2018). Amboseli National Park is another example, where the Maasai population has been affected negatively by the initiatives of conservation NGOs. It is important to understand that framing these cases as EJ conflicts, as done by the EJAtlas, only makes sense if the interests of local people are put centre stage. While inclusion into community-based conservation, benefit-sharing or compensation for displacement and access restriction are closely connected to distributive and procedural justice, conservation itself only becomes a matter of environmental justice if it is driven by local people. Sometimes, conservation NGOs are instead the driving force, and try to recruit grassroots support after the fact, or even end up in opposition with local actors.

Theme 4: Recognition of local people can be framed differently from case to case, depending on the historical and political context.

How NGOs, whether they are internationally or nationally based, interact with local people must be understood within a specific historical and political context. These circumstances influence how both NGOs and local people perceive a conflict, and what both sides think of each other, but they also determine potential broader consequences. The foundation of Amboseli National Park restricted access to herding lands and the ways in which local Maasai could handle animal-human conflict, while not sufficiently compensating and including the local population, leading to mistrust towards conservation NGOs (Unks *et al.*, 2021). When in

2005, the Kenyan Government planned to transfer management responsibilities from national agencies to the County Council, conservation NGOs and the Kenyan Wildlife Service filed court cases and eventually stopped the motion (Veit *et al.*, 2008). Conservationists argued that the move was political, designed to secure Maasai support for a new constitution (*ibid.*), while cautioning against donors pulling out should Amboseli lose its status (The East African, 2011). The reactions to Amboseli's planned degazettement show that EJ conflicts do not take place in a vacuum, and that historical and political context shape how different actors interact, how they frame the importance of donor money and interpret a just outcome.

Even when INGOs and grassroots groups interpret justice within a case similarly, their interactions can affect EJ in complicated ways. This can be seen in the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve, in some ways an inverted case of the Amboseli National Park. While the EJAtlas frames Amboseli as a biodiversity conflict, where Maasai are supposed to be included in community conservation (EJOLT, no date b), in the case of Lake Bogoria, local Endorois fought against a conservation initiative, and for recognition as indigenous people with special land rights, supported by INGOs (Lynch, 2012). While the Maasai in the Amboseli area clearly have distinct motivations and interests, the EJAtlas and NGOs frame them as an additional consideration to the focus, which is stopping the downgrading of the National Park. The interests of the Endorois around Lake Bogoria are the main focus of the EJAtlas (EJOLT, no date f) and resistance was initialized by Endorois themselves, and only later supported by INGOs (Lynch, 2012). The Endorois case eventually led to a legal victory in front of the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights, recognising the Endorois as a distinct ethnic group with collective rights, making their displacement during the establishment of the game reserve illegal. But even in this seemingly straightforward, grassroots-driven case, things become more complicated when looking at the broader context. The Endorois case set a legal precedent for other ethnic groups to use arguments for ethnic distinctiveness as a legal strategy, which might reinforce political tribalism, and favour politically better connected ethnic groups over others (Lynch, 2012). Another ethnic group from the Lake Bogoria area that is fighting for recognition are the Il Chamus, who later got into armed conflict with the Endorois after achieving increased political representation (Little, 2016).

Lake Bogoria and Amboseli show two interesting dynamics surrounding the understanding of recognition within and beyond environmental justice conflicts in Kenya. Firstly, framing of

recognition can vary across conflicts. Sometimes, recognition of local people might be more tangential to NGOs and other international observers, providing legitimacy for another motive, as seen in the case of Amboseli National Park. Other times, local people's interests are put centre stage, as demonstrated in the case of Lake Bogoria. In both cases, local people have shown agency, but only one case sees this agency effectively amplified by NGO support. Secondly, recognition must be framed within a specific local, which NGOs are sometimes not able to do. Both the Endorois and the Il Chamus were supported by INGOs in their struggle for recognition, without fully understanding possible long term conflicts in the area and how a success in the Endorois case might affect minority rights in Kenya. Critics have argued that the parts of the international indigenous movement has been captured by donor interests, shaping the discourse accordingly (Cameron, 2003), and that in the case of the Endorois and Il Chamus, INGOs have been "naïve" about local political dynamics (Little, 2016). Whether local peoples' interests are framed as the primary focus of an EJ conflict, how they are recognized and whose voice is heard loudest are important questions that depend on the support of NGOs and other observers.

Theme 5: Shared EJ vocabulary does not always fit a case but might be used anyways.

The EJ movement shares a common vocabulary, with terms such as "land grab" or "environmental racism" appearing across cases. Often, using recognisable EJ vocabulary is both strategically useful and fitting within the context of a case. Other times, the applicability of a term is questionable, for example because it might not fit the diversity of opinion that exists within the local population. An example for each can be found within the Tana River Delta, where two companies acquired land for large-scale farming. Both times, the land deals were described as "land grabs", but one case fits this description better than the other.

In the case of Tarda Agricultural Farming, the assessment is straight-forward. Arguing for development and job creation, the company acquired its land, which was situated in an area without clearly defined property rights, through a relatively untransparent process (Smalley and Corbera, 2012). To acquire public land, consultations with or compensation of local users were not required. Because of these circumstances, the project was met with strong, and mostly united opposition (ibid.). Conservation NGOs were active in the case, but their stance on the project mirrored the stance of most local people, even if its motivations differed. In a similar case in the same area, the Canadian company Bedford Biofuels acquired land for

Jatropha curcas biofuel cultivation, and again NGOs and academics described the deal as a land grab (J. Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2014; RSPB, no date). In some respects, this makes sense. Bedford Biofuels was an international company, acquiring land for large-scale agriculture, and restricting access of local pastoralists and other land users. However, there are important differences, putting into question how fitting the label “land grab” is, or at least whether its usage obscures complexities regarding the perceptions of local people.

Firstly, the land acquired by the company was privately owned, meaning that consultations with local people, compensation, and a detailed land use plan were necessary. While problems remained, during the process of land acquisition, Bedford Biofuels was relatively transparent and considerate with the wishes of local people, leading to support in a majority of villages in the project area (Smalley and Corbera, 2012). Simultaneously, NGOs had already been active against other land acquisitions in the region, such as the case of Tarda discussed above. The new Bedford Biofuels case was added to this portfolio, without specifically discussing the differences regarding the acquisition process and local peoples’ perceptions (Krijtenburg and Evers, 2014; RSPB, no date). The NGO campaigns made an important contribution to the company eventually pulling out, which the EJAtlas includes by categorizing the case as one where environmental justice was achieved (EJOLT, no date c). There were reasonable arguments for the project not being able to deliver on its promises of development, as the economic viability of *Jatropha curcas* as a biofuel crop is questionable (Hunsberger, 2010). There were also some local people who were not in favour of the project (Smalley and Corbera, 2012). However, the campaign carried out by an alliance of national and international NGOs did not reflect the diversity of opinion existing among affected local people, many of whom were in favour of the project (Hagenström, 2022). Within this case, the use of the EJ term “land grab” obscured the perceptions, or senses of justice (Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2020), of local people.

NGOs connect cases across SSA (see section 4.1.) and are thus an important part of the transfer of ideas within the EJ movement. In the Tana River Delta, the term “land grab” was transferred, describing a specific type of land acquisition, defined by a range of characteristics. Others have pointed out that this insistence on the term land grab, and the connected assumptions regarding negative effects such as displacement and positive effects such as job creation can lead to strong recommendations based on weak evidence (Oya, 2013). Tana River

Delta shows that the transfer of ideas within the EJ movement can be both useful and problematic. Using recognisable vocabulary and descriptions is a useful tool for grassroots groups to build local-global alliances and for NGOs to increase attention or gain donor support. This transfer of ideas becomes problematic when it does not fit the local context and obscures the opinions of local people. In a truly grassroots-driven EJ movement, the senses of justice held by local people should be acknowledged in full and not instrumentalised (Pellow, 2017), even if they do not neatly line up with EJ vocabulary.

4.2.2. Intra-movement dynamics in countries with funding restrictions

I have shown that in the Kenyan EJAtlas, there is a mix of cases with and without conflictual intra-movement dynamics. As a comparison, I will now investigate a sample of negative cases for differences in the way that NGOs interact with grassroots groups. Overall, cases from countries with funding restrictions seem clearer cut. In most of the 11 cases, local people seem to perceive the conflict similarly, and are mostly in line with the stance taken by NGOs, when they are involved. Again, for some of the cases, the reasons for this are intuitive as the project that constitutes the focal point of the conflict has clear negative implications for local people with little potential advantages. In the case of Gold Mining in Penhalonga (Zimbabwe), people seem to be united against commercial mining that has moved into the area, because of drastic negative environmental effects that threaten their health and livelihoods, as well as negative effects to their income, which many derive from artisanal small-scale mining (Chimonyo and Mupfumi, 2012). For the Ethanol Fuel Plant in Zimbabwe, a large part of the local population seems to be unhappy with the project, but nuances exist (Konyana and Sipeyiye, 2015), which the EJAtlas acknowledges (EJOLT, no date e). In the case of Addax Biofuels in Sierra Leone, some highlight negative effects such as loss of biodiversity, farmland and insufficient compensation (Baxter, 2011; EJOLT, no date a), while others also mention positive effects, such as job creation and infrastructure improvements (Wedin *et al.*, 2013). The EJAtlas does not mention it, but among other sources there is little disagreement that most local people are dissatisfied, while still being in favour of the company staying in the region (ActionAid, 2013).

While cases in countries with funding restrictions seem to be less conflictual, takeaways from this relatively small subset should be handled with caution. Firstly, the political and historical context varies across countries. To what degree local NGOs can still operate with restricted or

without foreign support, depends on a range of variables, for example connected to poverty or democracy (Dupuy and Prakash, 2022). Secondly, restricting the amount of foreign funding of domestic NGOs does not directly affect international NGOs. While the work of INGOs might be hindered in countries that are trying to restrict the influence of civil society, as seen for example in Ethiopia's Gambela region (Horne, 2012a; Dupuy, Ron and Prakash, 2015), they are still directly or indirectly active in many of the cases. Still, among the cases that do not include international NGOs, none include significant intra-movement conflict, and if there is obvious intra-movement diversity of opinion, this is acknowledged by the EJAtlas or NGO reports.

4.2.3. Implications and limitations

As a final step, I will synthesize takeaways from the preceding between-case analysis, and relate them to the quantitative part, and existing theory of the EJ movement. Overall, it seems that in cases with funding restrictions, NGOs are more reliant on the grassroots, meaning that intra-movement conflict between NGOs and grassroots groups is less likely. Grassroots voices are presented in a relatively nuanced way, even if the EJ movement is not necessarily stronger for it, because legislation to restrict NGO funding has often been introduced to weaken civil society, which is seen as potential political opposition (Dupuy and Prakash, 2022). In Kenya, it seems more likely that NGOs pick and choose which interests to support and up to what point. Especially in cases that involve an element of conservation, interests of NGOs and local populations do not always align, which can lead to intra-movement conflict or actors that are traditionally considered as an integral part of the EJ movement ending up on opposing sides of a conflict. Between INGOs and grassroots groups, professionalized LEJOs can act as an entry point for foreign donors that might be easier to work with, because they often depend on foreign funding and thus have increased upward accountability (Igoe, 2003; Andrews, 2014), while still providing some legitimacy and connection to local communities. In Kenya, as in the larger sample, LEJOs seem more independent from other grassroots groups, occasionally putting the grassroots character of the EJ movement in a specific case in question. This independence seems to be less pronounced in African countries where restrictions on foreign funding exist.

This section has offered some confirmation of the main hypothesis from the quantitative part, according to which LEJOs in SSA are comparatively independent from grassroots groups, when

significant amounts of foreign funding are involved. This separation can lead to intra-movement conflict, if interests of grassroots groups and NGOs that depend on foreign funding do not align. In the preceding section, I have discussed examples of how NGOs, international and national, represent grassroots opinion. Often, interests seem to be aligned, and most actors have a similar understanding of the many aspects of environmental justice, from distribution to recognition, procedural justice, and capabilities. Other times these interpretations diverge, or senses of justice among local people are highly diverse, which some NGOs or the EJAtlas acknowledge, and some do not. The occurrence of the latter suggests that the EJ movement in SSA is not always as closely tied to the grassroots as is suggested by the (quantitative) EJ literature and experience from the “original” EJ movement in the United States (Capek, 1993; Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2016). Transferring vocabulary from and assumptions about the EJ movement taken from historical experience from the US therefore must be done with caution.

There are obvious limitations to this analysis. While the reliance on foreign funding seems to be similar between Kenya and other SSA countries, there are of course many other variables at play, affecting the dynamics between NGOs and grassroots groups within the EJ movement, meaning that broad generalizations based on a Kenyan subset are not possible. Additionally, and as mentioned before, the cases listed in the EJAtlas are likely just a snapshot of the “real” EJ movement, and coverage in SSA is comparatively sparse. Keeping these caveats in mind, interesting takeaways remain. Clearly, intra-movement dynamics are more complicated than generally acknowledged. Complexities are produced by a range of variables, one of which is African civil society’s dependence on foreign funding. This dependence has been highlighted and problematised by an extensive academic literature, and the EJ movement is not exempt from its effects, as I have shown based on a sample of over 400 EJAtlas cases and a subset from Kenya. Local, national, and international actors might work symbiotically in many cases, but SSA civil society remains a Gramscian place of contestation (Lewis and Kanji, 2009, p. 127), with distinct characteristics that have been shaped by history and interaction with an international context (Ekeh, 1975; Ferguson, 2006; Sakue-Collins, 2021). Interrogating whether the actual senses of justice held by local people are the main driving force within a conflict despite these complexities is an important step in ensuring that the EJ movement lives up to its expectation to be grassroots in nature.

5. Conclusion

In this thesis, I have set out to assess how foreign NGO funding affects intra-movement dynamics within the environmental justice movement in SSA. This question is interesting, because it allows for an interrogation of the transfer of ideas surrounding environmental justice to other contexts than its origin in the US. A common EJ vocabulary, but also the understanding of the EJ movement as grassroots driven emerged in a North American context. While the internationalization of concepts is a useful strategic instrument for activists, and often explains conflicts quite well, relatively little attention is paid to intra-movement relations which might complicate the picture. A broad literature has problematised power relations arising from reliance on foreign funding in NGOs of Global South countries, especially in SSA. This dependence is seldomly reflected upon in environmental justice literature, especially in recent quantitative work based on the EJAtlas, leaving a research gap that I have tried to fill by analysing the effect of foreign funding on the EJ movement in SSA.

To answer the research question, I have taken two main steps. Using a quantitative approach on a set of over 400 EJAtlas cases, I have shown that local NGOs are relatively independent from grassroots groups, mirroring arguments from the literature, that upwards accountability in NGOs increases and downwards accountability decreases if significant amounts of donor money are involved (Igoe, 2003). Then, I have shown that in a subset of Kenyan cases, dependence on foreign funding affects the interactions between EJ movement actors in varying ways. To illustrate these effects, major themes of intra-movement dynamics were identified. It was shown that diversity of opinion among local people is sometimes under- or even misrepresented, for example when many resist for fair inclusion, instead of outright stopping a project, or when conservation is a part of the conflict. These occasional omissions are not the only possible strategic tools that are employed within the EJ movement. NGOs and other observers sometimes change the way they present local people's positions, at times framing them as the focus, other times mentioning them as second priority besides other goals, such as conservation. Additionally, common EJ vocabulary might be used, even if it does not fit neatly with the case, obscuring senses of justice held by local people.

Such strategic decisions are not surprising. Most actors within the EJ movement are not neutral observers, and it makes sense that NGOs and grassroots groups alike promote

positions that align with their interests. However, in the case of NGOs which are sometimes more accountable towards donors than local people, either because they are international NGOs or because they are mostly financed by foreign funding, things can become problematic. Local people exhibit strong agency in most cases, but NGOs have power to enhance or inhibit these voices. In many cases, NGOs help empower local voices, and the EJAtlas demonstrates that often, grassroots groups are the driving force. But sometimes NGOs fall short, either when interests between the local population and NGOs/donors diverge or when local diversity of opinion is significant. In these cases, it becomes questionable whether the EJ movement is as grassroots-driven as generally assumed, both by academics and activists. Both groups should not shy away from self-reflection to make sure that the EJ movement stays as grassroots as it aims to be.

Finally, some caveats should be highlighted. The EJAtlas is a useful resource, and the most extensive database of environmental justice conflicts. Still, it is just a snapshot of the global EJ movement, and any takeaways are not generalisable beyond its database. Additionally, its content was created by many different academics and activists, which means that some variation in how case characteristics are described cannot be avoided. Accuracy is likely not always a given, considering the data's reliance on grey literature, that has been documented for similar databases (Oya, 2013). Despite this, the EJAtlas is the best snapshot available, and an important representation of the EJ movement for activists, observers, and academics alike. I have tried to alleviate the concerns by basing my quantitative analysis on data that is nominal and descriptive and by supplementing the qualitative analysis with a broad selection of secondary and grey literature. The resulting analysis should not be interpreted as an attempt to quantify exactly "how grassroots" the EJ movement is or to prove that it is not grassroots-driven at all, or that an emphasis on the agency of local people is misplaced. Clearly, grassroots groups across SSA are showing strong agency within EJ conflicts, and the EJAtlas is an important contribution to highlight this. What this analysis has instead tried to show is that local people's agency is diverse within and across cases and must interact with other actors within the EJ movement. These interactions are not exempt from power asymmetries produced by dependency on foreign funding. As a result, local people's voices might be under- or misrepresented, if they do not neatly align with the EJ discourse or NGO interests. In SSA, and specifically in Kenya, the EJ movement and its intra-movement dynamics are more complex and contested than often assumed.

Bibliography

A Rocha Kenya (no date) 'Protecting Dakatcha Woodland', *A Rocha International*. Available at: <https://arocha.org/en/projects/protecting-dakatcha-woodland/> (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

'About Save Lamu – Save Lamu' (no date). Available at: <https://www.savelamu.org/about-save-lamu/> (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

Abuya, W.O. (2013) 'What is in a Coconut? An Ethnoecological Analysis of Mining, Social Displacement, Vulnerability, and Development in Rural Kenya', 14.

Abuya, W.O. (2016) 'Mining conflicts and Corporate Social Responsibility: Titanium mining in Kwale, Kenya', *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 3(2), pp. 485–493. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.12.008>.

ActionAid (2011) *Fuelling Evictions Community Cost of EU Biofuels Boom*. ActionAid International.

ActionAid (2013) *Broken promises: The impacts of Addax Bioenergy in Sierra Leone on hunger and livelihoods*. Available at: https://actionaid.org/sites/default/files/broken_promises_final_-_short_0.pdf (Accessed: 11 April 2023).

Adeto, Y.A. and Abate, E. (2014) 'Conflict Dimensions of Large-scale Agricultural Investment in Ethiopia: Gambella Case Study', in *A delicate balance: land use, minority rights and social stability in the Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: Inst. for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa Univ.

Albertazzi, S. *et al.* (2018) 'Relations of power driving tropical deforestation: a case study from the Mau Forest (Kenya)', *Belgeo. Revue belge de géographie* [Preprint], (2). Available at: <https://doi.org/10.4000/belgeo.24223>.

Alden, C. and Otele, O.M. (2022) 'Fitting China in: local elite collusion and contestation along Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway', *African Affairs*, 121(484), pp. 443–466. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adac026>.

Andrews, A. (2014) 'Downward Accountability in Unequal Alliances: Explaining NGO Responses to Zapatista Demands', *World Development*, 54, pp. 99–113. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.07.009>.

Atack, I. (1999) 'Four Criteria of Development NGO Legitimacy', *World Development*, 27(5), pp. 855–864. Available at: [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X\(99\)00033-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00033-9).

Baxter, J. (2011) *Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Country Report: Sierra Leone*. Oakland Institute. Available at: https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_SierraLeone_Land_Investment_report_0.pdf (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

- Baxter, J. (2013) *Who Is Benefitting? The social and economic impact of three large-scale land investments in Sierra Leone: a cost-benefit analysis*. Action for Large-scale Land Acquisition Transparency (ALLAT).
- Benford, R.D. and Snow, D.A. (2000) 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26(1), pp. 611–639. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611>.
- Cameron, G. (2003) 'The globalization of indigenous rights in Tanzanian pastoralist NGOs', in *Development and Local Knowledge*. Routledge.
- Capek, S.M. (1993) 'The "Environmental Justice" Frame: A Conceptual Discussion and an Application'.
- Chabeda-Barthe, J. and Haller, T. (2018) 'Resilience of Traditional Livelihood Approaches Despite Forest Grabbing: Ogiek to the West of Mau Forest, Uasin Gishu County', *Land*, 7(4), p. 140. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.3390/land7040140>.
- Chelagat, C. (2015) 'Influence of Multinational Projects on the Welfare of Communities: the Case of Base Titanium Project in Kwale County, Kenya'.
- Chimonyo, G.R. and Mupfumi, J. (2012) *Environmental Impacts of Gold Mining in Penhalonga*. Centre for Research and Development.
- Chipangura, N. (2019) "'We are one big happy family": The social organisation of artisanal and small scale gold mining in Eastern Zimbabwe', *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 6(4), pp. 1265–1273. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2019.08.001>.
- Chome, N. (2020) 'Land, livelihoods and belonging: negotiating change and anticipating LAPSET in Kenya's Lamu county', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 14(2), pp. 310–331. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2020.1743068>.
- ClientEarth (2011) *Legal Analysis: Sustainability Criteria Compliance Review for Jatropha curcas Biofuels from the Dakatcha Woodland in Kenya*. ClientEarth. Available at: https://actionaid.org/sites/default/files/dakatcha_final_draft_april_2011.pdf (Accessed: 2 April 2023).
- Cormack, Z. and Kurewa, A. (2018) 'The changing value of land in Northern Kenya: the case of Lake Turkana Wind Power', *Critical African Studies*, 10(1), pp. 89–107. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/21681392.2018.1470017>.
- Daghar, M. (2022) *Kenya's sand cartels: Ecosystems, lives and livelihoods lost*. ENACT.
- Dell'Angelo, J. et al. (2021) 'Commons grabbing and agribusiness: Violence, resistance and social mobilization', *Ecological Economics*, 184, p. 107004. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107004>.
- Diani, M. (1992) 'The concept of social movement', *The Sociological Review*, 40(1), pp. 1–25.

Dupuy, K. and Prakash, A. (2022) 'Why Restrictive NGO Foreign Funding Laws Reduce Voter Turnout in Africa's National Elections', *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 51(1), pp. 170–189. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764019897848>.

Dupuy, K.E., Ron, J. and Prakash, A. (2015) 'Who survived? Ethiopia's regulatory crackdown on foreign-funded NGOs', *Review of International Political Economy*, 22(2), pp. 419–456. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2014.903854>.

Economic and Social Rights Centre (Hakijamii) (2017) *THE TENSION BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF LAPSET IN ISIOLO COUNTY*. Nairobi: Hakijami. Available at: <https://dlci-hoa.org/assets/upload/investment-in-the-dry-lands-documents/20200804041053648.pdf> (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

Edwards, M., Hulme, D. and Wallace, T. (1999) 'NGOs in a global future: marrying local delivery to worldwide leverage', *Public Administration and Development*, 19(2), pp. 117–136. Available at: [https://doi.org/10.1002/\(SICI\)1099-162X\(199905\)19:2<117::AID-PAD70>3.0.CO;2-S](https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-162X(199905)19:2<117::AID-PAD70>3.0.CO;2-S).

EJOLT (no date a) *Addax Bioenergy bioethanol project in Makeni, Bombali District, Sierra Leone* | *EJAtlas, Environmental Justice Atlas*. Available at: <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/addax-bioenergy-bioethanol-project-in-makeni-bombali-district-sierra-leone> (Accessed: 11 April 2023).

EJOLT (no date b) *Amboseli National Park; downgrading to a game reserve, Kenya* | *EJAtlas, Environmental Justice Atlas*. Available at: <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/amboseli-national-park-downgrading-to-a-game-reserve-kenya> (Accessed: 5 May 2023).

EJOLT (no date c) *Bedford Biofuels Jatropha, Tana Delta, Kenya* | *EJAtlas, Environmental Justice Atlas*. Available at: <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/bedford-biofuels-jatropha-tana-delta-kenya> (Accessed: 8 May 2023).

EJOLT (no date d) *EJAtlas*. Available at: <https://ejatlas.org> (Accessed: 5 April 2023).

EJOLT (no date e) *Ethanol Fuel Plant Land Conflict, Zimbabwe* | *EJAtlas, Environmental Justice Atlas*. Available at: <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/ethanol-fuel-plant-land-conflict-zimbabwe> (Accessed: 8 April 2023).

EJOLT (no date f) *Lake Bogoria Game Reserve evicts Endorois communities, Kenya* | *EJAtlas, Environmental Justice Atlas*. Available at: <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/endorois> (Accessed: 6 May 2023).

EJOLT (no date g) *Lamu Port and related infrastructure, Kenya* | *EJAtlas, Environmental Justice Atlas*. Available at: <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/lamu-port-and-related-infrastructure-kenya> (Accessed: 18 April 2023).

EJOLT (no date h) *Threats facing the Tana River Primate Reserve, Kenya* | *EJAtlas, Environmental Justice Atlas*. Available at: <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/threats-facing-the-tana-river-primate-reserve-kenya> (Accessed: 6 April 2023).

EJOLT (no date i) *Titanium Mining in the Kwale District, Kenya* | *EJAtlas, Environmental Justice Atlas*. Available at: <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/titanium-mining-in-the-kwale-district-kenya> (Accessed: 8 April 2023).

Ekeh, P.P. (1975) 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17(1), pp. 91–112.

Elhashmi, E.E. (2017) *The Politics of Mining and Trading of Gold in Sudan: Challenges of Corruption and Lack of Transparency*. Sudan Transparency Initiative. Available at: <https://democracyfirstgroup.org/2017/11/15/the-politics-of-mining-and-trading-of-gold-in-sudan-challenges-of-corruption-and-lack-of-transparency/> (Accessed: 31 March 2023).

Enns, C. and Bersaglio, B. (2015) 'Enclave oil development and the rearticulation of citizenship in Turkana, Kenya: Exploring "crude citizenship"', *Geoforum*, 67, pp. 78–88. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.10.010>.

Ferguson, J. (2006) *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*. Duke University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv11g97mg>.

Fielding, M. *et al.* (2015) *Agricultural investment and rural transformation: a case study of the Makeni bioenergy project in Sierra Leone*. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute.

Gebeyehu, A.K. and Abbink, J. (2022) 'Land, sugar and pastoralism in Ethiopia: Comparing the impact of the Omo-Kuraz sugar projects on local livelihoods and food (in) security in the lower Omo Valley', *Pastoralism*, 12(1), p. 32. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1186/s13570-022-00242-8>.

Githiora-Murimi, Y.W. *et al.* (2022) 'Integrating stakeholder preferences into ecosystem services mapping in Yala wetland, Kenya', *Ecosystems and People*, 18(1), pp. 146–163. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/26395916.2022.2039774>.

Grabbing Gambela (no date). Available at: <https://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/19502> (Accessed: 31 March 2023).

Hagenström, P. (2022) 'One biofuel, two publics: How NGOs have influenced the rise and fall of *Jatropha* agribusiness in the Tana River Delta'.

Horne, F. (2012a) "'Waiting Here for Death'", *Human Rights Watch* [Preprint]. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/01/17/waiting-here-death/forced-displacement-and-villagization-ethiopias-gambella> (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

Horne, F. (2012b) "'What Will Happen if Hunger Comes?'" , *Human Rights Watch* [Preprint]. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/06/18/what-will-happen-if-hunger-comes/abuses-against-indigenous-peoples-ethiopias> (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

Hunsberger, C. (2010) 'The politics of *Jatropha* -based biofuels in Kenya: convergence and divergence among NGOs, donors, government officials and farmers', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 37(4), pp. 939–962. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2010.512465>.

Igoe, J. (2003) 'Scaling up Civil Society: Donor Money, NGOs and the Pastoralist Land Rights Movement in Tanzania', *Development and Change*, 34(5), pp. 863–885. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2003.00332.x>.

Ille, E. (2018) 'International Joint Ventures in Industrial Gold Mining, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Harm-Production in Sudan', *Africa Spectrum*, 53(3), pp. 33–64. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/000203971805300302>.

Jima, A.O. (2021) 'Maintaining Mutual Benefits between Investor and Local Community: Mechanisms to Reopen Lega Dambi Gold Mining, Ethiopia', *PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development (PJGD)*, 2(1), pp. 55–81. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.46404/panjogov.v2i1.2913>.

Johannes, E.M., Zulu, L.C. and Kalipeni, E. (2015) 'Oil discovery in Turkana County, Kenya: a source of conflict or development?', *African Geographical Review*, 34(2), pp. 142–164. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19376812.2014.884466>.

Kamau, M.M. and Khsiebi, A.K. (2022) 'Voicing participation in large-scale infrastructural projects: A contextualization of participatory communication in Lamu Port, Kenya', *Journal of Media and Communication Studies*, 14(2), pp. 53–67. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.5897/JMCS2022.0765>.

Kamski, B. (2016) 'The Kuraz Sugar Development Project (KSDP) in Ethiopia: between "sweet visions" and mounting challenges', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 10(3), pp. 568–580. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2016.1267602>.

Kibugi, R., Mwathane, I. and Makathimo, M. (2016) 'Large Scale Land Acquisitions for Investment in Kenya: Is the participation, and benefits of affected local communities meaningful, and equitable?'

Kimani, M.W. (2007) *Valuation of forest benefits: The perception of communities adjacent to Mount Kenya Forest*. Thesis. University Of Nairobi. Available at: <http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/65692> (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

Kinaro, Z.O. (2008) *Wetland Conversion to large-scale agricultural production; implications on the livelihoods of rural communities, Yala Swamp, Lake Victoria basin, Kenya*. Linköping University, Sweden. Available at: <https://aquadocs.org/bitstream/handle/1834/7785/ktf0468.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y> (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

Konyana, E.G. and Sipeyiye, M. (2015) 'Complex moral dilemmas of large scale development projects: the case of Macdom-ARDA Chisumbanje ethanol project in Chipinge, Southeastern Zimbabwe', *International Journal of Sustainable Development*, 18(4), pp. 349–360. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJSD.2015.072667>.

Krijtenburg, F. and Evers, S. (2014) 'Putting a Spin on Jatropha: How Conservationist Rhetoric Drove Bedford Biofuels out of Tana Delta-Kenya', *Sustainability*, 6(5), pp. 2736–2754. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.3390/su6052736>.

Kuiper, G. (2017) *'The Flowers Are Carrying Us' Agro-industrial Labour and Migrant Workers' Settlements at Lake Naivasha, Kenya*. University of Cologne.

Langat, D.K. *et al.* (2016) 'Role of Forest Resources to Local Livelihoods: The Case of East Mau Forest Ecosystem, Kenya', *International Journal of Forestry Research*, 2016, p. e4537354. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1155/2016/4537354>.

Lewis, D. and Kanji, N. (2009) *Non-Governmental Organizations and Development*. London: Routledge. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203877074>.

Little, P.D. (2016) 'A victory in theory, loss in practice: struggles for political representation in the Lake Baringo-Bogoria Basin, Kenya', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 10(1), pp. 189–207. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2016.1138665>.

Lynch, G. (2012) 'Becoming indigenous in the pursuit of justice: The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Endorois', *African Affairs*, 111(442), pp. 24–45. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adr063>.

Martinez-Alier *et al.* (2014) "'Between activism and science: grassroots concepts for sustainability coined by Environmental Justice Organizations'", *Journal of Political Ecology*, 21, pp. 19–60. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2458/v21i1.21124>.

Martinez-Alier, J. *et al.* (2014) *The many faces of land grabbing: Cases from Africa and Latin America*.

Martinez-Alier, J. *et al.* (2016) 'Is there a global environmental justice movement?', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 43(3), pp. 731–755. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1141198>.

Matondi, P.B. and Rutherford, B. (2021) 'The Politics of "Land Grabs" and Development Contradictions in Zimbabwe: The Case of the Chisumbanje Ethanol Project', in L. Cochrane and N. Andrews (eds) *The Transnational Land Rush in Africa: A Decade After the Spike*. Cham: Springer International Publishing (International Political Economy Series), pp. 189–212. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60789-0_8.

Maua, J.O. *et al.* (2022) 'The difficult choice - to conserve the living filters or utilizing the full potential of wetlands: Insights from the Yala swamp, Kenya', *Environmental Challenges*, 6, p. 100427. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envc.2021.100427>.

Menzel, A. (2015) 'FOREIGN INVESTMENT, LARGE-SCALE LAND DEALS, AND UNCERTAIN "DEVELOPMENT" IN SIERRA LEONE', (18).

Miller, C.S. (2015) 'Striving for Environmental Justice through Regional and Local Change in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Whittier Law Review*, 37, p. 39.

Mkutu, K. *et al.* (2019) 'New Oil Developments in a Remote Area: Environmental Justice and Participation in Turkana, Kenya', *The Journal of Environment & Development*, 28(3), pp. 223–252. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496519857776>.

Mkutu, K. and Mdee, A. (2020) 'Conservancies, Conflict and Dispossession: The Winners and Losers of Oil Exploration in Turkana, Kenya', *African Studies Review*, 63(4), pp. 831–857. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2020.2>.

Moinde-Fockler, N.N. *et al.* (2007) 'Human and natural impacts on forests along lower Tana river, Kenya: implications towards conservation and management of endemic primate species and their habitat', in D.L. Hawksworth and A.T. Bull (eds) *Vertebrate Conservation and Biodiversity*. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands (Topics in Biodiversity and Conservation), pp. 335–347. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6320-6_21.

MRGI (2014) *Rights group urges Kenyan government to stop parcelling Endorois community land without consultation*, *Minority Rights Group*. Available at: <https://minorityrights.org/2014/02/20/rights-group-urges-kenyan-government-to-stop-parcelling-endorois-community-land-without-consultation/> (Accessed: 31 March 2023).

Mugambi, D.M. (2019) 'Fencing and Forest Conservation: Attitudes of Local People Living Adjacent to Eastern Slopes of Mount Kenya', *International Journal of Natural Resource Ecology and Management*, 4(1), p. 1. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijnrem.20190401.11>.

Mulu, K.S. (2011) *Are the endemic and endangered Tana River primates culprits of crop raiding? Evaluating Human – Nonhuman primate conflict status around Tana River Primate Reserve, in Kenya*. Nairobi: Institute of Primate Research.

Muthomi, S. *et al.* (2015) 'An Examination of the Nature of Sand Harvesting Conflicts and their Influence on Poverty Alleviation Initiatives in Makueni County, Kenya', *Journal of Education and Practice* [Preprint].

Mutune, J.M. *et al.* (2017) 'What rights and benefits? The implementation of participatory forest management in Kenya: The case of Eastern Mau Forest Reserve', *Journal of Sustainable Forestry*, 36(3), pp. 230–249. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10549811.2017.1289105>.

Neville, K.J. (2015) 'The Contentious Political Economy of Biofuels', *Global Environmental Politics*, 15(1), pp. 21–40. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1162/GLEP_a_00270.

NGOs Co-ordination Board (NCB) (2020) *Annual NGO Sector Report*. Nairobi. Available at: <https://ngobureau.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ANNUAL-NGOS-SECTOR-REPORT-2019-2020.pdf> (Accessed: 14 June 2022).

Nonfodji, P. (2017) 'The faces of land grabbing in Benin'.

Nunow, A.A. (2012) 'The Displacement and Dispossession of the Aweer (Boni) Community: The Kenya Government dilemma on the new Port of Lamu', in *International Conference on Global Land Grabbing II*, Development Sociology at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

Nussbaum, M. (2003) 'Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice', *Feminist Economics*, 9(2–3), pp. 33–59. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1354570022000077926>.

Oakland Institute (2013) *Unheard Voices: The Human Rights Impact of Land Investments on Indigenous Communities in Gambella*. Oakland Institute. Available at: https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_Report_Unheard_Voices.pdf (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

Okello, M.M. *et al.* (2011) 'Community Opinions on Wildlife, Resource Use and Livelihood Competition in Kimana Group Ranch Near Amboseli, Kenya', *The Open Conservation Biology Journal*, 5(1), pp. 1–12. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2174/1874839201105010001>.

Olsen, M.D. and Westergaard-Kabelmann, T. (2018) 'Socio-economic study of key impacts from Lake Turkana Wind Power (LTWP)'.

Omedo, G. *et al.* (2022) 'Theories and Practices on Deposit Bonds use for Environmental Management and Sustainable Development in Kenya's Titanium Mining Projects', *Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy (The)*, 13(1), pp. 1–35. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.4314/jsdlp.v13i1.1>.

Osaghae, E.E. (2006) 'Colonialism and Civil Society in Africa: The Perspective of Ekeh's Two Publics', *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 17(3), pp. 233–245. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-006-9014-4>.

Oya, C. (2013) 'Methodological reflections on "land grab" databases and the "land grab" literature "rush"', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 40. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.799465>.

Pellow, D.N. (2017) *What is Critical Environmental Justice?* John Wiley & Sons.

Pemunta, N.V. (2014) 'New forms of land enclosures : multinationals and state production of territory in Cameroon', *Studia Sociologia*, LXI(2), pp. 35–58.

Podder, S. (no date) "'Land back to the people or not?": The variable pathways of civic mobilisation against land grabs in rural Sierra Leone'.

Pueyo, A. (2018) 'What constrains renewable energy investment in Sub-Saharan Africa? A comparison of Kenya and Ghana', *World Development*, 109, pp. 85–100. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.04.008>.

Regassa, A. (2022) 'Frontiers of Extraction and Contestation: dispossession, exclusion and local resistance against MIDROC Laga-Dambi Gold Mine, southern Ethiopia', *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 11, p. 100980. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2021.100980>.

Regassa, A. and Tadesse, G. (2021) 'Electoral Authoritarianism and the Question of Representation: The Case of Caffee Oromia, Ethiopia', *Representation*, 0(0), pp. 1–17. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2021.2005672>.

Renkens, I. (2019) 'THE IMPACT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS ON INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IN KENYA'. Koninklijke Brill NV. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1163/2210-7975_HRD-1031-20190007.

Reuters (2016) 'Kenyan wind power project cancelled due to land disputes', *Reuters*, 23 February. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/kenya-electricity-idUSL8N1620QG> (Accessed: 30 March 2023).

Rowden, R. (2011) 'India's Role in the New Global Farmland Grab'.

RSPB (no date) *Tana River Delta Conservation Case | Our Work, The RSPB*. Available at: <https://www.rspb.org.uk/our-work/casework/cases/tana-river-delta/> (Accessed: 14 June 2022).

Sakue-Collins, Y. (2021) '(Un)doing development: a postcolonial enquiry of the agenda and agency of NGOs in Africa', *Third World Quarterly*, 42(5), pp. 976–995. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1791698>.

Save Lamu (no date) 'Save Lamu – Save Lamu'. Available at: <https://www.savelamu.org/> (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

Scheidel, A. *et al.* (2020) 'Environmental conflicts and defenders: A global overview', *Global Environmental Change*, 63, p. 102104. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102104>.

Schlosberg, D. (2009) *Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature*. Oxford University Press.

Sen, A. (1999) 'Commodities and Capabilities', *OUP Catalogue* [Preprint]. Available at: <https://ideas.repec.org//b/oxp/obooks/9780195650389.html> (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

Sena, K. (2015) *Renewable Energy Projects and the Rights of Marginalised/Indigenous Communities in Kenya*. International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). Available at: https://www.iwgia.org/images/publications/0725_REPORT21.pdf (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

Smalley, R. and Corbera, E. (2012) 'Large-scale land deals from the inside out: findings from Kenya's Tana Delta', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 39(3–4), pp. 1039–1075. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.686491>.

Styles, M.A. (2019) *Roses from Kenya: Labor, Environment, and the Global Trade in Cut Flowers*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Svarstad, H. and Benjaminsen (2020) 'Reading radical environmental justice through a political ecology lens', *Geoforum*, 108, pp. 1–11. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.11.007>.

Temper, L., Bene, D. del and Martinez-Alier, J. (2015) 'Mapping the frontiers and front lines of global environmental justice: the EJAtlas', *Journal of Political Ecology*, 22(1). Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2458/v22i1.21108>.

The East African (2011) 'KWS up in arms over Amboseli "invasion"', *The East African*. Available at: <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kws-up-in-arms-over-amboseli-invasion--1304984> (Accessed: 5 May 2023).

Tiafack, O. and Winslace, M. (2021) 'Plantation Agriculture Dynamics and Implications on Grass root Development in Fako and Moungo Divisions', *GPH-International Journal of Agriculture and Research* E-ISSN 2805-4362 P-ISSN 2805-4340, 4(08), pp. 01–18.

Unks, R. *et al.* (2021) "'People should also look after the people": relational values of wildlife and collectively titled land in Ilkisongo Maasai group ranches in Southern Kenya', *Ecology and Society*, 26(3). Available at: <https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-12539-260328>.

Veit, P.G. *et al.* (2008) *Protected areas and property rights: democratizing eminent domain in East Africa*. World Resources Institute.

Wang, Y. and Wissenbach, U. (2019) 'Clientelism at work? A case study of Kenyan Standard Gauge Railway project', *Economic History of Developing Regions*, 34(3), pp. 280–299. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/20780389.2019.1678026>.

Watts, J. (2020) 'Kenya environmental defenders win landmark \$12m court battle', *The Guardian*, 22 July. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/22/kenya-environmental-defenders-court-victory-government> (Accessed: 2 April 2023).

Wedin, A. *et al.* (2013) 'Food versus fuel: the case of the Makeni community in Sierra Leone', in. *FOOD AND ENVIRONMENT 2013*, Budapest, Hungary, pp. 37–48. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2495/FENV130041>.